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SimonL
Posts: 56
Joined: Tue Mar 12, 2019 3:38 pm

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 6:07 pm

A bit OT but i looked at the requirements Ethiopian have on external pilots when recruiting.
For a NG captain:
Must hold a current and valid JAA/FAA or ICAO ATPL/CPL
A current 737 NG type rating
Minimum Flight time
3500 hours jet time
2500 hours Pilot in command on jet aircraft
Command time in excess of 500 hours on 737 NG

And for First officer on 777/787

Must hold a current and valid JAA/FAA or ICAO ATPL/CPL
A current B777/787 type rating
Minimum flight time:
3500 hours on Multiengine
500 hours on B777/787
 
xmp125a
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 6:08 pm

morrisond wrote:
That doesn't seem like quality training to me. Is everyone else fine with the Quality of Training Worldwide given what we have seen in the last number of accidents?


I can agree with this. Especially training for 737MAX seems horribly inadequate. But again, onus is on airplane manufacturer and FAA to define PROPER requirements for training.
 
xmp125a
Posts: 292
Joined: Mon Mar 11, 2019 6:38 pm

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 6:11 pm

SimonL wrote:
Did any checklist or procedure suggest that they should have?


It does. Issued after Lion Air crash and does not even mention flaps. Anywhere.

https://www.aviationtoday.com/wp-conten ... rgency.pdf

So either this is big omission and negligence by FAA and Boeing or there is a reason that flaps are not to be attempted as remedy.
 
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speedbored
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobiq

Fri Apr 05, 2019 6:16 pm

morrisond wrote:
But they didn't follow Boeing's procedures - they didn't bring the nose up to Neutral Trim before disengaging Electric Trim - they were Overspeed (didn't follow the procedure to set Power at 75% N1 in case of erroneous Airspeed indications) and they turned Electric Trim back on and neglected to turn it right back off. It's hard to believe that had a good understanding of the system, the procedures or the Memo.

But Boeing's "procedure doesn't say "bring the nose up to Neutral Trim before disengaging Electric Trim"; that is only added as a footnote. Seems to me that the data shows that the pilots followed the procedure as written, found it to be unworkable, and then went back and tried it again including the footnote.

The data is also consistent with attempting to follow the unreliable airspeed checklist, but that also seems to have failed them at the point where they are required to set thrust and attitude - looks to me like they were struggling with persuading the aircraft to hold the required attitude. I don't have the tables to hand but I'd be surprised if 75% N1 is the correct thrust setting for the altitude they were at, or phase of flight that they were in.
 
morrisond
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Joined: Thu Jan 07, 2010 12:22 am

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 6:17 pm

SheikhDjibouti wrote:
morrisond wrote:
PW100 wrote:

Sure, but there are strong indications that in the ET accident things (manual pitch trim) stopped working even within the flight envelope.


I checked the timeline on the traces - it appears as though they were already over Vmo (meaning outside the approved flight envelope) when they tried the manual trim wheel - if it was the manual trim wheel they tried and not Manually flicking the Electric Trim Switch

You have totally ignored the point I made about IAS discrepancies even though they are staring you in the face on the graph!
One of the traces on the graph shows Vmo, the other shows a figure 20-25kts over Vmo.

I'll ask the question again; why would anybody choose one figure and ignore the other, except to promote their own agenda?


Because the one that was reading under was the one that was damaged?
 
B737900ER
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 6:17 pm

MD80Ttail wrote:
xmp125a wrote:
MD80Ttail wrote:
I have stated this before but no one has discussed.....if I was in the ET cockpit...and I had considered this before the ET crash after learning from the lion accident.....I would have lowered flaps to disable the MCAS while still allowing use of the electric trim. Thoughts?


You would tear off the flaps IF you could even extend them at unsafe aerodynamic pressure (I would assume system does not allow that). Even worse, you would partially tear of only one of them, sending plane into unrecoverable spin and end up as pile of smoking debris on the ground, with investigators wondering what the hell were you doing when extending flaps at 300kts, let alone 400kts.

http://www.b737.org.uk/flapspeedschedule.htm¡

Are you really an airline pilot?!



Wow. Can’t believe I have to explain in such detail. The Mcas issue started when flaps were retracted. One of the basic rules of flying is if you take an action and the plane doesn’t like it undo said action. The IAS problems started immediately after take off and the MCAS problems where flaps were retracted. I would have immediately redeployed the flaps after retracting them and having an issue -or- would have never retracted them in the beginning in this situation knowing it would engage MCAS. Which they should have known after the Lion crash. Then fly pitch and power for said configuration. Before the flaps “rip” off you will get some nice buffeting as a warning btw.

It’s frustrating today every little detail has to be explained. One would think the premise is easy to understand.

MD80Ttail, look you’re going to have to give it up. Your experience and facts bring nothing to this discussion. The determination has been made by all of the enthusiasts here who have never flown or been around aviation in a professional capacity but clearly know what their talking about because Reuters, CNN, and the NYT have so clearly explained this complex situation in 30 seconds or less. Let me spell it out for you. The pilots were heros. Boeing knowingly tried to kill people. Just jump on that train and you’ll be ok.
 
xmp125a
Posts: 292
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobiq

Fri Apr 05, 2019 6:24 pm

morrisond wrote:
But they didn't follow Boeing's procedures - they didn't bring the nose up to Neutral Trim before disengaging Electric Trim


Of course when plane pitches down for 9 seconds at LOW altitude, then you perhaps don't have ability or time to first trim it up and disengage, because the next downtrim could kill you. Which is exactly what happened after they reenabled the electric trim later!
- they were Overspeed (didn't follow the procedure to set Power at 75% N1 in case of erroneous Airspeed indications)

Was there erroneous Airspeed indication? Is AoA considered Airspeed indication? Isn't that the Pitot tube, which was not affected in any way?

and they turned Electric Trim back on and neglected to turn it right back off.


Again everybody is forgetting that they were WAY lower than LionAir pilots. They were desperate to trim it up, manual trim did not work, and mountains were ahead! Turn it back off and what then? The pilot was pulling the column as strong as possible, manual trim was impossible to engage, and there was MCAS monster waiting for them if they reenabled electrical trim!

They had to pick one of the options, none of them was good, and for two of them they were already tested to not help (column, manual trim). So electric trim with MCAS monster in the shadow was the only choice after checklist ran out.
 
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scbriml
Posts: 18971
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 6:24 pm

MD80Ttail wrote:
Could Boeing have done better w MCAS. Sure.


A masterpiece of understatement.

MD80Ttail wrote:
It’s frustrating today every little detail has to be explained. One would think the premise is easy to understand.


Patience is a virtue. How else can us mere mortals learn from such an obviously superior pilot?
Time flies like an arrow. Fruit flies like a banana!
There are 10 types of people in the World - those that understand binary and those that don't.
 
Planetalk
Posts: 470
Joined: Thu Aug 27, 2015 5:12 pm

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 6:26 pm

MD80Ttail wrote:
“” How about bowing to brave pilots from Ethiopia who paid the ultimate price for being the unplanned test pilots on badly designed procedure?””

Seriously? I don’t bow to anyone and no American bows. We fought a little war called the Revolutionary War to settle that debate.

Look, I fly for a living. That doesn’t mean these Max pilots get a free pass. In both crashes the planes were flyable and the crews failed to do so. Other flight crews had the same scenario and managed it perfectly. They landed. It’s that simple. Aviation is footnoted with many cases of pilots, even experienced ones, flying a perfectly good airplane or an airplane with a minor problem totally into the ground. Could Boeing have done better w MCAS. Sure. But the fact is the both of these planes should have landed safely.

Sadly these two crews didn’t get the right answer. To the person saying maybe the pilots were confused with the two switches ect and were experimenting turning them on and off I don’t buy it at all in the ET crash. IF that was the case then the ET crew was completely and totally incompetent. IF it happened the the Lion crew (and we have no reason to believe it did at this point) it’s justifiable they could have been confused. They are not switches used during normal ops. However and this is a HUGE HOWEVER after the Lion crash every single Max pilot should have known exactly the function of each switch and been intimately familiar with MCAS, procedures and the precise function and wiring of BOTH switches. If the ET crew didnt whoooooa. That’s really really bad on so many levels. I don’t believe that’s the case. I believe they knew or certainly had access to the proper information. They just didn’t execute as needed.


So your opinion does not come from any clear rational analysis of the situation, but blind patriotism. 'No American bows?' Seriously? They used a turn of phrase everyone knows to refer to showing respect and in this case to professional aviators who died trying to save themselves and their passengers and you take it as some slight on American pride? You seem to still be fighting that war. Lose that chip on your shoulder. Boeing have already effectively bowed to those who perished in their statements, perhaps you could try showing similar class?

The world's aviation authorities have agreed there is a problem with the plane. Boeing has agreed there is a problem with the plane. Boeing are no longer even trying to defend it, I can assure you if they felt there was the slightest chance this wasn't on them they wouldn't be publicly accepting fault, for well known legal reasons.

