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mjoelnir
Posts: 9386
Joined: Sun Feb 03, 2013 11:06 pm

Re: Passengers sue Boeing for EK 521 crash

Fri Aug 18, 2017 12:43 am

GalaxyFlyer wrote:
Mjoelnir,

Are you a pilot of a modern FAR 25 plane?

The "solution" you are asking for would require the pilot to look down at the EICAS as he was commanding a go around to confirm the A/T being armed. Is that smart? Movement of throttles to the commanded thrust or non-movement is sufficient cueing for the pilot. The PF clearly didn't understand the basics of the system.

GF


No, what I fly has no automation. But I work with automation in other industries. You could put visible cues in line of sight or use a sound.
 
Andre3K
Posts: 361
Joined: Tue May 30, 2017 10:11 pm

Re: Passengers sue Boeing for EK 521 crash

Fri Aug 18, 2017 12:43 am

cv990Coronado wrote:
Are these the same dumb people who delayed the evacuation to take their hand baggage out of the overhead lockers? They should thank Boeing for making it so strong not sue them.



That part^. :stirthepot: :banghead:
 
Andre3K
Posts: 361
Joined: Tue May 30, 2017 10:11 pm

Re: Passengers sue Boeing for EK 521 crash

Fri Aug 18, 2017 12:46 am

b747400erf wrote:
cv990Coronado wrote:
Are these the same dumb people who delayed the evacuation to take their hand baggage out of the overhead lockers? They should thank Boeing for making it so strong not sue them.

There is no point in making up from no facts, having no proof of something about people just to hate on them. That is very immature and unprofessional.


No making this up.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c6aKMTlBKVo

You act like you are new here man.
 
skyhawkmatthew
Posts: 480
Joined: Wed Oct 26, 2005 4:42 pm

Re: Passengers sue Boeing for EK 521 crash

Fri Aug 18, 2017 12:57 am

]
emiratesdriver wrote:

Wrong....and this will be highlighted in court..

It's up to BOEING to provide adequate resources to train crews for every eventuality, it's why training manuals and CBT programmes are written by lawyers rather than training staff, and it's why airlines like EK use manufacturer produced documentation to ensure they are insured for every eventuality.


They do...

wingman wrote:
Curious if anyone has been through 777 pilot training and can tell us how much focus there is on TOGA functionality in the landing phase.


It was covered in my initial computer-based systems training, and rejected landings were practiced in the simulator conversion training. It was not emphasised any more than any part of the course—but we did get additional focus on rejected landings after this EK accident.

The very first step in the Rejected Landing procedure is "Manually advance the thrust levers to go-around thrust," and the next line states "TO/GA switches are inhibited." That's pretty clear-cut.

Once airborne, you commence the standard go-around procedure. Immediately after initiating the go-around, pressing TO/GA and selecting Flaps 20, the very next thing BOTH PILOTS are to do is verify that the thrust is increasing, and call out the three FMA modes on the PFD. This is basic Boeing from the very start of flying the jet: mode awareness is key. For those saying "there should be some warning that TO/GA was inhibited," this is that warning. From day one, you are drilled to be aware of the AFDS modes. A lack of the expected "THR | TO/GA | TO/GA" ought be enough to tell you there's something wrong.

Beyond that, it's basic airmanship, in any aircraft, to advance the thrust levers if you want to go around. The main reason you press TO/GA for a normal go-around is not to advance the thrust levers, but to activate the relevant modes. If the autothrottle happens to be armed (as it usually is), it will wake up and help you set the appropriate thrust. It's still the pilot's job to verify that the thrust levers are where they want them to be.

My best guess as to why the switches are inhibited at this point is that in the jostling from a rough landing, inadvertently activating TO/GA by bumping the switch would be rather a bad thing. And on balance, there are a lot more rough landings than there are rejected landings.

emiratesdriver wrote:
Haha, I'm guessing then that you've not seen the EK 777 training manuals or FCOM, nor do you think that the EICAS "autospeedbrake" rather than it stowing automatically is nothing to do with liability? Every procedure is scrutinised and re-written if required by a legal "professional". EK don't write their manuals, we use Boeing and Airbus procedures verbatim.


The 777 doesn't have an AUTOSPEEDBRAKE message. Speedbrakes automatically stow upon advancing the thrust levers to takeoff thrust.

BravoOne wrote:
Every Boeing airplane built that is flying today started with a Boeing FCOM, or it's equivalent. Even the old beat up 737-200 that's working somewhere in a 3rd world operation has an underlying FCOM. Operators can modify the within certain limitations, but as a rule do not stray far off the farm. EK runs an excellent training department and along with Boeings support provide a sound basis for a new pilot to qualify in a Boeing aircraft. There is a saying around Boeing that says aviators and engineers design the systems but they are not deployed until legal has laid eyes on them, I don't know if that is true, but it sets the tone for training development. The fact that the Asiana and EK accidents occurred after thousands and thousands of landings and in both cases there was no mechanical problems found with the aircraft, make think that there was an airmanship issue, combined with a possible training component as a root cause to both of these accidents.

:checkmark:
Qantas - The Spirit of Australia.
 
Newbiepilot
Posts: 3641
Joined: Tue Aug 30, 2016 10:18 pm

Re: Passengers sue Boeing for EK 521 crash

Fri Aug 18, 2017 1:18 am

mjoelnir wrote:
GalaxyFlyer wrote:
Mjoelnir,

Are you a pilot of a modern FAR 25 plane?

The "solution" you are asking for would require the pilot to look down at the EICAS as he was commanding a go around to confirm the A/T being armed. Is that smart? Movement of throttles to the commanded thrust or non-movement is sufficient cueing for the pilot. The PF clearly didn't understand the basics of the system.

GF


No, what I fly has no automation. But I work with automation in other industries. You could put visible cues in line of sight or use a sound.


There are strict requirements for lights and sounds in the flight deck, which is what GalaxyFlyer is referring to. Superfluous information is inhibited during takeoff and landing or below certain altitudes. When a pilot is landing the attention is outside the window. Aural and visual warnings are for critical items that require immediate attention. A modern flight deck has way too much information that could be distracting in a critical phase of flight. There aren't alerts that the airplane is functioning correctly. Visible cues or sounds are for malfunctions or problems. When there is a major fault, EICAS can light up and be confusing for crew with so much annunciated. The engineers have safety assessments that dictate what is going to alert the pilots. A flight deck is much different than other industries.
 
AWACSooner
Posts: 2540
Joined: Tue Jan 22, 2008 12:35 am

Re: Passengers sue Boeing for EK 521 crash

Fri Aug 18, 2017 1:27 am

b747400erf wrote:
AWACSooner wrote:
This is getting really pathetic on the part of the pax...

Guess what? You walked away from an accident. Get over it. Life happens...crap things happen to good people all the time...move on!


A person in the military refusing to acknowledge ptsd and thinking to just magically "move on" and "man up", figures.

And there it is...the dumbest thing I've heard on the forum.

Got it...I'm suing ISIS and Al Qaeda tomorrow!
 
