XRAYretired
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 4:17 pm

PW100 wrote:
SomebodyInTLS wrote:
asdf wrote:

great solution
maybe B should be generously and provide additionally a three hour long ipad video training instead of the actual 90minutes one ........


are you serious? ;-)
IF this hardware design (instable in flight) is approveable AT ALL then definitely just with a specific type rating on the MAX


Well I'm serious in as much as the 737 has only ever had 2 sets of air data instruments and the "fix" should make it "as safe as the NG" (exactly what MCAS was supposed to do)... This is grandfathering in action! :)


If STS can handle rogue AoA sensor signal safely, why couldn't MCAS . . . ? Both steer the same electric trim motor.
Would the stretched limit (from 0.6 deg to 2.5 deg) be part of that reason?


Have I lost the plot?

Thought STS drives the electric trim motor on the basis of command from Auto Pilot (MCAS inhibited/Pilot Thumb Switch Inhibited) Or MCAS (AP OFF/Flaps UP/AOA high) Or Pilots Thumb Switch (AP OFF). So unreliable Airspeed/AOA potentially affects command from AP or MCAS.

Hence either AP or MCAS can command unexpected nose down.

Ray
 
AirFiero
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 4:17 pm

Trin wrote:
AirFiero wrote:
WSJ article on WN, AA and UAs decision not to ground the Max, initially...

https://www.wsj.com/articles/inside-u-s ... _lead_pos1

Edit, change link


It's behind a paywall. If you want others to read it you will have to quote pertinent sections on here.


I was afraid of that, sorry.

Here it is

Ask chief executives what an airline’s first responsibility is and most will quickly respond that it’s safety. But that industry norm was challenged last week by the Boeing 737 MAX.
The CEOs of Southwest, American and United decided to keep flying the plane after the second MAX 8 crash within five months. Three days after the March 10 crash in Ethiopia, after much of the rest of the world had ordered the plane grounded, the Federal Aviation Administration changed course and grounded Boeing’s new version of the 737 in the U.S.
What appeared to some as hesitation raised questions of whether potential revenue loss and schedule disruption were placed ahead of safety at Southwest, American and United.
One CEO, Gary Kelly of Southwest, talked to the Journal about the process he went through last week to keep flying even as many customers and some employees expressed fears about the plane. The choice, he says, was whether to disrupt flights out of an abundance of caution or continue based on conclusions from the airline’s internal safety team.
“The only real factor that we were thinking about was safety,” Mr. Kelly says. “And then No. 2 was to get our customers where they want to go.”
Top leaders at American, which has 24 MAX 8 jets, and United, which was flying 14 MAX 9 planes, declined interview requests. American did provide two safety officials to discuss the airline’s decision to keep flying.
All three airlines say their decisions were largely data-driven. They routinely download thousands of data points from new aircraft like the MAX, and some began new monitoring to track performance of sensors suspected of contributing to the Oct. 29 crash of Lion Air Flight 610 in Indonesia
The focus on data in aviation safety is seen as a major cause of improvement in the last decade or two.
But data don’t always capture the unknown, and just because an airplane hasn’t experienced a problem doesn’t mean it won’t have that problem in the future. Pilots routinely shut down systems suspected of malfunctioning and divert to the nearest airport or wait to take off until maintenance checks something. In aviation, there’s an adage: Better to be down here wishing you were up there than up there wishing you were down here.
In the case of the MAX, similarities between the crashes and other factors suggest some kind of problem. Boeing had identified deficiencies with its Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), new to the MAX, and was working on major software changes expected by the end of April.
Jim Hall, chair of the National Transportation Safety Board from 1994 to 2001, thinks Boeing and the FAA should have acted sooner to ground the plane. He says grounding by airlines would have been appropriate given the questions about MCAS, but not necessarily their responsibility.
“The prudent, responsible thing to do, if you actually put aviation safety first, would have been to ground the plane,” Mr. Hall says.
Financial questions didn’t come into consideration, all three airlines say.
Southwest’s Mr. Kelly says his internal, independent safety team was telling him that data collected from the MAX, which Southwest has been flying since 2017, showed no problem. (The airline flies 34 of those planes.)
And even if problems were to occur, Southwest pilots have been briefed on the system that was suspected of malfunctioning in both crashes and have routinely trained on steps to recover should the MAX’s computer mistakenly force the nose down. “These safety-management systems don’t speculate,” Mr. Kelly says
Southwest, which has the largest U.S. fleet of MAX jets, also completed installation earlier this year of warning lights in its MAX cockpits that alert pilots if the two angle-of-attack sensors disagree, a sign one is failing. A faulty angle-of-attack indicator is suspected of playing a role in the Lion Air crash.
But with many customers calling on the airline to change flights booked on the MAX and some employees nervous as well, factors beyond safety data did come into play. At the same time, Mr. Kelly says he was also influenced by the FAA’s insistence, up until Wednesday, that the plane was safe to fly.
“There’s a science to it. There’s also art and just compassion as well. Absolutely all of that needs to be factored in,” he says. The process, he adds, “worked as designed.”
At American, officials say the same two factors Southwest saw convinced Chief Executive Doug Parker to fly on: data showing no problems and confidence pilots could handle any problems.
American had also been studying its MAX 8 jets more closely after the Lion Air crash, increasing analysis of data from monitors installed on the angle-of-attack sensors and the horizontal stabilizer, the part of the tail that moves to point the nose of the plane up or down
No problems had shown up, says Neil Raaz, American’s director of flight safety. “We just didn’t see the indications that told us our airplanes were unsafe, and frankly, we still haven’t,” says Mr. Raaz, who is also a Boeing 737 captain and has U.S. Navy training in accident investigations.
But even if there are unknown problems with the MCAS system, American says it is confident pilots can recover because they train for similar problems. MCAS is supposed to push the nose of the plane down if it gets too high by moving the horizontal stabilizer, a panel used all the time to “trim” the airplane. The trim system keeps the plane level, or at a designated rate of climb or descent. The autopilot trims the airplane, or pilots can do it manually.
(Ethiopian Airlines has said its pilots had new training for 737 MAX planes after the crash in Indonesia.)
If the MCAS system malfunctions, pilots say the prescribed fix is to use manual trim to stabilize the plane, and then disconnect the trim system. There’s a cutoff switch on the center pedestal of the 737, not far from throttles, marked “Stab Trim.” Pilots routinely train to disconnect the automatic trim in the case of runaway trim with autopilot use.
 
cledaybuck
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 4:22 pm

astuteman wrote:
The prompt around the world appears to have been the satellite evidence which showed clear similarities between the crashes.
The difference around the world is that the rest of the world volunteered. Boeing and the FAA had to be instructed
The difference in timing may have been small. The difference in attitude to safety is vast.
That's the issue that is at the root of all this.
No diversions change that underlying fact.

Rgds

Is that true about the satellite data? Because the first time I heard that was when Canada grounded the airplane on Wednesday. Of course, you could read about the similarities from the FR24 data on a.net on Sunday. Maybe I am just cynical, but it seems the timing of the grounding by country generally followed a pattern of how detrimental the grounding would be to that country.
As we celebrate mediocrity, all the boys upstairs want to see, how much you'll pay for what you used to get for free.
 
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SomebodyInTLS
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 4:24 pm

PW100 wrote:
If STS can handle rogue AoA sensor signal safely, why couldn't MCAS . . . ? Both steer the same electric trim motor.
Would the stretched limit (from 0.6 deg to 2.5 deg) be part of that reason?


Without knowing in detail how STS works, I would assume it simply sets a trim level as a function mostlly of airspeed - and as airspeed data is only minorly influenced by angle of attack data that would result in small errors of trim which would stay constant with respect to where they should be.

MCAS on the other hand would - amidst unexpected stall warnings, stick shaker and other chaos - push the trim forward by quite a bit then stop... then do it again a few seconds later. Ad infinitum until hitting the stop or cut manually. Very different kettle of fish.
Last edited by SomebodyInTLS on Wed Mar 20, 2019 4:26 pm, edited 1 time in total.
"As with most things related to aircraft design, it's all about the trade-offs and much more nuanced than A.net likes to make out."
 
XRAYretired
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 4:24 pm

jollo wrote:
XRAYretired wrote:
For a dual channel control system in a control/monitor configuration, it is common to alternate channel in control for each flight leg for precisely the same reason.


WIederling wrote:
I've seen round robin switching of sensors or other things ( limit switches .. power supply what not ) only ever in systems where back up exists but would not be tested if the "front" thing is OK.


You are both right for dual channel designs (my emphasis in the quotes), i.e. where a backup channel is there to take over the task in case of an active channel failure.

But the AOA data feed to MCAS is not a dual channel design: there is no way to switch (automatically or manually) to the other sensor if the current active sensor fails. Pilots are not even aware which sensor is active: basically, it's random (for a given cycle). Besides, both sensors are always on: wear is identical, and "inactive" only means its data is being ignored, and will keep on being ignored until next cycle.

SomebodyInTLS wrote:
IIRC it's because the STS (speed trim) has been tied to alternating port/starboard instruments since the NG.
What I *haven't* seen is an explanation of why they did *that*...


Now this is interesting: I had already read the STS had a single sensor feed, but did not (want to) believe it. Now are you saying, since there's a port/starboard cycle, therefore in any given cycle the NG's speed trim is based on readings from a single instrument? Doesn't NG (as the Classic in its day, and the MAX today) have 3 pitots (Capts-F/O-Aux)? Why would anyone not use available sensors?



Agree. Was just trying to answer the question why alternate rather than getting into the fact that its pretty poinless in this case since you have a single point failure scenario anyway.


Ray
 
hivue
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 4:32 pm

AirFiero wrote:
Pilots routinely train to disconnect the automatic trim in the case of runaway trim with autopilot use.


