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PixelFlight
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Sun Dec 02, 2018 6:08 am

1989worstyear wrote:
I'm not deflecting to the A320 - I'm just saying it hasn't been made obsolete 30 years later and will likely last another 30, so adding all the features Pixel is talking about won't be available on an NB until then. I think we're all in agreement that the 737 core architecture is held down by the Jimi Hendrix era it came from, and this tragedy might indicate the layering approach has gone too far.

A320 have 3 ADIRUs. Each flight computers takes input from all 3 and compares them. So from an architecture point of view, the A320 could be upgraded with a more modern algorithm than the actual voting algorithm. It look like the original A320 flight computers are x86 and m68k clusters programmed in pascal for the command channel and in assembly for the surveillance channel by two independent teams. I don't know if it's still the same today, but in that case, it certainly take a lot of work to add a major new feature. There at least have certified a new version for the A320neo.
 
ikramerica
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Sun Dec 02, 2018 6:41 am

jetmatt777 wrote:
stratclub wrote:
Interested wrote:
Should those pilots not be suspended etc for not turning back during that flight. Had they turned back would we be even in a thread about a disaster now? Them turning back would have shown the plane not airworthy and maybe got a better maintenance job done etc?


Without a doubt. I'm sure that if their bodies are ever found they will be sitting in front of HR with their union rep.


I think he’s talking about the pilots from the prior flight who flew the entire trip with stick shaker activated and manually trimming.

To be fair the flight is a very short one. I was critic of the pilots continuing but it’s possible that considering the conditions and trajectories to the destination vs attempting a return, continuing on might have been safer. It might have been equal in terms of time and less risky in terms of not attempting a 180.
Of all the things to worry about... the Wookie has no pants.
 
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zeke
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Sun Dec 02, 2018 7:18 am

Yeah the “very short” 500+nm trip.

They did not return to DPS because the checklists they ran said they did need to divert.

I am not familiar with specific Indonesian rules, under ICAO practices what the crew did on the DPS-CGK sector was acceptable.

For example it is acceptable on a quad to keep going after an engine failure. The time an aircraft needs to be airworthy is at dispatch.
Human rights lawyers are "ambulance chasers of the very worst kind.'" - Sky News
 
ryanov
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Sun Dec 02, 2018 7:18 am

As it says in the preliminary report, they read and followed the appropriate checklists, which did NOT say “land at the nearest appropriate airport.” I suppose one could fault them for not seeing this as more serious, but they did what was necessary and safely completed the flight.

Reading and absorbing the preliminary report while seated comfortably on the ground seems to be beyond some of the posters making criticisms, so I’m not sure what makes them feel qualified to second guess the pilots.
 
ikramerica
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Sun Dec 02, 2018 7:49 am

zeke wrote:
Yeah the “very short” 500+nm trip.

They did not return to DPS because the checklists they ran said they did need to divert.

I am not familiar with specific Indonesian rules, under ICAO practices what the crew did on the DPS-CGK sector was acceptable.

For example it is acceptable on a quad to keep going after an engine failure. The time an aircraft needs to be airworthy is at dispatch.

After experiencing the problem running through the checklist and then the options it’s very possible they were near halfway. I didn’t remember reading anything about them flying at a reduced speed. Flying over mountains do you turn back or continue when regulations say you can continue?
Of all the things to worry about... the Wookie has no pants.
 
SimpleFlying
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Sun Dec 02, 2018 8:44 am

PixelFlight wrote:
1989worstyear wrote:
I'm not deflecting to the A320 - I'm just saying it hasn't been made obsolete 30 years later and will likely last another 30, so adding all the features Pixel is talking about won't be available on an NB until then. I think we're all in agreement that the 737 core architecture is held down by the Jimi Hendrix era it came from, and this tragedy might indicate the layering approach has gone too far.

A320 have 3 ADIRUs. Each flight computers takes input from all 3 and compares them. So from an architecture point of view, the A320 could be upgraded with a more modern algorithm than the actual voting algorithm. It look like the original A320 flight computers are x86 and m68k clusters programmed in pascal for the command channel and in assembly for the surveillance channel by two independent teams. I don't know if it's still the same today, but in that case, it certainly take a lot of work to add a major new feature. There at least have certified a new version for the A320neo.


PixelFlight, do you think it's possible to retrofit 737 will full FBW flight control?

The reason I ask is because we have done controls retrofit for a gas tubine generator / compressor package. Retrofitting from legacy relay based control to full PLC control. It's very doable and the engineering is not overly hard. So philosophically it should also be doable in 737 case.

Thanks.
 
maint123
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Sun Dec 02, 2018 9:10 am

Have the pilots of the 3rd flight accepted anywhere that they used manual trim to fly the plane or is it just being assumed here ?
After switching off the electrical trim , i understand the only way is to use manual trim but the pilots have been awfully quite and i would like to hear from them how they got the plane home.
 
patplan
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Sun Dec 02, 2018 9:41 am

maint123 wrote:
Have the pilots of the 3rd flight accepted anywhere that they used manual trim to fly the plane or is it just being assumed here ?
After switching off the electrical trim , i understand the only way is to use manual trim but the pilots have been awfully quite and i would like to hear from them how they got the plane home.


I think they are being "sequestered" for many reasons. The first reason, the most obvious, is because they are still in the state of shock. The second reason is to assist the investigation. The third reason, somewhat linked to #2, is to minimize the outflow of information, especially from the two pilots who perhaps have direct knowledge and details about PK-LQP "behavior" the night prior to the crash. The fourth is their lawyers possibly wanting them to stay quiet for now? And, so on.

