Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

MSPNWA · Sat Mar 23, 2019 4:44 pm

StTim wrote:
I really worry at the pilot is at fault brigade on here.

It's already safe when operated properly. What it isn't safe is sending up a critically malfunctioning airplane time after time, and having serious training and CRM questions. Those issues aren't dependent on an airplane to cause dangerous situations.

I worry because you're saying stats=safety. Thank goodness that's not how the industry has worked in the past. We'd be much less safe as a result.

StTim · Sat Mar 23, 2019 4:49 pm

There you go again. Does it need an American pilot to crash it before you believe there is an issue?

SheikhDjibouti · Sat Mar 23, 2019 5:27 pm

MSPNWA wrote:
StTim wrote:
I really worry at the pilot is at fault brigade on here.

It's already safe when operated properly. What it isn't safe is sending up a critically malfunctioning airplane time after time, and having serious training and CRM questions.

"critically malfunctioning" - is this you saying that MCAS is a critical system, absolutely necessary for safe flight?
Hold on, I think I can hear Boeing's legal department calling...… :lol:

"sending up a critically malfunctioning airplane time after time" - OMG that is really bad; who are the guilty party, United, SouthWest? Do tell.

And before you suggest Lion Air, I suggest you acquaint yourself with the facts.

(Thx wikipedia)

ikramerica · Sat Mar 23, 2019 9:38 pm

SheikhDjibouti wrote:
ikramerica wrote:
StTim wrote:
Thousands of pilots fly A320's, A330's, A350's, B737NG, B757, B767, B777, B787, B747 daily racking up thousands of flying hours. Most of these pilots are average. They are not making the sorts of mistakes that people are pointing at for the Lion Air and Ethiopian pilots and saying they made.

Yes they may have been able to make a different choice and they may have saved their plane, their passengers and their own lives!

BUT the MAX threw something at them they did not cope with. Something that killed them.

True. WN alone also flew 40,000 MAX flights 90,000+ hours before the grounding with no incidents. WN thinks its safe now. Just saying.

So you agreeing with StTim that 90,000+ hrs is a trivial number and WN are bonkers? Praise the Lord.

As has already been repeated in these forums; 90,000 hrs is what the worldwide NG fleets rack up in about two days.

Hence, if NGs replicated the MAX safety record to date, they would be falling out of the sky at the rate of one a week.

Good to have you aboard at long last!

You want to be that way?

2 can be a trivial number.

Against 200,000 flights. 2 is not a trend, 2 is not a significant number. 2 is not something to ground a fleet over without facts about number 2.

Jumping to conclusions over 2 out of 200,000 is statistical ignorance.

350 lost lives are tragic. But 2 crashes is not significant.

If 2 is significant, and we dont know if the cause is related to ALL 737NG and above, we are doing the world a disservice by only grounding the Max.

This isnt the grounding thread. I wont even enter that thread because I know Im going to see so much crap it’llmake my blood pressure jump.

jumbojet · Sat Mar 23, 2019 9:46 pm

MSPNWA wrote:
StTim wrote:
I really worry at the pilot is at fault brigade on here.

It's already safe when operated properly. What it isn't safe is sending up a critically malfunctioning airplane time after time, and having serious training and CRM questions. Those issues aren't dependent on an airplane to cause dangerous situations.

what isnt safe is building a plane fully knowing that it would require engines to big for it to fly without some sort of a software fix AND on top of that, not even making the AOA or MCAS warning indicator standard. Have there been ANY other planes built similar to the MAX where the engines are to big for the frame thus requiring a computer program to help ensure smooth and level flight? The MAX never should've been built to begin with. Its defective at its core. Is the 777, 787, 747, 350, 330, 320, 757, 767 like that? Do they have MCAS to prevent the plane from stalling due to engines that are simply to big for the frame they are attached to?

tropical · Sat Mar 23, 2019 11:14 pm

ikramerica wrote:
SheikhDjibouti wrote:
ikramerica wrote:
True. WN alone also flew 40,000 MAX flights 90,000+ hours before the grounding with no incidents. WN thinks its safe now. Just saying.

So you agreeing with StTim that 90,000+ hrs is a trivial number and WN are bonkers? Praise the Lord.

As has already been repeated in these forums; 90,000 hrs is what the worldwide NG fleets rack up in about two days.

Hence, if NGs replicated the MAX safety record to date, they would be falling out of the sky at the rate of one a week.

Good to have you aboard at long last!

You want to be that way?

2 can be a trivial number.

Against 200,000 flights. 2 is not a trend, 2 is not a significant number. 2 is not something to ground a fleet over without facts about number 2.

Jumping to conclusions over 2 out of 200,000 is statistical ignorance.

350 lost lives are tragic. But 2 crashes is not significant.

If 2 is significant, and we dont know if the cause is related to ALL 737NG and above, we are doing the world a disservice by only grounding the Max.

This isnt the grounding thread. I wont even enter that thread because I know Im going to see so much crap it’llmake my blood pressure jump.

Erm... In commercial aviation, a 100,000-1 crash rate for a given model a is in fact massive, and seen as extremely worrying in the commercial aviation industry.

SheikhDjibouti · Sat Mar 23, 2019 11:38 pm

SheikhDjibouti wrote:
ikramerica wrote:
True. WN alone also flew 40,000 MAX flights 90,000+ hours before the grounding with no incidents. WN thinks its safe now. Just saying.

