mjoelnir wrote:

I would assume that the weight for the T700 is off. No way a T700 is nearly as heavy as a T900. If one starts out with the T700 to heavy than a 1600 kg difference gives a to heavy T7000. Pulling the heavy generator off the T1000ten, replacing it with a smaller one and changing the bleed, should make the T7000 lighter than the T1000ten.
Somebody, way back, talked once about, the numbers for the T700 would include the thrust reverser. I can not find it now.
We just will have to wait for better information.

A CF6-80E1 is 5,092 kg and the two spool GE are usually heavier and longer than the comparable three spool Trent.

EASA has the T700 at 6160kg on the Type Cert.

https://www.easa.europa.eu/system/files ... 112013.pdf

I agree that it seems way off though.

Slug71 wrote:

mjoelnir wrote:

I would assume that the weight for the T700 is off. No way a T700 is nearly as heavy as a T900. If one starts out with the T700 to heavy than a 1600 kg difference gives a to heavy T7000. Pulling the heavy generator off the T1000ten, replacing it with a smaller one and changing the bleed, should make the T7000 lighter than the T1000ten.
Somebody, way back, talked once about, the numbers for the T700 would include the thrust reverser. I can not find it now.
We just will have to wait for better information.

EASA has the T700 at 6160kg on the Type Cert.

https://www.easa.europa.eu/system/files ... 112013.pdf

I know, and somewhere I read that would include the thrust reverser. Or the number is just plain wrong and nobody has bothered to correct it. 5160 kg would make more sense. I would guess below 5000 kg.

I am just curious as to the case in layman terms for for Rolls Royce Advance engine for A380?
I know there is talk of ultrafan but that is long time away and it would be too much range for this A380 , that maybe for a stretch. Besides I don't hear about any other application for Advance right now. How much efficiency would there be with the advance engine compared to the current operating engines?
Advance - 60:1 pressure ratio , 11:1 bypass ratio
GP7000 - 43:1 pressure ratio, 8.8 bypass ratio
Trent 900 - 39:1 pressure ratio, 8.7 bypass ratio.

Vladex wrote:

I am just curious as to the case in layman terms for for Rolls Royce Advance engine for A380?
I know there is talk of ultrafan but that is long time away and it would be too much range for this A380 , that maybe for a stretch. Besides I don't hear about any other application for Advance right now. How much efficiency would there be with the advance engine compared to the current operating engines?
Advance - 60:1 pressure ratio , 11:1 bypass ratio
GP7000 - 43:1 pressure ratio, 8.8 bypass ratio
Trent 900 - 39:1 pressure ratio, 8.7 bypass ratio.

It's probably to soon for much info considering it's still in development. The first demonstrator has only just been recently completed.

IIRC, the Advance is supposed to be 20% more efficient than the Trent 700 and the Ultrafan 25% more efficient than the Trent 700. Not sure how that relates to the T900 or GP7200 though.

Copied this over to the "Technical/Operations" section as its more appropriate over there. See thread "RR Builds Next-Gen "Advance 3" Demo Engine"

Taxi645 wrote:

If the A380NEO will not be stretched and will use a GTF engine together with a rigorous weight saving program centred around the 800, I expect the thrust requirements for the NEO to be significantly lower than for the CEO.

That's where it's getting interesting. The future of the A380 is maybe within an A380 Minus. We are focusing our attention on Emirates, but it's probably not by offering more capacity that the A380 will attract the interest of new customers or renew the interest of the existing customers. In any case, it's current payload exceeds by a large margin the one of the next smaller aircraft on offer. So, let's consider that the current payload is satisfactory for most of the potential customers.

What about the range? Is see that the A380 has an endurance exceeding 16 hours. Wouldn't 14 hours endurance satisfy most of the needs? Why not trade some marginal market share to A35K and the 779 in order to focus the A380 where the interest is the greatest.

Where does this bring us? There were talk about 4% aerodynamic improvement with the A380+. Let's add a few % SFC improvement on the engines (let's say 4%). Let's shave off 2.5 hours endurance. If you put all this together, my uneducated guesstimate is that you'd save about 45 tonnes of fuel compared to the current fuel burn observed with the current A380 taking-off at 575 tonnes for a 16 hours flight. We're down to 530t MTOW without sacrifying payload. That's a roughly 8% MTOW reduction. Are we done? No, if you design for a lower MTOW, you can still shave off some weight out of the beast. With such a MTOW and retaining the current aerodynamic , the max thrust requirement could probably be reduced by 10%. Such a reduction could offer some saving on the VTP height, leading to savings in both weight and drag. Also, a baseline with thrust requirements reduced by 10% could look for slightly lighter engine and a slightly smaller fan diameter, delivering a small drag saving and weight saving (from the engine itself, the nacelle and the pylons). Or you keep the current fan diameter and target a further reduced SFC (my assumption of 4% is conservative). By adding all these extra savings, we're getting closer to 525t.

Now, if we consider a more ambitious SFC improvement (which would be the goal if Airbus would sharpen its pencil), say 10%, we'd save another 10t of fuel. We're down to 515t. That's where I have this question: how much lower should the MTOW go in order to allow a 16 wheels main landing gear. The A346 spreads 380t over 12 wheels and 3 bogies. Going by this ratio, 16 wheels and 4 bogies would allow for 505t. We're 10t away and to reach this goal, we can already cash a decent weight saving on the MLG and MLG doors & casing. By the way, 505t MTOW is 12% lower than 575t, there are further saving to be had on the thrust requirements.

To summarize, an ambitious A380 Minus would offer the current unrivaled payload, with slightly reduced OEW, MZFW and MLW and with substantially reduced MTOW, fuel burn and installed thrust. Granted, EK couldn't fly to LAX and AKL with such an aircraft and Qantas should restricts its transpac operations to SYD (MEL-LAX wouldn't work anymore), but would it be the end of the world for both these airlines and for the A380? I'm aware that the A380 is currently offered in weight variants lower than 500t, so one might ask, why bothering redesigning so extensively the aircraft to achieve what's already done with the WV's, while loosing flexibility at the same time. I'm just thinking that there is no point keeping a baseline design capable of 575t MTOW once you have NEOed it. There is not much extra payload you can get from the current fuselage length, so keeping the current MTOW would only extend the range, which is of little use. Also, the bulk of the demand is for smaller aircraft, not larger ones. So the emphasis should be on lowering the operating costs of the A380 with it's current payload. Also a lighter and less powerful version could only contribute to limit the costs of ownership. All this would increase the appeal of the aircraft in the market (I believe).

Slug71 wrote:

Vladex wrote:

I am just curious as to the case in layman terms for for Rolls Royce Advance engine for A380?
I know there is talk of ultrafan but that is long time away and it would be too much range for this A380 , that maybe for a stretch. Besides I don't hear about any other application for Advance right now. How much efficiency would there be with the advance engine compared to the current operating engines?
Advance - 60:1 pressure ratio , 11:1 bypass ratio
GP7000 - 43:1 pressure ratio, 8.8 bypass ratio
Trent 900 - 39:1 pressure ratio, 8.7 bypass ratio.

It's probably to soon for much info considering it's still in development. The first demonstrator has only just been recently completed.

IIRC, the Advance is supposed to be 20% more efficient than the Trent 700 and the Ultrafan 25% more efficient than the Trent 700. Not sure how that relates to the T900 or GP7200 though.

Copied this over to the "Technical/Operations" section as its more appropriate over there. See thread "RR Builds Next-Gen "Advance 3" Demo Engine"

But the advanced is in development and no other application in sight. The T900 is somewhere in between the T700 and T7000 oe TXWB.
20 % difference was against the plain T700, that got a few pips since than. The T advanced should manage 10% advantage against the T900.

tomcat wrote:

Taxi645 wrote:

If the A380NEO will not be stretched and will use a GTF engine together with a rigorous weight saving program centred around the 800, I expect the thrust requirements for the NEO to be significantly lower than for the CEO.

That's where it's getting interesting. The future of the A380 is maybe within an A380 Minus. We are focusing our attention on Emirates, but it's probably not by offering more capacity that the A380 will attract the interest of new customers or renew the interest of the existing customers. In any case, it's current payload exceeds by a large margin the one of the next smaller aircraft on offer. So, let's consider that the current payload is satisfactory for most of the potential customers.

What about the range? Is see that the A380 has an endurance exceeding 16 hours. Wouldn't 14 hours endurance satisfy most of the needs? Why not trade some marginal market share to A35K and the 779 in order to focus the A380 where the interest is the greatest.

