With these statements, trav777 has "won" this thread:

"Sorry but if you actually believe a sample size of n=2 is large enough to base a statistical probability estimate off of, then you're....uninformed. And I'm being polite here.

These were Lion Air "pilots". "Flying" a jet that should have returned to base on the previous leg. This plane should not have been in the air at all. Nothing is wrong with MCAS, the lack of redundancy in the AoA sensor chain is the defect here."

Both flight legs show that Lion Air pilots appear to be trained to attempt to continue to destination on a plane that is trying to kill them. We have, using your math, a 100% sample on that."

This thread become an endless loop of the same arguments with Airbus fanboys questioning the airworthiness of the Max with a sample size of n=2. It should be locked until the CVR is found.

trav777 wrote:

Both flight legs show that Lion Air pilots appear to be trained to attempt to continue to destination on a plane that is trying to kill them. We have, using your math, a 100% sample on that.

Not the JT610: there communicate to the ATC that there have control problem and asked to return back to Jakarta.

As for the JT43, the preliminary report say:
"The PIC declared “PAN PAN” to the Denpasar Approach controller due to instrument failure
and requested to maintain runway heading. The PIC performed three Non-Normal Checklists
and none contained the instruction “Plan to land at the nearest suitable airport”."

GEUltraFan9XGTF wrote:

This thread become an endless loop of the same arguments with Airbus fanboys questioning the airworthiness of the Max with a sample size of n=2.

Where is the airworthiness of the Max questioned?

GEUltraFan9XGTF wrote:

With these statements, trav777 has "won" this thread:

"Sorry but if you actually believe a sample size of n=2 is large enough to base a statistical probability estimate off of, then you're....uninformed. And I'm being polite here.

These were Lion Air "pilots". "Flying" a jet that should have returned to base on the previous leg. This plane should not have been in the air at all. Nothing is wrong with MCAS, the lack of redundancy in the AoA sensor chain is the defect here."

Both flight legs show that Lion Air pilots appear to be trained to attempt to continue to destination on a plane that is trying to kill them. We have, using your math, a 100% sample on that."

This thread become an endless loop of the same arguments with Airbus fanboys questioning the airworthiness of the Max with a sample size of n=2. It should be locked until the CVR is found.

let me fix that for you,

signed, a boring fanboy

rheinwaldner wrote:

GEUltraFan9XGTF wrote:

This thread become an endless loop of the same arguments with Airbus fanboys questioning the airworthiness of the Max with a sample size of n=2.

Where is the airworthiness of the Max questioned?

"Emergency Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2018-23-51 is sent to owners and operators of The Boeing Company Model 737-8 and -9 airplanes."

GEUltraFan9XGTF wrote:

This thread become an endless loop of the same arguments with Airbus fanboys questioning the airworthiness of the Max with a sample size of n=2. It should be locked until the CVR is found.

I agree the thread should be locked until something new turns up. The only reason I returned to the thread last week was to push back at what I saw as an endless stream of posts that seemed as if they were from Lion Air's public relations department.

salttee wrote:

GEUltraFan9XGTF wrote:

This thread become an endless loop of the same arguments with Airbus fanboys questioning the airworthiness of the Max with a sample size of n=2. It should be locked until the CVR is found.

I agree the thread should be locked until something new turns up. The only reason I returned to the thread last week was to push back at what I saw as an endless stream of posts that seemed as if they were from Lion Air's public relations department.

Lock the thread because you don’t like what direction it’s going? Why is that the go-to solution for some posters vs just moving along or adding your 2 cents? [I won’t even bring up the obvious answer]

PlanesNTrains wrote:

Lock the thread because you don’t like what direction it’s going?

As has been pointed out, the direction this thread is going is in a circle.

PlanesNTrains wrote:

Why is that the go-to solution for some posters vs just moving along or adding your 2 cents?

I have added my "two cents", and then the Lion air faction added their "two cents" then I again added my "two cents" and they again added their "two cents" and so it goes, as it has gone for the last month and more: long before I re-joined the thread..

Then I added another two cents that this is going nowhere; I said that I go along with GEUltraFan's view:

GEUltraFan9XGTF wrote:

This thread become an endless loop of the same arguments with Airbus fanboys questioning the airworthiness of the Max with a sample size of n=2.