The report shows the pilots didn't make any of the mistakes the vastly superior pilots here were claiming they made without a shred of evidence. Because hey, they're not American and that's all the proof we need they got it wrong. These pilots seem to have known their machine a damn sight better than the guy who snapped the tail off his because he couldn't use the rudder. And now the efforts to blame them get more and more desperate. Give it up. You may think you make the odd clever claim but you're on a little known forum on the internet. Your efforts will make not an iota of difference in the real world where the causes will be assigned according to reason, not national pride. Get some humanity.

Yes we can discuss that there are things the pilots could have done that might have saved it. But expressing that as 'they are idiots for not doing this particular thing amidst it all, and any good pilot would have done' when they appear to have tried damn hard, in a plane which the world has now agreed was not airworthy at the time, is frankly contemptible and reflects on you. In years to come these pilots names will be remembered and they will likely be honoured. How about you?
 
xmp125a
Posts: 292
Joined: Mon Mar 11, 2019 6:38 pm

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 6:30 pm

B737900ER wrote:
MD80Ttail, look you’re going to have to give it up. Your experience and facts bring nothing to this discussion. The determination has been made by all of the enthusiasts here who have never flown or been around aviation in a professional capacity but clearly know what their talking about because Reuters, CNN, and the NYT have so clearly explained this complex situation in 30 seconds or less. Let me spell it out for you. The pilots were heros. Boeing knowingly tried to kill people. Just jump on that train and you’ll be ok.


No. We appreciate any information from real pilots.

It is just the smug 20/20 attitude that bothers us. Because we could be sitting on such aircraft one day and the jock attitude that does not consider all real world factors that the pilots faced makes us nervous. Bring "NO 737MAX desired" option to airline ticket searching engines then!

You, big, smart, above average pilots then fly 737MAX and brag about this, but we will choose Airbus or other Boeing planes as passengers instead.
 
Amexair
Posts: 56
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 6:30 pm

MD80Ttail wrote:
767333ER wrote:
MD80Ttail wrote:
I believe the Max is safe and will be safer as a result of the changes made. Very sad people died in the crashes but the root cause seems to be poor piloting decisions spurred by failures in automation and / or faulty equipment. The bottom line is both flights should never have become accidents....both could and should have landed safely. The decisions the pilots made ultimately sealed everyone’s fate. Yes Boeing made some poor engineering decisions but had the flight crews responded appropriately the outcomes would have been nothing more than an emergency landing.

In the case of Lion Air, I’m not sure what you think you know about their piloting decisions when the issue first off was literally nothing they’ve ever seen before and something they weren’t trained to deal with thanks to Boeing’s obviously deliberate “negligence” to include it in the differences training and manuals. And now the idea I’ve heard circulating now that the trim might have ended up failing before the crash. Someone who comes on here and says both planes could have and should have landed safely clearly just does not get how flying a plane in a situation like this works or just doesn’t get the situation in the first place. The real point is they should never have allowed the risk from this design to get to the point where it’s almost not humanly possible to mitigate the risk! I don’t know what your background is but when you have most pilots and all the ones I know saying this thing designed the way it is is a death trap, I think it’s pretty close to that.

MD80Ttail wrote:
In the ET accident we are learning the pilots made basic trim management mistakes. The Lion crew similar mistakes and an ill timed hand off of PF from the captain who was in control to the FO. Aviation. Navigate. Communicate. Previous accidents and incidents....the Embraer biz jet mid air w a 737.....the FO was flying and the captain elected not to take control of the plane and allow the FO...who was solidly in control and I believe had more hours on type...continue to be the PF. Smart decision. I question why the PF who was successfully controlling the plane handed control to the FO.

The pilots in both of the Max accidents made bad decisions and did not properly execute emergency procedures resulting in the crashes. Of course, had Boeing made different decisions many will argue...and I agree...but at the end if the day nothing we know about either flight should have resulted in a catastrophe.

What trim management mistakes when there is no trim anyway? Turn the power on, you’re fighting MCAS with your thumb switch that has limited authority, turn it off and you have “manual trim” which according to an engineer that was in charge of such things on the NG said at that point it was almost impossible for most pilots to use since they used a smaller trim wheel and different mechanics than the older 737.

Ultimately blaming the crew and considering them the variable that needs to be changed is flawed logic. Why change the inconsistent variable that will always be imperfect? You put another crew in there with different training, they might recover, they might not, we can’t sit here and refute that theywill be able to do it because we just don’t and can’t know. That’s why the constant variable shouldn’t be targeted which is Boeing’s design. Of course this can only be done if there is a design flaw (yes it is a flaw as per Merriam-Webster dictionary: an imperfection or weakness and especially one that detracts from the whole or hinders effectiveness) in the mix which there is. Take this away and you can be guaranteed none of these crashes would’ve happened because there would be no erroneous operation of the trim to have to deal with. A pilot should never have to fly a plane that literally is trying to crash itself, of course this does happen from time to time for various reasons, but when it’s because of lousy engineering, that’s the worst because that junk is flying off the assembly line at a rate of 50-60 a month all with the same flaw, not just one plane that got damaged and now is compromised.


Here’s what I know in Lion. The captain was PF. He was successfully controlling a plane with multiple issues for several minutes. He was able to override MCAS by making trim up inputs. They had issues BUT they were flying. The plane was somewhat stable and I use that term loosely but the point is he WAS in control for several minutes. How do I know this? If he wasn’t they would have crashed sooner. He hands off flying duties to the FO. The FO does not employ the same previously successful techniques as the captain had moments and minutes before. The plane becomes out of control and crashes. I also know there are procedures in place on the Max, the 737 and every single plane equipped with electric trim...since electric trim was invented.....which should be a memory item and should have been sufficient to disable MCAS. I know at least one previous Lion flight crew had a mirror situation on the previous flight and they properly handled the situation and made a safe landing. To say this was an impossible situation the Lion pilots faced is just completely wrong. Would we say AF447 faced an impossible situation? It was also a known situation as the plane had experienced multiple prior failures of the same or similar nature. Information the fatal crew had the benefit of knowing the previous crews did not have. Further we know the previous crew was successful but what we don’t know or haven’t learned....or I don’t know at least....is how many of the other 4-5 previous flight crews also had the same or similar situation and handled it properly. We know there were issues but not how severe. Possibly we had multiple flight crew properly manage the same issue. We do know for sure the previous flight crew had things come completely off the rails and they managed the situation properly.

We know with the ET flight the crew turned the trim on and off. What I don’t understand and makes no sense is why they would not return the plane to a properly trimmed state before again shutting off the trim. They almost had a successful outcome but botched the procedure. Kind of an “the operation was a success but the patient died” scenario. In this case and I have been very vocal about the 150-200 hrs FO not having enough experience for this set of circumstances......the crew didn’t make good decisions. They knew about MCAS...don’t tell me a single Max pilot in the world didn’t know about Mcas after the Lion accident. I will not believe you unless the max pilot was in a coma. Every Max, and every non Max pilot knew. I know the ET plane was capable of flying, it had wings, control surfaces, power ect. All of the ingredients. Again the crew managed the Mcas issue partially. They successfully handled it, used the proper procedures and the. Turned back on the system. Ok fine. Probably needed the electric trim. Makes sense. What doesn’t is why after trimming the plane they didn’t disable the system? Knowing what I learned after the Lion crash I probably would have elected to extend the flaps knowing MCAS is disabled AND I had the benefit of full electric trim.

Having a 200 hr guy in the right seat certainly wasn’t an asset to the flight no matter how you want to justify it. All they had to do was trim the plane neutral or slightly nose up and fly pitch and power on a bright, clear sunny day and land. It was that simple and it was that hard.



As crew, your job is not to sit and follow-up on Air investigations as they are happening. Your role is simply to follow operational procedures normal/non-normal and try your best to troubleshoot an issues as they arise. Putting the trim to a "properly trim state" was not indicated in Boeing's Bulletin/ FAA's AD. Unfortunately, the reason is - it would have required additional SIM time since the RUNAWAY TRIM NNC would require revision.

The crew did the best they possibly could. In every situation its always easy to look back and say of "they could have done this/that". At the end of the day, they followed procedure and it did not work, period. So, if that doesn't prove that to you then I don't know what will. I recall saying the same thing to someone on this thread when he was so sure that all they had to do was "Cut-off the Trim switches". Guess what, now we realized that they did then its time we shift our eyes to your lovely Boeing company that you're so passionately defending.

Maybe, we can reenact the whole situation and put you on the controls in the SIM idk.
 
morrisond
Posts: 2648
Joined: Thu Jan 07, 2010 12:22 am

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobiq

Fri Apr 05, 2019 6:33 pm

speedbored wrote:
morrisond wrote:
But they didn't follow Boeing's procedures - they didn't bring the nose up to Neutral Trim before disengaging Electric Trim - they were Overspeed (didn't follow the procedure to set Power at 75% N1 in case of erroneous Airspeed indications) and they turned Electric Trim back on and neglected to turn it right back off. It's hard to believe that had a good understanding of the system, the procedures or the Memo.

But Boeing's "procedure doesn't say "bring the nose up to Neutral Trim before disengaging Electric Trim"; that is only added as a footnote. Seems to me that the data shows that the pilots followed the procedure as written, found it to be unworkable, and then went back and tried it again including the footnote.