Where does this bring us? There were talk about 4% aerodynamic improvement with the A380+. Let's add a few % SFC improvement on the engines (let's say 4%). Let's shave off 2.5 hours endurance. If you put all this together, my uneducated guesstimate is that you'd save about 45 tonnes of fuel compared to the current fuel burn observed with the current A380 taking-off at 575 tonnes for a 16 hours flight. We're down to 530t MTOW without sacrifying payload. That's a roughly 8% MTOW reduction. Are we done? No, if you design for a lower MTOW, you can still shave off some weight out of the beast. With such a MTOW and retaining the current aerodynamic , the max thrust requirement could probably be reduced by 10%. Such a reduction could offer some saving on the VTP height, leading to savings in both weight and drag. Also, a baseline with thrust requirements reduced by 10% could look for slightly lighter engine and a slightly smaller fan diameter, delivering a small drag saving and weight saving (from the engine itself, the nacelle and the pylons). Or you keep the current fan diameter and target a further reduced SFC (my assumption of 4% is conservative). By adding all these extra savings, we're getting closer to 525t.

Now, if we consider a more ambitious SFC improvement (which would be the goal if Airbus would sharpen its pencil), say 10%, we'd save another 10t of fuel. We're down to 515t. That's where I have this question: how much lower should the MTOW go in order to allow a 16 wheels main landing gear. The A346 spreads 380t over 12 wheels and 3 bogies. Going by this ratio, 16 wheels and 4 bogies would allow for 505t. We're 10t away and to reach this goal, we can already cash a decent weight saving on the MLG and MLG doors & casing. By the way, 505t MTOW is 12% lower than 575t, there are further saving to be had on the thrust requirements.

To summarize, an ambitious A380 Minus would offer the current unrivaled payload, with slightly reduced OEW, MZFW and MLW and with substantially reduced MTOW, fuel burn and installed thrust. Granted, EK couldn't fly to LAX and AKL with such an aircraft and Qantas should restricts its transpac operations to SYD (MEL-LAX wouldn't work anymore), but would it be the end of the world for both these airlines and for the A380? I'm aware that the A380 is currently offered in weight variants lower than 500t, so one might ask, why bothering redesigning so extensively the aircraft to achieve what's already done with the WV's, while loosing flexibility at the same time. I'm just thinking that there is no point keeping a baseline design capable of 575t MTOW once you have NEOed it. There is not much extra payload you can get from the current fuselage length, so keeping the current MTOW would only extend the range, which is of little use. Also, the bulk of the demand is for smaller aircraft, not larger ones. So the emphasis should be on lowering the operating costs of the A380 with it's current payload. Also a lighter and less powerful version could only contribute to limit the costs of ownership. All this would increase the appeal of the aircraft in the market (I believe).

Finally someone using their imagination! Thank you.

tomcat wrote:

That's where I have this question: how much lower should the MTOW go in order to allow a 16 wheels main landing gear. The A346 spreads 380t over 12 wheels and 3 bogies. Going by this ratio, 16 wheels and 4 bogies would allow for 505t. We're 10t away and to reach this goal, we can already cash a decent weight saving on the MLG and MLG doors & casing.

Funny, that's the exact same thing I have been wondering for months. What weight would a 16 wheel lay out be able to carry? 505T seems a realistic and achievable number.

tomcat wrote:

There were talk about 4% aerodynamic improvement with the A380+

At 505T MTOW at equal span and wing loading and A380+ style scimiters the effective aspect ratio would increase to 9.6. I feel that the average drag improvement at that aspect ratio would be closer to 8-10%.

tomcat wrote:

What about the range? Is see that the A380 has an endurance exceeding 16 hours. Wouldn't 14 hours endurance satisfy most of the needs? Why not trade some marginal market share to A35K and the 779 in order to focus the A380 where the interest is the greatest.

I reckon somewhere between 7.600 to 7.800NM vs. the current 8.200NM would be sufficient. It's not the shrunk version any more it can be range optimized when being centred around the 800.

Taxi645 wrote:

tomcat wrote:

Taxi645 wrote:

If the A380NEO will not be stretched and will use a GTF engine together with a rigorous weight saving program centred around the 800, I expect the thrust requirements for the NEO to be significantly lower than for the CEO.

That's where it's getting interesting. The future of the A380 is maybe within an A380 Minus. We are focusing our attention on Emirates, but it's probably not by offering more capacity that the A380 will attract the interest of new customers or renew the interest of the existing customers. In any case, it's current payload exceeds by a large margin the one of the next smaller aircraft on offer. So, let's consider that the current payload is satisfactory for most of the potential customers.

What about the range? Is see that the A380 has an endurance exceeding 16 hours. Wouldn't 14 hours endurance satisfy most of the needs? Why not trade some marginal market share to A35K and the 779 in order to focus the A380 where the interest is the greatest.

Where does this bring us? There were talk about 4% aerodynamic improvement with the A380+. Let's add a few % SFC improvement on the engines (let's say 4%). Let's shave off 2.5 hours endurance. If you put all this together, my uneducated guesstimate is that you'd save about 45 tonnes of fuel compared to the current fuel burn observed with the current A380 taking-off at 575 tonnes for a 16 hours flight. We're down to 530t MTOW without sacrifying payload. That's a roughly 8% MTOW reduction. Are we done? No, if you design for a lower MTOW, you can still shave off some weight out of the beast. With such a MTOW and retaining the current aerodynamic , the max thrust requirement could probably be reduced by 10%. Such a reduction could offer some saving on the VTP height, leading to savings in both weight and drag. Also, a baseline with thrust requirements reduced by 10% could look for slightly lighter engine and a slightly smaller fan diameter, delivering a small drag saving and weight saving (from the engine itself, the nacelle and the pylons). Or you keep the current fan diameter and target a further reduced SFC (my assumption of 4% is conservative). By adding all these extra savings, we're getting closer to 525t.

Now, if we consider a more ambitious SFC improvement (which would be the goal if Airbus would sharpen its pencil), say 10%, we'd save another 10t of fuel. We're down to 515t. That's where I have this question: how much lower should the MTOW go in order to allow a 16 wheels main landing gear. The A346 spreads 380t over 12 wheels and 3 bogies. Going by this ratio, 16 wheels and 4 bogies would allow for 505t. We're 10t away and to reach this goal, we can already cash a decent weight saving on the MLG and MLG doors & casing. By the way, 505t MTOW is 12% lower than 575t, there are further saving to be had on the thrust requirements.

To summarize, an ambitious A380 Minus would offer the current unrivaled payload, with slightly reduced OEW, MZFW and MLW and with substantially reduced MTOW, fuel burn and installed thrust. Granted, EK couldn't fly to LAX and AKL with such an aircraft and Qantas should restricts its transpac operations to SYD (MEL-LAX wouldn't work anymore), but would it be the end of the world for both these airlines and for the A380? I'm aware that the A380 is currently offered in weight variants lower than 500t, so one might ask, why bothering redesigning so extensively the aircraft to achieve what's already done with the WV's, while loosing flexibility at the same time. I'm just thinking that there is no point keeping a baseline design capable of 575t MTOW once you have NEOed it. There is not much extra payload you can get from the current fuselage length, so keeping the current MTOW would only extend the range, which is of little use. Also, the bulk of the demand is for smaller aircraft, not larger ones. So the emphasis should be on lowering the operating costs of the A380 with it's current payload. Also a lighter and less powerful version could only contribute to limit the costs of ownership. All this would increase the appeal of the aircraft in the market (I believe).

Finally someone using their imagination! Thank you.

tomcat wrote:

That's where I have this question: how much lower should the MTOW go in order to allow a 16 wheels main landing gear. The A346 spreads 380t over 12 wheels and 3 bogies. Going by this ratio, 16 wheels and 4 bogies would allow for 505t. We're 10t away and to reach this goal, we can already cash a decent weight saving on the MLG and MLG doors & casing.

Funny, that's the exact same thing I have been wondering for months. What weight would a 16 wheel lay out be able to carry? 505T seems a realistic and achievable number.

Some good points. I've thought about the MLG too.
The 747-8's MTOW is 447,696kgs. A fair amount away from 505t, but now sure if that's a good indication.
If the A350-900 is good for a 280t MTOW, could you combine another set for 560t?

AvWeek ( http://aviationweek.com/commercial-avia ... ales-chief ) ( free registration required ) gives us the names of the two candidates to become Leahy's successor:

Two candidates remain on the short list, according to industry sources, both industry heavyweights with the experience and skills to do the job: Eric Schulz, president of Rolls-Royce Civil Aerospace, and Christian Scherer, CEO of ATR.

