fabian9 wrote:

What many are forgetting is that MCAS (and its higher THS deflection angle) have been implemented for a reason. It wouldn’t have been introduced in the first place, or changed from 0.6 to 2.5deg deflection, if it wasn’t required to create a “stable” aircraft.

The fact that the system has had to exist in the first place also tells a story. This is an aircraft that has been artificially engineered beyond its architectural limits. As I said in a previous thread, the Max changes are lipstick on a pig.

If MCAS fails, and a stall is entered, will pilots be able to get the aircraft back into a stable configuration?

Precisely. MCAS exists for a reason. Changing the software to self-disengage MCAS does not really solve anything. Now we need to re-train all pilots to fly without MCAS, which defeats the purpose of MCAS in the first place.

Wayfarer515 wrote:

Interested wrote:

Part of the proposed new fix is going to be a compulsory warning light

A bit more from the same link

https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/us-lawm ... dy-2011581

"Norwegian Air played down the significance of the compulsory light, saying that, according to Boeing, it would not have been able to prevent erroneous signals that Lion Air pilots received before their new 737 MAX plane crashed in October.

Boeing must be cautious with how it characterizes the safety alert, risking legal claims by saying it could have made a difference in the crash while not wanting to suggest that the retrofit is meaningless, legal experts said.

The Lion Air plane did not have the warning light installed, and Ethiopian Airlines did not immediately comment on whether its crashed plane had the alert."

It's a shame when Boeing have to be careful what they say due to worries over compensation etc when at this stage the whole focus should be on future safety full stop

Bollocks, it is a shame when a company such as Boeing thinks only about its proftis and not the safety of the flying public, by this point I would trust a lot more COMAC and the CAAC and not the cartel made up by Boeing and the FAA, I hope airlines sue them into oblivion.

The sad part is..... Boeing factory workers have been warning the execs of this company that the constant outsourcing of jobs could lead to serious problems. Boeing execs pretty much just want the planes built by the cheapest vendors, and then slap a Boeing sticker on the planes. They have cut Engineers, and QA like they are out of style. Then.... Pushed for a new record delivery of planes per month. It used to be one 737 a day. Arent they close to 60 planes a month now? Not to mention how much Boeing has been in DC, and how much they "donate" for political reasons.

Anyways, I think the MAX was rushed. I also suspect investigators will follow the money, and learn that Boeing manipulated the system politically. I do suspect we will see quite a few heads rolling when this is all said and done. What a shame too.

F9Animal wrote:

Wayfarer515 wrote:

Interested wrote:

Part of the proposed new fix is going to be a compulsory warning light

A bit more from the same link

https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/us-lawm ... dy-2011581

"Norwegian Air played down the significance of the compulsory light, saying that, according to Boeing, it would not have been able to prevent erroneous signals that Lion Air pilots received before their new 737 MAX plane crashed in October.

Boeing must be cautious with how it characterizes the safety alert, risking legal claims by saying it could have made a difference in the crash while not wanting to suggest that the retrofit is meaningless, legal experts said.

The Lion Air plane did not have the warning light installed, and Ethiopian Airlines did not immediately comment on whether its crashed plane had the alert."

It's a shame when Boeing have to be careful what they say due to worries over compensation etc when at this stage the whole focus should be on future safety full stop

Bollocks, it is a shame when a company such as Boeing thinks only about its proftis and not the safety of the flying public, by this point I would trust a lot more COMAC and the CAAC and not the cartel made up by Boeing and the FAA, I hope airlines sue them into oblivion.

The sad part is..... Boeing factory workers have been warning the execs of this company that the constant outsourcing of jobs could lead to serious problems. Boeing execs pretty much just want the planes built by the cheapest vendors, and then slap a Boeing sticker on the planes. They have cut Engineers, and QA like they are out of style. Then.... Pushed for a new record delivery of planes per month. It used to be one 737 a day. Arent they close to 60 planes a month now? Not to mention how much Boeing has been in DC, and how much they "donate" for political reasons.

Anyways, I think the MAX was rushed. I also suspect investigators will follow the money, and learn that Boeing manipulated the system politically. I do suspect we will see quite a few heads rolling when this is all said and done. What a shame too.

Well, if it takes heads to roll (and a good deal of money) to prevent the next related crash, so be it.

I woudn't be surprised the costs from this problem with the 737MAX to Boeing and component suppliers will be $1 Billion or more. They have the costs to create a fix, do the fix, test, train, certify the changes, followup, storage of grounded aircraft, penalties to airlines, lost and cancelled sales, lawsuits from killed pax and crew members and other costs. For sure it will hurt profits, share prices, and people for several quarters.

ltbewr wrote:

I woudn't be surprised the costs from this problem with the 737MAX to Boeing and component suppliers will be $1 Billion or more. They have the costs to create a fix, do the fix, test, train, certify the changes, followup, storage of grounded aircraft, penalties to airlines, lost and cancelled sales, lawsuits from killed pax and crew members and other costs. For sure it will hurt profits, share prices, and people for several quarters.

I think I 1B is a very conservative estimate of their total losses after all dust has settled. I think it will 10B or more. If they have to stop production, and I expect they will have to, at some point, that alone will cost them 5B per month.

ltbewr wrote:

I woudn't be surprised the costs from this problem with the 737MAX to Boeing and component suppliers will be $1 Billion or more. They have the costs to create a fix, do the fix, test, train, certify the changes, followup, storage of grounded aircraft, penalties to airlines, lost and cancelled sales, lawsuits from killed pax and crew members and other costs. For sure it will hurt profits, share prices, and people for several quarters.

Even more costly if DoT & DoJ find unlawfull acts during certification which can lead to other countries' certification bodies requiring their own certification process.

PixelFlight wrote:

No, the problem is in the design. The MCAS function was added into the FCC where the STS function already was. For some reason, only the automatic control (AP) was implemented with both sensors comparison. The manual control already use only a single sensor before the MCAS was added. Details:
https://www.satcom.guru/2018/11/737-fcc ... mmand.html

But Satcom Guru says:

"Based on information available, in all three cases of autopilot augmentation, only one FCC produces the valid command, and that FCC command is based only a single sensor set."

But it mentions two CPUs, which I would assume exist within one FCC (two FCCs mean a total of four CPUs):

"While the autopilot is engaged, both CPUs are utilized to ensure a single CPU error is detected."

Funny that you quoted the same source but got a different interpretation of it.

Yes.

I had a coworker who had a saying: "How come there's never time to do it right, but there's always time to do it over?".

mjoelnir wrote:

Boeing Plans Fixes to Make 737 MAX Stall-Prevention Feature Easier for Pilots to Control

https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-pla ... 1553373777

quote: The modifications, officials said, create a gentler stall-prevention feature, redesigned so it won’t overpower other cockpit commands or misfire based on faulty readings from a single sensor. It is devised to automatically push the nose down only once—for no longer than 10 seconds—if the aircraft is in danger of stalling and losing lift.

