gia777 wrote:

ErichHartmann wrote:

There has to be a system to prevent sloppiness, there should be a 2 man rule, or something....I dont know but my saying is if Qantas, Lufthansa, etc name it....they are all accident free means their system are perfect

Or LH and QF are just luckier... There typically is a requirement for independent checks after performing maintenance on critical systems. But people still screw up. I recall an incident at another major carrier that also has an impeccable safety record where a fuel line came adrift from an HMU on takeoff because the mechanics didn't secure the fuel line's retaining collar properly and the independent checker didn't catch the error - even the idle power engine runup passed. The aircraft was spewing so much fuel after it got airborne that the control tower thought the engine was on fire. Fortunately that leaking fuel didn't ignite and the flight was able to make a safe landing. Don't discount Lady luck. As Earnie Gann famously said, fate is the hunter.

gia777 wrote:
You do not know that "they did not perform the repair". Furthermore, if an airline is running a company and an engineer says that they have repaired the fault/issue according to Boeing specifications/manual, then if the repair was not done in accordance with the relevant specifications/procedure but signed off by an engineer, is that still the Airline's negligence, or is it 'professional' sloppiness from one or more individual/s?

I'm not a fan of JT, I actually hated them for the way they treated their passenger like some doo-doo. I only fly them if I have no other choice (e.g. the time my uni bought the ticket for me). But I liked them because they started the competition and 'forced' others to lower their ticket prices, so I (and probably you) could fly with the other airline instead.

However, I'm sure that they are not that heartless and stupid to deliberately let an aircraft down just for some penny. I assume from your username that you're a fellow Indonesian (CMIIW) and you do realize from reading the local news that most of their mishaps is not from the technical side, right? It usually involves a sub-par CRM. I have a good friend who worked as an engineer in JT's domestic rival and he assure me that JT did follow all maintenance procedure correctly all this time and did a good job in maintaining their fleet (mechanically, not aesthetically). I suggest that you dropped our classic 'whose fault is this?' mentality and starts to think about 'what is the problem?'. I actually read that quote from a post by mandala499 aka Mr.Gerry (the guy who was somehow accused of being not credible by some in this forum), either here or on the old local forum. I've never meet the guy in person but ever since I saw that (I think it's during the Adam Air accident years ago), it actually changed my perspective on life. So Mr.Gerry, if you're reading this: Thank you!!

Also for posters from the EU and US who immediately judged and wildly condemned Indonesian aviation without any base, you do realize that FAA and EASA audited us and lift the ban right? If you still say that they're not credible and the lifting doesn't make a difference, shouldn't you be worried that those 'in-credible' institution also responsible for your country's aviation safety?

I've been a reader of this forum since I was in middle school in the 2000s and kinda followed the development of this forum as a guest since I don't have the money to pay for the membership. I did save up for the membership during college, but then a.net change the membership policy before I saved enough. Since then, I feel that this forum has turned from my source of aviation knowledge into some weird place full of fanboys and ignorant armchair experts who for some reason really wants every airline in the world to fly to DTW/MIA and to see Norwegian went bust. I hoped that the mods will do something about this and not just delete my post like before

gzm wrote:

We mean,if they had performed a test flight on that plane, they would have fixed it right. It is obvious they did not, they pressed it back into flight schedules instead.

How do you figure that. What if the test fight didn't show the issue or worse broke something else no one detected? This is about risk management. A test flight based on the MX done was unnecessary.

NOW I don't necessarily believe the MX was done properly or completely for the problems reported but that is a different issue. Had the test flight crashed then we would still have a crashed plane.

Not to mention you need special clearance for most test flights. Sorry but a test flight should have been completely unnecessary here.

osiris30 wrote:

gzm wrote:

We mean,if they had performed a test flight on that plane, they would have fixed it right. It is obvious they did not, they pressed it back into flight schedules instead.

Not to mention you need special clearance for most test flights. Sorry but a test flight should have been completely unnecessary here.

What was unnecessary is the 178 deaths. Perhaps they are not yet familiar with the new type. Now, you are not trying to tell us that what they did was justified are you? Seriously.... I quit!