The trouble is, MCAS is only available when the AP is off.
"You're sitting. In a chair. In the SKY!!" ~ Louis C.K.
 
vfw614
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 4:39 pm

If the MCAS system malfunctions, pilots say the prescribed fix is to use manual trim to stabilize the plane, and then disconnect the trim system. There’s a cutoff switch on the center pedestal of the 737, not far from throttles, marked “Stab Trim.” Pilots routinely train to disconnect the automatic trim in the case of runaway trim with autopilot use.


All very well in theory, the simulator or at FL34.

But in an aircraft a few thousand feet above ground during a busy stage of the flight, there is precious little time to find out what is wrong and get things under control. If I understood correctly, what Lion Air and Ethiopian experienced was not a standard runaway trim (continuos movement of the trim wheel). So it will take some time to figure out what is wrong as looking at the instruments and the trim wheel will not be conclusive at first. Then buttons need to be pushed to get rid of the software malfunction, the trim wheel has to be turned probably dozens of times to retrim the aircraft. This all very close to the ground at high speeds.

The only conclusion for me is that no aircraft should be constructed in a way that carries a significant risk to put a pilot in such a scenario.
 
osiris30
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 4:42 pm

astuteman wrote:
osiris30 wrote:
seat64k wrote:

We can blame Boeing, the FAA and whoever else, but at the end of the day, a lot of the root culpability lies in what the consumer is demanding of the industry and government. The complexity of modern aircraft has continued to grow. We have more systems on an aircraft than ever before. We are closer and closer to aerodynamic margins than ever before. Certification should be harder than ever before and require more effort. Not less. But no one is willing to pay for it.

Of course I am sure a bunch of people will claim I am being apologetic and making excuses for Boeing or the FAA, but I am not. I don't believe either did anything intentionally malicious. I believe mistakes may have been made that will be corrected (as they have throughout the history of aviation). I do believe the safety net designed to prevent such accidents has been weakened and I don't believe it is entirely 'industry pressure' responsible for it. Rather I believe it is ideological beliefs driving a lot of it.


In a 21st century modern safety culture there is no excuse for the behaviours that have been exhibited. Period.
Safety does not cut corners, no matter what the pressure.
The only appropriate behaviour is to raise the red flag and stop.
Any evidence that there is pressure to do otherwise is an absolutely appalling indictment of the prevailing safety culture
That has to be stopped. Now

We need to be clear here.
This situation with the MAX is specific.
It is specific with respect to the sudden runaway success of the A320NEO putting Boeing on the back foot.

I posted in the FAA Head thread.
None of the programmes executed in the 21st century has had a fatal crash. not one..

The 748 has not crashed
The 787 has not crashed
Both certified by the FAA, and yes they have had incidents, but no fatal crashes.

For reference

The A380 has not crashed
The A320NEO has not crashed
The A350 XWB has not crashed
The A330 NEO has not crashed

(you might want to read the response I got to those statistics on that thread by the way, if you want to see an illustration of a broken safety culture. "Well, they're going to crash one day" Just WOW! :eyepopping: )

The 737NG and A320CEO have crash statistics of 1 in 10 000 000 flights.
They are so rare in these '80's and '90's designs that most are statistical anomalies, or German pilots with a death wish
Currently the MAX is statistically 100 times less safe than these '90's planes.
It is statistically infinitely less safe than any other 21st century programme.

The REAL issue is that despite these appalling statistics, Boeing and the FAA were desperate to keep these planes flying
It took the intervention of the chief for the only rational decision in the circumstances to be made.
That is unforgivable, and has nothing to do with the consumer or anyone else.
That is 100% the signature of a safety culture broken in order to get the MAX out.

No debate.
No "yes but".
That is it.
The only fact remotely relevant in safety management in the 21st century.
All the noise about "3rd world (a horrible label) pilot training" is just more evidence of the same broken culture, if we're really honest.
All the noise about DC10's and Comets, and the implied regression to 1960's safety standards is also more evidence of the same broken culture.
This is 2019.

We have seen the wholesale changes made at the top of Airbus, punitive fines, the withholding of credit, as a result of the bribery scandal.
My own company has gone through a very similar process previous to that (which is well documented).
There is now a zero tolerance to any infringements on ethical behaviour or integrity in business dealings in my company. Instant dismissal.
Regular, repeated, mandated training which is a prerequisite of your ongoing employment, no matter how good you are.

The only way to create an upside here, is to sting both Boeing and the FAA so hard that it results in a "never again" corporate culture, clear and explicit to every employee. Punitive fines. Prison sentences. Restrictions on business dealing.
I'm not saying that because I'm an Airbus fan. I would say exactly the same for them.
Boeing will become a way stronger company for it.

The Air transport industry can not allow such a culture to continue. The MAX can not be allowed to happen again.
Not only should we not expect any more crashes. we should demand that there aren't any.
Too many people fly today to permit any other approach.

Rgds


Astuteman:

First of all, great to see you again. Secondly, I agree wholeheartedly, safety should NOT be compromised. I am merely pointing out it is a bigger deeper problem than JUST blaming Boeing or the FAA. Hopefully, this is a turning point.
I don't care what you think of my opinion. It's my opinion, so have a nice day :)
 
PixelPilot
Posts: 254
Joined: Tue Jan 16, 2018 1:19 am

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 5:03 pm

AirFiero wrote:
Trin wrote:
AirFiero wrote:
WSJ article on WN, AA and UAs decision not to ground the Max, initially...

https://www.wsj.com/articles/inside-u-s ... _lead_pos1

Edit, change link


It's behind a paywall. If you want others to read it you will have to quote pertinent sections on here.


I was afraid of that, sorry.

Here it is

Ask chief executives what an airline’s first responsibility is and most will quickly respond that it’s safety. But that industry norm was challenged last week by the Boeing 737 MAX.
The CEOs of Southwest, American and United decided to keep flying the plane after the second MAX 8 crash within five months. Three days after the March 10 crash in Ethiopia, after much of the rest of the world had ordered the plane grounded, the Federal Aviation Administration changed course and grounded Boeing’s new version of the 737 in the U.S.
What appeared to some as hesitation raised questions of whether potential revenue loss and schedule disruption were placed ahead of safety at Southwest, American and United.
One CEO, Gary Kelly of Southwest, talked to the Journal about the process he went through last week to keep flying even as many customers and some employees expressed fears about the plane. The choice, he says, was whether to disrupt flights out of an abundance of caution or continue based on conclusions from the airline’s internal safety team.
“The only real factor that we were thinking about was safety,” Mr. Kelly says. “And then No. 2 was to get our customers where they want to go.”
Top leaders at American, which has 24 MAX 8 jets, and United, which was flying 14 MAX 9 planes, declined interview requests. American did provide two safety officials to discuss the airline’s decision to keep flying.
All three airlines say their decisions were largely data-driven. They routinely download thousands of data points from new aircraft like the MAX, and some began new monitoring to track performance of sensors suspected of contributing to the Oct. 29 crash of Lion Air Flight 610 in Indonesia
The focus on data in aviation safety is seen as a major cause of improvement in the last decade or two.
But data don’t always capture the unknown, and just because an airplane hasn’t experienced a problem doesn’t mean it won’t have that problem in the future. Pilots routinely shut down systems suspected of malfunctioning and divert to the nearest airport or wait to take off until maintenance checks something. In aviation, there’s an adage: Better to be down here wishing you were up there than up there wishing you were down here.
In the case of the MAX, similarities between the crashes and other factors suggest some kind of problem. Boeing had identified deficiencies with its Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), new to the MAX, and was working on major software changes expected by the end of April.
Jim Hall, chair of the National Transportation Safety Board from 1994 to 2001, thinks Boeing and the FAA should have acted sooner to ground the plane. He says grounding by airlines would have been appropriate given the questions about MCAS, but not necessarily their responsibility.
“The prudent, responsible thing to do, if you actually put aviation safety first, would have been to ground the plane,” Mr. Hall says.
Financial questions didn’t come into consideration, all three airlines say.
Southwest’s Mr. Kelly says his internal, independent safety team was telling him that data collected from the MAX, which Southwest has been flying since 2017, showed no problem. (The airline flies 34 of those planes.)
And even if problems were to occur, Southwest pilots have been briefed on the system that was suspected of malfunctioning in both crashes and have routinely trained on steps to recover should the MAX’s computer mistakenly force the nose down. “These safety-management systems don’t speculate,” Mr. Kelly says
Southwest, which has the largest U.S. fleet of MAX jets, also completed installation earlier this year of warning lights in its MAX cockpits that alert pilots if the two angle-of-attack sensors disagree, a sign one is failing. A faulty angle-of-attack indicator is suspected of playing a role in the Lion Air crash.
But with many customers calling on the airline to change flights booked on the MAX and some employees nervous as well, factors beyond safety data did come into play. At the same time, Mr. Kelly says he was also influenced by the FAA’s insistence, up until Wednesday, that the plane was safe to fly.
“There’s a science to it. There’s also art and just compassion as well. Absolutely all of that needs to be factored in,” he says. The process, he adds, “worked as designed.”
At American, officials say the same two factors Southwest saw convinced Chief Executive Doug Parker to fly on: data showing no problems and confidence pilots could handle any problems.
American had also been studying its MAX 8 jets more closely after the Lion Air crash, increasing analysis of data from monitors installed on the angle-of-attack sensors and the horizontal stabilizer, the part of the tail that moves to point the nose of the plane up or down
No problems had shown up, says Neil Raaz, American’s director of flight safety. “We just didn’t see the indications that told us our airplanes were unsafe, and frankly, we still haven’t,” says Mr. Raaz, who is also a Boeing 737 captain and has U.S. Navy training in accident investigations.
But even if there are unknown problems with the MCAS system, American says it is confident pilots can recover because they train for similar problems. MCAS is supposed to push the nose of the plane down if it gets too high by moving the horizontal stabilizer, a panel used all the time to “trim” the airplane. The trim system keeps the plane level, or at a designated rate of climb or descent. The autopilot trims the airplane, or pilots can do it manually.
(Ethiopian Airlines has said its pilots had new training for 737 MAX planes after the crash in Indonesia.)
If the MCAS system malfunctions, pilots say the prescribed fix is to use manual trim to stabilize the plane, and then disconnect the trim system. There’s a cutoff switch on the center pedestal of the 737, not far from throttles, marked “Stab Trim.” Pilots routinely train to disconnect the automatic trim in the case of runaway trim with autopilot use.