Then you added your snarky two cents.
I guess this is progress, at least it's broken the chain of circular argument.

bob75013 wrote:

Albert Einstein once made a statement that pretty well describes this situation:

Insanity: doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results

Not really: the results the last time were quite different . . . to the extent that they didn't live to tell.

But to the point, how do you know they did the same thing over and over again? There were many variables during those five minutes. These guys were faced with numerous warnings, indications, unknown behavior never trained in the sim before, of which the elevator trim was only one of many items to consider. It's not far fetched that several times (some of) the inputs and troubleshooting were different, but with the same result (as they didn't understand the root cause).

It is so easy to lay back behind the key board, have another coffee and focus only on the elevator trim. Understanding why they did not follow the runaway trim procedure, requires a lot more investigation and insight . . .

So is Boeing still contemplating a software mod/update for the 737Max? If nothing is "broken", why is an update necessary?

Gesendet von meinem SM-G950F mit Tapatalk

salttee wrote:

PlanesNTrains wrote:

Lock the thread because you don’t like what direction it’s going?

As has been pointed out, the direction this thread is going is in a circle.

PlanesNTrains wrote:

Why is that the go-to solution for some posters vs just moving along or adding your 2 cents?

I have added my "two cents", and then the Lion air faction added their "two cents" then I again added my "two cents" and they again added their "two cents" and so it goes, as it has gone for the last month and more: long before I re-joined the thread..

Then I added another two cents that this is going nowhere; I said that I go along with GEUltraFan's view:

GEUltraFan9XGTF wrote:

This thread become an endless loop of the same arguments with Airbus fanboys questioning the airworthiness of the Max with a sample size of n=2.

Then you added your snarky two cents.
I guess this is progress, at least it's broken the chain of circular argument.

It’s progress if we’re not trying to shut down the dialogue.

FWIW, I appreciate the back and forth that you are having with others because it challenges everybody to articulate better or more thoroughly or to otherwise make their case. While it might seem redundant to you, plenty of people are following this thread and find that process educational. You certainly can just stop posting but to suggest locking the thread just sounds like someone trying to control the discussion.

PlanesNTrains wrote:

It’s progress if we’re not trying to shut down the dialogue.

FWIW, I appreciate the back and forth that you are having with others because it challenges everybody to articulate better or more thoroughly or to otherwise make their case. While it might seem redundant to you, plenty of people are following this thread and find that process educational. You certainly can just stop posting but to suggest locking the thread just sounds like someone trying to control the discussion.

+1

(Plus it's always a good laugh to see two people each desperately trying to have the final word....)

GEUltraFan9XGTF wrote:

With these statement, trav777 has "won" this thread:

Sorry but if you actually believe a sample size of n=2 is large enough to base a statistical probability estimate off of
.....................
This thread becoming an endless loop of the same arguments, (.......) should be locked until the CVR is found.

1) I will tear up my Proficiency. Isn’t “thereof” the correct word?
2)Yes, lock it up and we will start talking about MH370 instead.It’s high time!

oschkosch wrote:

So is Boeing still contemplating a software mod/update for the 737Max? If nothing is "broken", why is an update necessary?

Gesendet von meinem SM-G950F mit Tapatalk

This illustrates a very destructive attitude that has impeded many safety improvements, and one that I had hoped aviation had gotten beyond. And that is if the safety of some device is questioned and the manufacturer changes it, it is an admission of guilt that it was in fact dangerous. The result is that many manufacturers become afraid to change anything once a safety question has arisen, even when they can see a way to improve it. And this impedes safety improvements.

SEPilot wrote:

oschkosch wrote:

So is Boeing still contemplating a software mod/update for the 737Max? If nothing is "broken", why is an update necessary?

Gesendet von meinem SM-G950F mit Tapatalk

This illustrates a very destructive attitude that has impeded many safety improvements, and one that I had hoped aviation had gotten beyond. And that is if the safety of some device is questioned and the manufacturer changes it, it is an admission of guilt that it was in fact dangerous. The result is that many manufacturers become afraid to change anything once a safety question has arisen, even when they can see a way to improve it. And this impedes safety improvements.

Improvements being the key word. Why does something need to be “broken” for it to be improved upon?