And some characterizations:

The profiles of the two are very different: Schulz is an aerospace engineer with broad experience in various fields of the industry as well as different management roles. Scherer is a gifted speaker and strategist as well as a charismatic salesman who personifies the cultural vision of Airbus—bringing together people of various backgrounds.

And to bring it on target for this thread, some A380 chatter:

The challenges facing Airbus are related to execution rather than sales—with the exception of the A380 program. Leahy has, so far unsuccessfully, tried to convince the airline industry that the big aircraft is the answer for its capacity shortages at sprawling, congested airports. But given his efforts in support of the aircraft, Leahy did not want to be the one to discontinue it. A new sales chief will have to take a fresh, non-biased view on the issue and may well come to a different conclusion. And Enders, a hard-nosed businessman with little understanding for sticking to failing programs for the wrong reasons, would likely be the last to stop him.

Will the new sales chief have to learn the party lines such as "airlines are just not being bold enough" and "China will save the program in a decade or so"?

Revelation wrote:

AvWeek ( http://aviationweek.com/commercial-avia ... ales-chief ) ( free registration required ) gives us the names of the two candidates to become Leahy's successor:

Two candidates remain on the short list, according to industry sources, both industry heavyweights with the experience and skills to do the job: Eric Schulz, president of Rolls-Royce Civil Aerospace, and Christian Scherer, CEO of ATR.

And some characterizations:

The profiles of the two are very different: Schulz is an aerospace engineer with broad experience in various fields of the industry as well as different management roles. Scherer is a gifted speaker and strategist as well as a charismatic salesman who personifies the cultural vision of Airbus—bringing together people of various backgrounds.

And to bring it on target for this thread, some A380 chatter:

The challenges facing Airbus are related to execution rather than sales—with the exception of the A380 program. Leahy has, so far unsuccessfully, tried to convince the airline industry that the big aircraft is the answer for its capacity shortages at sprawling, congested airports. But given his efforts in support of the aircraft, Leahy did not want to be the one to discontinue it. A new sales chief will have to take a fresh, non-biased view on the issue and may well come to a different conclusion. And Enders, a hard-nosed businessman with little understanding for sticking to failing programs for the wrong reasons, would likely be the last to stop him.

Will the new sales chief have to learn the party lines such as "airlines are just not being bold enough" and "China will save the program in a decade or so"?

It's easy to underestimate the human side of things when looking at financial issues like an aircraft program. Leahy was the ultimate author of the market forecasts that made the A380 "business case" and his attachment to the big bird must have some sway in the organization. His retirement without another A380 sale makes cancellation more likely.

Matt6461 wrote:

It's easy to underestimate the human side of things when looking at financial issues like an aircraft program. Leahy was the ultimate author of the market forecasts that made the A380 "business case" and his attachment to the big bird must have some sway in the organization. His retirement without another A380 sale makes cancellation more likely.

True from a human standpoint but that is not how big ( aviation ) enterprises macroeconomics work.
I'll gladly buy you a beer if I am mistaken but
1. Airbus needs it to pressure Boeing's profits down, someone said that without the A380, the 777X would sell for $50 million more. With 326 orders, assuming a conservative 50% discount on launch orders, that is more than $8 billions Boeing won't get for the 777X alone. Add $20 million min. for every 777 sold after year 1999 (A380 launched in 2000), that's an additional 20x1450 = 29 billion min Boeing never got, to say nothing of a possible pressure on the 787 & 748, very crude calculations but they give an idea of what is at stake for Airbus.
2. And I don't see EK abandonning the A380, they want it in their guts, all their recent shebang is to ensure its financial & thus commercial viabilities. No matter the lack of sales, Airbus won't be stopping the programme until EK decides to.
As to the Chinese bet, well, it's a bate the Chinese evidently are in no hurry to take...

DWC wrote:

1. Airbus needs it to pressure Boeing's profits down, someone said that without the A380, the 777X would sell for $50 million more. With 326 orders, assuming a conservative 50% discount on launch orders, that is more than $8 billions Boeing won't get for the 777X alone. Add $20 million min. for every 777 sold after year 1999 (A380 launched in 2000), that's an additional 20x1450 = 29 billion min Boeing never got, to say nothing of a possible pressure on the 787 & 748, very crude calculations but they give an idea of what is at stake for Airbus.
..

"Someone said" -- easy enough to say but I think a bit far fetched. The 748i kept the A380 in check to some point as the A330/340 kept the 777 in check, as the A350 will keep the 777X in check -- to some extent. Most airlines are not going to be considering A380's vs 777X's so there's no leverage there,

DWC wrote:

Matt6461 wrote:

No matter the lack of sales, Airbus won't be stopping the programme until EK decides to.

It would be quite unprecedented for an aircraft manufacturer to keep a production line as expensive as the A380 running for a single airline. At some point it will become unacceptable to the board.

7BOEING7 wrote:

"Someone said" -- easy enough to say but I think a bit far fetched. The 748i kept the A380 in check to some point as the A330/340 kept the 777 in check, as the A350 will keep the 777X in check -- to some extent. Most airlines are not going to be considering A380's vs 777X's so there's no leverage there,

Yes, both OEMs keep in check each other products.
But the A350 is too small to keep the 779 in check.
The "someone" is upthread.
I studied a Harvard Business Case on the monopoly premiums the 747 commanded, they are consistent with that figure.
Now, it is not so much about airlines considering either frames, but about what each OEM can command for their darling model : any airline dead set on the 777 would have had to pay a higher price had the A380 not been around. The whole sales history of the 747 proves how Boeing used it as a tool to "subsidize" large orders, the fact is well known in the industry & Airbus wanted to replicate it with some 750 sales ( half of their VLA projections ). Well, the world capsized in 2001 & many other things thwarted that optimistic plan, ironically no one foresaw then the rapid rise of the ME3 ( QR & EY have one more A380 than SQ ), let alone the very unusual EK, an alien in the industry unreplicated elsewhere to this day.

douwd20 wrote:

It would be quite unprecedented for an aircraft manufacturer to keep a production line as expensive as the A380 running for a single airline. At some point it will become unacceptable to the board.

Well, yes, EK are quite unprecedented, nearly half the production, they are the only credible customer willing to purchase more & in numbers, reportedly 36-38 additional frames.
Also, the VLA market is a very "non contestable market", meaning the price tag to get out is as high as to get in or nearly. Airbus will lose much more getting out : this was amply discussed earlier in the thread.
And again, last but not least, you need to know some Game Theory to see how Boeing & Airbus calculate their strategies & synergies with their other airplane families. As counter-intuitive as it sounds, the production cost of each A380 is only one variable, the big picture factors in many other important ones.

There is always the A350-1100 option.

seahawk wrote:

There is always the A350-1100 option.

For time being & all practical purposes, the A350-1100 has beem officially shelved by Airbus.
The A35K is not selling like hotcakes either (169), as compared to the 681 orders for the A359, to which a number of initial A35K orders have been converted...

Reuters ( https://www.reuters.com/article/us-airb ... DQ0GR?il=0 ) now tells us it will be Shultz who will replace Leahy. It seems the board insists on having an outsider, even though Scherer was not implicated in the ongoing corruption investigations.

Revelation wrote:

Reuters ( https://www.reuters.com/article/us-airb ... DQ0GR?il=0 )
now tells us it will be Shultz who will replace Leahy.

Leahy's replacement is discussed in a dedicated thread viewtopic.php?f=3&t=1379691&p=19984039
And it is Schulz spelled à l'Allemande, with a C & without a T

DWC wrote:

President – Civil Aerospace
In January 2016, Eric Schulz was appointed to the Executive Leadership Team as President – Civil Aerospace.
Eric joined Rolls Royce in February 2010 as COO – Gas Turbine Services. He became COO – Civil Aerospace in 2011, before to be appointed President – Civil Large Engines in January 2013.
Eric started his career at Aerospatiale/Airbus. In 1989, he joined UTA French Airlines where he worked in several positions in maintenance and operations. In 1996, he became President of Air Liberte Industries, part of British Airways Group. In 2000, Eric moved to the US where he worked for EADS as President of EADS Aeroframe, which was a joint venture between EADS and Northrop Grumman. In 2003 Eric was appointed by Goodrich as President of Aviation Technical Services based in Seattle before becoming President of Goodrich Actuation Systems three years later, where he worked until he joined Rolls Royce.
A native of France, Eric holds two Masters Degrees: Mechanical Engineering from the Ecole d’Ingenieurs of Geneva and Aeronautical Engineering from ESTA-Paris. He also followed an Executive Leadership Program from the University of California, Berkeley.

https://www.rolls-royce.com/about/who-we-are/executive-leadership-team/eric-schultz.aspx

DWC wrote:

seahawk wrote:

There is always the A350-1100 option.