The changes have been tentatively approved by FAA officials, the people familiar with the details said, subject to final ground-simulator checks and flight tests. They could be rolled out to airlines’ 737 MAX jets in the next few weeks.

A Boeing official said the new MAX software could still go through revisions, and the timing of formal approval from the FAA and foreign regulators remains fluid.

Even after the changes are fully implemented in the U.S., air-safety regulators in Canada and the EU are poised to conduct their own evaluation of the new software as well as how the FAA initially certified the plane to carry passengers. Those reviews could take months, according to safety experts..

Among other changes, the revised software would rely on two “angle of attack” sensors, rather than one, to measure the upward or downward angle of the wings and nose in flight. If two sensors send data differing by five degrees or more, MCAS wouldn’t activate at all, according to the officials briefed on the tentative changes..

One sentence I find interesting regarding 737MAX simulators:

Quote: The changes have been tentatively approved by FAA officials, the people familiar with the details said, subject to final ground-simulator checks and flight tests.

So Boeing has simulators that make it possible to check up on MCAS. That feature seems only be banned on simulators sold to airlines

edit: additional quote: A draft FAA document spelling out the training revisions shows pilots now will be specifically informed about “MCAS activation thresholds,” “flight crew alerts” and how to turn off the system by flipping a single switch. Such details weren’t highlighted in earlier manuals or training materials circulated by Boeing.

FAA officials have determined the handing qualities of 737 MAX jets will be close enough to earlier 737 models that pilots won’t need additional training in ground-based simulators, which is expensive for airlines and disruptive to their schedules.

Boeing seems still to be still strongly opposed to pilots getting a lot of training going from the 737NG to the 737MAX, all in the name of cost.

Hei, as usual, my comment is from an enthusiast. Not a pilot. Not an engineer.

Topic 1)
Did I understood correctly and the steps are:
1) the plane is reaching conditions for MCAS activation.
2) the pilot is able to counteract/override.
3) the plane should activate again the MCAS for a real need but it will not happen due to the new software setting and the "just 1 time" rule.

In this case, it seems the patch because will make the plane safe in one scenario but not cover up the other scenarios.

EDIT:
Topic 2)
Also, the solution is to fix the MCAS software but will not solve the fact the MAX flying attitude is different from the NG which should mean that Pilots will both need training on CMAS and on flying differences from NG to MAX... Because if they were similar the MCAS would not be needed. right?

F9Animal wrote:

Anyways, I think the MAX was rushed. I also suspect investigators will follow the money, and learn that Boeing manipulated the system politically. I do suspect we will see quite a few heads rolling when this is all said and done. What a shame too.

It is a process of brinkmanship. It doesn't have a distinct "core" that shows fully criminal behavior "pressed button and people died".
Thus no single person will have subverted the system enough to make it criminally actionable.
Everyone: Scot free.

vahancrazy wrote:

3) the plane should activate again the MCAS for a real need but it will not happen due to the new software setting and the "just 1 time" rule.

In this case, it seems the patch because will make the plane safe in one scenario but not cover up the other scenarios.

If you use AoA going actionable as a trigger and not as a level decider you get the desired "once" behavior.
the next cycle would requires AoA to go below the threshold for MCAS being rearmed.
( currently AoA over the treshhold causes MCAS trim action, a backoff is caused by pilot trim input.)

WIederling wrote:

vahancrazy wrote:

3) the plane should activate again the MCAS for a real need but it will not happen due to the new software setting and the "just 1 time" rule.

In this case, it seems the patch because will make the plane safe in one scenario but not cover up the other scenarios.

If you use AoA going actionable as a trigger and not as a level decider you get the desired "once" behavior.
the next cycle would requires AoA to go below the threshold for MCAS being rearmed.
( currently AoA over the treshhold causes MCAS trim action, a backoff is caused by pilot trim input.)

Thank you for the explanation!

To double check if I got it right:
the system will learn from case 1 and no activate again during the flight in similar scenario. Whereas, it will work normally in any new scenarios and will learn from the new ones too?!

If yes, then it seems a sound option!

vahancrazy wrote:

WIederling wrote:

vahancrazy wrote:

3) the plane should activate again the MCAS for a real need but it will not happen due to the new software setting and the "just 1 time" rule.

In this case, it seems the patch because will make the plane safe in one scenario but not cover up the other scenarios.

If you use AoA going actionable as a trigger and not as a level decider you get the desired "once" behavior.
the next cycle would requires AoA to go below the threshold for MCAS being rearmed.
( currently AoA over the treshhold causes MCAS trim action, a backoff is caused by pilot trim input.)

Thank you for the explanation!

To double check if I got it right:
the system will learn from case 1 and no activate again during the flight in similar scenario. Whereas, it will work normally in any new scenarios and will learn from the new ones too?!


If yes, then it seems a sound option!

No learning. ( unpredictable behavior? god forbid! )

And this is just my interpretation/solution : currently AoA over the threshold (static) pushes MCAS into action as long as AoA is over the treshold. ( The expectation is that AoA decreases on MCAS trim activity over time ) manual trim input activates a back off time. After that MCAS continues its action as before. ( repeat, ad nauseam )

The alternative ( and afaics the better solution from the get go and what could have been intended but not effected)
is to use AoA going over the threshold (dynamic) as trigger for one cycle of MCAS action. After that AoA has to go below the threshold to rearm and be ready for the next intervention.
And I really have no idea how close a shaving this is in relation to the basic 737 MAX airframe behavior.
( cranking up MCAS trim delta after certification by a factor of 5+ seems to indicate it is a very close shave or a hamfisted typo. What kind of QA would allow that?)

WIederling wrote:

vahancrazy wrote:

WIederling wrote:

If you use AoA going actionable as a trigger and not as a level decider you get the desired "once" behavior.
the next cycle would requires AoA to go below the threshold for MCAS being rearmed.
( currently AoA over the treshhold causes MCAS trim action, a backoff is caused by pilot trim input.)

Thank you for the explanation!

To double check if I got it right:
the system will learn from case 1 and no activate again during the flight in similar scenario. Whereas, it will work normally in any new scenarios and will learn from the new ones too?!


If yes, then it seems a sound option!

