I still do not believe it, because it is not true. At no point was the aircraft ever below FL050, not even while still on the runway.
Take note of the phase of flight that the pilots were in (climb - they were trying to get to 14,000ft), and the altitude they were actually at, and look at the pitch and power settings again.
Regardless of the tables, it is clear from the CVR recordings of overspeed warnings, that the pilots maintained an airspeed within the limits of the airframe for at least the first half of the flight, until they really started to struggle with, and get distracted by, controlling the aircraft. Even then, the overspeed was minor and intermittent according to one side of the aircraft, When presented with multiple different issues, and expending considerable effort on trying to keep the nose up (the overspeed warnings don't kick in until ~80 seconds after both pilots start pulling hard back on the yokes), the pilots have to prioritise what they work on.
Yeah, well, the idea of reducing N1 to 75% is... well... you know...
For the benefit perhaps Morrisond...
Climb at flaps up at unreliable airspeed, as we know, is at max climb thrust (N1 way over 75%), with pitch at 9.5 or more degrees, for a 737-800... The max would have similar numbers...
75% N1 is for cruise with unreliable airspeed at 15000ft... pitch 3.5, N1 75%... and that is for LEVEL flight...
The overspeed warnings, probably came from not reducing the thrust once they wanted to go level... but then, given what they were faced with, am not surprised they didn't end up doing a pitch and power for level flight, because they were task saturated in getting control of the aircraft.
For the Lion Air, both 043 and 610 they didn't overspeed... the question is, why did ET302 have overspeed? Not saying who/what's wrong, but important to understand what went on in the mind of the pilot and what he was trying to prioritize at the time.
in emergency use the hand break to reduce speed of the car
we recommend you to stop the car before you apply hand break
That’s not what I said.....when flaps were retracted the problems started. I would have redeployed the flaps immediately while still at a safe speed. I have been reading here 10 plus years and finally made an account...but the whole forum has become like the news. Pick one word and focus on it to try and make a point. I never suggested deploying the flaps at an unsafe speed. My point was I would have wanted electric trim and no MCAS. Understanding the system after the Lion crash I would have immediately redeployed flaps which should give me what I want.
I agree with this. The crew of 610 did redeploy flaps when MCAS initially played up... but they retracted it again. The mindset flow goes with your saying of "if you do somthing in a plane and it immediately doesn’t like what you did go to back to prior config"... And before anyone has a go at you for this, let me also say, that, this is not monday morning quarterbacking like some would like to accuse you of.
This is probably my fault for not spelling out my main point clearly enough.
The "something else" was autopilot randomly disengaging.
If flaps retraction had been the only action in this 15 second window, MCAS would not have activated at 05:40:00
The autopilot disengaging is likely to be due to the MCAS wanting to engage. After all, if you set your autopilot to a selection where you would cause a stall, you'd want it to disengage... not sure of the detailed logic of the 737 Autopilot in the realms of near stall, plus the addition of MCAS on the Max on top... but just by common sense, you'd want the MCAS to disengage the A/P and then command trim nose down if you're in an actual stall... especially if the A/T isn't disengaged.
Captain Hindsight with a possible answer here;
1. Re-engage stab trim cut-out
2. Immediately (or even sooner than that!) use thumb switches, and continue to depress the thumb switch to prevent MCAS function.(*)
3. Now, in conjunction with the electric motor attempting to move the stabiliser, both pilots crank the manual trim wheel
4. You now have one electric motor plus two pilots attempting to move the jackscrew
5. If that fails; pray.
You mean 1 = provide power back to the stab trim?
I really wonder what Boeing was thinking, having the yoke in the aft (nose up) position and trying to manually crank the trim wheel (especially with heavier than normal forces), isn't an easy walk in the park for some.
What the crew of 302 tried to do was probably what you said above, except for #3, because I think just use the thumb switch for the electric trim should be enough but they needed to do it immediately after reengaging power to the stab trim.
I think the investigation will go deeper into this...
Two. Why didn’t the pilots up trim inputs time out MCAS allowing for the electric trim to be shut off after the pilots had commanded an acceptable trim condition? When conditions changed and the pilots needed more trim ok from what I’ve read and learned the manual trim wheel maybe was useless. That’s a Huge concern. No plane should ever be designed that can’t be manually trimmed.
I think the AD was badly worded that caused pilots reading it, to think, "OK I'll cut it off immediately"... and then lower down, it says, "you may use electric trim to reduce the load forces" (or something like that)... BUT HECK! YOU TOLD ME TO CUT IT OFF !!!!
The lack of emphasis to retrim the aircraft prior to cutting out the stab trim within the AD's wording and content structure, is my guess as being the culprit.
Oh hang on, is someone going to accuse me of being on Boeing's or FAA's payroll for saying that?