sabenapilot wrote:

And when it is successfully relit??? Nothing, right?!?

With the LAND ASAP amber gone and no reason to suspect fuel issues as root cause, the airplane is once again a twin, one that is ETOPS certified and flying on an ETOPS stretch even.

You will have a LAND ASAP amber before the relight was commenced. It will go away once the hydraulics and electrics are restored. The relight checklist says nothing about continuing onto your destination. As I mentioned a few times there is no way to determine why it flamed out in the first place, and that would put doubt in my mind.

Even if they determined Algeria was not suitable, they had Sardinia, Spain, and France.

sabenapilot wrote:

Contaminated fuel is not forseen in any engine trouble related procedure on Airbus for the simple reason the manufacturer starts from the point such fuel is never going to be uplifted, hence they are allowed to work from the basis that one engine issue will not lead to a similar case on another one: otherwise ETOPS would not be allowed on any plane in the first place of course.

That simply is not true, the A330 has a “Engine Fuel System Contamination” checklist in the QRH. That is LAND ASAP red when confirmed. See the CX780 report to see how challenging of a situation that really is, and the subtle ECAMs that appear.

7BOEING7 wrote:

The 737, 757, 767 Engine Fail checklists say PTLANSA (Plan To Land At Nearest Suitable Airport).

The 737, 757, 767 Engine In-Flight Start Checklist reconfigures the aircraft for normal operations and does not say PTLANSA if the relight is successful.

The 737, 757, 767 Engine In-Flight Start Checklist says PTLANSA if relight is not successful.

The 777, 787 have the relight as part of the ENG FAIL checklist and only says PTLANSA if the relight is not successful.

(This is aged information but probably still valid)

Have a look at the JT610 (737Max crash) preliminarily report. The pilots justification for completing the previous sector was the Boeing checklist they followed did not say plan to land at the nearest suitable. So they continued to the destination with the stick shaker activated and no altitude or airspeed on the captains side.

The investigators said once the defect occoured the aircraft should have diverted. I would have also done so.

7BOEING7 wrote:

DeltaMD90 wrote:

As I said before, I'm pretty sure engine failure that won't restart: land as soon as possible

Engine failure that restarts: land as soon as practicable

Land as soon as practicable doesn't mean you gotta put it down on the nearest piece of pavement but doesn't mean you can continue 8 hours to your destination. It gives you more of a judgement call

I have no idea if this is universal on all Boeing aircraft or if it carries over to Airbus, but I'd imagine it's similar

Sorry, I am out of town and can't look at my old checklists but I'm pretty sure that's what they said (and it makes sense)

As for Boeing aircraft:

The only "land as soon as possible" relates to Smoke, Fire, Fumes (not from the engines). All the engine issues being discussed are "land at nearest suitable airport".

Although I've heard it talked about alot there is no "land as soon as practical" in any of the documents I have at my disposal.

There's a lot left to the Captain's discression (prior to airline modifications).

Indeed. I suspect that goes back to the days of four engine aircraft with prop/piston engines. A lot could go wrong and it often did.

I'm not going to criticize this decision because we don't know what kind of feedback the pilots were getting from their instruments, their operations department or the engines themselves.

I just find it interesting that a more conservative decision wasn't made.

I think modern engines are so reliable that indications of problems are quite significant.

https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=220016 gives us:



It's a shame that the data is missing from the Sahara segment.

https://avherald.com/h?article=4c170682 says:

A Brussels Airlines Airbus A330-200, registration OO-SFU performing flight SN-358 (dep Dec 10th) from Kinshasa (DR Congo) to Brussels (Belgium), was enroute at FL380 over Algeria when the left hand engine (PW4168) failed prompting the crew to drift the aircraft down to below FL270. The crew was subsequently able to re-start the engine in flight about 140nm eastsoutheast of Oued Irara (Algeria), climbed back to FL380 and continued the flight to Brussels for a safe landing about 3:15 hours after the engine was restarted.

The occurrence aircraft is still on the ground in Brussels 10 days later.

That's pretty interesting. You would think if it was simple fuel contamination they would have sorted it by now.

Revelation wrote:

.

If I understand this graph correctly, they were flying for 2 hours on a single engine while pushing for the destination. Seems like a bit of a stretch...

Revelation wrote:

SheikhDjibouti wrote:

The large consensus of opinion here seems to be swayed in favor of the "safe" option; i.e. land at the first available airport.

Except …. common sense would also dictate you would desire an airport with reasonable facilities, both in terms of maintenance for the aircraft, and comfort for the passengers. If you neglect either of these, the time on the ground could be extensive and uncomfortable. Uncomfortable to the extent that an elderly or less than totally healthy person might succumb to stress or other factors, and die (of "natural causes"). What price the "safe" option then? It's an extreme case, but every time a collection of people are delayed in the name of safety, they all suffer a little death by virtue of a diminishing of their quality of life.
It is a variation on every health system on the planet; we have limited resources and are faced with a choice; do we spend $100,000 saving one individual from certain death; or $1,000 x 100 individuals, each of whom gains quality of life in some way. These decisions are made every single day, except most of us are never faced directly with the one individual who is left to die; it's all lost in the general statistics.

Joseph Stalin wrote:

One death is a tragedy; a million deaths is a statistic

So the pilots made a decision to carry on, not only so that they could get to back Brussels, greet the wife & children, and sleep in their own bed, but so that 300 pax on board could look forward to the same, instead of some ghastly alternative. Not to mention the implications for getting the a/c back to base where the problem could be investigated promptly, the aircraft turned around, and potential delays to the next flight avoided, yielding an improved quality of life for another 300 passengers down the line. There are financial implications too - but it's not just about the $$$

The common misconception is that safety is free-of-charge, because following the safe option, no-one gets visibly hurt. The truth is safety costs every single one of us, and the cumulative effect is to shorten everyone's life expectancy. But we all have grown used to this, and don't even see it.

I'm looking forward to some flak from many of you, except perhaps health professionals who face difficult decisions like these every day.

Thing is, that pilot had to know after the first event any future decision s/he made would now be subject to question. From what I read here most pilots would be worried about losing their license and thus their career should a second event come along and make the first decision to continue onward look like a bad one. Sure, I know the odds of a second significant event happening were minuscule, but some times odds bite you in the arse.

I think the pilot was taking a lot of personal risk after the first event occurred, since if things did go wrong afterwards they would take a lot of blame for whatever happened after the decision to continue. It's strange to think they'd take that risk just because they didn't want to spend a day or two in Africa, given the crew had just spent the night in Africa. It's strange they'd take that risk to benefit their employer because we've seen employers can't really do anything once the regulators get involved.

