Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi Q1 2019

PlanesNTrains · Tue Mar 12, 2019 7:20 am

ELBOB wrote:
A320FlyGuy wrote:
1. Aviation doesn’t always take the time needed to properly resolve a problem - look at the DC-10 cargo door or the 737 rudder or the various bugs that have plagued Airbus. It’s happened before, it could certainly happen again.

And that's because ( Western ) regulators are beholden to corporate interests. There should be no consideration of commercial impact when reviewing the airworthiness or otherwise of a new type, or when considering a grounding. There should be no grandfathering of type certification. There should certianly be a prohibition on former corporate executives moving into regulatory jobs.

I believe that commercial interests certainly play a role in the regulatory environment. Otherwise, you'd have no accountability for their decisions. I don't think you can trust government any more or less than commercial interests. I do agree, though, that putting the two in bed together is not always going to be the best decision.

A320FlyGuy · Tue Mar 12, 2019 7:24 am

ELBOB wrote:
A320FlyGuy wrote:
1. Aviation doesn’t always take the time needed to properly resolve a problem - look at the DC-10 cargo door or the 737 rudder or the various bugs that have plagued Airbus. It’s happened before, it could certainly happen again.

And that's because ( Western ) regulators are beholden to corporate interests. There should be no consideration of commercial impact when reviewing the airworthiness or otherwise of a new type, or when considering a grounding. There should be no grandfathering of type certification. There should certianly be a prohibition on former corporate executives moving into regulatory jobs.

Remember when those crazy Soviets used to schedule a new airliner on mail and freight runs for a couple of years before they were authorised to carry passengers, flying them on realistic routes in realistic weather? Back then we laughed at that primitive certification system. Now it doesn't seem so stupid.

I agree with what you are saying 100%. I think your comment is one of the most intelligent points that anyone has said in this entire thread.

If the 737MAX8 had such significantly different handling Charecteristics that it required MCAS to bring the aircraft inline from a pilot handling experience with the 737NG, then that to me says that we have enough of a change in the aircraft that a new TC should have been issued.

I would love to know more about the back room discussions that went on between Boeing and the FAA pertaining to the 737 MAX8 - I hope that for both Boeing and the FAA’s sake that there wasn’t another “gentleman’s agreement” similar to the one that allowed the DC-10 to fly with a defective cargo door.

Those crazy Soviets might have been on to something back in the day - Airlines should not be doing any product testing and development with passengers onboard.

rheinwaldner · Tue Mar 12, 2019 7:25 am

TTailedTiger wrote:
Two A330's roughly a year apart. And not a peep for grounding the fleet immediately after the crash (and that was the right decision imo).

Yes, due to the evidence of many years crash free operations. Not so in case of the MAX. Do you understand the difference between two incidents right after EIS and two incidents many years after EIS?

TTailedTiger wrote:
Why do you think Airbus gets the benefit of the doubt but not Boeing?

Has nothing to do with the vendor. The case is different.

smartplane · Tue Mar 12, 2019 7:26 am

TTailedTiger wrote:
A320FlyGuy wrote:
TTailedTiger wrote:

What have we seen? There has been no conclusion to either crash. I get that you are biased toward Airbus but come on. Would you have supported grounding the A320 after the XL Airways crash and the A330 after the Qantas plunge? Apparently when a little water gets in the AOA sensors on the A320 it can seriously mess with the ADIRU. But fortunately cooler heads prevailed in those cases.

I don’t think that grounding is justified in any of the situations that you indicated above - my airline operates both the A320 and the 737MAX. I know pilots who fly both aircraft and the general concenus is that the 737MAX lacks the refinement one would expect from a brand new aircraft. I freely admit that I am biased towards Airbus. I have spent time in Toulouse, I have seen the aircraft being built and I know the A320 intimately. I don’t like what I am seeing with the 737MAX - I believe that Boeing has pushed the limits a bit far with this aircraft and it is coming back to bite them.

Of course you don't. Nevermind that Qantas 72 nearly dived into the ocean only one year before AF 447 did. Two A330's roughly a year apart. And not a peep for grounding the fleet immediately after the crash (and that was the right decision imo). No talk that Airbus was building deathtraps either. Why do you think Airbus gets the benefit of the doubt but not Boeing?

The bar is rising all the time. And the effectiveness of social media too.

You are referring to accidents a decade or more ago. If repeated today, whether Airbus or Boeing, the outcome would likely be different.

A320FlyGuy · Tue Mar 12, 2019 7:27 am

PlanesNTrains wrote:
ELBOB wrote:
A320FlyGuy wrote:
1. Aviation doesn’t always take the time needed to properly resolve a problem - look at the DC-10 cargo door or the 737 rudder or the various bugs that have plagued Airbus. It’s happened before, it could certainly happen again.

And that's because ( Western ) regulators are beholden to corporate interests. There should be no consideration of commercial impact when reviewing the airworthiness or otherwise of a new type, or when considering a grounding. There should be no grandfathering of type certification. There should certianly be a prohibition on former corporate executives moving into regulatory jobs.

I believe that commercial interests certainly play a role in the regulatory environment. Otherwise, you'd have no accountability for their decisions. I don't think you can trust government any more or less than commercial interests. I do agree, though, that putting the two in bed together is not always going to be the best decision.

