StTim
Posts: 3122
Joined: Thu Aug 08, 2013 7:39 am

Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Wed Dec 12, 2018 2:59 pm

Why is it that people are looking to blame a single point of failure?

Plane crashes very rarely happen because of a single point of failure. The stars have to align in a bad way.

There will be more than enough blame in this incident to share around.
 
PlanesNTrains
Posts: 8924
Joined: Tue Feb 01, 2005 4:19 pm

Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Wed Dec 12, 2018 3:12 pm

StTim wrote:
Why is it that people are looking to blame a single point of failure?

Plane crashes very rarely happen because of a single point of failure. The stars have to align in a bad way.

There will be more than enough blame in this incident to share around.


Emotions and paychecks.
-Dave


”Yet somewhere in Iceland a great anger stirred in the soul of a troubled individual...” - Revelation
 
dtw2hyd
Posts: 6411
Joined: Wed Jan 09, 2013 12:11 pm

Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Wed Dec 12, 2018 3:14 pm

TTailedTiger wrote:
Would Boeing have a viable defamation case against Lion Air for all of the nonsense they are spewing about the 737?


Of course, they do, as long as Boeing is open to the discovery process. Winning defamation lawsuit is not as simple as keyboard warriors blaming dead people on what they didn't do.
 
sgbroimp
Posts: 170
Joined: Thu Sep 01, 2016 6:35 pm

Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Wed Dec 12, 2018 6:58 pm

There is an old business adage that is true 90% of the time. No one really every wins an argument with a customer.
 
klkla
Posts: 771
Joined: Fri Jul 16, 2004 8:51 am

Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Wed Dec 12, 2018 11:14 pm

PlanesNTrains wrote:
StTim wrote:
Why is it that people are looking to blame a single point of failure?

Plane crashes very rarely happen because of a single point of failure. The stars have to align in a bad way.

There will be more than enough blame in this incident to share around.


Emotions and paychecks.


Don't forget fanboyism.
 
aaexecplat
Posts: 443
Joined: Tue Sep 29, 2009 2:49 pm

Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Wed Dec 12, 2018 11:26 pm

klkla wrote:
PlanesNTrains wrote:
StTim wrote:
Why is it that people are looking to blame a single point of failure?

Plane crashes very rarely happen because of a single point of failure. The stars have to align in a bad way.

There will be more than enough blame in this incident to share around.


Emotions and paychecks.


Don't forget fanboyism.
That is covered by "emotions".

Sent from my SM-G960U using Tapatalk
 
2175301
Posts: 1314
Joined: Wed May 16, 2007 11:19 am

Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Fri Dec 14, 2018 2:45 am

WIederling wrote:
2175301 wrote:
Such discussions and contract resolutions typically occur in a few days, a week at the most for most disasters in the world that require specialized equipment and/or expertise.


could you give some examples for those overachievements?
( what I found surprising is that Boeing didn't seem to even twitch a finger
in context of their product crashes in the last 5..6 years. )


My apologies for my late reply. I was on a business trip for a few days.

The general situation is not any different than many other accidents or disasters that require specialized equipment to resolve and restore things. An example is when the "Big Blue" crane collapsed in Milwaukee building the baseball stadium (there were I believe less than 10 cranes of that size in the world - and they take weeks to assemble after all the parts are onsite). In that case, while cleanup could be done with smaller cranes... completion of the project required another one of those rare large cranes; and they knew where that replacement crane was coming from within a week.

The process is simple:

1) Identify what kind of equipment is needed to deal with the situation: In this case you need dredging equipment that can work at a certain depth and not require hard anchors due to the number of cables and pipelines in the area. There are a known number of such dredges in the world (and I recall seeing an article weeks ago about that that identified that there were between I believe 8 and 30 such dredges in the world depending on the depth and what the job requirement was - I am not going to spend a lot of time looking for it again); and that some of them were readily available in all capabilities (could be rented and on the way in about a week or less with appropriate crew and initial supplies).

2) The people who own and rent such equipment around the world has standard contracts about what their liability is. Take it or leave it is the common answer. You the lessor are required to buy any supplemental insurance for other risks; and there are companies that sell such insurance (dredging around cables and pipelines is a fairly common task in the world).

I have no doubt that within 2 days any competent supply person who had the details of the geographic area and issues would have rough quotes for all available vendors and at least one insurance company. It might take a few days to fine tune those quotes and issue final contracts. If it was my job the first thing I would do is hire a local dredging contractor to assist me locating and hiring (renting) the equipment & crew for the main dredge. Supplemental support vessels likely would be locally sourced. They have the contacts to be able to find the right equipment in less than a day (and often hours).

In my case I have had to once personally quickly locate an unusually large crane for urgent work in a power plant (Nearest one of that size available was either Chicago or Minneapolis, for central Wisconsin; and took over a day to get it there due to the permitting process to move it across the highways); and in our case our normal plant insurance company had an existing contract rider we could add to our normal insurance to cover that work.

Do you recall US Airways Flight 1549 (Sully, landing in Hudson river). How fast the tugs and barges were onsite to hold and raise the aircraft and engines from the river. The NTSB has standing contracts with various recovery/salvage vendors around the US and only had to call the company with the contract in that area and tell them "go - take care of it - do the obvious; additional instructions to follow later." Those contracts are on a cost + basis for any additional equipment that those companies need that they do not have handy at the location. The NTSB trust that they know better what kind of equipment they need for any situation and who to get it from. My understanding is that in that case the company involved immediately called one of their competitors that had needed equipment in that area for assistance; and everyone worked together.

I personally believe that something is rather fishy that a contract for an appropriate salvage dredge was not issued within 10 days of the crash (a week would be normal to me); or at least after it was identified that the CVR may well be in the mud at the bottom.

Now, it might take a month or more to get there if its coming from the other side of the world. But, there are only a limited number of these vessels available. You hire what is available; and there really is not much to negotiate. You buy the additional insurance from companies that specialize in that kind of insurance - or you accept the risk yourself. There is very little to negotiate as the companies supplying dredges and related equipment and insurance provides a short list of options with the appropriate cost. You just pick your options and issue the contracts.

Have a great day,
 
AvObserver
Posts: 2604
Joined: Sat Apr 06, 2002 7:40 am

Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Fri Dec 14, 2018 3:37 am

PixelFlight wrote:
TTailedTiger wrote:
Lion Air is responsible for this crash.

