PixelPilot
Posts: 252
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Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 12:36 pm

seb76 wrote:
SFOtoORD wrote:
BlueSky1976 wrote:

Having experience in working at global corporations social media department, I can assure you they do. Heck, some of a.net members may even be on their payroll, for sure.


Where does the conspiracy end? How do you know Boeing doesn’t secretly own Airliners.net via a secret subsidiary? Maybe some of the more vocal members here are being tailed home by private investigators? They must get tired of masterminding these schemes all day every day.


American corporations are generally never ashamed to use every possible communication tools and chanels to spread their word. They probably also believe that when you repeat the same lie many times at different places, even though some well informed people will get more upset, most will start believing it (like the radios playing the same crappy song over and over again until you start liking it).

I remember a year or two ago, I was "receiving" those sponsored ads on Facebook praising the qualities of the Lockheed-Martin F-35 and how it would be a perfect product for the Belgian Army. That my profile would show up when doing queries on "aviation hobby" + "belgian" was probably enough to be targetted.
I was quite half amused, half upset that LM deemed necessary to spent money on trying to convince people like me that my country had to buy their junk. I have zero influence on my country's governement other than being able to vote and the comments below their advertising were anything but polite. Clearly that strategy was counter-productive and naïve, but since Lockheed Martin finally got the deal, it was actually not their money but MY taxes they were spending in advance ;-)


Right cause rest of the world is teddy bears and cotton candy ROFL!
People's hate towards other races, nationalities, religions while pretending his/hers is pristine is mind blowing.

"The age of stupid".
 
asdf
Posts: 312
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Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 12:37 pm

justloveplanes wrote:
I think one should keep in mind there is really nothing wrong with the Max other than an incredibly botched add on auxiliary control system. No reason EASA shouldn't re-certify once it is fixed.


i am not an aviation engineer
but every time I speak to some they tell me that it is not the right way to build a transport category aircraft with the center of drag not at the center of gravity

no one did that befor (ok, let the Concorde out of that play)

but well
what do I know ....
 
xmp125a
Posts: 233
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Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 12:43 pm

justloveplanes wrote:
I think one should keep in mind there is really nothing wrong with the Max other than an incredibly botched add on auxiliary control system. No reason EASA shouldn't re-certify once it is fixed.


No! Post-mortem examination of such failed system does not stop with "we had it at pitch authority of X, now we would use value Y and now it is solved, and we also updated the manual". Especially with safety-critical systems. Because with safety-critical systems there are procedures how one comes to safe working product. So for MCAS v1.0 to happen, the following MUST have happened:

- crazy initial specification that was somehow confirmed
- crazy implementation that was somehow certified
- crazy decisions on not documenting the system in plane docs sent to pilots
- again, certified by someone.

In MCAS 1.0 perhaps there is single failure that led to crash of both planes, but in the design and certification process of 737MAX there were many serious breakdowns, protocols violated, wrong assumptions taken for granted, designs signed when plainly they should not be. MCAS v1 failure is just window into that broken process.

The key is: since MCAS v1.0 demonstrated all these failures at Boeing/FAA we cannot be sure that there are no more gremlins in 737MAX, not to mention new 777. Because flawed and broken process might affect many other things, not only MCAS design.

Whenever a monumental fckup like this happens, it is not only THE PRODUCT that has to be reasessed and recertified, but the PROCESS that led to such product. My god, perhaps pilots on these forums are not aware of that, but at the current levels of air travel we would have 1 deadly crash of airliner per week, if all planes would be designed the way 737MAX was! These things are known in industry literarly for decades, and there are immortal lectures with dead people that always remind us on why it is important!

Please at least read up on Therac-25 fiasco, if nothing else. It should be mandatory reading for any engineer which goes even near safety-critical computer systems. If that does not convince you, perhaps billions punitive damages levied upon Toyota because its crocked up design of engine computer will... the damages were awarded because they made incredibly fkd up design that could lead to deaths, even no deaths were conclusively attributed to the system. But they violated 4 of their own 9 rules for design and lied about how things were implemented, when asked first.
Last edited by xmp125a on Fri Apr 19, 2019 12:47 pm, edited 1 time in total.
 
FlyBitcoin
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Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 12:46 pm

justloveplanes wrote:
I think one should keep in mind there is really nothing wrong with the Max other than an incredibly botched add on auxiliary control system. No reason EASA shouldn't re-certify once it is fixed.


Or maybe they require a physical aerodynamic fix rather than a software fix?
The plane could have been designed that way more expensively and with a longer time in development, but it would not have been one point of failure away from disaster due to that piece of software and its data inputs.

Time and cost have long since been thrown out of all consideration at this point.
 
Interested
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Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 12:56 pm

justloveplanes wrote:
I think one should keep in mind there is really nothing wrong with the Max other than an incredibly botched add on auxiliary control system. No reason EASA shouldn't re-certify once it is fixed.


But they've taken a safer plane that didn't need an auxiliary control system like this to create a less safe plane that does?

And that can be certified and grandfathered as ok?
 
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BlueSky1976
Posts: 1876
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Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 12:56 pm

SFOtoORD wrote:
BlueSky1976 wrote:
Bradin wrote:

Are we sure Boeing paid for the adwords? Is it possible that the public relations firm Boeing hired to do damage control paid for the adwords?


Having experience in working at global corporations social media department, I can assure you they do. Heck, some of a.net members may even be on their payroll, for sure.


Where does the conspiracy end? How do you know Boeing doesn’t secretly own Airliners.net via a secret subsidiary? Maybe some of the more vocal members here are being tailed home by private investigators? They must get tired of masterminding these schemes all day every day.


As I said - I have actual experience myself working in social media department of such global corporation. So my claim isn't unfounded. I suggest you to read something a few times and try tu understand what's written.

Boeing IS following what's posted on a.net for sure and also, DOES pay people to influence others on this forum, for sure. Whether through their own internal social media department or through outsourced entity - that's another question. But EVERY global corporation does it.
Tarriffs are taxes. Taxation is theft. You are not entitled to anything.
If it's a Boeing, I'm not going.
 
Interested
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Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 12:59 pm

asdf wrote:
justloveplanes wrote:
I think one should keep in mind there is really nothing wrong with the Max other than an incredibly botched add on auxiliary control system. No reason EASA shouldn't re-certify once it is fixed.


i am not an aviation engineer
but every time I speak to some they tell me that it is not the right way to build a transport category aircraft with the center of drag not at the center of gravity

no one did that befor (ok, let the Concorde out of that play)

but well
what do I know ....


This is the whole point - they've covered up a bad design with a botched add on

Now it seems we have to accept a bad design (because it already got certified wrongly IMO) but with a better add on

We shouldn't be facing a plane design that needs the add on or the training for the add on in the first place
 
SFOtoORD
Posts: 1082
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Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 1:16 pm

BlueSky1976 wrote:
SFOtoORD wrote:
BlueSky1976 wrote:

Having experience in working at global corporations social media department, I can assure you they do. Heck, some of a.net members may even be on their payroll, for sure.


Where does the conspiracy end? How do you know Boeing doesn’t secretly own Airliners.net via a secret subsidiary? Maybe some of the more vocal members here are being tailed home by private investigators? They must get tired of masterminding these schemes all day every day.


As I said - I have actual experience myself working in social media department of such global corporation. So my claim isn't unfounded. I suggest you to read something a few times and try tu understand what's written.

Boeing IS following what's posted on a.net for sure and also, DOES pay people to influence others on this forum, for sure. Whether through their own internal social media department or through outsourced entity - that's another question. But EVERY global corporation does it.


Yes, the post was read. Yes companies use tools like search and social for influence. But sometimes when a thread is 112 pages in the conspiracy starts to get pretty thick.
 
Bricktop
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Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 1:21 pm

PixelPilot wrote:
seb76 wrote:
SFOtoORD wrote:

Where does the conspiracy end? How do you know Boeing doesn’t secretly own Airliners.net via a secret subsidiary? Maybe some of the more vocal members here are being tailed home by private investigators? They must get tired of masterminding these schemes all day every day.