In due course, their perspective having directly fly that aircraft with more or less the same malfunctions and having live to tell about it will answer some of our questions as well.

BTW, how long before "Sully" started freely answering/speaking to the media after that miracle?
 
fadecfault
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Sun Dec 02, 2018 10:51 am

ferpe wrote:
I guess my question remains. fadecfault or someone else:

Is the Stall ID information in the SYMD and FCC different? As is now clear from the traces we are not facing an MCAS range AoA situation for JT610 (or previous flight), the SYMD must have full Stall ID to start the stick shaker. It means the aircraft is flying in the stall AoA range the whole previous flight and for all the fatal flight except a short moment. With this AoA, does the FCC have Stall ID?

A) If not the Stall trim loop in the FCC has other trigger criteria than the pre-Stall MCAS loop. Why in such a case is MCAS allowed to have laxer rules than Stall? The trim authority seems to be the same, other than it's not clear if the Stall trim is stopped after 10s, waits and then continues. It might continue until the AoA goes below stall value.

B) If the Stall criteria in the FCC is the same for MCAS and Stall trim the Lion Air scenario is not a concern for the 737 MAX but for both 737 NG and MAX.

The absence of FAA being active on the NG points to A. But is this the case really? Or is there something wrong in my logic?


I could not find a full logic diagram for Speed Trim Stall recovery. I agree with you this accident could happened to a NG crew not paying attention.
Here is the Text I found for the NG:

"The FCC trims the stabilizer nose down as speed decreases and
to allow for speed trim above the stickshaker AOA and idle thrust.
When the stabilizer position reaches its limit, the trim stops. When
the trim starts to exceed the aft column cutout position, the trim
stops. The FCC stops the speed trim function if the roll angle is
more than 40 degrees."

Aircraft with Elevator Feel Shift Module:
"During a stall, the FCCs command the stabilizer to trim the
airplane nose down. The EFSM and column cut-out switch
modules operate to make sure the pilot cannot easily stop this
automatic stabilizer movement with the elevator control column
nose up input."

Here is a summary for the smyd stall warning:
Normal Stall Warning
Normal stall warning uses this data:
- Angle of attack (AOA)
- TE flap position
- LE flap and slat asymmetry information
- LE uncommanded motion (UCM) information
- Engine thrust settings (N1 and N2)
- Computed airspeed (VCAS)
- Wing and engine thermal anti-ice switch (TAI) status
A normal stall warning schedule sets the AOA trip point for each
TE flap position. The AOA trip point values change from 13.0 to
23.5 degrees depending on flap position. If the AOA is more than
the trip point for a TE flap position, the SMYDs send a stall
warning signal to the column stick shakers.
The SMYDs use the other data for bias calculations. If a bias is
active, the SMYDs send a stall warning signal at a lower AOA.
The SMYDs calculate all biases simultaneously and use the
highest bias. The SMYDs subtract the highest active bias from the
normal trip point schedule to decrease the trip point. These are the
biases that the SMYD calculates:
- LE flap and slat asymmetry bias (10.2 - 15.0)
- High thrust bias (0 - 13.6)
- LE UCM bias (2.3 - 6.7)
- TAI bias (0.8 - 5.3)
Last edited by fadecfault on Sun Dec 02, 2018 11:11 am, edited 1 time in total.
The views and opinions written here are my own and do not reflect those of my employer.
 
mandala499
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Sun Dec 02, 2018 10:57 am

zeke wrote:
Yeah the “very short” 500+nm trip.
They did not return to DPS because the checklists they ran said they did need to divert.
I am not familiar with specific Indonesian rules, under ICAO practices what the crew did on the DPS-CGK sector was acceptable.

Yeaps. There is a difference between right and acceptable...
With hindsight, returning to DPS would be the right thing.

ikramerica wrote:
After experiencing the problem running through the checklist and then the options it’s very possible they were near halfway. I didn’t remember reading anything about them flying at a reduced speed. Flying over mountains do you turn back or continue when regulations say you can continue?

They didn't continue at reduced speed, but they did fly lower, at FL280, because they can't go into RVSM airspace with only 1 primary air data system deemed as correct.
And no, there were no mountain ranges there.
They decided to continue early on in the flight not long after they've done the checklist.

SimpleFlying wrote:
PixelFlight, do you think it's possible to retrofit 737 will full FBW flight control?

You can... but the certification changes would make designing a new aircraft more attractive.
When losing situational awareness, pray Cumulus Granitus isn't nearby !
 
rocketPower
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Sun Dec 02, 2018 11:44 am

Southwest is adding the aoa option to it's MAX fleet, I assume because they want the AOA DISAGREE message that can give better awareness.

https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safe ... max-fleet/

Could they make Boeing pay for it?
rocketPower

Life is about enjoying being uncomfortable. If you're complacent, something is wrong!
 