In some ways, aviation shares a lot in common with the pharmaceutical industry....

When you have a new drug, you have to go through an entire application process with the FDA to get the drug approved for the market - similar to certification with commercial aircraft.

When a revision or a change to an aircraft comes out, you have a type certificate amendment - in the pharmaceutical world, you have an abbreviated new drug application for revisions or changes to a drug.

The common thread here is that the ANDA process and the TC amendment process have both been designed for the convenience of the manufacturer - not nesscessarily the benefit of the airlines and the passengers that fly on the aircraft.

PlanesNTrains · Tue Mar 12, 2019 7:28 am

A320FlyGuy wrote:
First of all, Qantas 72 and AF447 were very different situations and really share no commonality other than both are A330s.

We ultimately learned that the two incidents/accidents had nothing in common.

But immediately following AF447 we didn't know what caused the crash. We did know, though, about Qantas 72.
But immediately following ET802, we didn't know what caused the crash. We did know, though, about LionAir 610.

RE Qantas 72: "The Australian Transport Safety Bureau investigation found a fault with one of the aircraft's three air data inertial reference units and a previously unknown software design limitation of the Airbus A330's fly-by-wire flight control primary computer (FCPC)." (wiki)

RE AF 447: "On 5 June 2009, the BEA cautioned against premature speculation as to the cause of the crash. At that time, the investigation had established only two facts: the weather near the aircraft's planned route included significant convective cells typical of the equatorial regions; and the speeds measured by the three pitot tubes differed from each other during the last few minutes of the flight." (wiki)

I'm not saying the A330 and MAX incidents are the same, but we didn't know with AF447 what had happened, but we did know that an A330 had previously suffered uncontrolled diving. Was AF447 somehow related? Was there another unknown issue with the airframe? We knew from the 737 hardover issues that sometimes it takes many years for issues to become understood.

Anyhow....

A320FlyGuy · Tue Mar 12, 2019 7:38 am

PlanesNTrains wrote:
A320FlyGuy wrote:
First of all, Qantas 72 and AF447 were very different situations and really share no commonality other than both are A330s.

We ultimately learned that the two incidents/accidents had nothing in common.

But immediately following AF447 we didn't know what caused the crash. We did know, though, about Qantas 72.
But immediately following ET802, we didn't know what caused the crash. We did know, though, about LionAir 610.

RE Qantas 72: "The Australian Transport Safety Bureau investigation found a fault with one of the aircraft's three air data inertial reference units and a previously unknown software design limitation of the Airbus A330's fly-by-wire flight control primary computer (FCPC)." (wiki)

RE AF 447: "On 5 June 2009, the BEA cautioned against premature speculation as to the cause of the crash. At that time, the investigation had established only two facts: the weather near the aircraft's planned route included significant convective cells typical of the equatorial regions; and the speeds measured by the three pitot tubes differed from each other during the last few minutes of the flight." (wiki)

I'm not saying the A330 and MAX incidents are the same, but we didn't know with AF447 what had happened, but we did know that an A330 had previously suffered uncontrolled diving. Was AF447 somehow related? Was there another unknown issue with the airframe? We knew from the 737 hardover issues that sometimes it takes many years for issues to become understood.

Anyhow....

It’s really an Apples to Oranges comparison.....

AF447 had transmitted considerable ACARS data that indicated a number of issues that at least hinted at what was going on. It was only until after the FDR/CVR were recovered that we learned the issue was totally crew induced and the aircraft itself was vindicated. Also this issue was unique in the history of the aircraft - 2 737MAX have been lost inside of 6 months in conditions that are too similar for comfort.

QF72 was due to a failure of the ADIRU and the aircraft was saved and it ultimately was found to be an issue with hardware on the aircraft.

Look - it’s clear that you are a Boeing fan and don’t like the idea of the aircraft or it’s builder being slighted. But there is clearly an issue here and it needs to be resolved. There are too many of these aircraft in service now or about to go into service for the plane to have “gotchas” that could bite a crew in the ass.

And in the interest of full disclosure - no, I don’t particularly like Boeing’s 737. I think that the 737NG should have been the ultimate development of the aircraft and the 737MAX is a step too far.

SomebodyInTLS · Tue Mar 12, 2019 7:49 am

gia777 wrote:
I think a simple fix would be, "make it like a cruise control function in your car"....The MCAS can only be activated manually / automatic at certain safe altitude and disengaged automatically below safe altitude.

The whole point of MCAS is that it's a literally vital pilot aid in those stages of flight. You want to manually turn it off at exactly the point its supposed to come on automatically in emergencies.

To stick with the car analogy - it's like manually turning off ABS as you go into a wet corner.

PlanesNTrains · Tue Mar 12, 2019 7:52 am

A320FlyGuy wrote:
PlanesNTrains wrote:
A320FlyGuy wrote:
First of all, Qantas 72 and AF447 were very different situations and really share no commonality other than both are A330s.

We ultimately learned that the two incidents/accidents had nothing in common.

But immediately following AF447 we didn't know what caused the crash. We did know, though, about Qantas 72.
But immediately following ET802, we didn't know what caused the crash. We did know, though, about LionAir 610.