American corporations are generally never ashamed to use every possible communication tools and chanels to spread their word. They probably also believe that when you repeat the same lie many times at different places, even though some well informed people will get more upset, most will start believing it (like the radios playing the same crappy song over and over again until you start liking it).

I remember a year or two ago, I was "receiving" those sponsored ads on Facebook praising the qualities of the Lockheed-Martin F-35 and how it would be a perfect product for the Belgian Army. That my profile would show up when doing queries on "aviation hobby" + "belgian" was probably enough to be targetted.
I was quite half amused, half upset that LM deemed necessary to spent money on trying to convince people like me that my country had to buy their junk. I have zero influence on my country's governement other than being able to vote and the comments below their advertising were anything but polite. Clearly that strategy was counter-productive and naïve, but since Lockheed Martin finally got the deal, it was actually not their money but MY taxes they were spending in advance ;-)


Right cause rest of the world is teddy bears and cotton candy ROFL!
People's hate towards other races, nationalities, religions while pretending his/hers is pristine is mind blowing.

"The age of stupid".

Especially when Airbus is going through a huge bribery scandal. Yeah, it's just us evil corrupt Americans.
 
seb76
Posts: 49
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Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 1:31 pm

PixelPilot wrote:
seb76 wrote:
SFOtoORD wrote:

Where does the conspiracy end? How do you know Boeing doesn’t secretly own Airliners.net via a secret subsidiary? Maybe some of the more vocal members here are being tailed home by private investigators? They must get tired of masterminding these schemes all day every day.


American corporations are generally never ashamed to use every possible communication tools and chanels to spread their word. They probably also believe that when you repeat the same lie many times at different places, even though some well informed people will get more upset, most will start believing it (like the radios playing the same crappy song over and over again until you start liking it).

I remember a year or two ago, I was "receiving" those sponsored ads on Facebook praising the qualities of the Lockheed-Martin F-35 and how it would be a perfect product for the Belgian Army. That my profile would show up when doing queries on "aviation hobby" + "belgian" was probably enough to be targetted.
I was quite half amused, half upset that LM deemed necessary to spent money on trying to convince people like me that my country had to buy their junk. I have zero influence on my country's governement other than being able to vote and the comments below their advertising were anything but polite. Clearly that strategy was counter-productive and naïve, but since Lockheed Martin finally got the deal, it was actually not their money but MY taxes they were spending in advance ;-)


Right cause rest of the world is teddy bears and cotton candy ROFL!
People's hate towards other races, nationalities, religions while pretending his/hers is pristine is mind blowing.

"The age of stupid".


It's apparently impossible to discuss cultural differences, even in company cultures without being classified as racist nowadays? Please realize that I am not even talking about individual persons but about how corporations communicate in this post !
By the way, the difference between the people from different parts of the world is what makes to my eyes the world a more interesting place ... I believe this so much that my own family is a quite good example of that reality, so you can keep your hastly conclusions for yourself.

It is obvious that companies from different parts of the world adopt different communication methods in a crisis.
When placed in a similar crisis situation, the strategy of say for example a Japanese company will be to apology in public and become as discrete as possible in the medias from some time while US companies will prefer to pretend all is fine to avoid lawsuits and will continue to lobby as much as possible in order to change the bias on their product.
 
frmrCapCadet
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Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 2:00 pm

OldAeroGuy wrote:
xmp125a wrote:
The stall prevention feature of MCAS is not needed if pilots have some sim time, to train on this "stall afinity" in very small part of the flight envelope where MAX's new engines cause different aerodynamic handling that NG. The other reason for MCAS, the feeling of the column, could be probably solved separately.


No amount of simulator time would have eliminated the need for MCAS on the MAX. The issue was that the MAX stall entry Flaps Up did not meet the certification requirement for steadily increasing stick force until the airplane stalls. MCAS was a solution to this problem. The MAX is not the first airplane to have this issue and the solutions range from aerodynamic to electronic and/or combinations of the two.

And once again, MCAS was not a stall prevention device. The pilot could still stall the MAX with MCAS operating. MCAS was designed to make sure the stall entry stick force did not "lighten" duding the stall entry.


A question from the bleachers! Rather than an MCAS that appears to this aviation fan as a kludge, would FAA (and other agencies) have objected to just a warning device to the FOs that the plane was approaching that particular condition. I really would trust a pilot to know that this was the one major difference of a MAX compared to an NG. So how would such a warning have been worded? And would that have been difficult for pilots to understand?

And rather obviously FOs should always know when AoAs, pitot tubes etc disagree. Gad!
Buffet: the airline business...has eaten up capital...like..no other (business)
 
Interested
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Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 2:17 pm

frmrCapCadet wrote:
OldAeroGuy wrote:
xmp125a wrote:
The stall prevention feature of MCAS is not needed if pilots have some sim time, to train on this "stall afinity" in very small part of the flight envelope where MAX's new engines cause different aerodynamic handling that NG. The other reason for MCAS, the feeling of the column, could be probably solved separately.


No amount of simulator time would have eliminated the need for MCAS on the MAX. The issue was that the MAX stall entry Flaps Up did not meet the certification requirement for steadily increasing stick force until the airplane stalls. MCAS was a solution to this problem. The MAX is not the first airplane to have this issue and the solutions range from aerodynamic to electronic and/or combinations of the two.

And once again, MCAS was not a stall prevention device. The pilot could still stall the MAX with MCAS operating. MCAS was designed to make sure the stall entry stick force did not "lighten" duding the stall entry.


A question from the bleachers! Rather than an MCAS that appears to this aviation fan as a kludge, would FAA (and other agencies) have objected to just a warning device to the FOs that the plane was approaching that particular condition. I really would trust a pilot to know that this was the one major difference of a MAX compared to an NG. So how would such a warning have been worded? And would that have been difficult for pilots to understand?

And rather obviously FOs should always know when AoAs, pitot tubes etc disagree. Gad!


Shouldn't your question be that rather than MCAS - that FAA prefer a plane that is designed so it is safe without the add on being needed and without any new warning signs needed and zero new issues for either pilots or maintenance crew to worry about

Then just certify the plane, no training needed and fly it!

Why are we accepting a plane that needs add ons to fly safely?

When the previous plane didn't need them?

Why accept this?

Boeing designers messed up. They hid the extra stuff they had to add to try and make the plane safe

Now we know they messed up - just because they can make their add on better why accept the initial design that needs the add on?

This is just not the way forward for safety
 
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Polot
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Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 2:20 pm

Interested wrote:
frmrCapCadet wrote:
OldAeroGuy wrote:

No amount of simulator time would have eliminated the need for MCAS on the MAX. The issue was that the MAX stall entry Flaps Up did not meet the certification requirement for steadily increasing stick force until the airplane stalls. MCAS was a solution to this problem. The MAX is not the first airplane to have this issue and the solutions range from aerodynamic to electronic and/or combinations of the two.

And once again, MCAS was not a stall prevention device. The pilot could still stall the MAX with MCAS operating. MCAS was designed to make sure the stall entry stick force did not "lighten" duding the stall entry.


A question from the bleachers! Rather than an MCAS that appears to this aviation fan as a kludge, would FAA (and other agencies) have objected to just a warning device to the FOs that the plane was approaching that particular condition. I really would trust a pilot to know that this was the one major difference of a MAX compared to an NG. So how would such a warning have been worded? And would that have been difficult for pilots to understand?

And rather obviously FOs should always know when AoAs, pitot tubes etc disagree. Gad!


Shouldn't your question be that rather than MCAS - that FAA prefer a plane that is designed so it is safe without the add on being needed and without any new warning signs needed and zero new issues for either pilots or maintenance crew to worry about

Then just certify the plane, no training needed and fly it!

Why are we accepting a plane that needs add ons to fly safely?

When the previous plane didn't need them?

Why accept this?

That line of thinking makes no sense. Things are “added on” and and designed (and flight computer/autopilot logic altered) to make planes safer all the time. If planes were perfect from the get go there would be no such thing as airworthiness directives.

If it is properly engineered and integrated who cares if it was baked into the initial design of the aircraft or added on during a refresh years later. It is the fact that MCAS was poorly engineered and implemented that Boeing got into the mess. If MCAS was properly executed then nobody here would likely even know about it, or have any problem with it.
 