So easy. But it's easy too to see some parts of the story where Lion Air did not have any responsibilities:
- Design of an unstable aircraft requiring automated augmentation system even in manual flight.
- Design of a automated augmentation system highly depending on a single angle of attack sensor without any redundancy.
- Avoiding documentation about the automated augmentation system.
- Avoiding training about the automated augmentation system possible malfunction.
- Certification of all the points above.

Point one is an assumption too many are making before all of the facts are in. MAX pilots who chimed in here dispute it. Point two is quite possible but still must be verified by the investigation. Points three and four are indisputable and Boeing should face a big fine for such negligence.
 
TTailedTiger
Posts: 427
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Fri Dec 14, 2018 3:41 am

AvObserver wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
TTailedTiger wrote:
Lion Air is responsible for this crash.

So easy. But it's easy too to see some parts of the story where Lion Air did not have any responsibilities:
- Design of an unstable aircraft requiring automated augmentation system even in manual flight.
- Design of a automated augmentation system highly depending on a single angle of attack sensor without any redundancy.
- Avoiding documentation about the automated augmentation system.
- Avoiding training about the automated augmentation system possible malfunction.
- Certification of all the points above.

Point one is an assumption too many are making before all of the facts are in. MAX pilots who chimed in here dispute it. Point two is quite possible but still must be verified by the investigation. Points three and four are indisputable and Boeing should face a big fine for such negligence.


Uh, the FAA certified the 737-Max. They would be quite the hypocrites to fine Boeong over the design. There is no such thing as indisputable.
 
patplan
Posts: 22
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Fri Dec 14, 2018 10:32 am

Finally, a brand "new" news pertaining to the CVR search effort by Indonesian's NTSC...This is taken from credible Australian news source.

------------------------------------------
14 December 2018
Lion Air to foot bill for new search for Flight 610 voice recorder
...In a rare move, Lion Air has agreed to foot the bill for a new, more advanced search to find the cockpit voice recorder from its 737 Max-8 plane that crashed in Indonesia in October, killing 189 people.

The airline will reportedly pay nearly $US3 million ($4.2 million) to deploy a specialised ship for 10 days, beginning next week, to search a section of the sea floor under huge oil pipes, where the main fuselage is believed to be buried in mud.

It was revealed this week that Indonesian authorities lacked the funds to carry out a more sophisticated search...


source
------------------------------------------

I don't know if 10 days will be enough to search, find and retrieve the CVR from the muddy bottom of the Java Sea. However, with the small search radius of less than 1 KM wide, it might be enough. Fingers crossed...
 
StTim
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Fri Dec 14, 2018 10:55 am

All of this just goes to prove that the locator beacons in the "black boxes" need to be enhanced to have a longer working duration and probably a stronger signal.
 
Noshow
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Fri Dec 14, 2018 10:59 am

Put all the data in every device. So if only one is recovered or undamaged all the data is available.
 
User avatar
PixelFlight
Posts: 129
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Fri Dec 14, 2018 11:26 am

AvObserver wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
TTailedTiger wrote:
Lion Air is responsible for this crash.

So easy. But it's easy too to see some parts of the story where Lion Air did not have any responsibilities:
- Design of an unstable aircraft requiring automated augmentation system even in manual flight.
- Design of a automated augmentation system highly depending on a single angle of attack sensor without any redundancy.
- Avoiding documentation about the automated augmentation system.
- Avoiding training about the automated augmentation system possible malfunction.
- Certification of all the points above.

Point one is an assumption too many are making before all of the facts are in. MAX pilots who chimed in here dispute it. Point two is quite possible but still must be verified by the investigation. Points three and four are indisputable and Boeing should face a big fine for such negligence.

Point two is officially confirmed by the EMERGENCY AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE 2018-23-51:

(e) Unsafe Condition

"This AD was prompted by analysis performed by the manufacturer showing that if
an erroneously high ****___SINGLE____**** angle of attack (AOA) sensor input is received by the flight control
system, there is a potential for repeated nose-down trim commands of the horizontal stabilizer. We are issuing
this AD to address this potential resulting nose-down trim, which could cause the flight crew to have
difficulty controlling the airplane, and lead to excessive nose-down attitude, significant altitude loss,
and possible impact with terrain."
 
User avatar
PixelFlight
Posts: 129
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Fri Dec 14, 2018 1:19 pm

AvObserver wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
TTailedTiger wrote:
Lion Air is responsible for this crash.

So easy. But it's easy too to see some parts of the story where Lion Air did not have any responsibilities:
- Design of an unstable aircraft requiring automated augmentation system even in manual flight.
- Design of a automated augmentation system highly depending on a single angle of attack sensor without any redundancy.
- Avoiding documentation about the automated augmentation system.
- Avoiding training about the automated augmentation system possible malfunction.
- Certification of all the points above.

Point one is an assumption too many are making before all of the facts are in. MAX pilots who chimed in here dispute it. Point two is quite possible but still must be verified by the investigation. Points three and four are indisputable and Boeing should face a big fine for such negligence.


Point one is visible in https://www.easa.europa.eu/sites/defaul ... 0final.pdf

European Aviation Safety Agency TYPE-CERTIFICATE DATA SHEET TCDS No.: IM.A.120 Issue: 16 BOEING 737
Appendix A Detailed Certification Basis of the 737-8/-9
TABLE A – 737-8/-9 CERTIFICATION BASIS
CS-25 Section No.: 25.672
Title: Stability Augmentation and Automatic and Power-operated Systems
737-8 Amdt: CS 11
737-9 Amdt: CS 12
System/Area: 737-8/-9 Airplane

https://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?n ... .1.25_1672

§25.672 Stability augmentation and automatic and power-operated systems.
If the functioning of stability augmentation or other automatic or power-operated systems is necessary to show compliance with the flight characteristics requirements of this part, such systems must comply with §25.671 and the following:

(a) A warning which is clearly distinguishable to the pilot under expected flight conditions without requiring his attention must be provided for any failure in the stability augmentation system or in any other automatic or power-operated system which could result in an unsafe condition if the pilot were not aware of the failure. Warning systems must not activate the control systems.

