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planecane
Posts: 1558
Joined: Thu Feb 09, 2017 4:58 pm

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 11:44 am

What I don't understand is why, around the 5:30:40 mark, they are using the manual electric trim and the pitch trim is going back up but then the FO (assumed based on CVR) hits the cutout switch and stops the trimming before getting it back to where it was before MCAS took over. MCAS wasn't fighting the nose up trim at that point while they were manually trimming (electric).

Then, it appears that they continued to gain altitude with the cutout switches off while (assumption) attempting to turn the trim wheel which they couldn't do. Between 5:43:00 and 5:43:15 somebody hit the manual electric trim switch twice and there was no change in pitch because (I assume) the cutout switches were still off. Then, it appears they turned the cutoff switches back on but for some unknown reason, didn't try the electric trim again. They just let MCAS kick back in and trim to what looks like full nose down which led to the final nose dive.

I don't know if there is any indication from the CVR of why, at those two critical points they took illogical actions. Before they threw the cutout switches, I don't understand why they didn't keep trimming manually to offset MCAS first. At the end, when they turned the cutout switches back on, I suspect they were mentally and physically exhausted and probably very confused so I can understand that time but the first time they appeared to be responding properly and just had to keep trimming to neutral before throwing the cutout switches.
 
morrisond
Posts: 2659
Joined: Thu Jan 07, 2010 12:22 am

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 11:45 am

scbriml wrote:
SimonL wrote:
In certain situations the air flow over the control surfaces makes it very hard to use a mechanical trim due to the aerodynamic forces. These forces are transferred trough the system all the way to the trim wheels. For the pilots the result is that the trim wheel are very heavy or impossible to move.


It's even more difficult when both pilots are pulling back on the yokes with all their strength to try and maintain level flight.

Everyone should read this. It offers reasonable explanations for most things that appear to have happened on that flight.
https://leehamnews.com/2019/04/05/bjorn ... t-analysis


Yes that is a plausible explanation.

And I get it - they were dealt with a very difficult situation that they were not trained well enough for.

That has been my intended focus and sorry If it comes across as blaming the pilots.

I am concerned about the training system Worldwide (after blaming Boeing for building such a botched system the more I read about it the more you can see the screw ups, on the NG you had the option of turning off the Electronic Helpers effect on the Electric Trim system while still allowing the Electric Trim system to be used with full Manual authority) for maybe not being as robust as it should be.

It seems as though as Electronic systems have gotten so good that basic skills are not taught or emphasized as much anymore. With the limited Flight experience I had I had thought basic flying skills and practising really unusual situations in the simulator was what was emphasized in more advanced training. I made a bad assumption.

In the past on similar aircraft with similar control manual control systems (707, early 737) Yo-Yo like manoeuvres were taught to releave aerodynamic pressure on controls so things like manual trim could be used if you were flying too fast and the loads were too high.

This is a quote from a Commercial Captain based in the UK on the other forum "Turning the wheel was on my type rating course, but featured only one other time in my run of recurrent sims."

Why are neither not part of 737 Primary training or recurrent training?

Why did AF447 happen? Lack of training.

Asiana 214 - Bad Boeing Documentation combined with Lack of Training.

All the overruns of runways in the last 20 years worldwide - Bad Decision making/ bad training.

Who thinks the MAX should be allowed to fly again without extensive training on how to control it in Manual mode and how to lower your airspeed if too high so the flight controls become effective again?
 
ELBOB
Posts: 319
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 11:59 am

morrisond wrote:
It seems as though as Electronic systems have gotten so good that basic skills are not taught or emphasized as much anymore. With the limited Flight experience I had I had thought basic flying skills and practising really unusual situations in the simulator was what was emphasized in more advanced training. I made a bad assumption.


No, you were just naive.

Start making a list of all 'unusual situations' that should be practised in the simulator.

Now, calculate how many times each pilot should practise each scenario and multiply by the duration of each session.

Now deduct that from the number of working hours in the year. Or conversely if you're finance-orientated, calculate that in terms of additional staffing required to maintain the operational schedules whilst performing all that training.

It is simply INFEASIBLE to practise each possible scenario, so the emphasis has to be on those which are most likely to arise.
 
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PW100
Posts: 4109
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 12:24 pm

morrisond wrote:
It seems as though as Electronic systems have gotten so good that basic skills are not taught or emphasized as much anymore. With the limited Flight experience I had I had thought basic flying skills and practising really unusual situations in the simulator was what was emphasized in more advanced training. I made a bad assumption.
. . .
Who thinks the MAX should be allowed to fly again without extensive training on how to control it in Manual mode and how to lower your airspeed if too high so the flight controls become effective again?


First of all my apologies if I came over to harsh to you in previous posts of mine (I actually edited one already to make it less harsh); your posts really came over to me as putting (large part of) the blame on the crew.

Secondly, while I don't disagree with your message here, I think the larger part of improved training requirements should focus on the MAX. Of course general piloting skills are certainly under debate, it is basically the recent two MAX accidents that are highlighting this. That suggests more of a MAX training issue (besides all the other stuff), than a general piloting issue. Discussing general piloting skills, is deviation from the main factors in these incidents.

Thirdly, with respect to the automation I'd like to point out a bit of irony (to keep the words friendly) :
The rogue AoA signal (whether indicator itself, or signal processing, or ADIRU) is believed to have caused unreliable the airspeed. Unreliable airspeed mandates Autopilot to be off, as we don't want automation to control the plane based on questionable sensor data. However when disengaging Autopilot, the bogus sensor data (AoA) that triggered the disengagement of automation in the first place, now becomes alive through MCAS!!!

WTF?? . . . we just decided we don't want automation (autopilot) to control the plane when sensor data is (suspect/known to be) bogus, only to activate an even more aggressive Piece Of Software (POS-Automation) using the very same bogus sensor data . . . . how on earth did that pass the certification smell test?
Immigration officer: "What's the purpose of your visit to the USA?" Spotter: "Shooting airliners with my Canon!"
 
aljrooney
Posts: 21
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 12:31 pm

From what I have read, on both of the accident flights the MCAS activated (not going into the why) while they had both started a turn to RTB, which seems to have lead to not enough counter ANU inputs being made, although these had been made prior to the turn.
Is it possible the PF/Crew assumed (wrongly) that the trim wheel movement was the STS kicking in to assist in a balanced turn? This and the bank angle then lead to a runaway AND movement?
The Lion Air flight where they diagnosed and dealt with the MCAS issue did not attempt a turn and managed to carry on.
 
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SheikhDjibouti
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 1:15 pm

KingOrGod wrote:
dragon6172 wrote:
They were at least 25-30 knots over Vmo


According to the graph only much later into the sequence of events though, right? They did not go straight into overspeed (not that they could really tell with all the variance in the values).

I would go back one stage and query if they ever exceeded Vmo?

1. What precisely is "overspeed"? What margin is acceptable? +1knot, +10 knots?
2. There are two speed traces on the graph. Only one exceeds the guideline Vmo. Why would you select one version over another (except to promote a certain agenda)?
3. Vmo does not automatically equate to an aircraft becoming uncontrollable. Vmo can be defined by various parameters, including legal, and FAR 25.571 (Birdstrike)
4. Vmo is less relevant at altitude. Consider at what point do you usually swap Vmo for Mmo?
5. Vmo for the original 737 was 350 kts, but this was reduced to 340 kts for later models. I believe this applies at sea level.
6. At what altitude was ET302 when it allegedly exceeded Vmo? For purely structural considerations, at FL130 you could add 40-50kts to the figure applicable at sea level. Except legally you are on sticky ground.....
7. Old threads on this site will tell you that the 737 A/T will intervene to prevent overspeed.
8. There was also an incident where a 737 entered a dive, exceeded Vmo by 100 kts, and recovered. Unfortunately the link to the NTSB report is broken, and I have no other details other than it was maintenance test flight with four crew on board (& sometime pre 2009)

So, it appears that in some cases you can exceed Vmo and still retain control of a 737, and in others your control can be compromised even if you remain within the flight envelope.
EASA reported instances where electric trim on the MAX would be insufficient at well below Vmo, and pilots would need to use the manual trim wheel
Now we are faced with the scenario where manual trim via the trim wheel is near impossible.
p.s. As has been mentioned before; at some point on the road to MAX, the manual trim wheel has bee reduced in physical size, and as any schoolboy will confirm, this makes life harder....