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neutrino
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Sun Dec 02, 2018 12:43 pm

I just flown on (Thai) LionAir two nights ago from Bkk to Sin on a 737-900. It was 100% full.
My outgoing flight four days earlier was on a 737-9MAX, with a 95% pax load. It was my first MAX experience. After the door closed, I requested and was granted the move to the only completely empty row on the starboard side, in line with the fan blades. Watching that big LEAP so closeup for the best part of an hour was great. Nice flight, with friendly, attentive FAs. Would go on a MAX again, anytime (JT610 notwithstanding).
Potestatem obscuri lateris nescitis
 
mxaxai
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Sun Dec 02, 2018 12:52 pm

mandala499 wrote:
zeke wrote:
Yeah the “very short” 500+nm trip.
They did not return to DPS because the checklists they ran said they did need to divert.
I am not familiar with specific Indonesian rules, under ICAO practices what the crew did on the DPS-CGK sector was acceptable.

Yeaps. There is a difference between right and acceptable...
With hindsight, returning to DPS would be the right thing.

Or, as someone once put it, there are no good decisions, only correct decisions to make. Whether a decision is good can only be determined in hindsight. Correct decisions are the best for a given set of information at a point in time, regardless whether they turn out to be bad in the end.
Of course, future decisions should be influenced by identified bad past decisions, so what was the correct action yesterday may not be correct tomorrow.
 
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PixelFlight
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Sun Dec 02, 2018 3:20 pm

SimpleFlying wrote:
PixelFlight, do you think it's possible to retrofit 737 will full FBW flight control?

The reason I ask is because we have done controls retrofit for a gas tubine generator / compressor package. Retrofitting from legacy relay based control to full PLC control. It's very doable and the engineering is not overly hard. So philosophically it should also be doable in 737 case.

I don't know for full FBW, but I think an upgraded avionic is unavoidable in the future, when this will happen is the question. Nobody will understand why a particular model still have an obsolete avionic while the same manufacturer use a safer new avionic on others models. Now the extend of a such project will depend on the objectives. If the goal is to keep the same sensors and actuators to replace the old computers by an AFDX network of new computers, this would be certainly the quickest path given the B787 achievement. This would bring the required platform to integrate more advanced and safer algorithms. If the goal is to have a full FBW flight control, the previous goal will still be required, but with a lot more work on the way to handle both human actions and computers actions, as there are actually heavy coupled by a lot of mechanics on the B737. I don't know what decision Boeing could make regarding this, but it's easy to observe that each new generation of aircraft go toward a less, if still any, mechanical coupling between human actions and computer actions. It's a rater radical change for a B737, up to the point that a clean sheet design could maybe be preferred. Regardless of the the goals and the way of doing, it will be a marketing decision to still call it a B737.
 
smartplane
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Sun Dec 02, 2018 6:08 pm

mxaxai wrote:
mandala499 wrote:
zeke wrote:
Yeah the “very short” 500+nm trip.
They did not return to DPS because the checklists they ran said they did need to divert.
I am not familiar with specific Indonesian rules, under ICAO practices what the crew did on the DPS-CGK sector was acceptable.

Yeaps. There is a difference between right and acceptable...
With hindsight, returning to DPS would be the right thing.

Or, as someone once put it, there are no good decisions, only correct decisions to make. Whether a decision is good can only be determined in hindsight. Correct decisions are the best for a given set of information at a point in time, regardless whether they turn out to be bad in the end.
Of course, future decisions should be influenced by identified bad past decisions, so what was the correct action yesterday may not be correct tomorrow.

Reminds me of........ There are old pilots. And there are bold pilots. But there are no old, bold pilots.
 
ferpe
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Sun Dec 02, 2018 6:14 pm

fadecfault wrote:
I could not find a full logic diagram for Speed Trim Stall recovery. I agree with you this accident could happened to a NG crew not paying attention.
Here is the Text I found for the NG:


Thanks fadecfault, new and good information. As the AoA bias, for whatever reason, was 20° we are firmly in the Stall region more than any MCAS region. It might be the FCC has filtering criteria which degrade the trimming from Stall trimming to MCAS trimming. It will ultimately come forward why this is considered limited to the MAX. I'm not convinced it is until we know about such additional filtering when it hits Stall ID in the FCC.
Non French in France
 
CO953
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Sun Dec 02, 2018 10:12 pm

wingman wrote:


I agree with what you're saying but would honestly be shocked and very upset of Boeing is discovered to have designed a poor system knowingly and then worked to cover that up to their customers. If they did do so then billions will get paid and execs may go to prison (again, rightly so). While it's no consolidation to the victims and their families I sincerely hope that Boeing thought the emergency response (hit switch and hand fly to nearest airport) was well known/intuitive. The prior crew knowing it would be testament to that. Passing the incident details to the next crew would've saved 189 lives, and somewhere along the way both incidents should have led to a global directive and proper fix without the lives lost.


wingman wrote:
wingman wrote:

.......................................
Just as thought:

I agree with what you're saying but would honestly be shocked and very upset of Boeing is discovered to have designed a poor system knowingly and then worked to cover that up to their customers. If they did do so then billions will get paid and execs may go to prison (again, rightly so). While it's no consolidation to the victims and their families I sincerely hope that Boeing thought the emergency response (hit switch and hand fly to nearest airport) was well known/intuitive. The prior crew knowing it would be testament to that. Passing the incident details to the next crew would've saved 189 lives, and somewhere along the way both incidents should have led to a global directive and proper fix without the lives lost.


This is the quintessential tragedy of the "swiss-cheese" nature of aviation progress. It will likely apply as long as aircraft design moves forward. At some point an airframe "ripens," and reaches an age where most of the Swiss cheese holes have been plugged. Case in point, the DC-10, which has had, and is still having what I would consider an epic run in shipping transportation history, after a chequered one in passenger transport. Of course, the holes never really disappear with any design, because holes due to aging replace those created due to the uncharted territory of a newer design.