(b) The design of the stability augmentation system or of any other automatic or power-operated system must permit initial counteraction of failures of the type specified in §25.671(c) without requiring exceptional pilot skill or strength, by either the deactivation of the system, or a failed portion thereof, or by overriding the failure by movement of the flight controls in the normal sense.

(c) It must be shown that after any single failure of the stability augmentation system or any other automatic or power-operated system—

(1) The airplane is safely controllable when the failure or malfunction occurs at any speed or altitude within the approved operating limitations that is critical for the type of failure being considered;

(2) The controllability and maneuverability requirements of this part are met within a practical operational flight envelope (for example, speed, altitude, normal acceleration, and airplane configurations) which is described in the Airplane Flight Manual; and

(3) The trim, stability, and stall characteristics are not impaired below a level needed to permit continued safe flight and landing.
 
fadecfault
Posts: 141
Joined: Mon Nov 05, 2007 8:44 pm

Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Fri Dec 14, 2018 10:46 pm

PixelFlight wrote:
TTailedTiger wrote:
Lion Air is responsible for this crash.

So easy. But it's easy too to see some parts of the story where Lion Air did not have any responsibilities:
- Design of an unstable aircraft requiring automated augmentation system even in manual flight.
- Design of a automated augmentation system highly depending on a single angle of attack sensor without any redundancy.


If you call the MAX unstable because they added mcas then you must call the 737 classic and NG unstable too.
Both added trim augmentation controlled by a single sensor and somehow they managed to fly decades without this sort of accident.
The views and opinions written here are my own and do not reflect those of my employer.
 
patplan
Posts: 22
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Sat Dec 15, 2018 1:08 am

fadecfault wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
TTailedTiger wrote:
Lion Air is responsible for this crash.

So easy. But it's easy too to see some parts of the story where Lion Air did not have any responsibilities:
- Design of an unstable aircraft requiring automated augmentation system even in manual flight.
- Design of a automated augmentation system highly depending on a single angle of attack sensor without any redundancy.


If you call the MAX unstable because they added mcas then you must call the 737 classic and NG unstable too.
Both added trim augmentation controlled by a single sensor and somehow they managed to fly decades without this sort of accident.


Quoting you, "somehow" is indeed the word. It sounded almost mystical, mysterious and unexplainable because that's in the realm of so-called the law of big numbers. After million upon million hours of flights, finally the super tiny negligible possibility, the-wrongly-thought-to-be-improbable, will eventually show up to bite you...

That is when the edges of a Probability Curve greet you and say: "We are the neglected "negligibles" warning you to never neglect us..., ever...!!"
 
User avatar
PixelFlight
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Sat Dec 15, 2018 1:38 am

fadecfault wrote:
If you call the MAX unstable because they added mcas then you must call the 737 classic and NG unstable too.
Both added trim augmentation controlled by a single sensor and somehow they managed to fly decades without this sort of accident.

This is not what the EAD 2018-23-51 say:

(c) Applicability
This AD applies to all The Boeing Company Model 737-8 and -9 airplanes, certificated in any category.

For some reason, others 737 models did not have the same unsafe condition: a erroneous AoA value did have the possibility to trim the stab the same way as on the MAX, specifically in manual flight mode. Given how fast Boeing was able to analyse and identify the unsafe condition on the MAX, there certainly have verified if that condition exists on others models. I can't imagine that there fail on that given the situation.

A slightly unstable design with augmentation system near the edge of the required flight envelop is not a problem in itself, if done correctly. It was in my list because it's just out of scope of any Lion Air responsibilities and was the reason why the MCAS exists on the MAX.
 
smartplane
Posts: 395
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Sat Dec 15, 2018 4:29 am

Surely this is the key part of the AD, because it's correcting / reversing claims made that 737 pilots were briefed / aware of different 737 flight characteristics. If they were, it wouldn't need to be issued. And certainly not so urgently.

The million dollar question. Is this sufficient to remove the common type rating? Do these models comply with certification requirements? Presumably the FAA/EASA meeting at the beginning of the month in Bangkok concluded no and yes, at least for now.

FAA's Determination of the Effective Date
An unsafe condition exists that requires the immediate adoption of Emergency AD 2018-23-51, issued on November 7, 2018, to all known U.S. owners and operators of these airplanes. The FAA found that the risk to the flying public justified waiving notice and comment prior to adoption of this rule because an erroneously high single AOA sensor input received by the flight control system can result in a potential for repeated nose-down trim commands of the horizontal stabilizer, which could cause the flight crew to have difficulty controlling the airplane, and lead to excessive nose-down attitude, significant altitude loss, and possible impact with terrain.
 
sgrow787
Posts: 46
Joined: Fri May 16, 2014 8:12 pm

Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Sat Dec 15, 2018 4:33 am

PixelFlight wrote:
Point one is visible in https://www.easa.europa.eu/sites/defaul ... 0final.pdf

European Aviation Safety Agency TYPE-CERTIFICATE DATA SHEET TCDS No.: IM.A.120 Issue: 16 BOEING 737
Appendix A Detailed Certification Basis of the 737-8/-9
TABLE A – 737-8/-9 CERTIFICATION BASIS
CS-25 Section No.: 25.672
Title: Stability Augmentation and Automatic and Power-operated Systems
737-8 Amdt: CS 11
737-9 Amdt: CS 12
System/Area: 737-8/-9 Airplane

https://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?n ... .1.25_1672

§25.672 Stability augmentation and automatic and power-operated systems.
If the functioning of stability augmentation or other automatic or power-operated systems is necessary to show compliance with the flight characteristics requirements of this part, such systems must comply with §25.671 and the following:

(a) A warning which is clearly distinguishable to the pilot under expected flight conditions without requiring his attention must be provided for any failure in the stability augmentation system or in any other automatic or power-operated system which could result in an unsafe condition if the pilot were not aware of the failure. Warning systems must not activate the control systems.

(b) The design of the stability augmentation system or of any other automatic or power-operated system must permit initial counteraction of failures of the type specified in §25.671(c) without requiring exceptional pilot skill or strength, by either the deactivation of the system, or a failed portion thereof, or by overriding the failure by movement of the flight controls in the normal sense.