Beware of anyone offering simple answers.
Nothing to see here; move along please.
 
morrisond
Posts: 2659
Joined: Thu Jan 07, 2010 12:22 am

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 1:23 pm

PW100 wrote:
morrisond wrote:
It seems as though as Electronic systems have gotten so good that basic skills are not taught or emphasized as much anymore. With the limited Flight experience I had I had thought basic flying skills and practising really unusual situations in the simulator was what was emphasized in more advanced training. I made a bad assumption.
. . .
Who thinks the MAX should be allowed to fly again without extensive training on how to control it in Manual mode and how to lower your airspeed if too high so the flight controls become effective again?


First of all my apologies if I came over to harsh to you in previous posts of mine (I actually edited one already to make it less harsh); your posts really came over to me as putting (large part of) the blame on the crew.

Secondly, while I don't disagree with your message here, I think the larger part of improved training requirements should focus on the MAX. Of course general piloting skills are certainly under debate, it is basically the recent two MAX accidents that are highlighting this. That suggests more of a MAX training issue (besides all the other stuff), than a general piloting issue. Discussing general piloting skills, is deviation from the main factors in these incidents.

Thirdly, with respect to the automation I'd like to point out a bit of irony (to keep the words friendly) :
The rogue AoA signal (whether indicator itself, or signal processing, or ADIRU) is believed to have caused unreliable the airspeed. Unreliable airspeed mandates Autopilot to be off, as we don't want automation to control the plane based on questionable sensor data. However when disengaging Autopilot, the bogus sensor data (AoA) that triggered the disengagement of automation in the first place, now becomes alive through MCAS!!!

WTF?? . . . we just decided we don't want automation (autopilot) to control the plane when sensor data is (suspect/known to be) bogus, only to activate an even more aggressive Piece Of Software (POS-Automation) using the very same bogus sensor data . . . . how on earth did that pass the certification smell test?


Thank you for your comments.

And yes on MCAS - they (Boeing and the FAA) really screwed up and if the MAX had the same switches as the NG and the procedure was to hit the One Switch (not both) to cut off Autopilot intervention (and MCAS if designed correctly to be defeatable by that one switch) then it shouldn't have been that big of a problem even if it was only reliant on one sensor - the pilots did the right action and they would have still had full Manual use of Electric trim.

On the NG I would have to guess that that one switch defeats the speed trim system as well - which MCAS was supposed to be an add on too.

However whatever the MCAS fix - parts will fail and it appears 737 pilots need more training Worldwide on how to control it without the Electronic helpers.

They can't learn what they aren't being taught.
 
morrisond
Posts: 2659
Joined: Thu Jan 07, 2010 12:22 am

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 1:31 pm

SheikhDjibouti wrote:
KingOrGod wrote:
dragon6172 wrote:
They were at least 25-30 knots over Vmo


According to the graph only much later into the sequence of events though, right? They did not go straight into overspeed (not that they could really tell with all the variance in the values).

I would go back one stage and query if they ever exceeded Vmo?

1. What precisely is "overspeed"? What margin is acceptable? +1knot, +10 knots?
2. There are two speed traces on the graph. Only one exceeds the guideline Vmo. Why would you select one version over another (except to promote a certain agenda)?
3. Vmo does not automatically equate to an aircraft becoming uncontrollable. Vmo can be defined by various parameters, including legal, and FAR 25.571 (Birdstrike)
4. Vmo is less relevant at altitude. Consider at what point do you usually swap Vmo for Mmo?
5. Vmo for the original 737 was 350 kts, but this was reduced to 340 kts for later models. I believe this applies at sea level.
6. At what altitude was ET302 when it allegedly exceeded Vmo? For purely structural considerations, at FL130 you could add 40-50kts to the figure applicable at sea level. Except legally you are on sticky ground.....
7. Old threads on this site will tell you that the 737 A/T will intervene to prevent overspeed.
8. There was also an incident where a 737 entered a dive, exceeded Vmo by 100 kts, and recovered. Unfortunately the link to the NTSB report is broken, and I have no other details other than it was maintenance test flight with four crew on board (& sometime pre 2009)



So, it appears that in some cases you can exceed Vmo and still retain control of a 737, and in others your control can be compromised even if you remain within the flight envelope.
EASA reported instances where electric trim on the MAX would be insufficient at well below Vmo, and pilots would need to use the manual trim wheel
Now we are faced with the scenario where manual trim via the trim wheel is near impossible.
p.s. As has been mentioned before; at some point on the road to MAX, the manual trim wheel has bee reduced in physical size, and as any schoolboy will confirm, this makes life harder....

Beware of anyone offering simple answers.


Vmo is based on Indicated Airspeed (basically pressure on the airframe) - Vmo does not increase as you go higher - but your effective groundspeed (assuming zero winds aloft) increases as the air gets let's dense.

The plane stills feels like it's flying at 340 knots (same pressure on the airframe) even though in reality it's travelling at a lot higher speed in the upper levels due to the less dense air.

Not a very good explanation - but I hope that makes sense.
 
VV
Posts: 1702
Joined: Sat Feb 13, 2016 1:03 pm

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 1:33 pm

speedbored wrote:
VV wrote:
I still don't understand.

Why switched them back ON?
Didn't the trim wheel work? Does someone know about it?

Isn't the trim wheel the manual mean to control the horizontal stabilizer.

No, the trim wheel did not work. From the report:
Preliminary Report wrote:
At 05:41:46, the Captain asked the First-Officer if the trim is functional. The First-Officer has replied that the trim was not working and asked if he could try it manually. The Captain told him to try.At 05:41:54, theFirst-Officer replied that it is not working.


I am not sure the term "manual" here means the trim wheel.

I read the report now and my interpretation is that it was about the manual input to the electric trim (in lieu of the automatic trim).

Obviously it didn't work since the switch was OFF.

Did anyone in the cockpit turn the real manual trim, that is the trim wheel?

The article below have some pictures.
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/201 ... ckpit.html
Last edited by VV on Fri Apr 05, 2019 1:36 pm, edited 1 time in total.
 
MD80Ttail
Posts: 170
Joined: Wed Dec 07, 2016 1:22 am

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 1:36 pm

ELBOB wrote:
morrisond wrote:
It seems as though as Electronic systems have gotten so good that basic skills are not taught or emphasized as much anymore. With the limited Flight experience I had I had thought basic flying skills and practising really unusual situations in the simulator was what was emphasized in more advced training. I made a bad assumption.


No, you were just naive.

Start making a list of all 'unusual situations' that should be practised in the simulator.

Now, calculate how many times each pilot should practise each scenario and multiply by the duration of each session.

Now deduct that from the number of working hours in the year. Or conversely if you're finance-orientated, calculate that in terms of additional staffing required to maintain the operational schedules whilst performing all that training.

It is simply INFEASIBLE to practise each possible scenario, so the emphasis has to be on those which are most likely to arise.


It’s not necessary to practice each possible scenario. What is needed is proficiency in overall basic flying skills and knowledge. Stick and rudder time. I consider myself a very average pilot. I have a lot of safe hours. I’m close to retirement. I do believe in my “prime” I was a very good stick and rudder guy....very proficient. Today? Not so much. I don’t consider myself unsafe but I certainly am not as sharp with basic flying as I was at one point. I am much sharper than many of the younger FOs I fly with. Much of that is due to experience and much of that is because when I’m not “working” I’m often still flying. I also yearly practice and take unusual attitudes and spin training from an aerobatic pilot / school. I don’t do aerobatics, but the training makes me a better pilot and I enjoy the heck out of it so I do it. It helps.

The key is not to practice every scenario, they key is experience, proficiency and having a high level of both flying and decision making skills. This allows a pilot to have a large “toolbox” from which to draw in every scenario. In other words you don’t have to have practiced a specific failure in the simulator if you have a pool of knowledge and experience. A pilot should be able to draw from all skills and experiences to solve problems.

Today many pilots are not getting hand flying time, rely too much on automation—not always their fault but the whole “system” they have learned and trained in. Basic skills and knowledge is weaker and weaker.