In fairness, if the general implication was that ‘If the design was fine as-is, why would they be looking to make changes?’, then ya, likely it isn’t “fine” or they’d just leave it alone.

rheinwaldner wrote:

trav777 wrote:

If the plane is going haywire and you do something and it goes straight and level, YOU DON'T TOUCH A THING AFTER THAT and you return to the runway. I cannot even fathom a professional pilot in a jet that is trying to push you into the ground and you go flaps 1 and it levels out and you....disengage flaps!??!?

The nerves that you are demonstrating do not convince me, that you would have noticed the unknown causality between the flaps position and the trim movements. You are aware that several system from time to time do move these trim wheels, perfectly legitimate and meaningful? A spinning trim wheel is not an indication of a trim runaway. There is no obvious evidence available, whether any particular trim wheel movement was triggered by a disturbed or a working system.

Again, in a situation overwhelmed by a flood of different error messages they flew manually, a lot of things happened at the same time, trimming manually they had dozens of time trimmed away the somewhat built up forces on the control column (maybe not even by conscious actions, so the fact that the applied trim was always upwards and always repeated in steady cycles maybe went unnoticed). As speculated here earlier, they could have attempted to make a turn, and during turns you dont trim. And, bang, the two cycles the disturbed MCAS needed to become a deadly monster passed unopposed...

Considering that, IMO any pilot who now steps up and claims, that he would have survived like the first crew, shows nothing than arrogance.

Most pilots would have returned to base after the first failure of the system. A US pilot wouldn't fly with a busted AoA sensor upon which several autopilot systems depend.

Your agenda is transparent- to blame Boeing. We can all see that. You resort to things like a n=2 sample size to base a statistical estimate on. This is absurd.

What the FDR showed in this crash was that the engagement of flaps STOPPED the nose down trim. The pilots should have left the plane in that configuration and returned to base.

Why didn't they?

Why didn't the PREVIOUS pilots do the same thing? Why was everyone's first goal to fly to destination when the appropriate course of action was to get this plane back on earth?

The previous pilots didn't loudly sound a warning about a FATAL defect in that plane's electronics after surviving a failure event that could've killed them.

What does this tell you about Lion Air?

How did this plane go 5000 down in a few seconds; they let it go into a vertical dive. After successfully getting it to go straight and level via engagement of flaps. Why didn't someone put the flaps back out?

These pilots were focused on finding a way to get that plane to its destination instead of flying and flying safely. They probably went heads down at the same time and were unaware that their nose pitched to the ocean. Nobody was watching the instruments or even looking for visual reference. Nobody was flying.

SEPilot wrote:

oschkosch wrote:

So is Boeing still contemplating a software mod/update for the 737Max? If nothing is "broken", why is an update necessary?

Gesendet von meinem SM-G950F mit Tapatalk

This illustrates a very destructive attitude that has impeded many safety improvements, and one that I had hoped aviation had gotten beyond. And that is if the safety of some device is questioned and the manufacturer changes it, it is an admission of guilt that it was in fact dangerous. The result is that many manufacturers become afraid to change anything once a safety question has arisen, even when they can see a way to improve it. And this impedes safety improvements.

can chime in here with legal experience- product liability is strict liability in many cases.

Like people have to make use of your product in a way VERY far outside of the expected, normal use for you not to be liable for a defect that occasions an injury.

In this case, yes Lion Air's response to the defect is the issue, just as AF447...my god what were those pilots doing? the young guy should have been relieved, I mean so many issues with that aircraft, the least of which was lack of sensor feedback from one control stick to the other...neither pilot knew the other was trying to fly. But still, the product defect is with Thales and Airbus on that one. In this one sure it will be joint and several liability between Boeing and Lion. There's no way IMO Boeing avoids product liability for this and they will try to subrogate the AoA sensor company. Everyone is going to have to pay. It's only about % shares at this point.

IMO the 330's behavior in AF447 was unconscionably bad (as was the piloting of AF). I'm not sure the MAX is as egregious (nor Lion's pilots) but I agree 100% that one component's failure should not precipitate a frame loss with all souls aboard regardless of mediocre piloting.

trav777 wrote:

These pilots were focused on finding a way to get that plane to its destination

No. According to the preliminary report:

"At 2320 UTC, the aircraft departed from Jakarta using runway 25L and intended
cruising altitude was 27,000 feet. The LNI610 pilot was instructed to follow the
Standard Instrument Departure (SID) of ABASA 1C 4 ."