I think that continuing can be justified if the routing keeps you close to airports and away from mountains. If not, the routing should be adapted.
So the real question is, did they adapt their routing to stay far away from the Alps and as close as possible from diversion airports?

Other than that, they were lucky this time but who knows what happens next time?

Commercial pressure gets things done, but sometimes it kills. Sometimes training saves the day, sometimes it's luck, sometimes nothing is there to save the day and people die.

https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=220016 gives us:

Revelation wrote:

It's a shame that the data is missing from the Sahara segment.

Are you sure about that? Which data? The altitude & speed graph seems fine to me.
I'm seeing an eight hour flight, take off to landing. How big do you think Europe is?

On the other hand, there do appear to be obvious discrepancies in that graph; why climb to 39,200 ft, and then slowly run it down to 25,133 ft? If that was the extent of the first incident, then it happened around 120mins out of Kinshasa as they reached cruise altitude (which was mentioned in the article), and continued for nearly three hours before they successfully re-lit the engine. I certainly did not get this understanding from the article(s). Is that because I missed something?

Up until now I had assumed two things;
1) The aircraft was able to maintain altitude on one engine, allowing infinite time to consider their options.
2) The failed engine was re-lit fairly promptly, certainly within 30 mins, and not against a background of losing altitude as they flew.

I confess this does alter my reading of the situation. Have I been so very careless with my reading skills? Do I need a new pair of spectacles?

kalvado wrote:

Revelation wrote:

.

If I understand this graph correctly, they were flying for 2 hours on a single engine while pushing for the destination. Seems like a bit of a stretch...

Actually, no. The black line over the Sahara indicates loss of data, because FR24 has no stations gathering data in the Sahara. We don't have the information to tell us where the first engine issue arose, but the text I quoted suggested it was over Algeria so on the north side of the Sahara.

Yep, it was me. I failed to grasp all the data first time around.

In my defence, it was Xmas day, and I may have had a little drink at some point...…

7BOEING7 wrote:

DeltaMD90 wrote:

As I said before, I'm pretty sure engine failure that won't restart: land as soon as possible

Engine failure that restarts: land as soon as practicable

Land as soon as practicable doesn't mean you gotta put it down on the nearest piece of pavement but doesn't mean you can continue 8 hours to your destination. It gives you more of a judgement call

I have no idea if this is universal on all Boeing aircraft or if it carries over to Airbus, but I'd imagine it's similar

Sorry, I am out of town and can't look at my old checklists but I'm pretty sure that's what they said (and it makes sense)

As for Boeing aircraft:

The only "land as soon as possible" relates to Smoke, Fire, Fumes (not from the engines). All the engine issues being discussed are "land at nearest suitable airport".

Although I've heard it talked about alot there is no "land as soon as practical" in any of the documents I have at my disposal.

There's a lot left to the Captain's discression (prior to airline modifications).

Actually the exact words in the SFF checklist are “If the situation becomes uncontrollable, consider an immediate landing.”

The definition of “immediate landing” is something like preferably land on a runway; consider a downwind Landing if necessary; consider an overweight landing if necessary; consider an off-airport landing or ditching if necessary.

I had some involvement in the development of the Smoke, Fire, or Fumes checklist.

Revelation wrote:

kalvado wrote:

Revelation wrote:

.

If I understand this graph correctly, they were flying for 2 hours on a single engine while pushing for the destination. Seems like a bit of a stretch...

Actually, no. The black line over the Sahara indicates loss of data, because FR24 has no stations gathering data in the Sahara. We don't have the information to tell us where the first engine issue arose, but the text I quoted suggested it was over Algeria so on the north side of the Sahara.

Yep, realized that a bit later. Makes much more sense this way. I wonder if generic drift down profile is available - how long would it take to get down to FL270 for relight attempt?

Waterbomber wrote:

I think that continuing can be justified if the routing keeps you close to airports and away from mountains. If not, the routing should be adapted.
So the real question is, did they adapt their routing to stay far away from the Alps and as close as possible from diversion airports?

I'm currently kicking myself for careless errors I have made, so read the following with caution;

I don't believe they had to alter their route at all. The obvious straight line, as shown on the map, takes them close to the Alps, but not right through them. They probably could see the Alps out of their right hand window and realise turning right wasn't an option, but the whole of lowland France was available both to their left and straight ahead. I'm fairly certain there was no shortage of diversion possibilities down there.

Fingers crossed I have got that right; I confess I only glanced at the map very briefly.

Strange this has been picked up almost 2 weeks after mentioned here:

https://www.aviation24.be/airlines/luft ... r-failure/

kalvado wrote:

I wonder if generic drift down profile is available - how long would it take to get down to FL270 for relight attempt?

Wikipedia wrote:

In November 2009, the Airbus A330 became the first aircraft to receive ETOPS-240 approval, which has since been offered by Airbus as an option

Is that an option for new builds from that time, or could they retro-fit older airframes? Either way, what was the ETOPS status of this particular A330?
And indeed, regardless of status, would this A330 be capable of ETOPS type single-engine performance even if was not technically certified?

I realise the above doesn't give you the generic drift-down profile that you asked for, but if that isn't available, maybe we can use ETOPS as a rough guide...?

SheikhDjibouti wrote:

kalvado wrote:

I wonder if generic drift down profile is available - how long would it take to get down to FL270 for relight attempt?

Wikipedia wrote:

In November 2009, the Airbus A330 became the first aircraft to receive ETOPS-240 approval, which has since been offered by Airbus as an option

Is that an option for new builds from that time, or could they retro-fit older airframes? Either way, what was the ETOPS status of this particular A330?
And indeed, regardless of status, would this A330 be capable of ETOPS type single-engine performance even if was not technically certified?

I realise the above doesn't give you the generic drift-down profile that you asked for, but if that isn't available, maybe we can use ETOPS as a rough guide...?

ETOPS is basically a set of rules to ensure high reliability and survivability of the aircraft. One of the aspects of ETOPS is to minimize the probability of common cause dual engine failure, for example, due to the maintenance issues.
Assuming single engine out and no further problems, any twin can stay airborne in a level flight (although below normal cruise) and continue on until fuel runs out - probably less than it would with 2 engines, but similar distance.
Single engine flight, however, is deemed risky as you're only one failure away from the crash - and you want to be on the ground (specifically on the equipped runway and in one piece, as opposed to fragments on a random spot of terrain)- as soon as possible. ETOPS is a way to calculate and minimize the risks involved, aircraft remains physically the same (maybe lifeboats or some similar stuff is added - but that is irrelevant in this case)

7BOEING7 wrote:

BoeingGuy wrote:

Adispatcher wrote:

In regards to what? Engine failure?