So you agreeing with StTim that 90,000+ hrs is a trivial number and WN are bonkers? Praise the Lord.
As has already been repeated in these forums; 90,000 hrs is what the worldwide NG fleets rack up in about two days.
Hence, if NGs replicated the MAX safety record to date, they would be falling out of the sky at the rate of one a week.

ikramerica wrote:
You want to be that way?

2 can be a trivial number.

Against 200,000 flights. 2 is not a trend, 2 is not a significant number. 2 is not something to ground a fleet over without facts about number 2.

Jumping to conclusions over 2 out of 200,000 is statistical ignorance.

350 lost lives are tragic. But 2 crashes is not significant.

If 2 is significant, and we dont know if the cause is related to ALL 737NG and above, we are doing the world a disservice by only grounding the Max.

Have you been in a coma for this past week?
Your line of argument is reminiscent of page 1 of the ET302 crash thread, a few hours after the crash happened.
Since then, the rest of the world (and even Donald Trump

) have recognised that two crashes showing similar patterns is indeed very significant.

I understand your frustration because the rest of the world doesn't see things as clearly as you do, but there's a reason for that.

ikramerica wrote:
This isnt the grounding thread. I wont even enter that thread because I know Im going to see so much ~~crap~~ math it’llmake my blood pressure jump.

Probably a wise move for someone who believes "2 crashes is not significant" :banghead:

Have a nice day. :wave:

zeke · Sat Mar 23, 2019 11:58 pm

ikramerica wrote:

You want to be that way?

2 can be a trivial number.

Against 200,000 flights. 2 is not a trend, 2 is not a significant number. 2 is not something to ground a fleet over without facts about number 2.

Jumping to conclusions over 2 out of 200,000 is statistical ignorance.

350 lost lives are tragic. But 2 crashes is not significant.

If 2 is significant, and we dont know if the cause is related to ALL 737NG and above, we are doing the world a disservice by only grounding the Max.

This isnt the grounding thread. I wont even enter that thread because I know Im going to see so much crap it’llmake my blood pressure jump.

95% of statistics are made up.

dragon6172 · Sun Mar 24, 2019 12:47 am

jetmatt777 wrote:
I think the crux of the issue is that it is not immediately apparent that the trim is the issue. The airplane automatically trims all the time (from what I understand), so when MCAS is working it’s not the first thing that will come to mind. Perhaps an aural alert any time MCAS is actually sending commands would be helpful to differentiate it from the normal speed trim system.

I dont know if I buy that they aren't aware that there is an issue with trim. Both accident crews reported to ATC that they had flight control problems.

maint123 · Sun Mar 24, 2019 1:00 am

Before max enters service again, Boeing should demonstrate in a actual airborne max737 the measures to be taken with the MCAS off.
Maybe switch off the auto features at 1000 m altitude and disable MCAS and land the plane manually 10 times. And not use the same pilots.

AvFanNJ · Sun Mar 24, 2019 2:23 am

jumbojet wrote:

what isnt safe is building a plane fully knowing that it would require engines to big for it to fly without some sort of a software fix AND on top of that, not even making the AOA or MCAS warning indicator standard. Have there been ANY other planes built similar to the MAX where the engines are to big for the frame thus requiring a computer program to help ensure smooth and level flight? The MAX never should've been built to begin with. Its defective at its core. Is the 777, 787, 747, 350, 330, 320, 757, 767 like that? Do they have MCAS to prevent the plane from stalling due to engines that are simply to big for the frame they are attached to?[/quote]

This is largely hysterical claptrap. Indeed, the MAX is redundancy deficient and never should have been certified to have MCAS reliant on but a single AOA sensor. The issue with aerodynamics occurs at the edge of the flight envelope so under most conditions, the aero instability would not be a big concern. And the Leap1-B nacelle diameter is not that much larger than that of the CFM56s they replace and only 6" farther forward on the wing. Yes, they weigh almost 800 lbs. more each but it's an aerodynamic, not a balance issue in play. I've got to think the NGs may have exhibited this nose up tendency themselves to a smaller degree; it's just that it's significantly more pronounced on the MAX. A sufficiently AOA sensor redundant retuned MCAS should be able to go through all of the individual regulators revised certification process without having to physically redesign the main landing gear and repositioning the engines rearward. And I predict that the regulators will sign off on this. Sure, the damage to Boeing's rep, is substantial but it's because they didn't sweat the details and build sufficient redundancy and operating finesse into the MCAS, along with the lack of disclosure and proper training for it. The design isn't "defective at its core" because the engines are bigger and slightly farther forward on the wing. None of this likely would have happened had Boeing adhered to its prior practice of building a multiple redundant flight control enhancement into this airplane. Somehow, the prior safety culture broke down and even worse, the FAA was passive and let that deficiency sail through the certification process. I suspect the MAX could easily lose 20 to 25% of its order backlog before things get better but that's the price of rushing the process and cutting corners too much in the first place. A costly and painful lesson to be sure but software and sensor fallacies aside, the basic airplane design itself is sound, otherwise none of those regulatory agencies would have approved it to begin with.

9Patch · Sun Mar 24, 2019 2:45 am

Duplicate post.

9Patch · Sun Mar 24, 2019 2:46 am

9Patch wrote:
SheikhDjibouti wrote:
Since then, the rest of the world (and even Donald Trump ) have recognised that two crashes showing similar patterns is indeed very significant.

Have a nice day.

Whenever you use Donald Trump to bolster your argument, you're making a mistake.
BIG mistake!
Have a nice day.