Moose135 wrote:

gia777 wrote:

I must agree....TEST FLIGHT must be performed every time after the plane got fixed!

What airlines do a test flight on every aircraft after every repair?

Every single airline............in some folks' alternative universe.

gzm wrote:

osiris30 wrote:

gzm wrote:

We mean,if they had performed a test flight on that plane, they would have fixed it right. It is obvious they did not, they pressed it back into flight schedules instead.

Not to mention you need special clearance for most test flights. Sorry but a test flight should have been completely unnecessary here.

What was unnecessary was the 178 deaths.

That without knowing a cause for the deaths means it is IMPOSSIBLE for you to know if a test flight would have saved any lives. If you want to go back and address my points rather than responding with some non sequitur reply please do. Or if you would rather rage illogically then carry on but spare us the rest of us.

People died and it sucks but your "solution" has no guarantees it would have saved any lives. Hence your solution actually isn't a solution but rather a knee-jerk reaction that is poorly thought out and backed by 0 factual information. In short your solution is a feel good scam.

Starlionblue wrote:

k3nnis wrote:

Once they find the black boxes how long until they will let the public know what happened?

That depends on a lot of things. For one thing, the recorders may not have all the relevant information.

A final report typically takes several months at least.

I looked up some of the old AirAsia 8501 news items and found some answers. A preliminary report is due to be filed within 30 days of the accident. In the case of QZ8501, the Indonesian authorities chose not to make that report public and revealed only few details (it was for only internal use and those countries involved with no comment/analysis). A final report was to be filed within a year.

https://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFKBN0KU0A120150121

trent768 wrote:

........this forum has turned from my source of aviation knowledge into some weird place full of fanboys and ignorant armchair experts............

Careful there. I made a comment along these lines, albeit more hard hitting, a couple of days ago and the post was deleted. Someone somewhere has a low threshold of tolerance,

gzm wrote:

osiris30 wrote:

gzm wrote:

We mean,if they had performed a test flight on that plane, they would have fixed it right. It is obvious they did not, they pressed it back into flight schedules instead.

Not to mention you need special clearance for most test flights. Sorry but a test flight should have been completely unnecessary here.

What was unnecessary is the 178 deaths. Perhaps they are not yet familiar with the new type. Now, you are not trying to tell us that what they did was justified are you? Seriously.... I quit!

Until they determine the cause of the crash, there is no reason to believe a test flight would have helped anything. Test flights are not usually necessary after maintenance, and there's no guarantee they'll find any problem from doing one.

The only time I've ever even heard of a test flight, is after a scheduled heavy maintenance check - like a D check. Pressurization and pitot static systems etc, can all be "flight tested" on the ground with specialized equipment that simulates the aircraft being airborne. In fact, it's part of the sign-off process.

They actually really do test flights after heavy maintenence like a D-check for example.

One can be seen in a video of a KL 734 here:

https://youtu.be/a4V8W31YwTQ

Erebus wrote:

Starlionblue wrote:

k3nnis wrote:

Once they find the black boxes how long until they will let the public know what happened?

That depends on a lot of things. For one thing, the recorders may not have all the relevant information.

A final report typically takes several months at least.

I looked up some of the old AirAsia 8501 news items and found some answers. A preliminary report is due to be filed within 30 days of the accident. In the case of QZ8501, the Indonesian authorities chose not to make that report public and revealed only few details (it was for only internal use and those countries involved with no comment/analysis). A final report was to be filed within a year.

https://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFKBN0KU0A120150121

Thanks. It is somewhat disheartening to know that there can be such a long wait, even though I do know that certain procedures must be followed. I imagine if preliminary data shows that something on the plane may be at fault, a TSB may be issued for checks to be performed. I would say that is unlikely given the age and type of plane - but also equally unlikely is the aircraft-in-question's erratic climb-out patterns in its two last flights (one of which resulted in it being flown successfully and landed at the destination, the other of course is the cause of this thread).