"At 23:30:03 UTC, the LNI610 contacted the ARR controller and advised that they
were experiencing a flight control problem. The ARR controller advised LNI610 to
prepare for landing on runway 25L and instructed them to fly heading 070°. The
instruction was read back by the LNI610 SIC."

Please use factual argumentation.

PixelFlight wrote:

Please use factual argumentation.

Complete and total lack of Situation Awareness.
Inability to manually FLY (control) an otherwise sound airplane.
There's a reason we don't read about more accidents in big jets with TWO good engines and primary flight controls FREE AND CORRECT?
Airmanship.

PlanesNTrains wrote:

SEPilot wrote:

oschkosch wrote:

So is Boeing still contemplating a software mod/update for the 737Max? If nothing is "broken", why is an update necessary?

Gesendet von meinem SM-G950F mit Tapatalk

This illustrates a very destructive attitude that has impeded many safety improvements, and one that I had hoped aviation had gotten beyond. And that is if the safety of some device is questioned and the manufacturer changes it, it is an admission of guilt that it was in fact dangerous. The result is that many manufacturers become afraid to change anything once a safety question has arisen, even when they can see a way to improve it. And this impedes safety improvements.

Improvements being the key word. Why does something need to be “broken” for it to be improved upon?

In fairness, if the general implication was that ‘If the design was fine as-is, why would they be looking to make changes?’, then ya, likely it isn’t “fine” or they’d just leave it alone.[/quote

You you haven't a clue about continuous improvement, do you? I know, that was a rhetorical question, as I know the answer.

And, I suggest you look up "subsequent remedial measures".....and how a manufacturer who makes modifications to something that MAY have been the cause of an accident ISN'T admission that the part IS the reason for an accident. in fact, you can't hold a manufacturer liable for something if the subsequently fix something in the interest of increased safety.

FFS - this crash cost people (including the pilots and the travelling engineer) their lives.

The investigation must be done to find out how and why the issues aligned to cause the crash.

There will be plenty of recommendations to Boeing, FAA (certification process), training, maintenance, pilot training and practice, lion air process and practice.

Yes the pilots could have caught it - but it should not have got that far.

trav777 wrote:

can chime in here with legal experience- product liability is strict liability in many cases.

Like people have to make use of your product in a way VERY far outside of the expected, normal use for you not to be liable for a defect that occasions an injury.

In this case, yes Lion Air's response to the defect is the issue, just as AF447...my god what were those pilots doing? the young guy should have been relieved, I mean so many issues with that aircraft, the least of which was lack of sensor feedback from one control stick to the other...neither pilot knew the other was trying to fly. But still, the product defect is with Thales and Airbus on that one. In this one sure it will be joint and several liability between Boeing and Lion. There's no way IMO Boeing avoids product liability for this and they will try to subrogate the AoA sensor company. Everyone is going to have to pay. It's only about % shares at this point.

IMO the 330's behavior in AF447 was unconscionably bad (as was the piloting of AF). I'm not sure the MAX is as egregious (nor Lion's pilots) but I agree 100% that one component's failure should not precipitate a frame loss with all souls aboard regardless of mediocre piloting.

Correct. My background in risk management tells me Boeing's Legal Counsel is feeling much better since the release of the FDR data. They will pay, but nowhere near initial estimates. Despite the downturn of the broader market, Boeing stock has recovered nicely.

neutronstar73 wrote:

PlanesNTrains wrote:

SEPilot wrote:

This illustrates a very destructive attitude that has impeded many safety improvements, and one that I had hoped aviation had gotten beyond. And that is if the safety of some device is questioned and the manufacturer changes it, it is an admission of guilt that it was in fact dangerous. The result is that many manufacturers become afraid to change anything once a safety question has arisen, even when they can see a way to improve it. And this impedes safety improvements.

Improvements being the key word. Why does something need to be “broken” for it to be improved upon?

In fairness, if the general implication was that ‘If the design was fine as-is, why would they be looking to make changes?’, then ya, likely it isn’t “fine” or they’d just leave it alone.[/quote

You you haven't a clue about continuous improvement, do you? I know, that was a rhetorical question, as I know the answer.

And, I suggest you look up "subsequent remedial measures".....and how a manufacturer who makes modifications to something that MAY have been the cause of an accident ISN'T admission that the part IS the reason for an accident. in fact, you can't hold a manufacturer liable for something if the subsequently fix something in the interest of increased safety.