What I mean is that the DC-3 has probably encountered every design-based Swiss-cheese hole it will ever have, disregarding age-and maintenance-related ones

We could all fly DC-3s, or MD-80 or 747-400s for that matter, and at least feel that the Swiss is pretty unlikely to get us, as far as the aircraft design is concerned.

The best I think we can hope for with any new design is that the aircraft-spawned holes are proactively identified and "extincted" as soon as possible
 
FTMCPIUS
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Mon Dec 03, 2018 4:36 am

My understanding is the FDR and CVR are located side by side on most aircraft. If that is the case with the 737 the CVR cannot be all that far from where the FDR was located. Wonder what obstacles the search team are facing.
 
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zeke
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Mon Dec 03, 2018 4:59 am

FTMCPIUS wrote:
My understanding is the FDR and CVR are located side by side on most aircraft. If that is the case with the 737 the CVR cannot be all that far from where the FDR was located. Wonder what obstacles the search team are facing.


The CVR location is the aft cargo hold, the FDR in the ceiling of the rear passenger cabin.
Human rights lawyers are "ambulance chasers of the very worst kind.'" - Sky News
 
rocketPower
Posts: 105
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Mon Dec 03, 2018 10:01 am

PixelFlight wrote:
SimpleFlying wrote:
PixelFlight, do you think it's possible to retrofit 737 will full FBW flight control?

The reason I ask is because we have done controls retrofit for a gas tubine generator / compressor package. Retrofitting from legacy relay based control to full PLC control. It's very doable and the engineering is not overly hard. So philosophically it should also be doable in 737 case.

I don't know for full FBW, but I think an upgraded avionic is unavoidable in the future, when this will happen is the question. Nobody will understand why a particular model still have an obsolete avionic while the same manufacturer use a safer new avionic on others models. Now the extend of a such project will depend on the objectives. If the goal is to keep the same sensors and actuators to replace the old computers by an AFDX network of new computers, this would be certainly the quickest path given the B787 achievement. This would bring the required platform to integrate more advanced and safer algorithms. If the goal is to have a full FBW flight control, the previous goal will still be required, but with a lot more work on the way to handle both human actions and computers actions, as there are actually heavy coupled by a lot of mechanics on the B737. I don't know what decision Boeing could make regarding this, but it's easy to observe that each new generation of aircraft go toward a less, if still any, mechanical coupling between human actions and computer actions. It's a rater radical change for a B737, up to the point that a clean sheet design could maybe be preferred. Regardless of the the goals and the way of doing, it will be a marketing decision to still call it a B737.


A full FBW upgrade to the 737 wouldn't make sense. The three main advantages of it would be the better envelope protection, easier and cheaper maintenance and weight reduction. The 737 already has decent protection for a classic fight control system and pilots like to fly it. Maintenance is well understood for this aircraft and probably optimized. The latter only really cashes in by reducing the size of the aerodynamic surfaces (reduced stability) and compensating with a closed loop system, in addition to the wire weight savings. Not sure the business case is fully there. FUll FBW only seems to be allowed (reluctantly even by management, since it has caused substantial delays in many programs) on clean sheet aircraft.

The only thing the 737 MAX needs is better sensor management and redundancy to solve the current issue. Southwest (see my post just above) is one way to do it, but I would prefer annunciated auto disconnect of MCAS due to AOA disagreement.
rocketPower

Life is about enjoying being uncomfortable. If you're complacent, something is wrong!
 
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PixelFlight
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Mon Dec 03, 2018 11:19 am

rocketPower wrote:
The only thing the 737 MAX needs is better sensor management and redundancy to solve the current issue.

Agree. The question is how the current 737MAX interconnection between computers can do that. Some valuables contributors on this forum have published information that show a completely split computer interconnect between the leff "A" side ant the right "B" side, from the sensor up to the FCC with the MCAS function. If true, even a MCAS auto-disconnect on AoA disagreement would require at least two ARINC 429 link crossing the sides and two available free ports. Maybe there can forward down to the FCCs the AoA disagree generated by the display computers. Hard to tell, but it look like it could be something more than a new software revision.
 
felipekk
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Tue Dec 04, 2018 4:10 pm

I understand that in the cockpit the automatic trimming would be visible through the constant spinning of the trim wheels. My question is: how/where is it shown to the pilots the current ammount of trim applied?
 
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caoimhin
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Tue Dec 04, 2018 10:37 pm

felipekk wrote:
I understand that in the cockpit the automatic trimming would be visible through the constant spinning of the trim wheels. My question is: how/where is it shown to the pilots the current ammount of trim applied?


There is a gauge on the throttle quadrant, beside each of the trim wheels.
 
stratclub
Posts: 565
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Wed Dec 05, 2018 3:53 pm

felipekk wrote:
I understand that in the cockpit the automatic trimming would be visible through the constant spinning of the trim wheels. My question is: how/where is it shown to the pilots the current ammount of trim applied?


Image
 
freakyrat
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Wed Dec 05, 2018 4:29 pm

rocketPower wrote:
Southwest is adding the aoa option to it's MAX fleet, I assume because they want the AOA DISAGREE message that can give better awareness.

https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safe ... max-fleet/

Could they make Boeing pay for it?


