BravoOne wrote:

Carlos01 wrote:

ktof wrote:

But they're not.

We have absolutely 0 preliminary information about this crash, nothing.

Nobody is playing chicken, for all we know this could have been a simple pilot error or something completely unrelated.

Maybe save your faux horror for when we have the full details, if it turns out it is an MCAS issue I will happily come back here and apologise to you.

This is the part I still don't understand. Everyone keeps saying "safety first", "safety is our top priority" and all that crap, and yet actions are the complete opposite. You want to save the faux horror, and keep on flying until we know more. Fine. But what if there will be another deadly crash while we wait? Is that seriously "ok"? Shit happens? Human life really means that little to you and other likeminded people?

It seems to me that Boeing, their fanboys, and the FAA are completely indifferent to the fact that hundreds of people have been killed, and it could be their fault! Well ok, not the fanboys, but the other two. Seriously, this so-what attitude is just unbelievable, even racist.

Carlos, that was uncalled for.

It's okay, I've been called a Boeing fanboy and a racist in the space of the past hour for daring to have an opposing opinion.

I love the Internet.

Bobloblaw wrote:

For everyone saying Boeing should have made a clean sheet design to replace the 737, do you realize Boeing didn’t and doesn’t have the resources for a 737 replacement AND the 787???

Yes, it does, but they were all busy designing a slow-moving product. God knows how many undocumented grandfathers it has.

Per Boeing's press release this morning, regarding a software update to MCAS in the near future...
"...The enhanced flight control law incorporates angle of attack (AOA) inputs, limits stabilizer trim commands in response to an erroneous angle of attack reading, and provides a limit to the stabilizer command in order to retain elevator authority."

IMHO it's absolutely infuriating (regardless of its impact on either crash) that they had the ability to add these COMMON SENSE modifications to the MCAS system in a few months, yet launched the aircraft without them (and presumably would have never added them anyways). MAJOR shortcuts by Boeing here, or just complete and utter lack of common sense incorporating even the smallest form of FBW (yes I know 777/787 are FBW).

We basically knew all of this, but casually hearing it from Boeing (and the assumption of an immediate AD) kinda pisses me off.


edit: If those features/rules had been developed parallel to the MAX design/development it probably wouldn't have added a single day to the program.

afriwing wrote:

trpmb6 wrote:

A320FlyGuy wrote:

The issue that I have with the certification process is the use of a DER - a designated engineering representative who is an employee of the airframe manufacturer yet has approval powers granted by the FAA - so it’s a case of the fox guarding the henhouse.

I don't think I need to remind you that your beloved Airbus product was designed in the exact same manner. Only difference is what Airbus calls it. If I recall its 300 or 400 signature authority. Something like that.

Literally every aerospace company works in this manner.

It doesn't matter if Airbus also uses a similar method. The method is flawd, period. You wouldn't let a student mark their own paper in an exam would you? .. no matter how brilliant or honest the examinee is, it's simply a conflict of interest.

It might be acceptable in limited circumstances, but not on a large scale, and most certainly not on such important additions to the flight systems. Yesterday on CNN a former NTSB boss admitted that the FAA allows Boeing to "self-certify" around 85% of their aircraft. I think that's too much for the sake of conflict of interest.

Thank-You for mentioning that interview and the statements regarding the DER issue - it’s nice to know that I’m not the only one who finds flaws in allowing the manufacturer to inspect and certify their own product.

One book that is extremely interesting and is for the most part extremely accurate is “The Sporty Game”. It covers all aspects of the birth and development of the A300, DC-10 and L-1011 as well as to a lesser extent the 747. It goes into extensive detail of the DER system and it’s flawed execution.

A320FlyGuy wrote:

Bobloblaw wrote:

For everyone saying Boeing should have made a clean sheet design to replace the 737, do you realize Boeing didn’t and doesn’t have the resources for a 737 replacement AND the 787??? It was one of the other. Clean sheet 737 replacement means no 787, giving away the market to the A350.. btw same thing with Airbus. Either 320 replacement Or 350, both cannot be built.

Your logic is a tad flawed here:

With Boeing:

The 737 should have been replaced as it is the volume leader - there is a larger market for single aisle aircraft like the 737 and it should be the focus of the company’s developement resources. Instead of doing a full clean sheet design and creating the 787, it would have made more sense to invest the funds in the 737 replacement and create a 767MAX. Funds that were wasted on the 747-8 could and should have been directed to the 737 since it is the only single aisle aircraft model still in production at Boeing and there is very healthy demand.

With Airbus:

The A320 being a newer design in comparison to the 737 has greater development potential and a clean sheet replacement was not as pressing - Also, Airbus began a program in 2006 known as the A320 Enhanced - a series of improvements that would deliver a 4-6% increase in efficiency. The A320 has benefitted from this program of continuous improvement with incremental modifications and improvements. Also, the A320 benefits from having a very efficient airframe that is now dependent on improvements in engine technology to better the performance of the aircraft.

Airlines have clearly responded to the A320neo as being a superior alternative to the 737MAX based on sales - Airbus has a healthy 1,350 aircraft lead over the 737MAX in terms of sales.

My logic isn’t flawed. What’s flawed is you think you know more than Boeing about how to make strategic manufacturing decisions without having any of the inside knowledge about what was discussed at Boeing. The idea that the 748 funds could have been used to make a clean sheet 737 replacement is absurd.

estorilm wrote:

Per Boeing's press release this morning, regarding a software update to MCAS in the near future...
"...The enhanced flight control law incorporates angle of attack (AOA) inputs, limits stabilizer trim commands in response to an erroneous angle of attack reading, and provides a limit to the stabilizer command in order to retain elevator authority."

IMHO it's absolutely infuriating (regardless of its impact on either crash) that they had the ability to add these COMMON SENSE modifications to the MCAS system in a few months, yet launched the aircraft without them (and presumably would have never added them anyways). MAJOR shortcuts by Boeing here, or just complete and utter lack of common sense incorporating even the smallest form of FBW (yes I know 777/787 are FBW).

We basically knew all of this, but casually hearing it from Boeing (and the assumption of an immediate AD) kinda pisses me off.

I couldn’t agree more!

It would appear that Boeing is doing major damage control with the MAX - and it would also appear that this aircraft is a product of tombstone technology...

scbriml wrote:

Many people in these threads are complaining that aviation authorities around the World are overreacting and are unjustified in grounding the 737MAX. How many people would have to die in how many more crashes before they (grudgingly) admit that maybe grounding the plane is a good idea and justified?