The data is also consistent with attempting to follow the unreliable airspeed checklist, but that also seems to have failed them at the point where they are required to set thrust and attitude - looks to me like they were struggling with persuading the aircraft to hold the required attitude. I don't have the tables to hand but I'd be surprised if 75% N1 is the correct thrust setting for the altitude they were at, or phase of flight that they were in.


I got this off the other Forum for the NG - apparently it applies to almost all Boeing Models

"A few days back I received a new procedure in my 737 QRH, for airspeed unreliable. We now have a set of thrust settings in combination with a specific pitch attitude, as memory items.
Config flaps up: 4 degrees pitch up, and 75% N1
Config flaps extended: 10 degrees pitch up and 80% N1

Boeing has introduced this for most if not all of their types. I'll simply let Boeing answer this for you:

These pitch and power settings provide a simple reference setting for the crew to use for a short period of time while the initial steps of the checklist are accomplished. These settings do not ensure a level flight or constant airspeed at any particular altitude/airspeed/weight combination. However, they do ensure that at any and all weight/altitude combinations, the aircraft will accelerate from low speeds, and slow from a high speeds, as we cannot assume the aircraft is in stable flight when the NNC is run. It is more likely that the crew or the autopilot has destabilized the airplane as a result of erroneous airspeed indications prior to identification of the need to run the NNC. These memory item pitch and power settings often result in a significant climb (from lower altitudes) and can also result in a gradual descent (from higher altitudes)."

This is a memory item for 737 Pilots and given the low altitude (relative to flying above 30,000') they were at should have produced a climb.

Apparently it was in response to AF447.

It looks like ET302 were trying to hold 4 Degrees but they didn't reduce to 75% N1
Last edited by morrisond on Fri Apr 05, 2019 6:36 pm, edited 1 time in total.
 
mandala499
Posts: 6593
Joined: Wed Aug 29, 2001 8:47 pm

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 6:33 pm

Waterbomber2 wrote:
The CEO recording that video is a good first step, they promise to get the fix right.

I had the opportunity to discuss this with some PR consultants, international journalists, and (former and current) airline executives today in Jakarta... their reactions were... not good. To which I agree somewhat.
They see the video as being too little too late. He wasn't looking at the camera and it was obvious he was reading the statement. One journalist mentioned, "For God's sake get a teleprompter so that he can look sincere and look into the camera!"

morrisond wrote:
That is just wrong and should not be considered sufficient experience in any shape or form. In Canada you would need Hundred's (300-400) hours to accumulate all those ratings and then at least another 1,000 hours or so before you graduated to a 737 as FO.

If you are good with that standard of training then fine - but I am not.

Try and tell that to the Europeans and their cadetship program... And yeah, stay away from those European airlines who employ pilots fresh out of their cadetship programme with less than 500hrs to fly an A320/B737.

morrisond wrote:
How would you feel about getting in an 737 at 250 hours the pilot being incapacitated at night in IFR conditions over water coming into an unfamiliar airport and having some of the electronic systems not working?

1. They're trained to deal with pilot incap, under those conditions, without the "some of the electronic systems not working" part.
2. They usually fly with a safety co-pilot as a 3rd pilot for not so few hours.
3. If my memory serves me right, your scenario has happened with a 300-500hr pilot on a 737 once here... the plane didn't crash. He landed safely, and yes, with at least one of the aircraft systems not working or faulty.

benjjk wrote:
I'd just like to point out that the FO had 361 total hours (interestingly 263 were on the 737).

Something's not quite right here. 361 hours total is OK (low, but nothing unusual for a lot of countries)... the 263hrs on the 737 is the main worry.
That means his flight training prior to the 737 was only... 98 hours.
My question on this is, did he go through the MPL path? Because if he went through the normal PPL CPL ME IR path, 98 hours would mean he has a basic CPL probably with no IR and no ME. I wonder if the investigation will reveal more on this aspect in the final report.

morrisond wrote:
In the past on similar aircraft with similar control manual control systems (707, early 737) Yo-Yo like manoeuvres were taught to releave aerodynamic pressure on controls so things like manual trim could be used if you were flying too fast and the loads were too high.

This is a quote from a Commercial Captain based in the UK on the other forum "Turning the wheel was on my type rating course, but featured only one other time in my run of recurrent sims."

Why are neither not part of 737 Primary training or recurrent training?

The early 737s and the current 737s, has the same flight controls (albeit with STS on the NG and also now MCAS on the Max)... there is not much different.

You seem to be worried about lack of training... at a time when accidents and serious incidents are on a very low rate (albeit 2018 and 2019 seems to be 2 bad years in a row compared with recent years). The numbers are very low, for a reason, built on experience built by the industry over the past few decades.

morrisond wrote:
However whatever the MCAS fix - parts will fail and it appears 737 pilots need more training Worldwide on how to control it without the Electronic helpers.

Without electronic helpers such as?
Flight with manual trim, is part of the 737 training and recurrent at Lion Air (from before the Max crash), including runaway stabilizer training. They do flight with no hydraulics too...

MD80Ttail wrote:
I have stated this before but no one has discussed.....if I was in the ET cockpit...and I had considered this before the ET crash after learning from the lion accident.....I would have lowered flaps to disable the MCAS while still allowing use of the electric trim. Thoughts?

I wrote soemthing like this about how to disable MCAS, but forgot at which topic...
I think after the Lion Air Crash, Boeing should have made the AOA DISAGREE warning on the Max as standard, then, if you have an AOA disagree on take off, then you continue the airspeed disagree pitch and power for climb, AND do not retract flaps to up, and after you level off and figure out what's going on, land ASAP. I think that procedure, may have prevented this ET crash... but Boeing didn't make this as the procedure... they published what they published instead, which may have led to the challenges faced by the ET accident pilots.

The question in ET's case vs the JT043 and JT610 case, was why in ET's case they allowed their speed to be built rapidly, while the other 2 cases, they kept to within the normal climb schedule...

[quote="morrisond']But they didn't follow Boeing's procedures - they didn't bring the nose up to Neutral Trim before disengaging Electric Trim -[/quote]
Can someone point out to me where this is in the published Boeing procedure?
When losing situational awareness, pray Cumulus Granitus isn't nearby !
 
mig17
Posts: 305
Joined: Thu Aug 11, 2016 8:34 am

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 6:37 pm

B737900ER wrote:
MD80Ttail wrote:
xmp125a wrote:

You would tear off the flaps IF you could even extend them at unsafe aerodynamic pressure (I would assume system does not allow that). Even worse, you would partially tear of only one of them, sending plane into unrecoverable spin and end up as pile of smoking debris on the ground, with investigators wondering what the hell were you doing when extending flaps at 300kts, let alone 400kts.

http://www.b737.org.uk/flapspeedschedule.htm¡

Are you really an airline pilot?!



Wow. Can’t believe I have to explain in such detail. The Mcas issue started when flaps were retracted. One of the basic rules of flying is if you take an action and the plane doesn’t like it undo said action. The IAS problems started immediately after take off and the MCAS problems where flaps were retracted. I would have immediately redeployed the flaps after retracting them and having an issue -or- would have never retracted them in the beginning in this situation knowing it would engage MCAS. Which they should have known after the Lion crash. Then fly pitch and power for said configuration. Before the flaps “rip” off you will get some nice buffeting as a warning btw.

It’s frustrating today every little detail has to be explained. One would think the premise is easy to understand.

MD80Ttail, look you’re going to have to give it up. Your experience and facts bring nothing to this discussion. The determination has been made by all of the enthusiasts here who have never flown or been around aviation in a professional capacity but clearly know what their talking about because Reuters, CNN, and the NYT have so clearly explained this complex situation in 30 seconds or less. Let me spell it out for you. The pilots were heros. Boeing knowingly tried to kill people. Just jump on that train and you’ll be ok.

Oh but the pilots made a big mistake. While trying to execute Boeing's stupid procedure, they "forgot" to fly the airplane, espacially the forgot to managed their speed ...
Speed which amplified so much the effect of MCAS that it was impossible to save the plane in only seconds.
But the fact remains that the MCAS is right now a system capable to fly an aircraft directly into the ground against the inputs of it's crew. It is a bad design and combine with faulty instrumentation it is deadly. A system acting against the crew will accaparate the crew attention, it is human and this system does it to much to often ... Every crew can and will make mistakes. You can't let such an aircraft fly without a huge fix.
727 AT, 737 UX/SK/TO/SS, 747 UT/AF/SQ/BA/SS, 767 UA, 777 AF, A300 IW/TG, A310 EK, A318/19/20/21 AF/U2/VY, A332/3 EK/QR/TX, A343 AF, A388 AF, E145/170/190 A5/WF, Q400 WF, ATR 72 A5/TX, CRJ100/700/1000 A5, C-150/172, PC-6.
 
mxaxai
Posts: 1772
Joined: Sat Jun 18, 2016 7:29 am

Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 6:41 pm

xmp125a wrote:
SimonL wrote:
Did any checklist or procedure suggest that they should have?


It does. Issued after Lion Air crash and does not even mention flaps. Anywhere.

https://www.aviationtoday.com/wp-conten ... rgency.pdf

So either this is big omission and negligence by FAA and Boeing or there is a reason that flaps are not to be attempted as remedy.