For time being & all practical purposes, the A350-1100 has beem officially shelved by Airbus.
The A35K is not selling like hotcakes either (169), as compared to the 681 orders for the A359, to which a number of initial A35K orders have been converted...

Further to that, the 777X is also slow at selling.

DWC wrote:

But the A350 is too small to keep the 779 in check.

I am lost on this one, the 779 is Boeing's replacement for it 773 which Airbus has placed the A350-1000 as its direct competitor, slightly smaller but more efficient, same as was done decades ago with the A321 and the 757.

Boeing has limited the number of pax on the 779 by the type of doors, so the 779 will not seat much more than the 773, so where do we get the the A350 is too small to keep the 779 in check, certainly not from Airbus.

Order still in the pipeline, straight out of the horses mouth at a very recent standards meeting, bigger issue however relating to crews and shortages. The target was to have recruited 270-280 FO’s this year for the 380, as of Nov 25th less than 60 have come through the system, hence it is now 380 crews rather than 777 crews working max hours.

par13del wrote:

DWC wrote:

But the A350 is too small to keep the 779 in check.

I am lost on this one, the 779 is Boeing's replacement for it 773 which Airbus has placed the A350-1000 as its direct competitor, slightly smaller but more efficient, same as was done decades ago with the A321 and the 757.

Boeing has limited the number of pax on the 779 by the type of doors, so the 779 will not seat much more than the 773, so where do we get the the A350 is too small to keep the 779 in check, certainly not from Airbus.

Glad I'm not the only one.

The 777-9X is only 2.84m longer than the 77W. With the same MTOW and weighs more.
And 3.11m longer than the A35K.

Really not a significant difference.

DWC wrote:

True from a human standpoint but that is not how big ( aviation ) enterprises macroeconomics work.

You're instantiating the thing that I'm saying is easy to do, and which I usually do: to apply rational economic modelling to human behavior while forgetting that it's partially irrational humans doing the behavior. Even the field of economics has moved beyond this kind of myopia.

Were Airbus' decision processes perfectly rational, we either wouldn't have an A380 or we'd have a much different plane: only a very bad kind of economic thinking could have produced this financial disaster. You'll counter with your arguments about broader benefits of the A380 program to Airbus, but even if I grant you those arguments, Airbus needn't have produced a product this bad. In other words, even if Airbus HAD to build a VLA, it didn't need to build a bad VLA that lost this much money and surely imposed some reputational costs. Airbus could have built, for instance, a 500-seater instead of optimizing for a 650-seater. That plane likely would have been better on both trip and per-seat costs and therefore much more popular and profitable (at least less unprofitable).

DWC wrote:

1. Airbus needs it to pressure Boeing's profits down, someone said that without the A380, the 777X would sell for $50 million more. With 326 orders, assuming a conservative 50% discount on launch orders, that is more than $8 billions Boeing won't get for the 777X alone. Add $20 million min. for every 777 sold after year 1999 (A380 launched in 2000), that's an additional 20x1450 = 29 billion min Boeing never got, to say nothing of a possible pressure on the 787 & 748, very crude calculations but they give an idea of what is at stake for Airbus.

I don't think this is how a competitive market in airplanes works. The A380 is not the primary competition for the 777-9; the A350-900/1000 as well as the 787 are. Airlines think in terms of dollars not seat categories.

But even I granted your argument that somehow the A380 will prevent Boeing from getting $billions, that's not how good companies work either: market-share grabs are not the point of a firm; profit maximization is far more important. In every aspect of the airline industry, companies have recognized - as other industries did long ago - that a smaller firm can be much more valuable than a larger one, especially if the larger firm's size depends on unprofitable market share grabs.

And please, don't make the mistake of telling me that because I'm talking about profit I'm only caring about some narrow conception of profit. As I said above, even if I grant your other points, there's still no justification for losing this much money doing what Airbus has done and is doing with the A380.

DWC wrote:

No matter the lack of sales, Airbus won't be stopping the programme until EK decides to.

But that directly contradicts everything that EK has said and done. EK is ready to order A380's IF production is guaranteed. That "IF" entails that EK does not believe it holds the A380's future in its hands. For your statement to be right, you'd have to know better than EK what impact an EK commitment would have on the A380's durability.

Matt6461 wrote:

Were Airbus' decision processes perfectly rational, we either wouldn't have an A380 or we'd have a much different plane: only a very bad kind of economic thinking could have produced this financial disaster

Even if Airbus HAD to build a VLA, it didn't need to build a bad VLA that lost this much money and surely imposed some reputational costs.

Granted. But Tthe A380 was launched in 2000 & conceived some 20 years ago, you cannot use hoc ergo propter hoc thinking.
No one denies that the programme has fared below all Airbus expectations. But then few programmes actually fare according to plans.
Notable FAILURES so far : Concorde, TU-144, L-1011, MD-12, A346, A380, 748i
Notable MEGASUCCESSES exceeding all initial expectations : 737, A320 ( originally set at 800 frames ), A330/A340, 747, 77W

Matt6461 wrote:

I don't think this is how a competitive market in airplanes works. The A380 is not the primary competition for the 777-9; the A350-900/1000 as well as the 787 are. Airlines think in terms of dollars not seat categories.

1. It's not just Demand that sets prices. Check Prices in Duopoly 101
2. The A380 & the 777 contribute to keep their prices in check, some tens of millions less, independently of Airline pressure.
3. The A350 & 787 introduced later must also play with the price pressure on the 777 & A380, so they they do not cannibalize them.

Matt6461 wrote:

But even I granted your argument that somehow the A380 will prevent Boeing from getting $billions, that's not how good companies work either

You are wrong & it's not "my argument"
Get hold of Harvard Boeing/Airbus Business case & read the proper literature & economic research, not the newspaper pop-science.

Matt6461 wrote:

And please, don't make the mistake of telling me that because I'm talking about profit I'm only caring about some narrow conception of profit. As I said above, even if I grant your other points, there's still no justification for losing this much money doing what Airbus has done and is doing with the A380.

You obviously are not a macroeconomist.
The 30 something positive aspects I elicited earlier about the A380 tell that the programme is globally positive for Airbus. I don't have the figures nor Airbus econometric model to quantify it for you, so I am sharing what my experience tells me.
Be sure that if it weren't positive, Airbus would have cancelled it. They did not hesitate in stopping the A346 with little more than half the orders the A380s now has, though I'll grant you that exit price was significantly less as actually Airbus did not get out of the WB market, commonalities & improvements on the A330 have made up for that handsomely.

Matt6461 wrote:

But that directly contradicts everything that EK has said and done. EK is ready to order A380's IF production is guaranteed. That "IF" entails that EK does not believe it holds the A380's future in its hands. For your statement to be right, you'd have to know better than EK what impact an EK commitment would have on the A380's durability.

EK will order the A380. Forget the sable-ratling, EK craves for the A380, at their financial conditions ( and wishfully NEO-ed asap )
Consider that EK have never said they would stop ordering the A380 : they have anything but incremented on their initial order for 5 (!)
It is only because of this consistency that the A380 is afloat. If not, either other airlines may have ordered more of it or the programme would have gone bust, we will never know because world history cannot be reconstructed with ifs.

CORRECTION on my comment above, cannot edit : I meant MD11 (not the MD12 that never was)

Slug71 wrote:

par13del wrote:

DWC wrote:

But the A350 is too small to keep the 779 in check.

I am lost on this one, the 779 is Boeing's replacement for it 773 which Airbus has placed the A350-1000 as its direct competitor, slightly smaller but more efficient, same as was done decades ago with the A321 and the 757.

Boeing has limited the number of pax on the 779 by the type of doors, so the 779 will not seat much more than the 773, so where do we get the the A350 is too small to keep the 779 in check, certainly not from Airbus.

The 777-9X is only 2.84m longer than the 77W. With the same MTOW and weighs more.
And 3.11m longer than the A35K.

Really not a significant difference.

Yes & No gentlemen.
Strategic maximazition is on the Flagship, now the A380 in everyone's mind & for most major airlines but CX, TK & US3.
Should the A380 be shelved, the 779 becomes the Flagship as it can have 48 more pax (414 per wiki) than the A35K (366) in typical 3 class layout.
That additional 48 Pax alone would allow Boeing to have a monopoly on the wider 777X version & thereby command the price they want.
The A35K & 778 are competing directly.