RE Qantas 72: "The Australian Transport Safety Bureau investigation found a fault with one of the aircraft's three air data inertial reference units and a previously unknown software design limitation of the Airbus A330's fly-by-wire flight control primary computer (FCPC)." (wiki)

RE AF 447: "On 5 June 2009, the BEA cautioned against premature speculation as to the cause of the crash. At that time, the investigation had established only two facts: the weather near the aircraft's planned route included significant convective cells typical of the equatorial regions; and the speeds measured by the three pitot tubes differed from each other during the last few minutes of the flight." (wiki)

I'm not saying the A330 and MAX incidents are the same, but we didn't know with AF447 what had happened, but we did know that an A330 had previously suffered uncontrolled diving. Was AF447 somehow related? Was there another unknown issue with the airframe? We knew from the 737 hardover issues that sometimes it takes many years for issues to become understood.

Anyhow....

It’s really an Apples to Oranges comparison.....

AF447 had transmitted considerable ACARS data that indicated a number of issues that at least hinted at what was going on. It was only until after the FDR/CVR were recovered that we learned the issue was totally crew induced and the aircraft itself was vindicated. Also this issue was unique in the history of the aircraft - 2 737MAX have been lost inside of 6 months in conditions that are too similar for comfort.

QF72 was due to a failure of the ADIRU and the aircraft was saved and it ultimately was found to be an issue with hardware on the aircraft.

Look - it’s clear that you are a Boeing fan and don’t like the idea of the aircraft or it’s builder being slighted. But there is clearly an issue here and it needs to be resolved. There are too many of these aircraft in service now or about to go into service for the plane to have “gotchas” that could bite a crew in the ass.

And in the interest of full disclosure - no, I don’t particularly like Boeing’s 737. I think that the 737NG should have been the ultimate development of the aircraft and the 737MAX is a step too far.

I'm glad you find it so easy to just brush away my comments as "look, I know you're a Boeing fan" when all I was doing was pointing out some of the similarities in the hours following the two crashes. I don't think I've said anything in either MAX crash thread to lead you or anyone to believe that I'm defending the MAX because I'm a fanboy. However, you admit you have your biases so perhaps you might want to make sure you're not interpreting my comments through that prism?

You're right - we had acars. We also have a really good clue of what might have happened with ET802. FR24 and ATC comments have also "hinted at" what might have happened. Frankly, there's a good chance that ET802 was a repeat of JT610 and fully preventable had the proper actions been taken by the crew. Now, you might interpret that as me defending the MAX or blaming the crew, but you'd be washing over "good chance". The point is that there is probably doubt in the minds of some that this would happen at their airline because they know that their crews have been trained for it. There's probably some that are shaking their heads at it happening again. And there's probably quite a few who are like "Stop the ride, I want to get off". I respect all those positions. As more data comes out in the coming days, we'll see a clearer direction that will either reinforce the prudence of grounding the fleet or perhaps relieve their concerns and allow the full fleet to enter service quickly [and quietly].

A320FlyGuy · Tue Mar 12, 2019 7:59 am

PlanesNTrains wrote:
A320FlyGuy wrote:
PlanesNTrains wrote:

We ultimately learned that the two incidents/accidents had nothing in common.

But immediately following AF447 we didn't know what caused the crash. We did know, though, about Qantas 72.
But immediately following ET802, we didn't know what caused the crash. We did know, though, about LionAir 610.

RE Qantas 72: "The Australian Transport Safety Bureau investigation found a fault with one of the aircraft's three air data inertial reference units and a previously unknown software design limitation of the Airbus A330's fly-by-wire flight control primary computer (FCPC)." (wiki)

RE AF 447: "On 5 June 2009, the BEA cautioned against premature speculation as to the cause of the crash. At that time, the investigation had established only two facts: the weather near the aircraft's planned route included significant convective cells typical of the equatorial regions; and the speeds measured by the three pitot tubes differed from each other during the last few minutes of the flight." (wiki)

I'm not saying the A330 and MAX incidents are the same, but we didn't know with AF447 what had happened, but we did know that an A330 had previously suffered uncontrolled diving. Was AF447 somehow related? Was there another unknown issue with the airframe? We knew from the 737 hardover issues that sometimes it takes many years for issues to become understood.

Anyhow....

It’s really an Apples to Oranges comparison.....

AF447 had transmitted considerable ACARS data that indicated a number of issues that at least hinted at what was going on. It was only until after the FDR/CVR were recovered that we learned the issue was totally crew induced and the aircraft itself was vindicated. Also this issue was unique in the history of the aircraft - 2 737MAX have been lost inside of 6 months in conditions that are too similar for comfort.

QF72 was due to a failure of the ADIRU and the aircraft was saved and it ultimately was found to be an issue with hardware on the aircraft.

Look - it’s clear that you are a Boeing fan and don’t like the idea of the aircraft or it’s builder being slighted. But there is clearly an issue here and it needs to be resolved. There are too many of these aircraft in service now or about to go into service for the plane to have “gotchas” that could bite a crew in the ass.

And in the interest of full disclosure - no, I don’t particularly like Boeing’s 737. I think that the 737NG should have been the ultimate development of the aircraft and the 737MAX is a step too far.

