indcwby wrote:

This has always been a software issue.

up front it is a hardware issue. The raw aerodynamic shape of the fuselage, wings, engine nacelles, ...
of the MAX does not fit the required benign stall characteristics.
MCAS does not change this but tries to reduce the available envelope to aid the pilot to not "go there".

You can make a sophist argument about this meeting the required behavior or not.

I’m curious whether the “hardware” issue due to the larger engines and GC position is only a MAX 8 issue due to its shorter length. Any thoughts?

https://medium.com/@jpaulreed/the-737ma ... 41290994bd

Great analysis of the problem in this link by a software expert

"When this system detects a dangerous flight condition, it trims the aircraft, attempting to prevent a stall by pushing the nose down. Trim is not a fancy, new fangled technology: the Cessnas I fly have trim wheels, and autopilots manipulate trim to fly aircraft in an automated way.

What is different here is: the MCAS commands the trim in this condition without notifying the pilots AND to override the input, the pilots must deactivate the system via a switch on a console, NOT by retrimming the aircraft via the yoke, which is a more common way to manage the airplane’s trim.


Also of note: the MCAS system directs the 737Max’s stabilizer; this is part of the horizontal tail-fin on the 737, but it is located in the front; pilot input, however, affects the elevator, which is located on the opposite edge of the tail-fin. The important part here is: given continued input into the stabilizer, it’s been reported that a pilot can be applying full opposite input into the stabilizer, and the physics are such that the stabilizer — the part under control of the automatic system — can override the inputs of the pilot.


An important aspect of both accidents is how quickly they unfolded: the New York Times has a very good interactive piece illustrating this. We’re talking about minutes — about as long as it’s taken you to read this far — at low altitudes right after takeoff, asking pilots to realize, understand, and respond to why their aircraft was silently fighting their inputs, in a context of being told that the “system” they were operating was pretty much like every other 737 they’d been likely to operate in their careers, ever."

You read the software article and for sure you can understand why 737 pilots need specific new training for flying these planes

Even more so they really don't want to really flying both types of plane in their role as they are actually so different to fly?

And they don't want to be learning and experimenting on the job

Interested wrote:

And whilst these planes are grounded wouldn't it be a good time to train pilots across the world the differences in what the switches are and do. How stuff is supposed to work etc. So if the planes ever do fly again they don't just get thrown into them cold or feeling unprepared

Get them all on training courses. They clearly need them

Yes, but first you need to wait current Boeing update and check how it might affect the training in case pilots need to do something different from current situation.

ytz wrote:

bhill wrote:

One thing I have been wondering...and bothering me a ton. Why now? This model has been in service for TWO years! If the only thing that has changed over the years is the Humans operating it.....

Numbers.

Two years ago they had one airplane in service. Now they have ~350. They were probably just coming up on a million cycles for the global fleet. And so they are finding out those 1 in a million problems.

too bad one n a million is 1970-s aviation safety standard.

kalvado wrote:

ytz wrote:

bhill wrote:

One thing I have been wondering...and bothering me a ton. Why now? This model has been in service for TWO years! If the only thing that has changed over the years is the Humans operating it.....

Numbers.

Two years ago they had one airplane in service. Now they have ~350. They were probably just coming up on a million cycles for the global fleet. And so they are finding out those 1 in a million problems.

too bad one n a million is 1970-s aviation safety standard.

I've read safety standard is 1 in a billion now?

So that stops Boeing claiming their software fix is "making a safe plane safer"

It's needed to make an unsafe plane safe. Alongside new pilot training from what I'm discovering

Virtual737 wrote:

indcwby wrote:

This has always been a software issue. Some folks posting here are acting this plane needs a re-design, while saying Airbus can do this, this and this. Looks like that won't happen.

Also, didn't Airbus have their own issues with their aircraft too.

https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/15/boeing- ... -days.html

"The FAA set to sign off on Boeing 737 Max software fix in 10 days, shares rise"

Of the 10 days, how many of them are Boeing still working on the fix and how many of them are the FAA analysing and then signing it off? Or are they just rubber stamping what Boeing tell them again?

Before the FAA sign this software fix off, should there be some sort of testing to make sure this fix works?. What happens if the same problems show up a few months down in the line what happens then?.

bombayduck wrote:

Virtual737 wrote:

indcwby wrote:

This has always been a software issue. Some folks posting here are acting this plane needs a re-design, while saying Airbus can do this, this and this. Looks like that won't happen.

Also, didn't Airbus have their own issues with their aircraft too.

https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/15/boeing- ... -days.html

"The FAA set to sign off on Boeing 737 Max software fix in 10 days, shares rise"

Of the 10 days, how many of them are Boeing still working on the fix and how many of them are the FAA analysing and then signing it off? Or are they just rubber stamping what Boeing tell them again?

Before the FAA sign this software fix off, should there be some sort of testing to make sure this fix works?. What happens if the same problems show up a few months down in the line what happens then?.

Especially as Boeing and the FAA were happy to tell, that the problem of the ET crash is unidentified at the moment.

vahancrazy wrote:

Interested wrote:

And whilst these planes are grounded wouldn't it be a good time to train pilots across the world the differences in what the switches are and do. How stuff is supposed to work etc. So if the planes ever do fly again they don't just get thrown into them cold or feeling unprepared

Get them all on training courses. They clearly need them

Yes, but first you need to wait current Boeing update and check how it might affect the training in case pilots need to do something different from current situation.

How about they show them all what the cockpit looks like as a start?