Etheereal · Sun Mar 24, 2019 3:28 am

zeke wrote:
ikramerica wrote:

You want to be that way?

2 can be a trivial number.

Against 200,000 flights. 2 is not a trend, 2 is not a significant number. 2 is not something to ground a fleet over without facts about number 2.

Jumping to conclusions over 2 out of 200,000 is statistical ignorance.

350 lost lives are tragic. But 2 crashes is not significant.

If 2 is significant, and we dont know if the cause is related to ALL 737NG and above, we are doing the world a disservice by only grounding the Max.

This isnt the grounding thread. I wont even enter that thread because I know Im going to see so much crap it’llmake my blood pressure jump.

95% of statistics are made up.

I love you man, i knew someone would do this.

2175301 · Sun Mar 24, 2019 4:55 am

zeke wrote:
95% of statistics are made up.

I disagree... About 95% of statistical information has incorrectly applied statistical analysis to the situation. The most common misapplications involve using standard normal distributions and averages to situations that do not have standard normal statistical distributions; and incorrect sample size (or not accounting for the error for less than ideal sample sizes - Student t often applies to many standard normal distributions and usually at least doubles the simple probability calculation done without considering sample size).

I personally believe that almost everyone tossing out statistics related to this and the Ethiopian event is likely making both errors.

I long forgot the name of the statistical function: but there is a function that describe things that occurs in surges... with valleys of minimal (or no) activity. I'd want to run the validity test for that function to the history of airline crashes as I suspect that it applies. There are a number of other "weird" statistical functions that actually apply to the real world. I'd have to consult my old statistical textbook - and perhaps a current fully trained statistician to see what statistical functions would most likely apply; and how to validate which function is the correct one and what the correct sample size is (and errors due to non-ideal sample size).

Have a great day,

WIederling · Sun Mar 24, 2019 8:25 am

zeke wrote:
95% of statistics are made up.

The correct term is "beautified" :-)

)

And it is a perfect fit. 95% of people have just enough understanding of statistics to demand 100% safety :-)

)))))))

smartplane · Sun Mar 24, 2019 8:36 am

maint123 wrote:
Before max enters service again, Boeing should demonstrate in a actual airborne max737 the measures to be taken with the MCAS off.
Maybe switch off the auto features at 1000 m altitude and disable MCAS and land the plane manually 10 times. And not use the same pilots.

And for the confidence of future crews and passengers, with half the Boeing Board on each flight.

flybucky · Sun Mar 24, 2019 9:32 am

ren0312 wrote:
Would it have helped if the pilot of the Lion Air flight, upon being stumped over the behavior of the plane, asked ATC to immediately call somebody from Boeing or Lion Air to figure out what is happening and why the plane keeps pitching down?

I agree. I made a similar comment previously. Although it wouldn't be to ATC, who wouldn't have the right expertise. It would be a call to an emergency hotline, which would have an expert on the aircraft type.

Everyone always says Aviate, Navigate, Communicate, which I don't disagree with. However, I would argue that the pilots had the Aviate and Navigate somewhat under control. They weren't 100% stable, but the Captain had been holding the airplane at 5000 ft +/- 500 ft for over 6 minutes. He could have kept flying like that for another hour or more.

So in my opinion, they were in position to Communicate. The Captain could have continued to Aviate and Navigate, continuing the electric trimming. He could have had the FO call the "emergency hotline" to get help on what to do.

Instead of digging through a manual during an onboard crisis, it would be better if there was an emergency hotline to call with an expert on the aircraft type.
1. They would have access to a powerful computer system to enter the symptoms and walk the pilots through troubleshooting steps.
2. They would be calmer.
3. They could be a "fresh set of eyes", which could help in situations where the pilots were fixated on the wrong issue.
4. Pilots can offload the troubleshooting so they can focus on Aviating and Navigating, and keeping an eye on critical indicators like pitch, airspeed, etc.

Digging through a manual should be the last resort only if the plane lost radio communications and could not reach anyone for help.

lifecomm · Sun Mar 24, 2019 10:19 am

No matter what the topic, when I scroll the page down and zeke's name appears I think, "finally, someone who knows what the hell they are talking about."

zeke wrote:

95% of statistics are made up.

This made me laugh out loud. Thank you, this really made my day!

intrepidflyer · Sun Mar 24, 2019 10:27 am

To all you pilots out there - has anyone actually ever experienced runaway trim?

WIederling · Sun Mar 24, 2019 10:34 am

flybucky wrote:
Digging through a manual should be the last resort only if the plane lost radio communications and could not reach anyone for help.

How much (of your life)sand will run through the hourglass till you have someone competent on line, made your problem clear,
and get no response because the HotLine doesn't know about MCAS either?
And all that would have been through ATC as interchange? good luck, you need it :-)

Interested · Sun Mar 24, 2019 10:45 am

smartplane wrote:
maint123 wrote:
Before max enters service again, Boeing should demonstrate in a actual airborne max737 the measures to be taken with the MCAS off.
Maybe switch off the auto features at 1000 m altitude and disable MCAS and land the plane manually 10 times. And not use the same pilots.

And for the confidence of future crews and passengers, with half the Boeing Board on each flight.

You mean you won't let them do all of that in a simulator?

That's cruel

Interested · Sun Mar 24, 2019 10:46 am

Will you at least allow those test flights to be in daylight and nice weather from airports nowhere near any kind of terrain?

