Austin787 wrote:

AEROFAN wrote:

bob75013 wrote:

Ahh a 737-800 is not a 737 Max8

It may not be, but how does someone purchasing a ticket on an airline supposed to know this? What designation would AA or any airline use to provide this information to the public when purchasing a ticket given that both are variants of the 800 series?

In the flight details section, AA codes the 737-800 (NG) as 738, and the 737 MAX 8 as 7M8. I believe UA website also distinguishes between the 737-900ER and 737 MAX 9 as well.

Ah, thank you much,Austin787. Much appreciated.

I can see my flights are not on a MAX. That's a load off...

benjjk wrote:

A lot of arguments saying they shouldn't be grounded because we don't know the cause of this accident. But, in the absence of any other obvious cause, two superficially-similar fatal accidents in close succession is exactly why they SHOULD be grounded. Qantas grounded their A380s after the QF32 near-disaster, voluntarily, until there was an indication of what caused the explosion. I'd expect that similar safety-focused airlines are having crisis meetings today to consider the same with the Max fleets.

Well, again, "shouldn't be grounded" and "shouldn't be grounded YET" have very different meanings on the day of the crash. I think many of the "YET" crowd would be onboard with basic evidence of what happened on this flight.

In the case of QANTAS, they chose to ground their fleet, and ET might choose to do the same. Indeed, every airline might choose to. However, the airline that loses (or nearly loses) an airframe under questionable circumstances causing loss of life will have a different motivation than the airline that hasn't.

It's still a very fluid situation, and any moment we might hear of a grounding. Or not.

klm617 wrote:

The problem is not the airplane it's pilot training. With so much being taken over by technology and relying on the technology to get you out of harms way the art of hand flying out of danger is becoming a lost art. By the time you process all the messages and warning the automated cockpit is given you the event is over and you've hit the ground.

Agreed. And I'm not saying this to be insensitive but many of these nations do not have appropriate regulatory agencies like the FAA who approve pilot and maintenance training practices. Often the person in charge is whoever paid the biggest bribe to the government. These crews are just not as well trained in systems, CRM, inflight emergencies, unusual attitude recovery, etc. And it's not their fault but the fault of the airline and the governing body or lack thereof. A checklist only goes so far. You need to understand the appropriate aircraft systems to figure out why something is happening.

casinterest wrote:

We don't know what caused either crash. A grounding is premature.

For those that point to the 787, the batteries overheated, and caught fire. People knew the cause of the issue.
These two planes have crashed due to much more complicated factors that need to be investigated. The only thing to do is wait for the investigations to release their findings and directives. There are now hundreds of flights a day that are successful on the 737 max, so we really need to wait to see if this is a horrible coincidence of two planes crashing, or if there is an airframe/software/pilot training issue that needs to be addressed.

Thank you for injecting some much needed sanity regarding this discussion thread! Calls for groundings by those who are among the least in the know regarding what happened, are really ridiculous.

My opinion is that unless any obvious evidence shows up within a week or two that points AGAINST that the cause of these crashes are related and/or has to do with faulty design of the 737 MAX, then they should be grounded until such evidence shoes up and/or Boeing has implemented a fix.

Again, I am not setting my foot on a MAX, neither is any family member or friend, until these crashes are resolved.

PlanesNTrains wrote:

benjjk wrote:

A lot of arguments saying they shouldn't be grounded because we don't know the cause of this accident. But, in the absence of any other obvious cause, two superficially-similar fatal accidents in close succession is exactly why they SHOULD be grounded. Qantas grounded their A380s after the QF32 near-disaster, voluntarily, until there was an indication of what caused the explosion. I'd expect that similar safety-focused airlines are having crisis meetings today to consider the same with the Max fleets.

Well, again, "shouldn't be grounded" and "shouldn't be grounded YET" have very different meanings on the day of the crash. I think many of the "YET" crowd would be onboard with basic evidence of what happened on this flight.

In the case of QANTAS, they chose to ground their fleet, and ET might choose to do the same. Indeed, every airline might choose to. However, the airline that loses (or nearly loses) an airframe under questionable circumstances causing loss of life will have a different motivation than the airline that hasn't.

It's still a very fluid situation, and any moment we might hear of a grounding. Or not.

All very true, news could come out at any time which influences an opinion either way.