No learning. ( unpredictable behavior? god forbid! )

And this is just my interpretation/solution : currently AoA over the threshold (static) pushes MCAS into action as long as AoA is over the treshold. ( The expectation is that AoA decreases on MCAS trim activity over time ) manual trim input activates a back off time. After that MCAS continues its action as before. ( repeat, ad nauseam )

The alternative ( and afaics the better solution from the get go and what could have been intended but not effected)
is to use AoA going over the threshold (dynamic) as trigger for one cycle of MCAS action. After that AoA has to go below the threshold to rearm and be ready for the next intervention.
And I really have no idea how close a shaving this is in relation to the basic 737 MAX airframe behavior.
( cranking up MCAS trim delta after certification by a factor of 5+ seems to indicate it is a very close shave or a hamfisted typo. What kind of QA would allow that?)

Uh! Quite interesting info. I need to reread it 3 times to fully understand it to avoid again misunderstanding!

SimpleFlying wrote:

ltbewr wrote:

I woudn't be surprised the costs from this problem with the 737MAX to Boeing and component suppliers will be $1 Billion or more. They have the costs to create a fix, do the fix, test, train, certify the changes, followup, storage of grounded aircraft, penalties to airlines, lost and cancelled sales, lawsuits from killed pax and crew members and other costs. For sure it will hurt profits, share prices, and people for several quarters.

Even more costly if DoT & DoJ find unlawfull acts during certification which can lead to other countries' certification bodies requiring their own certification process.

We are there already. EASA and Canada are already requiring their own certification process.
https://globalnews.ca/news/5072383/canada-eu-reviewing-certification-boeing-737-max/

So. Even in the unlikely event that Boeing

a) Have the MCAS software fix ready on April 10 like announced
b) Gets an approval rubber-stamped through FAA by April 30 (harder to do now that FAA are under investigation )
c) On May 1st promptly starts installing MCAS update worldwide on all 350-ish MAX delivered worldwide ....

(This sounds already like a fairytale, btw.)

STILL

EASA will do their own independent certification not of MCAS but of THE WHOLE AIRLINER.

MAX will not fly in Europe (or Asia??) until EASA has certified MAX from bottom up. Expect six months or more from now.

I said it before, and I am saying it again. Boeing Stock is currently trading way too high. What have the analysts been drinking? Were I a trader I would short Boeing like crazy.

hilram wrote:

SimpleFlying wrote:

ltbewr wrote:

I woudn't be surprised the costs from this problem with the 737MAX to Boeing and component suppliers will be $1 Billion or more. They have the costs to create a fix, do the fix, test, train, certify the changes, followup, storage of grounded aircraft, penalties to airlines, lost and cancelled sales, lawsuits from killed pax and crew members and other costs. For sure it will hurt profits, share prices, and people for several quarters.

Even more costly if DoT & DoJ find unlawfull acts during certification which can lead to other countries' certification bodies requiring their own certification process.

We are there already. EASA and Canada are already requiring their own certification process.
https://globalnews.ca/news/5072383/canada-eu-reviewing-certification-boeing-737-max/

So. Even in the unlikely event that Boeing

a) Have the MCAS software fix ready on April 10 like announced
b) Gets an approval rubber-stamped through FAA by April 30 (harder to do now that FAA are under investigation )
c) On May 1st promptly starts installing MCAS update worldwide on all 350-ish MAX delivered worldwide ....

(This sounds already like a fairytale, btw.)

STILL

EASA will do their own independent certification not of MCAS but of THE WHOLE AIRLINER.

MAX will not fly in Europe (or Asia??) until EASA has certified MAX from bottom up. Expect six months or more from now.

I said it before, and I am saying it again. Boeing Stock is currently trading way too high. What have the analysts been drinking? Were I a trader I would short Boeing like crazy.

I agree

That software fix upgrade coming soon message from Boeing eased some short term pressure on their shares

But as soon as the planes aren't back in the air as quick as hoped they've got a hell of a lot of pain to come

They've gone from more or less being able to make their own rules up for these planes to now having the whole world scrutinising every tiny detail

Nothing will happen quickly. And if safety isn't optimal for every decision from now on these planes will never fly again full stop. No quick fixes or fudges available with these planes any more.

Chemist wrote:

I had a coworker who had a saying: "How come there's never time to do it right, but there's always time to do it over?".

I like that, along with someone else's "A plane needs to be designed to be safe with an average pilot on a bad day" But there is also the, as at Lake Wobegon all pilots are above average.

Res the plane, it appears the MAX as is, is almost a good safe plane. It does not need to be re-certified "from the ground up". The MCAS was done poorly. In particular the plane under certain circumstances (failed AofA) could do things that apparently set off several alarm systems - at that point the pilot may be confronted by multiple possible problems. There is another saying, sometimes you want to help a person who is becoming dysfunctional, but "which screw do you tighten first?"

Amiga500 wrote:

dakota123 wrote:

Not true. Stick force gradient decreases. It doesn’t go negative.

Dunno if that is directed at me - but reduced (or not enough) control authority does not result in an inversion of stick force.

It is not the elevator stalling that is the problem.

Merely a clarification.

Have a look here, OldAeroGuy explains it well in post 28. viewtopic.php?f=5&t=1418159

(Not directed at you; just generally given all the hysteria that “MCAS is a kludge”. )

frmrCapCadet wrote:

Chemist wrote:

I had a coworker who had a saying: "How come there's never time to do it right, but there's always time to do it over?".

I like that, along with someone else's "A plane needs to be designed to be safe with an average pilot on a bad day" But there is also the, as at Lake Wobegon all pilots are above average.

Res the plane, it appears the MAX as is, is almost a good safe plane. It does not need to be re-certified "from the ground up". The MCAS was done poorly. In particular the plane under certain circumstances (failed AofA) could do things that apparently set off several alarm systems - at that point the pilot may be confronted by multiple possible problems. There is another saying, sometimes you want to help a person who is becoming dysfunctional, but "which screw do you tighten first?"

It does need recertification as the rest of the world has lost faith in the FAA


Sent from my iPad using Tapatalk Pro

frmrCapCadet wrote:

Chemist wrote:

I had a coworker who had a saying: "How come there's never time to do it right, but there's always time to do it over?".

(...)

Res the plane, it appears the MAX as is, is almost a good safe plane. It does not need to be re-certified "from the ground up". The MCAS was done poorly. In particular the plane under certain circumstances (failed AofA) could do things that apparently set off several alarm systems - at that point the pilot may be confronted by multiple possible problems. There is another saying, sometimes you want to help a person who is becoming dysfunctional, but "which screw do you tighten first?"

It really makes no difference whether Boeing, friends of Boeing, the FAA and even Trump insists that the 737 MAX is not in need of full re-certification. The confidence internationally has been shattered, to the point where EASA will conduct their own, full certification regardless. That will take time. The MAX will not fly over Europe until EASA are confident the plane is safe. Any MAX meant to operate in Europe will with certainty have to have the 2nd AOA sensor retrofitted together with disagree light.