Only using pilots and maintenance crew from the western world where English is their first language

And can all of the pilots and co pilots have at least 5,000 hrs experience on this type of plane and the maintenance crew 6 months experience looking after the plane

We've got to make this testing safe for all concerned

And can we have spare pilots in the plane in case they sense the actual pilots need help

WIederling · Sun Mar 24, 2019 11:03 am

Interested wrote:
That's cruel

Nah!
Pharaohnic burials are to be preferred:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2010_Poli ... -154_crash
( only entourage coverage was too limited )

morrisond · Sun Mar 24, 2019 12:16 pm

flybucky wrote:
ren0312 wrote:
Would it have helped if the pilot of the Lion Air flight, upon being stumped over the behavior of the plane, asked ATC to immediately call somebody from Boeing or Lion Air to figure out what is happening and why the plane keeps pitching down?

I agree. I made a similar comment previously. Although it wouldn't be to ATC, who wouldn't have the right expertise. It would be a call to an emergency hotline, which would have an expert on the aircraft type.

Everyone always says Aviate, Navigate, Communicate, which I don't disagree with. However, I would argue that the pilots had the Aviate and Navigate somewhat under control. They weren't 100% stable, but the Captain had been holding the airplane at 5000 ft +/- 500 ft for over 6 minutes. He could have kept flying like that for another hour or more.

So in my opinion, they were in position to Communicate. The Captain could have continued to Aviate and Navigate, continuing the electric trimming. He could have had the FO call the "emergency hotline" to get help on what to do.

Instead of digging through a manual during an onboard crisis, it would be better if there was an emergency hotline to call with an expert on the aircraft type.
1. They would have access to a powerful computer system to enter the symptoms and walk the pilots through troubleshooting steps.
2. They would be calmer.
3. They could be a "fresh set of eyes", which could help in situations where the pilots were fixated on the wrong issue.
4. Pilots can offload the troubleshooting so they can focus on Aviating and Navigating, and keeping an eye on critical indicators like pitch, airspeed, etc.

Digging through a manual should be the last resort only if the plane lost radio communications and could not reach anyone for help.

No they did not have proper control of the aircraft. That is basic aviation 101. They had a system (Electric Trim) that wasn't acting as they expected it too - they had no idea why it wasn't acting as it should but the first reaction should have been to turn it off - just like any system that wasn't acting properly.

If the Autopilot was turning you 90 degrees in the wrong direction would you keep using it turning yourself back on course 22 times or turn it off?

If you did not have the comfort to turn it off you shouldn't be in the cockpit. It should not be an unrealistic expectation that a commercial airplane pilot can fly the plane manually with no electronic helpers - that is why we have pilots to take over when the systems fail - through bad design or outright failure just because sometimes things break - which can and will happen no matter how well a system is designed or made fault tolerant.

Yes the MAX has a systems problem that doesn't appear to be fault tolerant enough - however MCAS was basically designed to help pilots with poor piloting skills from entering a stall.

Both MAX's crashed due to inadequate basic training - they were both perfectly capable of flying in Manual mode. Even if you didn't know about MCAS (understandable on Lionair -inexcusable on the ET flight) - any reasonably competent Pilot should have been able to realize that a system wasn't doing what it was supposed to and turn it off.

Have we really entered the realm of it's always the planes fault and never the Pilot's?

StTim · Sun Mar 24, 2019 12:41 pm

morrisond wrote:
flybucky wrote:
ren0312 wrote:
Would it have helped if the pilot of the Lion Air flight, upon being stumped over the behavior of the plane, asked ATC to immediately call somebody from Boeing or Lion Air to figure out what is happening and why the plane keeps pitching down?

I agree. I made a similar comment previously. Although it wouldn't be to ATC, who wouldn't have the right expertise. It would be a call to an emergency hotline, which would have an expert on the aircraft type.

Everyone always says Aviate, Navigate, Communicate, which I don't disagree with. However, I would argue that the pilots had the Aviate and Navigate somewhat under control. They weren't 100% stable, but the Captain had been holding the airplane at 5000 ft +/- 500 ft for over 6 minutes. He could have kept flying like that for another hour or more.

So in my opinion, they were in position to Communicate. The Captain could have continued to Aviate and Navigate, continuing the electric trimming. He could have had the FO call the "emergency hotline" to get help on what to do.

Instead of digging through a manual during an onboard crisis, it would be better if there was an emergency hotline to call with an expert on the aircraft type.
1. They would have access to a powerful computer system to enter the symptoms and walk the pilots through troubleshooting steps.
2. They would be calmer.
3. They could be a "fresh set of eyes", which could help in situations where the pilots were fixated on the wrong issue.
4. Pilots can offload the troubleshooting so they can focus on Aviating and Navigating, and keeping an eye on critical indicators like pitch, airspeed, etc.

Digging through a manual should be the last resort only if the plane lost radio communications and could not reach anyone for help.

No they did not have proper control of the aircraft. That is basic aviation 101. They had a system (Electric Trim) that wasn't acting as they expected it too - they had no idea why it wasn't acting as it should but the first reaction should have been to turn it off - just like any system that wasn't acting properly.

If the Autopilot was turning you 90 degrees in the wrong direction would you keep using it turning yourself back on course 22 times or turn it off?

If you did not have the comfort to turn it off you shouldn't be in the cockpit. It should not be an unrealistic expectation that a commercial airplane pilot can fly the plane manually with no electronic helpers - that is why we have pilots to take over when the systems fail - through bad design or outright failure just because sometimes things break - which can and will happen no matter how well a system is designed or made fault tolerant.