(c) It must be shown that after any single failure of the stability augmentation system or any other automatic or power-operated system—

(1) The airplane is safely controllable when the failure or malfunction occurs at any speed or altitude within the approved operating limitations that is critical for the type of failure being considered;

(2) The controllability and maneuverability requirements of this part are met within a practical operational flight envelope (for example, speed, altitude, normal acceleration, and airplane configurations) which is described in the Airplane Flight Manual; and

(3) The trim, stability, and stall characteristics are not impaired below a level needed to permit continued safe flight and landing.


25.671(c)
"Probable malfunctions must have only minor effects on control system operation and must be capable of being readily counteracted by the pilot"

MCAS failed because its stall detection failed. Its stall detection failed because a sensor (AOA) failed, _and_ there was no redundant system to check for that or compensate for that. Because there was no redundancy to crosscheck the stall detection, the system didn't know it failed. Because the system didn't know it failed, it couldn't possibly warn the pilot (and, as well, there probably wasn't a warning flag designed in the system to warn the pilot that MCAS and/or stall detection had failed - because had there been one, they would've had to've included difference training on that, which they didn't).

Is the runaway trim recovery procedure considered to be readily available to the pilot so that he or she can "readily counteract" the failure? "Readily" means immediately figuring out what the hell is going on... uncommanded nose trim down but no warning to the pilots in terms of a flashing MCAS flag on the PFD. "Counteracted" means having enough time to counteract by using the runaway trim recovery procedure before hitting terrain. Ie, should MCAS even be running at an altitude of 5000ft?
 
sgrow787
Posts: 46
Joined: Fri May 16, 2014 8:12 pm

Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Sat Dec 15, 2018 5:30 am

And from 25.672(a):

"(a) A warning which is clearly distinguishable to the pilot under expected flight conditions without requiring his attention must be provided for any failure in the stability augmentation system or in any other automatic or power-operated system which could result in an unsafe condition if the pilot were not aware of the failure. Warning systems must not activate the control systems."

Certainly Boeing would have had to have designed in a redundancy system (and informing the FAA) to meet the warning requirement. And to meet a warning requirement for a failed MCAS would absolutely require a redundancy system to check it. So I'm now wondering if or how we came to the conclusion this is a single source failure situation. Note that one AOA sensor being bad doesn't necessarily mean single failure. If there was a redundant check (using the copilot side's AOA) but the FCC failed to correctly perform that check during source selection, then there were two simultaneous failures - the pilot's AOA sensor _and_ the FCC crosscheck system - and this is no longer a single source failure problem. But then where's the difference training on the MCAS fail flag? Or was there already an existing stall detection fail warning in the 737 NG?
 
LDRA
Posts: 89
Joined: Fri Jan 15, 2016 3:01 am

Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Sat Dec 15, 2018 6:11 am

sgrow787 wrote:
And from 25.672(a):

"(a) A warning which is clearly distinguishable to the pilot under expected flight conditions without requiring his attention must be provided for any failure in the stability augmentation system or in any other automatic or power-operated system which could result in an unsafe condition if the pilot were not aware of the failure. Warning systems must not activate the control systems."

Certainly Boeing would have had to have designed in a redundancy system (and informing the FAA) to meet the warning requirement. And to meet a warning requirement for a failed MCAS would absolutely require a redundancy system to check it. So I'm now wondering if or how we came to the conclusion this is a single source failure situation. Note that one AOA sensor being bad doesn't necessarily mean single failure. If there was a redundant check (using the copilot side's AOA) but the FCC failed to correctly perform that check during source selection, then there were two simultaneous failures - the pilot's AOA sensor _and_ the FCC crosscheck system - and this is no longer a single source failure problem. But then where's the difference training on the MCAS fail flag? Or was there already an existing stall detection fail warning in the 737 NG?


There is no failure indication for MCAS meeting 25.672a. if there were, Boeing would have to explain MCAS in FCOM, we wouldn't have this thread

Other similar systems on 737, STS and Mach trim, all have their own warning lights to properly indicate failure to flight crew, per 25.672a
Last edited by LDRA on Sat Dec 15, 2018 6:18 am, edited 1 time in total.
 
LDRA
Posts: 89
Joined: Fri Jan 15, 2016 3:01 am

Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Sat Dec 15, 2018 6:15 am

For cert authority to ground fleet, they need evidence and justification, which means digging through failure analysis and design documentation, which takes time. By that time, fix might already be available
 
sgrow787
Posts: 46
Joined: Fri May 16, 2014 8:12 pm

Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Sat Dec 15, 2018 7:07 am

LDRA wrote:
There is no failure indication for MCAS meeting 25.672a.


So the 737Max is not airworthy, at least for European air space (assuming the MCAS on European airlines is the same). Do we have Indonesian or Asian airspace type certification document available?
 
Chemist
Posts: 402
Joined: Tue Oct 20, 2015 4:46 am

Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Sat Dec 15, 2018 7:59 am

Seems to me, notwithstanding Boeing lack of redundancy, Lion maintenance, or pilot training -
If I am in an airplane and it keeps trimming nose down when that doesn't seem right, and the big trim wheel is spinning and clicking, and I have to hold too much back pressure -- I'm going to disconnect that damn automatic trim system.
 
marcelh
Posts: 295
Joined: Wed Jun 19, 2013 12:43 pm

Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Sat Dec 15, 2018 8:12 am

Chemist wrote:
Seems to me, notwithstanding Boeing lack of redundancy, Lion maintenance, or pilot training -
If I am in an airplane and it keeps trimming nose down when that doesn't seem right, and the big trim wheel is spinning and clicking, and I have to hold too much back pressure -- I'm going to disconnect that damn automatic trim system.


Easliy said with today’s knowledge. IMHO Boeing made the initial mistake to downplay the existence of MCAS.
 
ryanov
Posts: 103
Joined: Sat Nov 03, 2012 4:38 am

Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Sat Dec 15, 2018 8:35 am

I asked awhile back, more or less, "wouldn't a pilot relatively quickly decide to do that?" that is if they were sure that the system was not performing a necessary trim action (eg. they could see where the horizon was, etc.)? I can certainly understand not being able to diagnose something that quickly, and that this system being unknown would mask what could be happening. It would just seem like if the plane is trimming and you don't want it to, there are few other choices. Is there some reason that's not true?
 
sgrow787
Posts: 46
Joined: Fri May 16, 2014 8:12 pm

Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Sat Dec 15, 2018 11:09 am

Chemist wrote:
Seems to me, notwithstanding Boeing lack of redundancy, Lion maintenance, or pilot training -
If I am in an airplane and it keeps trimming nose down when that doesn't seem right, and the big trim wheel is spinning and clicking, and I have to hold too much back pressure -- I'm going to disconnect that damn automatic trim system.