Interestingly, neither the 777-10 nor the A350-1100 are proposed. If the A380 were to be scrapped, Airbus would theoritically have to propose the A350-1100, but the current sluggish 777X orders & the threat of Boeing countering with a 777-10 are reasons enough for both OEMs to abstain, in fact financially & strategically they are both better off as it is. Situation may change in a few years, pending the A380 future AND economic upturn.

DWC wrote:

Matt6461 wrote:

1. Airbus needs it to pressure Boeing's profits down, someone said that without the A380, the 777X would sell for $50 million more. With 326 orders, assuming a conservative 50% discount on launch orders, that is more than $8 billions Boeing won't get for the 777X alone. Add $20 million min. for every 777 sold after year 1999 (A380 launched in 2000), that's an additional 20x1450 = 29 billion min Boeing never got, to say nothing of a possible pressure on the 787 & 748, very crude calculations but they give an idea of what is at stake for Airbus.
...

An incredibly stupid justification for a failed program. Throw away billions of dollars on a failed program in an attempt to hurt the "other guy's" profits by millions. "Penny wise, dollar foolish" comes to mind. If this was a thought of Airbus, and I doubt it is true, they failed miserably. Boeing's profits are higher than ever while profitability at Airbus is in the tank. Boeing has the cash to self finance new models while Airbus goes hat in hand to investor governments to renegotiate launch aid pay backs.

If this is known as "game theory" best find a new game.

Couprace wrote:

An incredibly stupid justification for a failed program. Throw away billions of dollars on a failed program in an attempt to hurt the "other guy's" profits by millions. "Penny wise, dollar foolish" comes to mind. If this was a thought of Airbus, and I doubt it is true, they failed miserably. Boeing's profits are higher than ever while profitability at Airbus is in the tank. Boeing has the cash to self finance new models while Airbus goes hat in hand to investor governments to renegotiate launch aid pay backs.

If this is known as "game theory" best find a new game.

You have no idea how this makes you look like in the face of the whole world.
You need to read all the thread before stating uneducated opinions like this.
Game Theory is now standard practice in big business & with public Regulation, Jean Tirole was awarded the Nobel prize in 2014 for this.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean_Tirole
You may also want to check amazon for the sheer amount of 1000p+ Econometric books he has published with the MIT Press or elsewhere.
You also need to read the threads here that explain how Boeing's program accounting is a pure gimmick, they are not doing as well as you think.

DWC wrote:

Couprace wrote:

An incredibly stupid justification for a failed program. Throw away billions of dollars on a failed program in an attempt to hurt the "other guy's" profits by millions. "Penny wise, dollar foolish" comes to mind. If this was a thought of Airbus, and I doubt it is true, they failed miserably. Boeing's profits are higher than ever while profitability at Airbus is in the tank. Boeing has the cash to self finance new models while Airbus goes hat in hand to investor governments to renegotiate launch aid pay backs.

If this is known as "game theory" best find a new game.

You have no idea how this makes you look like in the face of the whole world.
You need to read all the thread before stating uneducated opinions like this.
Game Theory is now standard practice in big business & with public Regulation, Jean Tirole was awarded the Nobel prize in 2014 for this.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean_Tirole
You may also want to check amazon for the sheer amount of 1000p+ Econometric books he has published with the MIT Press or elsewhere.
You also need to read the threads here that explain how Boeing's program accounting is a pure gimmick, they are not doing as well as you think.

If he has written a book, or article defending the gaping black hole known as the A380 program, why would I care? If he has, please point me to the book. As far as Boeing not doing as well as I think they are... what is obvious is that Airbus is doing much, much, worse than you think they are.

DWC wrote:

Couprace wrote:

An incredibly stupid justification for a failed program. Throw away billions of dollars on a failed program in an attempt to hurt the "other guy's" profits by millions. "Penny wise, dollar foolish" comes to mind. If this was a thought of Airbus, and I doubt it is true, they failed miserably. Boeing's profits are higher than ever while profitability at Airbus is in the tank. Boeing has the cash to self finance new models while Airbus goes hat in hand to investor governments to renegotiate launch aid pay backs.

If this is known as "game theory" best find a new game.

You have no idea how this makes you look like in the face of the whole world.
You need to read all the thread before stating uneducated opinions like this.
Game Theory is now standard practice in big business & with public Regulation, Jean Tirole was awarded the Nobel prize in 2014 for this.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean_Tirole
You may also want to check amazon for the sheer amount of 1000p+ Econometric books he has published with the MIT Press or elsewhere.
You also need to read the threads here that explain how Boeing's program accounting is a pure gimmick, they are not doing as well as you think.

DWC. I would like thank you for your contributions to this forum with solid discussion on Game Theory and how it affect real world decisions. I believe it to be the best addition of the year to A-net (in my opinion).

If you would, please consider that there is a difference between Game Theory and the decisions made and financial performance of programs and companies; and that sometimes companies (and individuals) make mistakes, or at least don't make the best decisions (I will personally plead guilty to that).

I would like to point out that once you get out of pure cash accounting... that everything else is an accounting gimmick to shift value from one period to another. These tricks were developed and implemented (with approval by government authorities) because they make sense.

Does it make sense to amortize a new building or piece of equipment? In essence, if you look at program accounting and how it works, you will see that it is just an amortization schedule that is based on Units Produced and not Time. Nothing really special or unique about the concept.

Years ago on I believe one of the 787 threads I pointed out that there are similar non-common accounting practices for such things as Nuclear Power Plants (it often takes 15 years to build one - with heavy investment up front). When I was taking classes for an MBA (while working for a utility) I raised the question of how even for many common things Utilities in the USA used different accounting rules; and the instructor conceded that. Worse yet for those looking for standardization: many times it's different for each State in the USA as each state Public Utility Commission may track and consider the same items differently. In my opinion, it's all just gimmicks created to get away from some of the negative consequences of using pure case accounting (and would also put about 2/3 of accountants out of business if all of these non-cash accounting "gimmicks" disappeared).

With all that being said: There are some real differences between Airbus and Boeing finances that cannot be hidden from anyone who looks at both with a critical eye. Boeing is far more open with data. The reason we know about the 787 "program accounting deferral" is that Boeing publishes the information. What is really interesting is that they also publish an alternate set of numbers if there was not program accounting. Many of the 747-8 program financial "issues" have also been published. Airbus hides as much information about the A380 program as they can. No one in the public knows the numbers like we know for the 787; there are only guesstimates at the losses, and continuing losses (Airbus's statement is that the current A380 construction program losses are "not material" - which in my opinion could easily be a $Billion per year depending on how you define "non-material"; but, is likely less than that).

If you take those alternate numbers that Boeing publishes... and look at the different companies financial reports over the years; it is obvious that Boeing has indeed done better financially and has more free money to spend over the last decade or so. I am not going to put numbers on those statements as in my opinion there is a lot more unknown grey in the Airbus books than there are in the Boeing books - and that grey between the two could sway certain values by as much as 10 billion or so (in my personal estimate).

Now many on this site love to argue about accounting rules and details; and just feel they have to win their point. In my opinion, they miss the bigger picture.

Please continue with your addition on Game Theory and how it affects decisions and options. I personally enjoy reading that and I believe many have found it enlightening. Please be cautious of stepping into arguments concerning accounting as I doubt there are more than 2 other people on this site who has real world working knowledge of what they are talking about. Theoreticians, even if they are technically correct, rarely make good practitioners..

Have a great day,

2175301 wrote:

Years ago on I believe one of the 787 threads I pointed out that there are similar non-common accounting practices for such things as Nuclear Power Plants (it often takes 15 years to build one - with heavy investment up front). When I was taking classes for an MBA (while working for a utility) I raised the question of how even for many common things Utilities in the USA used different accounting rules; and the instructor conceded that. Worse yet for those looking for standardization: many times it's different for each State in the USA as each state Public Utility Commission may track and consider the same items differently. In my opinion, it's all just gimmicks created to get away from some of the negative consequences of using pure case accounting (and would also put about 2/3 of accountants out of business if all of these non-cash accounting "gimmicks" disappeared).

There is no justification any longer for using program accounting for mass produced commercial aircraft such as the 737, 787, A320, A330 and A350. These should be treated more like commercial vehicles. There is more justification for program accounting for niche, low volume / high value models like the A380, 777X and 748.