The pilots' job is to safely land the aircraft. You shouldn't add unneccesary complexity by describing multiple ways to solve a single problem. Boeing decided that "stab trim cutout" is the way to go to disable MCAS. And apparently, it did disable MCAS successfully.

Troubleshooting the system is not part of a pilot's job. You cannot expect every pilot to have detailed knowledge of every aircraft system and its operating modes. Nor is it a good idea to improvise stuff in a stressful environment, only seconds away from potential death. So the pilot follows procedures to return the aircraft to a safe state, and only after landing do the maintenance guys (and girls) get a shot at analysing the underlying issue.
 
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speedbored
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobiq

Fri Apr 05, 2019 6:42 pm

morrisond wrote:
speedbored wrote:
morrisond wrote:
But they didn't follow Boeing's procedures - they didn't bring the nose up to Neutral Trim before disengaging Electric Trim - they were Overspeed (didn't follow the procedure to set Power at 75% N1 in case of erroneous Airspeed indications) and they turned Electric Trim back on and neglected to turn it right back off. It's hard to believe that had a good understanding of the system, the procedures or the Memo.

But Boeing's "procedure doesn't say "bring the nose up to Neutral Trim before disengaging Electric Trim"; that is only added as a footnote. Seems to me that the data shows that the pilots followed the procedure as written, found it to be unworkable, and then went back and tried it again including the footnote.

The data is also consistent with attempting to follow the unreliable airspeed checklist, but that also seems to have failed them at the point where they are required to set thrust and attitude - looks to me like they were struggling with persuading the aircraft to hold the required attitude. I don't have the tables to hand but I'd be surprised if 75% N1 is the correct thrust setting for the altitude they were at, or phase of flight that they were in.


I got this off the other Forum for the NG - apparently it applies to almost all Boeing Models

"A few days back I received a new procedure in my 737 QRH, for airspeed unreliable. We now have a set of thrust settings in combination with a specific pitch attitude, as memory items.
Config flaps up: 4 degrees pitch up, and 75% N1
Config flaps extended: 10 degrees pitch up and 80% N1

Boeing has introduced this for most if not all of their types. I'll simply let Boeing answer this for you:

These pitch and power settings provide a simple reference setting for the crew to use for a short period of time while the initial steps of the checklist are accomplished. These settings do not ensure a level flight or constant airspeed at any particular altitude/airspeed/weight combination. However, they do ensure that at any and all weight/altitude combinations, the aircraft will accelerate from low speeds, and slow from a high speeds, as we cannot assume the aircraft is in stable flight when the NNC is run. It is more likely that the crew or the autopilot has destabilized the airplane as a result of erroneous airspeed indications prior to identification of the need to run the NNC. These memory item pitch and power settings often result in a significant climb (from lower altitudes) and can also result in a gradual descent (from higher altitudes)."

This is a memory item for 737 Pilots and given the low altitude (relative to flying above 30,000') they were at should have produced a climb.

Apparently it was in response to AF447.

It looks like ET302 were trying to hold 4 Degrees but they didn't reduce to 75% N1

At takeoff, they should have had >90% N1 set. Going by your specified "memory items", they should then have reduced this to 75% N1 after the flaps came up. But, before they got as far as reducing thrust to 75% N1, MCAS kicked in and started messing with their pitch, so they worked on that first by following the AD / runaway trim procedure. They never got the chance to get back onto the unreliable airspeed checklist to reduce their thrust.
 
chicawgo
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobiq

Fri Apr 05, 2019 6:42 pm

remcor wrote:
MD80Ttail wrote:
remcor wrote:

You're like the guy in that Sully movie who is like 'why couldn't you land at Teterboro? you could have made the runway had your decision-making process been better.'


No I’m not. Sully and his crew made the absolute best decision and the outcome proves he was correct. Often the difference between a good decision and bad decision is outcome. I do not believe sully could have made any other successful decision that he did with the circumstances he was dealt. I still order a “Sully” often when I’m out w friends in the industry. It’s a double shot of great goose and a splash of water.


He totaled a perfectly good plane and put people's lives at risk, and people got injured. He could have a boat or underwater pier something. Simulations show if he did everything perfectly he could have made a runway and that plane would still be flying today. So apply the same standard to him.

It was about 3 minutes from first MCAS input to the crash. They were pretty low the whole time. Boeing's proscribed procedures failed to correct the problem, because Boeing didn't predict what is now obvious, that manually trimming may be extremely difficult or impossible. Had they known this - or perhaps been willing to hear it - they should have grounded the MAX fleet immediately after JT610.


Um... no... both engines failed and they had no thrust. That's not a perfectly good plane. Nice try.
 
kalvado
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 6:52 pm

Etheereal wrote:
SheikhDjibouti wrote:
kalvado wrote:
But they were dangerously underspeed, as proven by stick shaker!

Damn - you beat me to it! :lol:

(strictly speaking it's a stall warning as opposed to underspeed per se)

Are you as frustrated as me with all these answers that make it all seem so easy......?

Excuse me, wasnt precisely the stick shaker active because the Captain side's AoA had a 76° pitch up nose up indicator?

The FO side was overspeeding instead.

There is no AOA or AOA disagree indicator. All there is is a pair of different airspeeds - and a plane trying to jump out of control, with stall warning on one side, overspeed on the other, and jumpy flight which could be the stall buffet.
How do they know which airspeed is the true one?
 
SimonL
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobiq

Fri Apr 05, 2019 6:56 pm

chicawgo wrote:
remcor wrote:
MD80Ttail wrote:

No I’m not. Sully and his crew made the absolute best decision and the outcome proves he was correct. Often the difference between a good decision and bad decision is outcome. I do not believe sully could have made any other successful decision that he did with the circumstances he was dealt. I still order a “Sully” often when I’m out w friends in the industry. It’s a double shot of great goose and a splash of water.


He totaled a perfectly good plane and put people's lives at risk, and people got injured. He could have a boat or underwater pier something. Simulations show if he did everything perfectly he could have made a runway and that plane would still be flying today. So apply the same standard to him.

It was about 3 minutes from first MCAS input to the crash. They were pretty low the whole time. Boeing's proscribed procedures failed to correct the problem, because Boeing didn't predict what is now obvious, that manually trimming may be extremely difficult or impossible. Had they known this - or perhaps been willing to hear it - they should have grounded the MAX fleet immediately after JT610.


Um... no... both engines failed and they had no thrust. That's not a perfectly good plane.


And a plane trying to push itself down while the stick shaker is active is also not a perfectly good plane...
 
Planetalk
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobiq

Fri Apr 05, 2019 6:57 pm

MD80Ttail wrote:
remcor wrote:
MD80Ttail wrote:

No I’m not. Sully and his crew made the absolute best decision and the outcome proves he was correct. Often the difference between a good decision and bad decision is outcome. I do not believe sully could have made any other successful decision that he did with the circumstances he was dealt. I still order a “Sully” often when I’m out w friends in the industry. It’s a double shot of great goose and a splash of water.


He totaled a perfectly good plane and put people's lives at risk, and people got injured. He could have a boat or underwater pier something. Simulations show if he did everything perfectly he could have made a runway and that plane would still be flying today. So apply the same standard to him.

It was about 3 minutes from first MCAS input to the crash. They were pretty low the whole time. Boeing's proscribed procedures failed to correct the problem, because Boeing didn't predict what is now obvious, that manually trimming may be extremely difficult or impossible. Had they known this - or perhaps been willing to hear it - they should have grounded the MAX fleet immediately after JT610.


Now who’s trolling? A good decision is based on outcome. Everyone lived. He was successful. Good decision. Just like a famous ball coach used to say...Steve Spurrier...a dear friend of mine btw.....when asked “coach was going for it on 4th down a bad decision”. He says “obviously ya we didn’t make it. Would have been a great decision if we had made the play work.”

I think that sums up aviation and most things well.

Back to Sully...he was experiencing somthing that never has happened before. I’m not aware of any commercial aircraft ever having the same scenario in the same exact location. In fact, in our industry in general very few water landings happen. The ET crew and the Lion crew to a lesser extent, had the benefit of exact prior experiences happening at the same stage of flight. I see a huge difference between Sully and the Max accidents.


Interesting you mention Sully and water landings, since one of the other most famous occurrences was Ethiopian airlines., which I believe is the only successful ditching of a widebody. Where the pilots were also put in an unprecedented situation and had to make a water landing on the sea (which we know is far harder than on a still river for obvious reasons) while dealing with hijackers interfering with them in the cockpit, and were aware enough to land parallel to the waves. And most of the people on board would have survived if at the time the advice had been given on not inflating life jackets before leaving the aircraft. (I believe this event is what spurred that addition to the safety briefing)
 
Planetalk
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 7:08 pm

morrisond wrote:
Planetalk wrote:
morrisond wrote:

I stand corrected - I was doing that off Memory.

How would you feel about getting in an 737 at 250 hours the pilot being incapacitated at night in IFR conditions over water coming into an unfamiliar airport and having some of the electronic systems not working?