GalaxyFlyer
Posts: 6112
Joined: Fri Jan 01, 2016 4:44 am

Re: Passengers sue Boeing for EK 521 crash

Fri Aug 18, 2017 2:02 am

I was in a mid-air collision followed by an ejection and six months of recovery. Not a suit or disability considered. I was doing my job, stuff happens, move on. Yes, PTSD is real, but these uninsured pax just want to hit the law suit jackpot
 
Waterbomber
Posts: 849
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Re: Passengers sue Boeing for EK 521 crash

Fri Aug 18, 2017 5:06 am

777GE90 wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:
skyhawkmatthew wrote:
I don’t understand how there are grounds for a suit. There was no “faulty switch;” the system operated exactly as designed and described in the manuals. Lack of TO/GA modes and thrust levers not advancing ought have been enough of a “warning” that the switches didn’t do anything—and the crew should have known about this behaviour anyway from prior training.

It’s the same as the Asiana accident: simply calling the modes at the top of the PFD would likely have prevented both accidents. Yes, the 777 is a complicated aeroplane with a complicated autoflight system, but it’s the pilots’ job to understand it and know what it is and isn’t doing at a given time.


There can be endless talk here about if it is possible to blame some automation when something happens with an Airbus.

I asked in another thread what the rationale is, that the TOGA switch does not work when the main gear is on the runway and that it is not clearly indicated when the TOGA switch is not working, the silence was deafening. The 777 being a complicated airplane with a complicated autoflight system is a lame excuse. Automation, especially in difficult situations should reduce workload not add to it. Automation should show what is automated and what needs input clearly at all times. You hit a switch, something does not happen, it will always take added time to realize nothing is happening, remembering a different procedure and doing it.


Yes you are right, it is not a faulty switch and I am pretty sure it is part of the design element that TOGA is not activated after wheels touch the ground. The reason for this is probably going to be best answered by the people who designed it at Boeing but from my speculation I would hazard a guess that it prevents unintended TOGA activation after landing, which could have deadly consequences.

Wheels on the ground means touchdown has occurred and usually the next priority in the landing phase is to slow down the plane so I guess that's why it makes sense to disable the TOGA once that occurs.

I'm pretty sure pilots would be trained about how the TOGA switch works and it would have been documented extensively in the flight manuals too. Although given this accident has now occurred I guess some thought has to be put into whether it was a good design or not in the first place and whether it can be improved.

Whether it is justifiable to sue Boeing for it is another matter, as the blame could be easily passed onto the pilots (i.e. not learning the proper operating procedure of the TOGA switch) but I guess that's for the lawyers to argue.


Let's say that you enter the flare to land. Then you suddenly see an aircraft down the runway moving beyond the holding point and starting to cross the runway. You push the TOGA switch and pitch the thing up, but the question is now, have the main wheels already touched or not?
On a B777, the guys sitting upfront don't always feel that pivot main gear touching down, and there is no "wheels have touched down" indication hence it's a 50/50 guess whether TOGA will be activated or inhibited, and this at a crucial and high workload moment.

This logic could be considered a trap and there may be grounds to sue as there is no clear indication of the mode that you're in, until it's too late.

While advancing the levers and monitoring what the thing is doing is great, on a B777 it takes a while before the engines spool up. At 140 kts you're travelling 72 meters every second. By the time that the engines should have spooled up and the pilots realise that the engines aren't doing that, the speed could be below VMCa and Vs. Sure, the instinct should be to keep an eye on the EICAS to see the N1 spool up, but are you going to focus on that in a high workload environment if you fully expect the engines to spool up after pressing the switch?

Whether a lawsuit can be successful is difficult to predict. The victims would have to prove negligence on the part of Boeing.
It depends on how much this trap is highlighted in the Boeing manuals and EK's OM.
 
emiratesdriver
Posts: 292
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Re: Passengers sue Boeing for EK 521 crash

Fri Aug 18, 2017 5:21 am

skyhawkmatthew wrote:
]
emiratesdriver wrote:

Wrong....and this will be highlighted in court..

It's up to BOEING to provide adequate resources to train crews for every eventuality, it's why training manuals and CBT programmes are written by lawyers rather than training staff, and it's why airlines like EK use manufacturer produced documentation to ensure they are insured for every eventuality.


They do...

wingman wrote:
Curious if anyone has been through 777 pilot training and can tell us how much focus there is on TOGA functionality in the landing phase.


It was covered in my initial computer-based systems training, and rejected landings were practiced in the simulator conversion training. It was not emphasised any more than any part of the course—but we did get additional focus on rejected landings after this EK accident.

The very first step in the Rejected Landing procedure is "Manually advance the thrust levers to go-around thrust," and the next line states "TO/GA switches are inhibited." That's pretty clear-cut.

Once airborne, you commence the standard go-around procedure. Immediately after initiating the go-around, pressing TO/GA and selecting Flaps 20, the very next thing BOTH PILOTS are to do is verify that the thrust is increasing, and call out the three FMA modes on the PFD. This is basic Boeing from the very start of flying the jet: mode awareness is key. For those saying "there should be some warning that TO/GA was inhibited," this is that warning. From day one, you are drilled to be aware of the AFDS modes. A lack of the expected "THR | TO/GA | TO/GA" ought be enough to tell you there's something wrong.

Beyond that, it's basic airmanship, in any aircraft, to advance the thrust levers if you want to go around. The main reason you press TO/GA for a normal go-around is not to advance the thrust levers, but to activate the relevant modes. If the autothrottle happens to be armed (as it usually is), it will wake up and help you set the appropriate thrust. It's still the pilot's job to verify that the thrust levers are where they want them to be.

My best guess as to why the switches are inhibited at this point is that in the jostling from a rough landing, inadvertently activating TO/GA by bumping the switch would be rather a bad thing. And on balance, there are a lot more rough landings than there are rejected landings.


emiratesdriver wrote:
Haha, I'm guessing then that you've not seen the EK 777 training manuals or FCOM, nor do you think that the EICAS "autospeedbrake" rather than it stowing automatically is nothing to do with liability? Every procedure is scrutinised and re-written if required by a legal "professional". EK don't write their manuals, we use Boeing and Airbus procedures verbatim.


The 777 doesn't have an AUTOSPEEDBRAKE message. Speedbrakes automatically stow upon advancing the thrust levers to takeoff thrust.

BravoOne wrote:
Every Boeing airplane built that is flying today started with a Boeing FCOM, or it's equivalent. Even the old beat up 737-200 that's working somewhere in a 3rd world operation has an underlying FCOM. Operators can modify the within certain limitations, but as a rule do not stray far off the farm. EK runs an excellent training department and along with Boeings support provide a sound basis for a new pilot to qualify in a Boeing aircraft. There is a saying around Boeing that says aviators and engineers design the systems but they are not deployed until legal has laid eyes on them, I don't know if that is true, but it sets the tone for training development. The fact that the Asiana and EK accidents occurred after thousands and thousands of landings and in both cases there was no mechanical problems found with the aircraft, make think that there was an airmanship issue, combined with a possible training component as a root cause to both of these accidents.