Tuesday I finished a trip with a very nice rather young FO but still experienced with a very respectable amount of hours flying RJs. She had decent skills. Somehow we started talking about coffin corner and being behind the power curve.....she had never heard of this before in her entire career. Not her fault. But concerning. The conversation further progressed to t-tail aircraft and their inherent characteristics. Again, despite the fact we were flying a t-tail, her rating on type and her previous experience flying t-tails in both general avaiation an scheduled her understanding was very basic. Again not her fault. A Sign of the times.
Last edited by MD80Ttail on Fri Apr 05, 2019 1:39 pm, edited 3 times in total.
 
morrisond
Posts: 2659
Joined: Thu Jan 07, 2010 12:22 am

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 1:36 pm

ELBOB wrote:
morrisond wrote:
It seems as though as Electronic systems have gotten so good that basic skills are not taught or emphasized as much anymore. With the limited Flight experience I had I had thought basic flying skills and practising really unusual situations in the simulator was what was emphasized in more advanced training. I made a bad assumption.


No, you were just naive.

Start making a list of all 'unusual situations' that should be practised in the simulator.

Now, calculate how many times each pilot should practise each scenario and multiply by the duration of each session.

Now deduct that from the number of working hours in the year. Or conversely if you're finance-orientated, calculate that in terms of additional staffing required to maintain the operational schedules whilst performing all that training.

It is simply INFEASIBLE to practise each possible scenario, so the emphasis has to be on those which are most likely to arise.


Yes - you cannot train for every feasible scenario but would being able to control the aircraft in full manual mode without electronic helpers not be one of those scenarios that should be taught?
 
namezero111111
Posts: 139
Joined: Thu Mar 20, 2014 7:05 pm

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 1:42 pm

dtw2hyd wrote:

Here are a couple of facts. It takes less money (than Boeing is going spend now) and fewer lines of code (than social media warriors typing on the internet in its defense) to fix the damn code.

Give it a rest. You are not helping Boeing or America.



No. Code alone cannot fix this. The 737 will never be safe this way. Good that it's getting more technical reviews now; maybe some other skeletons are going to come out of the closet.
 
MD80Ttail
Posts: 170
Joined: Wed Dec 07, 2016 1:22 am

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 1:43 pm

You can get a ppl today without ever having recovered from a spin. It’s not taught or required. It used to be a requirement. SMH. Lowering of standards and skills. It’s a snowball effect at all levels of aviation.
 
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speedbored
Posts: 2230
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 1:43 pm

morrisond wrote:
Vmo is based on Indicated Airspeed (basically pressure on the airframe) - Vmo does not increase as you go higher - but your effective groundspeed (assuming zero winds aloft) increases as the air gets let's dense.

The plane stills feels like it's flying at 340 knots (same pressure on the airframe) even though in reality it's travelling at a lot higher speed in the upper levels due to the less dense air.

Not a very good explanation - but I hope that makes sense.

About the only thing you got right here is "Not a very good explanation".
 
morrisond
Posts: 2659
Joined: Thu Jan 07, 2010 12:22 am

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 1:48 pm

VV wrote:
speedbored wrote:
VV wrote:
I still don't understand.

Why switched them back ON?
Didn't the trim wheel work? Does someone know about it?

Isn't the trim wheel the manual mean to control the horizontal stabilizer.

No, the trim wheel did not work. From the report:
Preliminary Report wrote:
At 05:41:46, the Captain asked the First-Officer if the trim is functional. The First-Officer has replied that the trim was not working and asked if he could try it manually. The Captain told him to try.At 05:41:54, theFirst-Officer replied that it is not working.


I am not sure the term "manual" here means the trim wheel.

I read the report now and my interpretation is that it was about the manual input to the electric trim (in lieu of the automatic trim).

Obviously it didn't work since the switch was OFF.

Did anyone in the cockpit turn the real manual trim, that is the trim wheel?

The article below have some pictures.
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/201 ... ckpit.html


That is not impossible - The FO only tried for 8 seconds - we don't know if he extended the Handle to help and there is no indication the Pilot tried to help him crank. You would think that if he couldn't move the manual trim wheel by hand he would have asked the Pilot to help him just like the Pilot was asking him to pull on the Control Column from time to time - but we were not in the cockpit - no way to know.
 
morrisond
Posts: 2659
Joined: Thu Jan 07, 2010 12:22 am

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 1:50 pm

speedbored wrote:
morrisond wrote:
Vmo is based on Indicated Airspeed (basically pressure on the airframe) - Vmo does not increase as you go higher - but your effective groundspeed (assuming zero winds aloft) increases as the air gets let's dense.

The plane stills feels like it's flying at 340 knots (same pressure on the airframe) even though in reality it's travelling at a lot higher speed in the upper levels due to the less dense air.

Not a very good explanation - but I hope that makes sense.

About the only thing you got right here is "Not a very good explanation".


Please explain it better then instead of just being critical.
 
MD80Ttail
Posts: 170
Joined: Wed Dec 07, 2016 1:22 am

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 1:55 pm

namezero111111 wrote:
dtw2hyd wrote:

Here are a couple of facts. It takes less money (than Boeing is going spend now) and fewer lines of code (than social media warriors typing on the internet in its defense) to fix the damn code.

Give it a rest. You are not helping Boeing or America.



No. Code alone cannot fix this. The 737 will never be safe this way. Good that it's getting more technical reviews now; maybe some other skeletons are going to come out of the closet.



I believe the Max is safe and will be safer as a result of the changes made. Very sad people died in the crashes but the root cause seems to be poor piloting decisions spurred by failures in automation and / or faulty equipment. The bottom line is both flights should never have become accidents....both could and should have landed safely. The decisions the pilots made ultimately sealed everyone’s fate. Yes Boeing made some poor engineering decisions but had the flight crews responded appropriately the outcomes would have been nothing more than an emergency landing.

In the ET accident we are learning the pilots made basic trim management mistakes. The Lion crew similar mistakes and an ill timed hand off of PF from the captain who was in control to the FO. Aviation. Navigate. Communicate. Previous accidents and incidents....the Embraer biz jet mid air w a 737.....the FO was flying and the captain elected not to take control of the plane and allow the FO...who was solidly in control and I believe had more hours on type...continue to be the PF. Smart decision. I question why the PF who was successfully controlling the plane handed control to the FO.

The pilots in both of the Max accidents made bad decisions and did not properly execute emergency procedures resulting in the crashes. Of course, had Boeing made different decisions many will argue...and I agree...but at the end if the day nothing we know about either flight should have resulted in a catastrophe.
 
marcelh
Posts: 1007
Joined: Wed Jun 19, 2013 12:43 pm

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 1:59 pm

MD80Ttail wrote:
You can get a ppl today without ever having recovered from a spin. It’s not taught or required.

Wow.... I’ve flown gliders when I was young (in Germany) and I did a lot of spin training. Also when flying a new type, getting into a spin and recovery was the norm.
 
marcelh
Posts: 1007
Joined: Wed Jun 19, 2013 12:43 pm

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 2:00 pm

MD80Ttail wrote:
namezero111111 wrote:
dtw2hyd wrote:

Here are a couple of facts. It takes less money (than Boeing is going spend now) and fewer lines of code (than social media warriors typing on the internet in its defense) to fix the damn code.

Give it a rest. You are not helping Boeing or America.



No. Code alone cannot fix this. The 737 will never be safe this way. Good that it's getting more technical reviews now; maybe some other skeletons are going to come out of the closet.



I believe the Max is safe and will be safer as a result of the changes made. Very sad people died in the crashes but the root cause seems to be poor piloting decisions spurred by failures in automation and / or faulty equipment. The bottom line is both flights should never have become accidents....both could and should have landed safely. The decisions the pilots made ultimately sealed everyone’s fate. Yes Boeing made some poor engineering decisions but had the flight crews responded appropriately the outcomes would have been nothing more than an emergency landing.

In the ET accident we are learning the pilots made basic trim management mistakes. The Lion crew similar mistakes and an ill timed hand off of PF from the captain who was in control to the FO. Aviation. Navigate. Communicate. Previous accidents and incidents....the Embraer biz jet mid air w a 737.....the FO was flying and the captain elected not to take control of the plane and allow the FO...who was solidly in control and I believe had more hours on type...continue to be the PF. Smart decision. I question why the PF who was successfully controlling the plane handed control to the FO.

The pilots in both of the Max accidents made bad decisions and did not properly execute emergency procedures resulting in the crashes. Of course, had Boeing made different decisions many will argue...and I agree...but at the end if the day nothing we know about either flight should have resulted in a catastrophe.

But why do they fly the NG without problems but sent the MAX into Terra Firma?
 
morrisond
Posts: 2659
Joined: Thu Jan 07, 2010 12:22 am

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 2:01 pm

MD80Ttail wrote:
ELBOB wrote:
morrisond wrote:
It seems as though as Electronic systems have gotten so good that basic skills are not taught or emphasized as much anymore. With the limited Flight experience I had I had thought basic flying skills and practising really unusual situations in the simulator was what was emphasized in more advced training. I made a bad assumption.