Trin

If you look at Edward Limbong on Youtube, you can see the terrible CRM and state of training for pilots in the Lion Air Group(this guy is employed by Batik Air). In some videos when the FO is PF and the Captain is PM, he retracts flaps etc. without any callout from the FO. Even worse, in one of the videos when the FO is PF on the landing, they forgot to arm the spoilers. The captain notices right on touchdown and manually pulls the lever and laughs about it. Terrible, absolutely terrible.

Trin wrote:

Thanks. It is somewhat disheartening to know that there can be such a long wait, even though I do know that certain procedures must be followed. I imagine if preliminary data shows that something on the plane may be at fault, a TSB may be issued for checks to be performed.

If there is something in the FDR/CVR data that points to a systemic issue that can theoretically be replicated in other airplanes of the type, then we will know about it very quickly. Safety boards never make the world wait for years to solve a problem they know exists (or could exist) in other airplanes and that can affect safety of flight. They will work with the world's regulatory bodies to issue AD's or other notices to fix the problem, even before reporting on the accident. So we wouldn't know exactly what happened, but we could conceivably know one of the important links in the chain that led to the accident.

This has happened a bunch of times - probably the most recent example I can think of was after the Southwest uncontained engine failure this year: https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/20/faa-iss ... light.html

If there's no AD but there is a service bulletin, then it's probably safe to assume that whatever the service bulletin refers to *may* be related in some way to the accident, but probably isn't considered a primary cause.

If we don't hear anything quickly once the FDR/CVR are read out, then it's safe to assume that whatever happened was probably unique to this aircraft and/or crew. Or, that they just don't know enough yet, but that nothing immediately jumps out as a danger to other aircraft from that data.

I don't know what the laws and customs are in Indonesia regarding accidents, but in the US the NTSB does make the evidence they collect public and holds public hearings on it, so people can follow along with the investigation. Usually you don't need to wait for the report to have a basic idea of what happened. But Indonesia may or may not do that; I'm not sure.

The people demanding a test flight after every maintenance action don't grasp the concept of safety management. It is not possible to have total safety, no matter how hard you try there WILL be accidents. There will always be a balance between safety and other factors. For example it could be argued that having more fuel available equals to more options and therefore to more safety and therefore every flight should depart with the maximum allowable fuel load (limited by tank capacity/MTOW/MLW). While this is a valid argument, the costs of implementing this measure would be prohibitive. You always have to consider the probability of an occurrence and the expected consequences. The product of the two is the risk - so if you have a high probability of occurrence and massive possible consequences (f.e. during maintenance inspection there are many findings of damage to a certain principal structural elements, i.e. those which could case a catastrophic failure of the aircraft - this is just a fictional example) this operation should be changed immediately. This could be done either by stopping it altogether or by reducing the likelihood of occurrence (f.e. mandating checks of the affected element more often and redesigning the element) or by reducing the consequences (f.e. by installing a second, redundant part that could carry the loads if the first one fails). However, if there is a low probability of occurrence and low consequences it might be too expensive to change (f.e. once in 10000 hours of operations there is a mechanical failure of a fuel pump which would be indicated to the crew by a warning light/warning message and which is redundant and does not affect the operation). Anything in between has to be evaluated. I'm sure Airbus and Boeing did those evaluations when designing their maintenance procedures and decided that a test flight is not necessary in these circumstances (either because there a rarely any findings after the test flight or the evaluated the consequences as not severe enough).

gzm wrote:

osiris30 wrote:

gzm wrote:

We mean,if they had performed a test flight on that plane, they would have fixed it right. It is obvious they did not, they pressed it back into flight schedules instead.

Not to mention you need special clearance for most test flights. Sorry but a test flight should have been completely unnecessary here.

What was unnecessary is the 178 deaths. Perhaps they are not yet familiar with the new type. Now, you are not trying to tell us that what they did was justified are you? Seriously.... I quit!

It is poor form to edit your post twice after someone has responded and then to throw in accusations when you do is extra not cool. Add to that your temper tantrum and you have more than clearly demonstrated the lack of skills necessary to be remotely involved in an RCA and fix suggestions.

gia777 wrote:

I must agree....TEST FLIGHT must be performed every time after the plane got fixed!