What really is appaling in all this is in reading this article is that Southwest has an optional AOA Disagree warning light installed on their MAX and is enhancing it with incorporation of an AOA guage in the PFD. Then why didn't Lion Air order their MAX with at least the AOA Disagree warning light or Aural alarm? Or will the FAA order Boeing to incorporate these optional safety backups as standard equipment on the MAX?
 
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SEPilot
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Wed Dec 05, 2018 5:50 pm

freakyrat wrote:
rocketPower wrote:
Southwest is adding the aoa option to it's MAX fleet, I assume because they want the AOA DISAGREE message that can give better awareness.

https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safe ... max-fleet/

Could they make Boeing pay for it?


What really is appaling in all this is in reading this article is that Southwest has an optional AOA Disagree warning light installed on their MAX and is enhancing it with incorporation of an AOA guage in the PFD. Then why didn't Lion Air order their MAX with at least the AOA Disagree warning light or Aural alarm? Or will the FAA order Boeing to incorporate these optional safety backups as standard equipment on the MAX?

The answer as to why Lion didn’t order it is almost certainly that they didn’t want to pay for it. And if I were in charge of Boeing I wouldn’t wait for any regulatory action; I would just make it standard.
The problem with making things foolproof is that fools are so doggone ingenious...Dan Keebler
 
WIederling
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Wed Dec 05, 2018 6:03 pm

freakyrat wrote:
rocketPower wrote:
Southwest is adding the aoa option to it's MAX fleet, I assume because they want the AOA DISAGREE message that can give better awareness.

https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safe ... max-fleet/

Could they make Boeing pay for it?


What really is appaling in all this is in reading this article is that Southwest has an optional AOA Disagree warning light installed on their MAX and is enhancing it with incorporation of an AOA guage in the PFD. Then why didn't Lion Air order their MAX with at least the AOA Disagree warning light or Aural alarm? Or will the FAA order Boeing to incorporate these optional safety backups as standard equipment on the MAX?


Having to buy additional options to make a product (finally) safe is a rather strange concept, isn't it?
Murphy is an optimist
 
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ODwyerPW
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Wed Dec 05, 2018 10:58 pm

Everyone new flaps were going fly-by-wire on the MAX. TailCone, Flaps, Engines and NoseGear were major cited changes... I would think EVERY single customer would have wanted full disclosure about EVERY feature (MCAS) and would have made IT a part of the Differences training. Along this note, Boeing should have divuldged EVERY feature and insisted they be part of Differences training between NG and MAX. I can see the indicators WN have ordered becoming standard equipment on MAXES moving forward.
learning never stops.
 
kalvado
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Wed Dec 05, 2018 11:17 pm

WIederling wrote:
freakyrat wrote:
rocketPower wrote:
Southwest is adding the aoa option to it's MAX fleet, I assume because they want the AOA DISAGREE message that can give better awareness.

https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safe ... max-fleet/

Could they make Boeing pay for it?


What really is appaling in all this is in reading this article is that Southwest has an optional AOA Disagree warning light installed on their MAX and is enhancing it with incorporation of an AOA guage in the PFD. Then why didn't Lion Air order their MAX with at least the AOA Disagree warning light or Aural alarm? Or will the FAA order Boeing to incorporate these optional safety backups as standard equipment on the MAX?


Having to buy additional options to make a product (finally) safe is a rather strange concept, isn't it?

I am not sure if it is more safe or the other way around.
More (possibly unneeded) information fed to the operator can be a disadvantage as it is easy to be overwhelmed by all the shiny scales and screens.
I can understand certain features selected by a driver, who picks a car for himself. Pilots don't have the luxury of configuring planes for their liking (Cessna 172 notwithstanding), so it may boil down to fine print in regulations or liking of chief pilot and head of training department. I can definitely see Boeing providing sufficient set for safe operation as a baseline with customization above and beyond for paying customer.
I suspect we cannot even blame lack of AoA information here for the crash - pitch and power, as we are being told, is an idiot proof arrangement. It is the fact that a single AoA failure was not isolated by the system - but amplified into triple or quadruple failure (plus uncommanded movement of control surfaces and envelope shrinkage to begin with). Diagnosing triple failure is surely challenging for flight crew and maintenance folks alike (or ask your doctor about similar experience with human beings having multiple health issues, they may have something to tell as well).
And at least one set of pilots failed the task - and the rest is history.
 
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litz
Posts: 2199
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Wed Dec 05, 2018 11:22 pm

SEPilot wrote:
freakyrat wrote:
rocketPower wrote:
Southwest is adding the aoa option to it's MAX fleet, I assume because they want the AOA DISAGREE message that can give better awareness.

https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safe ... max-fleet/

Could they make Boeing pay for it?


What really is appaling in all this is in reading this article is that Southwest has an optional AOA Disagree warning light installed on their MAX and is enhancing it with incorporation of an AOA guage in the PFD. Then why didn't Lion Air order their MAX with at least the AOA Disagree warning light or Aural alarm? Or will the FAA order Boeing to incorporate these optional safety backups as standard equipment on the MAX?

The answer as to why Lion didn’t order it is almost certainly that they didn’t want to pay for it. And if I were in charge of Boeing I wouldn’t wait for any regulatory action; I would just make it standard.


WN has the HUD option too, which is another option Lion Air declined.
 
maint123
Posts: 67
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Thu Dec 06, 2018 9:35 am

https://www.wsj.com/articles/behind-boe ... 1544025884

Some very interesting points which might point towards deliberate underplaying of MCAS to avoid simulator training.