Interested
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Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 2:29 pm

Polot wrote:
Interested wrote:
frmrCapCadet wrote:

A question from the bleachers! Rather than an MCAS that appears to this aviation fan as a kludge, would FAA (and other agencies) have objected to just a warning device to the FOs that the plane was approaching that particular condition. I really would trust a pilot to know that this was the one major difference of a MAX compared to an NG. So how would such a warning have been worded? And would that have been difficult for pilots to understand?

And rather obviously FOs should always know when AoAs, pitot tubes etc disagree. Gad!


Shouldn't your question be that rather than MCAS - that FAA prefer a plane that is designed so it is safe without the add on being needed and without any new warning signs needed and zero new issues for either pilots or maintenance crew to worry about

Then just certify the plane, no training needed and fly it!

Why are we accepting a plane that needs add ons to fly safely?

When the previous plane didn't need them?

Why accept this?

That line of thinking makes no sense. Things are “added on” and and designed (and flight computer logic altered) to make planes safer all the time.

If it is properly engineered and integrated who cares if it was baked into the initial design of the aircraft or added on during a refresh years later.


Added on to improve safety from previous plane of course. I'm all for that if it's tested and proven etc

This isn't added on to improve safety of the previous plane

This is added on to allow a new plane they've badly designed resemble the old plane. It can't add safety in any way. It can only rectify issues of a bad design,

And when the add on goes wrong (twice already) and any time in the future it goes wrong weve got a less safe plane

We've created a problem we didnt need to create with a better designed planes

It goes against the principle of making safer planes - weve made a less safe plane. Hundreds of families devastated already and we risk more to come in the future

This isn't an add on to make an older plane safer - it's an add on to try and make a new plane as safe as it can be against the older version - it's an elastoplast fix to a problem that we shouldn't have to fix. And the fix adds risks we don't need

Because the add on can and will fail, groundcrew maintaining the add on can and will fail, trained pilots having to deal with new problems the add on may present can and will fail. That's risk management gone wrong purely from the initial botched design and concept of the plane

Unacceptable and shouldn't be certified IMO

I'm expecting in the next few years this plane will be grounded forever when the aviation world finally realise as one they just made a huge mistake with this

Some of us can spot the unneeded risk. Others clearly can't get their heads round it yet

But any extra risks brought in to a plane due to fly so many flights in the future is simply a recipe for disaster(s)

Sad but true
Last edited by Interested on Fri Apr 19, 2019 2:34 pm, edited 1 time in total.
 
OldAeroGuy
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Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 2:31 pm

justloveplanes wrote:
I think one should keep in mind there is really nothing wrong with the Max other than an incredibly botched add on auxiliary control system. No reason EASA shouldn't re-certify once it is fixed.


Well said, I think you've got it right.

EASA will probably re-certify the MAX with MCAS.v2. While they may require additional simulator time but it will probably involve the "AoA Disagree" symbology that will now be on every MAX as it's a new feature and its relationship to "Runaway Stab" and "Unreliable Airspeed" training.

They may also address proper procedures for dealing with sticker activation during takeoff. This is a linking event for JT043, JT610 and ET302 and none of the crews dealt with it well. MCAS was not an issue when dealing with early stick shaker activation.
Airplane design is easy, the difficulty is getting them to fly - Barnes Wallis
 
xmp125a
Posts: 233
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Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 2:35 pm

frmrCapCadet wrote:
OldAeroGuy wrote:
xmp125a wrote:
The stall prevention feature of MCAS is not needed if pilots have some sim time, to train on this "stall afinity" in very small part of the flight envelope where MAX's new engines cause different aerodynamic handling that NG. The other reason for MCAS, the feeling of the column, could be probably solved separately.


No amount of simulator time would have eliminated the need for MCAS on the MAX. The issue was that the MAX stall entry Flaps Up did not meet the certification requirement for steadily increasing stick force until the airplane stalls. MCAS was a solution to this problem. The MAX is not the first airplane to have this issue and the solutions range from aerodynamic to electronic and/or combinations of the two.

And once again, MCAS was not a stall prevention device. The pilot could still stall the MAX with MCAS operating. MCAS was designed to make sure the stall entry stick force did not "lighten" duding the stall entry.


A question from the bleachers! Rather than an MCAS that appears to this aviation fan as a kludge, would FAA (and other agencies) have objected to just a warning device to the FOs that the plane was approaching that particular condition. I really would trust a pilot to know that this was the one major difference of a MAX compared to an NG. So how would such a warning have been worded? And would that have been difficult for pilots to understand?

And rather obviously FOs should always know when AoAs, pitot tubes etc disagree. Gad!


Regardless of the other problems, such new sensor would need sim training. Which was a no-no, apparently.
 
Interested
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Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 2:36 pm

OldAeroGuy wrote:
justloveplanes wrote:
I think one should keep in mind there is really nothing wrong with the Max other than an incredibly botched add on auxiliary control system. No reason EASA shouldn't re-certify once it is fixed.


Well said, I think you've got it right.

EASA will probably re-certify the MAX with MCAS.v2. While they may require additional simulator time but it will probably involve the "AoA Disagree" symbology that will now be on every MAX as it's a new feature and its relationship to "Runaway Stab" and "Unreliable Airspeed" training.

They may also address proper procedures for dealing with sticker activation during takeoff. This is a linking event for JT043, JT610 and ET302 and none of the crews dealt with it well. MCAS was not an issue when dealing with early stick shaker activation.


So you are happy to introduce extra risks to a plane that was previously safer to fly? (The NG that is)

Why would you accept a plane that needs this add on?

It's clearly riskier than not needing it at all?

Why are we accepting extra risks with such an important plane? What do we gain by the extra risks?

This isn't "grandfathering" and adding on extra safety

It's adding on extra bits to try and make it grandfather

Unacceptable. It shouldn't be certified. It's a different and less safe plane than the one it replaces.
 
Heinkel
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Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 3:11 pm

Elementalism wrote:
Heinkel wrote:
Elementalism wrote:
MCAS will be turned off if either the pilots cut it off or the AOA sensors are in disagreement by more than 5.5 degrees. In both cases the pilots will know MCAS is disabled and thus have to fly the airplane with that in mind. I get the feeling people think when MCAS is turned off the plane goes into an immediate high AOA like a rocket. It won't.


And that's why they need proper sim training to know how to fly the plane with MCAS disabled. The statement "it flies like the NG" is no longer valid.


Do you believe the flight characteristics to be so drastically different? If so, why?


Yes, I do believe. At least in certain areas of the flight envelope. And Boeing believed, too. It was the reason, why they thought the manoevering characteristics of the MAX had to be augmented. So they installed MCAS. Do you think, Boeing puts a system into a plane, which is not needed? Especially, when they can't charge extra money for it, because they kept it secret.

I have the stange feeling, that all those people from the failed "MAX grounding is not necessary" bandwagon now jump on the "MAX sim training is not necessary" bandwagon. Ok, we know, there are (at least) 280 million reasons for that opinion. Lady Gaga only asked for a million reasons.
 
hivue
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Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 3:44 pm

SomebodyInTLS wrote:
the intention of the system is to prevent the pilot initiating stall - *for certification purposes*.


But MCAS 1.0 can't do that. Nobody intended for it to be able to do that. MCAS 2.0 will not be able to do that. Nobody intends for it to be able to do that.
"You're sitting. In a chair. In the SKY!!" ~ Louis C.K.
 
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ACCS300
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Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 3:52 pm

Aither wrote:
Jamie514 wrote:
According to a Canadian Press article being carried on CTVnews.ca, Canadian Transport Minister Marc Garneau says any airline operating MAX8 into Canadian airspace will be required to include simulator training.

If true, this confirms earlier WSJ reporting of a possible break with the FAA, and possibly goes even farther by requiring the same of foreign carriers using the airspace, even those who might not face this training requirement under their own regulatory regime.

https://montreal.ctvnews.ca/pilots-must ... -1.4385223


Considering what Boeing / USA has done to Bombardier we should expect Canada to play hard on this one.