Who are you talking to and what are you babbling on about? I was addressing the notion that to make changes to something is to imply it was broken, whereas my point was that you can improve something that was fine but can be better.

I then tried to leave open that a previous post may have been trying to make a different point than was being responded to.

trav777 wrote:

Most pilots would have returned to base after the first failure of the system.

They tried, as it has been explained to you several times just in the last some posts. So stop posting wrong information.

trav777 wrote:

A US pilot wouldn't fly with a busted AoA sensor upon which several autopilot systems depend.

Thats the arrogance I mentioned: without having all the details about what was going on in that plane there is a group, that believes to be better than all the rest.

trav777 wrote:

Your agenda is transparent- to blame Boeing. We can all see that.

Not more than your agenda is to keep blame from Boeing. Look, I have no agenda to blame Boeing alone. I can see weaknesses on the operators side. Nobody doubts that. If anything I try to counter those, who would never admit failure on Boeings side.

trav777 wrote:

You resort to things like a n=2 sample size to base a statistical estimate on. This is absurd.

Quickly recap the sample size, by which the 787 was grounded.

Note: I dont say the MAX should be grounded because after the emergency AD we can expect that the MAX pilots will be able to handle this failure mode. So the N=2 is all we ever get (occurences of unwanted MCAS action faced by pilots having the knowledge how it was spread before the crash). One crew was lucky the other not. I have never said, that we have full statistical evidence of a 50% failure rate. I just say, as we have only two occurences, the failure in one case is far away from an acceptable level in aviation. You know that even single occurences of failures have triggered corrective measures on the vendors side?

trav777 wrote:

What the FDR showed in this crash was that the engagement of flaps STOPPED the nose down trim.

That is again wrong information. The nose down trim was stopped by correcting manual trim inputs. Trimming away forces from the control column is so normal and the trim reaction to pilot input was so normal, that they possibly did not even notice, that there was a systematic pattern behind the required trim corrections. You know, having to trim an aircraft frequently can be required for a number of reasons. Any change in the flight configuration requires to apply manual trim input, so there was no obvious hint, that an automatic nose down trimming system was the reason for their frequent corrections.

trav777 wrote:

Why didn't the PREVIOUS pilots do the same thing? Why was everyone's first goal to fly to destination when the appropriate course of action was to get this plane back on earth?
The previous pilots didn't loudly sound a warning about a FATAL defect in that plane's electronics after surviving a failure event that could've killed them.

You again got it wrong, that the pilots of the crash flight did not want to return.

trav777 wrote:

How did this plane go 5000 down in a few seconds; they let it go into a vertical dive. After successfully getting it to go straight and level via engagement of flaps. Why didn't someone put the flaps back out?

After two full uncorrected MCAS cycles (which have lead to the dive), the flaps would have helped nothing. Understanding that is the base for a factual discussion. Can you see that?

trav777 wrote:

These pilots were focused on finding a way to get that plane to its destination instead of flying and flying safely.

By repetition the claim will not become true.

FlyXLsa wrote:

PixelFlight wrote:

Please use factual argumentation.

Complete and total lack of Situation Awareness.
Inability to manually FLY (control) an otherwise sound airplane.
There's a reason we don't read about more accidents in big jets with TWO good engines and primary flight controls FREE AND CORRECT?
Airmanship.

maybe

but should those guys ever have been brought in that situation?

a never before described new flightcontrol system
to adapt the birds not 737 usuall attitude to go into a stall
never trained on
never thought on in that situation

how could they identify the cause and find the solution on their flight control problem if they didnt know that it is present and how it is supposed to work ...?

FlyXLsa wrote:

Complete and total lack of Situation Awareness.

The JT610 crew was very aware of the situation as there communicate it to the ATC (See ATC communication in the preliminary report) and aviate with a unknown source of stab trim (see the FDR data in the preliminary report). Yes there make the error to not cut out the stab trim actuator, but this is very precisely the cause of that error that must be addressed to improve safety. So far there are a number of safety actions and safety recommendations that was identified and listed into the preliminary report. This list is already long and will only grow in the final report. Blaming the dead pilots will not improve the safety in any way.

FlyXLsa wrote:

Inability to manually FLY (control) an otherwise sound airplane.

The airplane was subject of a unsafe condition so severe that Boeing and FAA issued a Emergency Airworthiness Directive.