Regulators need solid evidence to order a grounding as, at least where I'm from, such a decision can be overturned in the courts. So I think any grounding in the next couple of days will come from airlines which, unlike regulators, include reputation risk in their reviews. I would not be surprised if some airlines (especially those with small fleets) decide to do so out of an abundance of caution.

BaconButty wrote:

As an interested layman, this isn't a good situation - frankly I'm amazed it was certified.

Why? What part of the certification process was inadequate or omitted? You can't deny certification without any basis, so on what basis would certification be denied?

BaconButty wrote:

And I think it warranted more communication from Boeing, the FAA and the NTSB.

How much communication was there? And how much more, and on what, should there have been?

BaconButty wrote:

I'm not saying that all Max's should be grounded, it may be that a reduction in operating altitude would address the issue.

What would this accomplish, and what should the altitude be? I think the FR24 data shows the plane in question reached max altitude of 8600 ft, should that be the new operating altitude?

And I love how people keep bringing up the UA and US Air crashes. That was the fault of Parker-Hannifan. Boeing did not build the defective power control unit. Do you hold Airbus responsible for the faulty engines? I certainly don't.

Zaf wrote:

TTailedTiger wrote:

No, these developing countries have crashed numerous 737NG and A320 aircraft. No one called for grounding those fleets.

But those were pilot errors and bad maintenance. The MAX keeps diving and pilots can't do anything about it.

Nice intelligent comment that is completely factually incorrect. If it were MCAS, and the rest of the world doesn’t know that yet, the pilots are trained to select the Stabilizer Cutout Switches to OFF. So yeah, even if there were a malfunction of MCAS the pilots can do something about it.

CriticalPoint wrote:

Zaf wrote:

TTailedTiger wrote:

No, these developing countries have crashed numerous 737NG and A320 aircraft. No one called for grounding those fleets.

But those were pilot errors and bad maintenance. The MAX keeps diving and pilots can't do anything about it.

The pilots can complete their immediate action items and cut off the automatic trim......the pilots at United, American and Southwest can complete this procedure without crashing, you know why? Because of world class training, before I ground an entire type I would consider the two airlines at play and their experience and training culture.

If any of you knew even 10% of the Flight manual bulletins and training bulletins pilots in the US get We would need 100 more 1000 post threads. Did lion air pilots and Ethiopian pilots get the same training bulletins and flight manual bulletins?

My last remark got thrown out by mods. Let see if this one will stick around. Evidently mods don´t throw out garbage like the above post. I have been through type rating training in the US as well as two other countries. The one in the US was not world class...

The big new engines further up front, coupled with a 1960s designed tail section, make the MAX8 unstable in certain circumstances such as the climb.

This could be a repeat of the MD11, which was all new up front, but suffered very poor control when landing. The tail was simply too small for the new added weight up front. Landing in crosswinds it would drop a wing and cartwheel.

It appears the MAX is unstable in much the same way, confusing both the AP and the crew into fatal actions.

The difference between AA191, the 787 battery fires, and this flight is that we /knew/ right away this was a design flaw to a relatively new aircraft (unlike the 767), due to the nature of each accident (the engines were ripped off in one case, the other one we had a visible fire). In these last few accidents, we’re so in the dark because they all have one thing in common; loss of communication (not so much JT610, but we don’t have all the data about that yet, do we?).

BoeingGuy wrote:

Zaf wrote:

TTailedTiger wrote:

No, these developing countries have crashed numerous 737NG and A320 aircraft. No one called for grounding those fleets.

But those were pilot errors and bad maintenance. The MAX keeps diving and pilots can't do anything about it.

Nice intelligent comment that is completely factually incorrect. If it were MCAS, and the rest of the world doesn’t know that yet, the pilots are trained to select the Stabilizer Cutout Switches to OFF. So yeah, even if there were a malfunction of MCAS the pilots can do something about it.

Böing issued a workaround. They didn't fix the root problem. We don't know how often pilots encountered MCAS takeover and managed to save their flights from crashing. We don't know if it's recoverable in any condition.

IPFreely wrote:

BaconButty wrote:

As an interested layman, this isn't a good situation - frankly I'm amazed it was certified.

Why? What part of the certification process was inadequate or omitted? You can't deny certification without any basis, so on what basis would certification be denied?

BaconButty wrote:

And I think it warranted more communication from Boeing, the FAA and the NTSB.

How much communication was there? And how much more, and on what, should there have been?