No quick fix. Who will pay for that upgrade? Will all ~ 4500 MAX yet to be delivered suffer severely in profitability because Boeing will have to give away what used to cost 100 grand? Quantify that cost...

hilram wrote:

frmrCapCadet wrote:

Chemist wrote:

I had a coworker who had a saying: "How come there's never time to do it right, but there's always time to do it over?".

(...)

Res the plane, it appears the MAX as is, is almost a good safe plane. It does not need to be re-certified "from the ground up". The MCAS was done poorly. In particular the plane under certain circumstances (failed AofA) could do things that apparently set off several alarm systems - at that point the pilot may be confronted by multiple possible problems. There is another saying, sometimes you want to help a person who is becoming dysfunctional, but "which screw do you tighten first?"

It really makes no difference whether Boeing, friends of Boeing, the FAA and even Trump insists that the 737 MAX is not in need of full re-certification. The confidence internationally has been shattered, to the point where EASA will conduct their own, full certification regardless. That will take time. The MAX will not fly over Europe until EASA are confident the plane is safe. Any MAX meant to operate in Europe will with certainty have to have the 2nd AOA sensor retrofitted together with disagree light.

No quick fix. Who will pay for that upgrade? Will all ~ 4500 MAX yet to be delivered suffer severely in profitability because Boeing will have to give away what used to cost 100 grand? Quantify that cost...

I still don't get why ANYBODY would accept workarounds to reduce risks that don't need to be risks in the first place on a better designed plane?

What am I missing here?

MACS was hidden by Boeing? Their fault not ours. They hid if for a reason.

Why would we now accept MACS as being a risk we would ever want to have to risk failing on a plane again? Now we know all about it and it's out in the open?

Other than 350 planes that need it to fly again and 4650 planes on order that need it?

Why does the world of passenger flights need to accept planes that need MACS to fly safely?

How does that improve the safety of planes to us the passengers? Reducing crashes is about keeping risks to the bare minimum. It's not about introducing new risks to have to deal with. Even a minute extra risk pro ratad out over the huge number of flights these planes will take leads to 1000s of deaths over time

Unacceptable to add in that new risk we don't need

It's just a fudge for an inherently unsafe plane by design?

Someone explain to me a valid reason why we allow planes that aren't stable to be designed and approved in the first place? Now we know about the need for MACS simply don't accept it as an extra risk to add to a plane. Design a plane that doesn't need it. End of.

I've read today that the decision to use 737 max rather than to design a new plane saved Boeing 4 years ..

Max took 6 years rather than a new plane design would take 10 years

Sorry boeing you made the wrong call. The world of airline safety doesn't need to suffer as a early of your short term decision.

One of the most expensive decisions in airline history. No doubt in fact the most expensive decision but safety should be paramount now.

Someone tell me what I am missing?

Interested wrote:

hilram wrote:

frmrCapCadet wrote:

(...)

Res the plane, it appears the MAX as is, is almost a good safe plane. It does not need to be re-certified "from the ground up". The MCAS was done poorly. In particular the plane under certain circumstances (failed AofA) could do things that apparently set off several alarm systems - at that point the pilot may be confronted by multiple possible problems. There is another saying, sometimes you want to help a person who is becoming dysfunctional, but "which screw do you tighten first?"

It really makes no difference whether Boeing, friends of Boeing, the FAA and even Trump insists that the 737 MAX is not in need of full re-certification. The confidence internationally has been shattered, to the point where EASA will conduct their own, full certification regardless. That will take time. The MAX will not fly over Europe until EASA are confident the plane is safe. Any MAX meant to operate in Europe will with certainty have to have the 2nd AOA sensor retrofitted together with disagree light.

No quick fix. Who will pay for that upgrade? Will all ~ 4500 MAX yet to be delivered suffer severely in profitability because Boeing will have to give away what used to cost 100 grand? Quantify that cost...

I still don't get why ANYBODY would accept workarounds to reduce risks that don't need to be risks in the first place on a better designed plane?

What am I missing here?

MACS was hidden by Boeing?

Why would we now accept MACS as being a risk we would ever want to have to risk failing on a plane again? Now we know all about it and it's out in the open.

Other than 350 planes that need it to fly again and 4650 planes on order that need it?

Why does the world of passenger flights need to accept planes that need MACS to fky safely?

How does that improve the safety of planes dos us the passengers?

It's just a fudge for an inherently unsafe plane by design?

Someone explain to me a valid reason why we allow planes that aren't stable to be designed and approved in the first place? Now we know about the need for MACS simply don't accept it as an extra risk to add to a plane. Design a plane that doesn't need it. End of.

Again, post 28 here: viewtopic.php?f=5&t=1418159 Common issue with swept-wing aircraft dealt with in a variety of ways.

dakota123 wrote:

Interested wrote:

hilram wrote:

It really makes no difference whether Boeing, friends of Boeing, the FAA and even Trump insists that the 737 MAX is not in need of full re-certification. The confidence internationally has been shattered, to the point where EASA will conduct their own, full certification regardless. That will take time. The MAX will not fly over Europe until EASA are confident the plane is safe. Any MAX meant to operate in Europe will with certainty have to have the 2nd AOA sensor retrofitted together with disagree light.

No quick fix. Who will pay for that upgrade? Will all ~ 4500 MAX yet to be delivered suffer severely in profitability because Boeing will have to give away what used to cost 100 grand? Quantify that cost...

I still don't get why ANYBODY would accept workarounds to reduce risks that don't need to be risks in the first place on a better designed plane?

What am I missing here?

MACS was hidden by Boeing?

Why would we now accept MACS as being a risk we would ever want to have to risk failing on a plane again? Now we know all about it and it's out in the open.

Other than 350 planes that need it to fly again and 4650 planes on order that need it?

Why does the world of passenger flights need to accept planes that need MACS to fky safely?

How does that improve the safety of planes dos us the passengers?

It's just a fudge for an inherently unsafe plane by design?

Someone explain to me a valid reason why we allow planes that aren't stable to be designed and approved in the first place? Now we know about the need for MACS simply don't accept it as an extra risk to add to a plane. Design a plane that doesn't need it. End of.

Again, post 28 here: viewtopic.php?f=5&t=1418159 Common issue with swept-wing aircraft dealt with in a variety of ways.

Does the existing 737 (before max) need MCAS to fly safely? Are we happy with the safety of that plane?

I'm assuming the answer is no followed by yes

If my assumption is correct I simply have no idea why this is even up for debate? They've fudged something that adds extra risk. Worse still Boeing have then tried to hide MCAS and keep it under the radar?? We only know that because of two disasters already that have shown up what's been going on behind closed doors.

That's totally unacceptable in any type of organisation involving health and safety. Let alone airline health and safety! It's disgraceful.

