MSPNWA wrote:

Talk to pilots (I'm assuming you're not one). They'll tell you.

A beginning pilot needs to know what trim is, what it does, and how to operate it. It's one of the basic mechanical tools on an airplane. If it's not doing what you want it to do, you should know how to react and take control of the situation to cause it to do what you want it to do. One of the only purposes of a pilot these days is for when something goes wrong. If you find it acceptable that a flyable airplane was flown into the ground, we have a problem in how to proceed to keep this industry safe.

If you'd bother to come down off your high horse and actually read up on what happened without assuming the crew didn't know what they were doing; you'd realise that the Lion Air crew "corrected" the MCAS trim inputs multiple (20+) times using the Boeing manual approved approach before eventually crashing.



edit: Just FYI; I don't typically defend the pilots. I largely blamed the pilots for the AF447 fiasco - you can go look back through that if you want - but now in hindsight, Airbus were partially to blame by having the AoA warnings turn themselves off when the AoA went far beyond stall.

art wrote:

I recall it being known that the landing gear would need to be lengthened for adequate engine ground clearance but I don't recall it being said that there might also be effects on the balance of the aircraft.

well, the problem was, that the MLG could not be extended with a simple quick design change and thus Boeing decided to hang the engines higher and further to the front, creating issues with handling the A/C apparently particularly at high AOA.

So if the MAX gets fast-tracked back into the air in the US (which I doubt will happen elsewhere), will Delta benefit from such a rushed solution as they are the only airline where an US customer does not run the risk ending up on a MAX? With the media coverage the story is getting, I am wondering if a significant number of passengers will be more attentive than usual with regard to the aircraft type they may fly in and try to avoid airlines with a MAX (I guess most of them simply associate AA und WN with the MAX and have no insight into the actual numbers operated and the actual risk of ending up in one). Or would travel agents discuss options with clients and point out the aircraft types involved? If so, it will only be a minority making an informed choice against airlines operating the MAX (or flights scheuled with a MAX), but they still could be enough to make a dent in load factors of WN, AA and UA.

It will also be interesting to see how AA, WN and UA react if passengers booked on them refuse to go on a MAX flight and make a scene. Will they simply preach the "the FAA has deemed it safe"-mantra? Free rebooking on a discretionary basis? Refunds?

YoungDon wrote:

tphuang wrote:

WeatherPilot wrote:

Does it seem like US media is TRYING to destroy Boeing with all their coverage of this? Like, why?

this kind of post just makes it clear how out of touch with reality people on a.net are.

It's fashionable these days to attack the media rather than accept truths one does not like. Blows my mind, but definitely isn't unique to aviation, unfortunately.

That is what happens when POTUS finds the words of certain North Korean leader to be more trustworthy than his own mainstream press.

Shoot the messenger, if you don't like the message.

sassiciai wrote:

I am ever more amazed by what is disclosed in this thread!

As a former software engineer, I can't begin to get my head around the claims that "a software fix will be ready in a few days". This conjures up images for 2 programmers in a garden shed at 3am rewriting "nodules" of code with no supervision, no revised specification, no predefined test plan, no QC review, no independent verification.

Software is just a tool to carry out functions as specified in a Functional Specification. Who has seen the old and revised Functional Spec? Did anyone develop tests based on the FS? What plans are there to test this in real life on a plane? Just get it out there, AA is waiting for it by the end of the month!

"Is the fix ready, Fred?"

"Yes, boss, good to go, me and Bill tried it out for the last 2 hours, and it is really solid, just like what you asked for"

"OK, we'll start emailing it and the installation code to our 350 customers now"

It's likely that Boeing has been working on improvements since shortly after the Lion Air crash. Wouldn't 4-5 months be enough?

Amiga500 wrote:

If you'd bother to come down off your high horse and actually read up on what happened without assuming the crew didn't know what they were doing; you'd realise that the Lion Air crew "corrected" the MCAS trim inputs multiple (20+) times using the Boeing manual approved approach before eventually crashing.

I'm of that opinion because I have educated myself on what has been reported. The fact that they "corrected" it incorrectly 20+ times tells me there's an issue in basic airmanship and knowledge of their aircraft. It should tell you the same.

I wonder with the DOJ convening a Grand Jury to investigate Boeing and FAA is going to delay any fix.
I believe any fix is going to have to go to a trusted 3rd party for testing, like a foreign regulator. I don't see any FAA rubber stamps with this kind of investigation over their heads.

Truthfully, had Boeing advised to the airlines this stabilty augmentation and MCAS system was the best thing since sliced cheese, would it had prompted more Boeing sales.

Or did Boeing internally see this as a liability that did not enhance the sales of the MAX?
A little detailed leg work may need to be done here with all parties involved.

Boeing, airline MAX pilot training, Pilot awareness, Boeing’s operating manuals....

The unfortunate thing is we have a lot of dead people, God rest and bless their souls.

Hei! Please consider I am just an AV enthusiast, I do not work in airline industry and I do not have engineer background.
Whilde guess. Do you think that:
- fixing the sodtware; and
- providing proper training instructions

Might be enough to make the plane safe for non-test pilots but average ATPL, or adding new sensors might be needed? I guess this would be quite a nightmare!