BaconButty wrote:

I'm not saying that all Max's should be grounded, it may be that a reduction in operating altitude would address the issue.

What would this accomplish, and what should the altitude be? I think the FR24 data shows the plane in question reached max altitude of 8600 ft, should that be the new operating altitude?

Imagine IP and I actually agreeing on something for once, but his comment is spot on and one of the more intelligent responses in this thread. There are a lot of very false assumptions being made on A.net just like there were for the Amazon accident

Let’s let the experts figure out what occurred, them I’m sure it will be effectively dealt with. I would know. I’m in the middle of another fix for a certain issue.

Is the MAX 8 the one that needs that little stand under its' butt so that the nose doesn't go up from uneven loading?

uta999 wrote:

It appears the MAX is unstable in much the same way, confusing both the AP and the crew into fatal actions.

If this is a repeat of JT610, and the crew was made aware of what to do, and it ended up playing out exactly as JT610 did, then you have to question - at some level, at least - the training and preparedness of the crew. That doesn't take away from how the MCAS is behaving in certain situations, but it would seem there should have been a way out. Were they confused? Or is this actually the same cause and effect as JT 610? My guess is that it is but I'm not going to assume that outright.

WeatherPilot wrote:

Is the MAX 8 the one that needs that little stand under its' butt so that the nose doesn't go up from uneven loading?

How is that even relevant to anything we're discussing here?

sldispatcher wrote:

I would think the outstanding pilots at UAL, AAL and WN along with their skilled technical folks would already have picked up on even the slightest concern and requested that it be addressed or brought to someone's attention. I would also believe the folks at the FAA need the opportunity to review any of the hard data as well.

I say let the investigation play out. Let the real experts handle the decisions. Any sudden reaction from a multi-national company travel policy is no less short-sighted than any of the recent knee jerk reactions to social justice causes that were based on emotion and not fact. Thank goodness millennials don't run everything.

To be fair, the potential problem here is not something pilots confront on every flight. We don’t know if the pitot tube is involved again, but this is likely the same software issue as before but the chain of events that led to that software kicking in is probably rare and may be aggravated by lower maintenance standards than in the USA. We definitely saw that with Lion Air IMHO.

BoeingGuy wrote:

Zaf wrote:

TTailedTiger wrote:

No, these developing countries have crashed numerous 737NG and A320 aircraft. No one called for grounding those fleets.

But those were pilot errors and bad maintenance. The MAX keeps diving and pilots can't do anything about it.

Nice intelligent comment that is completely factually incorrect. If it were MCAS, and the rest of the world doesn’t know that yet, the pilots are trained to select the Stabilizer Cutout Switches to OFF. So yeah, even if there were a malfunction of MCAS the pilots can do something about it.

As an engineer, I find the behaviour of the MCAS design not acceptable at all. You can not have a system that repeatedly tries to dive aircraft especially at low altitude. Cut off switches and training can only be considered as a band aid till a proper fix is implemented.

For instance, you can put instructions to perform hand ventilation when an ICU ventilator fails (i.e. what to do in failure) but not keep shipping faulty ventilator machines that display repeated undesired behaviour.

Zaf wrote:

BoeingGuy wrote:

Zaf wrote:

But those were pilot errors and bad maintenance. The MAX keeps diving and pilots can't do anything about it.

Nice intelligent comment that is completely factually incorrect. If it were MCAS, and the rest of the world doesn’t know that yet, the pilots are trained to select the Stabilizer Cutout Switches to OFF. So yeah, even if there were a malfunction of MCAS the pilots can do something about it.

Böing issued a workaround. They didn't fix the root problem. We don't know how often pilots encountered MCAS takeover and managed to save their flights from crashing. We don't know if it's recoverable in any condition.

The root cause is being fixed. Yes it’s recoverable from any condition. Stab Cutout Switches to OFF.

longhauler wrote:

sldispatcher wrote:

I would think the outstanding pilots at UAL, AAL and WN along with their skilled technical folks would already have picked up on even the slightest concern and requested that it be addressed or brought to someone's attention. I would also believe the folks at the FAA need the opportunity to review any of the hard data as well.

Exactly.

I know that at Air Canada, when the (likely) cause of the Lion Air accident became apparent, memos were issued to MAX8 pilots pointing them to proper drills for review. Also training was adjusted to include such a scenario during initial training and on recurrent training. I know of many Captains that include this scenario in their "emergency review" before the first flight of every pairing.