To answer completely honestly, I would say two similar accidents in short time could still be unlucky coincidence - although perfectly reasonable for people to suspect a potential link and demand a temporary grounding while the authorities compare notes... if it quickly becomes obvious that they are not connected then the grounding should be lifted ASAP.

If there were a third similar incident within a few months then I don't think anyone would argue against a full long-term grounding pending a thorough investigation and fix.

Pyrex wrote:

Starlionblue wrote:

Bobloblaw wrote:

For everyone saying Boeing should have made a clean sheet design to replace the 737, do you realize Boeing didn’t and doesn’t have the resources for a 737 replacement AND the 787??? It was one of the other. Clean sheet 737 replacement means no 787, giving away the market to the A350.. btw same thing with Airbus. Either 320 replacement Or 350, both cannot be built.

In context, it sounds as if you are saying that Boeing could not afford a clean sheet replacement, and thus they were forced to go with a stopgap involving dodgy design compromises... And this is fine?

If it takes $5bn, it takes $5bn.

Yes, because aerospace engineers just grow on trees, correct? Perhaps they could just have gone to Walmart and hired a few.

I understand that there are economic arguments. However there should be some points where the regulators throw themselves across the tracks and tell the manufacturer that enough is enough with this grandfathering of a type certificate at the expense of a modern design.

estorilm wrote:

Per Boeing's press release this morning, regarding a software update to MCAS in the near future...
"...The enhanced flight control law incorporates angle of attack (AOA) inputs, limits stabilizer trim commands in response to an erroneous angle of attack reading, and provides a limit to the stabilizer command in order to retain elevator authority."

IMHO it's absolutely infuriating (regardless of its impact on either crash) that they had the ability to add these COMMON SENSE modifications to the MCAS system in a few months, yet launched the aircraft without them (and presumably would have never added them anyways). MAJOR shortcuts by Boeing here, or just complete and utter lack of common sense incorporating even the smallest form of FBW (yes I know 777/787 are FBW).

We basically knew all of this, but casually hearing it from Boeing (and the assumption of an immediate AD) kinda pisses me off.


edit: If those features/rules had been developed parallel to the MAX design/development it probably wouldn't have added a single day to the program.

I'm with you. Boeing's statement from this morning (and by extent the FAA's yesterday) makes my blood boil. Average Joe flyer will of course read these statements and think "Oh good - the authorities are doing something - we are so glad and lucky to have these bodies that oversee!" - but you and I know all too well that this entire matter really needs looked at the other way around. The ONLY reason these modifications are necessary is because Boeing designed the 737MAX to the lowest common denominator w/r/t certification. The fact that the MCAS was needed to be bolted on in ORDER TO BE CERTIFIED just screams of a disaster waiting to happen.

And of course there are very few (if any) 737NAX sims out there - because the whole idea was that this "new" plane could masquerade as a 737 and no additional/new type training would be needed by those expected to fly the thing.

Makes me so mad.

Not sure, where you're trying to go, but the numbers seem non adequate:
(i did some cut from quote to show my case)

A320FlyGuy wrote:

their safety records were downright abysmal:
Boeing 707:
1962:
4 crashes in 8 months with a total of 435 fatalities

Boeing 727:
1965 (First Year of Service)
3 crashes in 87 days with a total of 131 fatalities

Judging by:
https://www.icao.int/safety/iStars/Page ... stics.aspx
and rate going down more than twice those 10 past years (anyone has a reliable source to judge past 10 years?), it's extremely rare to have two planes of the type going down so fast after EIS.

As such, even if the reason is the lack of training, or whatever reason not within the plane itself, I can't escape the feeling we'll learn something really important soon.

Cheers,
Adam

Carlos01 wrote:

ktof wrote:

FlapsOne wrote:

Can EU members ground the plane or do they have to wait for EASA?

I’m horrified that UK and Belgian airlines continue to operate the MAX and Norwegian MAX planes fly directly over my house regularly yet they’re all still flying. Having spent a decade at one of the operators I’m shocked and saddened that they’re seemingly playing chicken with people’s lives.

But they're not.

We have absolutely 0 preliminary information about this crash, nothing.

Nobody is playing chicken, for all we know this could have been a simple pilot error or something completely unrelated.

Maybe save your faux horror for when we have the full details, if it turns out it is an MCAS issue I will happily come back here and apologise to you.

This is the part I still don't understand. Everyone keeps saying "safety first", "safety is our top priority" and all that crap, and yet actions are the complete opposite. You want to save the faux horror, and keep on flying until we know more. Fine. But what if there will be another deadly crash while we wait? Is that seriously "ok"? Shit happens? Human life really means that little to you and other likeminded people?

It seems to me that Boeing, their fanboys, and the FAA are completely indifferent to the fact that hundreds of people have been killed, and it could be their fault! Well ok, not the fanboys, but the other two. Seriously, this so-what attitude is just unbelievable, even racist.

Using your logic every time there is a crash we should ground the type until the report. So right now 767s and 737maxes would be grounded. The 777 would be grounded (mh370). The 330s would have been out of the air for quite a while. And do we stop there or do we ground for near crashes and severe failures after all "safety first". In which case the NEOs and done and the a220 can stay right where it is too.

It isn't about Boeing or their fan boys. But the Johnny come lately ignoramuses on this board seem to think that just because they seem it a safety issue it is. The regulatory agencies are doing what they have always done.

If there was a risk folks were confident of the type would be grounded. See 787. Just because two unrelated aircraft crashed within a couple of months of each other doesn't mean a damn thing.

There have been times in history where this has happened with other types. Only twice were the crashes in close time proximity related. The comet and dc10. The former doesn't even really count because that was really alarming given how little air travel there was then. That would be like every 4th max falling from the sky.

Everyone needs to look at this rationally:. This flight while it may have some similarities to Lion Air has MANY more differences:

The plane NEVER climbed out appropriately from the get go. I will bet good money the aircraft was misconfigured before it ever left the ground. It also reached a speed of over 380 it's at 8600 ft in level flight. That is not normal and has nothing to do with mcas.

Could mcas be part of this :. Yes. Is it root cause:. No IMHO. At worst is exacerbated a bad situation. But something was very very very wrong as soon as the AC left the ground. The fact no one can see this because of the MCAS blinders would have surprised me 10 years ago. In today's world though the lack of insight and understanding is par for the course around here.