If the automatic trim system is considered a activation of "the control system", then that in and of itself is not the warning that 25.672(a) is mandating:

"(a) A warning which is clearly distinguishable to the pilot under expected flight conditions without requiring his attention must be provided for any failure in the stability augmentation system or in any other automatic or power-operated system which could result in an unsafe condition if the pilot were not aware of the failure. Warning systems must not activate the control systems."

Note that the pilot of JT610 - 33 yo Bhavye Suneja - was an Indian national from New Delhi, with 6000 hrs flight time. His bio says he began flying in 2009, and began with Lion Air in 2011. Would it be too much to conclude that Suneja was also the copilot in charge in the Lion Air JT904 crash in 2013? They don't give the name of the copilot with 2000 hrs of experience (which would be about right for someone starting flying in 2009):

"The co-pilot, an Indian national with 2,000 hours of relevant flying experience, was in charge for the domestic trip"

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indo ... D720130415
 
Dauntless
Posts: 1
Joined: Sat Dec 15, 2018 11:59 am

Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Sat Dec 15, 2018 12:58 pm

zeke wrote:
MSPNWA wrote:
Are you seriously trying to equate planned, expected, and essential automatic control inputs with unplanned, unexpected, and dangerous inputs?


How does a pilot know is Mach trim, STS, or MCAS are “planned, expected, and essential automatic control inputs” when there is no FMA to tell them they are happening, why they are happening, and not covered in the manuals or training properly.

As far as the manufacturer is concerned they are just normal autopilot inputs that require no specific training or notification by the aircraft to the pilot.

This is similar to the Turkish 737 crash into AMS where the aircraft automatically brought the thrust back to idle because of a radalt fault, it thought it should land.


I’ve been a lurker for well over a decade and have appreciated your contributions Zeke. This incident in particular has finally persuaded me to contribute for the first time.

The ambiguity of MCAS from the differences training is obviously a hot button and the QRH Runaway Trim NNC is, in my opinion, a bandage solution. Although it is an existing procedure and wholly effective in addressing MCAS trim movement due to faulty AoA data, I do not feel it’s appropriately sufficient due to the absence of Visual and Aural Warnings that occur during training and actually runaway trim events. It’s also important to recognize MCAS only activates during manual flight and how this can be an issue with the changes made to the cutout switches.

Right from the beginning when the maintenance logs were leaked, my suspicion went straight to Alpha Vane, Stab out of Trim, and Elevator Feel Shift leading to insufficient pitch authority. This incident back in 2010 came to mind:

https://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/nl/media/attachment/2018/7/10/ryan_air_en.pdf

I truly do hope that the CVR is recovered and data retrieved. Those last minutes are rather stunning; it almost looks like they finally cut the trim once it went full AND due to the lack of sufficient counter trim combined with possibly manual reversion in a last ditch effort to gain some elevator pitch up.
 
patplan
Posts: 22
Joined: Sun Nov 11, 2018 1:38 pm

Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Sat Dec 15, 2018 1:01 pm

sgrow787 wrote:
---snipped---

Note that the pilot of JT610 - 33 yo Bhavye Suneja - was an Indian national from New Delhi, with 6000 hrs flight time. His bio says he began flying in 2009, and began with Lion Air in 2011. Would it be too much to conclude that Suneja was also the copilot in charge in the Lion Air JT904 crash in 2013? They don't give the name of the copilot with 2000 hrs of experience (which would be about right for someone starting flying in 2009):

"The co-pilot, an Indian national with 2,000 hours of relevant flying experience, was in charge for the domestic trip"

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indo ... D720130415


Actually, before you started that "suspicion" of yours, you should at least try harder to find some readily available facts/data which may or may not support it.

If you look up some wiki's or stories pertaining to Lion Air JT904 accident, you'll end up stumbling across the following bits...

---- Lion Air Flight JT904 ----
CAPT Mahlup Ghazali (Indonesian)
FO Chirag Kalra (Indian).
 
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neutrino
Posts: 1502
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Sat Dec 15, 2018 4:14 pm

patplan wrote:
Actually, before you started that "suspicion" of yours, you should at least try harder to find some readily available facts/data which may or may not support it.

If you look up some wiki's or stories pertaining to Lion Air JT904 accident, you'll end up stumbling across the following bits...

---- Lion Air Flight JT904 ----
CAPT Mahlup Ghazali (Indonesian)
FO Chirag Kalra (Indian).


:D That's why I always tell people that "It's good to be smart. To act smart, not so much".
Potestatem obscuri lateris nescitis
 
sgrow787
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Sat Dec 15, 2018 7:54 pm

patplan wrote:
Actually, before you started that "suspicion" of yours, you should at least try harder to find some readily available facts/data which may or may not support it.

If you look up some wiki's or stories pertaining to Lion Air JT904 accident, you'll end up stumbling across the following bits...

---- Lion Air Flight JT904 ----
CAPT Mahlup Ghazali (Indonesian)
FO Chirag Kalra (Indian).


Thanks for providing a link:

https://www.jpnn.com/news/pilot-lion-ga ... mulonimbus

I actually _did_ search for the information, but how many people on this forum speak Indonesian, and hence know to look for "Kapten Pilot" or "Kopilot"? How many people know there is a Indonesian Wikipedia out there too (found by googling "Kapten pilot 904")? I didn't think so..
 
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PixelFlight
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Sun Dec 16, 2018 1:15 pm

Dauntless wrote:
truly do hope that the CVR is recovered and data retrieved. Those last minutes are rather stunning; it almost looks like they finally cut the trim once it went full AND due to the lack of sufficient counter trim combined with possibly manual reversion in a last ditch effort to gain some elevator pitch up.

The FDR data show the pitch trim position still moving from MCAS and pilot switch during the final abrupt fall up to about 5 seconds (my estimation) before the end of the recording. At this moment the pitch trim position was almost 0 and the recorded force of the pilots on the elevator was very high. In the last couple of seconds the situation was completely out of control to the point that I doubt that any human brain could have his mind free enough to focus on debugging a unknown automation.

