Serves me right for going off of memory and trying to follow and respond to something on my phone.
Don't worry... no one is immune from such mistakes, no matter how many thousands of hours one spends on the phone
I imagine LionAir was tough on you so just wanted to say thanks and that you are appreciated.
It was, and with that not finished and ET302 following, not having an easy time... however, I can breathe a sigh of relief in that after ET302 "foreign pressure" and attempts to railroad my comments in the media, have subsided. I just wish I could just say, "didn't I say those things a while back?"
Hands up those working for a crisis / reputation management PR specialist.
Some have stopped posting since ET302 because probably their "employers" realized it wasn't going to work... at least some of those who accused of me being on the payroll of whoever they were supposed to go after, have stopped throwing accusations against me too...
Who would have thought this could happen to a.net forums 5 years ago...
My post was a reaction to some that implied the crew made several mistakes:
No doubt. But yeah, let's not discuss it in a way that demonizes and blames them... Dead pilots can't talk to defend themselves...
1) Not performing electric uptrim prior to hitting the cut out switches (as [i] suggested[i] by the AD);
I disagree on this point. While I know this is implicit in the AD, in my opinion the AD was ambiguous and unclear on this... ie: poorly written.
2) Re-instating MCAS by reversing cut-out switches (in direct conflict with the AD);
Again, I think the AD is poorly written. It said, "cut it out"... and later at the end it said, "oh, if you find difficulty in manual trimming, you could use electric trim prior to cutting it out"... Poorly written in my opinion.
The above 2 points, are just different ways of reaching the same question as you had later, that were:
Conclusion: crew mistake? Not sure, in fact, don't think so.
Conclusion? Crew error? Probably not. More an act of desperation, rather than "not following AD procedures".
We have the same questions, but perhaps differing routes on how we got there.
3) Trim-control issues were a result of the crew allowing the aircraft to exceed Vmo.
This I agree and I think this should be questioned on what factors influencing the crew prior to the flight to allow this to happen on the flight... ie: perhaps the way they were instructed, or aviate prioritization philosophies, etc, that may differ from other carriers/countries... because the major difference between JT043 and JT610 and ET302 is the speed.
PS. Just to be clear, I'm not arguing with you that 200 hrs FO should not be in the cockpit of a commercial airliner (BTW, this FO had 361 hrs, of which 207 in 737, of which 56 in MAX). Just not (yet) convinced if his junior status was in any way a factor in this accident.
I think this is 261 hours on the 737 AND Max, as they are put in as separate entries.
The way I see it is:
TOTAL 361 Hours which includes 207 hours in 737s that is not a MAX, and 56 hours in a Max.
I raised this in an earlier reply but it seems no one has picked up on it...
If he has 361 total hours, how many hours did he spend in flying school?
My version: 361-207-56 = 98 hours
If I understand yours correctly, your version would be 154 hours.
If the guy does a standard training path (ie: non-MPL), 154 hours would get you PPL CPL with no ME and perhaps with no IR, and 98 hours... heck, that's a PPL and 50% of a CPL with no ME and no IR.
Even before going into total experience, I question the basic foundation for the FO... this is not to blame the FO, but the carrier's recruitment standards. And if the guy is MPL, then I want to know his total simulator hours.
In Indonesia we've stopped recruiting guys with less than 210 hrs because of excessive sim training requirements to bring these guys up to standards (mostly CPLSEIR), and are now beginning to only recruit those with more than 200hrs and ideally, more than 240hrs (the latter being with CPLMEIR)... because we consistently a huge difference in quality (and accident/incident rates have plummetted since this move), thanks also to a slowing in the market growth here allowing carriers to be more selective.
So, just what was the license path of the FO and his total training hours?
From experience over here, those with over 200hrs of pre-jet flight experience, the easier it is to train on CRM in abnormal situations on the 737 and 320.
I've heard too many lawn dart episodes in 737/320 simulators for those who applied to airlines with less than 200hrs...
Sorry for this "noise", but while I disagree with conclusions of guys with less than 1000hrs hours in a jet is criminal, for many of us who disagree with that, would however conclude that putting someone in a jet with less than 200hrs of total flying experience, is a "corporate misadventure" (to put it politely). However, we need to know in order to understand the FO and what his thinking process might be in contrast to the Captain's.
I think they did just that, as seeing TWO instances of uptrim before MCAS kicked in again, but this electric uptrimming did not provide the desired result. Perhaps that threw them off in thinking that electric (up)trimming was not working, thus MACS down trimming would also be not working . . .
This is the right question to ask.
Did they reengage the power to the stab trim prior to these 2 instances or not?
If yes, and the trim didn't work, we have an ever bigger design issue then...
If no, then task saturation under an overly stressed cockpit situation, can explain... including why "only 2 very short trim command actions" instead of the longer ones they did earlier.
What we can assume at the moment is that power to the trim was available after that. I think arguments for "did the MCAS engage the trim after the stab trim cutout" is misleading... we have an instance of automatic trim command (assumed MCAS) with no trim movement, so the cutout did what it did.
Let me go back to this:
The FDR clearly shows a good deal of uptrimming prior to cut out switches. Its not that the crew did not try that. Its that all of their uptrimming was cut short before the control column was pitch balanced. Why is that? Why would the crew stop uptriming if there is still considerable back force required on the column? That just does not make any sense whatsoever.
If you look at the combination of altitude, pitch attitude display, and control column inputs, I think it is possible that the crew felt that they the slight reduction in column input force required, made a big difference in their perception of where "neutral is"... call it adrenalin, or "heat of the moment" or whatever... But yeah, this is definitely far from conclusive and complete.
By the way, anyone tried to pulling the manual trim up while having 1/2 to 2/3 aft column input, while flying at Vmo, in the 737NG sim?