Except that Canadian carriers are likely the most effected, per capita, by the MAX grounding of perhaps any country in the world. For Air Canada, it's almost 1/4 of their narrow body fleet, less so for Westjet. AC is likely the most effected major carrier in the world on a percentage of fleet basis. Transport Canada will likely bow somewhat to the pressure of Canadian carriers to a degree. AC also has MAX simulators on hand.
 
mjoelnir
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Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 3:55 pm

justloveplanes wrote:
I think one should keep in mind there is really nothing wrong with the Max other than an incredibly botched add on auxiliary control system. No reason EASA shouldn't re-certify once it is fixed.


That is what a proper certification should check. It is just that a proper certification of the MAX never happened. If the certification by the FAA slips so glaringly up, one starts to ask, what did they check, what other defect were not recognized, what else did the FAA miss.

I assume everybody thinking about safety, should be glad if the EASA take a deep look. The Canadian agency seems to not agree with the process in the USA regarding the MAX.
 
OldAeroGuy
Posts: 3868
Joined: Sun Dec 05, 2004 6:50 am

Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 4:12 pm

Interested wrote:
OldAeroGuy wrote:
justloveplanes wrote:
I think one should keep in mind there is really nothing wrong with the Max other than an incredibly botched add on auxiliary control system. No reason EASA shouldn't re-certify once it is fixed.


Well said, I think you've got it right.

EASA will probably re-certify the MAX with MCAS.v2. While they may require additional simulator time but it will probably involve the "AoA Disagree" symbology that will now be on every MAX as it's a new feature and its relationship to "Runaway Stab" and "Unreliable Airspeed" training.

They may also address proper procedures for dealing with sticker activation during takeoff. This is a linking event for JT043, JT610 and ET302 and none of the crews dealt with it well. MCAS was not an issue when dealing with early stick shaker activation.


So you are happy to introduce extra risks to a plane that was previously safer to fly? (The NG that is)

Why would you accept a plane that needs this add on?

It's clearly riskier than not needing it at all?

Why are we accepting extra risks with such an important plane? What do we gain by the extra risks?


To start this discussion, let's look at some accident statistics:

737 NG Series: .09 accidents per million departures with a hull loss and fatalities

A320 Series: .11 accidents per million departures with a hull loss and fatalities

Source: https://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/4239.pdf

From these data, the 737 NG and A320 have essentially the same fatal accident rate.

Both airplanes have trimmable horizontal stabilizers and both are subject to "STAB Runaway". "STAB Runaway" events and Crew actions to deal with the Runaways are included in the accident statistics.

As barneycaptain points out, the 737 NG has five failure modes that can cause a "STAB Runaway". MCAS added a sixth mode for the MAX. All six modes were dealt with by using the same "STAB Runaway" procedure. If Crews can deal properly with the initial five failure modes, they should be able to deal with the sixth.

When the 737 MAX fatal accident statistics are published, they will look horrific. The reasons are the botched implementation of MCAS, the high MAX AoA vane failure rate and Crew errors in applying "Stabilizer Runaway" procedures.

When MCAS.v2 is incorporated, I'm confident that a single AoA vane signal failure will not erroneously activate MCAS and the MAX accident rate will drop to the NG historic level.

If AoA vane failure rates also drop to historic levels, it will make me even more confident.
Airplane design is easy, the difficulty is getting them to fly - Barnes Wallis
 
Noshow
Posts: 936
Joined: Wed Jun 15, 2016 3:20 pm

Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 4:17 pm

What made those MAX AoA vanes fail suddenly? Do they ever fail elsewhere or is it the MAX software analyzing their data that is more sensible or error prone or similar?
 
ArgentoSystems
Posts: 294
Joined: Sun Mar 24, 2019 12:05 am

Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 4:34 pm

I did not read last couple of pages, so maybe it was already posted.
At this point I bet sim training requirement will become universal within next couple of weeks.

Two day ago it was two entities that wanted sim training, now it is five:
Canada
Indonesia
RyanAir
Ethiopian Air
American Airlines

It becomes less of an issue whether it is objectively necessary, but a matter of perception. It will be so much harder for everyone else to say "we don't need sim training"

https://www.marketwatch.com/story/ryana ... 2019-04-19
 
ArgentoSystems
Posts: 294
Joined: Sun Mar 24, 2019 12:05 am

Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 4:39 pm

Heinkel wrote:
I have the stange feeling, that all those people from the failed "MAX grounding is not necessary" bandwagon now jump on the "MAX sim training is not necessary" bandwagon.


LOL, think that too.
 
SANChaser
Posts: 37
Joined: Sat Jan 20, 2007 5:36 am

Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 4:40 pm

Here's an article on ieee.org (for those not in software/EE, a very respected outfit :) ). I found it to be quite comprehensive and detailed, from a systems engineering and software point of view. Mods, if already posted, please delete, but I didn't find it.

https://spectrum.ieee.org/aerospace/aviation/how-the-boeing-737-max-disaster-looks-to-a-software-developer

For those who don't have the time to read it, here's his closing statement which I found particularly poignant:
I cannot get the parallels between the 737 Max and the space shuttle Challenger out of my head. The Challenger accident, another textbook case study in normal failure, came about not because people didn’t follow the rules but because they did. In the Challenger case, the rules said that they had to have prelaunch conferences to ascertain flight readiness. It didn’t say that a significant input to those conferences couldn’t be the political considerations of delaying a launch. The inputs were weighed, the process was followed, and a majority consensus was to launch. And seven people died.

In the 737 Max case, the rules were also followed. The rules said you couldn’t have a large pitch-up on power change and that an employee of the manufacturer, a DER, could sign off on whatever you came up with to prevent a pitch change on power change. The rules didn’t say that the DER couldn’t take the business considerations into the decision-making process. And 346 people are dead.



It will be interesting to see if Boeing makes any airframe changes down the road to make it that much more reliable. For example, do pilots need to be retrained to go from a NG without winglets (probably none left? :) ) to one with?
 
slcdeltarumd11
Posts: 4365
Joined: Fri Jan 09, 2004 7:30 am

Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 4:40 pm

World's most expensive paper weights


....... I bet right now those schedule extensions won't be enough for southwest,AA or UA. They didn't go far enough
 
Interested
Posts: 647
Joined: Thu May 19, 2016 12:19 pm

Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 4:58 pm

OldAeroGuy wrote:
Interested wrote:
OldAeroGuy wrote:

Well said, I think you've got it right.

EASA will probably re-certify the MAX with MCAS.v2. While they may require additional simulator time but it will probably involve the "AoA Disagree" symbology that will now be on every MAX as it's a new feature and its relationship to "Runaway Stab" and "Unreliable Airspeed" training.

They may also address proper procedures for dealing with sticker activation during takeoff. This is a linking event for JT043, JT610 and ET302 and none of the crews dealt with it well. MCAS was not an issue when dealing with early stick shaker activation.


So you are happy to introduce extra risks to a plane that was previously safer to fly? (The NG that is)

Why would you accept a plane that needs this add on?

It's clearly riskier than not needing it at all?

Why are we accepting extra risks with such an important plane? What do we gain by the extra risks?


As barneycaptain points out, the 737 NG has five failure modes that can cause a "STAB Runaway". MCAS added a sixth mode for the MAX. All six modes were dealt with by using the same "STAB Runaway" procedure. If Crews can deal properly with the initial five failure modes, they should be able to deal with the sixth.



So the 5 failure modes that can cause stab runaway on NG - are they serious and can they bring a plane down. And how often do they happen?

The 6th failure we already know is serious and can bring planes down. No doubt we can reduce the amount of times it fails. And no doubt we can reduce how strong the impact is.

But we can't remove the risk entirely. And we can't remove the risk of pilots or groundcrew error making the systems fail. Systems weve added we don't need.

Not only that we know the only way to deal with the failure is to turn the automated system off which automatically brings extra risk to a plane the NG doesn't have to face.

So no matter what you tell me you can't tell me that we've reduced risk with this plane. We've increased risks in more than one way. For what reason? What would justify certifying a new plane with more risks than the one it replaced.

Even with their updated software and the best sim training in the world it's very simple and beyond doubt:

"Boeing have made a safe plane (the NG) less safe"

Who can possibly accept that?

The only thing we don't know yet is how much the disaster rate will increase as a result.