And at least tell them which switches are for maintenance crew only

The basic stuff like that

They can always worry about the more complicated stuff when that gets fixed

They've got a lot of training for a lot of pilots to think about

May as well start now otherwise will be even longer delays getting these planes back in the air

chiad wrote:

DocLightning wrote:

Amiga500 wrote:

It is dawning on me that there is a slim but non-zero possibility that the 737max may never be cleared to operate again - unless Boeing are allowed to do something no other aircraft has been under FAR25. The FAA might buy off on it, but really dunno how that will go down across the rest of the world.

This has occurred to me, too. They might have to step so far back into the design that it might go outside the boundaries of certification for the type. To make it worse, I understand that the FAA will not certify any more 737 derivatives.

I hope not, because the lead time on a clean-sheet design would be years and Airbus simply can't build enough A320NEOs and A220s to cover the 737 backlog. Ooof, what a mess that would be.

Uh oh. I never even thought about that this could be a scenario.

I don't believe for one minute that the MAX will never fly again, that's just too far fetched. Equally, saying they have the fix in less than ten days is misleading since presumably, they have to fully test it and convince the Worlds aviation authorities that the fix works.

Interested wrote:

From those reports lack of training to fly the plane is as big a concern as any other issue

A US pilot suggesting a days notice if possible for anyone new to the plane they can swot up on these planes (by watching videos) in their own time before they fly them for the first time??

Truly Incredible state of affairs!!

I'm gobsmacked

Are you suggesting that training is not just an issue for developing world pilots? That won't go down well with some here.

Virtual737 wrote:

indcwby wrote:

This has always been a software issue. Some folks posting here are acting this plane needs a re-design, while saying Airbus can do this, this and this. Looks like that won't happen.

Also, didn't Airbus have their own issues with their aircraft too.

https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/15/boeing- ... -days.html

"The FAA set to sign off on Boeing 737 Max software fix in 10 days, shares rise"

Of the 10 days, how many of them are Boeing still working on the fix and how many of them are the FAA analysing and then signing it off? Or are they just rubber stamping what Boeing tell them again?

yeah, it is a bit scary imagining that the FAA might just rubber stamp anything. This really needs to be rectified.

Gesendet von meinem SM-G950F mit Tapatalk

oschkosch wrote:

Virtual737 wrote:

indcwby wrote:

This has always been a software issue. Some folks posting here are acting this plane needs a re-design, while saying Airbus can do this, this and this. Looks like that won't happen.

Also, didn't Airbus have their own issues with their aircraft too.

https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/15/boeing- ... -days.html

"The FAA set to sign off on Boeing 737 Max software fix in 10 days, shares rise"

Of the 10 days, how many of them are Boeing still working on the fix and how many of them are the FAA analysing and then signing it off? Or are they just rubber stamping what Boeing tell them again?

yeah, it is a bit scary imagining that the FAA might just rubber stamp anything. This really needs to be rectified.

Gesendet von meinem SM-G950F mit Tapatalk

Depending on the quality of the code, an audit can take months or year. I wonder if Boeing is disclosing their source code to FAA or any third party - or everything is proprietary and we can only trust Boeing wisdom.

scbriml wrote:

chiad wrote:

DocLightning wrote:

This has occurred to me, too. They might have to step so far back into the design that it might go outside the boundaries of certification for the type. To make it worse, I understand that the FAA will not certify any more 737 derivatives.

I hope not, because the lead time on a clean-sheet design would be years and Airbus simply can't build enough A320NEOs and A220s to cover the 737 backlog. Ooof, what a mess that would be.

Uh oh. I never even thought about that this could be a scenario.

I don't believe for one minute that the MAX will never fly again, that's just too far fetched. Equally, saying they have the fix in less than ten days is misleading since presumably, they have to fully test it and convince the Worlds aviation authorities that the fix works.

Interested wrote:

From those reports lack of training to fly the plane is as big a concern as any other issue

A US pilot suggesting a days notice if possible for anyone new to the plane they can swot up on these planes (by watching videos) in their own time before they fly them for the first time??

Truly Incredible state of affairs!!

I'm gobsmacked

Are you suggesting that training is not just an issue for developing world pilots? That won't go down well with some here.

I'm not suggesting that at all. It's the US pilots themselves suggesting that

Poor guys are crying out to know how the plane works and what all the new switches do on it

Even offering to learn stuff at home the night before if Boeing will send them some emails and videos

That's where it's at

Shocking stuff to read!

Embarrassing

Interested wrote:

vahancrazy wrote:

Interested wrote:

And whilst these planes are grounded wouldn't it be a good time to train pilots across the world the differences in what the switches are and do. How stuff is supposed to work etc. So if the planes ever do fly again they don't just get thrown into them cold or feeling unprepared

Get them all on training courses. They clearly need them

Yes, but first you need to wait current Boeing update and check how it might affect the training in case pilots need to do something different from current situation.

How about they show them all what the cockpit looks like as a start?

And at least tell them which switches are for maintenance crew only

The basic stuff like that

They can always worry about the more complicated stuff when that gets fixed

They've got a lot of training for a lot of pilots to think about

May as well start now otherwise will be even longer delays getting these planes back in the air

I agree with you on the time matter: training requires time and there are a lot of pilots needing training.

I gave my feedback because I fear by doing a training and another one following a few days/weeks later, might cause confusion.
Of course, if commands and inputs required by the pilot are not affected by the fix, then it is safe to train in 2 times.
Since I am not expert but an aviation enthusiast, I thought might be better to have a single training.