No, you were just naive.

Start making a list of all 'unusual situations' that should be practised in the simulator.

Now, calculate how many times each pilot should practise each scenario and multiply by the duration of each session.

Now deduct that from the number of working hours in the year. Or conversely if you're finance-orientated, calculate that in terms of additional staffing required to maintain the operational schedules whilst performing all that training.

It is simply INFEASIBLE to practise each possible scenario, so the emphasis has to be on those which are most likely to arise.


It’s not necessary to practice each possible scenario. What is needed is proficiency in overall basic flying skills and knowledge. Stick and rudder time. I consider myself a very average pilot. I have a lot of safe hours. I’m close to retirement. I do believe in my “prime” I was a very good stick and rudder guy....very proficient. Today? Not so much. I don’t consider myself unsafe but I certainly am not as sharp with basic flying as I was at one point. I am much sharper than many of the younger FOs I fly with. Much of that is due to experience and much of that is because when I’m not “working” I’m often still flying. I also yearly practice and take unusual attitudes and spin training from an aerobatic pilot / school. I don’t do aerobatics, but the training makes me a better pilot and I enjoy the heck out of it so I do it. It helps.

The key is not to practice every scenario, they key is experience, proficiency and having a high level of both flying and decision making skills. This allows a pilot to have a large “toolbox” from which to draw in every scenario. In other words you don’t have to have practiced a specific failure in the simulator if you have a pool of knowledge and experience. A pilot should be able to draw from all skills and experiences to solve problems.

Today many pilots are not getting hand flying time, rely too much on automation—not always their fault but the whole “system” they have learned and trained in. Basic skills and knowledge is weaker and weaker.

Tuesday I finished a trip with a very nice rather young FO but still experienced with a very respectable amount of hours flying RJs. She had decent skills. Somehow we started talking about coffin corner and being behind the power curve.....she had never heard of this before in her entire career. Not her fault. But concerning. The conversation further progressed to t-tail aircraft and their inherent characteristics. Again, despite the fact we were flying a t-tail, her rating on type and her previous experience flying t-tails in both general avaiation an scheduled her understanding was very basic. Again not her fault. A Sign of the times.


I would have to guess She had never heard of Colgan 3407?
 
seb76
Posts: 76
Joined: Tue May 20, 2008 5:02 pm

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 2:01 pm

morrisond wrote:
VV wrote:
speedbored wrote:
No, the trim wheel did not work. From the report:


I am not sure the term "manual" here means the trim wheel.

I read the report now and my interpretation is that it was about the manual input to the electric trim (in lieu of the automatic trim).

Obviously it didn't work since the switch was OFF.

Did anyone in the cockpit turn the real manual trim, that is the trim wheel?

The article below have some pictures.
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/201 ... ckpit.html


That is not impossible - The FO only tried for 8 seconds - we don't know if he extended the Handle to help and there is no indication the Pilot tried to help him crank. You would think that if he couldn't move the manual trim wheel by hand he would have asked the Pilot to help him just like the Pilot was asking him to pull on the Control Column from time to time - but we were not in the cockpit - no way to know.


I think no one can believe that a professional airline pilot would not know that there is a handle that can be extended on the trim wheel? Every 737 pilot is aware that this handle is a knee crusher when the handle is extended with electric trim is still on. That's a well known "feature" of this vintage cockpit.
 
morrisond
Posts: 2659
Joined: Thu Jan 07, 2010 12:22 am

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 2:03 pm

marcelh wrote:
MD80Ttail wrote:
namezero111111 wrote:


No. Code alone cannot fix this. The 737 will never be safe this way. Good that it's getting more technical reviews now; maybe some other skeletons are going to come out of the closet.



I believe the Max is safe and will be safer as a result of the changes made. Very sad people died in the crashes but the root cause seems to be poor piloting decisions spurred by failures in automation and / or faulty equipment. The bottom line is both flights should never have become accidents....both could and should have landed safely. The decisions the pilots made ultimately sealed everyone’s fate. Yes Boeing made some poor engineering decisions but had the flight crews responded appropriately the outcomes would have been nothing more than an emergency landing.

In the ET accident we are learning the pilots made basic trim management mistakes. The Lion crew similar mistakes and an ill timed hand off of PF from the captain who was in control to the FO. Aviation. Navigate. Communicate. Previous accidents and incidents....the Embraer biz jet mid air w a 737.....the FO was flying and the captain elected not to take control of the plane and allow the FO...who was solidly in control and I believe had more hours on type...continue to be the PF. Smart decision. I question why the PF who was successfully controlling the plane handed control to the FO.

The pilots in both of the Max accidents made bad decisions and did not properly execute emergency procedures resulting in the crashes. Of course, had Boeing made different decisions many will argue...and I agree...but at the end if the day nothing we know about either flight should have resulted in a catastrophe.

But why do they fly the NG without problems but sent the MAX into Terra Firma?


A bad add on systems design and it appears a Worldwide training system that needs to be beefed up.
 
User avatar
Finn350
Posts: 1601
Joined: Tue Jul 09, 2013 4:57 am

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 2:04 pm

MD80Ttail wrote:
I believe the Max is safe and will be safer as a result of the changes made. Very sad people died in the crashes but the root cause seems to be poor piloting decisions spurred by failures in automation and / or faulty equipment. The bottom line is both flights should never have become accidents....both could and should have landed safely. The decisions the pilots made ultimately sealed everyone’s fate. Yes Boeing made some poor engineering decisions but had the flight crews responded appropriately the outcomes would have been nothing more than an emergency landing.


There is a design flaw in the current 737MAX MCAS implementations. The design flaw can be corrected with software, manual and training updates Boeing is developing. I thought that no-one would dispute the design flaw at this point.
Last edited by Finn350 on Fri Apr 05, 2019 2:06 pm, edited 1 time in total.
 
VV
Posts: 1702
Joined: Sat Feb 13, 2016 1:03 pm

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 2:06 pm

morrisond wrote:
VV wrote:
speedbored wrote:
No, the trim wheel did not work. From the report:


I am not sure the term "manual" here means the trim wheel.

I read the report now and my interpretation is that it was about the manual input to the electric trim (in lieu of the automatic trim).

Obviously it didn't work since the switch was OFF.

Did anyone in the cockpit turn the real manual trim, that is the trim wheel?

The article below have some pictures.
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/201 ... ckpit.html


That is not impossible - The FO only tried for 8 seconds - we don't know if he extended the Handle to help and there is no indication the Pilot tried to help him crank. You would think that if he couldn't move the manual trim wheel by hand he would have asked the Pilot to help him just like the Pilot was asking him to pull on the Control Column from time to time - but we were not in the cockpit - no way to know.


I am not a pilot, but I guess if the handle was built on the trim wheel it means that a trim wheel is to be used to manually control the horizontal stabilizer.

I am confused by the report.

Image
Last edited by VV on Fri Apr 05, 2019 2:13 pm, edited 1 time in total.
 
glideslope900
Posts: 164
Joined: Sun Feb 24, 2019 5:27 am

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 2:08 pm

MD80Ttail wrote:
ELBOB wrote:
morrisond wrote:
It seems as though as Electronic systems have gotten so good that basic skills are not taught or emphasized as much anymore. With the limited Flight experience I had I had thought basic flying skills and practising really unusual situations in the simulator was what was emphasized in more advced training. I made a bad assumption.


No, you were just naive.

Start making a list of all 'unusual situations' that should be practised in the simulator.

Now, calculate how many times each pilot should practise each scenario and multiply by the duration of each session.

Now deduct that from the number of working hours in the year. Or conversely if you're finance-orientated, calculate that in terms of additional staffing required to maintain the operational schedules whilst performing all that training.

It is simply INFEASIBLE to practise each possible scenario, so the emphasis has to be on those which are most likely to arise.


It’s not necessary to practice each possible scenario. What is needed is proficiency in overall basic flying skills and knowledge. Stick and rudder time. I consider myself a very average pilot. I have a lot of safe hours. I’m close to retirement. I do believe in my “prime” I was a very good stick and rudder guy....very proficient. Today? Not so much. I don’t consider myself unsafe but I certainly am not as sharp with basic flying as I was at one point. I am much sharper than many of the younger FOs I fly with. Much of that is due to experience and much of that is because when I’m not “working” I’m often still flying. I also yearly practice and take unusual attitudes and spin training from an aerobatic pilot / school. I don’t do aerobatics, but the training makes me a better pilot and I enjoy the heck out of it so I do it. It helps.