SuperEighty wrote:

Well said.

I can see certainly see the advantages that MCAS has to offer. Had Air France 447 had MCAS or a similar system maybe that flight would have ended differently.

I hope the issue gets sorted out, I’m without a doubt a Boeing fan but can’t blame any airline for grounding their fleet of MAX’s. That said, I also can’t blame any other airline for not grounding theirs.

Looking at the crash site, it brings flashes of both PSA 1771 and UAL93. Extremely high vertical speed and an extremely low ground (forward) speed.


-SuperEighty

As has been said, MCAS wouldn't have saved AF447. That aircraft had a vastly more sophisticated form of both speed protection and alpha / stall protection, with a MUCH higher degree of redundancy (3 independent pitot systems and ADR / ADIRU computers) - the problem was that all pitots froze to varying degrees and the computers (correctly) disabled due to no reliable source of air speed data. This would cripple any aircraft, except ironically all newer build A330/340/380/350 which would display the BUSS scale once the pilot shuts off all 3 ADRs. I believe the 787 can switch to "AOA SPD" or something but I forget.

Still - even Airbus FCOM says (in event of complete airspeed info loss) above FL250 they should fly using pitch and thrust tables - regardless of BUSS, those pilots should have had zero issues recovering (or not losing control in the first place).

afriwing wrote:

trpmb6 wrote:

A320FlyGuy wrote:

The issue that I have with the certification process is the use of a DER - a designated engineering representative who is an employee of the airframe manufacturer yet has approval powers granted by the FAA - so it’s a case of the fox guarding the henhouse.

I don't think I need to remind you that your beloved Airbus product was designed in the exact same manner. Only difference is what Airbus calls it. If I recall its 300 or 400 signature authority. Something like that.

Literally every aerospace company works in this manner.

It doesn't matter if Airbus also uses a similar method. The method is flawd, period. You wouldn't let a student mark their own paper in an exam would you? .. no matter how brilliant or honest the examinee is, it's simply a conflict of interest.

It might be acceptable in limited circumstances, but not on a large scale, and most certainly not on such important additions to the flight systems. Yesterday on CNN a former NTSB boss admitted that the FAA allows Boeing to "self-certify" around 85% of their aircraft. I think that's too much for the sake of conflict of interest.

You guys are missing out on the big picture... the entire reason you DONT go with a clean sheet design is because of the proven safety record of a safe/reliable design. When you add to an already safe design you only need to have certain changes go through the certification process with the feds. It seems to me that the MCAS and its flight control inputs during abnormal scenarios is safe if the flight crew is properly trained and understands what is going on in said scenario. Leave it to a bunch of engineers to come up with something that’s way over complicated and useless and not think about the fact that it will crash the airplane if the human interaction is not on point and A-) B-) C-) D. Any crew operating a MAX should be reading and memorizing what to do in this situation.

A320FlyGuy wrote:

I’m not on the verge of accusing anyone of anything - although you are on the verge of getting a tad defensive over a simple comment. The DER system is flawed - not the people who are DERs. That’s not my opinion, that is the opinion of US Government Accountability Office who authored a report stating that the FAA needed to both strengthen its oversight of the program and increase the checks and a balances in the system due to the dual mandate that places employees in a position that is a conflict of interest.

DERs are not perfect - the DER that signed off on DC-10 Ship 29 having received cargo door modifications signed off and stamped the paperwork that the door had been modified and...shock of shocks...it wasn’t. That error cost over 300 people their lives. Boeing has had a documented history of issues with DERs at the Ducommon plant that was manufacturing fuselages for the 737 of documenting work being performed that was not completed, certifying parts as airworthy that were not and so on.

Clearly you are in the camp of Boeing can do no wrong - and you have issues with the fact I prefer Airbus. Frankly, I don’t care....Airliners.net has this wonderful little “foe” feature that prevents me from seeing your posts and you from seeing mine...I suggest you use it!

I am not in the camp that Boeing can do no wrong - I'm not even associated with them. If you feel the need to Foe me go for it. Won't bother me. The fact is there are many existing layers of oversight. The airplanes are safe as far as I'm concerned. Ducommun does not manufacture 737 fuselages. So not even sure what you're talking about there.

You didn't address my key point. The DER system is something all aircraft companies across the industry use. If it's good enough for Airbus it's good enough for Boeing.

trpmb6 wrote:

Starlionblue wrote:

Bobloblaw wrote:

For everyone saying Boeing should have made a clean sheet design to replace the 737, do you realize Boeing didn’t and doesn’t have the resources for a 737 replacement AND the 787??? It was one of the other. Clean sheet 737 replacement means no 787, giving away the market to the A350.. btw same thing with Airbus. Either 320 replacement Or 350, both cannot be built.

In context, it sounds as if you are saying that Boeing could not afford a clean sheet replacement, and thus they were forced to go with a stopgap involving dodgy design compromises... And this is fine?

If it takes $5bn, it takes $5bn.

At the end of the day you have to define what clean sheet is. All airplane designs are just derivatives of some other aircraft before it. They are all design evolutions.

It's amazing how just a few weeks ago we had people talking about how Airbus should do this or that to the A321 to compete with some hypothetical Boeing 797. Guarantee parts on the 797 will be common to other things Boeing has done. It's done for a myriad of reasons because certifying new stuff takes time and is costly.

Some material systems were developed 50+ years ago and we still use them because they are tried and true.

So seriously people, stop with the whole "slapping a bandaid" on it type of discussion. It's a misrepresentation of what really happens in the design and certification process.

I disagree. The A320 was arguably the most clean sheet design in postwar history, apart perhaps from Concorde. It was a massive departure from previous designs. The 737 was not.

More importantly, a FBW architecture allows tweaks in software. A cable and pulley architecture presents issues in this respect. If the 737 had a FBW architecture at its core and from its original design, an increase in mass and thrust would have been an eminently manageable problem.

Trin wrote:

estorilm wrote:

Per Boeing's press release this morning, regarding a software update to MCAS in the near future...
"...The enhanced flight control law incorporates angle of attack (AOA) inputs, limits stabilizer trim commands in response to an erroneous angle of attack reading, and provides a limit to the stabilizer command in order to retain elevator authority."

IMHO it's absolutely infuriating (regardless of its impact on either crash) that they had the ability to add these COMMON SENSE modifications to the MCAS system in a few months, yet launched the aircraft without them (and presumably would have never added them anyways). MAJOR shortcuts by Boeing here, or just complete and utter lack of common sense incorporating even the smallest form of FBW (yes I know 777/787 are FBW).

