I was on topic, we're discussing information that was left out of the FCOM and I was pointing out it happens to everybody.
If the A320 documentation on alpha protection was adequate the NTSB wouldn't have recommended better documentation.
"The investigation also found that Airbus' training curricula did not contain information on the effects of alpha-protection-mode features that might affect the airplane's response to pilot sidestick pitch inputs."
Sullenberger wasn't reacting to a GPWS or windshear, he was trying to ditch an airplane -- entirely different operation.
You are making grand sweeping statements that are nothing more than your opinion and presenting them as facts. Your opinions are not factually correct here. It does not "happen to everybody", stop trying to point the finger at every other manufacturer to deflect this deficiency away from where it rests with this system on the 737MAX. When I went from the 747 classic to the 744 I saw a massive reduction in the detail of information that was made available to the crew. I just checked an old version of the A320 FCOM 1 and FM books comes in 1624 pages, the 737NG 1257 pages. The 787 Systems description is 1233 pages, the A350 4032 pages. You said "The philosophy for many, many years (30+) has been for manufacturers to not tell the pilots every little detail like in the old days", clearly the amount of information that can be conveyed in 4000 pages is not what is conveyed in 1200 pages. After the Asiana accident in SFO I went to read up on the 777 autothrottle, I was very surprised the FCOM only had half a page to describe the whole system. That is a complex system with many automatic features which is not disclosed to the crew.
I do not know what "Airbus' training curricula" the NTSB is referring to with that particular comment, the FCOM and FCTM does, see the high angle of attack protect on 1.27.20 P4 http://www.smartcockpit.com/docs/A320-F ... ntrols.pdf
and FCTM page 01.0202 Page 11 http://www.smartcockpit.com/docs/FCTM_A318_to_A321.pdf
The NTSB report also did say the aircraft was achieving the best performance for the weight and configuration, pitching up further would only reduce performance, any further increase in pitch attitude would have just increased rate of descent and reduced glide performance.
"HIGH ANGLE OF ATTACK PROTECTION
Under normal law, when the angle of attack becomes greater than aprot, the system switches elevator control from normal mode to a protection mode, in which the angle of attack is proportional to sidestick deflection. That is, in the aprot range, from a prot to amax, the sidestick commands a directly. However, the angle of attack will not exceed amax, even if the pilot gently pulls the sidestick all the way back.
If the pilot releases the sidestick, the angle of attack returns to aprot and stays there. This protection against stall and windshear has priority over all other protections. The autopilot disconnects at a prot + 1°."
"HIGH ANGLE-OF-ATTACK (AOA) PROTECTIONHigh AOA protection enables the PF to pull the sidestick full aft in dangerous situations, and thus consistently achieve the best possible aircraft lift.
This action on the sidestick is instinctive, and the high AOA protection minimizes the risk of stalls or control loss. High AOA protection is an aerodynamic protection:
. The PF will notice if the normal flight envelope is exceeded for any reason, because the autopitch trim will stop, the aircraft will sink to maintain its current AOA (alpha PROT, strong static stability), and a significant change in aircraft behavior will occur.
. If the PF then pulls the sidestick full aft, a maximum AOA (approximately corresponding to CL Max) is commanded. In addition, the speedbrakes will automatically retract, if extended."
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