So they've messed up and it can't be allowed to continue? Even if they get the new MCAS risk to the lowest it practically can be it's still a risk we don't need to introduce. A tiny extra percentage risk we don't need leads to too many deaths over the number of flights we would expect from these planes. We reduce and remove risks we don't add them in?

Does the 737 nearest competitor Airbus need MCAS to fly safely ?

It clearly states AA which is AMERICAN Airlines.

Boof02671 wrote:

It clearly states AA which is AMERICAN Airlines.

Well it may be entirely co-incidental but yesterday we were told 2 AA pilots had travelled to Renton to test the new software patch for Boeing in a max simulator.

South west airlines staff were due to observe the testing so maybe we get an announcement from them sooner or later

It's 90 flights per day that they are cancelling during the extended grounding

Yes AA, WN and and UA sent union and management pilots to Boeing.

Interested wrote:

dakota123 wrote:

Interested wrote:

I still don't get why ANYBODY would accept workarounds to reduce risks that don't need to be risks in the first place on a better designed plane?

What am I missing here?

MACS was hidden by Boeing?

Why would we now accept MACS as being a risk we would ever want to have to risk failing on a plane again? Now we know all about it and it's out in the open.

Other than 350 planes that need it to fly again and 4650 planes on order that need it?

Why does the world of passenger flights need to accept planes that need MACS to fky safely?

How does that improve the safety of planes dos us the passengers?

It's just a fudge for an inherently unsafe plane by design?

Someone explain to me a valid reason why we allow planes that aren't stable to be designed and approved in the first place? Now we know about the need for MACS simply don't accept it as an extra risk to add to a plane. Design a plane that doesn't need it. End of.

Again, post 28 here: https://www.airliners.net/forum/viewtop ... &t=1418159 Common issue with swept-wing aircraft dealt with in a variety of ways.

Does the existing 737 (before max) need MCAS to fly safely? Are we happy with the safety of that plane?

I'm assuming the answer is no followed by yes

If my assumption is correct I simply have no idea why this is even up for debate? They've fudged something that adds extra risk. Worse still Boeing have then tried to hide MCAS and keep it under the radar?? We only know that because of two disasters already that have shown up what's been going on behind closed doors.

That's totally unacceptable in any type of organisation involving health and safety. Let alone airline health and safety! It's disgraceful.

So they've messed up and it can't be allowed to continue? Even if they get the new MCAS risk to the lowest it practically can be it's still a risk we don't need to introduce. A tiny extra percentage risk we don't need leads to too many deaths over the number of flights we would expect from these planes. We reduce and remove risks we don't add them in?

Does the 737 nearest competitor Airbus need MCAS to fly safely ?

The only explanation for why this is is that this is American corruption at its finest! Boeing tried to cover up issues with the 727, 747, even the original 737, and now this disaster. You explain how this system works to anyone, even someone without any engineering or a aerospace knowledge and they say it sounds like a bad design because it really is which means Boeing and probably the FAA knew what the risk really could be but didn’t really care. And the world is just starting to lose faith in the FAA now when their track record really isn’t that great especially in situations like Chalks’s Ocean Airways where they basically figured that “they’re good old boys, they know what they’re doing” and after shoddy maintenance have a crash on their hands that killed a bunch of people.

And now there’s the notion that MCAS wasn’t the only culprit, but as well elevator blowback. If this is true it just makes everything worse! The NG never had any problem like this which shows the MAX is just too much and yet too little at the same time. How does a piece of junk like this get certified to roll off the assembly line and fly?

Boeing to issue fix this week

https://www.king5.com/article/news/boei ... 72ac4e5fe4

767333ER wrote:

Interested wrote:

dakota123 wrote:

Again, post 28 here: viewtopic.php?f=5&t=1418159 Common issue with swept-wing aircraft dealt with in a variety of ways.

Does the existing 737 (before max) need MCAS to fly safely? Are we happy with the safety of that plane?

I'm assuming the answer is no followed by yes

If my assumption is correct I simply have no idea why this is even up for debate? They've fudged something that adds extra risk. Worse still Boeing have then tried to hide MCAS and keep it under the radar?? We only know that because of two disasters already that have shown up what's been going on behind closed doors.

That's totally unacceptable in any type of organisation involving health and safety. Let alone airline health and safety! It's disgraceful.

So they've messed up and it can't be allowed to continue? Even if they get the new MCAS risk to the lowest it practically can be it's still a risk we don't need to introduce. A tiny extra percentage risk we don't need leads to too many deaths over the number of flights we would expect from these planes. We reduce and remove risks we don't add them in?

Does the 737 nearest competitor Airbus need MCAS to fly safely ?

The only explanation for why this is is that this is American corruption at its finest! Boeing tried to cover up issues with the 727, 747, even the original 737, and now this disaster. You explain how this system works to anyone, even someone without any engineering or a aerospace knowledge and they say it sounds like a bad design because it really is which means Boeing and probably the FAA knew what the risk really could be but didn’t really care. And the world is just starting to lose faith in the FAA now when their track record really isn’t that great especially in situations like Chalks’s Ocean Airways where they basically figured that “they’re good old boys, they know what they’re doing” and after shoddy maintenance have a crash on their hands that killed a bunch of people.

And now there’s the notion that MCAS wasn’t the only culprit, but as well elevator blowback. If this is true it just makes everything worse! The NG never had any problem like this which shows the MAX is just too much and yet too little at the same time. How does a piece of junk like this get certified to roll off the assembly line and fly?

I think there are two issues here

Number one ) obviously all concerned in the short term at least work their hardest to make the plane as it is as safe as it can be despite using MCAS

Number two) separate to that the world decides whether or not it's acceptable to launch a plane that is by its very design less safe than the plane it replaces

I simply cannot believe the second will be allowed to happen UNLESS money overrides our safety

In the event number two does happen i hope the airlines and customers move their orders and business to other suppliers regardless over time to show Boeing what they have done is unacceptable and they can't get away with it

Wallsendmag wrote:

frmrCapCadet wrote:

Chemist wrote:

I had a coworker who had a saying: "How come there's never time to do it right, but there's always time to do it over?".

I like that, along with someone else's "A plane needs to be designed to be safe with an average pilot on a bad day" But there is also the, as at Lake Wobegon all pilots are above average.

Res the plane, it appears the MAX as is, is almost a good safe plane. It does not need to be re-certified "from the ground up". The MCAS was done poorly. In particular the plane under certain circumstances (failed AofA) could do things that apparently set off several alarm systems - at that point the pilot may be confronted by multiple possible problems. There is another saying, sometimes you want to help a person who is becoming dysfunctional, but "which screw do you tighten first?"

It does need recertification as the rest of the world has lost faith in the FAA


Sent from my iPad using Tapatalk Pro

The first step in the recertification process would be revoking the current Airworthiness Certificate. I don’t think any Civil Aviation Agency in any country has taken that step, and I don’t think that to be likely either.