How many more disasters as a result of this increased risk are acceptable?

And why should a plane so badly designed it is less safe than the one it's supposed to grandfather be allowed to be certified?

It should never have been designed like this. TBF when it was initially designed the designers clearly didn't expect MCAS to be needed to the extent it was. It's badly designed from start to finish. And they've tried to hide their errors.
Last edited by Interested on Fri Apr 19, 2019 5:01 pm, edited 1 time in total.
 
mjoelnir
Posts: 8361
Joined: Sun Feb 03, 2013 11:06 pm

Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 4:59 pm

OldAeroGuy wrote:

As barneycaptain points out, the 737 NG has five failure modes that can cause a "STAB Runaway". MCAS added a sixth mode for the MAX. All six modes were dealt with by using the same "STAB Runaway" procedure. If Crews can deal properly with the initial five failure modes, they should be able to deal with the sixth.

.


The now a bit old Boeing excuse for hiding MCAS. Just a simple runaway trim.

The question is not if somebody describes the MCAS failure as run away trim, but if the pilot recognize the MCAS failure mode as a run away trim.

Two examples show that pilots do not think instantly "run away trim" when encountering MCAS failure mode.

Why may that be.
Because in the first place MCAS failure mode is not a runaway trim, but an automatic giving trim commands.
MCAS activation can be confused with the action of STS. MCAS is intermittent and stops in between.
It perhaps needs two instances of MCAS activation to recognize it, but than you are already in deep trouble.
The AoA failure gives you a instant workload of other failures you need to contain.

If that would not be enough, Zeke pointed out, that a broken AOA on the NG can cause the elevator feel shift module (EFSM) to increase the control column feel 4 times as it triggers at 11 degrees.

I count the several times pointing out that MCAS failure is simply the # 6 mode of runaway trim as simply trolling.
 
Jamie514
Posts: 140
Joined: Thu May 18, 2017 4:36 pm

Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 5:05 pm

ACCS300 wrote:
Aither wrote:
Jamie514 wrote:
According to a Canadian Press article being carried on CTVnews.ca, Canadian Transport Minister Marc Garneau says any airline operating MAX8 into Canadian airspace will be required to include simulator training.

If true, this confirms earlier WSJ reporting of a possible break with the FAA, and possibly goes even farther by requiring the same of foreign carriers using the airspace, even those who might not face this training requirement under their own regulatory regime.

https://montreal.ctvnews.ca/pilots-must ... -1.4385223


Considering what Boeing / USA has done to Bombardier we should expect Canada to play hard on this one.


Except that Canadian carriers are likely the most effected, per capita, by the MAX grounding of perhaps any country in the world. For Air Canada, it's almost 1/4 of their narrow body fleet, less so for Westjet. AC is likely the most effected major carrier in the world on a percentage of fleet basis. Transport Canada will likely bow somewhat to the pressure of Canadian carriers to a degree. AC also has MAX simulators on hand.


AC with their simulators and having not transitioned off NG, is probably among the best positioned to cope with additional training directives. I also think these measures will go a ways toward restoring public confidence in the plane, which Air Canada's unique fleet composition makes them most exposed to.

I'm interested to see how it plays out with regards to airlines under FAA jurisdiction operating over Canada. Like, will any of the US operators push back on the purported Canadian simulator training requirements for MAX operation. Even if their MAX isn't serving Canadian cities, they would surely use the airspace from time to time on transcons to Seattle or routes to Alaska.
 
Interested
Posts: 647
Joined: Thu May 19, 2016 12:19 pm

Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 5:06 pm

ArgentoSystems wrote:
Heinkel wrote:
I have the stange feeling, that all those people from the failed "MAX grounding is not necessary" bandwagon now jump on the "MAX sim training is not necessary" bandwagon.


LOL, think that too.


Well if the plane flies again it's a disaster waiting to happen one way or another. With or without the sim training IMO.

If this plane crashes again with anything related to MCAS involved (even with human error involved) its entirely predictable due to the added risks - simple as that

Don't blame pilots or groundcrew for not managing to deal with a badly designed and more risky plane
 
Interested
Posts: 647
Joined: Thu May 19, 2016 12:19 pm

Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 5:09 pm

mjoelnir wrote:
OldAeroGuy wrote:

As barneycaptain points out, the 737 NG has five failure modes that can cause a "STAB Runaway". MCAS added a sixth mode for the MAX. All six modes were dealt with by using the same "STAB Runaway" procedure. If Crews can deal properly with the initial five failure modes, they should be able to deal with the sixth.

.


The now a bit old Boeing excuse for hiding MCAS. Just a simple runaway trim.

The question is not if somebody describes the MCAS failure as run away trim, but if the pilot recognize the MCAS failure mode as a run away trim.

Two examples show that pilots do not think instantly "run away trim" when encountering MCAS failure mode.

Why may that be.
Because in the first place MCAS failure mode is not a runaway trim, but an automatic giving trim commands.
MCAS activation can be confused with the action of STS. MCAS is intermittent and stops in between.
It perhaps needs two instances of MCAS activation to recognize it, but than you are already in deep trouble.
The AoA failure gives you a instant workload of other failures you need to contain.

If that would not be enough, Zeke pointed out, that a broken AOA on the NG can cause the elevator feel shift module (EFSM) to increase the control column feel 4 times as it triggers at 11 degrees.

I count the several times pointing out that MCAS failure is simply the # 6 mode of runaway trim as simply trolling.


So the 6th mode is actually not a 6th mode but instead an entirely new mode and new risk we didn't need

Thanks for pointing that out

Back to Oldaeroguy?
 
xmp125a
Posts: 233
Joined: Mon Mar 11, 2019 6:38 pm

Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 5:20 pm

seb76 wrote:
It's apparently impossible to discuss cultural differences, even in company cultures without being classified as racist nowadays?


Discussing cultural differences is fine, unless overgeneralizing. For example. just because Ethiopian Airlines is from Africa, it does not mean that its pilots are idiots. The fact that FO had 300-400 flight hours does not necessarily mean that he is incapable of flying 737. Given that Ethiopia is poor country and flying as a hobby is non existent (unlike USA, and like most of the eastern Europe), only the best talent will get the chance to fly an airplane. And the training from hour 0 will be geared towards them having commercial license and fly for airlines (unlike pilots from USA who can afford flying as a hobby):

https://aviation.stackexchange.com/ques ... ed-for-cpl

(note this is NOT an attempt to bash the US system, just explaining that 250 hours in USA may have the simple reason that anyone worthy of training for commercial license will be already be flying and it is not worth bothering with people who didn't even fly for 250 hours given the easy avaliability of flying as a hobby in USA).

I will give you a very simple example: I routinely stay in 5 star hotels when I go to holiday. In 3rd world countries. Housekeeping and food is often much better that in poorly managed EU hotels? Why? Because to become a cook or a room cleaner in a fkd up 3rd world country you WILL be trained EVERYTHING as a trainee. Starting with how to make basic stuff like omelettes. At breakfast I have seen chefs patiently throwing away an omelette that was proudly prepared by the trainee (he burned it a little :)) but was not up to hotel chain's standard. In western hotels, you will just hire a cook and assume he knows how to make an omelette... most of them do, but probably everyone makes it in the way he learned himself, not in the cooking school...

That is the essentially the same difference as with the pilots. 3rd world pilots will be recruited among the top talents in a country where few people hold white collar (or even blue collar) jobs, and they will be trained from the ground up. It is of course no way to make another "Sully", but commercial aviation really should not depend on heroes. It is perfectly expected that among US pilots you will find some people who have great understanding of the flying and can become new Sully, but it is also probable that you will find people who will perhaps never get rid of bad habits they acquired by "self-training" using small aircraft before they went to get commercial license.

For example, US aviation is capable of producing Sullys. But it is also capable of producing and employing morons like the pilots of Pinnacle Airlines flight 3701: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pinnacle_ ... light_3701

And that is true cultural difference should be talking about when comparing for example Ethiopian Airlines/pilots and US airlines/pilots.
Last edited by xmp125a on Fri Apr 19, 2019 5:34 pm, edited 1 time in total.
 