I don't doubt that UA, AA and WN are doing the same thing! And I also don't doubt that the FAA (and Transport Canada) has compiled the data and feel this is a sufficient solution.

I guess the question is, why did Boeing not inform pilots about this change? I seem to recall they did the same thing when they introduced the 737-400 (some switch was altered) which led to the BD92 crash in the UK. It wasn't the sole cause, but the failure to disclose the alteration contributed to the crash.

It would be prudent to ground the MAX until they can at least figure out if this was a similar situation. Grounding some aircraft temporarily is better than potentially more loss of life (and further damage to the 737's reputation). I certainly won't be setting foot on a 737MAX until they've figured out what is going on. I'm sure a lot of other pax feel the same way.

It's embarrassing seeing the frequent a.net users spitting in the faces of others trying to have a discussion about the MAX by posting condescending sarcastic responses. If you don't think the MAX should be grounded make a reasonable argument, but knock it off with the rude posts.

Yes all we know for now is that 2 MAX's have crashed with causes not yet fully known. It's not enough to go off of. However, the fact that this new type has already had two catostrophic crashes in a little more than a year in service raises obvious concerns. How about a little civil discussion regarding causes and probabilities of concern for operators and fliers instead of scoffing at those who want such a discussion in the first place?

BoeingGuy wrote:

speedking wrote:

klm617 wrote:

The problem is not the airplane it's pilot training. With so much being taken over by technology and relying on the technology to get you out of harms way the art of hand flying out of danger is becoming a lost art. By the time you process all the messages and warning the automated cockpit is given you the event is over and you've hit the ground.

Yes. Looks like the MAX cannot be safely flown by an average pilot but you need an astronaut for that.

If it's Boeing and it's MAX
I ain't going, I ain't pax

On what basis do you say that? How many AA pilots have crashed a MAX for example? Please let us know your expertise in aviation for making a slanderous statement like that.

Unfortunately not every MAX in the world is flown by AA pilots. I only fly with AA. I like to stay safe.
Looks like the MAX is too difficult, when in trouble, to handle for the average and below pilots.

IPFreely wrote:

BaconButty wrote:

As an interested layman, this isn't a good situation - frankly I'm amazed it was certified.

Why? What part of the certification process was inadequate or omitted? You can't deny certification without any basis, so on what basis would certification be denied?

BaconButty wrote:

And I think it warranted more communication from Boeing, the FAA and the NTSB.

How much communication was there? And how much more, and on what, should there have been?

BaconButty wrote:

I'm not saying that all Max's should be grounded, it may be that a reduction in operating altitude would address the issue.

What would this accomplish, and what should the altitude be? I think the FR24 data shows the plane in question reached max altitude of 8600 ft, should that be the new operating altitude?

Q1: Specifically relating to the requirements set out in Part 25 Section 25.672.

Q3: you're missing my point. I'm raising concerns not so much about the issues with MCAS in the flight regime the Lion Air flight was in. I'm rather talking about it's potential intended use as a stall prevention flight augmentation system. So it looks like there are issues with task saturation when MCAS kicks in inadvertently due to loss of it's inputs. We'll see how this investigation goes. But I'm talking about the fact that Boeing didn't add the system for a laugh - it's there for a purpose. And my point is that, right at the point you need it (say pitot freezing at 37K feet) the pilot may have to disable it. In other words, JT610, even if it could be addressed with training, highlighted problems with the system in doing it's primary job. When a single AOA goes - so you may not be able to finely control pitch - you lose pitch protection! Hence my wondering out loud whether (since MCAS is a stall prevention system) staying away from your operating ceiling might be a good idea. But I'm a layman, I may well be talking bollocks - my wife says I do that a lot - but just trying to make the point that there are actions that can be taken short of grounding.

Q2: Given that you have this flight augmentation that doesn't seem to meet FAA certification criteria, and may well be unavailable when needed, damn right an explanation should be forthcoming.

PacificBeach wrote:

BoeingGuy wrote:

Zaf wrote:

But those were pilot errors and bad maintenance. The MAX keeps diving and pilots can't do anything about it.

Nice intelligent comment that is completely factually incorrect. If it were MCAS, and the rest of the world doesn’t know that yet, the pilots are trained to select the Stabilizer Cutout Switches to OFF. So yeah, even if there were a malfunction of MCAS the pilots can do something about it.