Not going to happen. There are already procedures in place to have test flights after specific maintenance is performed.

I must agree....TEST FLIGHT must be performed every time after the plane got fixed!

Sorry but I laughed out loud at that statement.

They actually really do test flights after heavy maintenence like a D-check for example.

One can be seen in a video of a KL 734 here:

But that is a B737. The B737 has very old fashioned flying controls. The elevator and aileron can be operated manually if the hydraulics fail. Because of this, every time that maintenance is performed on these control systems, then the aircraft needs to perform a manual reversion flight test afterwards, to prove that it is flyable with a hydraulic failure. This is not required on any modern aircraft (from 1982 B757 onwards).

I worked as a maintenance technician on the ramp most of my life. I have never called for a flight test, except for the one time that we replaced the elevator on a D check on a B737.

hayzel777 wrote:

If you look at Edward Limbong on Youtube, you can see the terrible CRM and state of training for pilots in the Lion Air Group(this guy is employed by Batik Air). In some videos when the FO is PF and the Captain is PM, he retracts flaps etc. without any callout from the FO. Even worse, in one of the videos when the FO is PF on the landing, they forgot to arm the spoilers. The captain notices right on touchdown and manually pulls the lever and laughs about it. Terrible, absolutely terrible.

I dunno, I gave it a shot and I kinda liked his videos (they would be better if he'd talk Englis though), but didn't find those videos you're talking about yet. The rest looks ok to me, seen worse with western or more renowned airlines.

@Tristarsteve: Thanks for the insight and the clarification. I'm not a aviation professional and didn't know, but assumed that they don't do it on all types and that it's actually not common.

Tristarsteve wrote:

But that is a B737. The B737 has very old fashioned flying controls. The elevator and aileron can be operated manually if the hydraulics fail. Because of this, every time that maintenance is performed on these control systems, then the aircraft needs to perform a manual reversion flight test afterwards, to prove that it is flyable with a hydraulic failure. This is not required on any modern aircraft (from 1982 B757 onwards).

I worked as a maintenance technician on the ramp most of my life. I have never called for a flight test, except for the one time that we replaced the elevator on a D check on a B737.

IIRC the only time a flight test was required for flight controls on a 737 was when the elevator was replaced or work was accomplished on the elevator tab. While in manual reversion you determined if the amount of stab trim wheel turns to maintain level flight was within a set tolerance. The check only applied to the -300 and on and was accomplished initially at FL310. Later (737NG?) it was determined a similar check at 15,000 ft was adequate so the airlines didn't have to fly to FL310 every time they messed with the elevator. I don't remember having to do flight tests for aileron issues.

Trin wrote:

I imagine if preliminary data shows that something on the plane may be at fault, a TSB may be issued for checks to be performed.

I would imagine the same and I think it is pretty much how the Indonesian investigators handled QZ8501, where the root cause seemed to be unique to that particular aircraft that no emergency directives were necessary immediately following the accident.

The problem in QZ8501's case started out with a cracked soldering in one of the components that gave rise to nuisance warnings on several prior flights but was inadequately resolved by maintenance, and the pilots of the ill-fated flight weren't prepared to deal with what followed when they tried some improvised troubleshooting. A classic example of the swiss-cheese model where the holes lined up perfectly to allow a problem to go through and become a full-scale disaster.

Not saying definitively that it is going to be a similar sequence of events here in JT610's case, but when they talk about an issue that emerged in a prior flight with this particular aircraft, it is something to ponder of course.

A couple questions:
1) Since the conditions of the prior flight may be able to shed some light on the incident, I'm wondering: will the FDR and CVR have data covering that flight also?
2) There seem to be questions of the accuracy of the ADS-B data; would the plane still have been in primary radar coverage from Jakarta that could serve as a cross-check of the reported data?

trent768 wrote:

Since then, I feel that this forum has turned from my source of aviation knowledge into some weird place full of fanboys and ignorant armchair experts who for some reason really wants every airline in the world to fly to DTW/MIA and to see Norwegian went bust.