Company procedure may supersede the QRH in the case of a reduced thrust situation.

The Boeing ENG FAIL checklist says to land at the nearest suitable airport. I don’t recall if the Engine Relight checklist says to land. I’ll look it up when I get back in the office.

The 737, 757, 767 Engine Fail checklists say PTLANSA (Plan To Land At Nearest Suitable Airport).

The 737, 757, 767 Engine In-Flight Start Checklist reconfigures the aircraft for normal operations and does not say PTLANSA if the relight is successful.

The 737, 757, 767 Engine In-Flight Start Checklist says PTLANSA if relight is not successful.

The 777, 787 have the relight as part of the ENG FAIL checklist and only says PTLANSA if the relight is not successful.

(This is aged information but probably still valid)

Let’s examine the situation the pilots were in in sequence.
1. Engine flames out, reason unknown.
2. Engine restart attempted, and is successful.
3. Aircraft is over Algeria, and headed to Europe with suitable landing sites never a long distance away. I do not know this for sure, but I doubt there were very many times that a suitable airport was outside of gliding distance.
4. Both engines are running normally; no long stretches are ahead where there are no diversion possibilities, so the pilots continue on course.
5. No further issues occur with either engine until descent to scheduled destination starts.
6. The other engine then flames out.
7. Restart is attempted several times, finally succeeds.
8. Plane lands at destination with both engines running.

I cannot find any fault with the decisions made by the pilots. The point is that at all times there were diversion possibilities should the problem recur. Had they diverted without any further sign of difficulty they may well have been questioned by management as to why. The situation would have been different had they been about to cross an ocean or other area where the nearest diversion airport was hours away. But they weren’t.

SEPilot wrote:

7BOEING7 wrote:

BoeingGuy wrote:

The Boeing ENG FAIL checklist says to land at the nearest suitable airport. I don’t recall if the Engine Relight checklist says to land. I’ll look it up when I get back in the office.

The 737, 757, 767 Engine Fail checklists say PTLANSA (Plan To Land At Nearest Suitable Airport).

The 737, 757, 767 Engine In-Flight Start Checklist reconfigures the aircraft for normal operations and does not say PTLANSA if the relight is successful.

The 737, 757, 767 Engine In-Flight Start Checklist says PTLANSA if relight is not successful.

The 777, 787 have the relight as part of the ENG FAIL checklist and only says PTLANSA if the relight is not successful.

(This is aged information but probably still valid)

Let’s examine the situation the pilots were in in sequence.
1. Engine flames out, reason unknown.
2. Engine restart attempted, and is successful.
3. Aircraft is over Algeria, and headed to Europe with suitable landing sites never a long distance away. I do not know this for sure, but I doubt there were very many times that a suitable airport was outside of gliding distance.
4. Both engines are running normally; no long stretches are ahead where there are no diversion possibilities, so the pilots continue on course.
5. No further issues occur with either engine until descent to scheduled destination starts.
6. The other engine then flames out.
7. Restart is attempted several times, finally succeeds.
8. Plane lands at destination with both engines running.

I cannot find any fault with the decisions made by the pilots. The point is that at all times there were diversion possibilities should the problem recur. Had they diverted without any further sign of difficulty they may well have been questioned by management as to why. The situation would have been different had they been about to cross an ocean or other area where the nearest diversion airport was hours away. But they weren’t.

Maybe it is just me... But if you have to consider gliding distance as part of the decision process - you're doing something wrong...

SheikhDjibouti wrote:

Waterbomber wrote:

I think that continuing can be justified if the routing keeps you close to airports and away from mountains. If not, the routing should be adapted.
So the real question is, did they adapt their routing to stay far away from the Alps and as close as possible from diversion airports?

I'm currently kicking myself for careless errors I have made, so read the following with caution;

I don't believe they had to alter their route at all. The obvious straight line, as shown on the map, takes them close to the Alps, but not right through them. They probably could see the Alps out of their right hand window and realise turning right wasn't an option, but the whole of lowland France was available both to their left and straight ahead. I'm fairly certain there was no shortage of diversion possibilities down there.

Fingers crossed I have got that right; I confess I only glanced at the map very briefly.

To me it looks like they flew straight over the Alps, near the Mont Blanc in fact.
Anything North of Nice is mountains and anything East of Grenoble is mountains and they were quite a chunk to the East of Grenoble, about 100km.
That was not their best decision IMO even if enough margin existed, that put them far from suitable diversion airports. It wouldn't have costed them anything to fly a bit more to the West.

SheikhDjibouti wrote:

Yep, it was me. I failed to grasp all the data first time around.

In my defence, it was Xmas day, and I may have had a little drink at some point...…

Nae wurries. I broke with a.net protocol and didn't belittle you. Maybe the holiday spirit moved me?

It is a common error. Personally I think FR24 should do something to more clearly delineate the missing data. They do have a good page explaining how they gather data and offering to help you set up your own monitoring station should you want to do so. Once you understand what they are doing the gaps in the data make more sense.

kalvado wrote:

SEPilot wrote:

7BOEING7 wrote:

The 737, 757, 767 Engine Fail checklists say PTLANSA (Plan To Land At Nearest Suitable Airport).

The 737, 757, 767 Engine In-Flight Start Checklist reconfigures the aircraft for normal operations and does not say PTLANSA if the relight is successful.

The 737, 757, 767 Engine In-Flight Start Checklist says PTLANSA if relight is not successful.

The 777, 787 have the relight as part of the ENG FAIL checklist and only says PTLANSA if the relight is not successful.

(This is aged information but probably still valid)

Let’s examine the situation the pilots were in in sequence.
1. Engine flames out, reason unknown.
2. Engine restart attempted, and is successful.
3. Aircraft is over Algeria, and headed to Europe with suitable landing sites never a long distance away. I do not know this for sure, but I doubt there were very many times that a suitable airport was outside of gliding distance.
4. Both engines are running normally; no long stretches are ahead where there are no diversion possibilities, so the pilots continue on course.
5. No further issues occur with either engine until descent to scheduled destination starts.
6. The other engine then flames out.
7. Restart is attempted several times, finally succeeds.
8. Plane lands at destination with both engines running.

I cannot find any fault with the decisions made by the pilots. The point is that at all times there were diversion possibilities should the problem recur. Had they diverted without any further sign of difficulty they may well have been questioned by management as to why. The situation would have been different had they been about to cross an ocean or other area where the nearest diversion airport was hours away. But they weren’t.