What there was learning from the manual is that the stab trim action cam from:
1) Auto pilot: but is was not active, so for them this was not the cause of the nose down trim action. And this was correct.
2) Trim switch: the up button work as expected, and there didn't touch the down button since there retraced the flaps. So not the cause of the node down trim action. And this was correct.
3) Manual trim wheels: FDR data don't show clear action from the trim wheels. Could not be the cause of the nose down trim action: And this was correct.

The CVR will eventually reveal if the crew talked about the trim runaway procedure, and if yes why there did not implement it. As others on this forum have already said, it's possible that there excluded this procedure because there can't understand that an unknown automation was acting and that there still feel to have the control of the stab trim with the trim up switch. I suspect that the start of the dive correspond to the moment where there realized that the trim wheels stop rotating as soon as there use a trim up switch even for a short time and that the trim wheels automatically started rotating again 5 seconds after. There discovered something that look like an unknown automation in manual flight. There where maybe so surprising and confusing by that finding that there lost attention to the fact that there should have press the trim up switch longer to compensate. Then the final long MCAS trim down occurred putting the aircraft in the falling attitude. My guess is that there where discovering and debugging while aviating. It's even possible that there where doing so because there realized that the maintenance was unsuccessful at fixing the reported issues despite multiple tries and that there wanted to collect more information in the hope to help fixing it. Yes, I am freely speculating on this.
 
patplan
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Mon Dec 17, 2018 3:43 am

The vessel to be used in the search of Lion Air's PK-LQP CVR is the Bahamian Flag "MPV Everest". It's planned to arrive at the location Wednesday after some delays due to seasonably bad weather enroute and some rough seas around Malacca Strait.

Image

Some background news for this vessel...
=======================================
Keppel Singmarine delivers multi-purpose ice-class vessel
Keppel Singmarine Pte Ltd (Keppel Singmarine), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Keppel Offshore & Marine Ltd (Keppel O&M), has delivered a multi-purpose ice-class vessel to New Orient Marine Pte Ltd, a subsidiary of Luxembourg-based Maritime Construction Services SA (Maritime Construction Services).

...Built to the proprietary design of Keppel O&M's ship design and development arm, Marine Technology Development (MTD), MPV Everest can operate in ambient temperature as low as minus 30 degree Celsius. It will have an Ice Class Arc 5 notation and capabilities such as Class 3 dynamic positioning and navigating in ice of up to 1 metre thickness...

...MPV Everest's versatility allows it to carry out subsea repair and construction activities at 3000 metres of water depth, well intervention, diving support services with an 18-men twin-bell system, fire-fighting and emergency rescue operations, as well as towing and the provision of supplies in Arctic terrain...

source
=======================================

So far, Lion Air confirmed to have leased the vessel for just 10 days. Should the search require more than 10 days, who'll foot the bill to continue the operation??

https://www.vesselfinder.com/vessels/MPV-EVEREST-IMO-9769130-MMSI-311000615
https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/hunt-for-black-box-of-crashed-indonesian-lion-air-jet-delayed-by-bad-weather
 
User avatar
AirlineCritic
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Tue Dec 18, 2018 8:13 pm

Heavy duty ship! Maybe they will complete operations in 10 days.
 
BEG2IAH
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Wed Dec 19, 2018 4:23 am

patplan wrote:
The vessel to be used in the search of Lion Air's PK-LQP CVR is the Bahamian Flag "MPV Everest".


patplan, thanks for these updates!
Flying at cruise altitude is (mostly) boring. I wish all flights were nothing but endless take offs and landings every 10 minutes or so.
 
patplan
Posts: 22
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Wed Dec 19, 2018 12:30 pm

Well, the vessel MPV Everest is in the vicinity now...

Image

Image

Let's pray that the crews and the vessel can get the job done in 10 days...



https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details/ships/shipid:4899461/mmsi:311000615/vessel:MPV%20EVEREST
 
WIederling
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Wed Dec 19, 2018 12:46 pm

Did the MAX8 actually enter water still in one piece
or did it start to disassemble even before the final impact?
Murphy is an optimist
 
Etheereal
Posts: 162
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Wed Dec 19, 2018 2:08 pm

PlanesNTrains wrote:
StTim wrote:
Why is it that people are looking to blame a single point of failure?

Plane crashes very rarely happen because of a single point of failure. The stars have to align in a bad way.

There will be more than enough blame in this incident to share around.


Emotions and paychecks.

But arent the a.net guys shilling for free tho?
 
WIederling
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Wed Dec 19, 2018 2:13 pm

Etheereal wrote:
But arent the a.net guys shilling for free tho?


for some it appears to be a nine to five job.
( Look at the distribution of posting times over the day :-)
Murphy is an optimist
 
BEG2IAH
Posts: 878
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Wed Dec 19, 2018 3:56 pm

This is a good summary. Fair use excerpt...
Source: law360.com


Expert Analysis
Aviation Watch: Behind The Lion Air Flight 610 Tragedy
By Alan Hoffman
December 14, 2018, 1:17 PM EST


On Oct. 29, 2018, Lion Air Flight 610, a newly delivered Boeing 737 MAX-8, with only 800 flight hours, crashed into the sea minutes after takeoff from Jakarta, Indonesia, killing all 189 persons on board. Radar records showed that the aircraft behaved erratically after takeoff, climbing and descending repeatedly before entering a final plunge from which it did not recover.

The Indonesian National Transportation Safety Committee has released a preliminary factual investigation report including the aircraft’s flight data recorder output.[1] It shows that that after takeoff, the 737 climbed approximately 1,500 feet, pitched sharply up, and then pitched down into a dive. It recovered from the dive and began climbing.

Within a minute after takeoff the first officer reported “flight control problems.” Four minutes into the flight the plane leveled off, and then entered a series of climbs and descents which continued for another six minutes. Eight minutes into the flight the first officer again reported flight control problems. Ten minutes after takeoff the aircraft dived steeply, and plunged into the sea.

Systems Issues

In the immediate aftermath of the accident attention focused on the aircraft’s angle of attack, or AOA, sensor system. On Nov. 7, the Federal Aviation Agency issued an emergency airworthiness directive for 737 MAX aircraft, based on information from Boeing showing that if an erroneously high AOA sensor input is received by the flight control system, there could be repeated nose-down trim commands generated by the system, which “if not addressed, could cause the flight crew to have difficulty controlling the airplane,” leading to “possible impact with terrain."[2]

The airworthiness directive requires supplements to the aircraft flight manual to provide flight crews with runaway horizontal stabilizer trim procedures to follow under certain conditions to correct “an urgent safety of flight situation,” and states, “We consider this AD interim action. If final action is later identified, we might consider further rulemaking then.”