Wrong, it does have an Auto Speedbrake EICAS, refer to your QRH...but 8 years after having flown the 777 last..my memory is a little rusty.
The EICAS I meant to refer too was


SPEEDBRAKE EXTENDED

Condition: The speedbrakes are extended and one or more of these occur: •The radio altitude is between 15 and 800 feet •The flap lever is in a landing setting •A thrust lever is not at idle

It all about mitigating liability, much like VNAV STEP CLIMB

It's also naive and disengenous to suggest that legal advice and opinion isn't sought when producing operating manuals...John Cashman is on record describing the process.
 
rheinwaldner
Posts: 1863
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Re: Passengers sue Boeing for EK 521 crash

Fri Aug 18, 2017 6:44 am

Newbiepilot wrote:
Mjoelnir, yes TO/GA switch could be disarmed later. At what point should they be disabled?

Easy: after any attempt to brake has been made (wheel brakes or reverser).

skyhawkmatthew wrote:
wingman wrote:
Curious if anyone has been through 777 pilot training and can tell us how much focus there is on TOGA functionality in the landing phase.


It was covered in my initial computer-based systems training, and rejected landings were practiced in the simulator conversion training. It was not emphasised any more than any part of the course—but we did get additional focus on rejected landings after this EK accident.

The very first step in the Rejected Landing procedure is "Manually advance the thrust levers to go-around thrust," and the next line states "TO/GA switches are inhibited." That's pretty clear-cut.

Fine, but whether the case is a "rejected landing" or a "go around" relies on a condition, for which there is no precise feedback, whether it has occurred already.
Many things are difficult, all things are possible!
 
Planesmart
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Re: Passengers sue Boeing for EK 521 crash

Fri Aug 18, 2017 7:31 am

Most airlines fly strictly in terms of Boeing and Airbus operating documentation. Might insert airline logo, etc, but no other tampering.

Always a leasor requirement, which is why 'owned' aircraft are used for flying into hostile/high risk airports, that require unusual approaches, departures and speeds.

Leasor and insurer approval is also usually required to operate into airports that meet or barely meet international safety standards.

Only areas for flexibility are the likes of engine shutdown post-arrival to minimise PBTH costs.
 
mjoelnir
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Re: Passengers sue Boeing for EK 521 crash

Fri Aug 18, 2017 8:33 am

Newbiepilot wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:
GalaxyFlyer wrote:
Mjoelnir,

Are you a pilot of a modern FAR 25 plane?

The "solution" you are asking for would require the pilot to look down at the EICAS as he was commanding a go around to confirm the A/T being armed. Is that smart? Movement of throttles to the commanded thrust or non-movement is sufficient cueing for the pilot. The PF clearly didn't understand the basics of the system.

GF


No, what I fly has no automation. But I work with automation in other industries. You could put visible cues in line of sight or use a sound.


There are strict requirements for lights and sounds in the flight deck, which is what GalaxyFlyer is referring to. Superfluous information is inhibited during takeoff and landing or below certain altitudes. When a pilot is landing the attention is outside the window. Aural and visual warnings are for critical items that require immediate attention. A modern flight deck has way too much information that could be distracting in a critical phase of flight. There aren't alerts that the airplane is functioning correctly. Visible cues or sounds are for malfunctions or problems. When there is a major fault, EICAS can light up and be confusing for crew with so much annunciated. The engineers have safety assessments that dictate what is going to alert the pilots. A flight deck is much different than other industries.



The sound would be for TOGA not working when pressed for example. I can not imagine calling that a superfluous information. In a critical situation requiring a go around what information is more critical?
 
Newbiepilot
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Re: Passengers sue Boeing for EK 521 crash

Fri Aug 18, 2017 11:12 am

rheinwaldner wrote:
Newbiepilot wrote:
Mjoelnir, yes TO/GA switch could be disarmed later. At what point should they be disabled?

Easy: after any attempt to brake has been made (wheel brakes or reverser).
.


It is not easy.

99% of landings use auto brakes which already activate on basically the same set of conditions that inhibit the TO/GA switch. Same thing with the auto speed brake. The airplane has proximity sensors in the gear and many different functions activate or deactivate when the airplane transitions from air to ground mode. To name a few, the autobrakes activate, auto speed brake deploys, idle drops from flight idle to ground idle, landing gear lever locks. Once the airplane transitions to ground mode, all the automatic functions are designed to get the plane stopped and not back in the air.
 
Newbiepilot
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Re: Passengers sue Boeing for EK 521 crash

Fri Aug 18, 2017 11:14 am

mjoelnir wrote:
Newbiepilot wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:

No, what I fly has no automation. But I work with automation in other industries. You could put visible cues in line of sight or use a sound.


There are strict requirements for lights and sounds in the flight deck, which is what GalaxyFlyer is referring to. Superfluous information is inhibited during takeoff and landing or below certain altitudes. When a pilot is landing the attention is outside the window. Aural and visual warnings are for critical items that require immediate attention. A modern flight deck has way too much information that could be distracting in a critical phase of flight. There aren't alerts that the airplane is functioning correctly. Visible cues or sounds are for malfunctions or problems. When there is a major fault, EICAS can light up and be confusing for crew with so much annunciated. The engineers have safety assessments that dictate what is going to alert the pilots. A flight deck is much different than other industries.



The sound would be for TOGA not working when pressed for example. I can not imagine calling that a superfluous information. In a critical situation requiring a go around what information is more critical?


I could see a TO/GA switch inhibit EICAS message being created for this condition once it has been pushed but not active. I'm not sure if it will do anything since the pilot already had the visual cues of no N speed changes, no throttle movement and declining airspeed, but flight decks are very redundant places.
 
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Aesma
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Re: Passengers sue Boeing for EK 521 crash

Fri Aug 18, 2017 11:49 am

Boeing can afford it, so I would sue too in their place.
New Technology is the name we give to stuff that doesn't work yet. Douglas Adams
 
mjoelnir
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Re: Passengers sue Boeing for EK 521 crash

Fri Aug 18, 2017 11:49 am

Newbiepilot wrote:
rheinwaldner wrote:
Newbiepilot wrote:
Mjoelnir, yes TO/GA switch could be disarmed later. At what point should they be disabled?

Easy: after any attempt to brake has been made (wheel brakes or reverser).
.


It is not easy.

99% of landings use auto brakes which already activate on basically the same set of conditions that inhibit the TO/GA switch. Same thing with the auto speed brake. The airplane has proximity sensors in the gear and many different functions activate or deactivate when the airplane transitions from air to ground mode. To name a few, the autobrakes activate, auto speed brake deploys, idle drops from flight idle to ground idle, landing gear lever locks. Once the airplane transitions to ground mode, all the automatic functions are designed to get the plane stopped and not back in the air.


Than I would say it would be still more important to move in a simple way from landing and slow down to go around.
 
dtw2hyd
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Re: Passengers sue Boeing for EK 521 crash

Fri Aug 18, 2017 12:02 pm

Two reasons why no passengers died. B777 is built like a tank and most passengers self-evacuated. Others taking credit or customary lawsuits are non-issues.