Maybe it is just me... But if you have to consider gliding distance as part of the decision process - you're doing something wrong...

I am just throwing that in there. They had two functioning engines and no reason to think that they would not continue to have at least one, no matter what happened. And, as I said, they were always in easy distance of a diversion airport, even if it wasn’t in gliding range.

Waterbomber wrote:

To me it looks like they flew straight over the Alps, near the Mont Blanc in fact.
Anything North of Nice is mountains and anything East of Grenoble is mountains and they were quite a chunk to the East of Grenoble, about 100km.
That was not their best decision IMO even if enough margin existed, that put them far from suitable diversion airports. It wouldn't have costed them anything to fly a bit more to the West.

Yep, you are right; they crossed the French coast somewhere near Cannes / Nice, and straight ahead their windows would have been full of mountain scenery, not good at all.

However the Alps are less than 200km in width (¹) on the section they traversed, so if they were more than 100km east of Grenoble, they were less than 100km from Turin. And, as often observed here on a.net; when an emergency requires a prompt landing, an airport immediately beneath you is no more useful than another that is some distance away, unless you are already at low level.
When Air Transat 236 set some kind of record for gliding 120km into Lajes, they had already descended down from FL390 to FL330 following the flame out of engine #2 (the first engine to fail) so in theory something more than their 120km is possible if this A330 suffered a double fail at higher altitudes. Whether they would still graze one of the lower peaks towards the edges of the range on their way down is a valid point; AT236 only had the sea beneath them.
Of course, following their track South to North, Nice to Geneva is only 186 miles, so they probably spent less than 25 minutes over the Alps in total, and only 10-12 mins deep in the heart of them.

But I doubt any of us would want to fly ourselves into the record books, so it probably was pushing the margins somewhat. And unnecessary, as you say.

(¹) GNB -TRN, 114 miles / 183km

Revelation wrote:

SheikhDjibouti wrote:

Yep, it was me. I failed to grasp all the data first time around.

In my defence, it was Xmas day, and I may have had a little drink at some point...…

Nae wurries. I broke with a.net protocol and didn't belittle you. Maybe the holiday spirit moved me?

It is a common error. Personally I think FR24 should do something to more clearly delineate the missing data. They do have a good page explaining how they gather data and offering to help you set up your own monitoring station should you want to do so. Once you understand what they are doing the gaps in the data make more sense.

Believe it or not, in my more sober state I now realise I have met this scenario before so I have no excuses.
I was tracking my daughter inbound to Cuba, but suddenly the FR24 data terminated at around 8,000ft just as the a/c dropped below the radar horizon of the nearest "friendly" station (MIA probably).
As a real treat, her return flight went technical (Cuba is another destination that eats A330's for fun, just like Kinshasa). This meant she got upgraded to a Vamos 747, which then turned out to be the worst flight she'd ever had. Amongst numerous incidents on the flight home, her bf had to be restrained from decking another passenger, and he is the most well-mannered chap you could hope to meet. A bit like myself, I dare say.
Apparently the FA's lost control of the entire flight, and for the most part hid away in the Upper deck area, leaving the pax to fight it out amongst themselves.....
Tip; don't ever get on a plane full of Brit holidaymakers on their way home after two weeks of heavy boozing.


© Shaky's Tales from the Dark Side; available in all good bookshops.

The law in the USA (CFR 121.565) says that in the event of an engine failure on a twin engine airplane in commercial service, the pilots SHALL land at the nearest suitable airport. Airplane model and manufacturers procedures don’t even play into it, this applies across the board. It isn’t a choice, it isn’t a “well if we get it going again it’ll be ok” decision, it’s an immediate diversion. Because there’s no way to know what is going on, and the other engine could fail as well.

The fact that this crew had an engine failure and elected to continue on with passengers on board for three hours, over a large body of water, is, to me, the most ridiculous thing I’ve heard in a long time. And to top it off the other engine failed later in flight, which is exactly why they are supposed to divert in the first place! They put a lot of people at risk and should not be praised for their decisions.

madpropsyo wrote:

The law in the USA (CFR 121.565) says that in the event of an engine failure on a twin engine airplane in commercial service, the pilots SHALL land at the nearest suitable airport. Airplane model and manufacturers procedures don’t even play into it, this applies across the board. It isn’t a choice, it isn’t a “well if we get it going again it’ll be ok” decision, it’s an immediate diversion. Because there’s no way to know what is going on, and the other engine could fail as well.

The fact that this crew had an engine failure and elected to continue on with passengers on board for three hours, over a large body of water, is, to me, the most ridiculous thing I’ve heard in a long time. And to top it off the other engine failed later in flight, which is exactly why they are supposed to divert in the first place! They put a lot of people at risk and should not be praised for their decisions.

Oh là là, illegal? Not to worry, Monsieur...Hercule Poirot is on the case....with help from Tintin.

MalevTU134 wrote:

Oh là là, illegal? Not to worry, Monsieur...Hercule Poirot is on the case....with help from Tintin.

Ah ha. Funny.

But yes, illegal. If this incident had happened on a US airline the pilots would be facing potential action against their licenses from the FAA.

madpropsyo wrote:

The law in the USA (CFR 121.565) says that in the event of an engine failure on a twin engine airplane in commercial service, the pilots SHALL land at the nearest suitable airport. Airplane model and manufacturers procedures don’t even play into it, this applies across the board. It isn’t a choice, it isn’t a “well if we get it going again it’ll be ok” decision, it’s an immediate diversion. Because there’s no way to know what is going on, and the other engine could fail as well.

The fact that this crew had an engine failure and elected to continue on with passengers on board for three hours, over a large body of water, is, to me, the most ridiculous thing I’ve heard in a long time. And to top it off the other engine failed later in flight, which is exactly why they are supposed to divert in the first place! They put a lot of people at risk and should not be praised for their decisions.

They relit the engine, therefore they no longer had an engine failure.

Or alternatively, what is the definition of "suitable"? (That always starts a lively conversation.)

BoeingGuy wrote:

cschleic wrote:

BoeingGuy wrote:

I’ve explained it multiple times and so have others. Read the thread. Also, you state that twin engine airplanes can even take off on one engine. Please provide an example of when that has occurred.

The level of discussion of this topic has been interesting to say the least. But regarding the last statement, unless I'm mistaken, to be certified, all twin-engine airliners are required to demonstrate completing a take-off with one engine failing. Therefore, many of them have performed that type of take off. Now if you're thinking in terms of beginning the take off roll with just one engine running...that's different. Some planes probably could do it...depends on which type, load, etc. although probably not a good idea due to many reasons including the result of thrust imbalance.