Amsterdam wrote:

klm617 wrote:

If it is proven that these two accidents are not the fault of the airplane but crew training issues can AA and WN go back and sue the US government for not allowing them to operate a perfectly safe aircraft.

There will always be ace crews that can save an aeroplane that 9 out of 10 crews will not save.

What is the standard?

Even amazingly difficult situations can be saved by some crews/pilots.

So you want to asses what percentage of crews could have handled a certain failure in a specifique situation? The same failures can happen at different situations.

At what percentage is it boeings fault and at what percentage the airlines?

If 10% of crews fail and 90% save it, is that the crews fault or boeings?
Or at 20% vs 80%?
Or 1% vs 99%?

What is the crew failure tipping point percentage after which you can blame the aircraft design?

Those are absolutely fair questions. And ones that need to be answered. I don’t think the aircraft design is inherently unsafe. Despite its recent entry into service, there have been many thousands of hours of safe operations on the MAX across many airlines. But there are so many questions. Initially I thought the groundings were very kneejerk. But I do think at this point it is warranted.

vahancrazy wrote:

Interested wrote:

vahancrazy wrote:

Yes, but first you need to wait current Boeing update and check how it might affect the training in case pilots need to do something different from current situation.

How about they show them all what the cockpit looks like as a start?

And at least tell them which switches are for maintenance crew only

The basic stuff like that

They can always worry about the more complicated stuff when that gets fixed

They've got a lot of training for a lot of pilots to think about

May as well start now otherwise will be even longer delays getting these planes back in the air

I agree with you on the time matter: training requires time and there are a lot of pilots needing training.

I gave my feedback because I fear by doing a training and another one following a few days/weeks later, might cause confusion.
Of course, if commands and inputs required by the pilot are not affected by the fix, then it is safe to train in 2 times.
Since I am not expert but an aviation enthusiast, I thought might be better to have a single training.

Actually if it's coming out that these plane are inherently different to fly than the earlier 737s surely they need a lot of new training?

In simulators and in the classroom?

Shouldn't they be practising all of this stuff before they get a chance to actually fly a real plane ?

Pbb152 wrote:

Amsterdam wrote:

klm617 wrote:

If it is proven that these two accidents are not the fault of the airplane but crew training issues can AA and WN go back and sue the US government for not allowing them to operate a perfectly safe aircraft.

There will always be ace crews that can save an aeroplane that 9 out of 10 crews will not save.

What is the standard?

Even amazingly difficult situations can be saved by some crews/pilots.

So you want to asses what percentage of crews could have handled a certain failure in a specifique situation? The same failures can happen at different situations.

At what percentage is it boeings fault and at what percentage the airlines?

If 10% of crews fail and 90% save it, is that the crews fault or boeings?
Or at 20% vs 80%?
Or 1% vs 99%?

What is the crew failure tipping point percentage after which you can blame the aircraft design?

Those are absolutely fair questions. And ones that need to be answered. I don’t think the aircraft design is inherently unsafe. Despite its recent entry into service, there have been many thousands of hours of safe operations on the MAX across many airlines. But there are so many questions. Initially I thought the groundings were very kneejerk. But I do think at this point it is warranted.

I did a very rough calculation using stats of 2 crashes in 5 months with just 350 planes in operation

Assuming that's the ongoing rate then with 5000 planes in operation (which is the number on order) then we would have a 737 Max crash to investigate roughly once a week

I do think based on the stats so far AND the reports I've read from US pilots complaining about the Max that this plane is itself unsafe and that the training given to pilots before they fly it is totally unacceptable

They are flying these planes without knowing how they work or what all the switches do

It's scandalous

But the whole point of miniminal training is for Boeing to use it as a competitive selling point to airlines: that buying MAX saves them the cost of additional training to pilots because it’s not different from NG!

scootaway wrote:

But the whole point of miniminal training is for Boeing to use it as a competitive selling point to airlines: that buying MAX saves them the cost of additional training to pilots because it’s not different from NG!

Yes. Read the article from the software guy above

He suggests stuff you have to do when there are issues is opposite to what you would do in the old 737s

Read the reports from the pilots above - loads of stuff they don't understand on the new planes. New switches which don't even get a mention in the manual

One of the pilots reports a conversation with a First Officer where they both discuss flicking a switch during flight to "see what it does" then decide against it !!

They discuss other switches that have warning lights they've never seen before and aren't even in their manual to find out what the warning means - when they land - maintenance crew explain those switches are for maintenance staff to use only!!

There's a pilot saying he wished he had a days notice before learning he was flying a max for the first time to try and learn how all the new stuff on the planes works etc

These are US pilots. They clearly aren't happy that they arent fully prepared to fly these planes. And they are very experienced pilots as well. How do non US pilots pass on their worries/concerns?

That selling point of no training needed is unacceptable from what I've read last 24 hours

These are pilots who are having to guess, learn and research stuff either during their flights or after their flights

It's a complete and utter joke

scootaway wrote:

But the whole point of miniminal training is for Boeing to use it as a competitive selling point to airlines: that buying MAX saves them the cost of additional training to pilots because it’s not different from NG!

Boeing: making a safe flying experience safer!

And cheaper!

win - win

Interested wrote:

That last one is damning isn't it?

No, because you're posting already posted undocumented incidents. The one about the manual is especially questionable. Anybody that personally dislikes the 737 could have written it.

Interested wrote:

vahancrazy wrote:

Interested wrote:

How about they show them all what the cockpit looks like as a start?