12 plaintiffs from 4 countries, while most of the passengers from India. Could be a frivolous lawsuit.
All posts are just opinions.
 
AAMDanny
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Re: Passengers sue Boeing for EK 521 crash

Fri Aug 18, 2017 12:21 pm

These are also the same passengers that ignored all the crews instructions, took their luggage with them, and endangered themselves, other passengers and the crew by doing so............... just saying.
 
Newbiepilot
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Re: Passengers sue Boeing for EK 521 crash

Fri Aug 18, 2017 12:46 pm

mjoelnir wrote:
Newbiepilot wrote:
rheinwaldner wrote:
Easy: after any attempt to brake has been made (wheel brakes or reverser).
.


It is not easy.

99% of landings use auto brakes which already activate on basically the same set of conditions that inhibit the TO/GA switch. Same thing with the auto speed brake. The airplane has proximity sensors in the gear and many different functions activate or deactivate when the airplane transitions from air to ground mode. To name a few, the autobrakes activate, auto speed brake deploys, idle drops from flight idle to ground idle, landing gear lever locks. Once the airplane transitions to ground mode, all the automatic functions are designed to get the plane stopped and not back in the air.


Than I would say it would be still more important to move in a simple way from landing and slow down to go around.


That is not how the airplane is designed. It is designed to stop once it hits the ground. Just like it is designed to takeoff once takeoff thrust is applied. If a pilot wants to reject a takeoff, they pull back the thrust levers physically. If a pilot wants to reject a landing once on the ground, they must advance the thrust levers. This is part of pilot training. All the switches and automation is going to keep the airplane doing what it is supposed to be doing.

I think it is intentional that a single switch can't reject a takeoff or landing because the consequences of that inadvertently being tripped are high. The designers have to prevent an accidental trigger or mechanical failure from causing a safety event. If the TO/GA switch shorter out in a hard landing and activated full thrust them that would be a hazardous or catastrophic incindent. The airplane is designed so that a single switch or button can't do that by inadvertently being pressed or failing in the open or closed position. The designers want to make it so that it is not simple to go from landing with the airplane in the ground to go around. Very smart and intelligent people work all of these issues out in the design and testing phase.
 
skyhawkmatthew
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Re: Passengers sue Boeing for EK 521 crash

Fri Aug 18, 2017 1:03 pm

Waterbomber wrote:

On a B777, the guys sitting upfront don't always feel that pivot main gear touching down, and there is no "wheels have touched down" indication
...
Sure, the instinct should be to keep an eye on the EICAS to see the N1 spool up, but are you going to focus on that in a high workload environment if you fully expect the engines to spool up after pressing the switch?.


Most of the time we definitely do feel the touchdown—and if we don't, the speedbrake automatically extends when the aircraft senses it's on the ground so that's often the next-best cue.

The published procedure for a go-around, that should be followed by all crew, states that the very first thing that should be done after rotating to the lift-off attitude is to:

Verify that the thrust increases and is sufficient for the go-around or adjust as needed.


So it's not just instinct: it's precisely what the crew should be doing at that moment.

emiratesdriver wrote:
it does have an Auto Speedbrake EICAS, refer to your QRH

But nothing to do with the context of this discussion—as you did clarify. I agree the SPEEDBRAKE EXTENDED EICAS message is an arse-covering exercise following the Cali accident. We were practicing high-speed approaches (cargo fire) in the sim today and got that nuisance message several times. Don't get me started on [] VNAV STEP CLIMB! :roll:

Newbiepilot wrote:
That is not how the airplane is designed. It is designed to stop once it hits the ground. Just like it is designed to takeoff once takeoff thrust is applied. If a pilot wants to reject a takeoff, they pull back the thrust levers physically.

Exactly. It's worth noting that just like not advancing the thrust levers automatically if you press TO/GA on the ground, if you retard the thrust levers early in the take-off roll (before 80 knots), the autothrottle will 'fight back' and return the levers to the TO/GA position. You must manually disconnect the autothrottle to prevent this.
Qantas - The Spirit of Australia.
 
dtw2hyd
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Re: Passengers sue Boeing for EK 521 crash

Fri Aug 18, 2017 1:03 pm

AAMDanny wrote:
These are also the same passengers that ignored all the crews instructions, took their luggage with them, and endangered themselves, other passengers and the crew by doing so............... just saying.


Off-topic but the video doesn't show any CC giving any instructions in the cabin. Only one crew member shouting jump at the exit.

18 crew, even with 4 FC, 14 CC should be everywhere for 282 pax. That is twice the legal requirement. Yet no evidence of any crew inside the cabin. Like I said, this was a self-evacuation.
All posts are just opinions.
 
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Classa64
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Re: Passengers sue Boeing for EK 521 crash

Fri Aug 18, 2017 1:45 pm

emiratesdriver wrote:
skyhawkmatthew wrote:
I don’t understand how there are grounds for a suit. There was no “faulty switch;” the system operated exactly as designed and described in the manuals. Lack of TO/GA modes and thrust levers not advancing ought have been enough of a “warning” that the switches didn’t do anything—and the crew should have known about this behaviour anyway from prior training.

It’s the same as the Asiana accident: simply calling the modes at the top of the PFD would likely have prevented both accidents. Yes, the 777 is a complicated aeroplane with a complicated autoflight system, but it’s the pilots’ job to understand it and know what it is and isn’t doing at a given time.


Wrong....and this will be highlighted in court..

It's up to BOEING to provide adequate resources to train crews for every eventuality, it's why training manuals and CBT programmes are written by lawyers rather than training staff, and it's why airlines like EK use manufacturer produced documentation to ensure they are insured for every eventuality.


"It's up to BOEING to provide adequate resources to train crews for every eventuality"

Is that even possible... no.
"Freedom is the miles i'm rolling on"
 
mjoelnir
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Re: Passengers sue Boeing for EK 521 crash

Fri Aug 18, 2017 2:25 pm

Newbiepilot wrote:
Very smart and intelligent people work all of these issues out in the design and testing phase.


So you never ever discuss how Boeing does things, as it is perfect.
 
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BartSimpson
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Re: Passengers sue Boeing for EK 521 crash

Fri Aug 18, 2017 2:47 pm

AAMDanny wrote:
These are also the same passengers that ignored all the crews instructions, took their luggage with them, and endangered themselves, other passengers and the crew by doing so............... just saying.


How do you know that those were the same passengers? Did you match the plaintiffs' names with the list of the non-obeying passengers?
 
GalaxyFlyer
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Re: Passengers sue Boeing for EK 521 crash

Fri Aug 18, 2017 3:53 pm

Not a T7 pilot, but there must be an aural "AUTO THROTTLE" sounded when disconnecting the A/T manually or a system disconnect. It could be added to touchdown. But why?

GF
 
Newbiepilot
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Re: Passengers sue Boeing for EK 521 crash

Fri Aug 18, 2017 5:07 pm

mjoelnir wrote:
Newbiepilot wrote:
Very smart and intelligent people work all of these issues out in the design and testing phase.


