Having read through the 1,227 posts so far in this thread, I'd like to share a few observations... here goes:
* The question was asked and, as far as I could see, not answered as to whether those with kids [and I'm going to extend that to loved ones of all varieties - partners, spouses, parents, grandparents/grandkids, aunts, uncles, cousins, the works] would feel comfortable putting those people on a 737 MAX. My answer to that is that I, personally and travelling alone, would probably not hesitate to travel on a MAX; but, I would be very hesitant to travel on a MAX with my wife, parents or other family (or to have them travel on one without me). In the latter case, I would try to find alternative flights or routes to avoid the MAX. Just in case. But, just in case, I echo the sentiment of the person who originally posed this question that this is why regulators and operators have, in many instances, chosen to exclude the MAX from the system.
* People in this thread are making a lot, and I mean a LOT, of the FR24 data... from a sparsely populated rural area of Ethiopia. As though the FR24 data is somehow the holy grail of information upon which to form conclusions about the cause of a plane crash. It isn't, even in a place where FR24 data is significantly more reliable.
* This thread is also making quite a bit of 'we don't know this' and 'we don't know that', as if the information available to the general public and posted on a website/forum for aviation enthusiasts is all the information there is to know about a situation, as though that information is somehow enough for the regulators and operators in our beloved industry to rely solely upon. Again, it isn't. It really isn't. There is, I've no doubt, a vast wealth of information available to the regulators and the operators (and to Boeing, obviously) that "we don't know" but that is no doubt behind more than one of the decisions being made by those regulators and operators (and, I'd like to think, Boeing). We, the public, don't need to know everything, we just need to know that those who are 'in the know' are doing what they can to keep us safe... and I suppose that leads me into my next point.
* On balance (and I sat on the fence for a really long time over whether I thought, as an enthusiast but also a regulator (not an aviation safety regulator, I hasten to add)), I feel that Singapore, Australia, the UK, the EU and others have made the right choice. And quite likely the only choice available to them. To be fair, Singapore probably started with the 'applying pressure' (whether that was their intention or not) and others have chosen to follow suit, demonstrate leadership, apply further pressure, etc. - and the more that do that, the more pressure there is for others to follow. The public in those jurisdictions no doubt feel (rightly or wrongly, we won't know until the investigations find something conclusive) that their respective regulators are 'keeping them safe', and the opposite is what is fueling the negative sentiment towards the FAA and Boeing....
* ... but, of course, there are good reasons for Boeing and the FAA (and, I suspect, for TCCA) to hold off on following suit. If Boeing says all operators should ground their MAX fleets, it will be seen as an admission that something is wrong, the type is flawed, and Boeing will be pursued for compensation for any losses incurred while the type is forcibly out of service. Likewise if the FAA orders a grounding, not to mention the questions that would be directed towards their certification processes. The TCCA could have any number of motives, including I'm sure that if they order a grounding in Canada that would most likely force the FAA's hand, and also wishing to avoid further conflict with Boeing. Of course, and most importantly, I am absolutely positive they genuinely believe (and no doubt for good reason) the MAX is safe. As do I. The very issue of pressure from other jurisdictions is likely to mean the US and Canada won't hold out too much longer, but I suspect the (first) move will come from the operators, not from Boeing or the regulators.
* Finally, given the air time being given to human factors, I want to share my thoughts on that aspect. I'm neither a pilot, an avionics technician, or a human factors expert. I am, however, in the industry (and have been for a while), a lifelong enthusiast, and know more than enough to keep me out of trouble. So I'm curious to know whether those who ARE more expert than myself believe a software update will suffice in addressing the issues with MCAS and with the handling of the MCAS? Is the software capable of being updated to such an extent that the issue should resolve and pilots should no longer have difficulty in handling the aircraft? Or would people prefer to see physical changes, such as perhaps moving the trim cutoff switch to the yoke so the pilot handling doesn't need to take one hand off the yoke at a time when they need to apply as much pressure to the yoke as possible (i.e. they're 'fighting the aircraft')?