Current AOA DISAGREE logic fault threshold is 10deg difference between two sensors. That tolerance threshold may be too wide to completely prevent false activation of MCAS, especially under low speed high grossweight condition(actual AoA on the high side). I believe MCAS activation is around ~15deg AoA? So if aircraft is flying around with 5degree actual AoA, current AOA DISAGREE logic would not trigger on false activation of MCAS
Also current AOA DISAGREE logic may not be certified to assurance level needed for flight control
The question is, would my oversimplified solution work as an interim solution?
10deg maybe too wide, but if it detects more than 10deg difference and generate the AOA DISAGREE, the proposed oversimplified procedure would still provide safeguard against MCAS activation, because the idea is "how to prevent MCAS from activation when AOA DISAGREE appears"...
Am not talking about whether the threshold is adequate enough...
So, can the oversimplified modification help or not?