So you never ever discuss how Boeing does things, as it is perfect.


I didn't say Boeing is perfect. I agreed with you that a inhibit message on EICAS may be appropriate if the TO/GA switch is pushed while the airplane is not correctly configured.

My comment regarding very smart people work out the issues is an accolade to the thousands of engineers behind each and ever switch, indication and message at not just Boeing, but Honeywell, GE, Rockwell Collins, etc. I've spent my entire career working on, in, and around airplanes and have profound respect for those engineers. There is always opportunity for improvement, but I think a casual aviation fan may not be aware of the amount of engineering and analysis that goes into every single thing a pilot sees, touches or hears in the flight deck.
 
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Re: Passengers sue Boeing for EK 521 crash

Fri Aug 18, 2017 5:46 pm

So the investigators didn't find anything like that, but the pax and lawyers did. Sure...
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fpetrutiu
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Re: Passengers sue Boeing for EK 521 crash

Fri Aug 18, 2017 9:47 pm

Here is straight 777 from the flight manual:


Procedure:

PF simultaneously pushes both throttles and a TO/GA switch PM verifies THR and TO/GA on the FMA BOTH PILOTS verify an increase in thrust and the aircraft pitches up and begins to climb
...

and more importantly:
The to/ga switches are inhibited after radio altitude decreases through two feet on landing, to/ga is enabled again three seconds after radio altitude increases through five feet for a rejected landing or touch and go.

Caution : If to/ga is initiated after touchdown a manual go-around must be conducted.


I say Boeing is pretty well covered here. All is present int he manual and responsibility falls on the pilots and training that they received.
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stefanJ
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Re: Passengers sue Boeing for EK 521 crash

Sat Aug 19, 2017 12:40 am

dtw2hyd wrote:
Two reasons why no passengers died. B777 is built like a tank and most passengers self-evacuated. Others taking credit or customary lawsuits are non-issues.

12 plaintiffs from 4 countries, while most of the passengers from India. Could be a frivolous lawsuit.


The lengths you go to, to make it sound like EK521's crew made zero contribution at all to the fact that all passengers survived is mind-boggling. No evidence whatsoever in them self-evacuating either (but rather evidence of them hampering the evacuation by disembarking the aircraft with their baggage) which is clearly visible in the report released one year after the mishap.

I understand you are not at all a fan of Emirates, but to discredit such people whose training and actions that day saved short of 300 people is truly unbelievable...
 
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Re: Passengers sue Boeing for EK 521 crash

Sat Aug 19, 2017 1:41 am

stefanJ wrote:
dtw2hyd wrote:
Two reasons why no passengers died. B777 is built like a tank and most passengers self-evacuated. Others taking credit or customary lawsuits are non-issues.

12 plaintiffs from 4 countries, while most of the passengers from India. Could be a frivolous lawsuit.


The lengths you go to, to make it sound like EK521's crew made zero contribution at all to the fact that all passengers survived is mind-boggling. No evidence whatsoever in them self-evacuating either (but rather evidence of them hampering the evacuation by disembarking the aircraft with their baggage) which is clearly visible in the report released one year after the mishap.

I understand you are not at all a fan of Emirates, but to discredit such people whose training and actions that day saved short of 300 people is truly unbelievable...


Watch the video in #53. First 53 seconds not a single crew member in that section. By that time everyone took their cabin bags, it is useless to say "leave the bags". At 1:19 the person took the video was on the slide.

Here are some details from Preliminary Accident report.

Full use - R2
Partial use -R1, R4, L5, and R5

Issues with slides
Slide detached(L1)
Slide deflated(R1)
Door not opened(L3, R3)
Wind affected (L2, L4, L5, and R5)
Waterlogged(R4) Also had passenger congestion
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AngMoh
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Re: Passengers sue Boeing for EK 521 crash

Sat Aug 19, 2017 2:54 am

GalaxyFlyer wrote:
I was in a mid-air collision followed by an ejection and six months of recovery. Not a suit or disability considered. I was doing my job, stuff happens, move on. Yes, PTSD is real, but these uninsured pax just want to hit the law suit jackpot


It is not the pax wanting to hit the jackpot but the US legal firm generating income for themselves. This suit it filed in the US against Boeing because the US legal system makes it possible and profitable. The lawsuit would fail in any other place in the world. Every time there is a plane crash anywhere in the world, there will be a law suit in the US against Boeing or a component supplier (hey, almost every plane has some us parts..) and most of the time is is file by the same law firm from Chicago. But more importantly, the lawsuit gets settled without going to court because it is the cheapest way out for Boeing. The main cause is that in the US, if you lose a lawsuit, you will never have to pay the legal cost of the other party. In all other parts of the world, if the lawsuit is frivolous, the winning party can be awarded costs to be paid by the losing party, regardless of who initiated the lawsuit. In the US this does not happen. This stupidity makes life profitable for ambulance chasers and patent trolls.

I worked for a US manufacturer of airbag components. They have never ever lost a liability suit in court. Still, we got sued in the US on average 3 times per week. Someone was completely drunk and crashed the car at 100mph on a winding dark rural road: we were sued. Somebody committed suicide by driving straight at an oncoming truck on a highway: we got sued. And every single case was settled out of court with insurance money going to the law firm of the drunk or suicidal idiot. The reason is the law firm which initiates the suit knows what it costs to defend the law suit. And that cost goes quickly into the millions. So as long as you settle for less, it is cheaper to settle than to defend the suit. It is an easy business with easy money.

This one will be settled out of court for exactly that reason with the bulk of the payout going to the law firm for "legal costs" and almost nothing going to the pax.
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Re: Passengers sue Boeing for EK 521 crash

Sun Aug 20, 2017 9:21 am

AWACSooner wrote:
The vultures obviously had to sell these idiots on the merits of suing someone!


Easy. Human greed is infinite.
Signature. You just read one.
 
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Re: Passengers sue Boeing for EK 521 crash

Sun Aug 20, 2017 9:40 am

fpetrutiu wrote:
Here is straight 777 from the flight manual:


Procedure:

PF simultaneously pushes both throttles and a TO/GA switch PM verifies THR and TO/GA on the FMA BOTH PILOTS verify an increase in thrust and the aircraft pitches up and begins to climb
...

and more importantly:
The to/ga switches are inhibited after radio altitude decreases through two feet on landing, to/ga is enabled again three seconds after radio altitude increases through five feet for a rejected landing or touch and go.

Caution : If to/ga is initiated after touchdown a manual go-around must be conducted.


I say Boeing is pretty well covered here. All is present int he manual and responsibility falls on the pilots and training that they received.


I find several issues here though.

How do pilots know that the radio altitude is below 2 feet? Its not realistic for pilots entering a flare to monitor the radio altitude,

I also like that they put a caution notice about the Toga not working after touchdown. Again, how do pilots know that they do have touchdown when at the same time a EGPWS is screaming at them that they havent landed yet? Are they going to start asking eachother, do you think that we touched?