Yes, exactly.

I don’t know what he was thinking in his post, but you are correct. All airplanes have to demonstrate they can suffer an engine failure at V1 and safely continue the takeoff and return to land.

I am thinking straight and clear. I must admit, in the field I've never met someone who approaches others in discussions like you do. Taking off with one engine, and judging the situation, especially during an EFTO, is part of our pilot trainings.

madpropsyo wrote:

The law in the USA (CFR 121.565) says that in the event of an engine failure on a twin engine airplane in commercial service, the pilots SHALL land at the nearest suitable airport. Airplane model and manufacturers procedures don’t even play into it, this applies across the board. It isn’t a choice, it isn’t a “well if we get it going again it’ll be ok” decision, it’s an immediate diversion. Because there’s no way to know what is going on, and the other engine could fail as well.

The fact that this crew had an engine failure and elected to continue on with passengers on board for three hours, over a large body of water, is, to me, the most ridiculous thing I’ve heard in a long time. And to top it off the other engine failed later in flight, which is exactly why they are supposed to divert in the first place! They put a lot of people at risk and should not be praised for their decisions.

In viewtopic.php?f=3&t=1411339&start=50#p20959511 we read:

7BOEING7 wrote:

The 737, 757, 767 Engine Fail checklists say PTLANSA (Plan To Land At Nearest Suitable Airport).

The 737, 757, 767 Engine In-Flight Start Checklist reconfigures the aircraft for normal operations and does not say PTLANSA if the relight is successful.

The 737, 757, 767 Engine In-Flight Start Checklist says PTLANSA if relight is not successful.

The 777, 787 have the relight as part of the ENG FAIL checklist and only says PTLANSA if the relight is not successful.

(This is aged information but probably still valid)

I suspect the FAR would support what 7BOEING7 is telling us.

I have read 7BOEING7's posts and can say for sure he's a very experienced pilot.

I think the right way to look at it is an engine failure isn't really a failure till after the relight is not successful.

LewisNEO wrote:

I am thinking straight and clear. I must admit, in the field I've never met someone who is so demonizing to others in discussions. Taking off with one engine, especially during an EFTO, is part of our pilot trainings. I don't fly as a pilot, but I do work as an academic in the relevant safety field.

I don't think I'd go with demonic, I think I'd go with overly pedantic.

The way the post read, one could interpret it as saying twins can take off with a single engine from a standing start rather than V1.

Some times people can't resist the urge to pounce on such ambiguities.

Believe it or not, I may have done so at some point in the past.

And I think it's fair to say that such pedantry is a characteristic of this site.

That's just how things go here.

I've certainly had people pounce on ambiguities in things I've posted here.

I've grown to expect it.

7BOEING7 wrote:

madpropsyo wrote:

The law in the USA (CFR 121.565) says that in the event of an engine failure on a twin engine airplane in commercial service, the pilots SHALL land at the nearest suitable airport. Airplane model and manufacturers procedures don’t even play into it, this applies across the board. It isn’t a choice, it isn’t a “well if we get it going again it’ll be ok” decision, it’s an immediate diversion. Because there’s no way to know what is going on, and the other engine could fail as well.

The fact that this crew had an engine failure and elected to continue on with passengers on board for three hours, over a large body of water, is, to me, the most ridiculous thing I’ve heard in a long time. And to top it off the other engine failed later in flight, which is exactly why they are supposed to divert in the first place! They put a lot of people at risk and should not be praised for their decisions.

They relit the engine, therefore they no longer had an engine failure.

Or alternatively, what is the definition of "suitable"? (That always starts a lively conversation.)

Can’t the airport just be adaquate

DeltaMD90 wrote:

As I said before, I'm pretty sure engine failure that won't restart: land as soon as possible

Engine failure that restarts: land as soon as practicable

Land as soon as practicable doesn't mean you gotta put it down on the nearest piece of pavement but doesn't mean you can continue 8 hours to your destination. It gives you more of a judgement call

I have no idea if this is universal on all Boeing aircraft or if it carries over to Airbus, but I'd imagine it's similar

Sorry, I am out of town and can't look at my old checklists but I'm pretty sure that's what they said (and it makes sense)

And pretty much what standard commercial aircraft hull and liability insurance policies state too.

Revelation wrote:

madpropsyo wrote:

The law in the USA (CFR 121.565) says that in the event of an engine failure on a twin engine airplane in commercial service, the pilots SHALL land at the nearest suitable airport. Airplane model and manufacturers procedures don’t even play into it, this applies across the board. It isn’t a choice, it isn’t a “well if we get it going again it’ll be ok” decision, it’s an immediate diversion. Because there’s no way to know what is going on, and the other engine could fail as well.

The fact that this crew had an engine failure and elected to continue on with passengers on board for three hours, over a large body of water, is, to me, the most ridiculous thing I’ve heard in a long time. And to top it off the other engine failed later in flight, which is exactly why they are supposed to divert in the first place! They put a lot of people at risk and should not be praised for their decisions.

In https://www.airliners.net/forum/viewtop ... #p20959511 we read:

7BOEING7 wrote:

The 737, 757, 767 Engine Fail checklists say PTLANSA (Plan To Land At Nearest Suitable Airport).

The 737, 757, 767 Engine In-Flight Start Checklist reconfigures the aircraft for normal operations and does not say PTLANSA if the relight is successful.

The 737, 757, 767 Engine In-Flight Start Checklist says PTLANSA if relight is not successful.

The 777, 787 have the relight as part of the ENG FAIL checklist and only says PTLANSA if the relight is not successful.

(This is aged information but probably still valid)

I suspect the FAR would support what 7BOEING7 is telling us.

I have read 7BOEING7's posts and can say for sure he's a very experienced pilot.

I think the right way to look at it is an engine failure isn't really a failure till after the relight is not successful.

LewisNEO wrote:

I am thinking straight and clear. I must admit, in the field I've never met someone who is so demonizing to others in discussions. Taking off with one engine, especially during an EFTO, is part of our pilot trainings. I don't fly as a pilot, but I do work as an academic in the relevant safety field.

I don't think I'd go with demonic, I think I'd go with overly pedantic.

The way the post read, one could interpret it as saying twins can take off with a single engine from a standing start rather than V1.

Some times people can't resist the urge to pounce on such ambiguities.

Believe it or not, I may have done so at some point in the past.

And I think it's fair to say that such pedantry is a characteristic of this site.