ArgentoSystems
Posts: 294
Joined: Sun Mar 24, 2019 12:05 am

Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 5:33 pm

Interested wrote:
Well if the plane flies again it's a disaster waiting to happen one way or another. With or without the sim training IMO.

I agree that generally speaking it is a compromised design that is worse than the previous one. However practically speaking it maybe considered "safe enough".

Frankly I'm more concerned that similar magnitude f-ups might exist in other s/w systems of the plane. So if the plane falls again, I would bet it will be due to s/w issues rather than due to compromised air-frame.
Last edited by ArgentoSystems on Fri Apr 19, 2019 5:36 pm, edited 1 time in total.
 
xmp125a
Posts: 233
Joined: Mon Mar 11, 2019 6:38 pm

Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 5:36 pm

ArgentoSystems wrote:
Interested wrote:
Well if the plane flies again it's a disaster waiting to happen one way or another. With or without the sim training IMO.

I agree that generally speaking it is a compromised design that is worse than the previous one. However practically speaking it maybe considered "safe enough".

Frankly I'm more concerned that similar magnitude f-ups exist in other s/w systems of the plane. So if the plane falls again, I would bet it will be due to s/w issues rather than due to compromised air-frame.


That is the reason it should not fly until the design and certification process is audited completely. Because if the rest of the avionics has been designed with the same attitude than MCAS...
 
XRAYretired
Posts: 483
Joined: Fri Mar 15, 2019 11:21 am

Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 5:44 pm

Jamie514 wrote:
ACCS300 wrote:
Aither wrote:

Considering what Boeing / USA has done to Bombardier we should expect Canada to play hard on this one.


Except that Canadian carriers are likely the most effected, per capita, by the MAX grounding of perhaps any country in the world. For Air Canada, it's almost 1/4 of their narrow body fleet, less so for Westjet. AC is likely the most effected major carrier in the world on a percentage of fleet basis. Transport Canada will likely bow somewhat to the pressure of Canadian carriers to a degree. AC also has MAX simulators on hand.


AC with their simulators and having not transitioned off NG, is probably among the best positioned to cope with additional training directives. I also think these measures will go a ways toward restoring public confidence in the plane, which Air Canada's unique fleet composition makes them most exposed to.

I'm interested to see how it plays out with regards to airlines under FAA jurisdiction operating over Canada. Like, will any of the US operators push back on the purported Canadian simulator training requirements for MAX operation. Even if their MAX isn't serving Canadian cities, they would surely use the airspace from time to time on transcons to Seattle or routes to Alaska.


If, and its probably still a big if, Canada prohibits flight in their airspace in such circumstances. Are you suggesting that US carriers might infringe illegally the airspace of a sovereign country? If you want a political storm with US closest (geographically) ally and neighbour, that would be a good way to instigated a whopper.

Ray
 
WPIAeroGuy
Posts: 295
Joined: Tue Aug 21, 2007 11:52 pm

Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 5:59 pm

Interested wrote:
OldAeroGuy wrote:
Interested wrote:

So you are happy to introduce extra risks to a plane that was previously safer to fly? (The NG that is)

Why would you accept a plane that needs this add on?

It's clearly riskier than not needing it at all?

Why are we accepting extra risks with such an important plane? What do we gain by the extra risks?


As barneycaptain points out, the 737 NG has five failure modes that can cause a "STAB Runaway". MCAS added a sixth mode for the MAX. All six modes were dealt with by using the same "STAB Runaway" procedure. If Crews can deal properly with the initial five failure modes, they should be able to deal with the sixth.



So the 5 failure modes that can cause stab runaway on NG - are they serious and can they bring a plane down. And how often do they happen?

The 6th failure we already know is serious and can bring planes down. No doubt we can reduce the amount of times it fails. And no doubt we can reduce how strong the impact is.

But we can't remove the risk entirely. And we can't remove the risk of pilots or groundcrew error making the systems fail. Systems weve added we don't need.

Not only that we know the only way to deal with the failure is to turn the automated system off which automatically brings extra risk to a plane the NG doesn't have to face.

So no matter what you tell me you can't tell me that we've reduced risk with this plane. We've increased risks in more than one way. For what reason? What would justify certifying a new plane with more risks than the one it replaced.

Even with their updated software and the best sim training in the world it's very simple and beyond doubt:

"Boeing have made a safe plane (the NG) less safe"

Who can possibly accept that?

The only thing we don't know yet is how much the disaster rate will increase as a result.

How many more disasters as a result of this increased risk are acceptable?

And why should a plane so badly designed it is less safe than the one it's supposed to grandfather be allowed to be certified?

It should never have been designed like this. TBF when it was initially designed the designers clearly didn't expect MCAS to be needed to the extent it was. It's badly designed from start to finish. And they've tried to hide their errors.


What do you want Boeing to do? Put out a press release saying "Hey sorry we built a deathtrap, guess we'll put a few billion into the 797 instead?". You're not even being reasonable. MCAS in its initial implementation was poorly designed. No one here will argue that. You (and others) keep saying the MAX was 'badly designed' because it had certain undesirable characteristics. Well guess what, every freaking airplane flying has undesirable characteristics that are the result of a compromise in some part of the design. Is every airplane with vortex generators, stall strips, or wing fences a bad design because they required modifications to improve stall characteristics?

It's clear how many people posting have never held a real engineering position. An engineers job is not to make the best performing product ever. It's to produce a product that meets the design goals while minimizing cost. Did you expect Boeing to get to flight testing of the MAX, notice a non-linearity in the pitch controls, and just say "well that design didn't work, let's start from scratch?" They know they screwed up MCAS. Unless there is evidence that there was knowledge that safety would be compromised with the initial MCAS implementation (and no, the fact that something could be made safer does not mean it was unsafe to begin with) then I will not condemn Boeing. I will expect them to be responsible financially for any and all reparations to the victims families, the airlines with grounded MAXes, and anyone else affected.
-WPIAeroGuy
 
hivue
Posts: 1902
Joined: Tue Feb 26, 2013 2:26 am

Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 6:00 pm

Interested wrote:
are they serious and can they bring a plane down.


The fact that many/most airliners have similar switches prominently placed close to hand should answer that question for you.
"You're sitting. In a chair. In the SKY!!" ~ Louis C.K.
 
hivue
Posts: 1902
Joined: Tue Feb 26, 2013 2:26 am

Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 6:03 pm

frmrCapCadet wrote:
Rather than an MCAS that appears to this aviation fan as a kludge, would FAA (and other agencies) have objected to just a warning device to the FOs that the plane was approaching that particular condition.


Yes. MCAS was implemented to meet a certification requirement for increasing control column force with increasing airspeed. A simple warning would not have met the certification requirement.
"You're sitting. In a chair. In the SKY!!" ~ Louis C.K.
 
xmp125a
Posts: 233
Joined: Mon Mar 11, 2019 6:38 pm

Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 6:22 pm

WPIAeroGuy wrote:

It's clear how many people posting have never held a real engineering position. An engineers job is not to make the best performing product ever. It's to produce a product that meets the design goals while minimizing cost. Did you expect Boeing to get to flight testing of the MAX, notice a non-linearity in the pitch controls, and just say "well that design didn't work, let's start from scratch?"


No. I would expect them to say to Sales "Well, fck it, no sim design is impossible, you will have to pay the fine, you did not check with us if LEAP engines on 737 are even possible without sim time, so it is sales fault". I don't even blame the engineers, because engineers at the top airplane manufacturer simply cannot be that stupid to do so many mistakes and take so many questionable decisions.

That's why I am saying that MCAS is not enginering problem, it is just a reflection of a systemic problem at boeing that somehow managed such flawed process even to happen.

Whether there was undue pressure on engineers, signature shopping, or even more criminal behavior will be clear after criminal investigation is completed. MAX could be a very safe airplane if they just drop the stubborn insistence on no sim training. In a second, most of the problems will go away, and the rest could be addressed in an inexpensive way even on MAX.

But as long as that damn requirement for no sim training is in the play, engineering the fix is next to impossible, IMHO.
Last edited by xmp125a on Fri Apr 19, 2019 6:24 pm, edited 1 time in total.
 