We basically knew all of this, but casually hearing it from Boeing (and the assumption of an immediate AD) kinda pisses me off.


edit: If those features/rules had been developed parallel to the MAX design/development it probably wouldn't have added a single day to the program.

I'm with you. Boeing's statement from this morning (and by extent the FAA's yesterday) makes my blood boil. Average Joe flyer will of course read these statements and think "Oh good - the authorities are doing something - we are so glad and lucky to have these bodies that oversee!" - but you and I know all too well that this entire matter really needs looked at the other way around. The ONLY reason these modifications are necessary is because Boeing designed the 737MAX to the lowest common denominator w/r/t certification. The fact that the MCAS was needed to be bolted on in ORDER TO BE CERTIFIED just screams of a disaster waiting to happen.

And of course there are very few (if any) 737NAX sims out there - because the whole idea was that this "new" plane could masquerade as a 737 and no additional/new type training would be needed by those expected to fly the thing.

Makes me so mad.

Does it make you just as mad to know mcas was on the NG BUT CALLED SOMETHING DIFFERENT? The auto trim system has been on the AC for decades. They just changed the name and tweaked the parameters. It isn't something "bolted on". It was given more authority and activates in additional situations as REQUIRED BY FAA rules. You understand that runaway stab trim has been in the 737 manual for decades and that the procedure for that is the same as MCAS.

The differences between the two types are such that 30 minutes of course time should cover it. You do realize the MCAS system only covers a small part of the flight envelope and that for most conditions the max flies pretty similarly to the NG.

The UK CAA has followed suit

https://www.caa.co.uk/News/Boeing-737-MAX-Aircraft/

http://news.sky.com/story/boeing-to-iss ... r-11662753

The UK-CAA has now grounded the B737max8

A320FlyGuy wrote:

Bobloblaw wrote:

For everyone saying Boeing should have made a clean sheet design to replace the 737, do you realize Boeing didn’t and doesn’t have the resources for a 737 replacement AND the 787??? It was one of the other. Clean sheet 737 replacement means no 787, giving away the market to the A350.. btw same thing with Airbus. Either 320 replacement Or 350, both cannot be built.

Your logic is a tad flawed here:

With Boeing:

The 737 should have been replaced as it is the volume leader - there is a larger market for single aisle aircraft like the 737 and it should be the focus of the company’s developement resources. Instead of doing a full clean sheet design and creating the 787, it would have made more sense to invest the funds in the 737 replacement and create a 767MAX. Funds that were wasted on the 747-8 could and should have been directed to the 737 since it is the only single aisle aircraft model still in production at Boeing and there is very healthy demand.

With Airbus:

The A320 being a newer design in comparison to the 737 has greater development potential and a clean sheet replacement was not as pressing - Also, Airbus began a program in 2006 known as the A320 Enhanced - a series of improvements that would deliver a 4-6% increase in efficiency. The A320 has benefitted from this program of continuous improvement with incremental modifications and improvements. Also, the A320 benefits from having a very efficient airframe that is now dependent on improvements in engine technology to better the performance of the aircraft.

Airlines have clearly responded to the A320neo as being a superior alternative to the 737MAX based on sales - Airbus has a healthy 1,350 aircraft lead over the 737MAX in terms of sales.

They pushed the design to compete with the A320 and A321 and the 737 was never meant to be that large. They literally crammed those engine in there. Look at the landing gear and how much they spent on design for the max 10’The A320/321 has room under the wings for larger engines. This is a direct result of the gap they have between the 737 and the 787. In my humble opinion you can only push a design so far.

estorilm wrote:

Per Boeing's press release this morning, regarding a software update to MCAS in the near future...
"...The enhanced flight control law incorporates angle of attack (AOA) inputs, limits stabilizer trim commands in response to an erroneous angle of attack reading, and provides a limit to the stabilizer command in order to retain elevator authority."

IMHO it's absolutely infuriating (regardless of its impact on either crash) that they had the ability to add these COMMON SENSE modifications to the MCAS system in a few months, yet launched the aircraft without them (and presumably would have never added them anyways). MAJOR shortcuts by Boeing here, or just complete and utter lack of common sense incorporating even the smallest form of FBW (yes I know 777/787 are FBW).

We basically knew all of this, but casually hearing it from Boeing (and the assumption of an immediate AD) kinda pisses me off.


edit: If those features/rules had been developed parallel to the MAX design/development it probably wouldn't have added a single day to the program.

Isn't it even worse seeing Boeing confirm they screwed up? They cut corners on common sense. The question is... was this an oversight or did they do it by accident?

Completely rediculous.

The only thing they didn't do is say... "Yep, we screwed up and did not have redundant data sources or common sense while design MCAS."

And for those that did not follow the lion air thread... part of the certification process is that there HAS TO BE redundancy.

afriwing wrote:

http://news.sky.com/story/boeing-to-issue-software-update-to-make-737-max-safer-11662753

The UK-CAA has now grounded the B737max8

Good for them!

UK just banned the MAX from UK airspace / airports

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47536502

SomebodyInTLS wrote:

scbriml wrote:

Many people in these threads are complaining that aviation authorities around the World are overreacting and are unjustified in grounding the 737MAX. How many people would have to die in how many more crashes before they (grudgingly) admit that maybe grounding the plane is a good idea and justified?

To answer completely honestly, I would say two similar accidents in short time could still be unlucky coincidence - although perfectly reasonable for people to suspect a potential link and demand a temporary grounding while the authorities compare notes... if it quickly becomes obvious that they are not connected then the grounding should be lifted ASAP.

If there were a third similar incident within a few months then I don't think anyone would argue against a full long-term grounding pending a thorough investigation and fix.

SomebodyInTLS you make a very sane and rational point without all of the "how many people have to die" bs that some hysterical people are shouting.

You are correct that if there is a third accident in a reasonably short period of time then yes, ground each and every one immediately. But at this point, we have no way of knowing if the two crashes are even related, Too early at this point to ground the entire fleet.

I do believe however that the 737s time is coming to an end. Boeing needs to step up with the clean sheet design.

osiris30 wrote:

Trin wrote:

estorilm wrote:

Per Boeing's press release this morning, regarding a software update to MCAS in the near future...
"...The enhanced flight control law incorporates angle of attack (AOA) inputs, limits stabilizer trim commands in response to an erroneous angle of attack reading, and provides a limit to the stabilizer command in order to retain elevator authority."