Boof02671 wrote:

Yes AA, WN and and UA sent union and management pilots to Boeing.

Shouldn't Boeing invite some "third world pilots" to determine if their fix is also good for the rest of the world . . . ?

dakota123 wrote:

Merely a clarification.

Have a look here, OldAeroGuy explains it well in post 28. viewtopic.php?f=5&t=1418159

(Not directed at you; just generally given all the hysteria that “MCAS is a kludge”. )

As said in that post, the nacelle effect should be included in the aircraft lift curve slope. The post does say windtunnel data would be useful before making assertions on interaction between nacelle and wing at high AoA. That does not mean the hypotheses put forward are wrong and definitely does not mean that the aircraft is stable at high alpha!

Furthermore - it only affirms that MCAS - as designed by Boeing - will never ever act in the fashion required to maintain common stick force and stick sensitivities with respect to 737NG. Otherwise it would need to vary continuously with angle of attack, not a discrete shove on the stabiliser when a certain AoA is reached.

Thus - MCAS most definitely is a kludge.

art wrote:

Interested wrote:

Someone explain to me a valid reason why we allow planes that aren't stable to be designed and approved in the first place?

Why did Boeing choose to design an unstable aircraft? I think the answer is straightforward: they did not want to let Airbus' A320 gain and hold a decisive edge over the 737 for several years. To me it is also possible that they thought they would lose customers to Bombardier if all they had to compete with the CS3000 was the 737-700.

Regarding why this desiign was approved, I think that's a question to put to the FAA. They certified it.

There's an article in New York Times today saying that a few years back the CEO of AA called the CEO of Boeing to say they were on the verge of giving a 100 plane order to airbus. Boeing then promised a new version of 737 (the max) within 6 years to keep the business. And so the rush job began. In comparison had they designed a new plane from scratch it would have taken 10 years and they would have lost the big order from AA

Finn350 wrote:

Wallsendmag wrote:

The first step in the recertification process would be revoking the current Airworthiness Certificate. I don’t think any Civil Aviation Agency in any country has taken that step, and I don’t think that to be likely either.

I do think that that is what's going to happen. 737Max is a liability that no one will want to take responsibility for letting it fly. It will happen in same way that spontaneous grounding occurred. Once a single agency pulls the plug, the rest will have to follow. And now it will take a whole lot of convincing that the plane is safe before whoever is in charge will sign off new certificate.

IMHO, after at least a couple decades of no fatal accidents do to plane malfunction, the management of the Boeing and FAA got lulled into believing that planes simply don't fall anymore, other than due to pilot's error. But now this whole process will be reset back to normal level of scrutiny.

I estimate at least 6 month before the plane fly again. But I also think it is possible it will never fly again. The plane is cursed in the eye of the public that don't really want to be bothered with technical details, even after the plane is made as safe as normal 737. As an airline, do you want a plane that people don't want to fly on? (And whether it is possible to make it is safe is not entirely clear either.)

Interested wrote:

art wrote:

Interested wrote:

Someone explain to me a valid reason why we allow planes that aren't stable to be designed and approved in the first place?

Why did Boeing choose to design an unstable aircraft? I think the answer is straightforward: they did not want to let Airbus' A320 gain and hold a decisive edge over the 737 for several years. To me it is also possible that they thought they would lose customers to Bombardier if all they had to compete with the CS3000 was the 737-700.

Regarding why this desiign was approved, I think that's a question to put to the FAA. They certified it.

There's an article in New York Times today saying that a few years back the CEO of AA called the CEO of Boeing to say they were on the verge of giving a 100 plane order to airbus. Boeing then promised a new version of 737 (the max) within 6 years to keep the business. And so the rush job began. In comparison had they designed a new plane from scratch it would have taken 10 years and they would have lost the big order from AA

Yes, I saw that article yesterday and nearly posted a link. Some interesting background information about the pressure Boeing engineers were put under to launch the MAX as soon as possible. It’s a good read:

https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.nytime ... h.amp.html

This statement in particular is remarkable:

“Engineers were pushed to submit technical drawings and designs at roughly double the normal pace,”

PW100 wrote:

Boof02671 wrote:

Yes AA, WN and and UA sent union and management pilots to Boeing.

Shouldn't Boeing invite some "third world pilots" to determine if their fix is also good for the rest of the world . . . ?

Look at it this way: fix will be tested on US flying public first.

PW100 wrote:

Boof02671 wrote:

Yes AA, WN and and UA sent union and management pilots to Boeing.

Shouldn't Boeing invite some "third world pilots" to determine if their fix is also good for the rest of the world . . . ?

I get your sarcasm, but in a way, if they are sure about their fix they should actually invite other pilots, training departments or authorities to gain a certain amount of trust in their product again.

kalvado wrote:

PW100 wrote:

Boof02671 wrote:

Yes AA, WN and and UA sent union and management pilots to Boeing.

Shouldn't Boeing invite some "third world pilots" to determine if their fix is also good for the rest of the world . . . ?

Look at it this way: fix will be tested on US flying public first.

If the fix gets any further than the simulator that is

Aviation737 wrote:

I mean if you are the CEO of an airline like Southwest or Ryanair would you cancel your rather wait for the grounding of the MAX to be lifted in a few months or decide to go with Airbus or any other aircraft manufactures where you have to pay a cancellation fee to Boeing, pay to retrain all your pilots to the new aircraft and not to mention you still have to pay a cost for a new plane.

If this goes on long enough, airlines will be suing Boeing to pay for all of those things.

ArgentoSystems wrote:

Finn350 wrote:

Wallsendmag wrote:

The first step in the recertification process would be revoking the current Airworthiness Certificate. I don’t think any Civil Aviation Agency in any country has taken that step, and I don’t think that to be likely either.

I do think that that is what's going to happen. 737Max is a liability that no one will want to take responsibility for letting it fly. It will happen in same way that spontaneous grounding occurred. Once a single agency pulls the plug, the rest will have to follow. And now it will take a whole lot of convincing that the plane is safe before whoever is in charge will sign off new certificate.

IMHO, after at least a couple decades of no fatal accidents do to plane malfunction, the management of the Boeing and FAA got lulled into believing that planes simply don't fall anymore, other than due to pilot's error. But now this whole process will be reset back to normal level of scrutiny.

I estimate at least 6 month before the plane fly again. But I also think it is possible it will never fly again. The plane is cursed in the eye of the public that don't really want to be bothered with technical details, even after the plane is made as safe as normal 737. As an airline, do you want a plane that people don't want to fly on? (And whether it is possible to make it is safe is not entirely clear either.)