WPIAeroGuy
Posts: 295
Joined: Tue Aug 21, 2007 11:52 pm

Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 6:24 pm

Interested wrote:
The now a bit old Boeing excuse for hiding MCAS. Just a simple runaway trim.

The question is not if somebody describes the MCAS failure as run away trim, but if the pilot recognize the MCAS failure mode as a run away trim.

Two examples show that pilots do not think instantly "run away trim" when encountering MCAS failure mode.



And there's a least one example where a pilot did think that.

I once read something on a different flying forum about the difference between pilots and engineers/mechanics. The poster was both a pilot and mechanic, and the topic was in regards to homebuilt airplanes and back-of-the mind concerns like "did I remember to lockwire that last bolt." The relevant part however was when the poster said that when he's on the ground, he thinks like a mechanic. Finding root causes, double and triple checking critical parts, etc. But when he's flying, he thinks like a pilot. That is, how do I respond if something goes wrong. If a control surface jams, to the pilot does it matter if a pushrod is bent, something is stuck in a bellcrank, or a hinge is binding? No, what matters is control authority is limited and that must be dealt with accordingly.

I will never condemn a pilot for making a mistake that cost him his life, especially when there are mitigating circumstances and a high-stress environment. But I will also not judge Boeing's engineer team for expecting a pilot to notice when a control surface is not behaving properly. In the Lion Air case, they knew the stab was trimming inappropriately because they corrected it 21 times in a row. We now have evidence that it is not obvious to pilots, but we can't judge the previous actions with 20/20 hindsight.
-WPIAeroGuy
 
XRAYretired
Posts: 483
Joined: Fri Mar 15, 2019 11:21 am

Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 6:27 pm

WPIAeroGuy wrote:
Interested wrote:
OldAeroGuy wrote:

As barneycaptain points out, the 737 NG has five failure modes that can cause a "STAB Runaway". MCAS added a sixth mode for the MAX. All six modes were dealt with by using the same "STAB Runaway" procedure. If Crews can deal properly with the initial five failure modes, they should be able to deal with the sixth.



So the 5 failure modes that can cause stab runaway on NG - are they serious and can they bring a plane down. And how often do they happen?

The 6th failure we already know is serious and can bring planes down. No doubt we can reduce the amount of times it fails. And no doubt we can reduce how strong the impact is.

But we can't remove the risk entirely. And we can't remove the risk of pilots or groundcrew error making the systems fail. Systems weve added we don't need.

Not only that we know the only way to deal with the failure is to turn the automated system off which automatically brings extra risk to a plane the NG doesn't have to face.

So no matter what you tell me you can't tell me that we've reduced risk with this plane. We've increased risks in more than one way. For what reason? What would justify certifying a new plane with more risks than the one it replaced.

Even with their updated software and the best sim training in the world it's very simple and beyond doubt:

"Boeing have made a safe plane (the NG) less safe"

Who can possibly accept that?

The only thing we don't know yet is how much the disaster rate will increase as a result.

How many more disasters as a result of this increased risk are acceptable?

And why should a plane so badly designed it is less safe than the one it's supposed to grandfather be allowed to be certified?

It should never have been designed like this. TBF when it was initially designed the designers clearly didn't expect MCAS to be needed to the extent it was. It's badly designed from start to finish. And they've tried to hide their errors.


What do you want Boeing to do? Put out a press release saying "Hey sorry we built a deathtrap, guess we'll put a few billion into the 797 instead?". You're not even being reasonable. MCAS in its initial implementation was poorly designed. No one here will argue that. You (and others) keep saying the MAX was 'badly designed' because it had certain undesirable characteristics. Well guess what, every freaking airplane flying has undesirable characteristics that are the result of a compromise in some part of the design. Is every airplane with vortex generators, stall strips, or wing fences a bad design because they required modifications to improve stall characteristics?

It's clear how many people posting have never held a real engineering position. An engineers job is not to make the best performing product ever. It's to produce a product that meets the design goals while minimizing cost. Did you expect Boeing to get to flight testing of the MAX, notice a non-linearity in the pitch controls, and just say "well that design didn't work, let's start from scratch?" They know they screwed up MCAS. Unless there is evidence that there was knowledge that safety would be compromised with the initial MCAS implementation (and no, the fact that something could be made safer does not mean it was unsafe to begin with) then I will not condemn Boeing. I will expect them to be responsible financially for any and all reparations to the victims families, the airlines with grounded MAXes, and anyone else affected.


It was unsafe to begin with. Knowingly, or unknowingly - negligent. (40yrs Deign, Development and Manufacture Aerospace and Defence) In my opinion. System design should not have got through step 1, In my opinion.

Ray
 
blrsea
Posts: 1909
Joined: Fri May 20, 2005 2:22 am

Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 6:31 pm

MCAS was a commercial requirement, not an engineering requirement. It was added so that Max handling characteristics was same as NG, to prevent additional training which could cost Boeing sales or reduced profits.

Why introduce additional points of failure even though it *might* have been mitigated in new design? It is not serving any engineering problem, just so that Boeing can use it to do more sales. Keep it simple from engineering perspective even if it means additional training/certification. No need to increase surface area for errors when there is no fundamental reason to do so
 
WPIAeroGuy
Posts: 295
Joined: Tue Aug 21, 2007 11:52 pm

Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 6:35 pm

blrsea wrote:
MCAS was a commercial requirement, not an engineering requirement. It was added so that Max handling characteristics was same as NG, to prevent additional training which could cost Boeing sales or reduced profits.

Why introduce additional points of failure even though it *might* have been mitigated in new design? It is not serving any engineering problem, just so that Boeing can use it to do more sales. Keep it simple from engineering perspective even if it means additional training/certification. No need to increase surface area for errors when there is no fundamental reason to do so


I hate sales guys as much as the next engineer, but there's no point in designing an airplane if no one is going to buy it. The airlines wanted a more efficient 737. That's what they got.
-WPIAeroGuy
 
blrsea
Posts: 1909
Joined: Fri May 20, 2005 2:22 am

Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 6:41 pm

WPIAeroGuy wrote:
blrsea wrote:
MCAS was a commercial requirement, not an engineering requirement. It was added so that Max handling characteristics was same as NG, to prevent additional training which could cost Boeing sales or reduced profits.

Why introduce additional points of failure even though it *might* have been mitigated in new design? It is not serving any engineering problem, just so that Boeing can use it to do more sales. Keep it simple from engineering perspective even if it means additional training/certification. No need to increase surface area for errors when there is no fundamental reason to do so


I hate sales guys as much as the next engineer, but there's no point in designing an airplane if no one is going to buy it. The airlines wanted a more efficient 737. That's what they got.



No, they would have still got a fuel efficient new aircraft with probably >95% commonality, but just a little additional training on where Max differs from NG if MCAS was excluded
 
WPIAeroGuy
Posts: 295
Joined: Tue Aug 21, 2007 11:52 pm

Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 6:44 pm

XRAYretired wrote:
WPIAeroGuy wrote:
Interested wrote:

So the 5 failure modes that can cause stab runaway on NG - are they serious and can they bring a plane down. And how often do they happen?

The 6th failure we already know is serious and can bring planes down. No doubt we can reduce the amount of times it fails. And no doubt we can reduce how strong the impact is.

But we can't remove the risk entirely. And we can't remove the risk of pilots or groundcrew error making the systems fail. Systems weve added we don't need.

Not only that we know the only way to deal with the failure is to turn the automated system off which automatically brings extra risk to a plane the NG doesn't have to face.

So no matter what you tell me you can't tell me that we've reduced risk with this plane. We've increased risks in more than one way. For what reason? What would justify certifying a new plane with more risks than the one it replaced.

Even with their updated software and the best sim training in the world it's very simple and beyond doubt:

"Boeing have made a safe plane (the NG) less safe"

Who can possibly accept that?

The only thing we don't know yet is how much the disaster rate will increase as a result.

How many more disasters as a result of this increased risk are acceptable?

And why should a plane so badly designed it is less safe than the one it's supposed to grandfather be allowed to be certified?

It should never have been designed like this. TBF when it was initially designed the designers clearly didn't expect MCAS to be needed to the extent it was. It's badly designed from start to finish. And they've tried to hide their errors.