Seems they are confident in flying them as they are because according tho their excessive data those planes are safe.
Ultimately they just followed the Trump/FAA grounding directive otherwise they would keep them in the air.
Interesting.
 
WIederling
Posts: 8888
Joined: Sun Sep 13, 2015 2:15 pm

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 5:07 pm

JetBuddy quoting Sullenberger wrote:
[b]"For too many years, the FAA has not been provided budgets sufficient to ensure appropriate oversight of a rapidly growing global aviation industry. Staffing has not been adequate for FAA employees to oversee much of the critically important work of validating and approving aircraft certification."[b]


If as a certification authority you don't have the money nor the manpower for the task set
the correct thing to do is "don't greenstamp what has not been checked sufficiently."
Murphy is an optimist
 
AviationBob
Posts: 14
Joined: Sun Mar 10, 2019 1:14 pm

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 5:13 pm

osiris30 wrote:
astuteman wrote:
osiris30 wrote:


In a 21st century modern safety culture there is no excuse for the behaviours that have been exhibited. Period.
Safety does not cut corners, no matter what the pressure.
The only appropriate behaviour is to raise the red flag and stop.
Any evidence that there is pressure to do otherwise is an absolutely appalling indictment of the prevailing safety culture
That has to be stopped. Now

We need to be clear here.
This situation with the MAX is specific.
It is specific with respect to the sudden runaway success of the A320NEO putting Boeing on the back foot.

I posted in the FAA Head thread.
None of the programmes executed in the 21st century has had a fatal crash. not one..

The 748 has not crashed
The 787 has not crashed
Both certified by the FAA, and yes they have had incidents, but no fatal crashes.

For reference

The A380 has not crashed
The A320NEO has not crashed
The A350 XWB has not crashed
The A330 NEO has not crashed

(you might want to read the response I got to those statistics on that thread by the way, if you want to see an illustration of a broken safety culture. "Well, they're going to crash one day" Just WOW! :eyepopping: )

The 737NG and A320CEO have crash statistics of 1 in 10 000 000 flights.
They are so rare in these '80's and '90's designs that most are statistical anomalies, or German pilots with a death wish
Currently the MAX is statistically 100 times less safe than these '90's planes.
It is statistically infinitely less safe than any other 21st century programme.

The REAL issue is that despite these appalling statistics, Boeing and the FAA were desperate to keep these planes flying
It took the intervention of the chief for the only rational decision in the circumstances to be made.
That is unforgivable, and has nothing to do with the consumer or anyone else.
That is 100% the signature of a safety culture broken in order to get the MAX out.

No debate.
No "yes but".
That is it.
The only fact remotely relevant in safety management in the 21st century.
All the noise about "3rd world (a horrible label) pilot training" is just more evidence of the same broken culture, if we're really honest.
All the noise about DC10's and Comets, and the implied regression to 1960's safety standards is also more evidence of the same broken culture.
This is 2019.

We have seen the wholesale changes made at the top of Airbus, punitive fines, the withholding of credit, as a result of the bribery scandal.
My own company has gone through a very similar process previous to that (which is well documented).
There is now a zero tolerance to any infringements on ethical behaviour or integrity in business dealings in my company. Instant dismissal.
Regular, repeated, mandated training which is a prerequisite of your ongoing employment, no matter how good you are.

The only way to create an upside here, is to sting both Boeing and the FAA so hard that it results in a "never again" corporate culture, clear and explicit to every employee. Punitive fines. Prison sentences. Restrictions on business dealing.
I'm not saying that because I'm an Airbus fan. I would say exactly the same for them.
Boeing will become a way stronger company for it.

The Air transport industry can not allow such a culture to continue. The MAX can not be allowed to happen again.
Not only should we not expect any more crashes. we should demand that there aren't any.
Too many people fly today to permit any other approach.

Rgds


Astuteman:

First of all, great to see you again. Secondly, I agree wholeheartedly, safety should NOT be compromised. I am merely pointing out it is a bigger deeper problem than JUST blaming Boeing or the FAA. Hopefully, this is a turning point.


It seems like the blame everything on Boeing/FAA bandwagon will not allow even the remote possibility that there was also a problem with Pilot training and competence as a contributor in the crash.

And yet, at least in the case of Lion Air, it appears to be a huge contributor. If it took a jump seat pilot to teach the crew how to turn off the Stab Trim, which they ALL should have known by memory, then that's almost criminal incompetence.
 
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PW100
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 5:15 pm

PixelPilot wrote:
Seems they are confident in flying them as they are because according tho their excessive data those planes are safe.
Ultimately they just followed the Trump/FAA grounding directive otherwise they would keep them in the air.
Interesting.

I must have missed that excessive data, as I had only seen the 140K 737 MAX operating hrs by American operators (the world fleet of 737 NG accumulates that number every 3 days or so).
Immigration officer: "What's the purpose of your visit to the USA?" Spotter: "Shooting airliners with my Canon!"
 
felipekk
Posts: 13
Joined: Tue Dec 04, 2018 4:06 pm

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 5:19 pm

AviationBob wrote:
If it took a jump seat pilot to teach the crew how to turn off the Stab Trim, which they ALL should have known by memory, then that's almost criminal incompetence.


You're jumping to conclusions. There is no evidence that the crew did not know the procedure. What is known is that they did not do it, which could be due to the fact that they did not identify the conditions that call to execute the procedure (i.e. were too busy handling the situation/alarms and did not identify that the trim was "running away").
 
PixelPilot
Posts: 254
Joined: Tue Jan 16, 2018 1:19 am

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 5:23 pm

PW100 wrote:
PixelPilot wrote:
Seems they are confident in flying them as they are because according tho their excessive data those planes are safe.
Ultimately they just followed the Trump/FAA grounding directive otherwise they would keep them in the air.
Interesting.

I must have missed that excessive data, as I had only seen the 140K 737 MAX operating hrs by American operators (the world fleet of 737 NG accumulates that number every 3 days or so).


Close to 100K hours by one of them WITHOUT anything major/out of ordinary incident (according to the article ), gives them overall impression that everything is working ok.

I know it hurts you and few more that some pros out there have different opinion but what can i say. I'm just a bystander in between a.net fanboys / news / actual pilots so srry if I'm not jumping on your fck Boeing bandwagon just yet. I'll wait for final report thank you very much.
Last edited by PixelPilot on Wed Mar 20, 2019 5:25 pm, edited 2 times in total.
 
MSPNWA
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Joined: Thu Apr 23, 2009 2:48 am

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 5:23 pm

astuteman wrote:
The 737NG and A320CEO have crash statistics of 1 in 10 000 000 flights.
They are so rare in these '80's and '90's designs that most are statistical anomalies, or German pilots with a death wish
Currently the MAX is statistically 100 times less safe than these '90's planes.
It is statistically infinitely less safe than any other 21st century programme.


Do we judge safety on a process, or stats? Do we base safety on causes, or stats?
 
Trin
Posts: 167
Joined: Mon May 02, 2011 4:45 pm

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 5:35 pm

AirFiero wrote:

I was afraid of that, sorry.

Here it is



Thanks - appreciate it. It was an interesting read - I just sort of wish some of it had surprised me. A heavy reliance on data (which of course is all they have to go on), increased monitoring of MAXs, and none of them wanting to disrupt airline operations to ground the fleet. However the MAX/AOA/MCAS issues do not appear to present front-and-center in 'data'. I mean - they are either working 100% fine, or one day they don't and the plane crashes out of the sky. It's not a sort of progressive degradation leading to a point in time that they could then say "OK yeah - this has reached an action point, we have to replace/fix/sort/ground this."
 
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SheikhDjibouti
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 5:58 pm

Astuteman wrote:
None of the programmes executed in the 21st century has had a fatal crash. not one..
The 748 has not crashed
The 787 has not crashed
Both certified by the FAA, and yes they have had incidents, but no fatal crashes.

For reference
The A380 has not crashed
The A320NEO has not crashed
The A350 XWB has not crashed
The A330 NEO has not crashed

(you might want to read the response I got to those statistics on that thread by the way, if you want to see an illustration of a broken safety culture. "Well, they're going to crash one day" Just WOW! :eyepopping: )

At the risk of causing your eyes to pop once more, I'll add one more to the list. Not from the 21st century - far from it.
Concorde
For decades it had an immaculate safety record. Right up until the day it didn't. Just one event transforms things.

The A380 is also a relatively low volume product, and as such the stats are subject to some interpretation, because just one event could transform things..

As for the remainder; it is a function of statistics that at least one of them will crash at some point.
Same as if I continue to buy lottery tickets, one day I will eventually win the jackpot. It might take 2000 years, but it will happen.
Until then, I will have a perfect record of success, er… failure.

The fact that none of the aircraft specified above have crashed so far, against a background of more flights than at any time in history, is a bluddy miracle.
astuteman wrote:
The 737NG and A320CEO have crash statistics of 1 in 10 000 000 flights.
They are so rare in these '80's and '90's designs that most are statistical anomalies, or German pilots with a death wish
Currently the MAX is statistically 100 times less safe than these '90's planes.
It is statistically infinitely less safe than any other 21st century programme.

The REAL issue is that despite these appalling statistics, Boeing and the FAA were desperate to keep these planes flying
It took the intervention of the chief for the only rational decision in the circumstances to be made.
That is unforgivable, and has nothing to do with the consumer or anyone else.
That is 100% the signature of a safety culture broken in order to get the MAX out.