And at least tell them which switches are for maintenance crew only

The basic stuff like that

They can always worry about the more complicated stuff when that gets fixed

They've got a lot of training for a lot of pilots to think about

May as well start now otherwise will be even longer delays getting these planes back in the air

I agree with you on the time matter: training requires time and there are a lot of pilots needing training.

I gave my feedback because I fear by doing a training and another one following a few days/weeks later, might cause confusion.
Of course, if commands and inputs required by the pilot are not affected by the fix, then it is safe to train in 2 times.
Since I am not expert but an aviation enthusiast, I thought might be better to have a single training.

Actually if it's coming out that these plane are inherently different to fly than the earlier 737s surely they need a lot of new training?

In simulators and in the classroom?

Shouldn't they be practising all of this stuff before they get a chance to actually fly a real plane ?

Yes, they must get simulator practice before flying the plane.
Maybe earlier I did not make myself clear because I agree with you on the current lack of training.

...let's wait for accidents result!

MSPNWA wrote:

Interested wrote:

That last one is damning isn't it?

No, because you're posting already posted undocumented incidents. The one about the manual is especially questionable. Anybody that personally dislikes the 737 could have written it.

You think a pilot has made that up?

Why would they?

It's a report they send in anonymously to an agency who deals with it and investigates?

What do they gain from sending that in?

If they wanted to trouble make they would go to the public not file a report like that?

What about the other 5 reports? All made up as well are they?

And what do they gain from filing reports ?

Lol

I think Boeing can fast-track its "fix" as much as they want and the FAA rubber-stamp it as quickly as they want - real proof of the pudding will be outside the US. I would be very surprised if other regulators will not take a very cautious approach and take all the time they feel is needed to give the green light.

MSPNWA wrote:

Interested wrote:

That last one is damning isn't it?

No, because you're posting already posted undocumented incidents. The one about the manual is especially questionable. Anybody that personally dislikes the 737 could have written it.

What conspiracy theory is next in line? That the Ethiopians crashed the plane deliberately because they dislike the 737 or the US? Clutching at straws goes really from one extreme to the other in this thread.

Interested wrote:

Pbb152 wrote:

Amsterdam wrote:

There will always be ace crews that can save an aeroplane that 9 out of 10 crews will not save.

What is the standard?

Even amazingly difficult situations can be saved by some crews/pilots.

So you want to asses what percentage of crews could have handled a certain failure in a specifique situation? The same failures can happen at different situations.

At what percentage is it boeings fault and at what percentage the airlines?

If 10% of crews fail and 90% save it, is that the crews fault or boeings?
Or at 20% vs 80%?
Or 1% vs 99%?

What is the crew failure tipping point percentage after which you can blame the aircraft design?

Those are absolutely fair questions. And ones that need to be answered. I don’t think the aircraft design is inherently unsafe. Despite its recent entry into service, there have been many thousands of hours of safe operations on the MAX across many airlines. But there are so many questions. Initially I thought the groundings were very kneejerk. But I do think at this point it is warranted.

I did a very rough calculation using stats of 2 crashes in 5 months with just 350 planes in operation

Assuming that's the ongoing rate then with 5000 planes in operation (which is the number on order) then we would have a 737 Max crash to investigate roughly once a week

I do think based on the stats so far AND the reports I've read from US pilots complaining about the Max that this plane is itself unsafe and that the training given to pilots before they fly it is totally unacceptable

They are flying these planes without knowing how they work or what all the switches do

It's scandalous

Cmon man. You are being over-the-top Twitteresque. I’ll be happy to eat crow if you show me reports of US pilots saying the MAX is unsafe. Admittedly I haven’t read the entire thread. So I’d like to see those claims. I’m not at all saying they don’t exist. But I’m interested to see them if they are out there.

Enjoy:

viewtopic.php?f=3&t=1417545&start=2550#p21191415

How do you like your crow served - rare, medium or well done?

Pbb152 wrote:

Interested wrote:

Pbb152 wrote:

Those are absolutely fair questions. And ones that need to be answered. I don’t think the aircraft design is inherently unsafe. Despite its recent entry into service, there have been many thousands of hours of safe operations on the MAX across many airlines. But there are so many questions. Initially I thought the groundings were very kneejerk. But I do think at this point it is warranted.

I did a very rough calculation using stats of 2 crashes in 5 months with just 350 planes in operation

Assuming that's the ongoing rate then with 5000 planes in operation (which is the number on order) then we would have a 737 Max crash to investigate roughly once a week

I do think based on the stats so far AND the reports I've read from US pilots complaining about the Max that this plane is itself unsafe and that the training given to pilots before they fly it is totally unacceptable

They are flying these planes without knowing how they work or what all the switches do

It's scandalous

Cmon man. You are being over-the-top Twitteresque. I’ll be happy to eat crow if you show me reports of US pilots saying the MAX is unsafe. Admittedly I haven’t read the entire thread. So I’d like to see those claims. I’m not at all saying they don’t exist. But I’m interested to see them if they are out there.

I've posted 6 separate reports from 6 pilots on page 52 of this thread.

All of them claiming the plane is unsafe to fly. Enjoy the crow.

Look at the level of detail they give. And tell me they are made up reports. And tell me what they gain writing made up reports that normally nobody like us will ever read?

There's serious training issues here as well as software and manual issues.