Yes the MAX has a systems problem that doesn't appear to be fault tolerant enough - however MCAS was basically designed to help pilots with poor piloting skills from entering a stall.

Both MAX's crashed due to inadequate basic training - they were both perfectly capable of flying in Manual mode. Even if you didn't know about MCAS (understandable on Lionair -inexcusable on the ET flight) - any reasonably competent Pilot should have been able to realize that a system wasn't doing what it was supposed to and turn it off.

Have we really entered the realm of it's always the planes fault and never the Pilot's?

Have we also entered the realm where it is always the pilots fault.

I have always said that there will be plenty of blame to spread around on this one.

Interested · Sun Mar 24, 2019 12:47 pm

morrisond wrote:
flybucky wrote:
ren0312 wrote:

Yes the MAX has a systems problem that doesn't appear to be fault tolerant enough - however MCAS was basically designed to help pilots with poor piloting skills from entering a stall.

Sorry I would suggest from everything I have learnt on here that MCAS was designed to compensate for the fact that the max is a inherently unstable and unsafe plane compared to the 737 it replaced? And it was needed to try and make the plane less unsafe.

The very fact MCAS had to be introduced int the first place demonstrates this plane should never have been designed the way it's been designed or certified to fly full stop

It's inherently less safe than the plane it replaced and will lead to a higher chance of crashes rather than less chance

An incredible situation for the airline industry to find itself in. But that is where it's at right now.

Anyone actually think the old 737 isn't a safer plane to fly without the need for MCAS ? If not why are we either debating these planes. From the safety standards we should expect - They are a complete failure in design before they even get in the air?

Regardless of who the pilots are.

Interested · Sun Mar 24, 2019 12:51 pm

StTim wrote:
morrisond wrote:
flybucky wrote:
I agree. I made a similar comment previously. Although it wouldn't be to ATC, who wouldn't have the right expertise. It would be a call to an emergency hotline, which would have an expert on the aircraft type.

Everyone always says Aviate, Navigate, Communicate, which I don't disagree with. However, I would argue that the pilots had the Aviate and Navigate somewhat under control. They weren't 100% stable, but the Captain had been holding the airplane at 5000 ft +/- 500 ft for over 6 minutes. He could have kept flying like that for another hour or more.

So in my opinion, they were in position to Communicate. The Captain could have continued to Aviate and Navigate, continuing the electric trimming. He could have had the FO call the "emergency hotline" to get help on what to do.

Instead of digging through a manual during an onboard crisis, it would be better if there was an emergency hotline to call with an expert on the aircraft type.
1. They would have access to a powerful computer system to enter the symptoms and walk the pilots through troubleshooting steps.
2. They would be calmer.
3. They could be a "fresh set of eyes", which could help in situations where the pilots were fixated on the wrong issue.
4. Pilots can offload the troubleshooting so they can focus on Aviating and Navigating, and keeping an eye on critical indicators like pitch, airspeed, etc.

Digging through a manual should be the last resort only if the plane lost radio communications and could not reach anyone for help.

No they did not have proper control of the aircraft. That is basic aviation 101. They had a system (Electric Trim) that wasn't acting as they expected it too - they had no idea why it wasn't acting as it should but the first reaction should have been to turn it off - just like any system that wasn't acting properly.

If the Autopilot was turning you 90 degrees in the wrong direction would you keep using it turning yourself back on course 22 times or turn it off?

If you did not have the comfort to turn it off you shouldn't be in the cockpit. It should not be an unrealistic expectation that a commercial airplane pilot can fly the plane manually with no electronic helpers - that is why we have pilots to take over when the systems fail - through bad design or outright failure just because sometimes things break - which can and will happen no matter how well a system is designed or made fault tolerant.

Yes the MAX has a systems problem that doesn't appear to be fault tolerant enough - however MCAS was basically designed to help pilots with poor piloting skills from entering a stall.

Both MAX's crashed due to inadequate basic training - they were both perfectly capable of flying in Manual mode. Even if you didn't know about MCAS (understandable on Lionair -inexcusable on the ET flight) - any reasonably competent Pilot should have been able to realize that a system wasn't doing what it was supposed to and turn it off.

Have we really entered the realm of it's always the planes fault and never the Pilot's?

Have we also entered the realm where it is always the pilots fault.

I have always said that there will be plenty of blame to spread around on this one.

The FAA did a report that stated 80 per cent of air crashes will involve some kind of human error. And as such it's the duty and challenge to aircraft designers to design new planes that limit the opportunity for human error.

These planes rely on pilot correct intervention more than the plane they replaced. So as such they should never have been designed like this.

It's pretty basic stuff IMO and should never even get as far as pilot training and who the best pilots are. We shouldn't be introducing planes that are harder and less safe to fly full stop. End of debate. Planes that need extra software with extra risk just to be stable shouldn't be getting designed and shouldn't be getting certified in the first place.

morrisond · Sun Mar 24, 2019 3:30 pm

The MAX is not unstable it has a tendency to pitch up in climb where if the pilot is inattentive to trim or the attitude of the aircraft in climb MCAS was designed to prevent a stall. In manual control if the pilot was paying attention to the atititude indicator and maintaining a steady climb angle MCAS would never come into play (unless they chose a too steep angle and the plane had insufficient thrust to maintain airspeed at that climb angle). That is basic piloting 101 if you are paying attention in Manual control you should be able to maintain a steady climb angle.