Absolutely :checkmark:

JetBuddy wrote:
The only way to create an upside here, is to sting both Boeing and the FAA so hard that it results in a "never again" corporate culture, clear and explicit to every employee. Punitive fines. Prison sentences. Restrictions on business dealing.
I'm not saying that because I'm an Airbus fan. I would say exactly the same for them.
Boeing will become a way stronger company for it.
All Good :checkmark:

Not only should we not expect any more crashes. we should demand that there aren't any.
Too many people fly today to permit any other approach.

Noble idea, but not sure it is entirely feasible; accidents will always happen. Always.

cledaybuck wrote:
Is there a lack of safety culture everywhere in the world that isn't China? Because those statistics were known on Sunday when the plan crashed. Europe didn't ground it until Tuesday. Canada didn't ground it until Wednesday, just a couple of hours before the US.

It wasn't only on here on a.net that people cried out "wait until we know a little more".
On Sunday, and maybe Monday too, ET302 could have been due to a bomb, or a suicide, or a problem caused by running over debris on the runway at take-off, or.....

What is damning is that China, Europe and Canada did not have access to the same data that Boeing (and presumably the FAA) already had regarding JT610 and the shenanigans surrounding the 737MAX program, and yet they still made the call based on what little information they had. :o

I'm betting they all woke up on Tuesday and reckoned it was a dead cert that America would take the lead in this, saving them the trouble.

Slowly it dawned on them that the supposedly reliable safety-conscious US of A had a slightly different agenda.......
Nothing to see here; move along please.
 
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scbriml
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 6:15 pm

AviationBob wrote:
It seems like the blame everything on Boeing/FAA bandwagon will not allow even the remote possibility that there was also a problem with Pilot training and competence as a contributor in the crash.


Firstly, the object of the exercise isn't to "blame someone". It's very unlikely that there's any one single cause for these two crashes. The vast majority of crashes occur as a result of a number of factors aligning in an unfortunate way.

Given the apparently shocking lack of MAX-specific training (a 30 minute iPad video?) and, prior to the Lion crash, a complete lack of knowledge about MCAS, training is clearly an issue for everyone.

AviationBob wrote:
And yet, at least in the case of Lion Air, it appears to be a huge contributor. If it took a jump seat pilot to teach the crew how to turn off the Stab Trim, which they ALL should have known by memory, then that's almost criminal incompetence.


Without knowing the exact circumstances of what was happening in that cockpit, your characterisation of having to "teach the crew how to turn off the Stab Trim" is disingenuous. These same pilots have been flying 737NGs without managing to destroy them in mid flight.
Time flies like an arrow. Fruit flies like a banana!
There are 10 types of people in the World - those that understand binary and those that don't.
 
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speedbored
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 6:18 pm

AviationBob wrote:
And yet, at least in the case of Lion Air, it appears to be a huge contributor. If it took a jump seat pilot to teach the crew how to turn off the Stab Trim, which they ALL should have known by memory, then that's almost criminal incompetence.

Or maybe the crew of the crash flight didn't "turn off the Stab Trim", by following the runaway trim checklist, because they correctly identified that the MCAS issue they were experiencing was not runaway trim.

And maybe the crew on the previous flight just got lucky because they incorrectly identified the issue as runaway trim.
 
dakota123
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 6:26 pm

astuteman wrote:
osiris30 wrote:
seat64k wrote:

We can blame Boeing, the FAA and whoever else, but at the end of the day, a lot of the root culpability lies in what the consumer is demanding of the industry and government. The complexity of modern aircraft has continued to grow. We have more systems on an aircraft than ever before. We are closer and closer to aerodynamic margins than ever before. Certification should be harder than ever before and require more effort. Not less. But no one is willing to pay for it.

Of course I am sure a bunch of people will claim I am being apologetic and making excuses for Boeing or the FAA, but I am not. I don't believe either did anything intentionally malicious. I believe mistakes may have been made that will be corrected (as they have throughout the history of aviation). I do believe the safety net designed to prevent such accidents has been weakened and I don't believe it is entirely 'industry pressure' responsible for it. Rather I believe it is ideological beliefs driving a lot of it.


In a 21st century modern safety culture there is no excuse for the behaviours that have been exhibited. Period.
Safety does not cut corners, no matter what the pressure.
The only appropriate behaviour is to raise the red flag and stop.
Any evidence that there is pressure to do otherwise is an absolutely appalling indictment of the prevailing safety culture
That has to be stopped. Now

We need to be clear here.
This situation with the MAX is specific.
It is specific with respect to the sudden runaway success of the A320NEO putting Boeing on the back foot.

I posted in the FAA Head thread.
None of the programmes executed in the 21st century has had a fatal crash. not one..

The 748 has not crashed
The 787 has not crashed
Both certified by the FAA, and yes they have had incidents, but no fatal crashes.

For reference

The A380 has not crashed
The A320NEO has not crashed
The A350 XWB has not crashed
The A330 NEO has not crashed

(you might want to read the response I got to those statistics on that thread by the way, if you want to see an illustration of a broken safety culture. "Well, they're going to crash one day" Just WOW! :eyepopping: )

The 737NG and A320CEO have crash statistics of 1 in 10 000 000 flights.
They are so rare in these '80's and '90's designs that most are statistical anomalies, or German pilots with a death wish
Currently the MAX is statistically 100 times less safe than these '90's planes.
It is statistically infinitely less safe than any other 21st century programme.

The REAL issue is that despite these appalling statistics, Boeing and the FAA were desperate to keep these planes flying
It took the intervention of the chief for the only rational decision in the circumstances to be made.
That is unforgivable, and has nothing to do with the consumer or anyone else.
That is 100% the signature of a safety culture broken in order to get the MAX out.

No debate.
No "yes but".
That is it.
The only fact remotely relevant in safety management in the 21st century.
All the noise about "3rd world (a horrible label) pilot training" is just more evidence of the same broken culture, if we're really honest.
All the noise about DC10's and Comets, and the implied regression to 1960's safety standards is also more evidence of the same broken culture.
This is 2019.

We have seen the wholesale changes made at the top of Airbus, punitive fines, the withholding of credit, as a result of the bribery scandal.
My own company has gone through a very similar process previous to that (which is well documented).
There is now a zero tolerance to any infringements on ethical behaviour or integrity in business dealings in my company. Instant dismissal.
Regular, repeated, mandated training which is a prerequisite of your ongoing employment, no matter how good you are.

The only way to create an upside here, is to sting both Boeing and the FAA so hard that it results in a "never again" corporate culture, clear and explicit to every employee. Punitive fines. Prison sentences. Restrictions on business dealing.
I'm not saying that because I'm an Airbus fan. I would say exactly the same for them.
Boeing will become a way stronger company for it.

The Air transport industry can not allow such a culture to continue. The MAX can not be allowed to happen again.
Not only should we not expect any more crashes. we should demand that there aren't any.
Too many people fly today to permit any other approach.

Rgds


Agree completely. Complacency, and loss of institutional memory as “high-paid” old-timers are shown the door in favor of less experienced, less expensive staff. Name the industry, it’s happening/haas happened.
“And If I claim to be a wise man, well surely it means that I don’t know”
 
LTC8K6
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 6:38 pm

speedbored wrote:
AviationBob wrote:
And yet, at least in the case of Lion Air, it appears to be a huge contributor. If it took a jump seat pilot to teach the crew how to turn off the Stab Trim, which they ALL should have known by memory, then that's almost criminal incompetence.

Or maybe the crew of the crash flight didn't "turn off the Stab Trim", by following the runaway trim checklist, because they correctly identified that the MCAS issue they were experiencing was not runaway trim.

And maybe the crew on the previous flight just got lucky because they incorrectly identified the issue as runaway trim.


I'm no pilot, but from the cheap seats it seems like the problem is similar to runaway trim. It's like runaway trim occurring in increments, or with breaks. Intermittent runaway trim?

It seems logical (from my couch) to want to turn off the trim if it keeps bothering your plane's attitude.

Now, if for some reason you never realize it's the trim motors that keep kicking in...then you are going to be lead down the wrong path trying to deal with the situation.
 
MSPNWA
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 6:39 pm

speedbored wrote:
Or maybe the crew of the crash flight didn't "turn off the Stab Trim", by following the runaway trim checklist, because they correctly identified that the MCAS issue they were experiencing was not runaway trim.

And maybe the crew on the previous flight just got lucky because they incorrectly identified the issue as runaway trim.


What happened on JT43 and 610 was the definition of runaway trim. Even if it wasn't, pilots are not trained to put themselves in a robot box where they can only think and do what they've been programmed.

Assuming the report is true, we now know conclusively that there's a Lion Air crew training question that needs to be answered. They failed to execute a memory item, and that needs to be looked at. What if a different type of failure occurs that creates another uncontrolled trim issue? Will the next Lion air crew know how to react? It's another reason why it's imperative not to jump to conclusions with the ET crash.
 
AviationBob
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 6:44 pm

speedbored wrote:
AviationBob wrote:
And yet, at least in the case of Lion Air, it appears to be a huge contributor. If it took a jump seat pilot to teach the crew how to turn off the Stab Trim, which they ALL should have known by memory, then that's almost criminal incompetence.

Or maybe the crew of the crash flight didn't "turn off the Stab Trim", by following the runaway trim checklist, because they correctly identified that the MCAS issue they were experiencing was not runaway trim.

And maybe the crew on the previous flight just got lucky because they incorrectly identified the issue as runaway trim.


Regardless of what system is causing the Runaway trim, which is what they were experiencing, they should have known to reach for the cut-out switches.....
 