I really wonder how well you can feel the mains contacting the runway on a B777 when the cockpit is still up high. Remember that there was some serious wind shear on that day.

What i find impressive is that it took only 16 seconds from initiating the go around to applying throttles. Probably they took just 12 seconds to realise that the TOGA switch wasnt doing the job. That while the EGPWS was flagging them and they were trying to figure out what was going on.
In an overwhelming situation, the automation that is supposed to share some of that burden failed and they realised it in as little time as it takes to push the TOGA button, pull the yoke, push the flap and ear levers, check the spoiler lever and look back at the thrust levers or EICAS.
Thats your 12 seconds right there. Sure, the thrust should come as a prority but the GE90 isnt exactly an electric motor and why waste those precious silent 7 seconds when you need to clean and climb away asap?

One more things is the EGPWS warning. That deserves a thorough analysis given that a system that is supposed to increase awareness actually caused the pilots to become overwhelmed.
Sure, they werent landing on the keys, but DXBs long runway gives sufficient margin that one has to start wondering if the warning was actually warranted.
One more aspect that deserves analysis is why the RAAS/EGPWS gave that long landing warning after touchdown, and whether it didnt contribute to the pilots misinterpreting the situation and thinking that they had not touched down yet, hence using the Toga to reduce workload in a high wirkload situation.

Finally, where was the stall warning? In the end, it was a stall and the aircraft didnt warn the crew that it was nearing one.

One cant argue it, this is a trap, and it s going to happen again sooner or later unless fixed.


So again, i dont know if they can win a lawsuit against Boeing, but the accident did happen and people can suffer traumatism from it, so it deserves a thorough look into how each of these individual systems are programmed to work.
 
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Re: Passengers sue Boeing for EK 521 crash

Sun Aug 20, 2017 9:56 am

Newbiepilot wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:
Newbiepilot wrote:

It is not easy.

99% of landings use auto brakes which already activate on basically the same set of conditions that inhibit the TO/GA switch. Same thing with the auto speed brake. The airplane has proximity sensors in the gear and many different functions activate or deactivate when the airplane transitions from air to ground mode. To name a few, the autobrakes activate, auto speed brake deploys, idle drops from flight idle to ground idle, landing gear lever locks. Once the airplane transitions to ground mode, all the automatic functions are designed to get the plane stopped and not back in the air.


Than I would say it would be still more important to move in a simple way from landing and slow down to go around.


That is not how the airplane is designed. It is designed to stop once it hits the ground. Just like it is designed to takeoff once takeoff thrust is applied. If a pilot wants to reject a takeoff, they pull back the thrust levers physically. If a pilot wants to reject a landing once on the ground, they must advance the thrust levers. This is part of pilot training. All the switches and automation is going to keep the airplane doing what it is supposed to be doing.

I think it is intentional that a single switch can't reject a takeoff or landing because the consequences of that inadvertently being tripped are high. The designers have to prevent an accidental trigger or mechanical failure from causing a safety event. If the TO/GA switch shorter out in a hard landing and activated full thrust them that would be a hazardous or catastrophic incindent. The airplane is designed so that a single switch or button can't do that by inadvertently being pressed or failing in the open or closed position. The designers want to make it so that it is not simple to go from landing with the airplane in the ground to go around. Very smart and intelligent people work all of these issues out in the design and testing phase.


And yet this potentially preventive measure contributed to a catastrophic result. If the pilots hadnt applied thrust when they did, many passengers would have died. Why install this switch in the first place if pushing it when needed or when not needed can cause an undesired result? That s a bad decision by definition.
 
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Re: Passengers sue Boeing for EK 521 crash

Sun Aug 20, 2017 12:00 pm

dtw2hyd wrote:
stefanJ wrote:
dtw2hyd wrote:
Two reasons why no passengers died. B777 is built like a tank and most passengers self-evacuated. Others taking credit or customary lawsuits are non-issues.

12 plaintiffs from 4 countries, while most of the passengers from India. Could be a frivolous lawsuit.


The lengths you go to, to make it sound like EK521's crew made zero contribution at all to the fact that all passengers survived is mind-boggling. No evidence whatsoever in them self-evacuating either (but rather evidence of them hampering the evacuation by disembarking the aircraft with their baggage) which is clearly visible in the report released one year after the mishap.

I understand you are not at all a fan of Emirates, but to discredit such people whose training and actions that day saved short of 300 people is truly unbelievable...


Watch the video in #53. First 53 seconds not a single crew member in that section. By that time everyone took their cabin bags, it is useless to say "leave the bags". At 1:19 the person took the video was on the slide.

Here are some details from Preliminary Accident report.

Full use - R2
Partial use -R1, R4, L5, and R5

Issues with slides
Slide detached(L1)
Slide deflated(R1)
Door not opened(L3, R3)
Wind affected (L2, L4, L5, and R5)
Waterlogged(R4) Also had passenger congestion


I don't know what you mean by self evacuation. There weren't cabin crew members in the cabin giving instructions about luggage because it is their primary responsibility to open the exit doors and determine if they are useable. The wind caused serious problems. Others weren't opened or blocked due to fire. The cabin crew were faced with serious problems with the exit doors. Additionally the force of the impact caused on jumpseat to collapse and a ceiling panel to come down near an exit. The crew were dealing with exit doors and slides that were having serious problems with wind and fire during the evacuation.

https://www.gcaa.gov.ae/en/ePublication ... A6-EMW.pdf
 
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Re: Passengers sue Boeing for EK 521 crash

Sun Aug 20, 2017 2:03 pm

Newbiepilot wrote:
.. The crew were dealing with exit doors and slides that were having serious problems with wind and fire during the evacuation.


And that frustration they vented on passengers on social media. While the crew was fighting with fire, exits, slides, and wind, passengers had time to collect their bags.

The point I was making, except on waterlogged R2 there was no passenger congestion, even with cabin bags.
All posts are just opinions.
 
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Re: Passengers sue Boeing for EK 521 crash

Sun Aug 20, 2017 3:10 pm

Waterbomber wrote:


In an overwhelming situation, the automation that is supposed to share some of that burden failed and they realised it in as little time as it takes to push the TOGA button, pull the yoke, push the flap and ear levers, check the spoiler lever and look back at the thrust levers or EICAS.
.


Overwhelming situation???? Airplane systems all fully functional, VMC conditions and gusty winds???? If that's overwhelming, I'm surprised we're no having a major crash everyday. If the flight crew had followed the proper procedures we wouldn't be having this conversation -- but they didn't.
 
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Re: Passengers sue Boeing for EK 521 crash

Sun Aug 20, 2017 3:33 pm

Waterbomber wrote:
fpetrutiu wrote:
Here is straight 777 from the flight manual:


Procedure:

PF simultaneously pushes both throttles and a TO/GA switch PM verifies THR and TO/GA on the FMA BOTH PILOTS verify an increase in thrust and the aircraft pitches up and begins to climb
...

and more importantly:
The to/ga switches are inhibited after radio altitude decreases through two feet on landing, to/ga is enabled again three seconds after radio altitude increases through five feet for a rejected landing or touch and go.