No kidding. Either that or its a rush to judgement based on zero facts.

On the bright side, news reports indicating that the black boxes may have been located along with the fueslage. That should help get answers.

flightless wrote:

A couple questions:
1) Since the conditions of the prior flight may be able to shed some light on the incident, I'm wondering: will the FDR and CVR have data covering that flight also?
2) There seem to be questions of the accuracy of the ADS-B data; would the plane still have been in primary radar coverage from Jakarta that could serve as a cross-check of the reported data?

1) The DFDR will have data from previous flights. The CVR might have some from the previous flight but probably no more. The requirements are a minimum of 25 hours for the DFDR and 2 hours for the CVR. This only includes time when the aircraft is powered up.

2) That is a good question.

gia777 wrote:

I must agree....TEST FLIGHT must be performed every time after the plane got fixed!

As several have mentioned upthread, that is unrealistic. Aircraft are "fixed" on a daily basis. Moreover, aircraft fly around with deferred defects all the time. If manufacturer procedure is followed this is all perfectly safe.

Test flights after heavy maintenance are often just the flight ferrying the plane home to base.

spacecadet wrote:

I have no idea how accurate any of these reports about maintenance logs or passenger reports of the problems on the previous flight are

Eye witness reports should always be treated with some level of skepticism. Reports often conflict or contain otherwise dubious details.

For example, there was a helicopter crash in the water near the Pearl Harbor visitor's center a few years ago. It was witnessed by dozens of people and a decent quality video of it was taken as it tried to make an auto-rotation landing, but stalled as the pilot realized his intended landing area was covered with visitors.

Some witnesses reported dark smoke, shaking, and unusual sounds. The video, in contrast, showed no signs of smoke, normal rotor sounds, and little to no visual indication of issues until the blades stalled, it began to yaw, and the descent rate increased rapidly. Other witness reports were fully consistent with the video. In short, some witnesses were reliable, some were not, and some even appear to not simply have missed details, but mistakenly "remembered" things that didn't even occur.

The investigators should be able to parse statements from passengers on the prior flight to pick out the details that are consistent, and especially anything that is consistent with maintenance records or any recorded flight data that might remain.

AirCanada777X wrote:

Although extremely, extremely unlikely, perhaps this is a MS990 repeat, because of the random nosedives. Like many others, I have the same questions for how such a young plane could suddenly nosedive into the sea like flight 610 did.

Potential explanations range from spatial disorientation to mistakes during recovery from an upset to a maintenance or assembly mistake. Examples of each:

Tatarstan 363 - probable spatial disorientation, leading to a nose down angle of 75 degrees at time of crash

Transasia 235 - Recovery mistakes - crew throttled back the wrong engine after a failure, leading an asymmetric stall and high speed impact.

Alaska Air 261 - Maintenance-related failure - the horizontal stabilizer lead screw nut failed, putting the horizontal stabilizer past its proper range of travel, making the aircraft uncontrollable. The crew made what was, as far as I know, an incredible feat of airmanship keeping the aircraft in flight as long as they did, but with the aircraft genuinely uncontrollable, the descent rate averaged 13,000 FPM for over a minute.

For such a young aircraft as the Lion Air 737, insufficient lubrication might be a dubious root cause of a hypothetical failure similar to Alaska 261, but that's not the only possible way a critical failure of the horizontal stabilizer trim actuator or related components might occur. Purely speculative ideas that come to mind range from a metallurgical issue with the ball nut housing or lead screw, to an assembly mistake, to a chafed control wire causing the actuator to drive to an inappropriate position.

To those that say a test flight is required after every maintenance item.

Would you say a test flight is required after changing a wheel? What about a blown lightbulb? Where do you draw the line?

The fact is the manufacturer has determined conditions where a test flight is mandatory, eg if you have changed the flaps or rudder (flight controls) it may require a test flight. A double engine change may require a test flight but a single engine change does not require one.

Now look at this case. An unreliable airspeed itself is bad but not recognizing the problem is the killer. A good conscientious pilot would flip thru the last few pages of the tech log to see what was written up on the last few legs..If he had seen the previous write up on the airspeed/altitude issue I bet he would have paid special attention to it during the take-off run. Having said that, I've never known any pilot NOT to look at the previous pages in the Tech log.