AirCalSNA
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 7:13 pm

AviationBob wrote:
speedbored wrote:
AviationBob wrote:
And yet, at least in the case of Lion Air, it appears to be a huge contributor. If it took a jump seat pilot to teach the crew how to turn off the Stab Trim, which they ALL should have known by memory, then that's almost criminal incompetence.

Or maybe the crew of the crash flight didn't "turn off the Stab Trim", by following the runaway trim checklist, because they correctly identified that the MCAS issue they were experiencing was not runaway trim.

And maybe the crew on the previous flight just got lucky because they incorrectly identified the issue as runaway trim.


Regardless of what system is causing the Runaway trim, which is what they were experiencing, they should have known to reach for the cut-out switches.....


I just heard John Nance say the same thing on the radio ... basically this is something any pilot worth his or her salt should have known to do automatically ... I think he used the word "memorized." Nance also said he would not hesitate to get on a 737Max today as long as it was being flown by an American or Canadian pilot.
 
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speedbored
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 7:14 pm

MSPNWA wrote:
What happened on JT43 and 610 was the definition of runaway trim.

No, it was not. It was interniittent, not continuous.

MSPNWA wrote:
They failed to execute a memory item

Care to show us where in the manuals there is a memory item for an MCAS failure? Or any MCAS procedures at all, for that matter?

AviationBob wrote:
Regardless of what system is causing the Runaway trim, which is what they were experiencing, they should have known to reach for the cut-out switches.....

Even if they did decide to follow the runaway trim checklist, they would not get as far as operating the cutout switches, as the checklist only gets that far if the runaway trim is continuous. MCAS trim was, by design, intermittent.

I don't know exactly what went on in the cockpit of the Lionair flights - maybe one or both of the crews did make mistakes (we'll have to await the report to know for sure) but what we do know for sure is that there was no checklist for an MCAS failure. All I'm saying is that it is entirely possible that the crew of the crashed aircraft did everything exactly by the book. The book had important pages missing.
 
XRAYretired
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 7:17 pm

PixelPilot wrote:
AirFiero wrote:
Trin wrote:

It's behind a paywall. If you want others to read it you will have to quote pertinent sections on here.


I was afraid of that, sorry.

Here it is

Ask chief executives what an airline’s first responsibility is and most will quickly respond that it’s safety. But that industry norm was challenged last week by the Boeing 737 MAX.
The CEOs of Southwest, American and United decided to keep flying the plane after the second MAX 8 crash within five months. Three days after the March 10 crash in Ethiopia, after much of the rest of the world had ordered the plane grounded, the Federal Aviation Administration changed course and grounded Boeing’s new version of the 737 in the U.S.
What appeared to some as hesitation raised questions of whether potential revenue loss and schedule disruption were placed ahead of safety at Southwest, American and United.
One CEO, Gary Kelly of Southwest, talked to the Journal about the process he went through last week to keep flying even as many customers and some employees expressed fears about the plane. The choice, he says, was whether to disrupt flights out of an abundance of caution or continue based on conclusions from the airline’s internal safety team.
“The only real factor that we were thinking about was safety,” Mr. Kelly says. “And then No. 2 was to get our customers where they want to go.”
Top leaders at American, which has 24 MAX 8 jets, and United, which was flying 14 MAX 9 planes, declined interview requests. American did provide two safety officials to discuss the airline’s decision to keep flying.
All three airlines say their decisions were largely data-driven. They routinely download thousands of data points from new aircraft like the MAX, and some began new monitoring to track performance of sensors suspected of contributing to the Oct. 29 crash of Lion Air Flight 610 in Indonesia
The focus on data in aviation safety is seen as a major cause of improvement in the last decade or two.
But data don’t always capture the unknown, and just because an airplane hasn’t experienced a problem doesn’t mean it won’t have that problem in the future. Pilots routinely shut down systems suspected of malfunctioning and divert to the nearest airport or wait to take off until maintenance checks something. In aviation, there’s an adage: Better to be down here wishing you were up there than up there wishing you were down here.
In the case of the MAX, similarities between the crashes and other factors suggest some kind of problem. Boeing had identified deficiencies with its Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), new to the MAX, and was working on major software changes expected by the end of April.
Jim Hall, chair of the National Transportation Safety Board from 1994 to 2001, thinks Boeing and the FAA should have acted sooner to ground the plane. He says grounding by airlines would have been appropriate given the questions about MCAS, but not necessarily their responsibility.
“The prudent, responsible thing to do, if you actually put aviation safety first, would have been to ground the plane,” Mr. Hall says.
Financial questions didn’t come into consideration, all three airlines say.
Southwest’s Mr. Kelly says his internal, independent safety team was telling him that data collected from the MAX, which Southwest has been flying since 2017, showed no problem. (The airline flies 34 of those planes.)
And even if problems were to occur, Southwest pilots have been briefed on the system that was suspected of malfunctioning in both crashes and have routinely trained on steps to recover should the MAX’s computer mistakenly force the nose down. “These safety-management systems don’t speculate,” Mr. Kelly says
Southwest, which has the largest U.S. fleet of MAX jets, also completed installation earlier this year of warning lights in its MAX cockpits that alert pilots if the two angle-of-attack sensors disagree, a sign one is failing. A faulty angle-of-attack indicator is suspected of playing a role in the Lion Air crash.
But with many customers calling on the airline to change flights booked on the MAX and some employees nervous as well, factors beyond safety data did come into play. At the same time, Mr. Kelly says he was also influenced by the FAA’s insistence, up until Wednesday, that the plane was safe to fly.
“There’s a science to it. There’s also art and just compassion as well. Absolutely all of that needs to be factored in,” he says. The process, he adds, “worked as designed.”
At American, officials say the same two factors Southwest saw convinced Chief Executive Doug Parker to fly on: data showing no problems and confidence pilots could handle any problems.
American had also been studying its MAX 8 jets more closely after the Lion Air crash, increasing analysis of data from monitors installed on the angle-of-attack sensors and the horizontal stabilizer, the part of the tail that moves to point the nose of the plane up or down
No problems had shown up, says Neil Raaz, American’s director of flight safety. “We just didn’t see the indications that told us our airplanes were unsafe, and frankly, we still haven’t,” says Mr. Raaz, who is also a Boeing 737 captain and has U.S. Navy training in accident investigations.
But even if there are unknown problems with the MCAS system, American says it is confident pilots can recover because they train for similar problems. MCAS is supposed to push the nose of the plane down if it gets too high by moving the horizontal stabilizer, a panel used all the time to “trim” the airplane. The trim system keeps the plane level, or at a designated rate of climb or descent. The autopilot trims the airplane, or pilots can do it manually.
(Ethiopian Airlines has said its pilots had new training for 737 MAX planes after the crash in Indonesia.)
If the MCAS system malfunctions, pilots say the prescribed fix is to use manual trim to stabilize the plane, and then disconnect the trim system. There’s a cutoff switch on the center pedestal of the 737, not far from throttles, marked “Stab Trim.” Pilots routinely train to disconnect the automatic trim in the case of runaway trim with autopilot use.


Seems they are confident in flying them as they are because according tho their excessive data those planes are safe.
Ultimately they just followed the Trump/FAA grounding directive otherwise they would keep them in the air.
Interesting.


I doubt the US Airlines would ever ground their fleets without instruction from the regulator or TC holder irrespective of the data. The shock is it took Trump to force the correct decision.

Ah, that's a shock too. Never thought I'd write Trump and correct in the same sentence. I'd better go and get a cup of tea.
 
PixelPilot
Posts: 254
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 7:23 pm

XRAYretired wrote:
PixelPilot wrote:
AirFiero wrote:

I was afraid of that, sorry.