"Engineering, training and other experts inside Boeing had differing views on the precise language to be used in manuals. People familiar with the process said there was a sharp focus on one point: avoiding added simulator training."

"The decision to omit the new control system from manuals has put a Boeing design principle at the center of a probe into a fatal airliner crash for the first time in more than two decades. It has sparked public scrutiny of a typically behind-the-scenes process and threatens to tarnish Boeing’s reputation for safety and its tradition of prioritizing pilot authority over automation.

Former Boeing and current airline and government officials said there was a strong push to keep 737 MAX training to a minimum—a common goal for the introduction of new models. One former Boeing official recalls a colleague expressing concern about keeping their job if regulators rejected the company’s proposed guidelines. The program was eventually approved."

Very damning. A independent judicial enquiry should be instituted to see whether safety was sacrificed for getting approval of the changes in MAX.
 
StTim
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Thu Dec 06, 2018 10:07 am

maint123 wrote:
https://www.wsj.com/articles/behind-boeings-decision-to-omit-details-on-safety-system-in-lion-air-crash-from-manual-1544025884

Some very interesting points which might point towards deliberate underplaying of MCAS to avoid simulator training.

"Engineering, training and other experts inside Boeing had differing views on the precise language to be used in manuals. People familiar with the process said there was a sharp focus on one point: avoiding added simulator training."

"The decision to omit the new control system from manuals has put a Boeing design principle at the center of a probe into a fatal airliner crash for the first time in more than two decades. It has sparked public scrutiny of a typically behind-the-scenes process and threatens to tarnish Boeing’s reputation for safety and its tradition of prioritizing pilot authority over automation.

Former Boeing and current airline and government officials said there was a strong push to keep 737 MAX training to a minimum—a common goal for the introduction of new models. One former Boeing official recalls a colleague expressing concern about keeping their job if regulators rejected the company’s proposed guidelines. The program was eventually approved."

Very damning. A independent judicial enquiry should be instituted to see whether safety was sacrificed for getting approval of the changes in MAX.


Yes that article appears damning. I am pretty sure there will be a proper enquiry into what happened. It would look like Boeing managed to persuade the regulator. Was the discussion between the two in the light of the full facts of the change - if these were indeed understood?
 
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Finn350
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Thu Dec 06, 2018 10:54 am

WIederling wrote:
freakyrat wrote:
rocketPower wrote:
Southwest is adding the aoa option to it's MAX fleet, I assume because they want the AOA DISAGREE message that can give better awareness.

https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safe ... max-fleet/

Could they make Boeing pay for it?


What really is appaling in all this is in reading this article is that Southwest has an optional AOA Disagree warning light installed on their MAX and is enhancing it with incorporation of an AOA guage in the PFD. Then why didn't Lion Air order their MAX with at least the AOA Disagree warning light or Aural alarm? Or will the FAA order Boeing to incorporate these optional safety backups as standard equipment on the MAX?


Having to buy additional options to make a product (finally) safe is a rather strange concept, isn't it?


I agree. It is as when buying a car you would get ABS brakes as a standard feature but ABS brakes malfunction light would be an option, as any competent driver would notice the failure of ABS brakes and would have to be competent to brake the car even without ABS brakes functioning (which is of course true, but not very safe way of designing a product).
 
StTim
Posts: 3066
Joined: Thu Aug 08, 2013 7:39 am

Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Thu Dec 06, 2018 11:02 am

Finn350 wrote:
WIederling wrote:
freakyrat wrote:

What really is appaling in all this is in reading this article is that Southwest has an optional AOA Disagree warning light installed on their MAX and is enhancing it with incorporation of an AOA guage in the PFD. Then why didn't Lion Air order their MAX with at least the AOA Disagree warning light or Aural alarm? Or will the FAA order Boeing to incorporate these optional safety backups as standard equipment on the MAX?


Having to buy additional options to make a product (finally) safe is a rather strange concept, isn't it?


I agree. It is as when buying a car you would get ABS brakes as a standard feature but ABS brakes malfunction light would be an option, as any competent driver would notice the failure of ABS brakes and would have to be competent to brake the car even without ABS brakes functioning (which is of course true, but not very safe way of designing a product).


I would actually say most people do not know how ABS works and many when faced with a chattering brake pedal they stop braking. They certainly don't use the steering capability that ABS adds when you just ram the pedal down. They think ABS reduces braking distance - it doesn't and can in fact extend it.
 
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Finn350
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Thu Dec 06, 2018 11:12 am

StTim wrote:
Finn350 wrote:
WIederling wrote:

Having to buy additional options to make a product (finally) safe is a rather strange concept, isn't it?


I agree. It is as when buying a car you would get ABS brakes as a standard feature but ABS brakes malfunction light would be an option, as any competent driver would notice the failure of ABS brakes and would have to be competent to brake the car even without ABS brakes functioning (which is of course true, but not very safe way of designing a product).


I would actually say most people do not know how ABS works and many when faced with a chattering brake pedal they stop braking. They certainly don't use the steering capability that ABS adds when you just ram the pedal down. They think ABS reduces braking distance - it doesn't and can in fact extend it.


True - it is the maneuverability of the vehicle while braking that ABS brings.
 
mjoelnir
Posts: 7769
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Thu Dec 06, 2018 11:28 am

StTim wrote:
Finn350 wrote:
WIederling wrote:

Having to buy additional options to make a product (finally) safe is a rather strange concept, isn't it?