I remember many years ago watching a TV programme about building airliners. Someone in the industry sententiously claimed that safety was their number one priority and it would never be compromised. I thought then and I still think that this is cant. Of course they compromise on safety. They'd never make a profitable plane, if they didn't. Fewer passengers and more emergency exits would certainly be safer but we know it'll never happen. Nor, probably, we many of us want it to. If you really wanted to make an airliner absolutely as safe as current technology allowed, it would never sell and, if it did, the cost of a ticket would be astronomical.

I don't work in the airline industry and I'm not an engineer. I'm not even in a profit-making business and never have been. But in every business answerable to shareholders, there must be pressure to cut a few corners here and save a few cents there. Doesn't make it right, of course, but it's the reality.

So nobody's jaw should drop in disbelief (far less outrage) at the idea that Boeing (or Airbus or VW or Toyota or whoever) have taken the odd gamble or two.

Whether that has anything at all to do with these two tragic crashes, I have no idea.

But I won't be flying on a MAX any time soon.

The timeline for the fix shouldn’t be important as long as the needed updates happen. I’ve no problem personally if it takes a long time or a short time... if you don’t think Boeing is on this seriously, I’ve got a bridge to sell you.

Of course, even post grounding, I have yet to hear a negative thing about this plane from pilots who actually fly them. I talk to them everyday. Most comment on how it flies like every other NG, but with a better cockpit layout. Some have commented on its performance or how it handles well. And they all have pretty much said “not sure what training is like in other parts of the world but we haven’t had problems with the airplane here.”

I trust the words and the judgment from, at this point, 80 pilots or more with major global carriers. Just a small sample size obviously. Still, I don’t have problems with stepping foot on the a/c. I didn’t post Lion Air, and I don’t post Ethiopian. But then again, I wouldn’t fly a Lion Air airplane of any kind piloted by their chief captain. And if I knew I was on a 170-seat aircraft co-piloted by someone with 200 hours, I’d respectfully decline.

In SITA DCS I see 7M8 flights for both AA and WN showing for the summer. Haven’t looked for UA 7M9 flights yet.

vfw614 wrote:

So if the MAX gets fast-tracked back into the air in the US (which I doubt will happen elsewhere), will Delta benefit from such a rushed solution as they are the only airline where an US customer does not run the risk ending up on a MAX? With the media coverage the story is getting, I am wondering if a significant number of passengers will be more attentive than usual with regard to the aircraft type they may fly in and try to avoid airlines with a MAX (I guess most of them simply associate AA und WN with the MAX and have no insight into the actual numbers operated and the actual risk of ending up in one). Or would travel agents discuss options with clients and point out the aircraft types involved? If so, it will only be a minority making an informed choice against airlines operating the MAX (or flights scheuled with a MAX), but they still could be enough to make a dent in load factors of WN, AA and UA.

It will also be interesting to see how AA, WN and UA react if passengers booked on them refuse to go on a MAX flight and make a scene. Will they simply preach the "the FAA has deemed it safe"-mantra? Free rebooking on a discretionary basis? Refunds?

I have a max crew member in family and he doesn't tell anybody not to fly them.
I asked everybody at work about the issue and I was told "max what?"
You got pumped by lots of people here but reality is not what you make it.

Boeing will pay some money, get the bird/software fixed (I'm actually pretty sure it will happen with so much scrutiny around) and life will go on. I know I will board one no issues as I would fly one today with any US/most Eur airlines.

sassiciai wrote:

I am ever more amazed by what is disclosed in this thread!

As a former software engineer, I can't begin to get my head around the claims that "a software fix will be ready in a few days". This conjures up images for 2 programmers in a garden shed at 3am rewriting "nodules" of code with no supervision, no revised specification, no predefined test plan, no QC review, no independent verification.

Software is just a tool to carry out functions as specified in a Functional Specification. Who has seen the old and revised Functional Spec? Did anyone develop tests based on the FS? What plans are there to test this in real life on a plane? Just get it out there, AA is waiting for it by the end of the month!

"Is the fix ready, Fred?"

"Yes, boss, good to go, me and Bill tried it out for the last 2 hours, and it is really solid, just like what you asked for"

"OK, we'll start emailing it and the installation code to our 350 customers now"

Apparently the software fix has been in the works for months already (initiated shortly after the Lionair crash). Which seems very credible. So it is not as garden shed'esque as you make it seem.

Problem for Boeing is of course if they knew of this problem and been working on it for months, how is that the 737 MAX community did not know the full extent of the issue, eventually to the point that another deadly crash occurred.

Okay to the friends of pilots can you ask them if they have had an MCAS activation, how did it feel and how did they respond?

Once I have had experiences recounted of this occurring I would be more reassured than "it didnt happen to me so everything is fine'

I don't believe in grounding lifted shortly.

Boeing will correct the airplane, correct the training, do more analysis, and everyone will understand better where this plane is at and what it can or cannot do.