The same as I feel about getting on a flight across the Pacific with only two engines. Fine. Double engine is probably more likely that your scenario. And this fixation on hours is ridiculous. It is standard throughout the European majors. There is plenty of research done showing that human performance is more dependent on quality of training rather than arbitrary experience. The US hours requirement was nothing more than a PR move to look like something was being done, when the crash it was done in response to didn't even involve low hours pilots.


Fine - then the quality of training Worldwide appears to basically suck then.

I quoted a UK pilot up thread who is an 737 Pilot based in the UK (Doesn't mean he necessarily flies for a European Airline but not a bad assumption). He mentioned that he only had use the Manual Trim wheel twice - once on Type training and only once on one of the times he had recurrent training.

That doesn't seem like quality training to me. Is everyone else fine with the Quality of Training Worldwide given what we have seen in the last number of accidents?


The accident statistics, despite vastly increasing global air traffic, do not agree with you.With one outlier. The Boeing 737 MAX.
 
djm18
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 7:08 pm

A nice piece and some good graphics...

https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safe ... tigations/

Also a nice reference to the 1982 manual with the so called roller coaster recovery
Last edited by djm18 on Fri Apr 05, 2019 7:08 pm, edited 1 time in total.
 
morrisond
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 7:08 pm

mandala499 wrote:

morrisond wrote:
That is just wrong and should not be considered sufficient experience in any shape or form. In Canada you would need Hundred's (300-400) hours to accumulate all those ratings and then at least another 1,000 hours or so before you graduated to a 737 as FO.

If you are good with that standard of training then fine - but I am not.

Try and tell that to the Europeans and their cadetship program... And yeah, stay away from those European airlines who employ pilots fresh out of their cadetship programme with less than 500hrs to fly an A320/B737.

morrisond wrote:
How would you feel about getting in an 737 at 250 hours the pilot being incapacitated at night in IFR conditions over water coming into an unfamiliar airport and having some of the electronic systems not working?

1. They're trained to deal with pilot incap, under those conditions, without the "some of the electronic systems not working" part.
2. They usually fly with a safety co-pilot as a 3rd pilot for not so few hours.
3. If my memory serves me right, your scenario has happened with a 300-500hr pilot on a 737 once here... the plane didn't crash. He landed safely, and yes, with at least one of the aircraft systems not working or faulty.

benjjk wrote:
I'd just like to point out that the FO had 361 total hours (interestingly 263 were on the 737).

Something's not quite right here. 361 hours total is OK (low, but nothing unusual for a lot of countries)... the 263hrs on the 737 is the main worry.
That means his flight training prior to the 737 was only... 98 hours.
My question on this is, did he go through the MPL path? Because if he went through the normal PPL CPL ME IR path, 98 hours would mean he has a basic CPL probably with no IR and no ME. I wonder if the investigation will reveal more on this aspect in the final report.

morrisond wrote:
In the past on similar aircraft with similar control manual control systems (707, early 737) Yo-Yo like manoeuvres were taught to releave aerodynamic pressure on controls so things like manual trim could be used if you were flying too fast and the loads were too high.

This is a quote from a Commercial Captain based in the UK on the other forum "Turning the wheel was on my type rating course, but featured only one other time in my run of recurrent sims."

Why are neither not part of 737 Primary training or recurrent training?

The early 737s and the current 737s, has the same flight controls (albeit with STS on the NG and also now MCAS on the Max)... there is not much different.

You seem to be worried about lack of training... at a time when accidents and serious incidents are on a very low rate (albeit 2018 and 2019 seems to be 2 bad years in a row compared with recent years). The numbers are very low, for a reason, built on experience built by the industry over the past few decades.


[quote="morrisond']But they didn't follow Boeing's procedures - they didn't bring the nose up to Neutral Trim before disengaging Electric Trim -[/quote]
Can someone point out to me where this is in the published Boeing procedure?[/quote][/quote][/quote]


It sounds like are okay with the current state of training - Ok that's fine then - that's your choice.

Because of the overall lack of incidents due to overall quite safe airliner design I believe the industry has become too complacent leading to issues like Boeing Screwing up MCAS, the FAA missing it, Boeing publishing not a great procedure(the part about trimming up Electrically is in there - but it is not top and center) and the Pilots not being sufficiently trained on new procedures.

While the rate of accidents is low it could be better - many of accidents in the past years were a result of Electronics failures followed by incorrect procedures applied by pilots - and to be fair to them I would have to guess because of a lowering of training standards and Airlines not wanting to spend the money on training it's more a failure of training than anything. With the very few crashes we have had the Airlines probably would not have thought that a very good return on investment.

However this is something that can and should be legislated for all Airlines Worldwide so everyone is on the same playing field.

I'm willing to spend $5 more ticket so Pilots get more training.

There were approximately 4.3 Billion Passenger tickets sold last year - at $5 that's $21.5 Billion.

It seems like there is about 550,000 Commercial Pilots Worldwide.

That's $39,000 per pilot. Full motion Flight Sim time doesn't seem like it costs more than $1,000 per hour - that's an additional 39 hours per year of training on top of what the pilots are getting now for unusual situations.

That seems like a pretty good idea to me - Does it to you?
Last edited by morrisond on Fri Apr 05, 2019 7:36 pm, edited 1 time in total.
 
morrisond
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobiq

Fri Apr 05, 2019 7:16 pm

speedbored wrote:
morrisond wrote:
speedbored wrote:
But Boeing's "procedure doesn't say "bring the nose up to Neutral Trim before disengaging Electric Trim"; that is only added as a footnote. Seems to me that the data shows that the pilots followed the procedure as written, found it to be unworkable, and then went back and tried it again including the footnote.

The data is also consistent with attempting to follow the unreliable airspeed checklist, but that also seems to have failed them at the point where they are required to set thrust and attitude - looks to me like they were struggling with persuading the aircraft to hold the required attitude. I don't have the tables to hand but I'd be surprised if 75% N1 is the correct thrust setting for the altitude they were at, or phase of flight that they were in.


I got this off the other Forum for the NG - apparently it applies to almost all Boeing Models

"A few days back I received a new procedure in my 737 QRH, for airspeed unreliable. We now have a set of thrust settings in combination with a specific pitch attitude, as memory items.
Config flaps up: 4 degrees pitch up, and 75% N1
Config flaps extended: 10 degrees pitch up and 80% N1

Boeing has introduced this for most if not all of their types. I'll simply let Boeing answer this for you:

These pitch and power settings provide a simple reference setting for the crew to use for a short period of time while the initial steps of the checklist are accomplished. These settings do not ensure a level flight or constant airspeed at any particular altitude/airspeed/weight combination. However, they do ensure that at any and all weight/altitude combinations, the aircraft will accelerate from low speeds, and slow from a high speeds, as we cannot assume the aircraft is in stable flight when the NNC is run. It is more likely that the crew or the autopilot has destabilized the airplane as a result of erroneous airspeed indications prior to identification of the need to run the NNC. These memory item pitch and power settings often result in a significant climb (from lower altitudes) and can also result in a gradual descent (from higher altitudes)."

This is a memory item for 737 Pilots and given the low altitude (relative to flying above 30,000') they were at should have produced a climb.

Apparently it was in response to AF447.

It looks like ET302 were trying to hold 4 Degrees but they didn't reduce to 75% N1

At takeoff, they should have had >90% N1 set. Going by your specified "memory items", they should then have reduced this to 75% N1 after the flaps came up. But, before they got as far as reducing thrust to 75% N1, MCAS kicked in and started messing with their pitch, so they worked on that first by following the AD / runaway trim procedure. They never got the chance to get back onto the unreliable airspeed checklist to reduce their thrust.



They are not my Memory lists - they are Boeing's - you said you didn't believe they exist
 
xmp125a
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 7:16 pm

morrisond wrote:
However this is something that can and should be legislated for all Airlines Worldwide so everyone is on the same playing field.


Disingenuous. The training is specified by the manufacturer and the FAA (which was until now universally followed by other certification authorities).

Therefore, bad plane or insufficient training = responsibility of the Boeing (and Airbus.)
 
kalvado
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 7:28 pm

MD80Ttail wrote:
I have stated this before but no one has discussed.....if I was in the ET cockpit...and I had considered this before the ET crash after learning from the lion accident.....I would have lowered flaps to disable the MCAS while still allowing use of the electric trim. Thoughts?

So you're violating Boeing approved procedure - and basically take any possible consequences as your personal liability at this point.
What other SOPs you ignore as part of your work? What about your airlines chief pilot - is he aware of that? Can you envision how debriefing would go once you say "I got a problem in flight, I followed a non-approved procedure - I didn't like procedure BOeing approved - and after all I returned to the base"? Would you expect suspension or termination?

In general, I think flaps should work - but you may also ask why Boeing didn't put flaps down as a possible action into the AD.
 
BEG2IAH
Posts: 950
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 7:31 pm

xmp125a wrote:
SimonL wrote:
Did any checklist or procedure suggest that they should have?


It does. Issued after Lion Air crash and does not even mention flaps. Anywhere.

https://www.aviationtoday.com/wp-conten ... rgency.pdf

So either this is big omission and negligence by FAA and Boeing or there is a reason that flaps are not to be attempted as remedy.