IMHO it's absolutely infuriating (regardless of its impact on either crash) that they had the ability to add these COMMON SENSE modifications to the MCAS system in a few months, yet launched the aircraft without them (and presumably would have never added them anyways). MAJOR shortcuts by Boeing here, or just complete and utter lack of common sense incorporating even the smallest form of FBW (yes I know 777/787 are FBW).

We basically knew all of this, but casually hearing it from Boeing (and the assumption of an immediate AD) kinda pisses me off.


edit: If those features/rules had been developed parallel to the MAX design/development it probably wouldn't have added a single day to the program.

I'm with you. Boeing's statement from this morning (and by extent the FAA's yesterday) makes my blood boil. Average Joe flyer will of course read these statements and think "Oh good - the authorities are doing something - we are so glad and lucky to have these bodies that oversee!" - but you and I know all too well that this entire matter really needs looked at the other way around. The ONLY reason these modifications are necessary is because Boeing designed the 737MAX to the lowest common denominator w/r/t certification. The fact that the MCAS was needed to be bolted on in ORDER TO BE CERTIFIED just screams of a disaster waiting to happen.

And of course there are very few (if any) 737NAX sims out there - because the whole idea was that this "new" plane could masquerade as a 737 and no additional/new type training would be needed by those expected to fly the thing.

Makes me so mad.

Does it make you just as mad to know mcas was on the NG BUT CALLED SOMETHING DIFFERENT? The auto trim system has been on the AC for decades. They just changed the name and tweaked the parameters. It isn't something "bolted on". It was given more authority and activates in additional situations as REQUIRED BY FAA rules. You understand that runaway stab trim has been in the 737 manual for decades and that the procedure for that is the same as MCAS.

The differences between the two types are such that 30 minutes of course time should cover it. You do realize the MCAS system only covers a small part of the flight envelope and that for most conditions the max flies pretty similarly to the NG.

MCAS is not auto trim. :facepalm: MCAS was a required software fix to over ride the envelope due to the engines shifting. MCAS is in addition to.

Again, issue is not MCAS itself... but MCAS activated itself based on faulty data and A SINGLE DATA SOURCE! ZERO REDUNDANCY!

A320FlyGuy wrote:

afriwing wrote:

trpmb6 wrote:

I don't think I need to remind you that your beloved Airbus product was designed in the exact same manner. Only difference is what Airbus calls it. If I recall its 300 or 400 signature authority. Something like that.

Literally every aerospace company works in this manner.

It doesn't matter if Airbus also uses a similar method. The method is flawd, period. You wouldn't let a student mark their own paper in an exam would you? .. no matter how brilliant or honest the examinee is, it's simply a conflict of interest.

It might be acceptable in limited circumstances, but not on a large scale, and most certainly not on such important additions to the flight systems. Yesterday on CNN a former NTSB boss admitted that the FAA allows Boeing to "self-certify" around 85% of their aircraft. I think that's too much for the sake of conflict of interest.

Thank-You for mentioning that interview and the statements regarding the DER issue - it’s nice to know that I’m not the only one who finds flaws in allowing the manufacturer to inspect and certify their own product.

One book that is extremely interesting and is for the most part extremely accurate is “The Sporty Game”. It covers all aspects of the birth and development of the A300, DC-10 and L-1011 as well as to a lesser extent the 747. It goes into extensive detail of the DER system and it’s flawed execution.

You are right. Airbus does it too. Probably explains why their flight control computers randomly dive their aircraft thousands of feet uncommanded a few times every every year.

Haven't seen you calling for a grounding there even though it has been happening for years....

How will these airlines/countries grounding the MAX unground them? I mean you've got so many unknowns about why, with so many circumstantial facts that would say "ground them all!" and yet also "why the heck would you ground any of them?"

What is the proof sought that would say "OK, things are good again?" Or is this all a series of PR moves and once it all blows over suddenly the groundings will be lifted?

Starlionblue wrote:

trpmb6 wrote:

Starlionblue wrote:

In context, it sounds as if you are saying that Boeing could not afford a clean sheet replacement, and thus they were forced to go with a stopgap involving dodgy design compromises... And this is fine?

If it takes $5bn, it takes $5bn.

At the end of the day you have to define what clean sheet is. All airplane designs are just derivatives of some other aircraft before it. They are all design evolutions.

It's amazing how just a few weeks ago we had people talking about how Airbus should do this or that to the A321 to compete with some hypothetical Boeing 797. Guarantee parts on the 797 will be common to other things Boeing has done. It's done for a myriad of reasons because certifying new stuff takes time and is costly.

Some material systems were developed 50+ years ago and we still use them because they are tried and true.

So seriously people, stop with the whole "slapping a bandaid" on it type of discussion. It's a misrepresentation of what really happens in the design and certification process.

I disagree. The A320 was arguably the most clean sheet design in postwar history, apart perhaps from Concorde. It was a massive departure from previous designs. The 737 was not.

More importantly, a FBW architecture allows tweaks in software. A cable and pulley architecture presents issues in this respect. If the 737 had a FBW architecture at its core and from its original design, an increase in mass and thrust would have been an eminently manageable problem.

I understand what you're saying starlion but it's splitting hairs. In the design process we rely on as much previous design as possible. All the way down to the type of rivets used. When introducing a new "design" element you have to basically "buy" your way onto the aircraft. It's precisely this attitude that has led to massive improvements in reliability.

A320FlyGuy wrote:

their safety records were downright abysmal:
Boeing 707:
1962:
4 crashes in 8 months with a total of 435 fatalities

Boeing 727:
1965 (First Year of Service)
3 crashes in 87 days with a total of 131 fatalities

Not sure if looking back 50-60 years is really helpful in that context. Back at that time, cars were less safe, people died from all kinds of diseases that nowadays are no longer an issue etc. etc. I am not saying the comparison is as unhelpful as a comparison to "Those Magnificent Men in Their Flying Machines" would be but it comes pretty close...

osiris30 wrote:

Trin wrote:

I'm with you. Boeing's statement from this morning (and by extent the FAA's yesterday) makes my blood boil. Average Joe flyer will of course read these statements and think "Oh good - the authorities are doing something - we are so glad and lucky to have these bodies that oversee!" - but you and I know all too well that this entire matter really needs looked at the other way around. The ONLY reason these modifications are necessary is because Boeing designed the 737MAX to the lowest common denominator w/r/t certification. The fact that the MCAS was needed to be bolted on in ORDER TO BE CERTIFIED just screams of a disaster waiting to happen.