So poor when you read their complaints

Interested wrote:

Pbb152 wrote:

Interested wrote:

I did a very rough calculation using stats of 2 crashes in 5 months with just 350 planes in operation

Assuming that's the ongoing rate then with 5000 planes in operation (which is the number on order) then we would have a 737 Max crash to investigate roughly once a week

I do think based on the stats so far AND the reports I've read from US pilots complaining about the Max that this plane is itself unsafe and that the training given to pilots before they fly it is totally unacceptable

They are flying these planes without knowing how they work or what all the switches do

It's scandalous

Cmon man. You are being over-the-top Twitteresque. I’ll be happy to eat crow if you show me reports of US pilots saying the MAX is unsafe. Admittedly I haven’t read the entire thread. So I’d like to see those claims. I’m not at all saying they don’t exist. But I’m interested to see them if they are out there.

I've posted 6 separate reports from 6 pilots on page 52 of this thread.

All of them claiming the plane is unsafe to fly. Enjoy the crow.

Look at the level of detail they give. And tell me they are made up reports. And tell me what they gain writing made up reports that normally nobody like us will ever read?

There's serious training issues here as well as software and manual issues.

So poor when you read their complaints

Ok, I admitted I hadn’t read the entire thread. I’ll go back and check it out.

MSPNWA wrote:

Interested wrote:

That last one is damning isn't it?

No, because you're posting already posted undocumented incidents. The one about the manual is especially questionable. Anybody that personally dislikes the 737 could have written it.

Please humor us.

So let me ask a question...

Did anything prevent airlines from choosing to do specific MAX training? I see all this complaining that Boeing designed a plane that doesn't' need it. But just because it's no strictly required, doesn't mean airlines shouldn't have done it.

Certainly Boeing should have some blame, but really, so should airlines (and pilots unions for going along with them) for not making a choice to help ensure pilots are as prepared as possible.

zuckie13 wrote:

So let me ask a question...

Did anything prevent airlines from choosing to do specific MAX training? I see all this complaining that Boeing designed a plane that doesn't' need it. But just because it's no strictly required, doesn't mean airlines shouldn't have done it.

Certainly Boeing should have some blame, but really, so should airlines (and pilots unions for going along with them) for not making a choice to help ensure pilots are as prepared as possible.

From what I've read Boeing didn't even put all the new features or switches in the manual for the pilots to refer to

The software guy I've quoted above also claims that things you have to do to intervene on Max flights are the opposite of what you would do on older 737 flights and yet the pilots have been told they don't need any training

I don't care who's to blame for that - Boeing and or their airlines - regardless it's an absolute shambles - whoever you want to blame and it's no wonder pilots don't know what to do

How are you supposed to train for something that Boeing apparently hid from the pilots until JT610 plunged out of the sky`?

zuckie13 wrote:

So let me ask a question...

Did anything prevent airlines from choosing to do specific MAX training? I see all this complaining that Boeing designed a plane that doesn't' need it. But just because it's no strictly required, doesn't mean airlines shouldn't have done it.

Certainly Boeing should have some blame, but really, so should airlines (and pilots unions for going along with them) for not making a choice to help ensure pilots are as prepared as possible.

One poster says the pilots are to blame for making false complaints up

Now another poster blames pilot unions for not complaining and making sure they get what they want

It's interesting that when pilots do complain they have to be able to do it anonymously !!

God forbid they rock the boat!

This is a funny thread!

vfw614 wrote:

How are you supposed to train for something that Boeing apparently hid from the pilots until JT610 plunged out of the sky`?

That's also not mentioned in the manual?

https://www.theatlantic.com/notes/2019/ ... ax/584791/

All 6 pilot reports in the above link. Some of the reports before Lion I believe some after Lion. All on the record reports before Ethiopia.

Damning reports from US pilots. God knows how the non US pilots feel.

Well, this is what ALPA's safety committee wrote in reaction to the FAA Emergency Airworthiness Directive dated November 7, 2018:

“This is the first description you, as 737 pilots, have seen. It is not in the AA 737 Flight Manual Part 2, nor is there a description in the Boeing FCOM. Awareness is the key with all safety issues.”

Interested wrote:

zuckie13 wrote:

So let me ask a question...

Did anything prevent airlines from choosing to do specific MAX training? I see all this complaining that Boeing designed a plane that doesn't' need it. But just because it's no strictly required, doesn't mean airlines shouldn't have done it.

Certainly Boeing should have some blame, but really, so should airlines (and pilots unions for going along with them) for not making a choice to help ensure pilots are as prepared as possible.

One poster says the pilots are to blame for making false complaints up

Now another poster blames pilot unions for not complaining and making sure they get what they want

It's interesting that when pilots do complain they have to be able to do it anonymously !!

God forbid they rock the boat!

This is a funny thread!

This is not a funny thread. This thread is why the world is stopping looking to the USA (FAA) for a lead. There are so many now that cannot face reasonable criticism with turning it back on the accuser. It is obvious the process of design AND certification of the MAX has significant flaws.

These are not unknown design considerations where the world learns something new that must be taken into account. From everything we see and hear it is basic deign flaws waved through on certification and hidden from many interested parties for what can only be thought to be cost reasons. Well those cost reasons have now probably cost hundreds of lives and ruined thousands of lives.

The head in the sand it was someone elses fault and whataboutism we see just saddens me.

Interested wrote:

MSPNWA wrote:

Interested wrote:

That last one is damning isn't it?

No, because you're posting already posted undocumented incidents. The one about the manual is especially questionable. Anybody that personally dislikes the 737 could have written it.

You think a pilot has made that up?

Why would they?