That's just how things go here.

I've certainly had people pounce on ambiguities in things I've posted here.

I've grown to expect it.

Thnx for putting everything in perspective, you are right and I agree. I never knew some quick written reactions here between businesses could carry so far away.

I would have crossed The Med, then did a "pan pan pan" and land in Europe, putting the customers on Easyjet flights to continue their journey.

This is just me thinking logically.
If I am at cruising altitude and had an engine failure due to a blade failure or some other easily identifiable reason that resulted in a shut down, I would be less concerned with the second engine would fail in the same way or in any way. I would weigh my options and look for a more friendly airport and possibly fly a bit longer.
If I am at cruising altitude and had an engine failure due to an unknown reason and the engine relight's and I don't know why it flamed out, I am concerned with a single point failure such as fuel contamination or freezing and would look for a suitable airport within a reasonable time.
Just my .02 so have at it.

Let's think about this for a second, having 2 engines on any normal flight vs having 2 engines AFTER an engine failure and relight... definitely not the same!!!

Now I wouldn't consider 2 engines with a relit engine the same as only one running engine, but I wouldn't just think "wow, weird that it shut off, whatever, it's on now so nothing at all is wrong!"

On the other hand, if you're seriously considering changing your route to avoid the Alps/no diverts or considering no engine glide distance... probably should be working your way down to a good airport (not necessarily the nearest but not hours and hours away)

Revelation wrote:

I suspect the FAR would support what 7BOEING7 is telling us.

I have read 7BOEING7's posts and can say for sure he's a very experienced pilot.

I think the right way to look at it is an engine failure isn't really a failure till after the relight is not successful.

This wasn’t a Boeing
This wasn’t being operated under the FARs
The engine shutdown was not this issue, it was a symptom.

Unlike most Boeing’s the A330 FADEC will do an autorelight, this only came standard on later Boeing’s like the 777, 787, and 747-8.

The A330 does have a fuel contamination QRH procedure, it is a LAND ASAP red procedure (mayday).

A normal single engine drift down at green dot from FL400 to when they restarted would taken well over an hour.

They had a planned diversion airport just near them to the north east when they got the relight.

You are now looking at an A330 that needs two engines replaced, and a total fuel system decontamination.

Symptoms and cause are not the same.

zeke wrote:

A failed engine cannot be restarted, by defn it has failed, ie broken.

You do not continue on a flight after restarting a “failed” engine either.

You can. In fact, it will try to relight itself. Damaged is different.

ENG FAIL QRH on the A330.

ENG 1 (2) FAIL Condition: One engine has failed, or is damaged. LAND ASAP

1. ENG START SEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IGN 2. THR LEVER (affected engine) . . . . . . Confirm. . . . . . . . IDLE
► IF NO RELIGHT AFTER 30 S:
• ENG MASTER (affected engine) . . . . . Confirm. . . . . . . .OFF
>IF DAMAGE (fire, zero oil quantity, no windmilling, or severe vibration): Note: Failure to relight alone without supporting indications does not constitute damage.
• ENG FIRE P/B (affected engine) . . . . Confirm. . . . . .PUSH
• AGENT 1 AFTER 10 S. . . . . . . . . . . . DISCH
• L+R INR TK SPLIT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ON

>IF NO DAMAGE:
• ENG 1 (2) RELIGHT. . . . . . . . . . CONSIDER
• See “Engine Relight” on page 7.13

That is the ECAM you will typically see with a failure on takeoff, by the time you get to the ECAM 30 seconds has already elapsed. There is nothing to consider, besides it is more important to get to MSA at that point and to secure what you have.

You will not be able to relight an engine that has failed, you can relight an engine that has stalled, or had some other rundown. This will typically be from external environmental factors like wind, rain, or ice.

On the STATUS page you will see a consider engine relight after completing the ECAM if the fire P/B has not been depressed.

Even if I got a relight at that point after someone was able to run diagnostics on it, I would not continue to destination.

But hey don’t listen to me, I’m only a captain on type.

Yes Zeke, there's a QRH PROC for contaminated fuel and it's widely used every so many rears on a simulator check ride by all type rated crews whenever the ATA-FUEL chapter comes up for revision, probably after being hinted at fuel issues before by the checker like we all know how it is done, but do you pull it out each and every time the checker flames your engine out during a skill test in preparation of a routine one engine out excercise, yourself?
Seriously?

That's what it's about: now you know it's fuel related, they had no clue it was. If each time an engine shows troubles we must assume it's fuel related (damage could also occur from severe contamination, you know: it's not just limited to flame out) and act accordingly, a whole lot of things will have to be done quite differently each time you lose an engine, by everybody, on all types. There's a good reason why the LAND ASAP AMBER goes away from the ECAM after an engine relight, you know.

We're all talking from hindsight which was not available on board: that makes a big difference in the decision making process.

sabenapilot wrote:

but do you pull it out each and every time the checker flames your engine out during a skill test in preparation of a routine one engine out excercise, yourself?
Seriously?

Normally every skills test is based around an airport and you come back and land single engine, never have I ever continued to destination in a skills test. I have diverted to a secondary airport with the closure of the primary.

sabenapilot wrote:

That's what it's about: now you know it's fuel related, they had no clue it was. If each time an engine shows troubles we must assume it's fuel related (damage could also occur from severe contamination, you know: it's not just limited to flame out) and act accordingly, a whole lot of things will have to be done quite differently each time you lose an engine, by everybody, on all types..

Well if it is as you say they " they had no clue it was", on what basis did they know the engine was undamaged ? One cannot assume with a relight that there is no damage or no reason, jet engines will run with significant damage. Take for example a Royal Brunei 787 on departure out of MNL, they return back to MNL after a failure of one engine, when they inspected the second engine they discovered it also had several fan blades that failed. They were under an hour to the destination (short MNL-BKI sector), however returned to the point of departure.

As I have said up-thread, in my line of work, if there is doubt (and you said they had no idea), there is no doubt, take the conservative path. Unfortunately some airlines will criticize a crew for taking a safe course of action, so the captain is sitting in the hot seat.

sabenapilot wrote:

. There's a good reason why the LAND ASAP AMBER goes away from the ECAM after an engine relight, you know. .

I can make the LAND ASAP go away with the engine shutdown simply by starting the APU and turning on an electric hydraulic pump, hydraulics, electrics, and flight controls would "appear" normal to the FWC. The reason for LAND ASAP to come up is the reduction in flight controls, hydraulics, and electrics caused by the dead engine. Relighting the engine restores these, but still leaves the engine in an unknown state, there is no way to know why it stopped in the first place from the cockpit. People can remotely log onto the aircraft and have a look, however this is not instantaneous.

sabenapilot wrote:

We're all talking from hindsight which was not available on board: that makes a big difference in the decision making process.