Here it is

Ask chief executives what an airline’s first responsibility is and most will quickly respond that it’s safety. But that industry norm was challenged last week by the Boeing 737 MAX.
The CEOs of Southwest, American and United decided to keep flying the plane after the second MAX 8 crash within five months. Three days after the March 10 crash in Ethiopia, after much of the rest of the world had ordered the plane grounded, the Federal Aviation Administration changed course and grounded Boeing’s new version of the 737 in the U.S.
What appeared to some as hesitation raised questions of whether potential revenue loss and schedule disruption were placed ahead of safety at Southwest, American and United.
One CEO, Gary Kelly of Southwest, talked to the Journal about the process he went through last week to keep flying even as many customers and some employees expressed fears about the plane. The choice, he says, was whether to disrupt flights out of an abundance of caution or continue based on conclusions from the airline’s internal safety team.
“The only real factor that we were thinking about was safety,” Mr. Kelly says. “And then No. 2 was to get our customers where they want to go.”
Top leaders at American, which has 24 MAX 8 jets, and United, which was flying 14 MAX 9 planes, declined interview requests. American did provide two safety officials to discuss the airline’s decision to keep flying.
All three airlines say their decisions were largely data-driven. They routinely download thousands of data points from new aircraft like the MAX, and some began new monitoring to track performance of sensors suspected of contributing to the Oct. 29 crash of Lion Air Flight 610 in Indonesia
The focus on data in aviation safety is seen as a major cause of improvement in the last decade or two.
But data don’t always capture the unknown, and just because an airplane hasn’t experienced a problem doesn’t mean it won’t have that problem in the future. Pilots routinely shut down systems suspected of malfunctioning and divert to the nearest airport or wait to take off until maintenance checks something. In aviation, there’s an adage: Better to be down here wishing you were up there than up there wishing you were down here.
In the case of the MAX, similarities between the crashes and other factors suggest some kind of problem. Boeing had identified deficiencies with its Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), new to the MAX, and was working on major software changes expected by the end of April.
Jim Hall, chair of the National Transportation Safety Board from 1994 to 2001, thinks Boeing and the FAA should have acted sooner to ground the plane. He says grounding by airlines would have been appropriate given the questions about MCAS, but not necessarily their responsibility.
“The prudent, responsible thing to do, if you actually put aviation safety first, would have been to ground the plane,” Mr. Hall says.
Financial questions didn’t come into consideration, all three airlines say.
Southwest’s Mr. Kelly says his internal, independent safety team was telling him that data collected from the MAX, which Southwest has been flying since 2017, showed no problem. (The airline flies 34 of those planes.)
And even if problems were to occur, Southwest pilots have been briefed on the system that was suspected of malfunctioning in both crashes and have routinely trained on steps to recover should the MAX’s computer mistakenly force the nose down. “These safety-management systems don’t speculate,” Mr. Kelly says
Southwest, which has the largest U.S. fleet of MAX jets, also completed installation earlier this year of warning lights in its MAX cockpits that alert pilots if the two angle-of-attack sensors disagree, a sign one is failing. A faulty angle-of-attack indicator is suspected of playing a role in the Lion Air crash.
But with many customers calling on the airline to change flights booked on the MAX and some employees nervous as well, factors beyond safety data did come into play. At the same time, Mr. Kelly says he was also influenced by the FAA’s insistence, up until Wednesday, that the plane was safe to fly.
“There’s a science to it. There’s also art and just compassion as well. Absolutely all of that needs to be factored in,” he says. The process, he adds, “worked as designed.”
At American, officials say the same two factors Southwest saw convinced Chief Executive Doug Parker to fly on: data showing no problems and confidence pilots could handle any problems.
American had also been studying its MAX 8 jets more closely after the Lion Air crash, increasing analysis of data from monitors installed on the angle-of-attack sensors and the horizontal stabilizer, the part of the tail that moves to point the nose of the plane up or down
No problems had shown up, says Neil Raaz, American’s director of flight safety. “We just didn’t see the indications that told us our airplanes were unsafe, and frankly, we still haven’t,” says Mr. Raaz, who is also a Boeing 737 captain and has U.S. Navy training in accident investigations.
But even if there are unknown problems with the MCAS system, American says it is confident pilots can recover because they train for similar problems. MCAS is supposed to push the nose of the plane down if it gets too high by moving the horizontal stabilizer, a panel used all the time to “trim” the airplane. The trim system keeps the plane level, or at a designated rate of climb or descent. The autopilot trims the airplane, or pilots can do it manually.
(Ethiopian Airlines has said its pilots had new training for 737 MAX planes after the crash in Indonesia.)
If the MCAS system malfunctions, pilots say the prescribed fix is to use manual trim to stabilize the plane, and then disconnect the trim system. There’s a cutoff switch on the center pedestal of the 737, not far from throttles, marked “Stab Trim.” Pilots routinely train to disconnect the automatic trim in the case of runaway trim with autopilot use.


Seems they are confident in flying them as they are because according tho their excessive data those planes are safe.
Ultimately they just followed the Trump/FAA grounding directive otherwise they would keep them in the air.
Interesting.


I doubt the US Airlines would ever ground their fleets without instruction from the regulator or TC holder irrespective of the data. The shock is it took Trump to force the correct decision.

Ah, that's a shock too. Never thought I'd write Trump and correct in the same sentence. I'd better go and get a cup of tea.


I think if pilots would have a general opinion that the bird is bad the unions would make the noise so we would at least hear about their concerns.
Apart from few anonymous reports nothing official gave any indications of problems so I'm giving them the benefit of doubt on this. I believe they would especially that at this point their max fleets are rather small.
 
alhena
Posts: 13
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 7:43 pm

XRAYretired wrote:


... exercising each channel alternately gives an opportunity to identify a 'failing' channel...



By crashing the plane?
 
MSPNWA
Posts: 3430
Joined: Thu Apr 23, 2009 2:48 am

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 7:56 pm

speedbored wrote:
No, it was not. It was interniittent, not continuous.


The checklist does not say "continuous". It says "continuing". That definition is correct for this scenario, and even if you say it doesn't, the overriding "manner not appropriate for flight conditions" does.

Thankfully pilots aren't trained to be lawyers first and foremost. The are trained for the point of the checklist, and that is to fly an airplane and manually control of the trim when necessary.

speedbored wrote:
Care to show us where in the manuals there is a memory item for an MCAS failure? Or any MCAS procedures at all, for that matter?


The irony of your irrelevant distraction is that apparently MCAS didn't "fail" on JT610.
 
XRAYretired
Posts: 628
Joined: Fri Mar 15, 2019 11:21 am

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 7:57 pm

alhena wrote:
XRAYretired wrote:


... exercising each channel alternately gives an opportunity to identify a 'failing' channel...



By crashing the plane?


Out of context pal. Suggest you read the question and the answer. Yes, not much point alternating channels if your system is designed to have a single point failure in effect.
 
Basefly
Posts: 203
Joined: Thu Apr 12, 2007 4:35 am

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 8:22 pm

AirCalSNA wrote:
AviationBob wrote:
speedbored wrote:
Or maybe the crew of the crash flight didn't "turn off the Stab Trim", by following the runaway trim checklist, because they correctly identified that the MCAS issue they were experiencing was not runaway trim.

And maybe the crew on the previous flight just got lucky because they incorrectly identified the issue as runaway trim.


Regardless of what system is causing the Runaway trim, which is what they were experiencing, they should have known to reach for the cut-out switches.....


I just heard John Nance say the same thing on the radio ... basically this is something any pilot worth his or her salt should have known to do automatically ... I think he used the word "memorized." Nance also said he would not hesitate to get on a 737Max today as long as it was being flown by an American or Canadian pilot.


Wow just wow...

The arrogance on display is atrocious, I don't comment much on here, because these threads often spiral out of control.

People have lost their lives, and in all likelihood it is because Boeing installed a new system that proved to have a bigger impact on crews and aircraft than expected.

People are scared to fly on the max, and saying stuff like only North American pilots know how to fly airplanes is not helping, especially Boeing.
757/777-A340/A380, Love them.
 
Trin
Posts: 167
Joined: Mon May 02, 2011 4:45 pm

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 8:52 pm

Basefly wrote:
AirCalSNA wrote:
AviationBob wrote:

Regardless of what system is causing the Runaway trim, which is what they were experiencing, they should have known to reach for the cut-out switches.....


I just heard John Nance say the same thing on the radio ... basically this is something any pilot worth his or her salt should have known to do automatically ... I think he used the word "memorized." Nance also said he would not hesitate to get on a 737Max today as long as it was being flown by an American or Canadian pilot.


Wow just wow...

The arrogance on display is atrocious, I don't comment much on here, because these threads often spiral out of control.

People have lost their lives, and in all likelihood it is because Boeing installed a new system that proved to have a bigger impact on crews and aircraft than expected.

People are scared to fly on the max, and saying stuff like only North American pilots know how to fly airplanes is not helping, especially Boeing.


THIS. In general, airlines around the world and airline pilots are doing their very utmost to pilot their airplanes to the highest standard. They are professionals and they are highly trained. Expecting them to handle an airplane that is suddenly determined to fly itself into the ground immediately after takeoff, while simultaneously flipping through QRH handbooks, running memory items, dealing with stick shaker, trying to identify warning lights/alarms along with airspeed/AOA invalid messages and uncover the root cause of them, ALL THE WHILE THE PLANE IS NOSING DOWN shortly after takeoff is just obtuse.

If modern airplane manufacturers do not have man-machine interface built in to their top priorities when designing new systems, and therefore never test for it at the certification level, then THEY are to blame. Not the souls who tried against all odds to stop their plane from crashing.
 
XRAYretired
Posts: 628
Joined: Fri Mar 15, 2019 11:21 am

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 8:54 pm

Basefly wrote:
AirCalSNA wrote:
AviationBob wrote:

Regardless of what system is causing the Runaway trim, which is what they were experiencing, they should have known to reach for the cut-out switches.....


I just heard John Nance say the same thing on the radio ... basically this is something any pilot worth his or her salt should have known to do automatically ... I think he used the word "memorized." Nance also said he would not hesitate to get on a 737Max today as long as it was being flown by an American or Canadian pilot.


Wow just wow.

The arrogance on display is atrocious, I don't comment much on here, because these threads often spiral out of control.

People have lost their lives, and in all likelihood it is because Boeing installed a new system that proved to have a bigger impact on crews and aircraft than expected.

People are scared to fly on the max, and saying stuff like only North American pilots know how to fly airplanes is not helping, especially Boeing.

:checkmark: Well said.

I would go far as to say there is some good information and rational argumentation on the thread until the US wakes up then jingoistic nonsense and confrontationalism becomes the norm.

Ray
 
hivue
Posts: 1941
Joined: Tue Feb 26, 2013 2:26 am

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 8:56 pm

AviationBob wrote:
speedbored wrote:
AviationBob wrote:
And yet, at least in the case of Lion Air, it appears to be a huge contributor. If it took a jump seat pilot to teach the crew how to turn off the Stab Trim, which they ALL should have known by memory, then that's almost criminal incompetence.

Or maybe the crew of the crash flight didn't "turn off the Stab Trim", by following the runaway trim checklist, because they correctly identified that the MCAS issue they were experiencing was not runaway trim.

And maybe the crew on the previous flight just got lucky because they incorrectly identified the issue as runaway trim.


Regardless of what system is causing the Runaway trim, which is what they were experiencing, they should have known to reach for the cut-out switches.....


Perhaps any 737 pilots (who haven't abandoned this thread for all the weird posts) could comment on whether, during recurrent training, they have ever been presented with a runaway trim scenario with the AP off.
"You're sitting. In a chair. In the SKY!!" ~ Louis C.K.
 
Np2019
Posts: 5
Joined: Sat Mar 16, 2019 1:55 am

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 9:05 pm

The real question is why didn't every airline that operates a Boeing 737 max 8 or 9. Specifically train all their pilots on how to deal with the mcas and trim issue after the lion air Incident? Every pilot should know how to deal with this issue before they fly this aircraft.
 