And of course there are very few (if any) 737NAX sims out there - because the whole idea was that this "new" plane could masquerade as a 737 and no additional/new type training would be needed by those expected to fly the thing.

Makes me so mad.

Does it make you just as mad to know mcas was on the NG BUT CALLED SOMETHING DIFFERENT? The auto trim system has been on the AC for decades. They just changed the name and tweaked the parameters. It isn't something "bolted on". It was given more authority and activates in additional situations as REQUIRED BY FAA rules. You understand that runaway stab trim has been in the 737 manual for decades and that the procedure for that is the same as MCAS.

The differences between the two types are such that 30 minutes of course time should cover it. You do realize the MCAS system only covers a small part of the flight envelope and that for most conditions the max flies pretty similarly to the NG.

HUGE misconception here. Just because they spin the same little wheels doesn't make them the same. It wasn't called something different at all - the MAX has the same speed / auto trim system (STS) IN ADDITION TO MCAS.

They operate in completely different ways. An NG pilot familiar with STS will NOT be expecting MCAS-type behavior at any point. I assume you've looked at the control graphs from Lion where the system repeatedly fought the pilot - sure he should have disabled it, but my point is that such an action is not something that NG's auto trim has EVER done, nor could do. The runaway action isn't what is likely confusing, it's the 5 second delay between reactivation, which is atypical of a runaway trim situation and would be confusing. Keep in mind at the time of the Lion Air crash, there WAS no training, and the system wasn't even in FCOM. It's easy for us to sit here and say "hit the damn switch", but IMO it would have been confusing given the situation they were in.

It wasn't just "required by FAA rules" - it was required because the aircraft was inherently (or dangerously) unstable vs. NG in power-on stall or pre-stall situations. Also, that's NO BUENO in my book (and regardless of MCAS, could have been a contributing factor to this crash).

estorilm wrote:

Per Boeing's press release this morning, regarding a software update to MCAS in the near future...
[i]"...The enhanced flight control law incorporates angle of attack (AOA) inputs, limits stabilizer trim commands in response to an erroneous angle of attack reading, and provides a limit to the stabilizer command in order to retain elevator authority."

I asked this question, and others, in the Lion thread. If the stab is trimmed fully nose down, can the elevators still retain authority to change pitch? The question was never answered as far as I remember.

Now, the FAA are changing the logic in MCAS to put a limit on how much the stab can be trimmed, which in itself is good.

trpmb6 wrote:

At the end of the day... Should not every single pilot flying on a Max know about the MCAS at this point and how to cut off the trim as soon as it's acting up? Surely this can not be an issue anymore. Hell, next time I'm on a max I might just ask if they recall their memory items and to hit the trim cutoff switch during uncomannded runaway trim.

This. Even IF the MCAS situation is the issue, there's a known condition and a known procedure. Just like any other known condition and known procedure.

MaksFly wrote:

estorilm wrote:

Per Boeing's press release this morning, regarding a software update to MCAS in the near future...
"...The enhanced flight control law incorporates angle of attack (AOA) inputs, limits stabilizer trim commands in response to an erroneous angle of attack reading, and provides a limit to the stabilizer command in order to retain elevator authority."

IMHO it's absolutely infuriating (regardless of its impact on either crash) that they had the ability to add these COMMON SENSE modifications to the MCAS system in a few months, yet launched the aircraft without them (and presumably would have never added them anyways). MAJOR shortcuts by Boeing here, or just complete and utter lack of common sense incorporating even the smallest form of FBW (yes I know 777/787 are FBW).

We basically knew all of this, but casually hearing it from Boeing (and the assumption of an immediate AD) kinda pisses me off.


edit: If those features/rules had been developed parallel to the MAX design/development it probably wouldn't have added a single day to the program.

Isn't it even worse seeing Boeing confirm they screwed up? They cut corners on common sense. The question is... was this an oversight or did they do it by accident?

Completely rediculous.

The only thing they didn't do is say... "Yep, we screwed up and did not have redundant data sources or common sense while design MCAS."

And for those that did not follow the lion air thread... part of the certification process is that there HAS TO BE redundancy.

As far as oversight vs. accidental, eh.. they have some brilliant engineers over there. We've seen situations like this before where a few people voiced concerns and were silenced, and I'd HAVE to imagine this was the case here. I don't have 1/100th the knowledge or talent some of those people have, yet it was immediately obvious to me that one or two failures or faults could cause this thing to actually make control inputs by itself.

ACCS300 wrote:

UK just banned the MAX from UK airspace / airports

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47536502

Wow - not sure how much of a real-world impact that'll have, but it will certainly get a LOT of press and increase pressure on some additional details ASAP.

osiris30 wrote:

Trin wrote:

estorilm wrote:

Per Boeing's press release this morning, regarding a software update to MCAS in the near future...
"...The enhanced flight control law incorporates angle of attack (AOA) inputs, limits stabilizer trim commands in response to an erroneous angle of attack reading, and provides a limit to the stabilizer command in order to retain elevator authority."

IMHO it's absolutely infuriating (regardless of its impact on either crash) that they had the ability to add these COMMON SENSE modifications to the MCAS system in a few months, yet launched the aircraft without them (and presumably would have never added them anyways). MAJOR shortcuts by Boeing here, or just complete and utter lack of common sense incorporating even the smallest form of FBW (yes I know 777/787 are FBW).

We basically knew all of this, but casually hearing it from Boeing (and the assumption of an immediate AD) kinda pisses me off.


edit: If those features/rules had been developed parallel to the MAX design/development it probably wouldn't have added a single day to the program.

I'm with you. Boeing's statement from this morning (and by extent the FAA's yesterday) makes my blood boil. Average Joe flyer will of course read these statements and think "Oh good - the authorities are doing something - we are so glad and lucky to have these bodies that oversee!" - but you and I know all too well that this entire matter really needs looked at the other way around. The ONLY reason these modifications are necessary is because Boeing designed the 737MAX to the lowest common denominator w/r/t certification. The fact that the MCAS was needed to be bolted on in ORDER TO BE CERTIFIED just screams of a disaster waiting to happen.

And of course there are very few (if any) 737NAX sims out there - because the whole idea was that this "new" plane could masquerade as a 737 and no additional/new type training would be needed by those expected to fly the thing.

