In either case, I am taking the credit for making sure you at least read some professional opinions about the situation.
ANd I am talking about a different piece: https://leehamnews.com/2018/11/14/boein ... he-pilots/
Yes, that describes an instability in a certain corner of the flight envelope. Fundamental
instability? I don't know if that is the appropriate term.
Yes, it takes some pilot's determination to even get to that corner, as pilots are explicitly trained NOT to get there, recognize the condition and back out into the greener pastures.. Any talk about "disabling MCAS and hand flying" is meaningless, MCAS is a last ditch effort to save the plane and make a difference between a reportable accident and an actual crash.
Boeing is correct in saying regular pilot would never know about MCAS (properly functional
MCAS at least) and lack of MCAS training IMHO is not totally unreasonable (although likely illegal - but that is a different story). Properly
is the keyword, though.
Now an issue of what happens in that corner of the flight envelope got a life of its own. It is not directly related to Lion crash - but it was brought into a spotlight by the crash; and it is an interesting part of this "too far" discussion. Of course, it is interesting as long as we keep it technical, and maybe legal - not fanboy or emotions.[/quote]
Bjorn needs to cite his sources for the so-called facts he cites here. Most of this info. would surely have to have come from Boeing itself yet I don't see them or anyone else listed as a source. When he cites that the engines have been placed ahead of the CG line (comparing the MAX to the NG) how does he know that Boeing didn't relocate some systems aft to compensate for this and rebalance the aircraft to a point at least? And while the larger engines could surely alter the flight and pitch characteristics in rough maneuvers, affecting pitch stability, it doesn't sound as if it makes the MAX "fundamentally unstable", as was claimed by certain posters. Still, Bjorn and Leeham need to cite whatever sources were used to substantiate this article, otherwise it appears as if Bjorn is also making assumptions about the MAX that seemingly only Boeing insiders would know with certainty. I would still like to hear Boeing's exact statement for the rationale behind the MCAS. One indisputable fact as I see it though is that the pilots should have known all there is to know about the MCAS and that Boeing and the FAA are seemingly complicit in ensuring its existence wasn't properly disclosed to them.