It's a report they send in anonymously to an agency who deals with it and investigates?

What do they gain from sending that in?

If they wanted to trouble make they would go to the public not file a report like that?

What about the other 5 reports? All made up as well are they?

And what do they gain from filing reports ?

Lol

You realize pilots send these reports in when something happens in their flight. Many times when they make a mistake. It’s always going to be framed in a way that gets the pilot off the hook.

Interested wrote:

https://www.theatlantic.com/notes/2019/03/heres-what-was-on-the-record-about-problems-with-the-737-max/584791/

All 6 pilot reports in the above link. Some of the reports before Lion I believe some after Lion. All on the record reports before Ethiopia.

Damning reports from US pilots. God knows how the non US pilots feel.

Damning, but are they really different from what pilots reported during the Classic to NG transition? Here are some examples:

DESCRIPTION: AS WE TAXIED OUT FOR DEP AT LAX WE RECEIVED A CHANGE OF PLAN WHICH REQUIRED US TO REPROGRAM THE FMS. BOTH COCKPIT CREW MEMBERS ARE NEW TO THE B737-800 FMC SET-UP. WE WERE TAXIING SLOWLY AND CAUTIOUSLY WITH THE NEW AIRPLANE, 31 MIN TAXI OUT, AS WE WANTED TO MAKE SURE THE FMC WAS PROGRAMMED PROPERLY FOR DEP. GND CTL TOLD US TO 'EXPECT NO DELAY AT THE END' AND THERE WAS NO ONE IN LINE AT THE END. AS WE CONTINUED, THE TKOF REF SPDS CONTINUED TO DROP OUT AND WE RECEIVED MULTIPLE UPLINK MESSAGES. THE AUTOMATED COCKPIT WAS WORKING AGAINST US SO WE DROPPED DOWN TO THE MANUAL MODE. THE FO I BELIEVE WAS DISTRACTED BY THE FACT THAT THE TKOF REF PAGE DID NOT DISPLAY PREFLT COMPLETE AS IN THE B737-300 AND B737-500. I SHOULD EXPLAIN AT THIS POINT THAT I AM A NEW CAPT (194 HRS) ATTEMPTING TO CHK OUT AN FO WHO HAD NEVER SEEN THIS FMS SET-UP IN THE ACTUAL AIRPLANE -- ALL FAA APPROVED. THE FO CORRECTLY BROUGHT TO MY ATTN THAT THE TKOF REF PAGE DID NOT DISPLAY PREFLT COMPLETE. I VERIFIED THAT THE TEMP, TKOF REF SPDS, AND DEP WERE ALL PROPERLY PROGRAMMED AND ALL WAS READY.

FIRST FLT IN A NEW MODEL B737 ACFT. THE NEW MODEL B737- 700 HAS A GLASS COCKPIT WITH MANY SYS DIFFERENCES COMPARED TO THE B737-200, B737-300, OR B737-500 ACFT WE USUALLY FLY. THIS WAS MY FIRST FLT AND THE CAPT'S SECOND FLT IN THE B737-700. WE HAD RECEIVED THE ACFT FROM MAINT AND DID NOT REALIZE THEY HAD USED THE 'GANG BAR' TO DISENGAGE BOTH AUTOPLT SYS. AS WE WERE CLBING OUT, THE CAPT (PF) SELECTED THE 'A' AUTOPLT. THE ACFT WAS TRIMMED AND STABLE. AS WE APCHED OUR ASSIGNED ALT I NOTICED THE ACFT RATE OF CLB WAS NOT DECREASING. I ASKED THE CAPT IF THE ACFT WAS GOING TO LEVEL OFF. HE IMMEDIATELY TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT AND LEVELED AS BEST HE COULD, BUT DUE TO OUR HIGH RATE OF CLB, WE LEVELED APPROX 300 FT HIGH. WE CORRECTED TO ALT ASAP.

Interested wrote:

https://www.theatlantic.com/notes/2019/03/heres-what-was-on-the-record-about-problems-with-the-737-max/584791/

All 6 pilot reports in the above link. Some of the reports before Lion I believe some after Lion. All on the record reports before Ethiopia.

Damning reports from US pilots. God knows how the non US pilots feel.

You think the atsap reports about other types are any better? Have you ever read them?

Interested wrote:

Actually if it's coming out that these plane are inherently different to fly than the earlier 737s surely they need a lot of new training?
In simulators and in the classroom?
Shouldn't they be practising all of this stuff before they get a chance to actually fly a real plane ?

this nessesary training has a name
its called "type rating"

the key customers of the MAX made from the start the condition that they will only order the MAX if it does NOT need a new type rating

that was the point why B was fu**ed up

- they only came in the ballpark of the NEO if the fixed the big engines on the MAX
- the big engines made the plane aerodynamical instabile to fly because the wings are to low for them
- and the MAX is in some corners of the flight envelope completly other and much more different to control like the NG
- but a new type rating for the MAX was out of question
- as a last resort B implemented this unbelievable MCAS system ... lousy implementation ... no redundance ... against a lot of certification laws ... and it was approved bei FFA for what reason ever .... no one knows

i have no idea how they will solve that now

even if they make the MCAS redundant now ...
if it fails and switchs to "direct law" it leaves row number one with a plane with attitudes they have never been trained for ... because of no type rating
and its even not clear how strong the misbehavement of the MAX without the MCAS really is
its told this kind of testflights have been done in the past but the results are confidential ...