I'm glad you find it so easy to just brush away my comments as "look, I know you're a Boeing fan" when all I was doing was pointing out some of the similarities in the hours following the two crashes. I don't think I've said anything in either MAX crash thread to lead you or anyone to believe that I'm defending the MAX because I'm a fanboy. However, you admit you have your biases so perhaps you might want to make sure you're not interpreting my comments through that prism?

You're right - we had acars. We also have a really good clue of what might have happened with ET802. FR24 and ATC comments have also "hinted at" what might have happened. Frankly, there's a good chance that ET802 was a repeat of JT610 and fully preventable had the proper actions been taken by the crew. Now, you might interpret that as me defending the MAX or blaming the crew, but you'd be washing over "good chance". The point is that there is probably doubt in the minds of some that this would happen at their airline because they know that their crews have been trained for it. There's probably some that are shaking their heads at it happening again. And there's probably quite a few who are like "Stop the ride, I want to get off". I respect all those positions. As more data comes out in the coming days, we'll see a clearer direction that will either reinforce the prudence of grounding the fleet or perhaps relieve their concerns and allow the full fleet to enter service quickly [and quietly].

You know what....I’m just going to agree to disagree with you. I’m not going to get into an argument with you because it’s a waste of time and it doesn’t contribute to the productiveness of the thread. You have your opinions, I have mine.

If you chose to perpetuate this, you are welcome to do so on your own.

mzlin · Tue Mar 12, 2019 8:00 am

being reported in the AV Herald:

On Mar 12th 2019 Boeing issued following release with respect to MCAS, Lion Air Flight 610 and Ethiopian flight 302:

For the past several months and in the aftermath of Lion Air Flight 610, Boeing has been developing a flight control software enhancement for the 737 MAX, designed to make an already safe aircraft even safer. This includes updates to the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) flight control law, pilot displays, operation manuals and crew training. The enhanced flight control law incorporates angle of attack (AOA) inputs, limits stabilizer trim commands in response to an erroneous angle of attack reading, and provides a limit to the stabilizer command in order to retain elevator authority.

PlanesNTrains · Tue Mar 12, 2019 8:02 am

A320FlyGuy wrote:
PlanesNTrains wrote:
A320FlyGuy wrote:

It’s really an Apples to Oranges comparison.....

AF447 had transmitted considerable ACARS data that indicated a number of issues that at least hinted at what was going on. It was only until after the FDR/CVR were recovered that we learned the issue was totally crew induced and the aircraft itself was vindicated. Also this issue was unique in the history of the aircraft - 2 737MAX have been lost inside of 6 months in conditions that are too similar for comfort.

QF72 was due to a failure of the ADIRU and the aircraft was saved and it ultimately was found to be an issue with hardware on the aircraft.

Look - it’s clear that you are a Boeing fan and don’t like the idea of the aircraft or it’s builder being slighted. But there is clearly an issue here and it needs to be resolved. There are too many of these aircraft in service now or about to go into service for the plane to have “gotchas” that could bite a crew in the ass.

And in the interest of full disclosure - no, I don’t particularly like Boeing’s 737. I think that the 737NG should have been the ultimate development of the aircraft and the 737MAX is a step too far.

I'm glad you find it so easy to just brush away my comments as "look, I know you're a Boeing fan" when all I was doing was pointing out some of the similarities in the hours following the two crashes. I don't think I've said anything in either MAX crash thread to lead you or anyone to believe that I'm defending the MAX because I'm a fanboy. However, you admit you have your biases so perhaps you might want to make sure you're not interpreting my comments through that prism?

You're right - we had acars. We also have a really good clue of what might have happened with ET802. FR24 and ATC comments have also "hinted at" what might have happened. Frankly, there's a good chance that ET802 was a repeat of JT610 and fully preventable had the proper actions been taken by the crew. Now, you might interpret that as me defending the MAX or blaming the crew, but you'd be washing over "good chance". The point is that there is probably doubt in the minds of some that this would happen at their airline because they know that their crews have been trained for it. There's probably some that are shaking their heads at it happening again. And there's probably quite a few who are like "Stop the ride, I want to get off". I respect all those positions. As more data comes out in the coming days, we'll see a clearer direction that will either reinforce the prudence of grounding the fleet or perhaps relieve their concerns and allow the full fleet to enter service quickly [and quietly].

You know what....I’m just going to agree to disagree with you. I’m not going to get into an argument with you because it’s a waste of time and it doesn’t contribute to the productiveness of the thread. You have your opinions, I have mine.

If you chose to perpetuate this, you are welcome to do so on your own.

Perpetuate what? A discussion? Honestly, none of what you and I have said is anything approaching a problem - well, I guess other than writing me off as biased. I wasn't trying to change your mind so much as understand where you are coming from, and the accident comparison that I jumped into was (I thought) interesting.

Anyhow, thanks.

Olddog · Tue Mar 12, 2019 8:04 am

Just saw on Bloomberg that Australia grounds the max too.

Armodeen · Tue Mar 12, 2019 8:06 am

GalaxyFlyer wrote:
Armodeen

I’d agree with you, IF the program is rigorous and aimed at transport operations. That is NOTHING like that in US Part 61 or 141 training programs., which is why there’s this gulf between US and others on training. Like most military programs, they’re structured, have stringent checking standards and the instructor corps subject to similar levels of structure and checking. Still, experience matters.