The key is not to practice every scenario, they key is experience, proficiency and having a high level of both flying and decision making skills. This allows a pilot to have a large “toolbox” from which to draw in every scenario. In other words you don’t have to have practiced a specific failure in the simulator if you have a pool of knowledge and experience. A pilot should be able to draw from all skills and experiences to solve problems.

Today many pilots are not getting hand flying time, rely too much on automation—not always their fault but the whole “system” they have learned and trained in. Basic skills and knowledge is weaker and weaker.

Tuesday I finished a trip with a very nice rather young FO but still experienced with a very respectable amount of hours flying RJs. She had decent skills. Somehow we started talking about coffin corner and being behind the power curve.....she had never heard of this before in her entire career. Not her fault. But concerning. The conversation further progressed to t-tail aircraft and their inherent characteristics. Again, despite the fact we were flying a t-tail, her rating on type and her previous experience flying t-tails in both general avaiation an scheduled her understanding was very basic. Again not her fault. A Sign of the times.


There is no excuse for an airline pilot to not know what coffin corner is. Hopefully this isn’t a diversity hire...
 
morrisond
Posts: 2659
Joined: Thu Jan 07, 2010 12:22 am

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 2:10 pm

seb76 wrote:
morrisond wrote:
VV wrote:

I am not sure the term "manual" here means the trim wheel.

I read the report now and my interpretation is that it was about the manual input to the electric trim (in lieu of the automatic trim).

Obviously it didn't work since the switch was OFF.

Did anyone in the cockpit turn the real manual trim, that is the trim wheel?

The article below have some pictures.
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/201 ... ckpit.html


That is not impossible - The FO only tried for 8 seconds - we don't know if he extended the Handle to help and there is no indication the Pilot tried to help him crank. You would think that if he couldn't move the manual trim wheel by hand he would have asked the Pilot to help him just like the Pilot was asking him to pull on the Control Column from time to time - but we were not in the cockpit - no way to know.


I think no one can believe that a professional airline pilot would not know that there is a handle that can be extended on the trim wheel? Every 737 pilot is aware that this handle is a knee crusher when the handle is extended with electric trim is still on. That's a well known "feature" of this vintage cockpit.


Yes you would assume if he tried the Manual trim wheel he would know where the handle was - but the post by sed76 was speculating that the FO misinterpreted the Pilot and was trying the manual trim switch of the electric system.

The pilot would have been so focused on flying the plane he may not have been able to see what the FO was doing. No way to know.
 
ikramerica
Posts: 15086
Joined: Mon May 23, 2005 9:33 am

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 2:11 pm

morrisond wrote:
ELBOB wrote:
morrisond wrote:
It seems as though as Electronic systems have gotten so good that basic skills are not taught or emphasized as much anymore. With the limited Flight experience I had I had thought basic flying skills and practising really unusual situations in the simulator was what was emphasized in more advanced training. I made a bad assumption.


No, you were just naive.

Start making a list of all 'unusual situations' that should be practised in the simulator.

Now, calculate how many times each pilot should practise each scenario and multiply by the duration of each session.

Now deduct that from the number of working hours in the year. Or conversely if you're finance-orientated, calculate that in terms of additional staffing required to maintain the operational schedules whilst performing all that training.

It is simply INFEASIBLE to practise each possible scenario, so the emphasis has to be on those which are most likely to arise.


Yes - you cannot train for every feasible scenario but would being able to control the aircraft in full manual mode without electronic helpers not be one of those scenarios that should be taught?

Is a 200 hour FO going to be proficient?

Reading the selective information here I cant help but think inexperience put more of the load on the captain.

Heres a big question for Boeing: if the alpha 1 vane reads 75 degrees, how on earth does the MCAS system consider that at all? Its obviously either A. Erroneous or B. The plane in such a steep stall that a little trimming wont make any difference.

Is there any better indications what caused the problems at takeoff and climb with flaps? It wasnt MCAS at that point. Is a single bad AoA vane going to cause overspeed and poor climbout?
Of all the things to worry about... the Wookie has no pants.
 
mjoelnir
Posts: 9391
Joined: Sun Feb 03, 2013 11:06 pm

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 2:19 pm

MD80Ttail wrote:
namezero111111 wrote:
dtw2hyd wrote:

Here are a couple of facts. It takes less money (than Boeing is going spend now) and fewer lines of code (than social media warriors typing on the internet in its defense) to fix the damn code.

Give it a rest. You are not helping Boeing or America.



No. Code alone cannot fix this. The 737 will never be safe this way. Good that it's getting more technical reviews now; maybe some other skeletons are going to come out of the closet.



I believe the Max is safe and will be safer as a result of the changes made. Very sad people died in the crashes but the root cause seems to be poor piloting decisions spurred by failures in automation and / or faulty equipment. The bottom line is both flights should never have become accidents....both could and should have landed safely. The decisions the pilots made ultimately sealed everyone’s fate. Yes Boeing made some poor engineering decisions but had the flight crews responded appropriately the outcomes would have been nothing more than an emergency landing.

In the ET accident we are learning the pilots made basic trim management mistakes. The Lion crew similar mistakes and an ill timed hand off of PF from the captain who was in control to the FO. Aviation. Navigate. Communicate. Previous accidents and incidents....the Embraer biz jet mid air w a 737.....the FO was flying and the captain elected not to take control of the plane and allow the FO...who was solidly in control and I believe had more hours on type...continue to be the PF. Smart decision. I question why the PF who was successfully controlling the plane handed control to the FO.

The pilots in both of the Max accidents made bad decisions and did not properly execute emergency procedures resulting in the crashes. Of course, had Boeing made different decisions many will argue...and I agree...but at the end if the day nothing we know about either flight should have resulted in a catastrophe.


The 737MAX is an unsafe airplane, that it is why it is grounded. Boeing made a bad decision when implementing MCAS. The crew followed the Boeing checklist regarding a trim run away event, in the way Boeing intended for MCAS failure. Guess what, not only did Boeing this crazy implementation of an automatic that tried to kill them, Boeing also provided unworkable instructions regarding what you should do, if MCAS would kick in due to a broken AoA sensor, or another failure.
 
marcelh
Posts: 1007
Joined: Wed Jun 19, 2013 12:43 pm

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 2:20 pm

morrisond wrote:
marcelh wrote:
MD80Ttail wrote:


I believe the Max is safe and will be safer as a result of the changes made. Very sad people died in the crashes but the root cause seems to be poor piloting decisions spurred by failures in automation and / or faulty equipment. The bottom line is both flights should never have become accidents....both could and should have landed safely. The decisions the pilots made ultimately sealed everyone’s fate. Yes Boeing made some poor engineering decisions but had the flight crews responded appropriately the outcomes would have been nothing more than an emergency landing.

In the ET accident we are learning the pilots made basic trim management mistakes. The Lion crew similar mistakes and an ill timed hand off of PF from the captain who was in control to the FO. Aviation. Navigate. Communicate. Previous accidents and incidents....the Embraer biz jet mid air w a 737.....the FO was flying and the captain elected not to take control of the plane and allow the FO...who was solidly in control and I believe had more hours on type...continue to be the PF. Smart decision. I question why the PF who was successfully controlling the plane handed control to the FO.

The pilots in both of the Max accidents made bad decisions and did not properly execute emergency procedures resulting in the crashes. Of course, had Boeing made different decisions many will argue...and I agree...but at the end if the day nothing we know about either flight should have resulted in a catastrophe.

But why do they fly the NG without problems but sent the MAX into Terra Firma?


A bad add on systems design and it appears a Worldwide training system that needs to be beefed up.

The difference is the “bad add on systems design” between the MAX and the NG, so IMHO that is the main reason those planes crashed. And it made clear that the “one hour iPad training” isn’t enough to get used to the MAX for all pilots involved, because the MAX does not “feel” like a NG when something goes wrong. This problem may be solvable (and survivable) by very experienced (and lucky) crew, but that shouldn’t be the norm. Those less experienced crews fly the NG without problems.
 
ikramerica
Posts: 15086
Joined: Mon May 23, 2005 9:33 am

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 2:21 pm

Finn350 wrote:
MD80Ttail wrote:
I believe the Max is safe and will be safer as a result of the changes made. Very sad people died in the crashes but the root cause seems to be poor piloting decisions spurred by failures in automation and / or faulty equipment. The bottom line is both flights should never have become accidents....both could and should have landed safely. The decisions the pilots made ultimately sealed everyone’s fate. Yes Boeing made some poor engineering decisions but had the flight crews responded appropriately the outcomes would have been nothing more than an emergency landing.