Shouldn't this be common sense and part of a basic pilot training? Do you really need a checklist to tell you that something you just did made your aircraft hard to fly and you should go back to the previous configuration? e.g., if you stall your aircraft do you need a checklist to push the nose down or you just do it? Come on, guys, let's not be too pedantic to prove our point here. It's getting old.
Flying at the cruising altitude is (mostly) boring. I wish all flights were nothing but endless take offs and landings every 10 minutes or so.
 
Armodeen
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 7:32 pm

morrisond wrote:
tribird1011 wrote:
morrisond wrote:

Great post - I agree 100% It was a combination of many factors. Boeing and Pilots.

BTW - The FO of that plane had less hours than I do (he was at 98 hours(or 154 the report is a little unclear) - I got to about 110 total before stopping 10 years ago)before he was made a FO of an 737. If you don't think I know what I'm talking about - well someone with less hours (or slightly more) was made a FO of a 737.

In that time he apparently earned his basic license, night rating, instrument rating, multi engine rating and commercial rating. That is just wrong and should not be considered sufficient experience in any shape or form. In Canada you would need Hundred's (300-400) hours to accumulate all those ratings and then at least another 1,000 hours or so before you graduated to a 737 as FO.

If the Pilot was incapacitated how would you feel about having a FO with 98 total hours(or 154) in charge of getting you safely back to the ground? If you are good with that standard of training then fine - but I am not.

Over on the other forum someone who sounds very familiar with the 737 (possibly a Captain) is speculating the following:

"having belatedly recognized the need to cutout trim switches the
pilot either doesnt ask the copilot to trim ANU manually or the copilot
doesnt know how to operate manual trim (manual handle button must be depressed
before it will release)....relates to training and crew composition...200 hour
pilots dont belong in airline operations,pay to fly,SOP rote over airmanship etc etc"

It's quite possible the FO with that low hours had never operated the manual trim so didn't know they had to depress the manual handle button.

He gave up trying to see if it worked after 8 seconds. He may have tried it again (or the Pilot might have) - but there is nothing in the Text talking about that.


Need to highlight that particular line...

In Canada, I obtained my Commercial licence at 201.6 hours. That included Night rating and Group 1 Multi-Engine and IFR Ratings.
Believe it or not, in Canada you can write the IATRA exam (essentially ATPL knowledge) with 250 hours. IF you get a type rating on (let's say a 737) you too can ride right seat on that airplane with 250 hours. Now, the way the industry is set up here, the airlines won't hire you with that low time strictly for insurance purposes... as per TC, it's totally legal!!


I stand corrected - I was doing that off Memory.

How would you feel about getting in an 737 at 250 hours the pilot being incapacitated at night in IFR conditions over water coming into an unfamiliar airport and having some of the electronic systems not working?


How would you feel doing that after 1500 daylight hours in a light single towing gliders or whatever?
 
morrisond
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 7:37 pm

xmp125a wrote:
morrisond wrote:
However this is something that can and should be legislated for all Airlines Worldwide so everyone is on the same playing field.


Disingenuous. The training is specified by the manufacturer and the FAA (which was until now universally followed by other certification authorities).

Therefore, bad plane or insufficient training = responsibility of the Boeing (and Airbus.)


Yes - Boeing and Airbus set the minimum training standards for Pilot Training and recurrency......You really believe this?

Anything can be legislated.
Last edited by morrisond on Fri Apr 05, 2019 7:38 pm, edited 1 time in total.
 
BEG2IAH
Posts: 950
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 7:38 pm

kalvado wrote:
In general, I think flaps should work - but you may also ask why Boeing didn't put flaps down as a possible action into the AD.


If Boeing put it on a checklist and your MCAS kicked in at 380 knots, would you extend your flaps? Probably no for obvious reasons. So the checklist should say - if you are under 200 knots extend flaps, if over 200 don't, right? But your IAS is messed up. Then how do you know how fast you are? What kind of a checklist would allow that?

Erroneous AoA is followed by IAS disagree, there is a memory item that says pitch and power. If MCAS kicked in in the meantime right after you retracted flaps, but before you started flying pitch and power, of course you should bring your aircraft to the previous state, i.e., extend flaps back to stabilize. Then apply pitch and power and start to troubleshoot.
Flying at the cruising altitude is (mostly) boring. I wish all flights were nothing but endless take offs and landings every 10 minutes or so.
 
morrisond
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 7:39 pm

BEG2IAH wrote:
kalvado wrote:
In general, I think flaps should work - but you may also ask why Boeing didn't put flaps down as a possible action into the AD.


If Boeing put it on a checklist and your MCAS kicked in at 380 knots, would you extend your flaps? Probably no for obvious reasons. So the checklist should say - if you are under 200 knots extend flaps, if over 200 don't, right? But your IAS is messed up. Then how do you know how fast you are? What kind of a checklist would allow that?

Erroneous AoA is followed by IAS disagree, there is a memory item that says pitch and power. If MCAS kicked in in the meantime right after you retracted flaps, but before you started flying pitch and power, of course you should bring your aircraft to the previous state, i.e., extend flaps back to stabilize. Then apply pitch and power and start to troubleshoot.


This makes sense.
 
clancy688
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobiq

Fri Apr 05, 2019 7:56 pm

MD80Ttail wrote:
Now who’s trolling? A good decision is based on outcome. Everyone lived. He was successful. Good decision. Just like a famous ball coach used to say...Steve Spurrier...a dear friend of mine btw.....when asked “coach was going for it on 4th down a bad decision”. He says “obviously ya we didn’t make it. Would have been a great decision if we had made the play work.”

I think that sums up aviation and most things well.


I find that statement troublesome. Yes, that's exactly like it's in sports. I remember the 2015 Super Bowl where the Seahawks did the "worst call ever" by not handing the ball to Lynch. They lost. Yet, if it would have succeeded (and it could have), everyone would have called it brilliant.

But can we really apply the same binary standards to aviation? If the plane acts up and you save it, you're a good pilot. If you don't, you're a bad one. The world isn't black and white, though, it comes in shades of grey...


These pilots were put in very severe, rapidly worsening condition in a very vulnerable part of their flight envelope. Pulling out of it alive required following the official Boeing checklist (which they did) and making the right calls in split seconds. They didn't, so they crashed and everyone died. In hindsight, with lots of time on our hands and the comfort of a cozy, silent study room, we can determine what they should have done to save the plane.

But what actually happened here? Did they doom the plane? Did they fly it into the ground? Did they crash it? The answer is definitely no! These guys failed at saving the plane, but at the same time this doesn't, can't mean that they are responsible for flying it into the ground. MCAS did that for them. Yes, an experienced crew, with good CRM, intricate knowledge of their aircraft, on a good day, and if the stars aligned in their favor, could have saved this plane. It's possible. Does this mean that everyone who didn't manage the feat is automatically responsible for the crash? Please think about this, if just for a moment.

What crashed the plane and what kept it (not) from crashing, these are two different things. A poorly designed, poorly documented system put the 737 MAX into an ultra-dangerous flight configuration. I don't think anyone can argue with this statement. And that's the reason for the crash, right there. Not the pilots. They merely failed at reacting in time to keep the plane from killing them and all their passengers. We can blame them for this failure, they are paid the big bucks after all to make the correct decision in split seconds, but yet they are only human - and humans fail. Everyone of us does. But that still doesn't exonerate the system's designers in the slightest. It still doesn't make the pilots ultimately responsible for crashing.


Different crash: That anyone survived UA232 was a miracle. Many pilots would have failed at landing the bird. Putting the thing down so that anyone managed to walk away was a feat of incredible airmanship only few could have managed. Plus they also got help from passenger Dennis Fitch (a pilot as a passenger who rushes into the cockpit to help the struggling flight crew, does this sound familiar to anyone? *hint* Lion Air *hint*). But since someone managed, does this automatically mean that every crew who wouldn't have is a bad crew and responsible for everyone dying?

Now one could say that UA232 was really a miracle, a plane so severely damaged that there's no shame in not saving anyone. Let's say 9 out of 10 crews would have crashed. So we wouldn't blame anyone who failed. But what if 5 out of 10 would have managed to save it? Are the other 5 bad then? 6 out of 10? 7? Where comes the threshold?


Let's say you're driving in a car with lane assist. It's been reported that there's a fault in your car which pops up only very rarely but is nonetheless severe: In very rare cases, the lane assist malfunctions and turns the wheel. There's an established recovery procedure, but it has to be executed very, very fast. Suddenly the malfunction happens and lane assist turns the wheel. For some reason, you fail to execute the recovery procedure in time. Your car travels off the road and crashes into a bridge pillar, killing you.

You're now saying that you're at fault for dying since you didn't do the established recovery procedure in time. It doesn't matter that the car did something which it should never have done, that it put you into grave danger which needed exactly the right reaction in a moment's notice to avert catastrophe. You didn't react correctly. First and foremost, you're at fault for your death. Not the carmaker which created the flawed system which put you into danger in the first place. The situation was recoverable, after all, so the blame for your death rests with you.

That's ridiculous imho.
 