I’m still wrapping my mind around how, assuming the engines were operating and the basic airframe and controls were intact, crews could crash the plane in Day VFR conditions. The Boeing Runaway/Uncommanded Stab Trim procedure hasn’t changed since the 737 entered service in 1967. Its DAY VFR—look out the windscreen. Is the plane climbing with two engines, if yes, continue and work the failures. If it’s an uncommanded stab trim, turn it off. If stall warning, turn it off. We changed the stall recovery procedures to make reducing AOA the first step. I have to wonder, if these crews get an erroneous stall warnng and shove the nose down combined with any MCAS inputs, it’s becomes unrecoverable. That’s my argument with low experience pilots—too much rote responses, no sense of the big picture.

I’ve had loads of new pilots, civil and military, so indoctrinated in “trust your instruments” they can’t look out the windscreen and fly the plane by God”s Attitude Indicator—the natural horizon. I had a LT in C-5, in base to finals, visual pattern, go around. I asked why he was going around. “Well, sir, we’re 200’ high on base”. You can’t fix in 3 miles? “We were thought not to salvage landings, sir”. “Well, try being perfect more often then “.

GF

Thanks GF, good reply and very helpful.

aviation55 · Tue Mar 12, 2019 8:07 am

There is a lot of mention here regarding the MCAS system. Since we're looking at two separate incidents regarding the MAX 8, there are similarities I've uncovered:

JT610 (PK-LQP) was an overnight aircraft and the the aircraft went down the next morning after it took off from Indonesia, based off of maintenance records/news publications, a faulty AOA sensor had supposedly been replaced.

ET302 (ET-AVJ) was an originating aircraft (03-10-19), it had landed the morning prior (03-09-19) as ET858 from JNB-the aircraft basically sat on the ground for the entire day at ADD as it had no further flights scheduled associated with that aircraft.

So both incidents took place as the aircraft flew for the first time for that given day; could any of this have any contributing factor?

PlanesNTrains · Tue Mar 12, 2019 8:07 am

Olddog wrote:
Just saw on Bloomberg that Australia grounds max too.

Who flies the MAX there? I guess I've lost track. Anyhow, can you post this in the Grounding thread?

WIederling · Tue Mar 12, 2019 8:08 am

Armodeen wrote:
I'm yet to see any hard evidence (studies) that show that higher hours before starting initial line training has any effect on safety. If you know of any then please post links, I am genuinely curious.

With everything regulation wise in the US having a submarine component:
Was the (part)objective in extending required hours not just
to advantage ex mil pilots over their privately educated counterparts?

The path for training/qualifying for commercial flying in the US seems to be completely
different from other parts of the world.
LH as an example takes "green" applicants directly from school checks if they fit in
and then trains them to become cockpit crew.

WPvsMW · Tue Mar 12, 2019 8:11 am

"submarine component". Huh???

Starlionblue · Tue Mar 12, 2019 8:12 am

WIederling wrote:
Armodeen wrote:
I'm yet to see any hard evidence (studies) that show that higher hours before starting initial line training has any effect on safety. If you know of any then please post links, I am genuinely curious.

With everything regulation wise in the US having a submarine component:
Was the (part)objective in extending required hours not just
to advantage ex mil pilots over their privately educated counterparts?

The path for training/qualifying for commercial flying in the US seems to be completely
different from other parts of the world.
LH as an example takes "green" applicants directly from school checks if they fit in
and then trains them to become cockpit crew.

Your impression is correct. It is completely different. In the US, aviation training is a bit like an apprenticeship, while in many other countries it is more like a trade school.

Seeing as training costs has been increasing over the past three decades, the latter model is winning out. Fewer and fewer people can afford flight training up to a CPL, let alone 1500 hours, on their own dime.

FlapsOne · Tue Mar 12, 2019 8:15 am

PlanesNTrains wrote:
Olddog wrote:
Just saw on Bloomberg that Australia grounds max too.

Who flies the MAX there? I guess I've lost track. Anyhow, can you post this in the Grounding thread?

Fiji Airways do.

PlanesNTrains · Tue Mar 12, 2019 8:16 am

FlapsOne wrote:
PlanesNTrains wrote:
Olddog wrote:
Just saw on Bloomberg that Australia grounds max too.

Who flies the MAX there? I guess I've lost track. Anyhow, can you post this in the Grounding thread?

Fiji Airways do.

Ah, thanks.

WIederling · Tue Mar 12, 2019 8:16 am

A320FlyGuy wrote:
I would love to know more about the back room discussions that went on between Boeing and the FAA pertaining to the 737 MAX8.

Backroom? Over a coffee in the Boeing cantina. :-)

FAA has been "embedded" inside Boeing for a long time. A kiss that corrupts.

Carlos01 · Tue Mar 12, 2019 8:17 am

I didn't see this posted yet, but Boeing has issued a statement about the "bugfix" for the MAX:

https://boeing.mediaroom.com/news-relea ... tem=130402

Just one thing I'd like to highlight from it: "...Boeing has been developing a flight control software enhancement for the 737 MAX, designed to make an already safe aircraft even safer."