The assumption you are making is the crew only saw was a rollback and relight some time later. One of our aircraft had a significant contamination issue, and as a result that A330 QRH procedure was developed. The behaviors and ECAMS that proceeded the issue were very subtle and really only became apparent with thrust changes.

Can you point to an manufacturers document or EU OPS regulation/manual that says once a engine relight is successful, the requirement for a twin engine aircraft to divert to the nearest suitable no longer applies. I do not know of one.

EU_OPS wrote:

8. DIVERSION DECISION MAKING
Operators shall establish procedures for flight crew, outlining the criteria that indicate when a diversion or change of routing is recommended whilst conducting an ETOPS flight. For an ETOPS flight, in the event of the shutdown of an engine, these procedures should include the shutdown of an engine, fly to and land at the nearest aerodrome appropriate for landing.

Factors to be considered when deciding upon the appropriate course of action and suitability of an aerodrome for diversion may include but are not limited to:
a. Aircraft configuration/weight/systems status;
b. Wind and weather conditions en route at the diversion altitude;
c. Minimum altitudes en route to the diversion aerodrome;
d. Fuel required for the diversion;
e. Aerodrome condition, terrain, weather and wind;
f. Runways available and runway surface condition;
g. Approach aids and lighting;
h. RFFS* capability at the diversion aerodrome;
i. Facilities for aircraft occupants - disembarkation & shelter;
j. Medical facilities;
k. Pilot’s familiarity with the aerodrome;
l. Information about the aerodrome available to the flight crew.
Contingency procedures should not be interpreted in any way that prejudices the final
authority and responsibility of the pilot-in-command for the safe operation of the aeroplane.
Note: for an ETOPS en-route alternate aerodrome, a published RFFS category equivalent to
ICAO category 4, available at 30 minutes notice, is acceptable.

Note it does not say once an engine is restarted a diversion is no longer required.

As I mentioned up-thread, the investigator of the JT610 (737Max) accident in Jakarta were critical of the crew on the previous sector as the completed a number of QRH procedures that did not say divert to the nearest suitable. As such they continued to the destination with the left stick shaker on continuously, and no altitude or airspeed on the Captain PFD. Would you divert or continue to destination ?

Hi: any way to know if Fuel came for a “Central” (Underground) System or from a Truck?
We have plenty of experience when a truck, with upper hatch no properly closed, took water from rain. I even remember a DC-9, a long time ago, that when ready for TO and applied power, had one engine shutdown. It came back to Park..
Nowadays, we do not have time to ask for a water test before refueling. Mechanic was on board? Or in situ?
Crew doing w/a ask to see water test?
Many question arise
Rgds

SheikhDjibouti wrote:

Waterbomber wrote:

To me it looks like they flew straight over the Alps, near the Mont Blanc in fact.
Anything North of Nice is mountains and anything East of Grenoble is mountains and they were quite a chunk to the East of Grenoble, about 100km.
That was not their best decision IMO even if enough margin existed, that put them far from suitable diversion airports. It wouldn't have costed them anything to fly a bit more to the West.

Yep, you are right; they crossed the French coast somewhere near Cannes / Nice, and straight ahead their windows would have been full of mountain scenery, not good at all.

However the Alps are less than 200km in width (¹) on the section they traversed, so if they were more than 100km east of Grenoble, they were less than 100km from Turin. And, as often observed here on a.net; when an emergency requires a prompt landing, an airport immediately beneath you is no more useful than another that is some distance away, unless you are already at low level.
When Air Transat 236 set some kind of record for gliding 120km into Lajes, they had already descended down from FL390 to FL330 following the flame out of engine #2 (the first engine to fail) so in theory something more than their 120km is possible if this A330 suffered a double fail at higher altitudes. Whether they would still graze one of the lower peaks towards the edges of the range on their way down is a valid point; AT236 only had the sea beneath them.
Of course, following their track South to North, Nice to Geneva is only 186 miles, so they probably spent less than 25 minutes over the Alps in total, and only 10-12 mins deep in the heart of them.

But I doubt any of us would want to fly ourselves into the record books, so it probably was pushing the margins somewhat. And unnecessary, as you say.

(¹) GNB -TRN, 114 miles / 183km

Actually this is a night flight so they wouldn't have seen much through their windows.
Also, I doubt that they were carrying any VFR charts so all they could do is follow the MSA's.
They were lucky that both engines didn't fail simultaneously above the Alps, that's a nasty place to be in. Turin is a U-turn and all mountains to the North a bit like Denver. If both engines had failed at a bad point over the Alps, the risk of CFIT would have been real.

As said Zeke, you are judging them based on knowing the full scenario and root cause.
Not saying that what you would do is not correct, simply saying that unlike you, i'm not saying what they did is bad.
There are in fact often many possible decisions in specific failure cases which are entirely defendable, even very different ones.

As to a skill test normally being conducted simply around a local airport: count yourself lucky your operator isnt very LOFT oriented then....
Anyway: I take it that even on say the ELEC or HYD ATA simulator revision, right after your first sign of ENG trouble, you simply go for the contaminated fuel procedure, declare full mayday, make use of your captain's prerogative to skip all other further ECAMs and QRH procedures and just land overweight asap, because it could also be contaminated fuel with an all engine flame out pending, right, and that particular QRH procedure says LAND ASAP RED.
I bet you'll get a tap on the right shoulder really quickly from behind if you do that...

And are you now asking me to produce a document stating that a twin on two engines must divert????
Look, you're clearly somewhat biassed in your decision making because of a previous contaminated fuel event in your company, and that's very nice if ever the same thing happens again; I just hope you never get into a contaminated AIR incident, because there the solutions applied for contaminated FUEL would possibly be dead wrong....
Now, the all important question: how do you know it's the FUEL and not the AIR which is contaminated?

Hi: I’m sorry if it look that I was blamed some one. I just want to know the cause, Been only an aircraft mech, I use to talk about our incidents, nor pilots’ or FA’s or...
In that case, I just asked about Airlines water check policies and Outstation Mx proccedures
Rgds

A twin engine ETOPS flight where an engine powers off, intentionally through the actions of the flight crew, or automatically, suspends ETOPS on that specific flight.

The grey area is an engine re-start. If ETOPS is suspended for the flight when the shutdown occurs, can it be re-instated if an engine is re-started?