2175301 wrote:

Boeing is far more open with data. The reason we know about the 787 "program accounting deferral" is that Boeing publishes the information. What is really interesting is that they also publish an alternate set of numbers if there was not program accounting. Many of the 747-8 program financial "issues" have also been published. Airbus hides as much information about the A380 program as they can. No one in the public knows the numbers like we know for the 787; there are only guesstimates at the losses, and continuing losses (Airbus's statement is that the current A380 construction program losses are "not material" - which in my opinion could easily be a $Billion per year depending on how you define "non-material"; but, is likely less than that).

So we know all the details of the South Carolina incentives and impacts? We know all the details about Boeing Capital, including the prices they pay Boeing Commercial and customer lease terms? We know all the details about military cost sharing and technology spin off accounting treatment?

Boeing 'publish an alternative set of numbers' because they are not building nuclear power stations, or other non-repeatable, bespoke capital equipment. They are bowing to market pressures.

Couprace wrote:

DWC wrote:

Couprace wrote:

An incredibly stupid justification for a failed program. Throw away billions of dollars on a failed program in an attempt to hurt the "other guy's" profits by millions. "Penny wise, dollar foolish" comes to mind. If this was a thought of Airbus, and I doubt it is true, they failed miserably. Boeing's profits are higher than ever while profitability at Airbus is in the tank. Boeing has the cash to self finance new models while Airbus goes hat in hand to investor governments to renegotiate launch aid pay backs.

If this is known as "game theory" best find a new game.

You have no idea how this makes you look like in the face of the whole world.
You need to read all the thread before stating uneducated opinions like this.
Game Theory is now standard practice in big business & with public Regulation, Jean Tirole was awarded the Nobel prize in 2014 for this.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean_Tirole
You may also want to check amazon for the sheer amount of 1000p+ Econometric books he has published with the MIT Press or elsewhere.
You also need to read the threads here that explain how Boeing's program accounting is a pure gimmick, they are not doing as well as you think.

If he has written a book, or article defending the gaping black hole known as the A380 program, why would I care? If he has, please point me to the book. As far as Boeing not doing as well as I think they are... what is obvious is that Airbus is doing much, much, worse than you think they are.

It's already been discussed in this thread, that the A380 is NOT the big gaping black hole that posters like you, would like to believe. They wouldn't be making decisions like the C-Series one, if they were that "worse" off.

Please move along if you want to turn this into a A380 bashing thread. This has been a great thread thus far.

Slug71 wrote:

It's already been discussed in this thread, that the A380 is NOT the big gaping black hole that posters like you, would like to believe. They wouldn't be making decisions like the C-Series one, if they were that "worse" off.

True, the "big gapping black hole" has been filled in with lots of money but after a slight bump up to profitability it will soon be digging a modest little hole as the production rate decreases.

As for the C-series the expense to AB was minimal compared to the possible future gains -- sort of a no-brainer. After being turned down by Boeing, they were out of options.

I would be quite surprised if Emirates gets the kind of commitment from Airbus they say they want. For Airbus that would mean committing to the A380NEO 2-3 years earlier than they otherwise would have to. Furthermore the engine for the A380NEO would most probably need to be tide to another program to share risk and cost (almost certainly Airbus so they are not dependent on Boeing for the business case of the A380NEO). It might even mean that Airbus would have to take a decision on a A330NEO successor (since that would most likely be the engine sharing program) 4-6 years earlier than necessary.

That seams to be a huge gamble to take for Airbus. Airbus would have to have huge confidence in the A380NEO and their long term product planning if they were to commit now. I would be quite surprised if they would make that commitment knowing how bad EK wants an A380NEO. It would seem to me EK would be overplaying there hand in the negotiations.

The acquisition by IAG-BA of many additional slot pairs at LGW, and the absence of the long haul aeroplanes to work them may be relevant to A380 for BA.

If BA were to acquire say 7 A380, they would allow a cascade down and release a lot of existing BA aeroplanes to work the new slots.

As there does not appear a glut of good used T900 A380 on the market, the best way seems to be to acquire new ones without delay.

2175301 wrote:

DWC. I would like thank you for your contributions to this forum with solid discussion on Game Theory and how it affect real world decisions. I believe it to be the best addition of the year to A-net (in my opinion).

Thank you for that, 2175301
Game Theory is totally alien & counter-intuitive to most people & one cannot be surprised at it being taken lightly, it also was when Nash first introduced his simple equilibrium.
I am well aware it is only one of the many indispensable calculations & indicators neither OEMs can overlook, there are others naturally some here have discussed well. So I am not suggesting it is the sole criterion, specially that I have given a very crude description of it all. Real decision trees are much more complex, diversified & quantified than what little I have written nor am I into the financial & industrial decision making of either companies, but know enough to know there is much more going on. Yet the beauty is that those simple textbook theoretical strategic principles are enough to explain the evidence that keeps unfolding, namely why Airbus keeps the line open & why EK will eventually get to an agreement, as ditching the A380 for any other frame will cost them way more with dire ripple-effects. In fact, this is a bonus, EK & Airbus seem engaged in what is called a "war of attrition" also described in Game Theory & it is my understanding that EK went a step too far & gave undue leverage to Airbus, who have nothing more to lose, while EK are in danger that Airbus shut the A380 with all the financial consequences to lease prices, fleet renewal & extension of their current business model.

I otherwise agree on most of your points, I know enough of complex accounting practices & window dressing techniques to grasp where should the true figures lie - interesting word. Depending on how one looks at these, one may always find unfair & occult financial competitive practices ; the agreements reached with WTO & then between the EU & the USA have done enough but cannot cover all. For instance, public aid extended to Boeing by several US states or fomer launch aids by some EU countries to Airbus can be debated at length, same for how juicy military contracts influence Boeing decisions & leverage with their civil sector ( technology, industrial processes, economies of scale with subcontractors, etc. ), all of which lawyers, economists & accountants alike can present in different forms, much is occult whatever either party claims. As with income tax processing, there comes a point where the ideal of getting more information & better practices is actually more expensive & detrimental to competition than actual imperfect asymmetric competition. That is where the so called "invisible hand" comes into play, but is actually nowhere described satisfactorily. Just to say that public figures from either OEMs do not tell all the truth, in fact most people do not look for the whole truth or the big picture, they want narrow & simplistic indicators that actually say very little of all that is going on. The rapid & immense rise of Japan's & now China's industrial power cannot be understood nor programmed by the bottom-line alone, much more is playing behing the scenes & no one can deny they are doing very well from their POV. Few actually realize that with so much of the 777 & 787 externalized to "Japan Inc.", Boeing have actually given Japan all the know-how they need to produce WBs if they wanted to, a point actually well-understood by former Boeing Commercial Aircraft CEO Alan Mulally. What I am getting at is that this is also potential but huge deferred cost to Boeing, but one that is neither in the books nor included in the FCF many here focus on. I personally find the large civil aeronautics sector to be a fascinating sum of all that micro- & macro-economics cover, so much richer than what mere corporate financial sheets downsize to

Egerton wrote:

The acquisition by IAG-BA of many additional slot pairs at LGW, and the absence of the long haul aeroplanes to work them may be relevant to A380 for BA.

If BA were to acquire say 7 A380, they would allow a cascade down and release a lot of existing BA aeroplanes to work the new slots.

As there does not appear a glut of good used T900 A380 on the market, the best way seems to be to acquire new ones without delay.

Haven't BA made it very clear they won't buy new A380s as they are too expensive? Unless they get Emirates type volume discounts, I would say that's a non-starter. IAC, what's the lead time on new frames at current production rates?

DWC wrote:

Revelation wrote:

Reuters ( https://www.reuters.com/article/us-airb ... DQ0GR?il=0 )
now tells us it will be Shultz who will replace Leahy.

Leahy's replacement is discussed in a dedicated thread viewtopic.php?f=3&t=1379691&p=19984039
And it is Schulz spelled à l'Allemande, with a C & without a T

Thank you for the information on the other thread, as well as the correct spelling of Monsieur Shulz's name.

DWC wrote:

Yet the beauty is that those simple textbook theoretical strategic principles are enough to explain the evidence that keeps unfolding, namely why Airbus keeps the line open & why EK will eventually get to an agreement, as ditching the A380 for any other frame will cost them way more with dire ripple-effects. In fact, this is a bonus, EK & Airbus seem engaged in what is called a "war of attrition" also described in Game Theory & it is my understanding that EK went a step too far & gave undue leverage to Airbus, who have nothing more to lose, while EK are in danger that Airbus shut the A380 with all the financial consequences to lease prices, fleet renewal & extension of their current business model.