Just like the high speed automatic trim system is designed to trim the aircraft as fuel burns off and the centre of gravity changes reducing pilot workload.

Are you saying that aircraft designers should have to design an aircraft that the COG never changes as fuel burns off so you never have to touch the trim or have the computer do it?

The MAX is not a hard plane to fly - basic flight training should allow a competent pilot to fly it in manual mode.

Even parts on perfect systems will fail - pilots have to be able to recognize it and go to manual - that is basic piloting.

If the Autopilot had a fault due to a broken part and was pitching the nose down 22 times and the pilot didn't turn it off is that the plane's fault.

Stuff breaks - albeit the MAX does hav a design problem as the MCAS system is not redundant enough.

jakef · Sun Mar 24, 2019 3:36 pm

morrisond wrote:
The MAX is not unstable it has a tendency to pitch up in climb where if the pilot is inattentive to trim or the attitude of the aircraft in climb MCAS was designed to prevent a stall. In manual control if the pilot was paying attention to the atititude indicator and maintaining a steady climb angle MCAS would never come into play (unless they chose a too steep angle and the plane had insufficient thrust to maintain airspeed at that climb angle). That is basic piloting 101 if you are paying attention in Manual control you should be able to maintain a steady climb angle.

Just like the high speed automatic trim system is designed to trim the aircraft as fuel burns off and the centre of gravity changes reducing pilot workload.

Are you saying that aircraft designers should have to design an aircraft that the COG never changes as fuel burns off so you never have to touch the trim or have the computer do it?

The MAX is not a hard plane to fly - basic flight training should allow a competent pilot to fly it in manual mode.

Even parts on perfect systems will fail - pilots have to be able to recognize it and go to manual - that is basic piloting.

If the Autopilot had a fault due to a broken part and was pitching the nose down 22 times and the pilot didn't turn it off is that the plane's fault.

Stuff breaks - albeit the MAX does hav a design problem as the MCAS system is not redundant enough.

+20 to this post!

StTim · Sun Mar 24, 2019 3:49 pm

so why are pilots who competently flew the 737NG now spearing in when it comes to the 737MAX?

Have they suddenly become pilots or is the MAX causing them new and unexpected issues? Even for the ET pilots who knew about MCAS?

Interested · Sun Mar 24, 2019 3:59 pm

morrisond wrote:
The MAX is not unstable it has a tendency to pitch up in climb where if the pilot is inattentive to trim or the attitude of the aircraft in climb MCAS was designed to prevent a stall. In manual control if the pilot was paying attention to the atititude indicator and maintaining a steady climb angle MCAS would never come into play (unless they chose a too steep angle and the plane had insufficient thrust to maintain airspeed at that climb angle). That is basic piloting 101 if you are paying attention in Manual control you should be able to maintain a steady climb angle.

Just like the high speed automatic trim system is designed to trim the aircraft as fuel burns off and the centre of gravity changes reducing pilot workload.

Are you saying that aircraft designers should have to design an aircraft that the COG never changes as fuel burns off so you never have to touch the trim or have the computer do it?

The MAX is not a hard plane to fly - basic flight training should allow a competent pilot to fly it in manual mode.

Even parts on perfect systems will fail - pilots have to be able to recognize it and go to manual - that is basic piloting.

If the Autopilot had a fault due to a broken part and was pitching the nose down 22 times and the pilot didn't turn it off is that the plane's fault.

Stuff breaks - albeit the MAX does hav a design problem as the MCAS system is not redundant enough.

Simple question:

Is the older 737 easier and safer to fly because it does not have a tendency to pitch up in climb (your words) and does not need MCAS? It's one less thing to worry about that can go wrong.

That only needs a one word answer.

Yes or No?

If the answer is yes I think that's the whole crux of this debate myself

PW100 · Sun Mar 24, 2019 4:23 pm

morrisond wrote:
If the Autopilot had a fault due to a broken part and was pitching the nose down 22 times and the pilot didn't turn it off is that the plane's fault.

Pilots have been taught (memory item apparently) to turn it off when it continuously runways (upto recently, the common used referenced condition was sticky relais causing the motor to run all the way to the jack screw end stop). Which was not the case here.

One could even argue that the pilot felt that he had control over the electric trimming, providing him an important tool, which he knew worked for him, to control the plane while he had obvious pitch control issues. Cutting it off, would take away his tool in keeping pitch control (not knowing the same thing was working also against him), as he would now (in his head) be reverting to hand turning the wheel to maintain some for of pitch control at the next nose down tendency.

At the same time they were probably having lots of other issues (unreliable air speed, stall warning, stick share going off, lots of alarms and alerts), which at that point in time may have been of much more concern to them.

Now I do not know if this what they were thinking, and what they conditions they were exactly faced with, but so don't you.

t's easy with the benefit of hindsight, from the comfort of one's seat to point out what they should have done. I'll add another one: if Boeing would have told them about MCAS, and how it functionality is opposed to the STS they were so closely familiar with, we would probably not be having this discussion.

morrisond · Sun Mar 24, 2019 7:09 pm

StTim wrote:
so why are pilots who competently flew the 737NG now spearing in when it comes to the 737MAX?

Have they suddenly become pilots or is the MAX causing them new and unexpected issues? Even for the ET pilots who knew about MCAS?