But it will take time. The situation has changed considerably after the ET crash. It will not be enough to "have a patch". Reliance on FAA is very low at this point. Reliance is also low on self-acclaimed pilot experts - some on this thread - who cannot fathom the million different circumstances that some of these crashed could have involved, and keep repeating the just-turn-it-off mantra. When a number of things go wrong simultaneously, and ground is few hundred or thousand feet away, prioritization and identitication of what's wrong isn't easy.

What's needed is a long list of things. We'll need to find a way around what is believed to be the currently understood issue in Lion Air crash. But, as the matters have proven deadly, there will be a need to look at this comprehensively, and for that the Lion Air investigation needs to get further ahead. And the ET crash definitely needs to get further ahead. And then more analysis is needed about what possible things could go wrong, rather than just the specific case(s) that happened on those flights.

And this isn't merely a Boeing-FAA issue; I believe the other regulators will be watching carefully. Boeing will not dare bring a proposed fix and the lifting of the grounding up until the are convinced that they can get it lifted world-wide. At this point, EASA, CAAC and others would not be doing their job if they didn't demand more than FAA's word that all is well; they will be doing their own analysis.

Anything that is found, Boeing will need to address, through training, maintenance and airplane design modifications.

And, because per Seattle Times the certification was done without knowledge of what the systems actually did on the plane, the newly modified design needs to be properly certified for the first time. There will need to be a discussion of how to run that process, that alone could take months.

I'd guess the low end of getting some decent pre-results from the ET crash is at least two months. If that doesn't reveal anything that wasn't already known from the Lion Air crash, things are looking good, but there's still plenty of process to go through and plenty of people to convince. The 787 battery issue caused a three month grounding, and that wasn't about flight controls, and there was no issue of distrusting the FAA's analysis.

I would be extremely surprised if the grounding is lifted before three months have passed; six to nine months would be my guess. And again, I think that's totally fine; Boeing will survive that, but they might not survive a Southwest MAX crash on a too early lifted ban. But even that shouldn't matter. What matters is that no further planeloads of people will die. So lets do this properly.

MSPNWA wrote:

Amiga500 wrote:

If you'd bother to come down off your high horse and actually read up on what happened without assuming the crew didn't know what they were doing; you'd realise that the Lion Air crew "corrected" the MCAS trim inputs multiple (20+) times using the Boeing manual approved approach before eventually crashing.

I'm of that opinion because I have educated myself on what has been reported. The fact that they "corrected" it incorrectly 20+ times tells me there's an issue in basic airmanship and knowledge of their aircraft. It should tell you the same.

Your the one who said:

A beginning pilot needs to know what trim is, what it does, and how to operate it. It's one of the basic mechanical tools on an airplane. If it's not doing what you want it to do, you should know how to react and take control of the situation to cause it to do what you want it to do. One of the only purposes of a pilot these days is for when something goes wrong. If you find it acceptable that a flyable airplane was flown into the ground, we have a problem in how to proceed to keep this industry safe.

They interpreted the problem as one of either autotrim or STS gone wrong and reacted appropriately - use of the trim wheels are supposed to deactivate any auto functions.

Therefore you either didn't read what has happened, or you didn't understand it.


How they are supposed to know how to diagnose problems with systems that they have not been made aware of is beyond me. Unless you are a fan of line-pilots flicking random systems on and off to see if that has any effect?

SunsetLimited wrote:

Of course, even post grounding, I have yet to hear a negative thing about this plane from pilots who actually fly them. I talk to them everyday. Most comment on how it flies like every other NG, but with a better cockpit layout. Some have commented on its performance or how it handles well. And they all have pretty much said “not sure what training is like in other parts of the world but we haven’t had problems with the airplane here.”

I trust the words and the judgment from, at this point, 80 pilots or more with major global carriers.

How many of those have had MCAS go wrong?

If it is zero, then its a useless sample set.


"I asked 50 people who like to walk across freeways/motorways whether it was a good idea; all 50 replied yep - they could see no problem with it as they'd never been hit by a car."

InsideMan wrote:

spinotter wrote:

tphuang wrote:

this kind of post just makes it clear how out of touch with reality people on a.net are.

Some posters may be Boeing employees and/or paid by Boeing, and there is an entire chorus full of Boeing fanboys and girls ready to sing Boeing's praises for free no matter what the question is. Same for Airbus. Same for UA/AA/DL. Same whenever billions of dollars are at stake.

I also notice some weird extremely pro Boeing comments on here above and beyond the normal fanboyism.
I wonder if their PR arm employs some twitter and a.net trolls.....

Some of the "pro comments" are uncalled for as there have been questionable statements and actions by Boeing, however I think it is a unique situation where people associated with the 767, 777, 787, Defense, etc, all don't want to see the company dismantled and shutdown as some people have called for.

