Here is straight 777 from the flight manual:
PF simultaneously pushes both throttles and a TO/GA switch PM verifies THR and TO/GA on the FMA BOTH PILOTS verify an increase in thrust and the aircraft pitches up and begins to climb
and more importantly:
The to/ga switches are inhibited after radio altitude decreases through two feet on landing, to/ga is enabled again three seconds after radio altitude increases through five feet for a rejected landing or touch and go.
Caution : If to/ga is initiated after touchdown a manual go-around must be conducted.
I say Boeing is pretty well covered here. All is present int he manual and responsibility falls on the pilots and training that they received.
I find several issues here though.
How do pilots know that the radio altitude is below 2 feet? Its not realistic for pilots entering a flare to monitor the radio altitude,
I also like that they put a caution notice about the Toga not working after touchdown. Again, how do pilots know that they do have touchdown when at the same time a EGPWS is screaming at them that they havent landed yet? Are they going to start asking eachother, do you think that we touched?
I really wonder how well you can feel the mains contacting the runway on a B777 when the cockpit is still up high. Remember that there was some serious wind shear on that day.
What i find impressive is that it took only 16 seconds from initiating the go around to applying throttles. Probably they took just 12 seconds to realise that the TOGA switch wasnt doing the job. That while the EGPWS was flagging them and they were trying to figure out what was going on.
In an overwhelming situation, the automation that is supposed to share some of that burden failed and they realised it in as little time as it takes to push the TOGA button, pull the yoke, push the flap and ear levers, check the spoiler lever and look back at the thrust levers or EICAS.
Thats your 12 seconds right there. Sure, the thrust should come as a prority but the GE90 isnt exactly an electric motor and why waste those precious silent 7 seconds when you need to clean and climb away asap?
One more things is the EGPWS warning. That deserves a thorough analysis given that a system that is supposed to increase awareness actually caused the pilots to become overwhelmed.
Sure, they werent landing on the keys, but DXBs long runway gives sufficient margin that one has to start wondering if the warning was actually warranted.
One more aspect that deserves analysis is why the RAAS/EGPWS gave that long landing warning after touchdown, and whether it didnt contribute to the pilots misinterpreting the situation and thinking that they had not touched down yet, hence using the Toga to reduce workload in a high wirkload situation.
Finally, where was the stall warning? In the end, it was a stall and the aircraft didnt warn the crew that it was nearing one.
One cant argue it, this is a trap, and it s going to happen again sooner or later unless fixed.
So again, i dont know if they can win a lawsuit against Boeing, but the accident did happen and people can suffer traumatism from it, so it deserves a thorough look into how each of these individual systems are programmed to work.