As an engineer, I find the behaviour of the MCAS design not acceptable at all. You can not have a system that repeatedly tries to dive aircraft especially at low altitude. Cut off switches and training can only be considered as a band aid till a proper fix is implemented.

For instance, you can put instructions to perform hand ventilation when an ICU ventilator fails (i.e. what to do in failure) but not keep shipping faulty ventilator machines that display repeated undesired behaviour.

You make valid points. I leave the details off the Internet, but it’s an extreme corner case failure that causes the issue in the first place and it is being addressed.

bgm wrote:

longhauler wrote:

sldispatcher wrote:

I would think the outstanding pilots at UAL, AAL and WN along with their skilled technical folks would already have picked up on even the slightest concern and requested that it be addressed or brought to someone's attention. I would also believe the folks at the FAA need the opportunity to review any of the hard data as well.

Exactly.

I know that at Air Canada, when the (likely) cause of the Lion Air accident became apparent, memos were issued to MAX8 pilots pointing them to proper drills for review. Also training was adjusted to include such a scenario during initial training and on recurrent training. I know of many Captains that include this scenario in their "emergency review" before the first flight of every pairing.

I don't doubt that UA, AA and WN are doing the same thing! And I also don't doubt that the FAA (and Transport Canada) has compiled the data and feel this is a sufficient solution.

I guess the question is, why did Boeing not inform pilots about this change? I seem to recall they did the same thing when they introduced the 737-400 (some switch was altered) which led to the BD92 crash in the UK. It wasn't the sole cause, but the failure to disclose the alteration contributed to the crash.

It would be prudent to ground the MAX until they can at least figure out if this was a similar situation. Grounding some aircraft temporarily is better than potentially more loss of life (and further damage to the 737's reputation). I certainly won't be setting foot on a 737MAX until they've figured out what is going on. I'm sure a lot of other pax feel the same way.

That isn’t quite what happened in the British Midlands crash. It was total Crew error, but there was an engine indication instrument that could have been more clear. Wasn’t a new switch.

speedking wrote:

BoeingGuy wrote:

speedking wrote:

Yes. Looks like the MAX cannot be safely flown by an average pilot but you need an astronaut for that.

If it's Boeing and it's MAX
I ain't going, I ain't pax

On what basis do you say that? How many AA pilots have crashed a MAX for example? Please let us know your expertise in aviation for making a slanderous statement like that.

Unfortunately not every MAX in the world is flown by AA pilots. I only fly with AA. I like to stay safe.
Looks like the MAX is too difficult, when in trouble, to handle for the average and below pilots.

Not even close to accurate. Let’s let the experts determine what happened.

BoeingGuy wrote:

I leave the details off the Internet, but it’s an extreme corner case failure that causes the issue in the first place and it is being addressed.

Very interesting comment... I hope you would be able to tell the story some day, maybe when the fix goes to production...

enilria wrote:

sldispatcher wrote:

I would think the outstanding pilots at UAL, AAL and WN along with their skilled technical folks would already have picked up on even the slightest concern and requested that it be addressed or brought to someone's attention. I would also believe the folks at the FAA need the opportunity to review any of the hard data as well.

I say let the investigation play out. Let the real experts handle the decisions. Any sudden reaction from a multi-national company travel policy is no less short-sighted than any of the recent knee jerk reactions to social justice causes that were based on emotion and not fact. Thank goodness millennials don't run everything.

To be fair, the potential problem here is not something pilots confront on every flight. We don’t know if the pitot tube is involved again, but this is likely the same software issue as before but the chain of events that led to that software kicking in is probably rare and may be aggravated by lower maintenance standards than in the USA. We definitely saw that with Lion Air IMHO.

It’s not the Pitot Tube. It was a malfunction of the AOA Vane.

Ground the Max-8 ? For what exactly? Because somebody Lost one? Are you Kidding? Have any been Lost in the USA? How about Europe? Have ANY investigations been done that concluded they were unsafe? And? Who was flying the ones that crashed? And their training was What, and they were trained Where?
Justv to run and jump off of a ledge because an airplane went in for unknowen reasons is SILLY!.! Give it a break until you know WHY the airplane went in

China has asked its domestic airlines to ground the 737max.
https://www.forexlive.com/news/!/china- ... x-20190310

benjjk wrote:

A lot of arguments saying they shouldn't be grounded because we don't know the cause of this accident. But, in the absence of any other obvious cause, two superficially-similar fatal accidents in close succession is exactly why they SHOULD be grounded. Qantas grounded their A380s after the QF32 near-disaster, voluntarily, until there was an indication of what caused the explosion. I'd expect that similar safety-focused airlines are having crisis meetings today to consider the same with the Max fleets.

