PlanesNTrains wrote:downdata wrote:Per Bloomberg: Ethiopia wanted to send the flight-data and cockpit-voice recorders to the UK AAIB instead of NTSB in the US
Makes sense to me, and probably the best decision for everybody.hamiltondaniel wrote:I'm going to officially proclaim myself the logic checker of this thread. Somebody needs to.
Nice knowing ya.slider wrote:trpmb6 wrote:
Furthermore, the market dictated the development of the MAX not the other way around. It's not like Boeing went out and said, here's the max, take it or leave it. They developed what the market wanted. The market didn't want to wait for a new single aisle aircraft and it didn't want to pay the sticker price of a new single aisle aircraft.
I utterly disagree. They capitulated to the "market" in the sense they gave in to WN when the NG was being developed in the first place. Boeing has a history of allowing far too much latitude in carriers' ordering options. When the NG was launched, they gave in to WN for their "need" to have type commonality, and the die was cast...and it shouldn't have been. As a consequence, design took a back seat to sales--globally. And that continues today because they perpetuated an aging airframe with new engines even then.
Now, the development costs for a modified variant are obviously much less, so we all understand Boeing's approach, but it remains questionable as to whether they ought to have made a clean sheet decision even then, even considering the monster development to do so. IF--and I say this cautiously--this ET302 accident is related to the MCAS system, there are some roots to follow back and that would be even more tragic. A bridge too far, Boeing. IF that's the case.
*Sidenote....has anyone found bag data for this airplane yet? Load shift? Unlikely but a thought.
To be blunt, this is bullshit. If you are going to claim that a decision a quarter century ago to develop a 737 derivative that became a massive commercial success with an impeccable safety record is somehow responsible for the crashes we are discussing, then I think you've lost perspective.
Boeing had a decision to make in 2011 - clean sheet or re-engine. They chose re-engine. Within "re-engine" they had complete flexibility to spend as much or as little as they wanted to develop what became the MAX. That decision is entirely on their shoulders and is completely independent of the NG development. Yes, had they gone clean-sheet in the 90s then we wouldn't be having this discussion for obvious reasons, but that's irrelevant to reality. Reality is Boeing had options and the MAX is what they chose in 2011.
To blame anything in our current discussion on Boeing capitulating to WN back in the early 90's is simply gratuitous and self-serving.
Competitive pressures absolutely led Boeing to not do a clean sheet design. Now, I don't blame them entirely here given the cost of doing such a thing. But it's completely reasonable to say that WN's massive launch order for the NG led Boeing down that path. It's not bullshit at all. They got caught with their pants down, made the best of it (and believe me, I love the 737NG, make no mistake), but subsequent industry pressures forced their hand, I'm convinced. Hence, the 739, and, now, the MAX. It's a compromised design.
And you're making a gigantic leap of illogic (and putting words in my mouth) if you're conflating "massive commercial success with an impeccable safety record" and these crashes. But events sometimes do unfold over the span of years from seeds planted in the past.