From what I have read the probe feeding data to MCAS was not operating causing MCAS to not operate correctly which caused the Electric Trim to start doing things unexpected.

MCAS was put in place to help pilots who weren't that good in the first place.

Even if the MAX tends to pitch up - a pilot flying manually by the attitude indicator should have been able to counteract this simply by slightly more pressure on the control column. But you have to pay attention.

Air is not a medium that is constant - as you climb you go through different areas of temperature and density - lift has to be adjusted (by pressing the column forwards or releasing pressure) constantly while flying manually to maintain a consistent climb angle.

The MAX does not need MCAS to fly safely - it was put in place to help lazy or inattentive pilots.

If it wasn't in place and the Aircraft attained a too steep angle it would have stalled and the stick shaker would have activated.

Unfortunately in this case it did more harm than good.

Boeing's disclosure of the existence of MCAS didn't help the Ethiopian pilots.

You are right though - I was not in the cockpit. It just seems like undertraining is one of the route causes of both these crashes.

rheinwaldner · Mon Mar 25, 2019 6:10 am

morrisond wrote:
If the Autopilot had a fault due to a broken part and was pitching the nose down 22 times and the pilot didn't turn it off is that the plane's fault.

If he would have the benefit of looking at these nice diagrams months later, he surely and easily would have turned it off.

But as he had the stick shaker & was fighting airspeed and altitude issues & the trim nicely reacted on manual nose up input, the trim issue was not easily to detect.

Additionally, are you aware that cutting the trim off at a late stage would have reduced survivability? It would have left them with a severely trimmed down nose, which would have required them to bring the nose back up using the trim wheel. A time consuming procedure, that possibly would not have been completed soon enough.

Interested · Mon Mar 25, 2019 6:15 am

morrisond wrote:
StTim wrote:
so why are pilots who competently flew the 737NG now spearing in when it comes to the 737MAX?

Have they suddenly become pilots or is the MAX causing them new and unexpected issues? Even for the ET pilots who knew about MCAS?

From what I have read the probe feeding data to MCAS was not operating causing MCAS to not operate correctly which caused the Electric Trim to start doing things unexpected.

MCAS was put in place to help pilots who weren't that good in the first place.

Even if the MAX tends to pitch up - a pilot flying manually by the attitude indicator should have been able to counteract this simply by slightly more pressure on the control column. But you have to pay attention.

Air is not a medium that is constant - as you climb you go through different areas of temperature and density - lift has to be adjusted (by pressing the column forwards or releasing pressure) constantly while flying manually to maintain a consistent climb angle.

The MAX does not need MCAS to fly safely - it was put in place to help lazy or inattentive pilots.

If it wasn't in place and the Aircraft attained a too steep angle it would have stalled and the stick shaker would have activated.

Unfortunately in this case it did more harm than good.

Boeing's disclosure of the existence of MCAS didn't help the Ethiopian pilots.

You are right though - I was not in the cockpit. It just seems like undertraining is one of the route causes of both these crashes.

I'm finding it hard to understand why if MCAS is not needed to fly safely that it's been introduced?

mzlin · Mon Mar 25, 2019 7:38 am

For the umpteenth time it is to meet FAR specifications (federal aviation regulations) for longitudinal stability.

Now 'safely' is a word that means different things to different people so your opinion of safely may be different from someone else's.

flybucky · Mon Mar 25, 2019 7:42 am

morrisond wrote:
No they did not have proper control of the aircraft. That is basic aviation 101. They had a system (Electric Trim) that wasn't acting as they expected it too - they had no idea why it wasn't acting as it should but the first reaction should have been to turn it off - just like any system that wasn't acting properly.

If the Autopilot was turning you 90 degrees in the wrong direction would you keep using it turning yourself back on course 22 times or turn it off?

If you did not have the comfort to turn it off you shouldn't be in the cockpit. It should not be an unrealistic expectation that a commercial airplane pilot can fly the plane manually with no electronic helpers - that is why we have pilots to take over when the systems fail - through bad design or outright failure just because sometimes things break - which can and will happen no matter how well a system is designed or made fault tolerant.

Valid points.

Let me ask you this then. Which step does digging through a manual fall under: Aviate, Navigate, or Communicate? (The JT610 Captain was looking through a manual when they lost control of the aircraft.)

scbriml · Mon Mar 25, 2019 8:00 am

morrisond wrote:
If the Autopilot had a fault due to a broken part and was pitching the nose down 22 times and the pilot didn't turn it off is that the plane's fault.

But it wasn't autopilot because that was already disabled by other issues. Is it the pilot's fault if the manufacturer doesn't tell them about a horribly implemented "nice new feature" that behaves differently to trim runaway that pilots would have recognised?

Despite the claims of all the non-pilots on a.net who would have all immediately just hit the trim cutoff switches, because there was nothing else to worry about at all, was there?

Interested · Mon Mar 25, 2019 9:07 am

If they had been flying a NG plane without MCAS we don't even have a potential risk, a decision to make, a crash or this thread do we?

Isn't that the crux of this debate

mjoelnir · Mon Mar 25, 2019 11:21 am

The MAX has two systems trimming without pilot commanding it, STS and MCAS. STS is beneficially, MCAS is not beneficially with wrong sensory input.

If pilots should recognize the intermittent trimming by MCAS as a run away trim, why do pilots than do not immediately throw the disabling switches the moment STS gets active? Is perhaps one of the reasons, that it is difficult to distinguish between STS and MCAS, after not being told about MCAS?