And Qantas was right as a systematic issue was found which caused other airlines having to ground their A380s too.

The tolerance to this kind of issue is very different from country to country. I have been in the middle of a vehicle recall decision and it was a Japanese market car with the issue being a Asian designed and manfucatured component from an US supplier. The US headquarters were fighting tooth and nail to avoid a recall. The word "recall" was a banned worded so we referred to it as the "R"-word. Recall = PR disaster in their eyes. For the Japanese doing a recall was critical because in Japan, recall = customer service. For them, a recall is not bad as you are admitting you have a problem but are committed to fixing it properly so it means you are a company which cares for its customers. In the end, the recall was forced as it was reported to the authorities and they ordered a recall on safety grounds.

A bit the same with the 787. FAA and Boeing said "no problem" and then the Japanese airlines grounded their fleet to manage local market expectations. This forced the issue and in the end in a relatively short time an ugly but workable solution was put in place which seems to have fully addressed it. I believe without the Japanese Airlines grounding their fleets, it would have dragged on a lot longer and more look like the RR Trent 1000 distaster (btw a large part of the fleet was grounded not because a grounding was declared but because restrictions were put in place which airlines could not meet or which caused too much impact on their operations).

Not knowing yet what caused this crash is not a valid argument against grounding the MAX. It is in fact the opposit. If we knew it was a bombing, a crew suicide, a maintenance problem, a pilot error, ... we could say grounding isn't necessary. But if we have doubt about the plane itself, and with the MAX now, we may have, so we need to contain that risk. People who will have the first concret element about this new crash will decide and if it is not obvious the aircraft is not to blame, even Boeing will be asking for the grounding.
By the way, in problem solving methods use by the industry like 8D, the containement 3D, comes before the root cause analysis 4D.

Bloomberg is now posting it too.

Wow.

So, what do medium to large 738MAX operators do (Southwest, Air Canada, and American) to shore up capacity? Bring old 733s, MD80s and 757s out of storage?

I'm a big Boeing fan and an Airbus one too, I'm not a fanboy and not a stockholder in Boeing, I don't like overreacting to these kinds of things but honestly, this one has spooked me for some reason. Perhaps it's hit close to home as 18 Canadians lost their lives today and it's huge news here, also our two main carriers AC and WJ are investing heavily in the MAX and we'll likely have little choice other than the MAX when we fly domestically within Canada in the coming years.

mig17 wrote:

Not knowing yet what caused this crash is not a valid argument against grounding the MAX. It is in fact the opposit. If we knew it was a bombing, a crew suicide, a maintenance problem, a pilot error, ... we could say grounding isn't necessary. But if we have doubt about the plane itself, and with the MAX now, we may have, so we need to contain that risk. People who will have the first concret element about this new crash will decide and if it is not obvious the aircraft is not to blame, even Boeing will be asking for the grounding.
By the way, in problem solving methods use by the industry like 8D, the containement 3D, comes before the root cause analysis 4D.

Some take the view that you have to prove that the type is unsafe before you can ground it, and to an extent that is legally true for a regulator once it has been certified. But I take the view that the aircraft needs to prove to me that it is safe. And two major losses, in a superficially similar manner, with such low flight hours fleet-wide indicates a potential problem. Until it can be proven to me that the type is indeed safe, I will be reluctant to board a Max.

Having said that, I am not campaigning for a grounding. I trust that there are experts around the world who are working hard on this issue, possessing many more facts than I have, who will make the right decision.

Cayman Airways has decided to ground their fleet of 2 Max 8's.

https://www.caymanairways.com/mobile/CA ... Operations

washingtonflyer wrote:

So, what do medium to large 738MAX operators do (Southwest, Air Canada, and American) to shore up capacity? Bring old 733s, MD80s and 757s out of storage?

Southwest doesn't have any more 733's in storage to fly. They've all been moved and offspec.

A grounding of 34 jets will be tough on the operation.

arcticcruiser wrote:

CriticalPoint wrote:

Zaf wrote:

But those were pilot errors and bad maintenance. The MAX keeps diving and pilots can't do anything about it.