It is very puzzling to me how Boeing plans to come up with software fix for something that first of all has a problem architecture and hardware wise.....and furthermore how in the world FAA can sign off on that in 10 days???

32andBelow wrote:

Interested wrote:

https://www.theatlantic.com/notes/2019/03/heres-what-was-on-the-record-about-problems-with-the-737-max/584791/

All 6 pilot reports in the above link. Some of the reports before Lion I believe some after Lion. All on the record reports before Ethiopia.

Damning reports from US pilots. God knows how the non US pilots feel.

You think the atsap reports about other types are any better? Have you ever read them?

The guy who has posted these 6 made the comment there are 100s more complaints from pilots of 737 max but these 6 relate to new features on the plane so he's highlighted them to save trawling through loads more normal plane issues.

So yes I accept pilots complain all the time. But uptil now all I've heard on here is these issues are due to poor third world pilots and there's no problems with US pilots and these planes. Which was clearly BS.

Cubsrule wrote:

Interested wrote:

https://www.theatlantic.com/notes/2019/03/heres-what-was-on-the-record-about-problems-with-the-737-max/584791/

All 6 pilot reports in the above link. Some of the reports before Lion I believe some after Lion. All on the record reports before Ethiopia.

Damning reports from US pilots. God knows how the non US pilots feel.

Damning, but are they really different from what pilots reported during the Classic to NG transition? Here are some examples:

DESCRIPTION: AS WE TAXIED OUT FOR DEP AT LAX WE RECEIVED A CHANGE OF PLAN WHICH REQUIRED US TO REPROGRAM THE FMS. BOTH COCKPIT CREW MEMBERS ARE NEW TO THE B737-800 FMC SET-UP. WE WERE TAXIING SLOWLY AND CAUTIOUSLY WITH THE NEW AIRPLANE, 31 MIN TAXI OUT, AS WE WANTED TO MAKE SURE THE FMC WAS PROGRAMMED PROPERLY FOR DEP. GND CTL TOLD US TO 'EXPECT NO DELAY AT THE END' AND THERE WAS NO ONE IN LINE AT THE END. AS WE CONTINUED, THE TKOF REF SPDS CONTINUED TO DROP OUT AND WE RECEIVED MULTIPLE UPLINK MESSAGES. THE AUTOMATED COCKPIT WAS WORKING AGAINST US SO WE DROPPED DOWN TO THE MANUAL MODE. THE FO I BELIEVE WAS DISTRACTED BY THE FACT THAT THE TKOF REF PAGE DID NOT DISPLAY PREFLT COMPLETE AS IN THE B737-300 AND B737-500. I SHOULD EXPLAIN AT THIS POINT THAT I AM A NEW CAPT (194 HRS) ATTEMPTING TO CHK OUT AN FO WHO HAD NEVER SEEN THIS FMS SET-UP IN THE ACTUAL AIRPLANE -- ALL FAA APPROVED. THE FO CORRECTLY BROUGHT TO MY ATTN THAT THE TKOF REF PAGE DID NOT DISPLAY PREFLT COMPLETE. I VERIFIED THAT THE TEMP, TKOF REF SPDS, AND DEP WERE ALL PROPERLY PROGRAMMED AND ALL WAS READY.

FIRST FLT IN A NEW MODEL B737 ACFT. THE NEW MODEL B737- 700 HAS A GLASS COCKPIT WITH MANY SYS DIFFERENCES COMPARED TO THE B737-200, B737-300, OR B737-500 ACFT WE USUALLY FLY. THIS WAS MY FIRST FLT AND THE CAPT'S SECOND FLT IN THE B737-700. WE HAD RECEIVED THE ACFT FROM MAINT AND DID NOT REALIZE THEY HAD USED THE 'GANG BAR' TO DISENGAGE BOTH AUTOPLT SYS. AS WE WERE CLBING OUT, THE CAPT (PF) SELECTED THE 'A' AUTOPLT. THE ACFT WAS TRIMMED AND STABLE. AS WE APCHED OUR ASSIGNED ALT I NOTICED THE ACFT RATE OF CLB WAS NOT DECREASING. I ASKED THE CAPT IF THE ACFT WAS GOING TO LEVEL OFF. HE IMMEDIATELY TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT AND LEVELED AS BEST HE COULD, BUT DUE TO OUR HIGH RATE OF CLB, WE LEVELED APPROX 300 FT HIGH. WE CORRECTED TO ALT ASAP.

So you think what happened then is acceptable to happen in 2019?

You have very low standards and haven't moved forward with the times if so

It's a common of someone who is just accepting mediocrity

Health and safety dominates everything we do now

Surely we want to improve. Not just accept people dying when we swap planes?

I think my small business cares more about health and safety than Boeing right now! And the chances of us killing anyone are probably 100 times less. Touch wood

AA’s latest figures are the 85 flights a day effected due to the Max grounding is 1.27% of total flights.

Interested wrote:

32andBelow wrote:

Interested wrote:

https://www.theatlantic.com/notes/2019/03/heres-what-was-on-the-record-about-problems-with-the-737-max/584791/

All 6 pilot reports in the above link. Some of the reports before Lion I believe some after Lion. All on the record reports before Ethiopia.

Damning reports from US pilots. God knows how the non US pilots feel.

You think the atsap reports about other types are any better? Have you ever read them?

The guy who has posted these 6 made the comment there are 100s more complaints from pilots of 737 max but these 6 relate to new features on the plane so he's highlighted them to save trawling through loads more normal plane issues.