Makes me so mad.

Does it make you just as mad to know mcas was on the NG BUT CALLED SOMETHING DIFFERENT? The auto trim system has been on the AC for decades. They just changed the name and tweaked the parameters. It isn't something "bolted on". It was given more authority and activates in additional situations as REQUIRED BY FAA rules. You understand that runaway stab trim has been in the 737 manual for decades and that the procedure for that is the same as MCAS.

The differences between the two types are such that 30 minutes of course time should cover it. You do realize the MCAS system only covers a small part of the flight envelope and that for most conditions the max flies pretty similarly to the NG.

And yet we didn't have planes falling out of the sky due to MCAS meddling with pilots flying.

YES, I am aware that MCAS (whatever it was named) has been on previous models, and YES I am aware that MCAS only engages when a given set of parameters are met. All of those things are irrelevant w/r/t the shortcomings of the design systems of the MCAS on the 737MAX. Just look at Lion Air's FR24 data graphing and tell me that THAT is how an airplane should be handling. It was fighting the pilots from the get-go and (due to the questionable certification process of the MAX) the crew had not received enough (if any) differences training to understand what it was doing. And of course they had no INVALID-AOA data on the headsup display so their entire time was taken up with working checklists to try and unravel just WHAT the plane was doing and WHY......

If you are trying to assert that all of the above is irrelevant because "technically MCAS has been around for decades therefore the MAX is inherently OK" then I'm afraid I have to respectfully disagree with you.

(EDIT: Personally, I would like to know if Boeing ever did any simulation of how a 737MAX would behave with MCAS activated when autopilot is off and the ONE (and only) air reference it uses is invalidated.)

pugman211 wrote:

estorilm wrote:

Per Boeing's press release this morning, regarding a software update to MCAS in the near future...
[i]"...The enhanced flight control law incorporates angle of attack (AOA) inputs, limits stabilizer trim commands in response to an erroneous angle of attack reading, and provides a limit to the stabilizer command in order to retain elevator authority."

I asked this question, and others, in the Lion thread. If the stab is trimmed fully nose down, can the elevators still retain authority to change pitch? The question was never answered as far as I remember.

Now, the FAA are changing the logic in MCAS to put a limit on how much the stab can be trimmed, which in itself is good.

I actually remember seeing your post - I think someone answered similar to what I was going to say. From what I recall, there would be basically no chance (hypothetically, from an aerodynamic point of view.)

I think the other poster's visualization of both pilots with their feet up using their legs to pull back is likely accurate.

I'm not sure it got that far though, I think based on the pitch rate and the 5 second delays, it might take a while to get to that extreme.

I didn't really look into as much of the Lion Air data as I probably should have - good question though.

GalaxyFlyer wrote:

Interesting,

https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=10216695685377457&id=1620931826&anchor_composer=false

Yeah that popped up on my feed yesterday. He's taken a STARK and almost awkward stance on this one, practically refusing to say the word "Boeing" - kinda has me scratching my head. Very unusual for him to jump on crew factors like that (at least at this phase of the investigation).

TheOldDude wrote:

trpmb6 wrote:

At the end of the day... Should not every single pilot flying on a Max know about the MCAS at this point and how to cut off the trim as soon as it's acting up? Surely this can not be an issue anymore. Hell, next time I'm on a max I might just ask if they recall their memory items and to hit the trim cutoff switch during uncomannded runaway trim.

This. Even IF the MCAS situation is the issue, there's a known condition and a known procedure. Just like any other known condition and known procedure.

There is still a problem. In which category does MCAS fall?

Either MCAS is an aid to the pilot. Then he must be able to switch it off immediately if causes problems. The flight must be able to continue safely without MCAS. Also, MCAS should then have an obvious way of shutting it down - not via the runaway trim procedure, which also disables automatic stab trim.

Otherwise, MCAS is a technology that guarantees the safe operation of the 737 MAX. Then, it should not, under any conceivable circumstance, cause problems and put people into peril. Then, MCAS should come with a placard that reads "Enter the correct code and kill two rabid lions before you can switch me off."

The "known procedure" doesn't really solve the problem, as long as the FAA doesn't decide in which category MCAS falls.


David

flyingturtle wrote:

TheOldDude wrote:

trpmb6 wrote:

At the end of the day... Should not every single pilot flying on a Max know about the MCAS at this point and how to cut off the trim as soon as it's acting up? Surely this can not be an issue anymore. Hell, next time I'm on a max I might just ask if they recall their memory items and to hit the trim cutoff switch during uncomannded runaway trim.

This. Even IF the MCAS situation is the issue, there's a known condition and a known procedure. Just like any other known condition and known procedure.

There is still a problem. In which category does MCAS fall?

Either MCAS is an aid to the pilot. Then he must be able to switch it off immediately if causes problems. The flight must be able to continue safely without MCAS. Also, MCAS should then have an obvious way of shutting it down - not via the runaway trim procedure, which also disables automatic stab trim.

Otherwise, MCAS is a technology that guarantees the safe operation of the 737 MAX. Then, it should not, under any conceivable circumstance, cause problems and put people into peril. Then, MCAS should come with a placard that reads "Enter the correct code and kill two rabid lions before you can switch me off."

The "known procedure" doesn't really solve the problem, as long as the FAA doesn't decide in which category MCAS falls.


David

Why limit the universe to two categories? Seems like a straw man argument to me.

estorilm wrote:

It wasn't just "required by FAA rules" - it was required because the aircraft was inherently (or dangerously) unstable vs. NG in power-on stall or pre-stall situations. Also, that's NO BUENO in my book (and regardless of MCAS, could have been a contributing factor to this crash).

I think this is the crux of the decisions around the world to ground this aircraft. The plane is inherently unstable due to changes in the design from previous versions and the software fix is not 100% reliable. This much seems to have been acknowledged by the industry.

Who will have faith in any further fixes? I have always loved flying in the 737 as a passenger and have always felt it was about the safest commercial airliner. I don't think I will ever fly in a 737 MAX. I don't think I will have the option.

TheOldDude wrote:

Why limit the universe to two categories? Seems like a straw man argument to me.

It's called the "either/or fallacy" (aka the fallacy of the excluded middle).

Lot of that going on around here.

TheOldDude wrote:

Even IF the MCAS situation is the issue, there's a known condition and a known procedure. Just like any other known condition and known procedure.