Fix the root cause of all these problems, and increase the length of the @#%@& MLG. I know it's not trivial and I know it's not cheap. Find a location where it doesn't affect the wing box structurally, design a fairing that doesn't increase drag too much, reroute what needs to be rerouted, fire your finite element codes and your design optimization tools, your CATIA or whatever you use for 3D CAD, and spend those 12-18 months and those $1B to really fix the problem. What's $1B? 10-20 aircraft? Do you want to bet that with whatever fix they have in mind they are still going to lose ten times as many sales? I also bet that just the lawsuits will cost them much more than that.

IADFCO wrote:

What's $1B? 10-20 aircraft?

Erm, at the profit margin they make on these probably 200 or so aircraft.

smittythepirate wrote:

InsideMan wrote:

spinotter wrote:

Some posters may be Boeing employees and/or paid by Boeing, and there is an entire chorus full of Boeing fanboys and girls ready to sing Boeing's praises for free no matter what the question is. Same for Airbus. Same for UA/AA/DL. Same whenever billions of dollars are at stake.

I also notice some weird extremely pro Boeing comments on here above and beyond the normal fanboyism.
I wonder if their PR arm employs some twitter and a.net trolls.....

Some of the "pro comments" are uncalled for as there have been questionable statements and actions by Boeing, however I think it is a unique situation where people associated with the 767, 777, 787, Defense, etc, all don't want to see the company dismantled and shutdown as some people have called for.

I think there needs to be a full, independent audit of all of Boeing's commercial jets certified in the last decade or so. It's clear that the certification process was compromised by the cozy relationship between Boeing and the FAA and a more thorough review is needed.

MSPNWA wrote:

If you find it acceptable that a flyable airplane was flown into the ground, we have a problem in how to proceed to keep this industry safe.

Sadly, aviation history is littered with examples of flyable planes being flown into the ground.

In many of those cases we find that the crew have been swamped with trying to deal with multiple issues. At lowish altitude, how much time to analyse what was really happening did those 737MAX crews have? Plus, in the case of Lion, being completely in the dark about MCAS.

IADFCO wrote:

Fix the root cause of all these problems, and increase the length of the @#%@& MLG. I know it's not trivial and I know it's not cheap. Find a location where it doesn't affect the wing box structurally, design a fairing that doesn't increase drag too much, reroute what needs to be rerouted, fire your finite element codes and your design optimization tools, your CATIA or whatever you use for 3D CAD, and spend those 12-18 months and those $1B to really fix the problem. What's $1B? 10-20 aircraft? Do you want to bet that with whatever fix they have in mind they are still going to lose ten times as many sales? I also bet that just the lawsuits will cost them much more than that.

There's already been talk of taking the new max 10 MLG and retrofitting to the Max 8 & 9 and going with another bigger engine. Probably just a rumor but could be interesting. Probably wouldn't even take 1billion to get the engineering done actually.

tropical wrote:

Regardless of the financial cost, would it be technically viable to retrofit two extra AoA sensors on the MAX already built, and/or add them to those frames yet to be built? If so, perhaps Boeing should be forced to add the extra sensors as a condition for removing the grounding order.

The B777 and B787 have only 2 AOA probes. One is even allowed to be inop on departure by the MEL.
But there is back up in the ADIRU and software there that compares the AOA sensors and outvotes them if they are faulty.
Perhaps the MAX needs a better ADIRU, not more mechanical sensors

Amiga500 wrote:

Therefore you either didn't read what has happened, or you didn't understand it.

How they are supposed to know how to diagnose problems with systems that they have not been made aware of is beyond me. Unless you are a fan of line-pilots flicking random systems on and off to see if that has any effect?

Neither. You don't understand the original fact - airplanes are not incapable of human intervention. How were they supposed to know? Remember how to fly your airplane.

Boeing did what they thought was necessary. The pilots tried to do the best they could. Both made correctable mistakes. It's high time we expect those corrections from both aspects (and a third--the safety culture of Lion Air), not just one. If we truly care about safety, we would.

scbriml wrote:

Sadly, aviation history is littered with examples of flyable planes being flown into the ground.

In many of those cases we find that the crew have been swamped with trying to deal with multiple issues. At lowish altitude, how much time to analyse what was really happening did those 737MAX crews have? Plus, in the case of Lion, being completely in the dark about MCAS.

Sadly, yes, and when it happens, we identify ways to improve the human element. Or least that used to be the focus.

They apparently hit the cut-off switches 20+ times. We know about how much time they had to first and foremost fly the plane.

My question is poised to pilots who have flown both the NG and the MAX versions of the 737-8/9
According to the Seattle times which reportedly received this information from current and former Boeing engineers, Boeing designed the MCAS system because the larger engines on the MAX aircraft changed the center of gravity which in turn would change the way the aircraft feels to pilots who are use to flying the older models, meaning the MAX could feel nose heavy to pilots which could result in pilots increasing the angle of attack.
https://www.businessinsider.com/boeing- ... ort-2019-3
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... air-crash/

My question is for pilots who have flown both versions does the MAX feel inherently nose heavy when compared to the NG model? If so do you feel like you need to increase the angle of attack which could trigger the system (according to the Seattle Times) or do your instincts and training and leave the angle of attack as is?