AviationBob
Posts: 14
Joined: Sun Mar 10, 2019 1:14 pm

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 9:08 pm

Basefly wrote:
AirCalSNA wrote:
AviationBob wrote:

Regardless of what system is causing the Runaway trim, which is what they were experiencing, they should have known to reach for the cut-out switches.....


I just heard John Nance say the same thing on the radio ... basically this is something any pilot worth his or her salt should have known to do automatically ... I think he used the word "memorized." Nance also said he would not hesitate to get on a 737Max today as long as it was being flown by an American or Canadian pilot.


Wow just wow...

The arrogance on display is atrocious, I don't comment much on here, because these threads often spiral out of control.

People have lost their lives, and in all likelihood it is because Boeing installed a new system that proved to have a bigger impact on crews and aircraft than expected.

People are scared to fly on the max, and saying stuff like only North American pilots know how to fly airplanes is not helping, especially Boeing.


No one is exonerating Boeing here, but to say it's "arrogant" to suggest the flight crew may have played a part in not knowing their runaway trim memory procedure is utterly ridiculous. Especially with new information coming out suggesting that that may be the case. A competent investigation into the crashes better include a hard look at both Boeing AND the flight crew to determine where ALL of the mistakes were made.
 
Backseater
Posts: 478
Joined: Fri Aug 19, 2005 3:20 pm

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 9:13 pm

Improving the MCAS algorithm is clearly needed. Buy as many posts have stressed, the problem facing JT & ET pilots was to identify quickly enough what was happening, or rather “what had just happened”, MCAS having acted behind the scenes (except for the windmilling stab wheel), probably triggered by faulty AoA reading and/or AoA threshold computation.

For the crew, the instrument panel is an instant view of “what is.” The picture of “what was” is in the FDR, error logs used by maintenance, ACARS encoded messages sent by the engines to the engine manufacturer, …, all useful data for post-flight exploitation.

I think the a/c might help pilots by offering a simple, easy to understand log of “what just happened” containing major pilot and a/c actions/events that affect piloting. That screen would be recalled at the push of a button, showing first the most recent, logged entries. For instance:

10:19:20______________________________________________Flaps -5 => 0
10:19:30___________________________________________________AP ON
10:21:05 Unreliable airspeed detected
10:21:11 AP OFF (<= airspeed)
10:21:18 MCAS_L Stab << -0.81d (AoA 5.3 > 4.2)
10:21:47 MCAS_L Stab << -1.35d (AoA 6.1 > 5.9)

(Right adjusted are major pilot actions)
(Left adjusted are major a/c actions)
(obviously scrollable backwards as needed)

This “what just happened” screen might help understand quicker what the complex avionics logic just did, and why, thus ensuring a timely and appropriate response by the crew.
 
Interested
Posts: 647
Joined: Thu May 19, 2016 12:19 pm

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 9:26 pm

AviationBob wrote:
Basefly wrote:
AirCalSNA wrote:

I just heard John Nance say the same thing on the radio ... basically this is something any pilot worth his or her salt should have known to do automatically ... I think he used the word "memorized." Nance also said he would not hesitate to get on a 737Max today as long as it was being flown by an American or Canadian pilot.


Wow just wow...

The arrogance on display is atrocious, I don't comment much on here, because these threads often spiral out of control.

People have lost their lives, and in all likelihood it is because Boeing installed a new system that proved to have a bigger impact on crews and aircraft than expected.

People are scared to fly on the max, and saying stuff like only North American pilots know how to fly airplanes is not helping, especially Boeing.


No one is exonerating Boeing here, but to say it's "arrogant" to suggest the flight crew may have played a part in not knowing their runaway trim memory procedure is utterly ridiculous. Especially with new information coming out suggesting that that may be the case. A competent investigation into the crashes better include a hard look at both Boeing AND the flight crew to determine where ALL of the mistakes were made.


When an American Captain writes a report saying the manual on board a 737 Max was "criminally insufficient" (after the Lion Air Crash) do you respect what he is saying?

When we find out that Boeing chose not to include any information about MCAS in their manual or even tell the pilots tasked with writing the training manual that MCAS even existed because in their words they didn't want to "inundate them with too much information" do you agree with the head of a US pilots union who claimed this was disrespectful and a breach of trust?

Bearing in mind we appear to totally trust American pilots on here?

Were these guys wrong to complain. How will these pilots above feel now a second plane has crashed in similar circumstances. Will they be arrogantly saying it wouldn't have happened had we been flying the plane?

Or will they be shaking their heads in despair right now? Will they think what John Nance is saying actually helps improve things or makes them worse?
 
HaveBlue
Posts: 2154
Joined: Fri Jan 30, 2004 3:01 pm

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 9:43 pm

Backseater wrote:
Improving the MCAS algorithm is clearly needed. Buy as many posts have stressed, the problem facing JT & ET pilots was to identify quickly enough what was happening, or rather “what had just happened”, MCAS having acted behind the scenes (except for the windmilling stab wheel), probably triggered by faulty AoA reading and/or AoA threshold computation.

For the crew, the instrument panel is an instant view of “what is.” The picture of “what was” is in the FDR, error logs used by maintenance, ACARS encoded messages sent by the engines to the engine manufacturer, …, all useful data for post-flight exploitation.

I think the a/c might help pilots by offering a simple, easy to understand log of “what just happened” containing major pilot and a/c actions/events that affect piloting. That screen would be recalled at the push of a button, showing first the most recent, logged entries. For instance:

10:19:20______________________________________________Flaps -5 => 0
10:19:30___________________________________________________AP ON
10:21:05 Unreliable airspeed detected
10:21:11 AP OFF (<= airspeed)
10:21:18 MCAS_L Stab << -0.81d (AoA 5.3 > 4.2)
10:21:47 MCAS_L Stab << -1.35d (AoA 6.1 > 5.9)

(Right adjusted are major pilot actions)
(Left adjusted are major a/c actions)
(obviously scrollable backwards as needed)

This “what just happened” screen might help understand quicker what the complex avionics logic just did, and why, thus ensuring a timely and appropriate response by the crew.


That sounds like an amazing idea! Information is always helpful and knowing what the 'wizard' is doing behind the curtain certainly would help. Excellent!
 
AviationBob
Posts: 14
Joined: Sun Mar 10, 2019 1:14 pm

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 9:45 pm

Interested wrote:
AviationBob wrote:
Basefly wrote:

Wow just wow...

The arrogance on display is atrocious, I don't comment much on here, because these threads often spiral out of control.

People have lost their lives, and in all likelihood it is because Boeing installed a new system that proved to have a bigger impact on crews and aircraft than expected.

People are scared to fly on the max, and saying stuff like only North American pilots know how to fly airplanes is not helping, especially Boeing.


No one is exonerating Boeing here, but to say it's "arrogant" to suggest the flight crew may have played a part in not knowing their runaway trim memory procedure is utterly ridiculous. Especially with new information coming out suggesting that that may be the case. A competent investigation into the crashes better include a hard look at both Boeing AND the flight crew to determine where ALL of the mistakes were made.


When an American Captain writes a report saying the manual on board a 737 Max was "criminally insufficient" (after the Lion Air Crash) do you respect what he is saying?

When we find out that Boeing chose not to include any information about MCAS in their manual or even tell the pilots tasked with writing the training manual that MCAS even existed because in their words they didn't want to "inundate them with too much information" do you agree with the American Pilot who wrote the above report?

Bearing in mind we appear to totally trust American pilots on here?


Yes, I totally respect that Captain and agree that Boeing's actions appear indefensible by not properly explaining the new MCAS system and not properly updating the training manual.

But....in addition to that....I also wonder why the flight crew didn't know to hit the Stab Trim cut-off switches when they were having problems with what appeared to be runaway trim? That needs to be looked at too, sorry if it might hurt some people feelings, but people died, we need to know ALL of the contributing factors in the crash, not just what Boeing did wrong.
 
User avatar
AirlineCritic
Posts: 1648
Joined: Sat Mar 14, 2009 1:07 pm

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 9:46 pm

FWIW, I for one agree 1000% with what Astuteman wrote in this thread. This is a serious lapse, and needs to be dealt with. Promptly. Perhaps harshly if needed. And I believe both Boeing and its products will be better off the better when they do this. And when I say "this", I mean of course both technical fixes (which to me sound necessary based on the documented current design alone), training improvements, and proper, full re-certification. And I have no doubt that the software engineers and all workers at Boeing all want this, and feel the pain from the accidents. I'm a bit less certain how well the management at Boeing and FAA has seen the light; there's some re-arrangements of the leadership but the public statements do not, for instance, make any promise to fix the certification problems.

As for the continued whitewashing in this thread from the fans... it really leaves a bad taste. To be clear, it is almost guaranteed that this accident is not due to a single cause, most likely a combination of equipment and human issues. It is the job of the safety sensitive industry to attempt to avoid the safety issues in both, and to reduce the likelihood of Swiss cheese alignment. But when your manufacturer has decided to redo the design of a critical component in the airplane, 50 regulators throughout the world have decided to ground the product, and the flying product has a four times as powerful automatic function than certified, it should be clear that the technical component will also be on the list of problems to fix. Now, of course, pilots, training, maintenance may well also be. But to attempt to claim that only everything else than the tech should be blamed is not particularly believable. At this point, at least.

And I realise that you may have an opinion and you may be a super capable pilot with lots of experience. I respect that. But perhaps you should respect the possibility that there can be many different circumstances, and that sometimes those circumstances are not as favourable to pilots being able to recognise an issue -- even if I believe after recognition most pilots would know what to do. To me, it looks like the odds of successful handling of faulty MCAS behaviour are pretty low, and remarkably, this seems to be true of both before everyone realised it was a problem (JT accident) and after (ET accident).
 