There is a design flaw in the current 737MAX MCAS implementations. The design flaw can be corrected with software, manual and training updates Boeing is developing. I thought that no-one would dispute the design flaw at this point.

Flaw is an interesting word. I think you are both right for the most part. Finn is saying its safe if you know what you are doing. You are saying theres a flaw in that pilots don't know what to do. Updating manuals and training isn’t fixing a design flaw.

There is an apparent error in the AoA disagree logic relating to MCAS though. It shouldn't operate during disagree. And thats something Boeing and the FAA will need to answer for.
Of all the things to worry about... the Wookie has no pants.
 
MD80Ttail
Posts: 170
Joined: Wed Dec 07, 2016 1:22 am

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 2:35 pm

Finn350 wrote:
MD80Ttail wrote:
I believe the Max is safe and will be safer as a result of the changes made. Very sad people died in the crashes but the root cause seems to be poor piloting decisions spurred by failures in automation and / or faulty equipment. The bottom line is both flights should never have become accidents....both could and should have landed safely. The decisions the pilots made ultimately sealed everyone’s fate. Yes Boeing made some poor engineering decisions but had the flight crews responded appropriately the outcomes would have been nothing more than an emergency landing.


There is a design flaw in the current 737MAX MCAS implementations. The design flaw can be corrected with software, manual and training updates Boeing is developing. I thought that no-one would dispute the design flaw at this point.


What is the definition of “flaw”? I stated there were some implementation issues with MCAS and some questionable design decisions. I cannot go so far as to say a flaw. I cut my teeth flying checks all night in MU2s. Would you argue that’s a “flawed”design? What about the MD11. I’ve personally never piloted one but spent a ton of time jumpseating for my “regular drive to work” on MD11s when my company used to operate them. I don’t consider these flaws or flawed aircraft. I consider both advanced aircraft requiring solid and maybe in today’s world above average piloting skills.

The “flaw” perhaps is MCAS got its info from one sensor but I hardly consider the Max or MCAS in general a flawed system. The pilots flying the crash flights were flawed in their approach and handling of the situations they encountered leading to a crash.

And yes, the FAA removed the requirement to experience or recover from a developed spin for a private pilot lic many years ago. The rational was the pilot should have never have allowed the plane to enter a stall and if enetered a stall should recover properly from the stall without inducing or allowing a spin to occur.
 
morrisond
Posts: 2659
Joined: Thu Jan 07, 2010 12:22 am

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 2:41 pm

marcelh wrote:
morrisond wrote:
marcelh wrote:
But why do they fly the NG without problems but sent the MAX into Terra Firma?


A bad add on systems design and it appears a Worldwide training system that needs to be beefed up.

The difference is the “bad add on systems design” between the MAX and the NG, so IMHO that is the main reason those planes crashed. And it made clear that the “one hour iPad training” isn’t enough to get used to the MAX for all pilots involved, because the MAX does not “feel” like a NG when something goes wrong. This problem may be solvable (and survivable) by very experienced (and lucky) crew, but that shouldn’t be the norm. Those less experienced crews fly the NG without problems.


No one is debating that the implementation of MCAS wasn't really screwed up.

How does the MAX not feel like the NG when something goes wrong - not trying to be argumentative - just trying to understand what you mean by this?
 
clancy688
Posts: 15
Joined: Fri Apr 05, 2019 8:38 am

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 2:44 pm

ikramerica wrote:
Is a 200 hour FO going to be proficient?


Um... the 200 hours mean that he recently got out of training, right? And everyone says that this is a bad thing since he doesn't have any real flying experience, which will not help at all in such an accident.

But... is that really the case in *such* an accident like this? Isn't it maybe the other way around?

What does the pilot learn during flight school? I guess normal airplane operating stuff, but also lots of emergency things. What to do when certain pieces of equipment fail. Probably how to manually trim, too.

What does the pilot learn during his first few hundred or thousand hours as a commercial pilot? Accidents and incidents are rare, so... probably not that much which might have helped him in the situation he found himself in. Ferrying the plane from A to B, with not that many deviations from the norm.

My point being: Yes, he had no experience since he was just out of flight school and type certification. But precisely because he had so little real flying experience, all the emergency procedures might still have been very fresh in his head.

Personally I think the assumption that the FO didn't know that there's a handle to manually crank the trim wheels is ludicrous. I'll eat my shoes if that piece of equipment and how it's operated in emergency situations hasn't been taught in flight school and type certification, meaning very recently.


I'd find the opposite more believable. I.e. experienced pilots forgetting about the handle since it's barely ever used in normal operations. There actually is a piece of history to back this up, even though not out of the aviation world. Back in 2011 the Fukushima NPP had its infamous accidents. Unit 1, which went up first, was the oldest of the four reactors and equipped with an old, passive cooling system (called the Isolation Condenser). This is an emergency piece of equipment which works without electricity as long as the isolation valves are in a certain configuration. In the first few hours, the plant staff didn't operate the IC correctly. They later explained that nobody of them had ever seen the IC in operation. I.e. since it's so rarely used, they forgot or omitted key features of the safety systems of their plants. And these guys had decades of experience.
 
User avatar
PW100
Posts: 4109
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 2:58 pm

MD80Ttail wrote:
In the ET accident we are learning the pilots made basic trim management mistakes.


What "basic trim management mistakes" were made by the ET crew?
I have read the prelim report, and studied the FDR graphs, but did not see those mistakes. I'm sure that's on me, so would appreciate if you would enlighten me.
Immigration officer: "What's the purpose of your visit to the USA?" Spotter: "Shooting airliners with my Canon!"
 
User avatar
PW100
Posts: 4109
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 3:07 pm

mjoelnir wrote:
MD80Ttail wrote:
namezero111111 wrote:


No. Code alone cannot fix this. The 737 will never be safe this way. Good that it's getting more technical reviews now; maybe some other skeletons are going to come out of the closet.



I believe the Max is safe and will be safer as a result of the changes made. Very sad people died in the crashes but the root cause seems to be poor piloting decisions spurred by failures in automation and / or faulty equipment. The bottom line is both flights should never have become accidents....both could and should have landed safely. The decisions the pilots made ultimately sealed everyone’s fate. Yes Boeing made some poor engineering decisions but had the flight crews responded appropriately the outcomes would have been nothing more than an emergency landing.

In the ET accident we are learning the pilots made basic trim management mistakes. The Lion crew similar mistakes and an ill timed hand off of PF from the captain who was in control to the FO. Aviation. Navigate. Communicate. Previous accidents and incidents....the Embraer biz jet mid air w a 737.....the FO was flying and the captain elected not to take control of the plane and allow the FO...who was solidly in control and I believe had more hours on type...continue to be the PF. Smart decision. I question why the PF who was successfully controlling the plane handed control to the FO.

The pilots in both of the Max accidents made bad decisions and did not properly execute emergency procedures resulting in the crashes. Of course, had Boeing made different decisions many will argue...and I agree...but at the end if the day nothing we know about either flight should have resulted in a catastrophe.


The 737MAX is an unsafe airplane, that it is why it is grounded. Boeing made a bad decision when implementing MCAS. The crew followed the Boeing checklist regarding a trim run away event, in the way Boeing intended for MCAS failure. Guess what, not only did Boeing this crazy implementation of an automatic that tried to kill them, Boeing also provided unworkable instructions regarding what you should do, if MCAS would kick in due to a broken AoA sensor, or another failure.


Not only that, this MCAS debacle may have exposed another problem with the MAX (perhaps even also for the NG), namely that at certain parts of the approved flight envelope, manual trimming (hand spinning/cranking the wheel) may not be able to be performed by the average pilot, ie. unable to overcome aerodynamic loading. And that throws some important safety considerations out the door in respect to pitch control failure mode analysis.

It may very well be that Boeing not only has to address the MCAS issues, but also the manual trim force at high speed with elevator in ANU.
Immigration officer: "What's the purpose of your visit to the USA?" Spotter: "Shooting airliners with my Canon!"
 
B737900ER
Posts: 1028
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 3:07 pm

clancy688 wrote:
ikramerica wrote:
Is a 200 hour FO going to be proficient?