IADFCO wrote:

Fix the root cause of all these problems, and increase the length of the @#%@& MLG. I know it's not trivial and I know it's not cheap. Find a location where it doesn't affect the wing box structurally, design a fairing that doesn't increase drag too much, reroute what needs to be rerouted, fire your finite element codes and your design optimization tools, your CATIA or whatever you use for 3D CAD, and spend those 12-18 months and those $1B to really fix the problem. What's $1B? 10-20 aircraft? Do you want to bet that with whatever fix they have in mind they are still going to lose ten times as many sales? I also bet that just the lawsuits will cost them much more than that.

There is no way this is a 12-18 month process. This would take years.

PM wrote:

But I won't be flying on a MAX any time soon.

I don’t think anyone will.

jayunited wrote:

My question is poised to pilots who have flown both the NG and the MAX versions of the 737-8/9
According to the Seattle times which reportedly received this information from current and former Boeing engineers, Boeing designed the MCAS system because the larger engines on the MAX aircraft changed the center of gravity which in turn would change the way the aircraft feels to pilots who are use to flying the older models, meaning the MAX could feel nose heavy to pilots which could result in pilots increasing the angle of attack.
https://www.businessinsider.com/boeing- ... ort-2019-3
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... air-crash/

My question is for pilots who have flown both versions does the MAX feel inherently nose heavy when compared to the NG model? If so do you feel like you need to increase the angle of attack which could trigger the system (according to the Seattle Times) or do your instincts and training and leave the angle of attack as is?

see post 2909

BoeingVista wrote:

Amiga500 wrote:

9Patch wrote:

Leeham says this grounding should be much shorter than was the 787.

Summary:
MAX fix was already in the works.
Some say US government shutdown delayed software fix at least five weeks.
Implementing software upgrade will be quick.
Grounding estimated by LNA to be six weeks max.

- A fix to Lion Air was in the works. They will need to get enough data from Ethiopia to be sure it fixes all ills. That will take time.
- Some say the earth is flat. No way did the shutdown delay the software patch. Boeing self-certified the original system, the FAA were not stopping them making a patch. That is a bulls!t excuse and Leeham should know better.
- The physical implementation of a software patch is quick. If the solution can be accomplished via software.
- Very optimistic and based on a few very sizeable assumptions:
1. Is the max actually stable at higher AoA? If not, then it is not meeting FAR 25.203. Is it allowed to do so via FAR 25.672? I don't believe so.
2. Will the other regulators (EASA, CAAC etc) actually accept the FAA's word?
3. Will the DoT investigation stop the FAA from certifying the MAX?
4. Is the proposed fix actually suitable for use as a CATASTROPHIC risk level solution (enough redundancy and low enough probability of failure)?


Worst case scenario for Boeing is that the software fix is not fit to meet 25.671 or 25.672. They then have to resize the empennage and go through a rigorous re-certification to International regulators of all changes from NG to MAX. In which case minimum time to fix: 18 months.



Supporting info, bolding added for emphasis.

Sec. 25.671 — General.

(a) Each control and control system must operate with the ease, smoothness, and positiveness appropriate to its function.
(b) Each element of each flight control system must be designed, or distinctively and permanently marked, to minimize the probability of incorrect assembly that could result in the malfunctioning of the system.

(c) The airplane must be shown by analysis, tests, or both, to be capable of continued safe flight and landing after any of the following failures or jamming in the flight control system and surfaces (including trim, lift, drag, and feel systems), within the normal flight envelope, without requiring exceptional piloting skill or strength. Probable malfunctions must have only minor effects on control system operation and must be capable of being readily counteracted by the pilot.

(1) Any single failure, excluding jamming (for example, disconnection or failure of mechanical elements, or structural failure of hydraulic components, such as actuators, control spool housing, and valves).

(2) Any combination of failures not shown to be extremely improbable, excluding jamming (for example, dual electrical or hydraulic system failures, or any single failure in combination with any probable hydraulic or electrical failure).

(3) Any jam in a control position normally encountered during takeoff, climb, cruise, normal turns, descent, and landing unless the jam is shown to be extremely improbable, or can be alleviated. A runaway of a flight control to an adverse position and jam must be accounted for if such runaway and subsequent jamming is not extremely improbable.

(d) The airplane must be designed so that it is controllable if all engines fail. Compliance with this requirement may be shown by analysis where that method has been shown to be reliable.

Sec. 25.672 — Stability augmentation and automatic and power-operated systems.

If the functioning of stability augmentation or other automatic or power-operated systems is necessary to show compliance with the flight characteristics requirements of this part, such systems must comply with §25.671 and the following:
(a) A warning which is clearly distinguishable to the pilot under expected flight conditions without requiring his attention must be provided for any failure in the stability augmentation system or in any other automatic or power-operated system which could result in an unsafe condition if the pilot were not aware of the failure. Warning systems must not activate the control systems.

(b) The design of the stability augmentation system or of any other automatic or power-operated system must permit initial counteraction of failures of the type specified in §25.671(c) without requiring exceptional pilot skill or strength, by either the deactivation of the system, or a failed portion thereof, or by overriding the failure by movement of the flight controls in the normal sense.