Caution : If to/ga is initiated after touchdown a manual go-around must be conducted.


I say Boeing is pretty well covered here. All is present int he manual and responsibility falls on the pilots and training that they received.


I find several issues here though.

How do pilots know that the radio altitude is below 2 feet? Its not realistic for pilots entering a flare to monitor the radio altitude,

I also like that they put a caution notice about the Toga not working after touchdown. Again, how do pilots know that they do have touchdown when at the same time a EGPWS is screaming at them that they havent landed yet? Are they going to start asking eachother, do you think that we touched?

I really wonder how well you can feel the mains contacting the runway on a B777 when the cockpit is still up high. Remember that there was some serious wind shear on that day.

What i find impressive is that it took only 16 seconds from initiating the go around to applying throttles. Probably they took just 12 seconds to realise that the TOGA switch wasnt doing the job. That while the EGPWS was flagging them and they were trying to figure out what was going on.
In an overwhelming situation, the automation that is supposed to share some of that burden failed and they realised it in as little time as it takes to push the TOGA button, pull the yoke, push the flap and ear levers, check the spoiler lever and look back at the thrust levers or EICAS.
Thats your 12 seconds right there. Sure, the thrust should come as a prority but the GE90 isnt exactly an electric motor and why waste those precious silent 7 seconds when you need to clean and climb away asap?

One more things is the EGPWS warning. That deserves a thorough analysis given that a system that is supposed to increase awareness actually caused the pilots to become overwhelmed.
Sure, they werent landing on the keys, but DXBs long runway gives sufficient margin that one has to start wondering if the warning was actually warranted.
One more aspect that deserves analysis is why the RAAS/EGPWS gave that long landing warning after touchdown, and whether it didnt contribute to the pilots misinterpreting the situation and thinking that they had not touched down yet, hence using the Toga to reduce workload in a high wirkload situation.

Finally, where was the stall warning? In the end, it was a stall and the aircraft didnt warn the crew that it was nearing one.

One cant argue it, this is a trap, and it s going to happen again sooner or later unless fixed.


So again, i dont know if they can win a lawsuit against Boeing, but the accident did happen and people can suffer traumatism from it, so it deserves a thorough look into how each of these individual systems are programmed to work.


I believe the runway awareness advisory system gave the aural warning LONG LANDING LONG LANDING. I have never flown the 777, but I believe that only alerts when the gear touches the ground. If so and if that is why they did the go around, I would assume the procedure for responding to that message is physically advancing the throttles. That would mean no trap. Perhaps someone knows more about that system.
Last edited by Newbiepilot on Sun Aug 20, 2017 3:37 pm, edited 1 time in total.
 
a320fan
Posts: 838
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Re: Passengers sue Boeing for EK 521 crash

Sun Aug 20, 2017 3:36 pm

Waterbomber wrote:
fpetrutiu wrote:
Here is straight 777 from the flight manual:


Procedure:

PF simultaneously pushes both throttles and a TO/GA switch PM verifies THR and TO/GA on the FMA BOTH PILOTS verify an increase in thrust and the aircraft pitches up and begins to climb
...

and more importantly:
The to/ga switches are inhibited after radio altitude decreases through two feet on landing, to/ga is enabled again three seconds after radio altitude increases through five feet for a rejected landing or touch and go.

Caution : If to/ga is initiated after touchdown a manual go-around must be conducted.


I say Boeing is pretty well covered here. All is present int he manual and responsibility falls on the pilots and training that they received.


I find several issues here though.

How do pilots know that the radio altitude is below 2 feet? Its not realistic for pilots entering a flare to monitor the radio altitude,

I also like that they put a caution notice about the Toga not working after touchdown. Again, how do pilots know that they do have touchdown when at the same time a EGPWS is screaming at them that they havent landed yet? Are they going to start asking eachother, do you think that we touched?

I really wonder how well you can feel the mains contacting the runway on a B777 when the cockpit is still up high. Remember that there was some serious wind shear on that day.

What i find impressive is that it took only 16 seconds from initiating the go around to applying throttles. Probably they took just 12 seconds to realise that the TOGA switch wasnt doing the job. That while the EGPWS was flagging them and they were trying to figure out what was going on.
In an overwhelming situation, the automation that is supposed to share some of that burden failed and they realised it in as little time as it takes to push the TOGA button, pull the yoke, push the flap and ear levers, check the spoiler lever and look back at the thrust levers or EICAS.
Thats your 12 seconds right there. Sure, the thrust should come as a prority but the GE90 isnt exactly an electric motor and why waste those precious silent 7 seconds when you need to clean and climb away asap?

One more things is the EGPWS warning. That deserves a thorough analysis given that a system that is supposed to increase awareness actually caused the pilots to become overwhelmed.
Sure, they werent landing on the keys, but DXBs long runway gives sufficient margin that one has to start wondering if the warning was actually warranted.
One more aspect that deserves analysis is why the RAAS/EGPWS gave that long landing warning after touchdown, and whether it didnt contribute to the pilots misinterpreting the situation and thinking that they had not touched down yet, hence using the Toga to reduce workload in a high wirkload situation.

Finally, where was the stall warning? In the end, it was a stall and the aircraft didnt warn the crew that it was nearing one.

One cant argue it, this is a trap, and it s going to happen again sooner or later unless fixed.


So again, i dont know if they can win a lawsuit against Boeing, but the accident did happen and people can suffer traumatism from it, so it deserves a thorough look into how each of these individual systems are programmed to work.

16 seconds from pressing toga to moving the thrust levers is a terrible reaction time. Pilot flying should have had one hand on the thrust levers during the landing, on pressing TOGA they should have felt the thrust levers advance in their hand, if not felt set thrust manually. No need to look or listen to see if TOGA activated. If anyone should be found liable in this accident it should be EK, who either from fatigue or poor skill allowed pilots flying the line to have such poor situational awareness. Not boeing whose system performed as designed and certified.
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Aptivaboy
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Re: Passengers sue Boeing for EK 521 crash

Sun Aug 20, 2017 6:43 pm

As a defense lawyer I find the outrage over the filing of a lawsuit after an accident both amusing and odd. Product-liability lawsuits are a significant means by which the state of the art is advanced and manufacturers are compelled to design and build safe products.


I generally agree, although there are a few times (okay, more than a few) when plaintiffs and plaintiffs' attorneys have gone too far.

I love your handle, by the way. I really miss the days of AirCal, PSA, and even Hughes Air West flying out of SNA, plus the Marine birds roaring from El Toro. Those were great days to be enjoying aviation in the OC.
 
Waterbomber
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Re: Passengers sue Boeing for EK 521 crash

Sun Aug 20, 2017 7:19 pm

a320fan wrote:
Waterbomber wrote:
fpetrutiu wrote:
Here is straight 777 from the flight manual:


Procedure:

...

and more importantly:


I say Boeing is pretty well covered here. All is present int he manual and responsibility falls on the pilots and training that they received.