Um... the 200 hours mean that he recently got out of training, right? And everyone says that this is a bad thing since he doesn't have any real flying experience, which will not help at all in such an accident.

But... is that really the case in *such* an accident like this? Isn't it maybe the other way around?

What does the pilot learn during flight school? I guess normal airplane operating stuff, but also lots of emergency things. What to do when certain pieces of equipment fail. Probably how to manually trim, too.

What does the pilot learn during his first few hundred or thousand hours as a commercial pilot? Accidents and incidents are rare, so... probably not that much which might have helped him in the situation he found himself in. Ferrying the plane from A to B, with not that many deviations from the norm.

My point being: Yes, he had no experience since he was just out of flight school and type certification. But precisely because he had so little real flying experience, all the emergency procedures might still have been very fresh in his head.

Personally I think the assumption that the FO didn't know that there's a handle to manually crank the trim wheels is ludicrous. I'll eat my shoes if that piece of equipment and how it's operated in emergency situations hasn't been taught in flight school and type certification, meaning very recently.


Correct me if I’m wrong, but he had 360 hours total. Not 360 hours on type. If it’s the former he didn’t know how to fly. You can’t earn a transport license in the US without 1500 hours. A lesson learned from previous incidents. You may have head knowledge, but you don’t know how to fly, at least not enough to be transporting hundreds of passengers
 
BEG2IAH
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 3:07 pm

The aircraft had an unreliable IAS. Why do you think the pilots never executed the unreliable airspeed memory items? This would have prevented the overspeed.
Flying at the cruising altitude is (mostly) boring. I wish all flights were nothing but endless take offs and landings every 10 minutes or so.
 
B737900ER
Posts: 1028
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 3:09 pm

PW100 wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:
MD80Ttail wrote:


I believe the Max is safe and will be safer as a result of the changes made. Very sad people died in the crashes but the root cause seems to be poor piloting decisions spurred by failures in automation and / or faulty equipment. The bottom line is both flights should never have become accidents....both could and should have landed safely. The decisions the pilots made ultimately sealed everyone’s fate. Yes Boeing made some poor engineering decisions but had the flight crews responded appropriately the outcomes would have been nothing more than an emergency landing.

In the ET accident we are learning the pilots made basic trim management mistakes. The Lion crew similar mistakes and an ill timed hand off of PF from the captain who was in control to the FO. Aviation. Navigate. Communicate. Previous accidents and incidents....the Embraer biz jet mid air w a 737.....the FO was flying and the captain elected not to take control of the plane and allow the FO...who was solidly in control and I believe had more hours on type...continue to be the PF. Smart decision. I question why the PF who was successfully controlling the plane handed control to the FO.

The pilots in both of the Max accidents made bad decisions and did not properly execute emergency procedures resulting in the crashes. Of course, had Boeing made different decisions many will argue...and I agree...but at the end if the day nothing we know about either flight should have resulted in a catastrophe.


The 737MAX is an unsafe airplane, that it is why it is grounded. Boeing made a bad decision when implementing MCAS. The crew followed the Boeing checklist regarding a trim run away event, in the way Boeing intended for MCAS failure. Guess what, not only did Boeing this crazy implementation of an automatic that tried to kill them, Boeing also provided unworkable instructions regarding what you should do, if MCAS would kick in due to a broken AoA sensor, or another failure.


Not only that, this MCAS debacle may have exposed another problem with the MAX (perhaps even also for the NG), namely that at certain parts of the approved flight envelope, manual trimming (hand spinning/cranking the wheel) may not be able to be performed by the average pilot, ie. unable to overcome aerodynamic loading. And that throws some important safety considerations out the door in respect to pitch control failure mode analysis.

It may very well be that Boeing not only has to address the MCAS issues, but also the manual trim force at high speed with elevator in ANU.

If you’re out of the flight envelope on any aircraft lots of things stop working as designed.
 
cat3appr50
Posts: 183
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 3:10 pm

I think Boeing aircraft are great (this does not in any way imply anything about Airbus, I think they are a great aircraft Company as well and have great aircraft) and think that they are in general very pilot user friendly and rock solid to fly. In addition, all should remember that throughout history Boeing has also designed, constructed, and placed into operation military aircraft, weapon systems, space systems, etc. that have made the world a safer place, and led to powerful technological knowledge from the space sector, etc. instrumental towards vast products, systems, processes, etc. utilized in the private sector arena. Boeing's accomplishments are vast, and their technology developments have positively influenced and been applied over a wide spectrum of offshoot technologies and sectors.

That being said, it is deeply troubling regarding this current Max 8 situation (MCAS, etc.) relative to the lives lost in both recent accidents, and IMO technology that should have been better scrutinized, reviewed, tested etc. before becoming commercially implemented. It seems that top level management may have been driving the implementation based more on schedule (for accelerated sales), and maybe some management “it’s good enough” high level influence was being pushed towards the engineering and design and operational testing teams as a result. The “performance” part of the normal engineering and management project pillars seems may have sadly been lacking. In the past this simply was not the case with Boeing, with a long history of tangible success. And as an American I am simply shocked, appalled, and very sad that the US FAA abdicated their regulatory responsibilities and had not thoroughly regulated the development (and testing, etc.) towards commercial operation of this new aircraft. This abdication of responsibilities IMO was unacceptable, whatever the root cause was.

It should never have come to this current situation of apparent public mistrust, considering Boeing's past and proven enormous successes and technological achievements, highest level of professionalism, attention to detail, etc. The FAA also has a monumental task now in restoring public confidence and trust that had existed with the agency and all of its dedicated professional employees since its founding in 1958 as the premier airline regulatory agency in the world.

Are test pilots going to fully and exhaustively complete a full functional test of the MCAS, etc. software fixes at all potential equipment, systems, and loading scenarios? I would think that saying the fix is done without test pilots thoroughly testing all scenarios in operational conditions and loading that commercial airlines will face, will be necessary to restore “trust.” And that includes commercial pilots randomly selected from various airlines testing same in Max 8 specific simulators, and giving the thumbs up. All just my opinion.
 
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767333ER
Posts: 1169
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 3:11 pm

MD80Ttail wrote:
I believe the Max is safe and will be safer as a result of the changes made. Very sad people died in the crashes but the root cause seems to be poor piloting decisions spurred by failures in automation and / or faulty equipment. The bottom line is both flights should never have become accidents....both could and should have landed safely. The decisions the pilots made ultimately sealed everyone’s fate. Yes Boeing made some poor engineering decisions but had the flight crews responded appropriately the outcomes would have been nothing more than an emergency landing.

In the case of Lion Air, I’m not sure what you think you know about their piloting decisions when the issue first off was literally nothing they’ve ever seen before and something they weren’t trained to deal with thanks to Boeing’s obviously deliberate “negligence” to include it in the differences training and manuals. And now the idea I’ve heard circulating now that the trim might have ended up failing before the crash. Someone who comes on here and says both planes could have and should have landed safely clearly just does not get how flying a plane in a situation like this works or just doesn’t get the situation in the first place. The real point is they should never have allowed the risk from this design to get to the point where it’s almost not humanly possible to mitigate the risk! I don’t know what your background is but when you have most pilots and all the ones I know saying this thing designed the way it is is a death trap, I think it’s pretty close to that.

MD80Ttail wrote:
In the ET accident we are learning the pilots made basic trim management mistakes. The Lion crew similar mistakes and an ill timed hand off of PF from the captain who was in control to the FO. Aviation. Navigate. Communicate. Previous accidents and incidents....the Embraer biz jet mid air w a 737.....the FO was flying and the captain elected not to take control of the plane and allow the FO...who was solidly in control and I believe had more hours on type...continue to be the PF. Smart decision. I question why the PF who was successfully controlling the plane handed control to the FO.

The pilots in both of the Max accidents made bad decisions and did not properly execute emergency procedures resulting in the crashes. Of course, had Boeing made different decisions many will argue...and I agree...but at the end if the day nothing we know about either flight should have resulted in a catastrophe.

What trim management mistakes when there is no trim anyway? Turn the power on, you’re fighting MCAS with your thumb switch that has limited authority, turn it off and you have “manual trim” which according to an engineer that was in charge of such things on the NG said at that point it was almost impossible for most pilots to use since they used a smaller trim wheel and different mechanics than the older 737.