(c) It must be shown that after any single failure of the stability augmentation system or any other automatic or power-operated system—

(1) The airplane is safely controllable when the failure or malfunction occurs at any speed or altitude within the approved operating limitations that is critical for the type of failure being considered;

(2) The controllability and maneuverability requirements of this part are met within a practical operational flight envelope (for example, speed, altitude, normal acceleration, and airplane configurations) which is described in the Airplane Flight Manual; and

(3) The trim, stability, and stall characteristics are not impaired below a level needed to permit continued safe flight and landing.

Amiga500, you ask the right questions but also the wrong question; No the 737-8/9 is NOT compliant with the FAR sections you mention because it doesn't have to be, because of the miracle of grandfarthering nothing after 25.137 and 25.141 applies (which isn't even in the current printed copies, superseded I'm guessing) look at the certification basis from the TCDS.



So Boeing have been able to build control systems completely outside of FAA regulations, with barely any oversight and these systems are clearly non compliant with the sections you've quoted.

A scandal? One could call it that.

The latest amendment level of 14 CFR 25.671 and 25.672 is 25-23, and per the 737 TCDS, section XI, the certification basis for 25.671 and 25.672 is 25-23, therefore the max is complying with the same regulations as all other commercial aircraft with a certification basis later than 1970.

Boeing has not been able to build control systems completely outside of FAA regulations, with barely any oversight.

IADFCO wrote:

Fix the root cause of all these problems, and increase the length of the @#%@& MLG. I know it's not trivial and I know it's not cheap. Find a location where it doesn't affect the wing box structurally, design a fairing that doesn't increase drag too much, reroute what needs to be rerouted, fire your finite element codes and your design optimization tools, your CATIA or whatever you use for 3D CAD, and spend those 12-18 months and those $1B to really fix the problem. What's $1B? 10-20 aircraft? Do you want to bet that with whatever fix they have in mind they are still going to lose ten times as many sales? I also bet that just the lawsuits will cost them much more than that.

Might as well do NSA/Y1 at that point.

I think that the new CEO of Boeing (when he is soon appointed, IMHO) should immediately activate the project to take the idea of NSA to the next level of definition.

On the 737 Max, he should/could carry out a detailed review, and arrive at an assessment of what MUST be done to fix an unstable aircraft, due to the positioning of the larger engines on the old 737 frame. If this requires a "software fix of MCAS" or a redesign of the aircraft to accommodate higher undercarriage required to position the engines to avoid the stability issues, so be it. Then he can decide as he sees fit to commit the funds necessary to fix the 737 before the NSA arrives

Maybe I am too pessimistic, but I just feel that the 737 MAX is a bridge too far, and that it will, as currently designed, not be allowed back into the world's airspace - even if the FAA allows it back into the US airspace!

Boeing has other aircraft to look after in the civil market, notably the 787 and 777X. It needs to maintain its perceived ability to delivery these products in a manner that is dependable for reliability, fault-tolerance, and quality. All of that at risk from any further screw-ups with this latest 737 model, its certification history, and Boeing's tarnished image over the last few months of the 737 history!

MSPNWA wrote:

How were they supposed to know? Remember how to fly your airplane.

Are you acting thick? Or are you really that thick?

I've just explained to you how the manual says to deal with the symptoms that would have been as close to that induced by MCAS as possible.

They didn't know MCAS existed as the OEM seen fit not to tell them.

If they are to be assigned blame for not knowing how to fly their aeroplane, it is because Boeing decided to exclude the new system from the FCOM.


It ain't a Cessna they were in where there is only one means of adjusting the stabiliser trim. If that is the height of your knowledge, maybe its better if you bow out of the conversation.

MSPNWA wrote:

Boeing did what they thought was necessary. The pilots tried to do the best they could. Both made correctable mistakes.

The difference is - the pilots only had seconds to think about and make their decisions - and were doing so to try and save lives (theirs included).

Boeing had months - and decided to put their stock price first.

No certification should occur, nor should the grounding be lifted...if it is still required to turn off a perfectly good electric trim system to fix an unrelated software or sensor problem

Nobody should have to crank an old fashioned trim wheel while flying without protection from an aerodynamicaly flawed engine-wing combination.

If the lap-dog FAA approves a kludge fix, other country's authorities should not go along...EASA, Canada, China, etc....They should keep the Max grounded.

MSPNWA wrote:

Talk to pilots (I'm assuming you're not one). They'll tell you.

A beginning pilot needs to know what trim is, what it does, and how to operate it. It's one of the basic mechanical tools on an airplane. If it's not doing what you want it to do, you should know how to react and take control of the situation to cause it to do what you want it to do. One of the only purposes of a pilot these days is for when something goes wrong. If you find it acceptable that a flyable airplane was flown into the ground, we have a problem.

The question about how pilots feel the MAX flys perfectly fine should come down to have they done stall training in it, and if so, how did the plane react? What, if any differences did they as the pilot encountered compared to the NG?

I agree that in normal envelope flying, the max is probably safe, but it does appear to have some nasty pre-stall behaviour at present. I'm no expert on flying though.