Four days later, Boeing sent a message to 737 MAX operators, describing an automated stall protection feature built into the 737 MAX flight control system called the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, or MCAS. The Boeing communiqué advised that MCAS is one of several MAX auto-trim systems, which “commands nose-down stabilizer” based on “input data and other airplane systems,” and is “activated without pilot input.”

That got attention from airline pilots, because MCAS was not part of prior 737 flight control systems. “This is the first description you, as 737 pilots, have seen,” the Allied Pilots Association told American Airlines pilots. The Air Line Pilots Association, representing the pilots flying for Southwest, which operates the world’s largest 737 fleet and is Boeing’s biggest customer, blasted it as “a potential, significant aviation safety deficiency.”

In response, Boeing set up meetings with the Southwest and American pilots, and Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg denied a Wall Street Journal report that Boeing “withheld information about potential hazards” associated with MCAS. The United Airlines pilots’ union said its pilots were aware of the system, and knew how to deal with problems with its operation “with a flip of the cutout switches,” even though its functions were not explicitly described in the aircraft manuals. And Aviation Week quoted an experienced 737 captain to the effect that “how the system works is not relevant, so long as it works as designed.”

The problem, of course, is what happens when it does not work as designed.

Reporting since the accident indicates that Boeing incorporated MCAS into the flight control software for the 737 MAX because of important design changes in this latest model of Boeing’s most successful airliner, which celebrated 50 years of airline service in 2018. To improve performance and fuel economy, the MAX uses larger and heavier engines than earlier models, requiring heavier engine support structure and longer landing gear to provide adequate ground clearance. These changes resulted in changes to the plane’s stability and low-speed handling characteristics, which, it is claimed, made it more susceptible to aerodynamic stalls.

A stall occurs when a wing’s angle of attack becomes too great, and airflow over the wing no longer maintains flight. In-flight stalls resulted in the loss of Air France Flight 447 in 2009 and Air Asia Flight 8501 in 2014. In each of these accidents, the automated flight control system failed, and the cockpit crew took over, stalled the airplane and failed to recover.

Boeing apparently incorporated MCAS to guard against such occurrences. It automatically pushes the plane’s nose down when the AOA approaches a stall. That is a safety feature. However, if the AOA sensors malfunction, MCAS may push the nose down when the plane is flying properly, putting it into a dive. The Lion Air flight data recorder information is consistent with such a situation, though not probative of it.

Operational Issues

The Indonesian preliminary accident report reflects problems with the accident aircraft’s AOA system that existed for three days prior to the crash. One day before the accident, the pilots experienced faulty instrument indications that the aircraft was about to stall, and activation of nose down trim, which the pilots handled by disabling the stabilizer trim system.

The report states that the aircraft was in unairworthy condition, and the pilots should have landed at the nearest airport instead of continuing the flight. Afterwards, maintenance was performed on the instruments, but no work was done on the AOA system. The same problems occurred the next day prior to the final dive. Clearly, the unairworthy condition had not been corrected before it took off.

Other reporting paints a disturbing history of poor maintenance and operational procedures at Lion Air that may have played a role in the Oct. 29 accident. As far back as 2009, the airline had developed a reputation for safety lapses that led its insurers to required hiring Frank Caron, a veteran airline pilot, as its safety manager. Caron later reported that he found an average of one major engineering issue every three days, even though Lion Air had mostly new airplanes.

“Buying all the latest-generation, state-of-the-art engineering will be in vain if you don’t have systems in place that prioritize safety,” he stated. “What I saw was a company, from the top down, that made saving money a motto — so spend the minimum on pilot training, salaries, management, everything.” He added that defective equipment was swapped between planes rather than being repaired or replaced.

After Caron left in 2011, the problems continued. In 2013, a Lion Air flight undershot the runway at Bali and landed in the water. The accident report found that the 24-year old co-pilot lacked “basic principles of jet aircraft flying.” The New York Times reported that maintenance personnel were pressured to falsify records, and pilots were using methamphetamine to stay awake.

Lion Air President Rusdi Kirana, a former typewriter salesman who founded the low-cost carrier in 1989, enjoys significant political influence in Indonesia. He serves as the deputy chairman of the largest Islamic party in the nation, as an economic advisor to the country’s president, and as its ambassador to Malaysia.[3]

Who’s to Blame?

Rusdi is reported to be “very upset with Boeing” for issuing a statement detailing the maintenance problems identified in the preliminary accident report. Lion Air is now threatening to cancel some of its 188 outstanding 737 MAX orders, but some observers suggest that the airline is overextended and had considered deferring deliveries before the accident.

Southwest and American pilots have asked for additional training on MCAS, and Southwest has said it will modify the AOA cockpit display in its new 737 MAX aircraft. Boeing insists that the current aircraft documentation adequately directs pilots how to properly handle malfunctions in the AOA system and improper activation of MCAS.

In reality, all the contending parties are correct. MCAS was not used in earlier 737 models. It was adopted for the MAX as a safety feature, to address stability issues related to the design changes necessitated by its larger engines. It was not mentioned in the aircraft manuals, nor was the possibility of uncommanded control inputs discussed. However, the aircraft manual gives pilots correct instructions on how to deal with such a situation, irrespective of its cause, by disconnecting the stabilizer trim system — as the Lion Air crew who flew the aircraft the day before the accident had done.

The Lion Air crash has high stakes for all concerned. The 737 MAX is the latest iteration of Boeing’s most successful airliner and plays a crucial role in the company’s commercial prospects. Concerns about its safety could damage Boeing in its battle with rival Airbus for the crucial narrow-body airliner market. Lion Air’s uncertain future may now hang in the balance. Enormous human and economic costs are involved.

The first lawsuits have already been filed in Cook County, Illinois, the site of Boeing’s corporate headquarters and a notoriously plaintiff-friendly venue. The litigation will be complex and costly, pitting the manufacturer against its customer, as each tries to show that the other was more responsible for the tragedy, creating a target-rich environment for the plaintiffs seeking to maximize the exposure of both. Neither will escape unharmed. The ultimate question, as yet unanswered, is what might have been done to avert this human loss, and what can be done to prevent it in future.