I'll say it again - the source of the bad AoA data in the Lion Air case has still not been established. Several corrective actions were taken by maintenance.

Design screw ups aside, it's quite possible that MCAS activation was just the symptom of something else in the avionics.

TheOldDude wrote:

Why limit the universe to two categories? Seems like a straw man argument to me.

In which, third, category would MCAS fall, otherwise?

Something that is just a useful aid sometimes, and a necessary safety at other times? And you need to make a split-second decision on whether MCAS is working for you, or against you?


David

osiris30 wrote:

Using your logic every time there is a crash we should ground the type until the report. So right now 767s and 737maxes would be grounded. The 777 would be grounded (mh370). The 330s would have been out of the air for quite a while. And do we stop there or do we ground for near crashes and severe failures after all "safety first". In which case the NEOs and done and the a220 can stay right where it is too.

Don't try to put words in my mouth, please, I've never said anything like that. You know perfectly well the difference between the current situation with the MAX and what you just listed, I don't need to tell you that. Just a weak attempt to make fun of people who actually think human life is worth more than short-term corporate profits.

So the UK-CAA grounded MAX as well? Wow. That hits a lot of operators. Soon the US will be the only country in the world where the MAX still keeps on flying - there's some irony right there. Which country was again a third world country?

Anyway, UK-CAA made the following statement:
"(We have) been closely monitoring the situation, however, as we do not currently have sufficient information from the flight data recorder we have, as a precautionary measure, issued instructions to stop any commercial passenger flights from any operator arriving, departing or overflying UK airspace."


Funny enough, that's not really far away from what I was saying, or many others on this forum. Actually makes common sense doesn't it? Also the affected airlines (especially TUI and Norwegian in this case) play their cards perfectly right, they don't complain about the fearmongering, clueless kneejerk-decision by the CAA, instead they state that safety comes first, they take 100% of the PR value in this.

This is how civilized countries handle such matters. Nice one.

journeyperson wrote:

estorilm wrote:

It wasn't just "required by FAA rules" - it was required because the aircraft was inherently (or dangerously) unstable vs. NG in power-on stall or pre-stall situations. Also, that's NO BUENO in my book (and regardless of MCAS, could have been a contributing factor to this crash).

I think this is the crux of the decisions around the world to ground this aircraft. The plane is inherently unstable due to changes in the design from previous versions and the software fix is not 100% reliable. This much seems to have been acknowledged by the industry.

Who will have faith in any further fixes? I have always loved flying in the 737 as a passenger and have always felt it was about the safest commercial airliner. I don't think I will ever fly in a 737 MAX. I don't think I will have the option.

Yeah - I mean I'm not too worried about the aircraft itself, I just REALLY REALLY wish I knew exactly what the thing does in situations where they decided MCAS was required. I'm way more curious about that lately than I am about the MCAS system being at fault. It would be nice to know how the aircraft itself naturally flies and what it's trying to do.

tistpaa727 wrote:

A320FlyGuy wrote:

I would love to know more about the back room discussions that went on between Boeing and the FAA pertaining to the 737 MAX8 -

Is it just the FAA that is on the hook here or should we also be calling out the other regulatory bodies in other parts of the world that also allowed the certification process? I agree, grandfathering a plane that is vastly different to what was originally certified 51 years ago makes absolutely no sense unless you truly believe the NG and MAX are just "warmed over" derivatives - which they are not. How is it that no regulatory agency around the world has put up a wall to this practice? They all are culpable.

EASA initially resisted extension of common type certificate. And caved later. It's a good question about how much we can trust the regulators to protect the public's interests.

It would be very interesting to understand rationale and approach to how MCAS and flight controls with MCAS using single source air data was approved for certification...

Is Boeing becoming like US car makers? Building new products that are so far behind technological progress that buyers turn towards foreign makers who make much better and cheaper stuff. Is the 737 MAX the SUV of short-haul?

Or maybe it is that RAM truck with the oversized wheels... I wonder what the Boeing CEO drives.

estorilm wrote:

Per Boeing's press release this morning, regarding a software update to MCAS in the near future...
"...The enhanced flight control law incorporates angle of attack (AOA) inputs, limits stabilizer trim commands in response to an erroneous angle of attack reading, and provides a limit to the stabilizer command in order to retain elevator authority."

IMHO it's absolutely infuriating (regardless of its impact on either crash) that they had the ability to add these COMMON SENSE modifications to the MCAS system in a few months, yet launched the aircraft without them (and presumably would have never added them anyways). MAJOR shortcuts by Boeing here, or just complete and utter lack of common sense incorporating even the smallest form of FBW (yes I know 777/787 are FBW).

We basically knew all of this, but casually hearing it from Boeing (and the assumption of an immediate AD) kinda pisses me off.


edit: If those features/rules had been developed parallel to the MAX design/development it probably wouldn't have added a single day to the program.

Man is discovery going to be interesting during the coming lawsuits.....

We'll get to find out in due course what exactly Boeing and the FAA knew and what risks they passed over.

Curiousflyer wrote:

Is Boeing becoming like US car makers? Building new products that are so far behind technological progress that buyers turn towards foreign makers who make much better and cheaper stuff. Is the 737 MAX the SUV of short-haul?

Really????
Tesla????

ytz wrote:

estorilm wrote:

Per Boeing's press release this morning, regarding a software update to MCAS in the near future...
"...The enhanced flight control law incorporates angle of attack (AOA) inputs, limits stabilizer trim commands in response to an erroneous angle of attack reading, and provides a limit to the stabilizer command in order to retain elevator authority."

IMHO it's absolutely infuriating (regardless of its impact on either crash) that they had the ability to add these COMMON SENSE modifications to the MCAS system in a few months, yet launched the aircraft without them (and presumably would have never added them anyways). MAJOR shortcuts by Boeing here, or just complete and utter lack of common sense incorporating even the smallest form of FBW (yes I know 777/787 are FBW).

We basically knew all of this, but casually hearing it from Boeing (and the assumption of an immediate AD) kinda pisses me off.


edit: If those features/rules had been developed parallel to the MAX design/development it probably wouldn't have added a single day to the program.

Man is discovery going to be interesting during the coming lawsuits.....

We'll get to find out in due course what exactly Boeing and the FAA knew and what risks they passed over.

Yep, indeed. And let them both burn for their shortcuts, putting profit and stock price above safety. The damage to the Boeing brand will no doubt impact sales of other AC too.