So lets say he did his job and checked the tech log, he would have paid attention to his airspeed and briefed his co-pilot on the possible scenarios and consequent actions. Now if something happened in the climb, his natural reaction would be to think it was related to his instruments and his actions would follow on that thinking.

The thing is we'll only know when the final report is released, Being the captain in an emergency must be the loneliest place on earth so I would cut him some slack until we know otherwise.

bug

flightless wrote:

A couple questions:
1) Since the conditions of the prior flight may be able to shed some light on the incident, I'm wondering: will the FDR and CVR have data covering that flight also?
2) There seem to be questions of the accuracy of the ADS-B data; would the plane still have been in primary radar coverage from Jakarta that could serve as a cross-check of the reported data?

#1) The CVR would probably not be required. The FDR would definitely be available from that flight and if it matched the data from the accident flight, would be plenty enough correlation in itself. It's pretty easy to tell from the FDR alone whether a climb is anomalous or not, especially when comparing with a known accident flight.

#2) Primary radar coverage is far *less* accurate than ADS-B data.

Any maintenance that involves air speed indicatior altitude, primary flight system or major parts of the plane, a test flight must be performed. Changing light bulbs? no need test flight. Use common sense.

gia777 wrote:

Any maintenance that involves air speed indicatior altitude, primary flight system or major parts of the plane, a test flight must be performed. Changing light bulbs? no need test flight. Use common sense.

I’m not educated on the topic - can you summarize the accidents that would have been avoided with a test flight under your criteria?

gia777 wrote:

Any maintenance that involves air speed indicatior altitude, primary flight system or major parts of the plane, a test flight must be performed. Changing light bulbs? no need test flight. Use common sense.

Sounds like you have some extra time on your hands. Here's some good reading: https://flightsafety.org/files/FCF_Compendium.pdf

Apparently the flight recorders were found and retrieved.
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q ... GcHpsgrRMM

https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q ... LQ8FUJ_hyy

I've been following this thread from the original post, and I've read some really cool things from people with a LOT of experience (moreso than myself, that's for sure!) and I've learned quite a bit - unfortunately, under these circumstances... My thoughts and heart go to the victims and their families.

I was a little off-put by the comment(s) about test flights being required after every visit to the MX hangar, for lack of a better word... I think some of us are forgetting to give a token of appreciation to the mechanics that work tirelessly, oftentimes around the clock, to get us to our destinations. Recently, I was on a HA flight that went mechanical for two hours. Amid the griping, complaining and commentary by a few fellow passengers, I reminded my travel companions that getting there SAFE is our first priority, and I would not want to be on the maintenance crew I witnessed running around outside. When we look at the global picture - and aircraft are in maintenance VERY often, even if for a broken PSU light or something bigger - we truly should thank the mechanics that keep our aircraft airworthy.

We can speculate until our faces turn blue... Boeing made a bad airplane [/sarcasm], it's ALL Lion's Air fault [/sarcasm], the chemtrails brought it down [/sarcasm], but the reality is, we won't know until all investigations are complete. Every one of those reasons, with the exception of the latter, have arguments on all sides. Boeing makes a great product in fact, yet there is the possibility that something went wrong on THIS PARTICULAR frame. Maybe it was crew disorientation, maybe it was anything under the sun... It's one thing to speculate and debate, and it's another thing to pass off conjecture as fact. As a group of aviation fans on this forum, we need to remember that anyone can access and view these forums, including (but not limited to) the families of those who passed, as well as employees and their families of Lion Air. Indonesians, as a culture, are generally the kindest people I've come across (bearing in mind that there is good and bad everywhere). The subtle innuendos that Indonesians "just don't care" that I'm picking up in some replies is hogwash... Their families and friends may very well fly the same aircraft they work on. Safety culture is relative. Some countries have stringent, ironclad requirements, and other countries are still trying to find their "ah-ha". Aviation, no matter where, faces the same growing pains. If there was a way to ensure that there will NEVER be another fatality, I am very confident that all carriers/governments would rush to enforce it. Until that day comes, please exercise some semblance of humanity... The type and age of the frame pales in comparison to those lost.