Is that an over statement? Before I believe you spoke to the strategic and economic reasons for Airbus to keep the A380 open, the same ones I referred to as prestige and ego reasons ( ). Surely in real euros they will lose some more by closing down the line "early". They will need to repay RLA without the compensating income and they will have to pa the usual shutdown costs. They too will suffer from not being able to sell parts and services to the frames EK intends to buy, and then the knock-on effects to all fleet users as the "early" shut down of the line will devalue their assets and make parts instantly more expensive which may drive some marginal operators to shut down their A380 fleets, with more knock on effects for those remaining in service.

DWC wrote:

I personally find the large civil aeronautics sector to be a fascinating sum of all that micro- & macro-economics cover, so much richer than what mere corporate financial sheets downsize to

Yes, that is one aspect that keeps many of us interested in civil aviation. On the other hand, many here will say things like "I don't care that it's not economically viable, all I care is that I get a nice seat and a comfortable ride!". As my friend's father used to say, there's a seat for every arse!

Revelation wrote:

DWC wrote:

it is Schulz spelled à l'Allemande, with a C & without a T

Thank you for the information on the other thread, as well as the correct spelling of Monsieur Shulz's name.

Did you missed the C again ?

- Prestige only makes sense if there are megabucks down the road. And so it was, Airbus would not be today what they are without the A380, not sure if they would even have developped the current A350 XWB.
- Ego reasons is a pop-science concept, you don't get 4 european manufacturers ( before EADS was even formed ) working together on "Ego reasons" . Far more likely amchair CEO Egos setting on a the lowest common denominar

Revelation wrote:

Before I believe you spoke to the strategic and economic reasons for Airbus to keep the A380 open, the same ones I referred to as prestige and ego reasons ( ). Surely in real euros they will lose some more by closing down the line "early". They will need to repay RLA without the compensating income and they will have to pa the usual shutdown costs. They too will suffer from not being able to sell parts and services to the frames EK intends to buy, and then the knock-on effects to all fleet users as the "early" shut down of the line will devalue their assets and make parts instantly more expensive which may drive some marginal operators to shut down their A380 fleets, with more knock on effects for those remaining in service.

Yes. With the information we have, I just don't see Airbus closing the line.
But the A380 is less crucial to their survival imho whatever the consequences I predict, than it is to EK's own ambitions. So imho both need the A380, EK just more so Airbus can safely wait. Leasing contracts & fleet renewal strategy are what make EK so impatient. SQ will use the last 19 for 20 years or more. That's the price EK has put on themselves to expand so rapidly, they need lessors to do the initial investment so EK can pay monthly rents only.

Revelation wrote:

Many here will say things like "I don't care that it's not economically viable, all I care is that I get a nice seat and a comfortable ride!". As my friend's father used to say, there's a seat for every arse!

I am one of those ! I fly ME3, TG or SQ any time, even in Y.
But the most important thing is the destination, airline & class come second.

DWC wrote:

Revelation wrote:

DWC wrote:

it is Schulz spelled à l'Allemande, with a C & without a T

Thank you for the information on the other thread, as well as the correct spelling of Monsieur Shulz's name.

Did you missed the C again ?

Oh my, I can't seem to spell the man's name correctly!

I guess there's some Anglicization / Americanization influence I can't break.

I should just copy/paste his name from now on!

DWC wrote:

Ego reasons is a pop-science concept, you don't get 4 european manufacturers ( before EADS was even formed ) working together on "Ego reasons" . Far more likely amchair CEO Egos setting on a the lowest common denominar

We're going to have to agree to disagree on this one. Impact of ego (and other emotions such as pride and fear) probably can't be measured scientifically but it absolutely is a factor in major decisions including Apollo, Concorde, formation of Airbus, 747, A380 and many other major projects. Humans don't run on logic alone. See recent political events where people vote against their own interests i.e. logic overruled by emotion. Happens to CEOs too.

DWC wrote:

Yes. With the information we have, I just don't see Airbus closing the line.
But the A380 is less crucial to their survival imho whatever the consequences I predict, than it is to EK's own ambitions. So imho both need the A380, EK just more so Airbus can safely wait. Leasing contracts & fleet renewal strategy are what make EK so impatient. SQ will use the last 19 for 20 years or more. That's the price EK has put on themselves to expand so rapidly, they need lessors to do the initial investment so EK can pay monthly rents only.

I think this is closer to reality than saying Airbus has nothing more to lose on A380.

I think if we posit that EK needs the A380 more than Airbus itself does, then we should also posit that it makes a lot of sense for EK to seek "copper bottomed guarantees" for the future of the A380 whilst it still has something Airbus wants, namely the orders to keep the line open into the future.

If Airbus is not willing to insure the future of the A380, then EK is better off finding this out right now rather than finding it out at some indeterminate point in the future when it has even more invested in the program.

Personally I have a hard time seeing how Airbus could make the kind of guarantees we're hearing that EK is asking for, but that could be because we're hearing a false representation of the position, or it could be because EK is aiming high to provoke some/any sort of guarantee from Airbus.

DWC wrote:

I am one of those ! I fly ME3, TG or SQ any time, even in Y.
But the most important thing is the destination, airline & class come second.

For me, it's largely about minimizing stops. I try to avoid the risk of being stuck in some random hub city because of technical or operational issues. It also makes for a shorter journey. I frequently spend more or take an inferior seat for a non-stop flight than I would for a trip with one or more stops.

EK can 'double' its 380 fleet by extending leases 12 years. This goes against the EK grain, but could be profitable to both EK and AB. I am somewhat expecting for them to go beyond 12 years except for the earlier models. But probably not 12 years longer.

Game theory plays and important role in modern cognitive studies (my ongoing philosophy continuing studies), and indeed per Revelation there are a number of things going on as the mind makes decisions - rationality not being the biggest and most common.

Revelation wrote:

I guess there's some Anglicization / Americanization influence I can't break.

I made two grammatical mistakes in that comment

Revelation wrote:

Impact of ego (and other emotions such as pride and fear) probably can't be measured scientifically but it absolutely is a factor in major decisions including Apollo, Concorde, formation of Airbus, 747, A380 and many other major projects. Humans don't run on logic alone. See recent political events where people vote against their own interests i.e. logic overruled by emotion. Happens to CEOs too.

I don't see any of these being about Ego. They are about Vision.
In the end, if no one is prophet in his homeland at the beginning, Apollo was immensely rewarding in every way - starting with history & man on the Moon. Concorde is a technological marvel that led to France gathering other countries to work on Airbus, the 747 is a milestone in modern history & not just a cashcow for Boeing, imho the A380 has done well for Airbus, not as much as in predicted sales but the chapter is not yet over. It may be, but we are not writing it & have to wait to see how this ends.

Revelation wrote:

I think if we posit that EK needs the A380 more than Airbus itself does, then we should also posit that it makes a lot of sense for EK to seek "copper bottomed guarantees" for the future of the A380 whilst it still has something Airbus wants, namely the orders to keep the line open into the future.
If Airbus is not willing to insure the future of the A380, then EK is better off finding this out right now rather than finding it out at some indeterminate point in the future when it has even more invested in the program.
Personally I have a hard time seeing how Airbus could make the kind of guarantees we're hearing that EK is asking for, but that could be because we're hearing a false representation of the position, or it could be because EK is aiming high to provoke some/any sort of guarantee from Airbus.

Exactly my point. If Airbus doesn't budge, Game theory tells me EK have to scale back on their pretentions. Either way, I see them getting to an agreement, it's in the best interest of both, the best equilibrium to settle on. The boys will stop being childish & come with acceptable trades-off.
On a sidenote, I do not share Brégier's bet on China, but he & Airbus seem to, so for time being I grant them credibility, they have more info & experience than all of us combined. Now, if that scenario is true, Airbus have a reason to let EK pester all they want until they set for what Airbus is offering. If not, I still don't see EK shunning the A380 before the mid-2020s.

Revelation wrote:

For me, it's largely about minimizing stops. I try to avoid the risk of being stuck in some random hub city because of technical or operational issues. It also makes for a shorter journey. I frequently spend more or take an inferior seat for a non-stop flight than I would for a trip with one or more stops.

Here I can agree to disagree. Your last comment actually led me to phrase my first OP with a-net
Yet garners even less interest than Game Theory, never mind viewtopic.php?f=3&t=1379871

Bricktop wrote:

Egerton wrote:

The acquisition by IAG-BA of many additional slot pairs at LGW, and the absence of the long haul aeroplanes to work them may be relevant to A380 for BA.

If BA were to acquire say 7 A380, they would allow a cascade down and release a lot of existing BA aeroplanes to work the new slots.