I agree. It is as when buying a car you would get ABS brakes as a standard feature but ABS brakes malfunction light would be an option, as any competent driver would notice the failure of ABS brakes and would have to be competent to brake the car even without ABS brakes functioning (which is of course true, but not very safe way of designing a product).


I would actually say most people do not know how ABS works and many when faced with a chattering brake pedal they stop braking. They certainly don't use the steering capability that ABS adds when you just ram the pedal down. They think ABS reduces braking distance - it doesn't and can in fact extend it.


But the ABS braking system does not suddenly start to brake the car if one sensor gives a wrong signal.

The MCAS system does something the pilot has to know about, if it´s sensor or sensors fail.
 
WIederling
Posts: 7162
Joined: Sun Sep 13, 2015 2:15 pm

Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Thu Dec 06, 2018 12:00 pm

maint123 wrote:
.......... and its tradition of prioritizing pilot authority over automation.


That (overiding the pilot hard) afaics is fall out.
The underlying issue is an airframe unstable in pitch up.
All the indicators seem to show that Boeing was strongly interested in
hiding this fact. Less simulator time is a cop out. ( how did they pushover the FAA ?)
Murphy is an optimist
 
Chaostheory
Posts: 1095
Joined: Wed Mar 06, 2013 2:09 am

Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Thu Dec 06, 2018 12:20 pm

Google 'Ali Bahrami FAA'.

I will say no more.
 
WIederling
Posts: 7162
Joined: Sun Sep 13, 2015 2:15 pm

Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Thu Dec 06, 2018 12:35 pm

Chaostheory wrote:
Google 'Ali Bahrami FAA'.

I will say no more.

https://www.faa.gov/about/key_officials/bahrami_avs/

eye opener.
787 batteries happened under his direction.
Same for heckling Airbus on conjured up noise and separation issues.
Murphy is an optimist
 
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Starlionblue
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Fri Dec 07, 2018 4:07 am

ikramerica wrote:
zeke wrote:
Yeah the “very short” 500+nm trip.

They did not return to DPS because the checklists they ran said they did need to divert.

I am not familiar with specific Indonesian rules, under ICAO practices what the crew did on the DPS-CGK sector was acceptable.

For example it is acceptable on a quad to keep going after an engine failure. The time an aircraft needs to be airworthy is at dispatch.

After experiencing the problem running through the checklist and then the options it’s very possible they were near halfway. I didn’t remember reading anything about them flying at a reduced speed. Flying over mountains do you turn back or continue when regulations say you can continue?


Flying over high terrain, it depends. We have escape charts for some areas, but the complex ones are mostly reserved for places like central Asia, with large massifs and plateaus. Indonesia does have high terrain but not massive extended stretches of it. There are charts for some parts of the area, but the gist of them is "please miss the pointy bits as you turn towards the nearest suitable airport."
"There are no stupid questions, but there are a lot of inquisitive idiots." - John Ringo
 
sgrow787
Posts: 35
Joined: Fri May 16, 2014 8:12 pm

Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Sat Dec 08, 2018 7:48 am

maint123 wrote:
https://www.wsj.com/articles/behind-boeings-decision-to-omit-details-on-safety-system-in-lion-air-crash-from-manual-1544025884

Some very interesting points which might point towards deliberate underplaying of MCAS to avoid simulator training.


Interesting article indeed. I'm just wondering if Boeing should be taking more responsibility than the tired old line:

"The Boeing spokesman said the system “was designed and certified using aerospace industry best practices.”"

Tell us what broke down, who dropped the ball, and what you're doing to prevent it from happening again. This software fix is needed, but the real fix is why a culture exists in Boeing that may have allowed certain things to happen, or even allowed certain people to be ignored, or possible motivated people to keep their opinions and viewpoints to themselves to begin with.

They're following government regulations. That's not good enough. It's a revolving door (with the FAA). They're effectively writing those regulations. They're in the business of building airplanes that carry members of the public thousands of miles every day.
 
sgrow787
Posts: 35
Joined: Fri May 16, 2014 8:12 pm

Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Sat Dec 08, 2018 8:11 am

maint123 wrote:
https://www.wsj.com/articles/behind-boeings-decision-to-omit-details-on-safety-system-in-lion-air-crash-from-manual-1544025884

Some very interesting points which might point towards deliberate underplaying of MCAS to avoid simulator training.


"Cockpit instruments displayed a barrage of fault warnings, including unreliable airspeed and altitude, ..."

How would a bad AOA sensor result in erroneous altitude?
 
MaksFly
Posts: 270
Joined: Fri Jun 24, 2016 5:50 am

Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Sat Dec 08, 2018 10:47 am

It's not the crime, but the cover up.

Here it is... GREED. Downplaying changes so that you can sell the new model as the old. If they have evidence that Boeing purposefully tried to downplay the differences in order to minimize sim time... they need to be burned at the stake.
 
asdf
Posts: 151
Joined: Tue Mar 18, 2014 12:03 am

Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Sat Dec 08, 2018 11:57 am

if you look at the datasheets from the prim report .... ist really beyond my understanding how someone could expect that crew to react with the checklist or the memory items of a runaway stabilizer

it maybe would be intuitiv and logical
but it would be wrong by definition and training

there is a clear definition how to detect a runaway case and its defined as a electrical problem, leading to a not interruptible and not reversible movement of ...

in the actual case it was interruptible (it even interrupts itself every 5 seconds) and ist was reversible (they did it all the way down against the machine)

from time to time we get a proof, that asian LCC crews are not at the same level as "western" crews, but from my point of view - THIS case is not one of those ....
 
zippy
Posts: 105
Joined: Sun May 11, 2014 9:46 pm

Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Sat Dec 08, 2018 2:04 pm

mjoelnir wrote:
But the ABS braking system does not suddenly start to brake the car if one sensor gives a wrong signal.