I'm done rambling, just needed to get that off my chest. Carry on, godspeed to those affected... And thanks to the contributors that share their wealth of knowledge with all of us!

MaksFly wrote:

Apparently the flight recorders were found and retrieved.
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q ... GcHpsgrRMM

https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q ... LQ8FUJ_hyy

Only the FDR has been found at this stage

https://twitter.com/jamie_freed/status/ ... 75808?s=21

gia777 wrote:

Any maintenance that involves air speed indicatior altitude, primary flight system or major parts of the plane, a test flight must be performed. Changing light bulbs? no need test flight. Use common sense.

No one does this, not even beloved Garuda.

Standard maintenance happens ALL THE TIME without incident and without test flights for every little thing.

What incident would a test flight have solved?

I'm going to go out on a limb and guess the captain's side airspeed fault that occurred in the previous flight was not corrected, and that the pilots failed to follow proper procedure for unreliable airspeed, which is to use the proper pitch and power to maintain flight (something pilots are supposed to know for each aircraft) rather than respond to any warnings or airspeed indicators (similar to AF447).

A Boeing flight magazine reviews these procedures in summary form (this is not a manual, but a magazine; I'm sure there are more detailed sources available): http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aeroma ... tonly.html

"Maintaining reasonable airplane control with normal pitch and power settings is the most important and fundamental activity when confronted with erroneous flight instruments. All troubleshooting should be done later."

pianos101 wrote:

gzm wrote:

We mean,if they had done a test flight on that plane, they would have fixed it right. But they pressed it back into flight schedules instead.

That's a slippery slope. Where do you draw the line? The AMM for the procedures performed, at least from the tech log entry we've seen, does not require a test flight prior to the A/C returning to service. The AMM is FAA-approved, so why should an operator deviate from that?

Yeah and if you're not sure you've fixed an issue like that, a test flight is not a good idea either !

spacecadet wrote:

flightless wrote:

A couple questions:
1) Since the conditions of the prior flight may be able to shed some light on the incident, I'm wondering: will the FDR and CVR have data covering that flight also?
2) There seem to be questions of the accuracy of the ADS-B data; would the plane still have been in primary radar coverage from Jakarta that could serve as a cross-check of the reported data?

#1) The CVR would probably not be required. The FDR would definitely be available from that flight and if it matched the data from the accident flight, would be plenty enough correlation in itself. It's pretty easy to tell from the FDR alone whether a climb is anomalous or not, especially when comparing with a known accident flight.

#2) Primary radar coverage is far *less* accurate than ADS-B data.

I thought you meant we don't need the CVR at all so I was going to disagree, but if you're only talking about the previous flight then I agree. The crew of that flight can simply be interrogated, and probably already has been.

gia777 wrote:

.......

So, What you are saying is that Lion air should fly test any plane after maintenance because they've had so many incidents?

sadiqutp wrote:

gia777 wrote:

.......

So, What you are saying is that Lion air should fly test any plane after maintenance because they've had so many incidents?

It's like saying a student must have higher mark to pass than other students have to have because this particular student has lower average mark than the others.

I read through Gia777s list of incidents and it seems that quite a lot involve skidding off the runways, aqua planing springs to mind. Quite often this is caused by poor runway conditions, not necessarily the airlines fault.
Another one was caused by them fixing an aircraft due to a bird strike. I’m not commenting on how they looked after the passengers on a 3 day delay, but they fixed the aircraft.(18/2/15)
Another one a flight was cancelled due to a problem with the engine (19/4/13).
A few incidents have involved ground collisions, something which has happened to many airlines at many airports including IST, DUB, STN, ORD among others.
This does not prove that test flights are needed, nor does it prove that the maintenance is poor. Remember Lion Air has been cleared by IOSA and is no longer on the EU Black list, there has to be a reason for that

gzm wrote:

What was unnecessary is the 178 deaths. Perhaps they are not yet familiar with the new type. Now, you are not trying to tell us that what they did was justified are you? Seriously.... I quit!