As there does not appear a glut of good used T900 A380 on the market, the best way seems to be to acquire new ones without delay.

Haven't BA made it very clear they won't buy new A380s as they are too expensive? Unless they get Emirates type volume discounts, I would say that's a non-starter. IAC, what's the lead time on new frames at current production rates?

Thanks Bricktop. I was aware of the old comments from BA, who are unlikely to tell Airbus that the A380 is too cheap. I took Willie Walsh's comment with a pinch of salt.

I have not done the maths but the last time I did, the A380 list pricing was very low, when compared with everything else. I suspect that to purchase the new aeroplanes which would replace existing ones that trickle down would cost considerably more than the bill for the 7 A380s suggested.

As to lead times for delivery, yes, the production rate is going down. Airbus have the seating layout specification of the 12 BA aeroplanes, and this may be a long lead item. I feel sure that Airbus would assist with some prompt deliveries, by shuffling deliveries to some of their more reluctant customers. In any event, there seems to be a long lead time for all modern kit just now, with no end in sight. In the meantime, the A320 series IAG are currently taking can be treated as new capacity if planned retirements are retained. But this does not seem much of an option with the heavier metal.

In short, the lowest capital cost to secure a fixed amount of new capacity is by acquiring A380s. It may not be as impractical as suggested. Time will tell, your guess is as good as mine.

Taxi645 wrote:

I would be quite surprised if Emirates gets the kind of commitment from Airbus they say they want. For Airbus that would mean committing to the A380NEO 2-3 years earlier than they otherwise would have to. Furthermore the engine for the A380NEO would most probably need to be tide to another program to share risk and cost (almost certainly Airbus so they are not dependent on Boeing for the business case of the A380NEO). It might even mean that Airbus would have to take a decision on a A330NEO successor (since that would most likely be the engine sharing program) 4-6 years earlier than necessary.

That seams to be a huge gamble to take for Airbus. Airbus would have to have huge confidence in the A380NEO and their long term product planning if they were to commit now. I would be quite surprised if they would make that commitment knowing how bad EK wants an A380NEO. It would seem to me EK would be overplaying there hand in the negotiations.

They'll get the commitment. But I just don't see a NEO happening 2-3 years sooner. Airbus will want to use a GTF and the Ultrafan won't be ready until at least 2025.

I'm glad we (largely) agree.

DWC wrote:

Revelation wrote:

I guess there's some Anglicization / Americanization influence I can't break.

I made two grammatical mistakes in that comment

And I'm now realizing I should have written Anglicisation rather than Anglicization!

DWC wrote:

I don't see any of these being about Ego. They are about Vision.

Well, you are getting me to realize how cynical I can be. I have a hard time seeing any sort of visioning or altruism in almost anything involving business and politics. I see Sputnik not as a scientific endeavor but as a way for the Soviets to show superiority over the Americans. I see Apollo as a reaction to Sputnik and to JFK's fears of being seen as being soft on the Soviets ( a main theme of his earlier campaign was him falsely accusing the Eisenhower Administration of the same ). I've seen many documentaries where the principals tell us the goal was set that way, and none of the decision makers were interested in any of the science. We see Apollo died an early death after the goal was reached, science be damned. I see the DHC Comet as UK's attempt to get out in front of the Americans ( just watched a documentary where the principals state this as fact ) and in turn 707 and DC8 as a reaction. I see Concorde as UK's 2nd attempt to get out in front of the Americans ( we don't get much French perspective in our media, sadly ). Anyone doing the numbers ( even before the oil shock of the 70s ) could see the proposition was dicey, but so many bought in to the "drug like rush" of Concorde ( including the Americans who started up their own SST program ). I see 747 largely as Juan Trippe deciding he wanted to say "mine is bigger" much like SRB saying "size matters" decades later, and it turned out to be a grindstone around the neck of Pan Am ( and one can argue the same for Boeing in the late 60s / early 70s ). I see A380 in a similar light, so much ego involved that a whole lot of "fair weather sailing" assumptions were taken without much push back because the world's biggest plane was being built.

Well then, seen in that way, I am all for EGO VISIONARIES
If human history teaches anything is that leaps are made by self-centered geniuses.
Genius is not democratic, that is why there are a few geniuses for millions of obtuse I-know-better

JL is a genius, set Airbus ( not the Europeans ) to pass from less than 20% market share to more than 50%. And for a long time to come.
So I have questions :
1. Why is he not a European citizen by now ?
2. Why did Boeing not head hunt him ?
3. And more importantly : as a genius, he sees farther than most. He pulled the A380 bunny to all major airlines & most bought it. I deem the A380 idea was globally correct at launch time. But things have changed dramatically since 2001, as already discussed. So the million dollar question is : what arguments does JL have left now to give to Monsieur Schulz ?
4. Last, I cannot but notice ES ( Eric Schulz ) comes from RR ( and Airbus before that ). EK switched to RR to engine the last batches of A380. GE is with the 777X & EA said they would not invest more. RR's answer is pending further large orders & future engine tech availability.
So what in-house arguments could ES have to continue or scrap the A380 programme ?

You do not built an A380 just to stick it to Boeing. The A380 made sense as the 747 was the weakest link in the Boeing product line up at the time and the only one Airbus had no alternative for.

The same can be said for the Comet (jet airliners were a chance in a market under control of US firms) or the Concorde (supersonic airliners were a chance in the market dominated by US firms)

So if the products did not do as expected, was it really a chance in the market or someone's dream?

frmrCapCadet wrote:

EK can 'double' its 380 fleet by extending leases 12 years. This goes against the EK grain, but could be profitable to both EK and AB. I am somewhat expecting for them to go beyond 12 years except for the earlier models. But probably not 12 years longer.

Let's talk about the EK "grain". As I've said many times. although they lease initially for 12 years, they have kept many aircraft longer. IIRC the 772's lasted about 20 years and the 773's about 17. I expect that except for the initial 25 A380's that are scheduled for replacement with the current orders the rest will stay in the fleet well beyond 12 years.

par13del wrote:

So if the products did not do as expected, was it really a chance in the market or someone's dream?

Two companies did not bet BILLIONS, and one of them base their whole business model, around "someone's dream" or ego. The whole world went into an economic depression and resulted in record high fuel prices. Of course it did not do as expected. Should be no surprise. Most of us were going through a hard time then, airlines were hit hard. Which is arguably, why many say the A380 is now ahead of it's time. Fuel prices are now expected to remain down longterm, and the air travel industry expected to double by the mid 2030s. Theres good reason for EK and Airbus to reach an agreement. And theres good reason for Airbus to keep it going. Even if the -800 were the base model, I don't think it would have impacted sales much. Timing, Was the A380's biggest flaw. Theres no way Airbus could have predicted the depression in time.

eisenbach wrote:

My personal opinion is, that (unfortunately) the A380 has no real future and Emirates should focus on the 777. There is not so much capacity difference anymore.

But all the talking about the failure ("financial disaster") is not completely true in my opinion.
Airbus had no other choice the develop a 747 competitor, and in this regard Airbus was successful!

See the post of beaconinbound:

beaconinbound wrote:

Now think of a world without the A380. Maybe Airbus would have done another program like a slightly bigger A350 along a new A330. That would have most probably made Emirates the biggest 747-8 customer of all time (also flying 77Ws) with Boeing forcing Airbus' hand on pricing of smaller widebodies - pretty much what they did when the 744 ruled global aviation. Airbus would most probably have found themselves in a less fortunate position.

... and DWD (by the way, welcome to the forum and thanks for your good contributions)!

DWC wrote:

But mere profit is NOT the only criterion in business, contrary to what many US a-netters here think.
I am an economist, trained in France : many do not know that Jean Tirole - who also works in Toulouse, was awarded the Nobel prize in economics for all his pioneering research in "GAME THEORY". Strategy is core to business, specially in a duopoly where any project has infinite repercussions both in terms of line-up & sales down the road. The A330/340 program was essential but it is the A380 that made what Airbus is today, a game changer that convinced every airline still in doubt that Airbus was every bit just as big & good ( if not better ) than Boeing : while the 777 is a magnifiscent aircraft & a cash-cow for Boeing, the whale-jet is the new Queen of the Skies in everyone's mind from a communications point of view, however poor the sales compared to early projections, with many technological processes incorporated into the A350 ( or precisely, discontinued ).

eisenbach

Question: Do you really believe that Airbus needed to make the A380 to sell it's other airliners? Are there airlines out there that would not have bought A320s and A330s, but now will because Airbus also able to make a very large aircraft?