I agree with so much of what you just said

Even the existing 737 is dragged into the bad PR. And that's a plane in current terms we can all trust to be as safe as we hope within reason

And when the plane the max replaces is inherently safer that says it all really

It's end of discussion IMO and the nail in the coffin for Max

ArgentoSystems wrote:

I estimate at least 6 month before the plane fly again. But I also think it is possible it will never fly again. The plane is cursed in the eye of the public that don't really want to be bothered with technical details, even after the plane is made as safe as normal 737. As an airline, do you want a plane that people don't want to fly on? (And whether it is possible to make it is safe is not entirely clear either.)

I think they will be in the air by May (at the very least June when summer flying picks up). They already have the fix and pilots testing it in the sims. Once they decide it is okay it can't take that long to load it on planes. Assuming there are no hardware changes (besides maybe adding a light). I can't see it taking all that long. The idea that they will NEVER fly again is crazy. Way too much money has been invested in them to not have them fly again, even if it means bigger fixes.

I also don't think there will be that many people actively avoiding it to make it matter. I would guess not many people besides us on this forum even look at the plane type when they book a flight. Sure, now a few more will, but not enough to make a difference. I would choose a WN MAX over a -700 any day.

ArgentoSystems wrote:

fabian9 wrote:

What many are forgetting is that MCAS (and its higher THS deflection angle) have been implemented for a reason. It wouldn’t have been introduced in the first place, or changed from 0.6 to 2.5deg deflection, if it wasn’t required to create a “stable” aircraft.

The fact that the system has had to exist in the first place also tells a story. This is an aircraft that has been artificially engineered beyond its architectural limits. As I said in a previous thread, the Max changes are lipstick on a pig.

If MCAS fails, and a stall is entered, will pilots be able to get the aircraft back into a stable configuration?

Precisely. MCAS exists for a reason. Changing the software to self-disengage MCAS does not really solve anything. Now we need to re-train all pilots to fly without MCAS, which defeats the purpose of MCAS in the first place.

And we know the plane without MCAS engaged is inherently less safe

It's catch 22

Either way the plane is less safe than the one it replaces and more disasters will occur over time due to the amount of flights

Jshank83 wrote:

ArgentoSystems wrote:

I estimate at least 6 month before the plane fly again. But I also think it is possible it will never fly again. The plane is cursed in the eye of the public that don't really want to be bothered with technical details, even after the plane is made as safe as normal 737. As an airline, do you want a plane that people don't want to fly on? (And whether it is possible to make it is safe is not entirely clear either.)

I think they will be in the air by May (at the very least June when summer flying picks up). They already have the fix and pilots testing it in the sims. Once they decide it is okay it can't take that long to load it on planes. Assuming there are no hardware changes (besides maybe adding a light). I can't see it taking all that long. The idea that they will NEVER fly again is crazy. Way too much money has been invested in them to not have them fly again, even if it means bigger fixes.

I also don't think there will be that many people actively avoiding it to make it matter. I would guess not many people besides us on this forum even look at the plane type when they book a flight. Sure, now a few more will, but not enough to make a difference. I would choose a WN MAX over a -700 any day.

I don't want to misquote you but above you are justifying the plane being back in the air due to the money that's been invested in it already rather than it being the safest design option?

Is that correct?

You know it's not as safe as its predecessor but you will turn a blind eye due to the money invested in it?

That means the FAA have to rewrite their priorities to make planes safer and reduce risk? (Apart from when too much money has already been invested?) A new clause?

Are we going to ok that in writing for them and Boeing to do?

Just to be clear?

Money already invested is more important than safety now?

That's the new policy?

Ps I'm a businessman myself so I do know where you are coming from. But I just assume certain businesses can't put money ahead of safety?

spinotter wrote:

Interested wrote:

Pellegrine wrote:

It is in fact the US Department of Justice fraud division that is investigating Boeing along with the FBI.

Sarcasm alert

"Im going to blame any non western world employees who work for Boeing for anything they may have done wrong"

Any US or Canadian staff who work for them wont have done anything wrong

It's not at the level of Boeing employees that anyone is worrying about non-western employees, but at the level of pilots. But I think that most people have accepted that these accidents could have happened anywhere. What are people's thoughts about the lack of such accidents in the USA/Canada/etc.? Did pilots in this region get more training in MCAS? Should the airlines (JT/ET) involved be assigned a portion of the blame for inadequate training?

Well I think there have been incidents in North America regarding MCAS but no crashes thankfully, I would chalk this up to the US, Canada, Europe etc. have pilots whom started on Cessna's and learned worked their way up to the airlines or were military/air force pilots. They know how to fly first and where as the growing aviation industry in Africa and Asia trains pilots on simulators and might not have the experience of aviating first. I am not saying the crews are necessarily incompetent but they might lack the full experience of just taking over the plane manually that a pilot who flew bush planes when they were a kid might.

I would tend to think that AC pilots probably got full training on the Max because there was no 737's in their fleet prior to them getting them in 2017. I think all of the other airlines that operate the MAX had the 737 in their fleet to begin with so I have no idea if they got the full training.

Interested wrote:

Jshank83 wrote:

ArgentoSystems wrote:

I estimate at least 6 month before the plane fly again. But I also think it is possible it will never fly again. The plane is cursed in the eye of the public that don't really want to be bothered with technical details, even after the plane is made as safe as normal 737. As an airline, do you want a plane that people don't want to fly on? (And whether it is possible to make it is safe is not entirely clear either.)

I think they will be in the air by May (at the very least June when summer flying picks up). They already have the fix and pilots testing it in the sims. Once they decide it is okay it can't take that long to load it on planes. Assuming there are no hardware changes (besides maybe adding a light). I can't see it taking all that long. The idea that they will NEVER fly again is crazy. Way too much money has been invested in them to not have them fly again, even if it means bigger fixes.

I also don't think there will be that many people actively avoiding it to make it matter. I would guess not many people besides us on this forum even look at the plane type when they book a flight. Sure, now a few more will, but not enough to make a difference. I would choose a WN MAX over a -700 any day.

I don't want to misquote you but above you are justifying the plane being back in the air due to the money that's been invested in it already rather than it being the safest design option?

Is that correct?

You know it's not as safe as its predecessor but you will turn a blind eye due to the money invested in it?

That means the FAA have to rewrite their priorities to make planes safer and reduce risk? (Apart from when too much money has already been invested?) A new clause?

Are we going to ok that in writing for them and Boeing to do?

Just to be clear?

Money already invested is more important than safety now?

That's the new policy?

Ps I'm a businessman myself so I do know where you are coming from. But I just assume certain businesses can't put money ahead of safety?

I think because of all the money they have spent they will make sure it is fixed and SAFE to fly at some point. They won't fly until it is safe, but they will make it safe before they scrap it. Which is why I said, "even if it means bigger fixes".