Any deaths or incidents are regrettable. Working in aviation, we are always aware that lives depend on us doing our jobs as best as we can. To say that they are not familiar with the Max 8.. Who are we to make that statement? Unless you work in engineering or tech services, you wouldn't have the data or statistics.

Pressing an aircraft into service is not unusual nor it is unsafe. That's why the MEL is developed. It allows you to defer certain defects till it can be corrected with the proper ground time and spares. The DDL records all defects deferred, and the commander has to sign for the aircraft pre-flight. If for any reason the commander is not satisfied, the jet doesn't fly. Period. For the flight to have proceeded, the commander must have been satisfied that the defects were resolved for the flight to proceed safely.

Could we please stay on topic. Whether an airline should test flight an aircraft after maintenance is probably best if it was discussed in its own thread. Let's keep this thread on the developments of this particular accident

Data recorder recovered:
https://www.bing.com/search?q=www.latim ... ORM=CHROMN

Indonesian KOMPAS TV livestram now reporting that the black box which has been recovered today is the FDR.

https://www.kompas.tv/live

Anyone know if Indonesia has the ability to readout and interpret the FDR data? I would think it would be sent to D.C. for evaluation by the NTSB.

Kompas TV is stating KNKT in Indonesia will read out the black boxes in KNKT office in Jakarta.

Readout is taking about 1 month according to KNKT.


(edit: updated info)

FlyingLaw1 wrote:

Anyone know if Indonesia has the ability to readout and interpret the FDR data? I would think it would be sent to D.C. for evaluation by the NTSB.

Generally the nation in which the accident occurred take control of the investigation. However the aircraft manufacturer and suppliers as needed are usually part of the team working with the local authority. But that doesn't rule out asking other agencies, such as the NTSB for help.

mzlin wrote:

I'm going to go out on a limb and guess the captain's side airspeed fault that occurred in the previous flight was not corrected, and that the pilots failed to follow proper procedure for unreliable airspeed, which is to use the proper pitch and power to maintain flight (something pilots are supposed to know for each aircraft) rather than respond to any warnings or airspeed indicators (similar to AF447).

A Boeing flight magazine reviews these procedures in summary form (this is not a manual, but a magazine; I'm sure there are more detailed sources available): http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aeroma ... tonly.html

"Maintaining reasonable airplane control with normal pitch and power settings is the most important and fundamental activity when confronted with erroneous flight instruments. All troubleshooting should be done later."

If it was an a/s and alt disagree I'm curious how lion air maintenance did not catch the fault. As a maintenance tech you would want this fault fixed the first time because if you don't it will result in an air turn back at a minimum. If the log page pic I saw is authentic then it seems lion air mx did not change anything the previous day because the ops checks didn't not show any faults. A full pitot static test should have been accomplished and it would have shown any disagreement with the pitot and static systems. A test flight is not needed.
Very sorry for the families who have to go through this. I could not image what they are going through

mzlin wrote:

A Boeing flight magazine reviews these procedures in summary form (this is not a manual, but a magazine; I'm sure there are more detailed sources available): http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aeroma ... tonly.html

The accident case studies in the above link (near the bottom of the linked page) have a lot of parallels with the accident flight - two in particular sound like a very similar profile, with a crash occurring shortly after takeoff. In all cases, airspeed instruments disagreed between the captain and first officer - leading to massive confusion as one bank of instruments showed a stall and the other an overspeed.

This one's a particularly eerie parallel given the fatality count...

In February 1996, a Boeing 757 crashed after takeoff from the International Airport of Puerto Plata, Dominican Republic. After climbing through 7,300 ft, the airplane descended until it crashed into the Atlantic Ocean about 5 mi off the coast of the Dominican Republic. All 189 people on board were killed, and the airplane was destroyed.

JT610 could've been in VMC, and while altitude is easy to determine in VMC, airspeed, in particular airspeed over an ocean, might not be - particularly with a simultaneous stick shaker and overspeed clicker going off.