The pilots can complete their immediate action items and cut off the automatic trim......the pilots at United, American and Southwest can complete this procedure without crashing, you know why? Because of world class training, before I ground an entire type I would consider the two airlines at play and their experience and training culture.

If any of you knew even 10% of the Flight manual bulletins and training bulletins pilots in the US get We would need 100 more 1000 post threads. Did lion air pilots and Ethiopian pilots get the same training bulletins and flight manual bulletins?

I have done type ratings in three different countries. One of them was in the USA. And it was by far the sloppiest. Nothing world class about it. So get off your high horse.

Type ratings and recurrent airline training and tech bulletins are two different things.

I get the relatively high number of incidents with this type within a short time, but as others have (no doubt) pointed out, how many WN, AA, etc MAXes have crashed? What is the differentiating factor? It is obviously a safe aircraft in day-to-day use on certain missions. Maybe not on others/operated by others(??).

We dont know the cause of this crash. The 787 was a battery issue. If this is another MCAS issue then there need could be ground for a grounding until Boeing can find a permanent fix.

GSPSPOT wrote:

I get the relatively high number of incidents with this type within a short time, but as others have (no doubt) pointed out, how many WN, AA, etc MAXes have crashed? What is the differentiating factor? It is obviously a safe aircraft in day-to-day use on certain missions. Maybe not on others/operated by others(??).

Just because something hasn't happened yet doesn't mean it can't / won't.

I've got no skin in the game but erring on the side of caution isn't an unreasonable proposition.

arcticcruiser wrote:

CriticalPoint wrote:

Zaf wrote:

But those were pilot errors and bad maintenance. The MAX keeps diving and pilots can't do anything about it.

The pilots can complete their immediate action items and cut off the automatic trim......the pilots at United, American and Southwest can complete this procedure without crashing, you know why? Because of world class training, before I ground an entire type I would consider the two airlines at play and their experience and training culture.

If any of you knew even 10% of the Flight manual bulletins and training bulletins pilots in the US get We would need 100 more 1000 post threads. Did lion air pilots and Ethiopian pilots get the same training bulletins and flight manual bulletins?

My last remark got thrown out by mods. Let see if this one will stick around. Evidently mods don´t throw out garbage like the above post. I have been through type rating training in the US as well as two other countries. The one in the US was not world class...

I’m talking about airline training not some random shop with a sim. Sorry your training sucked but you probably got what you paid for.

acechip wrote:

Thats why automobile companies issue a recall. There is a regulatory provision for it.

No, it's not. Automobiles are not recalled because a certain number crashed. Recalls are issued when the cause of crashes is identified, and even then only when the remedy is a repair or replacement.

Separately, I can understand the emotions involved in wanting to ground the fleet at this point. I don't understand the logic. I'd like one of the proponents to provide the algorithm. I'd like to understand the reasoning that takes number of crashes, time period, deaths, degree of similarities/differences, and unknowns, and spits out an answer of "ground fleet".

Once the algorithm is understood, it should be trivial to apply it to smart phones. After all, pedestrian deaths have risen dramatically since smart phones were introduced, and most, if not all, of the increase was due to pedestrians using smart phones when walking. I'm interested in whether or not the algorithm will spit out an answer of "ban smart phones".

LAX772LR wrote:

We have 300+ posts on this on two other threads. Do we really need more of this crap?

I'm going to play devil's advocate here and I'm replying to your post because, across the recent 737 Max threads you at least appear to be the most vocal of those criticising any suggestion of a total Max 8 grounding.

On this forum we (mere mortals) are constantly reminded that the aviation industry is fully ingrained with a safety first attitude. People in the industry are highly trained and certified to a level seen in very few other industries. Just a few months ago we had a discussion where a highly respected pilot from a highly respected carrier suggested that a flight might not depart because of missing duvets as it was a very real safety of flight issue. Again it was made clear that "we do not take risks - period". To be fully open about raising this topic, I apologised profusely to said member because my tone during my replies in that conversation was not up to standard.

Now we have 2 almost brand new 737 Max 8 aircraft lost during initial climb. Some are suggesting that these 2 accidents absolutely did not occur during the same phase of flight because MCAS is not active with any flap extended. Other data suggests that the aircraft was a ~400kts, well above max flap 1 speed and several minutes after departure at which point flaps would usually be fully retracted. In other words, it is not yet fully clear whether flaps were extended or not, nor whether MCAS would be in play or not.