I understand why they have to say something like this, but after 300+ dead people, a statement like that most likely will piss people off.

Anyway, nothing to see here, please move on.

Pcoder · Tue Mar 12, 2019 8:19 am

I'm guessing we'll hear from EASA soon.

bcworld · Tue Mar 12, 2019 8:22 am

PlanesNTrains wrote:
Olddog wrote:
Just saw on Bloomberg that Australia grounds max too.

Who flies the MAX there? I guess I've lost track. Anyhow, can you post this in the Grounding thread?

Silkair to DRW...so already grounded by Singapore anyway.

Jouhou · Tue Mar 12, 2019 8:22 am

WPvsMW wrote:
"submarine component". Huh???

I'm thinking that may be a mis-translation from German...

Or maybe he is implying all American aircraft are certified to "fly" under water. It's just been kept a secret until now. Finally, the MH370 mystery has been solved!

I think "backroom discussions" already being used in this thread is probably close to what he's trying to say.

PlanesNTrains · Tue Mar 12, 2019 8:23 am

bcworld wrote:
PlanesNTrains wrote:
Olddog wrote:
Just saw on Bloomberg that Australia grounds max too.

Who flies the MAX there? I guess I've lost track. Anyhow, can you post this in the Grounding thread?

Silkair to DRW...so already grounded by Singapore anyway.

Ya I was just thinking "Australian" airline without considering those that fly it there.

14ccKemiskt · Tue Mar 12, 2019 8:23 am

Olddog wrote:
Just saw on Bloomberg that Australia grounds the max too.

Could the fact that more and more national aviation authorities ground the 737 max despite that the FAA does not grow into a trust issue of the FAA? Or is it, rather, a piece of evidence that a trust issue already exists?

And might the fact that most national US media has been headlining the 737 max problems also get the American public to stop trust the FAA?

LandSweetLand · Tue Mar 12, 2019 8:29 am

737Max8 operations have been suspended in Australia by CASA (our regulator)
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-03-12/ ... a/10894426

edit:oops by the time I remembered my password, someone else had posted it.

bcworld · Tue Mar 12, 2019 8:30 am

PlanesNTrains wrote:
bcworld wrote:
PlanesNTrains wrote:

Who flies the MAX there? I guess I've lost track. Anyhow, can you post this in the Grounding thread?

Silkair to DRW...so already grounded by Singapore anyway.

Ya I was just thinking "Australian" airline without considering those that fly it there.

Well Virgin Australia is a MAX customer with first deliveries due late this year.

PlanesNTrains · Tue Mar 12, 2019 8:32 am

14ccKemiskt wrote:
Olddog wrote:
Just saw on Bloomberg that Australia grounds the max too.

Could the fact that more and more national aviation authorities ground the 737 max despite that the FAA does not grow into a trust issue of the FAA? Or is it, rather, a piece of evidence that a trust issue already exists?

And might the fact that most national US media has been headlining the 737 max problems also get the American public to stop trust the FAA?

LandSweetLand wrote:
737Max8 operations have been grounded in Australia by CASA (our regulator)
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-03-12/ ... a/10894426

Can we move this discussion to the Grounding thread so this one can be kept for the ET crash exclusively?

viewtopic.php?f=3&t=1417545

Mods are trying to separate the two conversations to make it easier to follow them both. Thanks :-)

WIederling · Tue Mar 12, 2019 8:32 am

Carlos01 wrote:
I understand why they have to say something like this, but after 300+ dead people, a statement like that most likely will piss people off.
.

Just being In Style. After the Lion Air crash the first thing from Boeing was RFTM!

JoeCanuck · Tue Mar 12, 2019 8:42 am

There's has been a lot of mention of MCAS. Does anyone know if it was enabled? Were the flaps fully retracted? If the flaps were deployed, MCAS would have been disabled. Some reports seem to indicate the problems started immediately, or very shortly after takeoff. If so, it seems unlikely to me, that MCAS was involved.

It has been 6 months since the Lion accident. While people may have not been aware of MCAS before Lion...since then, there isn't a MAX pilot on the planet that isn't intimately aware of the MCAS disable procedures. Hell, everybody in this forum is intimately aware of the MCAS disable procedures.

From the information we have, which is pretty much zero, the primary cause of the accident could be anything...with MCAS being a less likely candidate than many others I could think of.

PlanesNTrains · Tue Mar 12, 2019 8:45 am

JoeCanuck wrote:
There's has been a lot of mention of MCAS. Does anyone know if it was enabled? Were the flaps fully retracted? If the flaps were deployed, MCAS would have been disabled. Some reports seem to indicate the problems started immediately, or very shortly after takeoff. If so, it seems unlikely to me, that MCAS was involved.

It has been 6 months since the Lion accident. While people may have not been aware of MCAS before Lion...since then, there isn't a MAX pilot on the planet that isn't intimately aware of the MCAS disable procedures. Hell, everybody in this forum is intimately aware of the MCAS disable procedures.

From the information we have, which is pretty much zero, the primary cause of the accident could be anything...with MCAS being a less likely candidate than many others I could think of.

