NOWHERE in the directive is "reenable flaps" mentioned as remedy. So, again, this is Monday morning quarterback syndrome. You know that because you had days to ponder over what to do. They had minutes and ton of work to do, even after being perfectly aware what is the problem.
It is NOT monday morning quarterbacking.
Deployment of flaps to disable MCAS was discussed by some in the industry, one reason is that the crew of JT610 did redeploy flaps at one stage and that disabled the MCAS... but when they retracted it, MCAS came alive again.
The mystery is, what made the Lion Air crew able to maintain trim for several minutes where Ethiopian crew failed to do (but then disabled stab trim power while out of trim)?
While the rate of accidents is low it could be better - many of accidents in the past years were a result of Electronics failures followed by incorrect procedures applied by pilots - and to be fair to them I would have to guess because of a lowering of training standards and Airlines not wanting to spend the money on training it's more a failure of training than anything. With the very few crashes we have had the Airlines probably would not have thought that a very good return on investment.
There is a difference between increasing training within the airline, with the idea that one must have 1000hrs before one can step into a jetliner. The former is OK, the latter, well, other countries are fine with it.
I'm willing to spend $5 more ticket so Pilots get more training.
If all the airlines offering a route has an acceptable standard of minimum training, and one airline spends extra on training and passes it on to the customer, and the other doesn't have the extra, with service and schedules being identical, how many people being offered would choose the one with $5 extra? The sad story is, not 100%... but that's the reality.
Wake up and smell the fresh spring air...
It is the final paragraph in this directive which is a restatement of the runaway stabilizer memory checklist:
Thanks... I think we have a problem in how this MCAS thing is trained...
I think the crew of ET followed this AD...
Going from the top to bottom.. Cutout... was told to cut out for the remainder of the flight... and then down at the bottom, "by the way, you can use the electric stabilizer before the cutout if it feels heavy or hard to move the stab trim"... Oh, OK, let's try that... then MCAS starts acting up...
As you can see in ALL of my posts, I continue asking questions as to why the crew did this, did that, stopped uptrimming way before the control column was balanced in pitch. Why they reinstated electric trimming. Trying to find answers.
The only thing I see from you, is that crew made a lot of mistakes. I have not seen one single effort from your side trying to answer these important questions.
See the above (and the reply by MZLIN at $4492)
"Whenever we talk about a pilot who has been killed in a flying accident, we should all keep one thing in mind. He called upon the sum of all his knowledge and made a judgment. He believed it so strongly that he knowingly bet his life on it. That his judgment was faulty was a tragedy, not stupidity. Every inspector, supervisor, and contemporary who ever spoke to him had an opportunity to influence his judgment, so a little of all of us goes with every pilot we lose." --- Anonymous
Thank you for that. The person who responded to a request for respect with 'Americans bow to nobody' is perhaps the most shameful, least humane thing I've ever read on this Forum. From a fellow pilot too. The sad thing is, many before held such attitudes, probably many pilots far more skilled than this individual, until the moment they too faced death and realised it can happen to them and they are not so special. Arrogance is the enemy of safety and I cannot believe there are still pilots out there who haven't learned that.
I don't even get it. A pissing match could go on forever pointing out American pilots who crashed planes that really did have nothing wrong with them. What does anyone learn from this crap? AsI noted, Ethiopians are the only pilots ever to have successfully ditched a widebody and while fighting off highjackers who insisted they keep a plane without fuel in the the air. And some here have been frankly disgusting in their allusions to the competence of pilots from their nation. Would all the armchair pilots here have done so well? Unlikely.
Agree to both of you.
In the discussions, asking why the crew did this and not that, should be done with the mindset of trying to understand what he was faced with, and what made his thought process go the direction of what he did... rightly or wrongly, because he didn't want to do wrong. The sad part of these discussions is that many, including pilots sadly, go through with the mindset of "he should have known he should have done this and not that, therefore he was being stupid or was trained wrong, because that's not how I would do it"... which is simply arrogance and is disgusting.
I've had the pleasure of dealing with this kind of people (real pilots and armchair pilots} by shoving them into a simulator and get the sim instructor operator to throw them malfunction combos (and often in varying sequences that's different from what they expected) and see them fail... miserably...
Notice after the ET crash and before the grounding I believe it was India (possibly wrong country) increased the min hours for cockpit crews to fly Max.
Lion Air raised the minimum total hours and the minimum total 737NG hours for Max left and right seaters, once the FDR content was known... Unfortunately, the manufacturer was adamant that such actions was unnecessary.
Boeing doesn’t tell airlines the min requirements to fly said type
They do for certain clients... (Lion was one, back in the early 737-900ER days, until the airline had enough 737NG pilots with a certain level of 737NG experience, then they stopped the requirement).
Airbus set the minimum requirements for Batik Air pilots for the 320, but this is done through the training partnership. This is probably because both Boeing and Airbus, didn't want their jets creating smoking holes in the ground on a regular basis... Yeah this ain't 1st world problems though... but it's part of reality with us down here...
I found this interesting: "But the aggressive MCAS, trimming with a speed 50% higher than the pilot and for a full nine seconds, kicks in at 8 with a force they didn’t expect. Speed is now at 375kts and MCAS was never designed to trim at these Speed/Altitude combinations."
So MCAS was not designed to scale its trim effectiveness at high dynamic pressure? I suppose that's understandable given that the Boeing engineers never thought it would ever activate in that type of situation, but it could have meant the difference between the crew being able to recover and crashing.
Hence the need for the fix to prevent pilots losing control...
There was a 15 second delay between flaps up and MCAS.
Which accident? ET or JT? From the ET302, the MCAS played immediately once flaps were up... It takes time from the flap handle being moved to UP and the flap reaching the UP position... and yes, in the ET302 case... that was the "macig 15seconds"... The cause-and-effect chain wasn't broken... in fact, it is reinforced by it.
In the FDR plot, the green line is the flap handle position, not the flap's actual position (blue line)... you'll see the 15 second gap.