User avatar
casinterest
Posts: 9279
Joined: Sat Feb 12, 2005 5:30 am

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 9:46 pm

HaveBlue wrote:
Backseater wrote:
Improving the MCAS algorithm is clearly needed. Buy as many posts have stressed, the problem facing JT & ET pilots was to identify quickly enough what was happening, or rather “what had just happened”, MCAS having acted behind the scenes (except for the windmilling stab wheel), probably triggered by faulty AoA reading and/or AoA threshold computation.

For the crew, the instrument panel is an instant view of “what is.” The picture of “what was” is in the FDR, error logs used by maintenance, ACARS encoded messages sent by the engines to the engine manufacturer, …, all useful data for post-flight exploitation.

I think the a/c might help pilots by offering a simple, easy to understand log of “what just happened” containing major pilot and a/c actions/events that affect piloting. That screen would be recalled at the push of a button, showing first the most recent, logged entries. For instance:

10:19:20______________________________________________Flaps -5 => 0
10:19:30___________________________________________________AP ON
10:21:05 Unreliable airspeed detected
10:21:11 AP OFF (<= airspeed)
10:21:18 MCAS_L Stab << -0.81d (AoA 5.3 > 4.2)
10:21:47 MCAS_L Stab << -1.35d (AoA 6.1 > 5.9)

(Right adjusted are major pilot actions)
(Left adjusted are major a/c actions)
(obviously scrollable backwards as needed)

This “what just happened” screen might help understand quicker what the complex avionics logic just did, and why, thus ensuring a timely and appropriate response by the crew.


That sounds like an amazing idea! Information is always helpful and knowing what the 'wizard' is doing behind the curtain certainly would help. Excellent!

It's called a syslog, and everyone in data and telecommunications uses them.
I have to wonder though, doesn't the Cockpit have a way of pulling this info?
Where ever you go, there you are.
 
User avatar
mfranjic
Posts: 236
Joined: Sat Jun 22, 2013 7:54 am

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 9:57 pm

speedbored wrote:

AviationBob wrote:

And yet, at least in the case of Lion Air, it appears to be a huge contributor. If it took a jump seat pilot to teach the crew how to turn off the Stab Trim, which they ALL should have known by memory, then that's almost criminal incompetence.


Or maybe the crew of the crash flight didn't "turn off the Stab Trim", by following the runaway trim checklist, because they correctly identified that the MCAS issue they were experiencing was not runaway trim.

And maybe the crew on the previous flight just got lucky because they incorrectly identified the issue as runaway trim.


……
….… from the thread (the link just below)
……
….….Image
……
….The framed text in the quote below is a link to the article …
……
mfranjic wrote:

….Image


……
Mario
Last edited by mfranjic on Wed Mar 20, 2019 10:10 pm, edited 2 times in total.
"Only a life lived for others is a life worthwhile" - Albert Einstein
 
Backseater
Posts: 478
Joined: Fri Aug 19, 2005 3:20 pm

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 10:08 pm

casinterest wrote:
HaveBlue wrote:
Backseater wrote:
Improving the MCAS algorithm is clearly needed. Buy as many posts have stressed, the problem facing JT & ET pilots was to identify quickly enough what was happening, or rather “what had just happened”, MCAS having acted behind the scenes (except for the windmilling stab wheel), probably triggered by faulty AoA reading and/or AoA threshold computation.

For the crew, the instrument panel is an instant view of “what is.” The picture of “what was” is in the FDR, error logs used by maintenance, ACARS encoded messages sent by the engines to the engine manufacturer, …, all useful data for post-flight exploitation.

I think the a/c might help pilots by offering a simple, easy to understand log of “what just happened” containing major pilot and a/c actions/events that affect piloting. That screen would be recalled at the push of a button, showing first the most recent, logged entries. For instance:

10:19:20______________________________________________Flaps -5 => 0
10:19:30___________________________________________________AP ON
10:21:05 Unreliable airspeed detected
10:21:11 AP OFF (<= airspeed)
10:21:18 MCAS_L Stab << -0.81d (AoA 5.3 > 4.2)
10:21:47 MCAS_L Stab << -1.35d (AoA 6.1 > 5.9)

(Right adjusted are major pilot actions)
(Left adjusted are major a/c actions)
(obviously scrollable backwards as needed)

This “what just happened” screen might help understand quicker what the complex avionics logic just did, and why, thus ensuring a timely and appropriate response by the crew.


That sounds like an amazing idea! Information is always helpful and knowing what the 'wizard' is doing behind the curtain certainly would help. Excellent!

It's called a syslog, and everyone in data and telecommunications uses them.
I have to wonder though, doesn't the Cockpit have a way of pulling this info?


That’s why I am asking. It is such a simple and useful tool in other environments.
And if they do have one in the cockpit, maybe MCAS was not deemed important enough to appear in such a log. That would be truly baffling!
 
kuhne
Posts: 56
Joined: Mon Jun 26, 2006 6:58 am

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 10:12 pm

Not to be crude but I think it’s more important to build planes that you know... don’t make people die minutes after take off. Once boring manages that astonishing feat of engineering with there super safe 737max planes, then we train pilots correctly. No pilot should ever get on a plane that might decide to kill everyone just because of a software glitch.
 
User avatar
casinterest
Posts: 9279
Joined: Sat Feb 12, 2005 5:30 am

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 10:13 pm

Backseater wrote:
casinterest wrote:
HaveBlue wrote:

That sounds like an amazing idea! Information is always helpful and knowing what the 'wizard' is doing behind the curtain certainly would help. Excellent!

It's called a syslog, and everyone in data and telecommunications uses them.
I have to wonder though, doesn't the Cockpit have a way of pulling this info?


That’s why I am asking. It is such a simple and useful tool in other environments.
And if they do have one in the cockpit, maybe MCAS was not deemed important enough to appear in such a log. That would be truly baffling!


Some times there is too much noise. The issue here is that the sensors that were supposed to give them good information was bad. This led to the cascade of failures. The logs in whole might help, but they can also be distracting especially when two people are trying to control the plane.

I do see value, but is there going to be a 3rd monitoring pilot on all these flights watching logs?
Where ever you go, there you are.
 
LTC8K6
Posts: 1534
Joined: Fri Jun 05, 2009 8:36 pm

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 10:17 pm

mfranjic wrote:
speedbored wrote:

AviationBob wrote:

And yet, at least in the case of Lion Air, it appears to be a huge contributor. If it took a jump seat pilot to teach the crew how to turn off the Stab Trim, which they ALL should have known by memory, then that's almost criminal incompetence.


Or maybe the crew of the crash flight didn't "turn off the Stab Trim", by following the runaway trim checklist, because they correctly identified that the MCAS issue they were experiencing was not runaway trim.

And maybe the crew on the previous flight just got lucky because they incorrectly identified the issue as runaway trim.


……
….… from the thread (the link just below)
……
….….Image
……
….The framed text in the quote below is a link to the article …
……
mfranjic wrote:

….Image


……
Mario

Why did he think the trim was running backwards? That thinking seems odd?
Is there any indication that the trim ever ran backwards?
Also, it seems like you'd think it was a big problem if the trim ran backwards?
 
Backseater
Posts: 478
Joined: Fri Aug 19, 2005 3:20 pm

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 10:19 pm

casinterest wrote:
Backseater wrote:
casinterest wrote:
It's called a syslog, and everyone in data and telecommunications uses them.
I have to wonder though, doesn't the Cockpit have a way of pulling this info?


That’s why I am asking. It is such a simple and useful tool in other environments.
And if they do have one in the cockpit, maybe MCAS was not deemed important enough to appear in such a log. That would be truly baffling!


Some times there is too much noise. The issue here is that the sensors that were supposed to give them good information was bad. This led to the cascade of failures. The logs in whole might help, but they can also be distracting especially when two people are trying to control the plane.

I do see value, but is there going to be a 3rd monitoring pilot on all these flights watching logs?

In my mind, that display would not normally be visible. There is not enough real estate on the dash.
But when the crew is presented with an unusual situation, they could just recall it at the push of a button.
 
flybucky
Posts: 175
Joined: Tue Apr 17, 2018 7:44 pm

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Wed Mar 20, 2019 10:52 pm

casinterest wrote:
Some times there is too much noise. The issue here is that the sensors that were supposed to give them good information was bad. This led to the cascade of failures. The logs in whole might help, but they can also be distracting especially when two people are trying to control the plane. I do see value, but is there going to be a 3rd monitoring pilot on all these flights watching logs?

I agree. Obviously, it is not practical to have a 3rd monitoring pilot on every flight.

I hope this doesn't sound too ridiculous, but maybe there needs to be a "911" call center that pilots can radio for help during emergencies. Obviously, ideally, the pilots are perfectly trained and can troubleshoot everything by themselves while flying the plane. But under duress with stick shaking, alarms blaring, low altitude, humans sometimes falter. It would help if they could radio an on-call expert on their aircraft type who can help them troubleshoot over the radio. Like if you call 911 they can walk you through CPR (Does the victim have a pulse? Do chest compressions. Are they breathing? Check their throat for blockage. Etc). The on-call expert can ask for the symptoms (or access the satellite ADB-S data logs), enter them in the computer database, and the computer can give a list of troubleshooting steps that the expert can walk the pilots through.

The advantage is the on-call expert is calmer, not distracted by flying, and can look things up quickly at their computer. And the pilots can focus on keeping the plane flying instead of looking down at instruments and manuals.
 
mjoelnir
Posts: 8508
Joined: Sun Feb 03, 2013 11:06 pm

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Thu Mar 21, 2019 12:17 am

One point I do not get. if MCAS is trimming down and the pilot is using the electrical trim to move the trim up again why did MCAS (if it was MCAS) in the end manage to over power in both cases.
I assume that using the trim switches should stop MCAS and the pilot should be able to trim the nose up again each time MCAS operates. Even if they do not realize what is happening and cut out the electrical trim, why did MCAS manage to overpower them, why did they not keep trimming the nose up?
Is MCAS the whole story?

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