FlyXLsa wrote:

There's a reason we don't read about more accidents in big jets with TWO good engines and primary flight controls FREE AND CORRECT?

Yes, and this is in part because of the safety improvement like addressing a officially identified unsafe condition:

"(e) Unsafe Condition
This AD was prompted by analysis performed by the manufacturer showing that if an
erroneously high single angle of attack (AOA) sensor input is received by the flight control system,
there is a potential for repeated nose-down trim commands of the horizontal stabilizer."

Apparently my expectations of basic pilot competency are too high? If the spinning 'wheel of fortune' is going clackity-clack when you don't want it to.... Never mind.

We live in a world where a baggage handler can pull off some relatively complex aerobatic maneuvers in a stolen Q400, but it's too much to expect multi-thousand hour ATP's to fly pitch and power... REALLY?

In a strange way, yes, because they are being trained to do exactly what the book says.

SomebodyInTLS wrote:

sgrow787 wrote:

rheinwaldner wrote:

Note: even if maintenance would have done their job, the AoA sensing system could fall into this failure mode by just e.g. a bird strike.

Many have been stating here for awhile this (MCAS) was a non-redundant design that could fail with one bad AOA sensor. How did we come to that conclusion?

Seriously? We didn't "come to that conclusion", the emergency AD and various diagrams posted early in this thread show unequivocally that that is how the system is designed.

The airworthiness directive stated a potential failure of MCAS due to a single AOA sensor. That doesn't say anything about how the MCAS was designed. There is a difference between whether redundancy was intentionally designed into a system, and whether a single sensor failure in a real-life airplane crash actually propagated to system failure. Systems are only as good as the testing that certifies them. It's possible MCAS was intended to incorporate redundant sensors, but wasn't fully tested during development, verification, and certification. And the Lion Air crash is just the first incident.

Reuters is reporting that Indonesian navy vessels have found the CVR

Thank God. Now we can all move on with our lives and stop predicting cover-ups. Well, hopefully....

FlyXLsa wrote:

par13del wrote:

it's too much to expect multi-thousand hour ATP's to fly pitch and power... REALLY?

In a strange way, yes, because they are being trained to do exactly what the book says.

This reflects the message from an earlier post of mine:

salttee wrote:

Is it going too far to say that these two didn't know how to fly a plane but had just memorized myriad procedures to operate a piece of complex machinery?

I believe that "trained to do exactly what the book says" accurately describes their skill set. I would bet that they never took up flying at all for the experience or challenge of flying itself. I suspect that from day one their intention was to earn an upper middle class living through aviation and they adopted a learning process that basically consisted of memorization. They were procedure bound and were very short on the intuitive skills that were needed that morning.

I don't know if it is true or not. But it is said they have found the FDR.

https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/lion-air-indonesia-finds-cockpit-voice-recorder-of-crashed-jet-11119706

SimpleFlying wrote:

I don't know if it is true or not. But it is said they have found the FDR.

https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/lion-air-indonesia-finds-cockpit-voice-recorder-of-crashed-jet-11119706

Sorry, I meant CVR not FDR.

SimpleFlying wrote:

SimpleFlying wrote:

I don't know if it is true or not. But it is said they have found the FDR.

https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/lion-air-indonesia-finds-cockpit-voice-recorder-of-crashed-jet-11119706

Sorry, I meant CVR not FDR.

Confirmed CVR found this morning, 8.40 AM local time.
https://m.detik.com/news/berita/d-43834 ... 1547340043
(Indonesian language)

asuflyer wrote:

Reuters is reporting that Indonesian navy vessels have found the CVR

BBC also reporting it’s been found.

That’s a blow to some posters, I guess.

PlanesNTrains wrote:

Thank God. Now we can all move on with our lives and stop predicting cover-ups. Well, hopefully....

That’s not how conspiracy theory nut-jobs work. The theory will now be modified to ‘fit the facts’ - this won’t be the real CVR, it’s a planted one designed to absolve Lion and Indonesia and make Boeing look bad.

PlanesNTrains wrote:

Thank God. Now we can all move on with our lives and stop predicting cover-ups. Well, hopefully....

Unfortunately we'll never be able to fully trust this investigation the way it's been handled.

MSPNWA wrote:

PlanesNTrains wrote:

Thank God. Now we can all move on with our lives and stop predicting cover-ups. Well, hopefully....

Unfortunately we'll never be able to fully trust this investigation the way it's been handled.