What Lies Ahead?

More fundamentally, the fate of Lion Air 610 highlights the complicated between humans and the machines they fly. Manufacturers have added ever greater levels of automation to improve safety, but unexpected failures and malfunctions have led to fatal pilot errors.

Both Air France 447 and Air Asia 8501 involved degradation of Airbus automated flight control systems which led the pilots to stall the airplanes and fail to regain control. The Lion Air crash arose from a defective AOA system which sent faulty data to the MCAS and caused uncommanded control inputs which the crew could not handle.

These accidents have important implications for efforts to move to single pilot cockpits, and even pilotless commercial aircraft. As one veteran airline captain put it: “When the automation fails, the pilot is the backup.” Improving the relationship between man and machine will be a continuing challenge in the coming years.


[1] Preliminary Accident Investigation Report KNKT.18.10.35.04, PT. Lion Mentari Airlines Boeing 737-8 MAX; PK-LQP Tanjung Karawang, West Java Republic of Indonesia 29 October 2018.

[2] Federal Aviation Administration Emergency Airworthiness Directive AD#: 2018-23-51, Nov. 7, 2018.

[3] Hannah Beech and Muktita Suhartono, “‘Spend the Minimum’: After Crash, Lion Air’s Safety Record is Back in the Spotlight,” The New York Times, Nov. 22, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/22/worl ... lures.html.
Flying at cruise altitude is (mostly) boring. I wish all flights were nothing but endless take offs and landings every 10 minutes or so.
 
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PixelFlight
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Wed Dec 19, 2018 5:20 pm

BEG2IAH wrote:
This is a good summary. Fair use excerpt...
Source: law360.com

Expert Analysis
Aviation Watch: Behind The Lion Air Flight 610 Tragedy
By Alan Hoffman
December 14, 2018, 1:17 PM EST


Sensor redundancy design, safety assessment activity, and certification are not even a subject in a expert analysis ?
 
BEG2IAH
Posts: 878
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Wed Dec 19, 2018 5:52 pm

PixelFlight wrote:
Sensor redundancy design, safety assessment activity, and certification are not even a subject in a expert analysis ?


This is an analysis written by a lawyer, not an engineer.
Flying at cruise altitude is (mostly) boring. I wish all flights were nothing but endless take offs and landings every 10 minutes or so.
 
marcelh
Posts: 295
Joined: Wed Jun 19, 2013 12:43 pm

Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Wed Dec 19, 2018 5:54 pm

@ BEG2IAH:
Good article, but IMHO it is a bit unbalanced. It lacks the answer at the question WHY Boeing told his customers/pilots nothing about the existence of MCAS.
 
kalvado
Posts: 1111
Joined: Wed Mar 01, 2006 4:29 am

Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Wed Dec 19, 2018 5:58 pm

WIederling wrote:
Did the MAX8 actually enter water still in one piece
or did it start to disassemble even before the final impact?

Airplane was at 5000 feet = 1500 meters when it all started. Just falling down from that altitude would accelerate a body to ~120 m/s = 0.36 Mach at room temperature. Then there is air drag and initial speed of about same magnitude.. Overall, doesn't look there would be enough energy to go supersonic, and without that I doubt there will be enough aerodynamic force to actually break up the plane before impact.
As far as I understand, if there are intact bodies, one can tell from their condition: air stream rips the clothing off. But it was mentioned that bodies (or what is left of them) are good for DNA analysis only... Also an indication that people were not slowed by the airstream.
 
BEG2IAH
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Wed Dec 19, 2018 5:59 pm

marcelh wrote:
@ BEG2IAH:
Good article, but IMHO it is a bit unbalanced. It lacks the answer at the question WHY Boeing told his customers/pilots nothing about the existence of MCAS.


How come UAL knew about MCAS?
Flying at cruise altitude is (mostly) boring. I wish all flights were nothing but endless take offs and landings every 10 minutes or so.
 
marcelh
Posts: 295
Joined: Wed Jun 19, 2013 12:43 pm

Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Wed Dec 19, 2018 6:05 pm

BEG2IAH wrote:
marcelh wrote:
@ BEG2IAH:
Good article, but IMHO it is a bit unbalanced. It lacks the answer at the question WHY Boeing told his customers/pilots nothing about the existence of MCAS.


How come UAL knew about MCAS?


How come WN and a lot of other customers didn’t?
 
LDRA
Posts: 89
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Wed Dec 19, 2018 6:36 pm

BEG2IAH wrote:
marcelh wrote:
@ BEG2IAH:
Good article, but IMHO it is a bit unbalanced. It lacks the answer at the question WHY Boeing told his customers/pilots nothing about the existence of MCAS.


How come UAL knew about MCAS?

What did UAL know before the AD? The actual symptoms outlined in AD to DETECT MCAS malfunction?
 
BEG2IAH
Posts: 878
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Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Wed Dec 19, 2018 7:00 pm

I understood that UAL shared the MCAS from Boeing documentation with its pilots and WN and AAL had not.
Flying at cruise altitude is (mostly) boring. I wish all flights were nothing but endless take offs and landings every 10 minutes or so.
 
N212R
Posts: 165
Joined: Wed Dec 14, 2016 5:18 pm

Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Wed Dec 19, 2018 7:01 pm

WIederling wrote:
Did the MAX8 actually enter water still in one piece
or did it start to disassemble even before the final impact?


Why would someone ask a question to which they already know the answer?
 
hivue
Posts: 1736
Joined: Tue Feb 26, 2013 2:26 am

Re: Lion Air 737MAX8 Crashed Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang

Wed Dec 19, 2018 8:48 pm

BEG2IAH wrote:
...In-flight stalls resulted in the loss of Air France Flight 447 in 2009 and Air Asia Flight 8501 in 2014. In each of these accidents, the automated flight control system failed...Both Air France 447 and Air Asia 8501 involved degradation of Airbus automated flight control systems which led the pilots to stall the airplanes and fail to regain control.


In the AF447 case the FCS did not "fail." It handed the airplane over to the pilots when it detected inaccurate sensor input -- as designed. This in turn did not "lead" the pilots to stall the airplane. They did that on their own.
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