So yes I accept pilots complain all the time. But uptil now all I've heard on here is these issues are due to poor third world pilots and there's no problems with US pilots and these planes. Which was clearly BS.

Well the US pilots never crashed it. And the unions would NEVER allow their pilots to fly a type they feel is unsafe.

That being said I fear that people outside the industry reading ATSAP or NASA reports is dubious since you could take these reports and structure the same story for every aircraft type in history. And again reports are filed lots of times when pilots are avoiding getting in trouble for something they did.

32andBelow wrote:

You realize pilots send these reports in when something happens in their flight. Many times when they make a mistake. It’s always going to be framed in a way that gets the pilot off the hook.

I believe those reports are totally voluntary. Why frame them in a way that would get them off the hook when, if they had made a mistake they were trying to cover up, they could just not file it at all?

zuckie13 wrote:

So let me ask a question...

Did anything prevent airlines from choosing to do specific MAX training? I see all this complaining that Boeing designed a plane that doesn't' need it. But just because it's no strictly required, doesn't mean airlines shouldn't have done it.

Certainly Boeing should have some blame, but really, so should airlines (and pilots unions for going along with them) for not making a choice to help ensure pilots are as prepared as possible.

It beggars belief there is place here for finger-pointing left. "Boeing fault", "No, pilot unions fault", "No, FAA fault", "No, airlines fault".

It does seem, now, that the flying public has been deliberately put at risk because of the SYSTEM failure. Which part of the mechanism is to blame -- is secondary. Professionals have either colluded or have been mislead or chose to ignore red flags.

Interested wrote:

Cubsrule wrote:

Interested wrote:

https://www.theatlantic.com/notes/2019/03/heres-what-was-on-the-record-about-problems-with-the-737-max/584791/

All 6 pilot reports in the above link. Some of the reports before Lion I believe some after Lion. All on the record reports before Ethiopia.

Damning reports from US pilots. God knows how the non US pilots feel.

Damning, but are they really different from what pilots reported during the Classic to NG transition? Here are some examples:

DESCRIPTION: AS WE TAXIED OUT FOR DEP AT LAX WE RECEIVED A CHANGE OF PLAN WHICH REQUIRED US TO REPROGRAM THE FMS. BOTH COCKPIT CREW MEMBERS ARE NEW TO THE B737-800 FMC SET-UP. WE WERE TAXIING SLOWLY AND CAUTIOUSLY WITH THE NEW AIRPLANE, 31 MIN TAXI OUT, AS WE WANTED TO MAKE SURE THE FMC WAS PROGRAMMED PROPERLY FOR DEP. GND CTL TOLD US TO 'EXPECT NO DELAY AT THE END' AND THERE WAS NO ONE IN LINE AT THE END. AS WE CONTINUED, THE TKOF REF SPDS CONTINUED TO DROP OUT AND WE RECEIVED MULTIPLE UPLINK MESSAGES. THE AUTOMATED COCKPIT WAS WORKING AGAINST US SO WE DROPPED DOWN TO THE MANUAL MODE. THE FO I BELIEVE WAS DISTRACTED BY THE FACT THAT THE TKOF REF PAGE DID NOT DISPLAY PREFLT COMPLETE AS IN THE B737-300 AND B737-500. I SHOULD EXPLAIN AT THIS POINT THAT I AM A NEW CAPT (194 HRS) ATTEMPTING TO CHK OUT AN FO WHO HAD NEVER SEEN THIS FMS SET-UP IN THE ACTUAL AIRPLANE -- ALL FAA APPROVED. THE FO CORRECTLY BROUGHT TO MY ATTN THAT THE TKOF REF PAGE DID NOT DISPLAY PREFLT COMPLETE. I VERIFIED THAT THE TEMP, TKOF REF SPDS, AND DEP WERE ALL PROPERLY PROGRAMMED AND ALL WAS READY.

FIRST FLT IN A NEW MODEL B737 ACFT. THE NEW MODEL B737- 700 HAS A GLASS COCKPIT WITH MANY SYS DIFFERENCES COMPARED TO THE B737-200, B737-300, OR B737-500 ACFT WE USUALLY FLY. THIS WAS MY FIRST FLT AND THE CAPT'S SECOND FLT IN THE B737-700. WE HAD RECEIVED THE ACFT FROM MAINT AND DID NOT REALIZE THEY HAD USED THE 'GANG BAR' TO DISENGAGE BOTH AUTOPLT SYS. AS WE WERE CLBING OUT, THE CAPT (PF) SELECTED THE 'A' AUTOPLT. THE ACFT WAS TRIMMED AND STABLE. AS WE APCHED OUR ASSIGNED ALT I NOTICED THE ACFT RATE OF CLB WAS NOT DECREASING. I ASKED THE CAPT IF THE ACFT WAS GOING TO LEVEL OFF. HE IMMEDIATELY TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT AND LEVELED AS BEST HE COULD, BUT DUE TO OUR HIGH RATE OF CLB, WE LEVELED APPROX 300 FT HIGH. WE CORRECTED TO ALT ASAP.

So you think what happened then is acceptable to happen in 2019?

You have very low standards and haven't moved forward with the times if so

It's a common of someone who is just accepting mediocrity

Health and safety dominates everything we do now

Surely we want to improve. Not just accept people dying when we swap planes?

I think my small business cares more about health and safety than Boeing right now! And the chances of us killing anyone are probably 100 times less. Touch wood

I’m not really suggesting anything about what is or should be acceptable. But the idea that the MAX is the first aircraft with a rocky transition for new pilots is categorically false.