SEPilot wrote:

Let’s examine the situation the pilots were in in sequence.
1. Engine flames out, reason unknown.
2. Engine restart attempted, and is successful.
3. Aircraft is over Algeria, and headed to Europe with suitable landing sites never a long distance away. I do not know this for sure, but I doubt there were very many times that a suitable airport was outside of gliding distance.
4. Both engines are running normally; no long stretches are ahead where there are no diversion possibilities, so the pilots continue on course.
5. No further issues occur with either engine until descent to scheduled destination starts.
6. The other engine then flames out.
7. Restart is attempted several times, finally succeeds.
8. Plane lands at destination with both engines running.

I cannot find any fault with the decisions made by the pilots. The point is that at all times there were diversion possibilities should the problem recur. Had they diverted without any further sign of difficulty they may well have been questioned by management as to why. The situation would have been different had they been about to cross an ocean or other area where the nearest diversion airport was hours away. But they weren’t.

SEPilot wrote:

I am just throwing that in there. They had two functioning engines and no reason to think that they would not continue to have at least one, no matter what happened. And, as I said, they were always in easy distance of a diversion airport, even if it wasn’t in gliding range.

I sincerely hope that you are not at the pointy end of an airliner. The fact that you don't know why the engine just crapped out on you should set alarm bells off in your head. Yes, you get it back online, but for how long before it craps out again? What about the other engine, it looks fine now but so did the first engine before flaming out? They landed with both engine running after both had flamed out in the same flight is not exactly a glowing endorsement of the decision making process. With the info we have, it just seems like they put a lot of faith in certain "ah, it won't happen again or to the other engine".

Questioned by management? You are responsible for the safety of the flight, especially if you happen to be in the left seat and signing the paperwork. Would you rather explain that you couldn't guarantee the safe continue of the journey with a bunch of passengers in the back, or explain how you glided an A330 into an off-airport crash? Even if you decide Algeria is not a place you'd like to land, take the damn thing to Italy.

I've turned back for less. Without wanting to judge, I'd be very interested in the thought process in that cockpit.

Waterbomber wrote:

Actually this is a night flight so they wouldn't have seen much through their windows.

What?
Have you ever flown over the Alps at night, perhaps under a full moon?
Those peaks are usually covered in beautiful white snow, particularly at this time of year. It's a beautiful sight.

Waterbomber wrote:

Also, I doubt that they were carrying any VFR charts so all they could do is follow the MSA's.

Ooh! Get you with the fancy acronyms....
Yeah, I doubt VFR was top of their list on a night-flight. Fortunately, they were over a bunch of countries that all allow Night VFR (France, Switzerland, Belgium), but it's probably a good job they weren't still over Algeria, because I don't see them on the list.


Meanwhile, I'll see your Minimum Safe Altitude, and raise you a very yellow B.707

Bonus points for identifying the executive selection in the background; my little grey cells are a bit fuzzy these days, so I can only suggest N10XY (G2), N655GP (the C-47), but the DC-9 has me beaten. It obviously isn't Hugh Hefner's N950PB. I'm also thinking N911Z, but that's not right either.

I have a question for any jet pilots. How frequent is it that an engine quits and a relight is successful? When it does happen, how often is it that the engine gives further trouble?

sabenapilot wrote:

There are in fact often many possible decisions in specific failure cases which are entirely defendable, even very different ones.

Only defendable if they are within the scope of regulations, procedures, and SOP.

sabenapilot wrote:

count yourself lucky your operator isnt very LOFT oriented then....

I do lofts but the T in loft is training, they are not skills tests.

sabenapilot wrote:

Anyway: I take it that even on say the ELEC or HYD ATA simulator revision, right after your first sign of ENG trouble, you simply go for the contaminated fuel procedure, declare full mayday, make use of your captain's prerogative to skip all other further ECAMs and QRH procedures and just land overweight asap, because it could also be contaminated fuel with an all engine flame out pending, right, and that particular QRH procedure says LAND ASAP

You are doing yourself a disservice with coments like that.

A shutdown after takeoff the decision making process is very easy, go back to where you departed from unless a departure alternate was required.

This aircraft departed at 20:34Z first flameout happened about 2.5 hours later at 00:50. Restarted about 01:30, flew for around 3:15 to BRU, at 04:37Z the other engine flamed out several times.

Icing and fuel contamination would be my thoughts for a shutdown so far into the flight, icing less so at FL400.

sabenapilot wrote:

And are you now asking me to produce a document stating that a twin on two engines must divert????

The regulations in my view are very clear, they say when an engine has been shutdown in flight on a twin (a binary event) a diversion is required. The regulation as far as I am aware gives no credit for a subsequent relight.

That was my question, where do you have the authority after an engine has been shutdown to not divert, regardless of a relight.

Having flown a lot of quads, I know there is a regulation for aircraft with more than two engines to do so, that does not apply in this case.

sabenapilot wrote:

Now, the all important question: how do you know it's the FUEL and not the AIR which is contaminated?

Because with volcanic ash you see the glow on the windscreen and the smell comes though the packs.

DeltaMD90 wrote:

Let's think about this for a second, having 2 engines on any normal flight vs having 2 engines AFTER an engine failure and relight... definitely not the same!!!

Now I wouldn't consider 2 engines with a relit engine the same as only one running engine, but I wouldn't just think "wow, weird that it shut off, whatever, it's on now so nothing at all is wrong!"

On the other hand, if you're seriously considering changing your route to avoid the Alps/no diverts or considering no engine glide distance... probably should be working your way down to a good airport (not necessarily the nearest but not hours and hours away)

That sounds pretty Bayesian to me. I suspect ETOPS would use some such logic and statistics.

My question is did the crew make any plans for diversion during the 40 minutes between flame out and relight?

My initial reading was that it relit immediately but this is not the case. I know it is ETOPS rated but surely in a single engine operative situation you plan to land at the nearest suitable airport. To the change that because they got the engine relit does seem foolish to me. The engines are very reliable, nothing obviously broke so Fuel contamination has to be the most likely cause.

StTim wrote:

My question is did the crew make any plans for diversion during the 40 minutes between flame out and relight?

My initial reading was that it relit immediately but this is not the case. I know it is ETOPS rated but surely in a single engine operative situation you plan to land at the nearest suitable airport. To the change that because they got the engine relit does seem foolish to me. The engines are very reliable, nothing obviously broke so Fuel contamination has to be the most likely cause.

If you look at the flight map posted above, it is pretty clear they were heading to some location in Tunisia, -but once relight they changed course and headed to BRU.