Frankly, at this stage, it seems none of us know shit about this crash.

Have a good night. zzzzzzzzzzz

WIederling · Tue Mar 12, 2019 9:02 am

Starlionblue wrote:
Your impression is correct. It is completely different. In the US, aviation training is a bit like an apprenticeship, while in many other countries it is more like a trade school.

Germany has a strong line in trade schooling anyway. ( 2.5 to 3.5 years of comprehensive hands on training combined with (public) schooling with a general and topic specific curriculum.
I'd liken the (commercial) pilot qualification process here to the "Fachhochschule" path you can take for qualification fitted between trade school and a ( full ) university degree.

MaksFly · Tue Mar 12, 2019 9:12 am

ELBOB wrote:
A320FlyGuy wrote:
1. Aviation doesn’t always take the time needed to properly resolve a problem - look at the DC-10 cargo door or the 737 rudder or the various bugs that have plagued Airbus. It’s happened before, it could certainly happen again.

And that's because ( Western ) regulators are beholden to corporate interests. There should be no consideration of commercial impact when reviewing the airworthiness or otherwise of a new type, or when considering a grounding. There should be no grandfathering of type certification. There should certianly be a prohibition on former corporate executives moving into regulatory jobs.

Remember when those crazy Soviets used to schedule a new airliner on mail and freight runs for a couple of years before they were authorised to carry passengers? Flying them on realistic routes in realistic weather with actual airline crews. Back then we laughed at that primitive certification system. Now it doesn't seem so stupid.

You bring up a great point but it all comes down to one thing...

"Acceptable Risk"

In Soviet Russia,flying impacted a lot less people than it does today. And of course, there was no monetary motivation.

Today, it is all about return on investment for both manufacturers and the operators. Saving a few cents per pax per flight ends up being millions more in profits. And of course, it is a race.

The cushy relationship between industry and regulators is of course also true, but it is not just in the airliners/aerospace/defense industries, it is everywhere.

You serve in office because you know when you retire, you need a cushy job that will hire you for your government connections. It is a never ending story and why companies shell out billions a year to recruit former government heads and employees to serve on board of directors. Heck, as an investment advisor, this is one of the things we look for.

groundbird · Tue Mar 12, 2019 9:21 am

WPvsMW wrote:
"submarine component". Huh???

Patience and context show 'submarine component' meant 'hidden from view'.

WIederling · Tue Mar 12, 2019 9:22 am

MaksFly wrote:
In Soviet Russia,flying impacted a lot less people than it does today. And of course, there was no monetary motivation.

Aeroflot once was the biggest airline on earth. 3000 strong fleet.
And they actually flew on a regular basis. Lots of milk can routes.
Ticket pricing ( often cheaper than the train )
allowing most everyone to go by plane.

you are right about profits not being a strong decider.
But excessive safety neither.

scbriml · Tue Mar 12, 2019 9:34 am

pintail21 wrote:
Was there all these hysterics after the rash of 777 mishaps? Judging by some posters here you’d think they should have scrapped the fleet after Asiana and Malaysian x2 because those darn planes kept crashing!

Very different circumstances. Ignoring that one of the MH birds was actually shot down and one likely deliberately crashed, try comparing apples and apples.

If two 77Ws had crashed in quick succession shortly after take-off killing maybe 700 people within two years of entering service, do you not think people would start asking questions? Some authorities might also decide to ground the planes until they were sure what the issue was.

journeyperson · Tue Mar 12, 2019 9:36 am

Carlos01 wrote:
I didn't see this posted yet, but Boeing has issued a statement about the "bugfix" for the MAX:

https://boeing.mediaroom.com/news-relea ... tem=130402

Just one thing I'd like to highlight from it: "...Boeing has been developing a flight control software enhancement for the 737 MAX, designed to make an already safe aircraft even safer."

I understand why they have to say something like this, but after 300+ dead people, a statement like that most likely will piss people off.

Anyway, nothing to see here, please move on.

Another quote from the statement: "MCAS does not control the airplane in normal flight; it improves the behavior of the airplane in a non-normal part of the operating envelope."

What part of the operating envelope is non-normal?

WIederling · Tue Mar 12, 2019 9:44 am

journeyperson wrote:
What part of the operating envelope is non-normal?

Anything that requires nose up, higher AoA.

But that is a blatant fib.

MCAS is constantly in the loop ( flaps retracted, no autopilot ).
It turns active when a preselected single sensor's data indicates high AoA.
Issues start when this single sensor is a false ticker.

MileHFL400 · Tue Mar 12, 2019 10:05 am

Here’s what we know so far:

Nothing. And all I can see is people talking about MCAS. So sad.

maint123 · Tue Mar 12, 2019 10:05 am

It's been 2 months since the CVR was recovered of 737 max crash-1. Isn't it time to bring out the findings on a priority basis and dispell some of the questions regarding the accident.? I understand that it can take upto a year to declare the final report but these are abnormal times. Some preliminary report is in order.

Philbky · Tue Mar 12, 2019 10:11 am

It has repeatedly been stated that MCAS can only activate with flaps retracted. That's how it should work, that's how it has been designed to work. In my 64 years interest in aviation, including many years working with the industry providing services in many disciplines, I learned early on, and have been constantly reminded, that "if something can go wrong, eventually it will". I'm not saying that MCAS operated with flaps in use in either accident, just that the possibility needs to be considered, investigated and eliminated or proved.