I can't imagine it would take that much to make it safe to fly. But I am also of the opinion the bigger issue is poor training (mostly because of boeing not disclosing things) than the plane itself.

StarAC17 wrote:

spinotter wrote:

Interested wrote:

Sarcasm alert

"Im going to blame any non western world employees who work for Boeing for anything they may have done wrong"

Any US or Canadian staff who work for them wont have done anything wrong

It's not at the level of Boeing employees that anyone is worrying about non-western employees, but at the level of pilots. But I think that most people have accepted that these accidents could have happened anywhere. What are people's thoughts about the lack of such accidents in the USA/Canada/etc.? Did pilots in this region get more training in MCAS? Should the airlines (JT/ET) involved be assigned a portion of the blame for inadequate training?

Well I think there have been incidents in North America regarding MCAS but no crashes thankfully, I would chalk this up to the US, Canada, Europe etc. have pilots whom started on Cessna's and learned worked their way up to the airlines or were military/air force pilots. They know how to fly first and where as the growing aviation industry in Africa and Asia trains pilots on simulators and might not have the experience of aviating first. I am not saying the crews are necessarily incompetent but they might lack the full experience of just taking over the plane manually that a pilot who flew bush planes when they were a kid might.

I would tend to think that AC pilots probably got full training on the Max because there was no 737's in their fleet prior to them getting them in 2017. I think all of the other airlines that operate the MAX had the 737 in their fleet to begin with so I have no idea if they got the full training.

They may not have faced the same issues and may have better maintenance teams as well

It's irrelevant IMO as we aren't supposed to be designing planes that need more competent people to maintain or fly them to keep them safe

We are supposed to be designing planes that are safer in the first place

Interested wrote:

dakota123 wrote:

Interested wrote:

I still don't get why ANYBODY would accept workarounds to reduce risks that don't need to be risks in the first place on a better designed plane?

What am I missing here?

MACS was hidden by Boeing?

Why would we now accept MACS as being a risk we would ever want to have to risk failing on a plane again? Now we know all about it and it's out in the open.

Other than 350 planes that need it to fly again and 4650 planes on order that need it?

Why does the world of passenger flights need to accept planes that need MACS to fky safely?

How does that improve the safety of planes dos us the passengers?

It's just a fudge for an inherently unsafe plane by design?

Someone explain to me a valid reason why we allow planes that aren't stable to be designed and approved in the first place? Now we know about the need for MACS simply don't accept it as an extra risk to add to a plane. Design a plane that doesn't need it. End of.

Again, post 28 here: viewtopic.php?f=5&t=1418159 Common issue with swept-wing aircraft dealt with in a variety of ways.

Does the existing 737 (before max) need MCAS to fly safely? Are we happy with the safety of that plane?

I'm assuming the answer is no followed by yes

If my assumption is correct I simply have no idea why this is even up for debate? They've fudged something that adds extra risk. Worse still Boeing have then tried to hide MCAS and keep it under the radar?? We only know that because of two disasters already that have shown up what's been going on behind closed doors.

That's totally unacceptable in any type of organisation involving health and safety. Let alone airline health and safety! It's disgraceful.

So they've messed up and it can't be allowed to continue? Even if they get the new MCAS risk to the lowest it practically can be it's still a risk we don't need to introduce. A tiny extra percentage risk we don't need leads to too many deaths over the number of flights we would expect from these planes. We reduce and remove risks we don't add them in?

Does the 737 nearest competitor Airbus need MCAS to fly safely ?

Of course it can be allowed to continue. Serious questions here; no snark intended. Or not much, anyway. You think that the FCCs weren’t re-programmed for NEO? You think it didn’t take several iterations of tuning to get the NEO to fly like the CEO? You think Airbus hasn’t screwed up flight controls now and again, and had to go back and patch? There are several human/machine interface design philosophies with the A320 that people have argued have contributed to accidents (this site is rife with those discussions) and given what I know about HMI design, which I did in a former life, there is some validity *to the uninitiated*. But you know what? They’re design decisions, and once understood, in my view they’re a big so what.

Once fixed, fewer pilots will ever experience MCAS than will experience an engine out scenario. And most pilots NEVER experience an engine-out.

Personally, I’m not absolving Boeing of anything. Something went terribly wrong here. But for whatever reason, some of you are hysterical about this.

People with pitchforks are usually wrong (tm).

art wrote:

... I think that's a question to put to the FAA. They certified it.

FAA stamped the docs. "In Boeing We Trust"

The established aircraft certification setup requires responsible participants.
This breaks in a society that can't step back from reflexively leveraging everything.

Jshank83 wrote:

Interested wrote:

Jshank83 wrote:

I think they will be in the air by May (at the very least June when summer flying picks up). They already have the fix and pilots testing it in the sims. Once they decide it is okay it can't take that long to load it on planes. Assuming there are no hardware changes (besides maybe adding a light). I can't see it taking all that long. The idea that they will NEVER fly again is crazy. Way too much money has been invested in them to not have them fly again, even if it means bigger fixes.

I also don't think there will be that many people actively avoiding it to make it matter. I would guess not many people besides us on this forum even look at the plane type when they book a flight. Sure, now a few more will, but not enough to make a difference. I would choose a WN MAX over a -700 any day.

I don't want to misquote you but above you are justifying the plane being back in the air due to the money that's been invested in it already rather than it being the safest design option?

Is that correct?

You know it's not as safe as its predecessor but you will turn a blind eye due to the money invested in it?

That means the FAA have to rewrite their priorities to make planes safer and reduce risk? (Apart from when too much money has already been invested?) A new clause?

Are we going to ok that in writing for them and Boeing to do?

Just to be clear?

Money already invested is more important than safety now?

That's the new policy?

Ps I'm a businessman myself so I do know where you are coming from. But I just assume certain businesses can't put money ahead of safety?

I think because of all the money they have spent they will make sure it is fixed and SAFE to fly at some point. They won't fly until it is safe, but they will make it safe before they scrap it. Which is why I said, "even if it means bigger fixes".

Thanks for the reply and like I say I understand exactly where you are coming from.

My point is that if the fix still involves MCAS being present weve made a less safe plane with more risk and having read the report by FAA about the future of certifying planes safely I just don't see how it can be certified

Otherwise we are going to have the authorities, the airlines, the government and the media and the public ALL accepting a backwards step in plane safety?

I can't fathom why we would do that?

This is Boeing financial problem. Nobody elses IMO.

We simply shouldn't put safety at risk because of their errors in decision making.

I'm not in the industry or even in the US to argue the case but I'm sure others will and it's going to be a hard one to justify.

And woe betide another crash in any way related to MCAS in the next few years if they turn a blind eye between them all

It should never have been allowed to even be needed or present on a plane

If they can fix the planes without MCAS then I'm with you. As long as how they fix it doesn't add any other risks.