Amiga500 wrote:https://aviationweek.com/commercial-aviation/elwell-mcas-issues-do-not-mean-737-max-certification-was-flawed“The FAA was directly involved in the system safety review of” MCAS, Elwell will tell the U.S. Senate aviation and space subcommittee during the first of several expected Congressional hearings on the 737 MAX saga, according to a copy of his prepared remarks obtained by Aviation Week. “FAA engineers and flight test pilots were involved in the MCAS operational evaluation flight test,” Elwell will say, noting that several of the MAX’s 297 certification flight tests included trials of MCAS functions.
To me, that only makes the FAA as incompetent as the system architects at Boeing that came up with the idea.
1. Incorrect classification (HAZARDOUS to CATASTROPHIC)
2. 1x AoA sensor as input
3. Alternating sensors from flight to flight
4. System could enter an infinite loop of stabilizer inputs
5. Not on FCOM
2 and 4 are beyond incompetent.
Of the moving on 4000 comments, it's looking like this one is the most spot on.
Admitted Boeing fanboy here, because … why not pick a team.
But from a design and engineering perspective, how this version of MCAS ended up implemented is mind boggling. Everyone in design and engineering is taught to imagine the consequences, and this is clearly an example of lack of imagination. The fix that is now being rolled out is first year teaching/engineering stuff. Amiga500's number 4 alone is insane given the system you're impacting. Unlimited nose down inputs to an airframe based on a single sensor input? This isn't the IFE, it's the goddamn horizontal stabilizer.
And I don't think it's Boeing being evil. I think it's Boeing being lazy. And I'm not sure what's worse given the outcome.