Amexair
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 7:57 pm

BEG2IAH wrote:
kalvado wrote:
In general, I think flaps should work - but you may also ask why Boeing didn't put flaps down as a possible action into the AD.


If Boeing put it on a checklist and your MCAS kicked in at 380 knots, would you extend your flaps? Probably no for obvious reasons. So the checklist should say - if you are under 200 knots extend flaps, if over 200 don't, right? But your IAS is messed up. Then how do you know how fast you are? What kind of a checklist would allow that?

Erroneous AoA is followed by IAS disagree, there is a memory item that says pitch and power. If MCAS kicked in in the meantime right after you retracted flaps, but before you started flying pitch and power, of course you should bring your aircraft to the previous state, i.e., extend flaps back to stabilize. Then apply pitch and power and start to troubleshoot.


By the time they diagnosed that MCAS was kicking in they were already past flaps-up speed. So circling pack, should they have reduced thrust while the plane was screaming 'Don't sink" to extend flaps back? Cmon guys, let's not try to knit-pick all possible scenarios, they did what they were supposed to given the trap they were in.
 
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PW100
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 8:11 pm

MD80Ttail wrote:
[threeid][/threeid]...turning the system back on and leaving it engaged.......fail common sense


Perhaps they re-engaged it because the plane wasn't giving the expected reaction . . .

MD80Ttail wrote:
One of the basic rules of flying is if you take an action and the plane doesn’t like it undo said action.
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hivue
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 8:25 pm

SheikhDjibouti wrote:
kalvado wrote:
hivue wrote:
When the overspeed clacker starts sounding.

But they were dangerously underspeed, as proven by stick shaker!

Damn - you beat me to it! :lol:

(strictly speaking it's a stall warning as opposed to underspeed per se)

Are you as frustrated as me with all these answers that make it all seem so easy......?


The question was asked, "What is overspeed?" They were fighting a serious nose down trim problem to the end and they presumably knew what their power setting was. Yes, there's likely nothing they could have done about it, but why would they not be confident that the overspeed warning was valid?
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chicawgo
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobiq

Fri Apr 05, 2019 8:25 pm

SimonL wrote:
chicawgo wrote:
remcor wrote:

He totaled a perfectly good plane and put people's lives at risk, and people got injured. He could have a boat or underwater pier something. Simulations show if he did everything perfectly he could have made a runway and that plane would still be flying today. So apply the same standard to him.

It was about 3 minutes from first MCAS input to the crash. They were pretty low the whole time. Boeing's proscribed procedures failed to correct the problem, because Boeing didn't predict what is now obvious, that manually trimming may be extremely difficult or impossible. Had they known this - or perhaps been willing to hear it - they should have grounded the MAX fleet immediately after JT610.


Um... no... both engines failed and they had no thrust. That's not a perfectly good plane.


And a plane trying to push itself down while the stick shaker is active is also not a perfectly good plane...


Agreed. Not sure how that was necessary. I was responding to someone that was trying to claim that the Sully situation was the same.
 
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speedbored
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobiq

Fri Apr 05, 2019 8:37 pm

morrisond wrote:
speedbored wrote:
morrisond wrote:

I got this off the other Forum for the NG - apparently it applies to almost all Boeing Models

"A few days back I received a new procedure in my 737 QRH, for airspeed unreliable. We now have a set of thrust settings in combination with a specific pitch attitude, as memory items.
Config flaps up: 4 degrees pitch up, and 75% N1
Config flaps extended: 10 degrees pitch up and 80% N1

Boeing has introduced this for most if not all of their types. I'll simply let Boeing answer this for you:

These pitch and power settings provide a simple reference setting for the crew to use for a short period of time while the initial steps of the checklist are accomplished. These settings do not ensure a level flight or constant airspeed at any particular altitude/airspeed/weight combination. However, they do ensure that at any and all weight/altitude combinations, the aircraft will accelerate from low speeds, and slow from a high speeds, as we cannot assume the aircraft is in stable flight when the NNC is run. It is more likely that the crew or the autopilot has destabilized the airplane as a result of erroneous airspeed indications prior to identification of the need to run the NNC. These memory item pitch and power settings often result in a significant climb (from lower altitudes) and can also result in a gradual descent (from higher altitudes)."

This is a memory item for 737 Pilots and given the low altitude (relative to flying above 30,000') they were at should have produced a climb.

Apparently it was in response to AF447.

It looks like ET302 were trying to hold 4 Degrees but they didn't reduce to 75% N1

At takeoff, they should have had >90% N1 set. Going by your specified "memory items", they should then have reduced this to 75% N1 after the flaps came up. But, before they got as far as reducing thrust to 75% N1, MCAS kicked in and started messing with their pitch, so they worked on that first by following the AD / runaway trim procedure. They never got the chance to get back onto the unreliable airspeed checklist to reduce their thrust.



They are not my Memory lists - they are Boeing's - you said you didn't believe they exist

No, I did not say that.
 
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PW100
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobiq

Fri Apr 05, 2019 8:48 pm

morrisond wrote:
A) But they didn't follow Boeing's procedures - they didn't bring the nose up to Neutral Trim before disengaging Electric Trim -
B) they were Overspeed (didn't follow the procedure to set Power at 75% N1 in case of erroneous Airspeed indications)
C) and they turned Electric Trim back on and neglected to turn it right back off. It's hard to believe that had a good understanding of the system, the procedures or the Memo.

D) The FO should have had training on what to do in this situation when they were in the SIM in January at the very least - but who knows they might have.


A)
The FDR trace shows a 10 second electric trim ANU prior to disengaging Electric Trim. So yes, they did follow procedures in uptrimming (as much as possible) before cutting out electric trimming.
Instead of slamming crew, the real question we should be asking is WHY did they stop with the uptrim before the elevator was in balanced trim?
It may be a crew/CRM fail, perhaps the FO threw the cut out switches while the CA was still running uptrim and thus cutting his uptrim.
But it may also that the electric trim motor could no further rotate the jack screw due to severe aerodynamic loading. As de FDR charts show us that all electric uptrims (after flap retraction) are stopped well before the elevator had been anywhere near being balanced, it suggests that the trim stop was not by crew action: why on earth would they stop uptrim if they struggle to pull the control column sufficiently. That makes no sense whatsoever, something else must be in play. I don't have the answer, but I'm amazed that you already KNOW they did jot follow procedure.
BTW, if they did not follow the procedure, I'm sure Boeing would be all over them, and let the world know so.


B)
* It is dubious to follow overspeed procedures with stickshaker and stall warning going of continuously;
* Apart from power, the overspeed procedure also requires for pitch control, which they obviously did not have;
* Reducing throttle will increase nose down tendency, which they were fighting so hard against.
I may be understanding this incorrectly, but it appears that the crew needed their FULL PHYSICAL STRENGTH (probably both pilots together) to pull the control column to maintain even a minimum of positive vertical speed. Reducing power would not help that, at all.


C)
As they were apparently needing ALL OF THEIR PHYSICAL STRENGTH to keep the nose up, and doing hat for several minutes, it seems very likely that they were running out of muscle power, with lactic acid setting and breaking their muscle power. It would seem that they were very desperate and decided to re-instate electric trimming. We see this on the FDR chart that there is some nose up trimming. But it is cut very short, and then MCAS kicks in so aggressively that all is lost. It seems that the nose up trim was cut short by some sort of mechanism outside crew control, most likely aerodynamic loading that can not be overcome by the electric trim motor.
I don't think this has anything to do but their (lack of) understanding of the system, but an action of sheer desperation. I don't see how this would be used against the crew.


D)
Boeing and FAA released the 737 MAX to service before any MAX sim was certified. Boeing did not talk about MCAS in the conversion training top MAX. Aerodynamic loading of elevator, and difficulties in trimming has long been removed from 737 FM and training syllabus. The crew did get the training on, and followed the AD instructions.
I don't see how any more training could be provided, nor how the FO experience level was a factor.

Now, I'm not claiming this is a hero crew and they did nothing wrong; there is simply not enough data to do such. But the reverse is even more true. So until solid evidence proves otherwise, I'll definitely give the crew the benefit of doubt.
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PW100
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 8:56 pm

dragon6172 wrote:
SheikhDjibouti wrote:
dragon6172 wrote:
They were at least 25-30 knots over Vmo


2. There are two speed traces on the graph. Only one exceeds the guideline Vmo. Why would you select one version over another (except to promote a certain agenda)?

Agenda? Sheesh. No agenda, just reading the data provided from the FDR. The RH speed trace exceeds Vmo. I chose it because the RH side is the working side. The LH AoA indicator is the failed side causing unreliable airspeed on the LH side (25-30 knots lower than the RH). And, for what its worth to you, the LH was above Vmo for some time as well. It says in the report the LH overspeed alarm sounded intermittently from 5:41:32 until the end of the flight.


By the time any of the overspeed clackers were going off, they were already in such deep shit, that the condition was proabbly irreversible .
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mzlin
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 9:04 pm

mandala499 wrote:
[quote="morrisond']But they didn't follow Boeing's procedures - they didn't bring the nose up to Neutral Trim before disengaging Electric Trim -[/quote]
Can someone point out to me where this is in the published Boeing procedure?[/quote][/quote]


It is the final paragraph in this directive which is a restatement of the runaway stabilizer memory checklist:

Image
 
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PW100
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 9:07 pm

MSPNWA wrote:
PW100 wrote:
Sure, but there are strong indications that in the ET accident things (manual pitch trim) stopped working even within the flight envelope.