It absolutely can. I know one person who's had intermittent ABS application at inopportune times happen on the track, and was reading a post earlier this year from someone who had a failed ABS control unit actually lock up one or more wheels completely. To put that extra twitch into your eyebrow, Mercedes used a brake-by-wire system (Sensotronic) for a few years but abandoned it. Alfa Romeo, that paragon of reliability, brought brake-by-wire back to the US with their new sedan.

The Toyota hybrid unintended acceleration stuff was a bit scary as there were plenty of rumors that the Toyota code didn't do much sanity checking on the throttle inputs and many owners simply didn't know how to force the car into neutral. Automotive electronics aren't really the benchmark you'd want to compare aerospace equipment to.
Last edited by zippy on Sat Dec 08, 2018 2:13 pm, edited 1 time in total.
 
kalvado
Posts: 1047
Joined: Wed Mar 01, 2006 4:29 am

Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Sat Dec 08, 2018 2:11 pm

zippy wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:
But the ABS braking system does not suddenly start to brake the car if one sensor gives a wrong signal.


It absolutely can.

Didn't hear about that - but heard of a few instances where ABS inhibited braking due to sensor failure. Arguably, that is an even worse scenario.
 
User avatar
Polot
Posts: 8728
Joined: Thu Jul 28, 2011 3:01 pm

Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Sat Dec 08, 2018 2:51 pm

kalvado wrote:
zippy wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:
But the ABS braking system does not suddenly start to brake the car if one sensor gives a wrong signal.


It absolutely can.

Didn't hear about that - but heard of a few instances where ABS inhibited braking due to sensor failure. Arguably, that is an even worse scenario.

It’s not technically the ABS system but emergency braking systems found on modern cars occasionally wrongly detect “roadblocks” and brake the car. Acura actually had a recall a few years ago because their system was detecting too many phantom objects (one false positive resulting in a rear end collision, probably the car behind the Acura slamming into the unexpectedly heavy braking car)- I’m guessing they recalibrated the software in the recall: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/mor ... 6aa2e6a1bc
 
kalvado
Posts: 1047
Joined: Wed Mar 01, 2006 4:29 am

Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Sat Dec 08, 2018 3:06 pm

Polot wrote:
kalvado wrote:
zippy wrote:

It absolutely can.

Didn't hear about that - but heard of a few instances where ABS inhibited braking due to sensor failure. Arguably, that is an even worse scenario.

It’s not technically the ABS system but emergency braking systems found on modern cars occasionally wrongly detect “roadblocks” and brake the car. Acura actually had a recall a few years ago because their system was detecting too many phantom objects (one false positive resulting in a rear end collision, probably the car behind the Acura slamming into the unexpectedly heavy braking car)- I’m guessing they recalibrated the software in the recall: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/mor ... 6aa2e6a1bc[/quote
Smart people learn from mistakes they make, wise people learn from mistakes others make - and fools keep making same mistakes
Boeing failed to make it into "wise" category; hopefully, they will be smart...
 
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PixelFlight
Posts: 97
Joined: Thu Nov 08, 2018 11:09 pm

Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Sat Dec 08, 2018 3:52 pm

zippy wrote:
The Toyota hybrid unintended acceleration stuff was a bit scary as there were plenty of rumors that the Toyota code didn't do much sanity checking on the throttle inputs and many owners simply didn't know how to force the car into neutral. Automotive electronics aren't really the benchmark you'd want to compare aerospace equipment to.

NASA Engineering and Safety Center produced a 177 pages Technical Assessment Report about the Toyota Motor Corporation unintended acceleration.
 
kalvado
Posts: 1047
Joined: Wed Mar 01, 2006 4:29 am

Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Sat Dec 08, 2018 3:56 pm

PixelFlight wrote:
zippy wrote:
The Toyota hybrid unintended acceleration stuff was a bit scary as there were plenty of rumors that the Toyota code didn't do much sanity checking on the throttle inputs and many owners simply didn't know how to force the car into neutral. Automotive electronics aren't really the benchmark you'd want to compare aerospace equipment to.

NASA Engineering and Safety Center produced a 177 pages Technical Assessment Report about the Toyota Motor Corporation unintended acceleration.

There was a follow up investigation by Michael Barr/Barr group, which was not made fully public,
In our analysis of Toyota’s source code, we built upon the prior analysis by NASA. First, we looked more closely at more lines of the source code for more vehicles for more man months. And we also did a lot of things that NASA didn’t have time to do, including reviewing Toyota’s operating system’s internals, reviewing the source code for Toyota’s “monitor CPU”, performing an independent worst-case stack depth analysis, running portions of the main CPU software including the RTOS in a processor simulator, and demonstrating–in 2005 and 2008 Toyota Camry vehicles–a link between loss of throttle control and the numerous defects we found in the software.

In a nutshell, the team led by Barr Group found what the NASA team sought but couldn’t find: “a systematic software malfunction in the Main CPU that opens the throttle without operator action and continues to properly control fuel injection and ignition” that is not reliably detected by any fail-safe.

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