Reasons?

The CVR being found should be a lesson to some people about coming up with ludicrous conspiracy theories not because there's any evidence for them, but simply because it helps support their own prejudiced opinion about what happened.

I doubt we'll see anyone admitting they were a bit hasty though. That's the way of the world these days.

The final report will probably make recommendations to all parties involved. No-one will be 100% to blame, as much as some here want it to be that way. And we should all be grateful accident investigators do not carry the prejudices and biases so many on this site do, if they did aviation would be a hell of a lot less safe.

MSPNWA wrote:

PlanesNTrains wrote:

Thank God. Now we can all move on with our lives and stop predicting cover-ups. Well, hopefully....

Unfortunately we'll never be able to fully trust this investigation the way it's been handled.

I'm glad that the CVR has been found. Long-term effort always pays off. Despite conspiracy theorists.

Lets just remember that the CVR is not all that matters. It will show serious confusion. At least. The pilots are at least partly to blame. But the question is how can we avoid such confusion in the future and reduce the chances of similar situation developing where plane unnecessarily behaves badly. Accidents are swiss cheese... we need to eliminate more of the holes. Not just the particular hole that someone on this thread feels is the primary hole, and wants to defend complete innocence of the other holes

Also, I think this thread has gone downhill. Too many people joining the discussion lately and making very one-sided arguments. From my perspective there's a lot to improve on many fronts, piloting, piloting procedures, maintenance, maintenance procedures, MCAS design.

Picking on one comment here:

trav777 wrote:

After successfully getting it to go straight and level via engagement of flaps. Why didn't someone put the flaps back out?

Well, how did they know the flaps had an effect? No one told them flaps had an effect to the MCAS algorithm... and you expect them to figure it out? Many weird things are happening in your airplane all the time (including right after liftoff, when flaps was still on). You're fighting the airplane. I fully understand that if they did not know beforehand, they were not going to 100% reliably understand the relation during their emergency.

par13del wrote:

In a strange way, yes, because they are being trained to do exactly what the book says.

thats the point

if one dont follow the books and something goes wrong - > bad pilot

if one (only) follows the books and something goes wrong -> bad airmenship

pick what you like ...

if they took months to find cvr in a known location let alone can u imagine the fate of mh370, we will never ever find it.

MSPNWA wrote:

Unfortunately we'll never be able to fully trust this investigation the way it's been handled.

In what way has it been handled that means it "can't be trusted"?

Oh, some conspiracy theorists have humble pie for breakfast this morning.
Enjoy!

Now let's find out what happened exactly!


No Tax On Rotax

WOW!!!!! I did not see this coming great news

Does anyone know if there is encryption on the data in these black boxes (to prevent tampering)? Eg, in PGP encryption, Boeing would have a private key hardcoded into the black box to encrypt the data, and a public key would be given to the airlines or investigation board to decrypt.

SEPilot wrote:

oschkosch wrote:

So is Boeing still contemplating a software mod/update for the 737Max? If nothing is "broken", why is an update necessary?

Gesendet von meinem SM-G950F mit Tapatalk

This illustrates a very destructive attitude that has impeded many safety improvements, and one that I had hoped aviation had gotten beyond. And that is if the safety of some device is questioned and the manufacturer changes it, it is an admission of guilt that it was in fact dangerous. The result is that many manufacturers become afraid to change anything once a safety question has arisen, even when they can see a way to improve it. And this impedes safety improvements.

You could turn it around. It is not aloud to question the safety of something, because the only think that matters is never admit to guilt that something was dangerous. That is the big no no in the western world. You change, you compensate, but you never admit something was wrong and had to be changed. Leads to very convoluted arguments.

sgrow787 wrote:

Does anyone know if there is encryption on the data in these black boxes (to prevent tampering)? Eg, in PGP encryption, Boeing would have a private key hardcoded into the black box to encrypt the data, and a public key would be given to the airlines or investigation board to decrypt.

If something like this exists, it will more likely be a encrypted checksum (signature) rater than encrypted data. The data are too precious for the investigators to take the risk of a corrupted or lost key, either private or public. Maintaining the keys integrity on so much aircrafts will require an adequate infrastructure, especially at high altitude where cosmic particles can easily flip a bit over a long time. While there was some cases where the recorder integrity was challenged, I don't know is it was proved that it was the case.

They found the CVR finally !