Philbky · Tue Mar 12, 2019 10:14 am

It has repeatedly been stated that MCAS can only activate with flaps retracted. That's how it should work, that's how it has been designed to work. In my 64 years interest in aviation, including many years working with the industry providing services in many disciplines, I learned early on, and have been constantly reminded that, "if something can go wrong, eventually it will". I'm not saying that MCAS operated with flaps in use in either accident, just that the possibility needs to be considered, investigated and eliminated or proved.

Bricktop · Tue Mar 12, 2019 10:26 am

maint123 wrote:
It's been 2 months since the CVR was recovered of 737 max crash-1. Isn't it time to bring out the findings on a priority basis and dispell some of the questions regarding the accident.? I understand that it can take upto a year to declare the final report but these are abnormal times. Some preliminary report is in order.

Absolutely agree.

Miquel787 · Tue Mar 12, 2019 10:34 am

GalaxyFlyer wrote:
Armodeen

I’d agree with you, IF the program is rigorous and aimed at transport operations. That is NOTHING like that in US Part 61 or 141 training programs., which is why there’s this gulf between US and others on training. Like most military programs, they’re structured, have stringent checking standards and the instructor corps subject to similar levels of structure and checking. Still, experience matters.

I’m still wrapping my mind around how, assuming the engines were operating and the basic airframe and controls were intact, crews could crash the plane in Day VFR conditions. The Boeing Runaway/Uncommanded Stab Trim procedure hasn’t changed since the 737 entered service in 1967. Its DAY VFR—look out the windscreen. Is the plane climbing with two engines, if yes, continue and work the failures. If it’s an uncommanded stab trim, turn it off. If stall warning, turn it off. We changed the stall recovery procedures to make reducing AOA the first step. I have to wonder, if these crews get an erroneous stall warnng and shove the nose down combined with any MCAS inputs, it’s becomes unrecoverable. That’s my argument with low experience pilots—too much rote responses, no sense of the big picture.

I’ve had loads of new pilots, civil and military, so indoctrinated in “trust your instruments” they can’t look out the windscreen and fly the plane by God”s Attitude Indicator—the natural horizon. I had a LT in C-5, in base to finals, visual pattern, go around. I asked why he was going around. “Well, sir, we’re 200’ high on base”. You can’t fix in 3 miles? “We were thought not to salvage landings, sir”. “Well, try being perfect more often then “.

GF

Many thanx for this clear and fine comment. So from what I read in your comment is that (young) pilots need more traing in basic flying?

dtwpilot225 · Tue Mar 12, 2019 10:39 am

SuperEighty wrote:
benjjk wrote:
dwachdorf wrote:
Dumb Question (And forgot my ignorance, I'm not an aviation expert) - Why doesn't Boeing just disable MCAS? Is it really necessary? Can you just train pilots on how to deal with the nose up pitch? Seems like the kind of things pilots would naturally want to counter-act.

MCAS is a condition for certification. When an aircraft is at a high AoA the FAA requires it to have a natural tendency to pitch the nose down, or otherwise some sort of system to force it down - hence MCAS. It is supposed to be a safeguard for when the pilots are disoriented/not in full control for whatever reason.

Unfortunately the Lionair crash (likely) showed that MCAS can be fooled by an erroneous sensor, and whilst there was a procedure in place for that situation, the procedure failed. We don't yet know if this accident experienced the same thing.

Well said.

I can see certainly see the advantages that MCAS has to offer. Had Air France 447 had MCAS or a similar system maybe that flight would have ended differently.

I hope the issue gets sorted out, I’m without a doubt a Boeing fan but can’t blame any airline for grounding their fleet of MAX’s. That said, I also can’t blame any other airline for not grounding theirs.

Looking at the crash site, it brings flashes of both PSA 1771 and UAL93. Extremely high vertical speed and an extremely low ground (forward) speed.

-SuperEighty

Mcas would not have saved Air France, that pilot was pulling on the stick the whole time.
Mcas was required on the 737 max to keep the airplane stable. Just not a overall good design, too many moving parts. I hate that people have to pay with their lives while they figure this out

dtw2hyd · Tue Mar 12, 2019 10:41 am

journeyperson wrote:
Another quote from the statement: "MCAS does not control the airplane in normal flight; it improves the behavior of the airplane in a non-normal part of the operating envelope."

What part of the operating envelope is non-normal?

Interesting. How can it improve behavior without manipulating(controlling) control surfaces?

tistpaa727 · Tue Mar 12, 2019 10:44 am

A320FlyGuy wrote:

I would love to know more about the back room discussions that went on between Boeing and the FAA pertaining to the 737 MAX8 -

Is it just the FAA that is on the hook here or should we also be calling out the other regulatory bodies in other parts of the world that also allowed the certification process? I agree, grandfathering a plane that is vastly different to what was originally certified 51 years ago makes absolutely no sense unless you truly believe the NG and MAX are just "warmed over" derivatives - which they are not. How is it that no regulatory agency around the world has put up a wall to this practice? They all are culpable.

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