Boeingphan · Mon Mar 25, 2019 12:14 pm

As a Boeing fan, it does feel a bit hallow and reminds me of a line my grandmother once told me. "My what a web we weave when we practice to deceive.''

SheikhDjibouti · Mon Mar 25, 2019 2:23 pm

Boeingphan wrote:
As a Boeing fan, it does feel a bit hallow and reminds me of a line my grandmother once told me. "My what a web we weave when we practice to deceive.''

Your grandmother had good taste.
"Oh! What a tangled web we weave, when first we practice to deceive"
It is often attributed to Shakespeare, but was actually written by Sir Walter Scott.

These days most people just say "it's karma" :spin:

SheikhDjibouti · Mon Mar 25, 2019 2:27 pm

morrisond wrote:
MCAS was put in place to help pilots who weren't that good in the first place.

morrisond wrote:
The MAX does not need MCAS to fly safely - it was put in place to help lazy or inattentive pilots.

I would add a pithy comment, but I'm lost for words.

7BOEING7 · Mon Mar 25, 2019 4:01 pm

rheinwaldner wrote:

Additionally, are you aware that cutting the trim off at a late stage would have reduced survivability? It would have left them with a severely trimmed down nose, which would have required them to bring the nose back up using the trim wheel. A time consuming procedure, that possibly would not have been completed soon enough.

Actually if they had decided to turn it off they would have trimmed nose up until they relieved the forces and then switched off the stab trim.

rheinwaldner · Mon Mar 25, 2019 4:12 pm

7BOEING7 wrote:
rheinwaldner wrote:

Additionally, are you aware that cutting the trim off at a late stage would have reduced survivability? It would have left them with a severely trimmed down nose, which would have required them to bring the nose back up using the trim wheel. A time consuming procedure, that possibly would not have been completed soon enough.

Actually if they had decided to turn it off they would have trimmed nose up until they relieved the forces and then switched off the stab trim.

Correct, that step belongs into the NNC. Otherwise it is dangerous.

jetmatt777 · Mon Mar 25, 2019 4:14 pm

How difficult would it be to install an aural alert when MCAS is actively trimming? Doesn’t have to be a siren or anything obnoxious, but something to differentiate it from normal STS operation. And how hard would it be to install an MCAS cutoff that disables the MCAS software but leaves electric trim functional?

Seems you could add a memory procedure: if airplane is trimming down to an unsafe angle while MCAS alert is sounding, trim up, disconnect MCAS.

On the surface it seems it is not apparent when MCAS is working as it works in the background and similarly to STS.

windy95 · Mon Mar 25, 2019 4:16 pm

morrisond wrote:
The MAX is not unstable it has a tendency to pitch up in climb where if the pilot is inattentive to trim or the attitude of the aircraft in climb MCAS was designed to prevent a stall. In manual control if the pilot was paying attention to the atititude indicator and maintaining a steady climb angle MCAS would never come into play (unless they chose a too steep angle and the plane had insufficient thrust to maintain airspeed at that climb angle). That is basic piloting 101 if you are paying attention in Manual control you should be able to maintain a steady climb angle.

Just like the high speed automatic trim system is designed to trim the aircraft as fuel burns off and the centre of gravity changes reducing pilot workload.

Are you saying that aircraft designers should have to design an aircraft that the COG never changes as fuel burns off so you never have to touch the trim or have the computer do it?

The MAX is not a hard plane to fly - basic flight training should allow a competent pilot to fly it in manual mode.

Even parts on perfect systems will fail - pilots have to be able to recognize it and go to manual - that is basic piloting.

If the Autopilot had a fault due to a broken part and was pitching the nose down 22 times and the pilot didn't turn it off is that the plane's fault.

Stuff breaks - albeit the MAX does hav a design problem as the MCAS system is not redundant enough.

We have a winner. Great post.

7BOEING7 · Mon Mar 25, 2019 4:54 pm

rheinwaldner wrote:
7BOEING7 wrote:
rheinwaldner wrote:

Additionally, are you aware that cutting the trim off at a late stage would have reduced survivability? It would have left them with a severely trimmed down nose, which would have required them to bring the nose back up using the trim wheel. A time consuming procedure, that possibly would not have been completed soon enough.

Actually if they had decided to turn it off they would have trimmed nose up until they relieved the forces and then switched off the stab trim.

Correct, that step belongs into the NNC. Otherwise it is dangerous.

I guess if you think a normal procedure for manually flying the airplane is dangerous you really don’t know what you’re talking about.

777Jet · Mon Mar 25, 2019 7:10 pm

scbriml wrote:
morrisond wrote:
If the Autopilot had a fault due to a broken part and was pitching the nose down 22 times and the pilot didn't turn it off is that the plane's fault.

But it wasn't autopilot because that was already disabled by other issues. Is it the pilot's fault if the manufacturer doesn't tell them about a horribly implemented "nice new feature" that behaves differently to trim runaway that pilots would have recognised?

Despite the claims of all the non-pilots on a.net who would have all immediately just hit the trim cutoff switches, because there was nothing else to worry about at all, was there?

We know the a.net experts were not worried that a particular Lion Air frame was dispatched despite having reoccurring control issues after supposedly being fixed. What a safe practice! "Don't worry that it happened again. It was supposed to be fixed. Let it fly." :banghead:

At least Indonesian investigators acknowledge that particular frame was not airworthy on the previous flight and should not have been flying.

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