No, the evidence doesn't tell us that. You're taking a guess, possibly because it fits your conclusion.


As you can see in ALL of my posts, I continue asking questions as to why the crew did this, did that, stopped uptrimming way before the control column was balanced in pitch. Why they reinstated electric trimming. Trying to find answers.
The only thing I see from you, is that crew made a lot of mistakes. I have not seen one single effort from your side trying to answer these important questions.

So it seems to me that it is you desperate for finding "facts" to fit a conclusion. I'm sorry, I can't debate against that.
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dragon6172
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 9:09 pm

PW100 wrote:
dragon6172 wrote:
SheikhDjibouti wrote:

2. There are two speed traces on the graph. Only one exceeds the guideline Vmo. Why would you select one version over another (except to promote a certain agenda)?

Agenda? Sheesh. No agenda, just reading the data provided from the FDR. The RH speed trace exceeds Vmo. I chose it because the RH side is the working side. The LH AoA indicator is the failed side causing unreliable airspeed on the LH side (25-30 knots lower than the RH). And, for what its worth to you, the LH was above Vmo for some time as well. It says in the report the LH overspeed alarm sounded intermittently from 5:41:32 until the end of the flight.


By the time any of the overspeed clackers were going off, they were already in such deep shit, that the condition was proabbly irreversible .

By deep shit you mean a 2000 fpm climb and no MCAS inputs for 2.5 minutes?
Phrogs Phorever
 
Etheereal
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 9:20 pm

kalvado wrote:
Etheereal wrote:
SheikhDjibouti wrote:
Damn - you beat me to it! :lol:

(strictly speaking it's a stall warning as opposed to underspeed per se)

Are you as frustrated as me with all these answers that make it all seem so easy......?

Excuse me, wasnt precisely the stick shaker active because the Captain side's AoA had a 76° pitch up nose up indicator?

The FO side was overspeeding instead.

There is no AOA or AOA disagree indicator. All there is is a pair of different airspeeds - and a plane trying to jump out of control, with stall warning on one side, overspeed on the other, and jumpy flight which could be the stall buffet.
How do they know which airspeed is the true one?

All commercial planes have an angle of attack indicator (even if analog), and i wasnt talking about AoA disagree light/message. Even the FDR in the "preliminary report" shown that the captain had a veeery high angle of attack.

smartplane wrote:
As my generation would say, correct* the record.

ftfy
 
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remcor
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 9:22 pm

PW100 wrote:
MSPNWA wrote:
PW100 wrote:
Sure, but there are strong indications that in the ET accident things (manual pitch trim) stopped working even within the flight envelope.


No, the evidence doesn't tell us that. You're taking a guess, possibly because it fits your conclusion.


As you can see in ALL of my posts, I continue asking questions as to why the crew did this, did that, stopped uptrimming way before the control column was balanced in pitch. Why they reinstated electric trimming. Trying to find answers.
The only thing I see from you, is that crew made a lot of mistakes. I have not seen one single effort from your side trying to answer these important questions.

So it seems to me that it is you desperate for finding "facts" to fit a conclusion. I'm sorry, I can't debate against that.


Bjorn from Leeham and Mentour Pilot tried this in a simulator:

"You can’t trim even at normal speeds for the situation they were in, we proved this Wednesday. Boeing’s and FAA’s clear instructions were: “Hit cutout, then trim manually”. You can’t in a large part of the approved speed envelope. No word about the speeds to fly in the AD or Checklists associated with MCAS. So now coming and quarterbacking about why this speeds? This is 20-20." - Bjorn Fehrm

https://leehamnews.com/2019/04/05/bjorns-corner-et302-crash-report-the-first-analysis/
 
kalvado
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 9:24 pm

Etheereal wrote:
kalvado wrote:
Etheereal wrote:
Excuse me, wasnt precisely the stick shaker active because the Captain side's AoA had a 76° pitch up nose up indicator?

The FO side was overspeeding instead.

There is no AOA or AOA disagree indicator. All there is is a pair of different airspeeds - and a plane trying to jump out of control, with stall warning on one side, overspeed on the other, and jumpy flight which could be the stall buffet.
How do they know which airspeed is the true one?

All commercial planes have an angle of attack indicator (even if analog), and i wasnt talking about AoA disagree light/message. Even the FDR in the "preliminary report" shown that the captain had a veeery high angle of attack.

smartplane wrote:
As my generation would say, correct* the record.

ftfy

OK, first link from Google: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/21/busi ... harge.html
Standard 737 Max planes are not equipped with a so-called angle of attack indicator or an angle of attack disagree light.

So?
 
D L X
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 9:26 pm

Question: I recall reading once upon a time that the previous generation 737s will naturally point downward if it stalls. Is that true?

Second question: if that is true for the earlier 737s, is that true for the MAX? I know the nacelles add lift in high AOA situations, but do they add so much lift that they would negate the natural pitch-down moment also?
 
kalvado
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 9:39 pm

D L X wrote:
Question: I recall reading once upon a time that the previous generation 737s will naturally point downward if it stalls. Is that true?

Second question: if that is true for the earlier 737s, is that true for the MAX? I know the nacelles add lift in high AOA situations, but do they add so much lift that they would negate the natural pitch-down moment also?

As far as I understand, pointing down in stall is a certification requirement. Not only that, since stall is an extremely undesired and dnagerous state - there are other certification requirements on how plane even approaches the stall, with objective of minimizing the chances of a close approach to actual stall and stop the problem well before it occurs.
MAX likely will still point down (Boeing didn't share details with general public) - but there are some of the requirements regarding stall entry which are not satisfied - exactly as you say, large nacelles. That is what MCAS is for.
 
dragon6172
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 9:40 pm

kalvado wrote:
Etheereal wrote:
SheikhDjibouti wrote:
Damn - you beat me to it! :lol:

(strictly speaking it's a stall warning as opposed to underspeed per se)

Are you as frustrated as me with all these answers that make it all seem so easy......?

Excuse me, wasnt precisely the stick shaker active because the Captain side's AoA had a 76° pitch up nose up indicator?

The FO side was overspeeding instead.

There is no AOA or AOA disagree indicator. All there is is a pair of different airspeeds - and a plane trying to jump out of control, with stall warning on one side, overspeed on the other, and jumpy flight which could be the stall buffet.
How do they know which airspeed is the true one?

If the left is reading 330 and the right is reading 360, pick whichever one is closer to a limit.
Phrogs Phorever
 
kalvado
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 9:53 pm

dragon6172 wrote:
kalvado wrote:
Etheereal wrote:
Excuse me, wasnt precisely the stick shaker active because the Captain side's AoA had a 76° pitch up nose up indicator?

The FO side was overspeeding instead.

There is no AOA or AOA disagree indicator. All there is is a pair of different airspeeds - and a plane trying to jump out of control, with stall warning on one side, overspeed on the other, and jumpy flight which could be the stall buffet.
How do they know which airspeed is the true one?

If the left is reading 330 and the right is reading 360, pick whichever one is closer to a limit.

And trim the hell out of it!!
Mr. MCAS, are you a living person by now?
 
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PW100
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Re: Ethiopian Airlines 737MAX crashes enroute to Nairobi

Fri Apr 05, 2019 9:55 pm

dragon6172 wrote:
PW100 wrote:
By the time any of the overspeed clackers were going off, they were already in such deep shit, that the condition was proabbly irreversible .

By deep shit you mean a 2000 fpm climb and no MCAS inputs for 2.5 minutes?


05:41:20 - Overspeed clacker (RH) was recorded on CVR (page 11 of report)
05:41:32 - Overspeed warning (LH) (page 11 of report).

The FDR chart, you will find that the at 05:41:20 aft column input was very large. Unfortunately, column force is not shown, but it seems extremely likely that control column force was already so large, that it would be sheer impossible to maintain for a longer period of time.
It also seems likely that both manual trimming as well as electric trimming could not bring the stabilizer to normal range.

At 05:43:12 electric uptrim was recorded (probably because in desperation they turned elect trimming back on). But there were only two very short uptrims. Why would the crew themselves cut that short? The most likely answer is that aerodynamic forces were so high, that the electric motor could not overcome that. And that condition, was most likely already present at 05:41:20, based on airspeed trace, and also based on the cutting short of the electric uptrimming at 05:40:39. Why did uptrim stop at 05:40:39 before the control column was balanced in pitch?? That strongly suggests that at that point the electric motor (and manual trimming) could not overcome aerodynamic forces.
From the graphs, there does not seem to be much difference to following parameters of the 05:41:20 timestamp, and 05:43:20:
* Airspeeds
* Pitch Trim
* Pitch Attitude
* Vertical Acceleration.
There was some difference in altitude, but at those speeds, that does not mean much in terms of pitch recovery.
The rollercoaster/yoyo technique was not feasible due to insufficient altitude.

So yes, that all suggests that at 05:41:20 the situation had become fairly irreversible.
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