WeatherPilot wrote:

Does it seem like US media is TRYING to destroy Boeing with all their coverage of this? Like, why?

It's the media's job to report important news, however unflattering it may be to powerful entities - be it a company as large as Boeing, or very powerful individuals.

Lucien23 wrote:

All this talk of not trusting the French or the Ethiopians, with zero evidence that either entity isn't worthy of trust, is simply xenophobic excuse-making in my view.

This is the climate we now live in unfortunately. A particular "sh*thole countries" remark comes to mind.

For those of you folks saying the pilots were not aware of the MCAS "feature," that is true up to the first crash. If memory serves, Boeing sent a NOTAM or other communication explaining what it is and what to do if this issue occurs. Now, FIVE MONTHS LATER, it happens again. So, it would seem to me that the airline did not get this info out, or the flight crew in this instance forgot it or "missed" that class. Do airlines require sign off of the intended audience on new/remedial training? Again, I am wondering after 2 years in service, why this is happening now. Perhaps this may turn out to be like the jack screw issue on the MD-80..it took time for the issue to present itself.

aaexecplat wrote:

par13del wrote:

So Leeham knows that the nations grounded the MAX because the fix Boeing was working on would have prevented the crashes?
Hmmm.....let's hope the official investigations don't result in another grounding for different reasons then the whole conspiracy theories will rise again.

Of course he doesn't. But Boeing is getting the word out via as many channels as possible that everyone is expecting the MAX to be back in the air before the end of the month (AA announced the same). It is the old adage that repeating lies (especially via multiple seemingly unrelated sources) can make them perceived as truth.

Since Boeing did not ground the MAX, what they say is only relevant to the authorities who have to make the decision to let the a/c fly again, methinks you are setting up a case where you can let the regulators off the hook.

sassiciai wrote:

I think that the new CEO of Boeing (when he is soon appointed, IMHO) should immediately activate the project to take the idea of NSA to the next level of definition.

On the 737 Max, he should/could carry out a detailed review, and arrive at an assessment of what MUST be done to fix an unstable aircraft, due to the positioning of the larger engines on the old 737 frame. If this requires a "software fix of MCAS" or a redesign of the aircraft to accommodate higher undercarriage required to position the engines to avoid the stability issues, so be it. Then he can decide as he sees fit to commit the funds necessary to fix the 737 before the NSA arrives

Why was the MAX project not abandoned as soon as it became apparent that lengthening the MLG was not practicall? I presume that moving the engines forward changed thei CofG position relative to centre of pressure.

Boeing was in the fortunate position that Airbus had announced what they were doing post A320 - developing a modified A320. At that point Boeing could have gone for their NSA which, based on then current technology (whereas Airbus was reworking a 30 year old airframe), should have enabled them to design an aircraft with a definite edge over the A320NEO.

BoeingVista wrote:

keesje wrote:

I think there is a large group of people that stood shoulder to shoulder with Boeing behind the safe operation of the 737MAX. And now wishes they hadn't. It seems to me much of the "new" information the sudden switch was based on, wasn't so new. Plus there was additional info that made the rest of the world ground the MAX earlier.

The Chinese CAAC where unhappy with the Lionair investigation, were in discussion with FAA for months, and the first to pull the plug on the MAX because of it and early info on strong similarities. Only to be politized by US main media channels.. and asking for proof..

Any idea what the CAAC were unhappy about with the Lion air investigation?

I thought they had inside information regarding the Lionair investigation, that was why they acted so quickly.
After all, they are known for certain activity.

sassiciai wrote:

Maybe I am too pessimistic, but I just feel that the 737 MAX is a bridge too far, and that it will, as currently designed, not be allowed back into the world's airspace

I love hearing these comments on various Facebook posts, here, Reddit, etc from people who aren't aerospace engineers, much less pilots or anything else.

The most likely scenario is a software update + training
A less likely scenario is a small hardware modification
Grounding the entire fleet permanently will never happen. It didn't happen to the 737 25 years ago after the rudder issues and didn't happen to the DC10 before that.

There will be a fix, and a month or two after, it will be old news.

Amiga500 wrote:

Are you acting thick? Or are you really that thick?

I'm wondering the same.

Amiga500 wrote:

I've just explained to you how the manual says to deal with the symptoms that would have been as close to that induced by MCAS as possible.

They didn't know MCAS existed as the OEM seen fit not to tell them.

If they are to be assigned blame for not knowing how to fly their aeroplane, it is because Boeing decided to exclude the new system from the FCOM.

It ain't a Cessna they were in where there is only one means of adjusting the stabiliser trim. If that is the height of your knowledge, maybe its better if you bow out of the conversation.

I don't believe you understand the 737 manual that well. And the point is this goes well beyond a manual. If the trim is not working right, take control of it (and what MCAS was doing wasn't completely opposite of the procedures in the manual that will correct it). A pilot is trained to deal with situations beyond what's specifically written in a manual. Do you think the UA232 pilots went by the book to save lives? Did Sully and Skiles have to find out what specifically caused their engine failures before they dealt with the harsh reality of their situation? How about the Northwest 85 pilots?