Ultimately blaming the crew and considering them the variable that needs to be changed is flawed logic. Why change the inconsistent variable that will always be imperfect? You put another crew in there with different training, they might recover, they might not, we can’t sit here and refute that theywill be able to do it because we just don’t and can’t know. That’s why the constant variable shouldn’t be targeted which is Boeing’s design. Of course this can only be done if there is a design flaw (yes it is a flaw as per Merriam-Webster dictionary: an imperfection or weakness and especially one that detracts from the whole or hinders effectiveness) in the mix which there is. Take this away and you can be guaranteed none of these crashes would’ve happened because there would be no erroneous operation of the trim to have to deal with. A pilot should never have to fly a plane that literally is trying to crash itself, of course this does happen from time to time for various reasons, but when it’s because of lousy engineering, that’s the worst because that junk is flying off the assembly line at a rate of 50-60 a month all with the same flaw, not just one plane that got damaged and now is compromised.
Been on: 732 733 734 73G 738 752 763 A319 A320 A321 CRJ CR7 CRA/CR9 E145 E175 E190 F28 MD-82 MD-83 C172R C172S P2006T PA-28-180

2 ears for spatial hearing, 2 eyes for depth perception, 2 ears for balance... How did Boeing think 1 sensor was good enough?!
 
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PW100
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 3:12 pm

scbriml wrote:
ikramerica wrote:
There is an apparent error in the AoA disagree logic relating to MCAS though. It shouldn't operate during disagree. And thats something Boeing and the FAA will need to answer for.


An 'apparent error'? More euphemisms. The whole design and implementation of MCAS is simply appalling. It should never have been certified as it was.


And from now on, we shall call it the System for Characteristic Augmented Maneuvering.
Immigration officer: "What's the purpose of your visit to the USA?" Spotter: "Shooting airliners with my Canon!"
 
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PW100
Posts: 4109
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 3:14 pm

B737900ER wrote:
PW100 wrote:
Not only that, this MCAS debacle may have exposed another problem with the MAX (perhaps even also for the NG), namely that at certain parts of the approved flight envelope, manual trimming (hand spinning/cranking the wheel) may not be able to be performed by the average pilot, ie. unable to overcome aerodynamic loading. And that throws some important safety considerations out the door in respect to pitch control failure mode analysis.

It may very well be that Boeing not only has to address the MCAS issues, but also the manual trim force at high speed with elevator in ANU.

If you’re out of the flight envelope on any aircraft lots of things stop working as designed.


Sure, but there are strong indications that in the ET accident things (manual pitch trim) stopped working even within the flight envelope.
Immigration officer: "What's the purpose of your visit to the USA?" Spotter: "Shooting airliners with my Canon!"
 
djm18
Posts: 104
Joined: Mon Feb 24, 2014 6:19 pm

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 3:14 pm

A question which I have not seen specifically in any post or report. Who was flying the plane? I am assuming the captain as he was significantly more experienced. But at the same time he was the one with the issues on his side and it must be very hard to fly with the stick-shaker. Is this the case?

Sorry for the ignorance, just wanting to better understand. I remember that in the Lion Air flight the night before the captain had the same issues on his side but gave PIC authority to the FO.
 
starrion
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 3:17 pm

MD80Ttail wrote:
You can get a ppl today without ever having recovered from a spin. It’s not taught or required. It used to be a requirement. SMH. Lowering of standards and skills. It’s a snowball effect at all levels of aviation.


One of the discussions I had with my flight inspector was about spins. He said he had been adamant about teaching it until he saw the number of losses from when spins were being taught compared to other phases of training, and that those losses were usually fatal. Getting someone killed trying to teach them how not to be killed stopped making sense to him.
Knowledge Replaces Fear
 
morrisond
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 3:21 pm

PW100 wrote:
scbriml wrote:
ikramerica wrote:
There is an apparent error in the AoA disagree logic relating to MCAS though. It shouldn't operate during disagree. And thats something Boeing and the FAA will need to answer for.


An 'apparent error'? More euphemisms. The whole design and implementation of MCAS is simply appalling. It should never have been certified as it was.


And from now on, we shall call it the System for Characteristic Augmented Maneuvering.



Good one
 
morrisond
Posts: 2659
Joined: Thu Jan 07, 2010 12:22 am

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 3:22 pm

PW100 wrote:
B737900ER wrote:
PW100 wrote:
Not only that, this MCAS debacle may have exposed another problem with the MAX (perhaps even also for the NG), namely that at certain parts of the approved flight envelope, manual trimming (hand spinning/cranking the wheel) may not be able to be performed by the average pilot, ie. unable to overcome aerodynamic loading. And that throws some important safety considerations out the door in respect to pitch control failure mode analysis.

It may very well be that Boeing not only has to address the MCAS issues, but also the manual trim force at high speed with elevator in ANU.

If you’re out of the flight envelope on any aircraft lots of things stop working as designed.


Sure, but there are strong indications that in the ET accident things (manual pitch trim) stopped working even within the flight envelope.


I checked the timeline on the traces - it appears as though they were already over Vmo (meaning outside the approved flight envelope) when they tried the manual trim wheel - if it was the manual trim wheel they tried and not Manually flicking the Electric Trim Switch
 
MSPNWA
Posts: 3698
Joined: Thu Apr 23, 2009 2:48 am

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 3:26 pm

PW100 wrote:
Sure, but there are strong indications that in the ET accident things (manual pitch trim) stopped working even within the flight envelope.


No, the evidence doesn't tell us that. You're taking a guess, possibly because it fits your conclusion.
 
xmp125a
Posts: 292
Joined: Mon Mar 11, 2019 6:38 pm

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 3:28 pm

B737900ER wrote:
If you’re out of the flight envelope on any aircraft lots of things stop working as designed.


There is a claim by widely known flying instructor, that manual trim is unfeasible inside major parts of the flight envelope as well:

In subsequent discussions with MentourPilot, a YouTube channel with millions of viewers, I was informed this would probably not be true for higher speeds. MentourPilot’s experience when examining hundreds of pilots as Type Rating Examiner for the 737 was the elevator got exceedingly heavy at higher speeds and manual trimming at the slightest miss-trim of the Stabilator from neutral Yoke forces was very difficult.

He also pointed out the high speeds observed in ET302’s FlightRadar24 trace (Figure 1) were logical. It’s a consequence of following the Emergency checklist for “IAS disagree” (IAS is Indicated Airspeed, i.e. the dynamic air pressure experienced by the aircraft) after takeoff.


Source: https://leehamnews.com/2019/04/03/et302 ... stop-mcas/

So I would like to have your opinion on this, as for now it seems you are jumping to conclusions.
 
mjoelnir
Posts: 9391
Joined: Sun Feb 03, 2013 11:06 pm

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 3:30 pm

B737900ER wrote:
PW100 wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:

The 737MAX is an unsafe airplane, that it is why it is grounded. Boeing made a bad decision when implementing MCAS. The crew followed the Boeing checklist regarding a trim run away event, in the way Boeing intended for MCAS failure. Guess what, not only did Boeing this crazy implementation of an automatic that tried to kill them, Boeing also provided unworkable instructions regarding what you should do, if MCAS would kick in due to a broken AoA sensor, or another failure.


Not only that, this MCAS debacle may have exposed another problem with the MAX (perhaps even also for the NG), namely that at certain parts of the approved flight envelope, manual trimming (hand spinning/cranking the wheel) may not be able to be performed by the average pilot, ie. unable to overcome aerodynamic loading. And that throws some important safety considerations out the door in respect to pitch control failure mode analysis.

It may very well be that Boeing not only has to address the MCAS issues, but also the manual trim force at high speed with elevator in ANU.

If you’re out of the flight envelope on any aircraft lots of things stop working as designed.


It is very clear that the trim with the trim wheel does not work everywhere inside the flight envelope and that all the way back to the 737-200. Since than changing to a smaller diameter wheel has made using the wheel to trim still more difficult.
 
SimonL
Posts: 56
Joined: Tue Mar 12, 2019 3:38 pm

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 3:32 pm

MSPNWA wrote:
PW100 wrote:
Sure, but there are strong indications that in the ET accident things (manual pitch trim) stopped working even within the flight envelope.


No, the evidence doesn't tell us that. You're taking a guess, possibly because it fits your conclusion.



I would say that there are, based on previous posts, indication that both the Electrical an mechanical trim could become hard to operate within the flight envelope. EASA had concerns about the electrical trim at higher speeds and we also know that the manual trim can be hard to use. There are most likely no hard boundary where the trims stop working so its hard to say exactly at what speed it happens. I also guess that noone have really tried to find out..

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