You have made the point that not knowing the cause of this latest crash is absolutely not a reason for a grounding, that it is a crazy idea and anyone even suggesting such is basically a dumbass. Heck, we even had a moderator stating that ANY suggestion of a grounding would result in the post being deleted.

Now we have CAAC grounding the type under their control, with others already or likely following. So there are those in the industry (and in a position to make such a decision) who have decided that a grounding is the right thing to do, which would suggest that those calling any such action crazy, and moderators suggesting that posts would be deleted are probably over-reacting more than those they are pointing the finger at for over-reacting.

CAAC is probably the LEAST likely authority to make a decision based on what is written on A.Net, so let's not go there. Others have already stated that CAAC's decision was only made to protect their Airbus final assembly business, which personally I think is a disgusting thing to suggest without direct proof.

Anyway, back to my main point:

1.) We have two Max 8 total loss accidents within a short time period.
2.) Both were during climb out.
3.) We "know" that one was directly related to MCAS.
4.) MCAS has not been categorically ruled out on the second.
5.) Boeing have a "procedure" in place (which they didn't widely publish before entry into service) for what to do when your new plane is trying to kill you.
6.) No absolute fix for potential MCAS flaws has been released (a procedure on what to do to arrest massive nose down pitch during a phase of flight where altitude is not on your side is not a fix!)

..and you state that not knowing a reason for a crash is absolutely no reason for grounding a fleet. What if there was another crash next week and we still don't know the reason? What if there were 2 more next week (and one was an American carrier) and we still don't know the reason? At what point would it be OK to take preventative action when you still don't know the cause?

I've been an aviation enthusiast for 40+ years and I am becoming more confused every day. On this forum we hear the same reasons being given to justify both action and inaction but you can't have it both ways.

The very fact that CAAC has decided to ground a fleet, in my humble opinion, would suggest that those who were criticising even the slightest suggestion of a grounding might want to rethink their position.... or maybe offer an apology.

NTLDaz wrote:

GSPSPOT wrote:

I get the relatively high number of incidents with this type within a short time, but as others have (no doubt) pointed out, how many WN, AA, etc MAXes have crashed? What is the differentiating factor? It is obviously a safe aircraft in day-to-day use on certain missions. Maybe not on others/operated by others(??).

Just because something hasn't happened yet doesn't mean it can't / won't.

I've got no skin in the game but erring on the side of caution isn't an unreasonable proposition.

I'm just saying, we need more information. Thousands of people fly on these planes daily without incident. Why are these issues happening in only a very small number of flights? Much more investigation is required before conclusions can be drawn.

I'm not going to be one to call for the grounding of the aircraft, but people here have been incredibly harsh on those of us who say will avoid the MAX for now even though there's very little information available regarding circumstances of the ET crash with everything still on the table.

It is a very valid concern. You have a new aircraft that has seen a few years of service, has had a fatal crash where the aircraft-related issue remains unresolved and not fully understood, while a second goes down in the space of a few months in a similar flight phase. With the JT610, most people have been fixated on the existence of the MCAS, maintenance and pilot training, but is the true nature of the glitch understood? Was it really the sensor that was going bad or was there something else in the chain that was malfunctioning and feeding bad information? Can whatever that is affect anything else and not just the MCAS?

I grant you that it is a matter of personal preference at the moment. Some people would feel comfortable swimming in the open ocean, others not so much. But it doesn't have to be because of an AvB thing. If in the next few months a couple of 737NGs went down, would I avoid the type? No, it is a very mature aircraft that has been in operation for more than 2 decades, it is unlikely to be due to issues with the particular aircraft type. If a couple of A320neos went down instead, of course, I would be very concerned about flying on it as it is a relatively new introduction too.

I would be more reluctant to fly Ethiopian or Lionair than I would be of flying on a 737 MAX8

GSPSPOT wrote:

I get the relatively high number of incidents with this type within a short time, but as others have (no doubt) pointed out, how many WN, AA, etc MAXes have crashed? What is the differentiating factor? It is obviously a safe aircraft in day-to-day use on certain missions. Maybe not on others/operated by others(??).

If I count correctly, as of 31 January, 65 MAX had been delivered to WN, UA, and AA in aggregate. That’s 18-19% of the world fleet. So even if it were just dumb luck, that could account for it. It’s hard to do any meaningful statistics on a figure like 2/350.