You have a chronic trim problem. You don't know why. You have a procedure to manually take control of your trim. And you don't use it? That's a safety question.

If "trying" is enough for you, then I expect you will give same courtesy to Boeing. Personally, "trying" isn't enough for me for either party.

Amiga500 wrote:

The difference is - the pilots only had seconds to think about and make their decisions - and were doing so to try and save lives (theirs included).

Boeing had months - and decided to put their stock price first.

Stop with the hyperbole. If you can't support your belief without it, there's a problem.

My oh my - some people please stop - its about data, fdr and cvr from both - the 'lets nuke boeing from space ' You going to take the AOC
train across the atlantic??

I think Boeing screwed up, I think they can fix thier plane. Its then a question of trust.

caverunner17 wrote:

sassiciai wrote:

Maybe I am too pessimistic, but I just feel that the 737 MAX is a bridge too far, and that it will, as currently designed, not be allowed back into the world's airspace

I love hearing these comments on various Facebook posts, here, Reddit, etc from people who aren't aerospace engineers, much less pilots or anything else.

The most likely scenario is a software update + training
A less likely scenario is a small hardware modification
Grounding the entire fleet permanently will never happen. It didn't happen to the 737 25 years ago after the rudder issues and didn't happen to the DC10 before that.

There will be a fix, and a month or two after, it will be old news.

Verry likely for the general population, but I for exemple, am not going to fly a MAX before a long time and it has statistically proved itself.

KlimaBXsst wrote:

Truthfully, had Boeing advised to the airlines this stabilty augmentation and MCAS system was the best thing since sliced cheese, would it had prompted more Boeing sales.

Or did Boeing internally see this as a liability that did not enhance the sales of the MAX?
A little detailed leg work may need to be done here with all parties involved.

Boeing, airline MAX pilot training, Pilot awareness, Boeing’s operating manuals....

The unfortunate thing is we have a lot of dead people, God rest and bless their souls.

Why are people seeing this as some safety feature in the past few days? It's NOT, and Boeing wouldn't want it there if it was up to them. It's there because it has to be.

If anything, its very existence puts a microscope on why it's there and what behaviors the aircraft displays which weren't an issue on the NG.

There's zero chance it would boost sales - it's only there for a very specific type of action and is NOT a highly-advanced flight envelope protection system using tons of data and calculations like that of Airbus' Alpha Prot/Floor etc.

It's simply there to get the thing certified, nothing more, nothing less. It's likely been a pain in the rear for Boeing since the moment they swallowed their pride and accepted the fact that they'd need to stick it in there.

MSPNWA wrote:

I don't believe you understand the 737 manual that well. And the point is this goes well beyond a manual. If the trim is not working right, take control of it (and what MCAS was doing wasn't completely opposite of the procedures in the manual that will correct it).

I have told you that the Lion Air crew manually took control of the trim and CORRECTED IT OVER TWENTY (20) TIMES.

MSPNWA wrote:

A pilot is trained to deal with situations beyond what's specifically written in a manual.

No. No they most definitely are not.

They are there to follow the book to the letter.

It is now quite obvious you know sweet FA about how a commercial pilot is supposed to operate.

I've had it spelled out to me in the distant past that line pilots are not, and can not, be allowed to operate like test pilots.

MSPNWA wrote:

Did Sully and Skiles have to find out what specifically caused their engine failures before they dealt with the harsh reality of their situation? How about the Northwest 85 pilots?

Interesting you mention Sully - as he went right by the book to ensure he had the APU active so the aircraft would continue to give him envelope protection when he was faced with having to pancake onto the water.

He knew the aircraft because of what he'd learned from the FCOM in the months and years preceding the incident had told him what all was on the aircraft and the inter-relationships of them all. Thus he was forearmed with the knowledge to take appropriate actions.

Unlike the guys working blind with the scandalous Boeing approach.

MSPNWA wrote:

You have a chronic trim problem. You don't know why. You have a procedure to manually take control of your trim. And you don't use it? That's a safety question.

THEY DID.

I have no idea what people actually discuss here. Boeing has shown it does not care about public safety, it is not interested if its planes are safe, otherwise it would not have done what it has done. Everything else coming now is just wishy washy. Read they Seattle article again and try telling me Boeing cares, I dare you

mig17 wrote:

Verry likely for the general population, but I for exemple, am not going to fly a MAX before a long time and it has statistically proved itself.

It already has. Hundreds of thousands of flights. Even without a software fix and training change, you're still statistically around 20x more likely to die in a car accident in the US than to have been part of either of the 2 MAX crashes.

Once the software has been updated and training revisited, I'd be fully confident in flying on one of them. If not, Valar Morghulis.

A3801000 wrote:

I have no idea what people actually discuss here. Boeing has shown it does not care about public safety, it is not interested if its planes are safe, otherwise it would not have done what it has done. Everything else coming now is just wishy washy. Read they Seattle article again and try telling me Boeing cares, I dare you

+1 for that! I agree!

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