If it was, someone will have to explain why they decided to change it from using data from both AOA sensor to just a single one on the 737MAX?
A 2-channel architecture can only be used to detect unreliable inputs, but doesn't tell you which channel is good and which has failed (well, there are ways to identify the failed sensor within a certain probability, but for real fail-safe operations you need at least 3 independent inputs). Therefore, 2 channels are only good to drive an AoA disagree flag (which the KC-46 has and the MAX can
have - as an option). I have no explicit references to USAF or ITAF procedures, but I bet that SOP is to disable MCAS on an AoA disagree warning (either manually or automatically, I don't know) - and to rely on training to handle the plane safely without MCAS.
The problem with the MAX is that MCAS needed to be hidden, and no training was even available (let alone mandatory) to handle the plane safely without MCAS. Therefore what are you going to do with 2 AoA channels? I would have loved to be a fly on the wall of that Boeing office were this discussion must have been had. I can almost picture someone - speculation here - coming up with the bright idea "hey, we've already got STS acting on a single channel with logic to alternate port and starbord inputs - let's piggy-back MCAS on the same architecture". Quick, cheap, apparently reasonable...