I find several issues here though.

How do pilots know that the radio altitude is below 2 feet? Its not realistic for pilots entering a flare to monitor the radio altitude,

I also like that they put a caution notice about the Toga not working after touchdown. Again, how do pilots know that they do have touchdown when at the same time a EGPWS is screaming at them that they havent landed yet? Are they going to start asking eachother, do you think that we touched?

I really wonder how well you can feel the mains contacting the runway on a B777 when the cockpit is still up high. Remember that there was some serious wind shear on that day.

What i find impressive is that it took only 16 seconds from initiating the go around to applying throttles. Probably they took just 12 seconds to realise that the TOGA switch wasnt doing the job. That while the EGPWS was flagging them and they were trying to figure out what was going on.
In an overwhelming situation, the automation that is supposed to share some of that burden failed and they realised it in as little time as it takes to push the TOGA button, pull the yoke, push the flap and ear levers, check the spoiler lever and look back at the thrust levers or EICAS.
Thats your 12 seconds right there. Sure, the thrust should come as a prority but the GE90 isnt exactly an electric motor and why waste those precious silent 7 seconds when you need to clean and climb away asap?

One more things is the EGPWS warning. That deserves a thorough analysis given that a system that is supposed to increase awareness actually caused the pilots to become overwhelmed.
Sure, they werent landing on the keys, but DXBs long runway gives sufficient margin that one has to start wondering if the warning was actually warranted.
One more aspect that deserves analysis is why the RAAS/EGPWS gave that long landing warning after touchdown, and whether it didnt contribute to the pilots misinterpreting the situation and thinking that they had not touched down yet, hence using the Toga to reduce workload in a high wirkload situation.

Finally, where was the stall warning? In the end, it was a stall and the aircraft didnt warn the crew that it was nearing one.

One cant argue it, this is a trap, and it s going to happen again sooner or later unless fixed.


So again, i dont know if they can win a lawsuit against Boeing, but the accident did happen and people can suffer traumatism from it, so it deserves a thorough look into how each of these individual systems are programmed to work.

16 seconds from pressing toga to moving the thrust levers is a terrible reaction time. Pilot flying should have had one hand on the thrust levers during the landing, on pressing TOGA they should have felt the thrust levers advance in their hand, if not felt set thrust manually. No need to look or listen to see if TOGA activated. If anyone should be found liable in this accident it should be EK, who either from fatigue or poor skill allowed pilots flying the line to have such poor situational awareness. Not boeing whose system performed as designed and certified.


I don't question that the pilots did miss out. However, it's easy to judge afterwards with all the time in the world to look at the facts.
You're flaring in wind shear after a challenging approach, then you get the warning, you push the TOGA that you expect to take care of the thrust, get the thing to pitch up higher but not too much, while decreasing flaps, operating the gear lever and checking the spoilers.
After as little as it took you to read the last sentence, the pilots realised that the thing wasn't producing the desired thrust. 16 seconds but really only 12 to realise that the thing wasn't upping the thrust. 12 seconds seems like a lot sitting in a chair looking at the needles of your watch, but when you're carrying out tasks, it happens very very quickly.

When designing an aircraft, one should also take into consideration that pilots are going to be landing after a sleepless layover and a 10 hour journey.
At such moments, the cognitive capacity is strongly decreased and safety shouldn't be left at the mercy of a short lapse of judgement, regardless of whether this should be compensated for in scheduling/planning, or in the design of the aircraft.
In many ways, one could say that the TOGA switch is built to compensate for some of the thrust lever functions that a 3rd crew, the engineer used to carry out. However in this accident, it failed to do that. This is bound to happen again sooner or later.
 
kalvado
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Re: Passengers sue Boeing for EK 521 crash

Sun Aug 20, 2017 7:37 pm

Waterbomber wrote:
When designing an aircraft, one should also take into consideration that pilots are going to be landing after a sleepless layover and a 10 hour journey.
At such moments, the cognitive capacity is strongly decreased and safety shouldn't be left at the mercy of a short lapse of judgement, regardless of whether this should be compensated for in scheduling/planning, or in the design of the aircraft.
In many ways, one could say that the TOGA switch is built to compensate for some of the thrust lever functions that a 3rd crew, the engineer used to carry out. However in this accident, it failed to do that. This is bound to happen again sooner or later.

Engineering today is a race between engineers striving to build bigger and better idiot-proof things, and the Universe trying to produce bigger and better idiots. So far, the Universe is winning.

Basically you're asking for something that is so idiot proof, that things go normally whatever those after a sleepless layover and a 10 hour journey are doing. When that actually happens, airlines would be putting extra 2 rows of seats in place of now-redundant operators....
 
GalaxyFlyer
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Re: Passengers sue Boeing for EK 521 crash

Sun Aug 20, 2017 7:51 pm

AirCalSNA wrote:
As a defense lawyer I find the outrage over the filing of a lawsuit after an accident both amusing and odd. Product-liability lawsuits are a significant means by which the state of the art is advanced and manufacturers are compelled to design and build safe products. And people have the legal right not to be physically or psychologically harmed by the avoidable negligence of others ... which is a question of fact and in this situation will likely be proven by the testimony of experts on both sides. It's silly to become outraged over the mere filing of a complaint, since the contentions of both sides ultimately have to be proven with evidence. The legal system also has many safeguards in place to allow parties to seek early dismissal of cases that are groundless.


Why yes, only lawyers can save us from evil companies trying to kill us. Do you really think the legal profession is a "significant" reason for aviation's safety record? Absolute bollocks.

GF
 
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Re: Passengers sue Boeing for EK 521 crash

Sun Aug 20, 2017 9:20 pm

GalaxyFlyer wrote:
AirCalSNA wrote:
As a defense lawyer I find the outrage over the filing of a lawsuit after an accident both amusing and odd. Product-liability lawsuits are a significant means by which the state of the art is advanced and manufacturers are compelled to design and build safe products. And people have the legal right not to be physically or psychologically harmed by the avoidable negligence of others ... which is a question of fact and in this situation will likely be proven by the testimony of experts on both sides. It's silly to become outraged over the mere filing of a complaint, since the contentions of both sides ultimately have to be proven with evidence. The legal system also has many safeguards in place to allow parties to seek early dismissal of cases that are groundless.


Why yes, only lawyers can save us from evil companies trying to kill us. Do you really think the legal profession is a "significant" reason for aviation's safety record? Absolute bollocks.

GF


Totally agree... Product liability suits may advance the sate of the art in many consumer products. Not in Aviation or Nuclear Plant safety. There Apparent Cause and Root Cause investigations; and recommendations drive improvements. Both are in an environment where pilots, mechanics, crew, and even certain manufacture personell (nuclear plant operators, etc) can admit mistakes without general fear of being fired (retrained perhaps, fired no). Virtually everyone who works in these environments is focused on safety (even if day to day gets hectic); and the entire corporate and regulatory structure is set up to drive identification and resolution of issues outside of the legal process. As such, the legal process plays minuscule, if any, role in product and procedure improvement.

Have a great day,

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