What do you want Boeing to do? Put out a press release saying "Hey sorry we built a deathtrap, guess we'll put a few billion into the 797 instead?". You're not even being reasonable. MCAS in its initial implementation was poorly designed. No one here will argue that. You (and others) keep saying the MAX was 'badly designed' because it had certain undesirable characteristics. Well guess what, every freaking airplane flying has undesirable characteristics that are the result of a compromise in some part of the design. Is every airplane with vortex generators, stall strips, or wing fences a bad design because they required modifications to improve stall characteristics?

It's clear how many people posting have never held a real engineering position. An engineers job is not to make the best performing product ever. It's to produce a product that meets the design goals while minimizing cost. Did you expect Boeing to get to flight testing of the MAX, notice a non-linearity in the pitch controls, and just say "well that design didn't work, let's start from scratch?" They know they screwed up MCAS. Unless there is evidence that there was knowledge that safety would be compromised with the initial MCAS implementation (and no, the fact that something could be made safer does not mean it was unsafe to begin with) then I will not condemn Boeing. I will expect them to be responsible financially for any and all reparations to the victims families, the airlines with grounded MAXes, and anyone else affected.


It was unsafe to begin with. Knowingly, or unknowingly - negligent. (40yrs Deign, Development and Manufacture Aerospace and Defence) In my opinion. System design should not have got through step 1, In my opinion.

Ray


What do you mean 'to begin with?' The extent of the high AoA pitching moment change wasn't known until flight testing. The MCAS implementation was bad, but that doesn't mean a 737 that needs (a more robust version of) MCAS is a bad design.
-WPIAeroGuy
 
Interested
Posts: 647
Joined: Thu May 19, 2016 12:19 pm

Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 6:58 pm

WPIAeroGuy wrote:
XRAYretired wrote:
WPIAeroGuy wrote:

What do you want Boeing to do? Put out a press release saying "Hey sorry we built a deathtrap, guess we'll put a few billion into the 797 instead?". You're not even being reasonable. MCAS in its initial implementation was poorly designed. No one here will argue that. You (and others) keep saying the MAX was 'badly designed' because it had certain undesirable characteristics. Well guess what, every freaking airplane flying has undesirable characteristics that are the result of a compromise in some part of the design. Is every airplane with vortex generators, stall strips, or wing fences a bad design because they required modifications to improve stall characteristics?

It's clear how many people posting have never held a real engineering position. An engineers job is not to make the best performing product ever. It's to produce a product that meets the design goals while minimizing cost. Did you expect Boeing to get to flight testing of the MAX, notice a non-linearity in the pitch controls, and just say "well that design didn't work, let's start from scratch?" They know they screwed up MCAS. Unless there is evidence that there was knowledge that safety would be compromised with the initial MCAS implementation (and no, the fact that something could be made safer does not mean it was unsafe to begin with) then I will not condemn Boeing. I will expect them to be responsible financially for any and all reparations to the victims families, the airlines with grounded MAXes, and anyone else affected.


It was unsafe to begin with. Knowingly, or unknowingly - negligent. (40yrs Deign, Development and Manufacture Aerospace and Defence) In my opinion. System design should not have got through step 1, In my opinion.

Ray


What do you mean 'to begin with?' The extent of the high AoA pitching moment change wasn't known until flight testing. The MCAS implementation was bad, but that doesn't mean a 737 that needs (a more robust version of) MCAS is a bad design.


You talk about people on here not knowing anything engineering. Then you have the audacity to describe a more robust version of MCAS as not a bad design?

It's not even worthy of being called a design. Engineers at Boeing made mistakes early on and had to create a bandage for their failed design. Now their bandage has disastrously failed twice you claim the new version is not going to be a bad design. Design is the wrong word - it's a more robust bandage they are trying to create
 
XRAYretired
Posts: 483
Joined: Fri Mar 15, 2019 11:21 am

Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 6:58 pm

WPIAeroGuy wrote:
XRAYretired wrote:
WPIAeroGuy wrote:

What do you want Boeing to do? Put out a press release saying "Hey sorry we built a deathtrap, guess we'll put a few billion into the 797 instead?". You're not even being reasonable. MCAS in its initial implementation was poorly designed. No one here will argue that. You (and others) keep saying the MAX was 'badly designed' because it had certain undesirable characteristics. Well guess what, every freaking airplane flying has undesirable characteristics that are the result of a compromise in some part of the design. Is every airplane with vortex generators, stall strips, or wing fences a bad design because they required modifications to improve stall characteristics?

It's clear how many people posting have never held a real engineering position. An engineers job is not to make the best performing product ever. It's to produce a product that meets the design goals while minimizing cost. Did you expect Boeing to get to flight testing of the MAX, notice a non-linearity in the pitch controls, and just say "well that design didn't work, let's start from scratch?" They know they screwed up MCAS. Unless there is evidence that there was knowledge that safety would be compromised with the initial MCAS implementation (and no, the fact that something could be made safer does not mean it was unsafe to begin with) then I will not condemn Boeing. I will expect them to be responsible financially for any and all reparations to the victims families, the airlines with grounded MAXes, and anyone else affected.


It was unsafe to begin with. Knowingly, or unknowingly - negligent. (40yrs Deign, Development and Manufacture Aerospace and Defence) In my opinion. System design should not have got through step 1, In my opinion.

Ray

What do you mean 'to begin with?' The extent of the high AoA pitching moment change wasn't known until flight testing. The MCAS implementation was bad, but that doesn't mean a 737 that needs (a more robust version of) MCAS is a bad design.

"Unless there is evidence that there was knowledge that safety would be compromised with the initial MCAS implementation (and no, the fact that something could be made safer does not mean it was unsafe to begin with) then I will not condemn Boeing."

Ray
 
FlyBitcoin
Posts: 91
Joined: Tue Nov 06, 2018 3:38 am

Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 7:00 pm

OldAeroGuy wrote:
Interested wrote:
OldAeroGuy wrote:

Well said, I think you've got it right.

EASA will probably re-certify the MAX with MCAS.v2. While they may require additional simulator time but it will probably involve the "AoA Disagree" symbology that will now be on every MAX as it's a new feature and its relationship to "Runaway Stab" and "Unreliable Airspeed" training.

They may also address proper procedures for dealing with sticker activation during takeoff. This is a linking event for JT043, JT610 and ET302 and none of the crews dealt with it well. MCAS was not an issue when dealing with early stick shaker activation.


So you are happy to introduce extra risks to a plane that was previously safer to fly? (The NG that is)

Why would you accept a plane that needs this add on?

It's clearly riskier than not needing it at all?

Why are we accepting extra risks with such an important plane? What do we gain by the extra risks?


To start this discussion, let's look at some accident statistics:

737 NG Series: .09 accidents per million departures with a hull loss and fatalities

A320 Series: .11 accidents per million departures with a hull loss and fatalities

Source: https://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/4239.pdf

From these data, the 737 NG and A320 have essentially the same fatal accident rate.

Both airplanes have trimmable horizontal stabilizers and both are subject to "STAB Runaway". "STAB Runaway" events and Crew actions to deal with the Runaways are included in the accident statistics.

As barneycaptain points out, the 737 NG has five failure modes that can cause a "STAB Runaway". MCAS added a sixth mode for the MAX. All six modes were dealt with by using the same "STAB Runaway" procedure. If Crews can deal properly with the initial five failure modes, they should be able to deal with the sixth.

When the 737 MAX fatal accident statistics are published, they will look horrific. The reasons are the botched implementation of MCAS, the high MAX AoA vane failure rate and Crew errors in applying "Stabilizer Runaway" procedures.

When MCAS.v2 is incorporated, I'm confident that a single AoA vane signal failure will not erroneously activate MCAS and the MAX accident rate will drop to the NG historic level.

If AoA vane failure rates also drop to historic levels, it will make me even more confident.


Assuming all MAX deliveries resume at the planned rate once the grounding is lifted worldwide, and the plane has a flawless safety record for 5 years, then it will still have a much higher rate of accident with hull loss compared to the NG and 320. It will take longer than 5 years to normalize that data.

And until that data is normalized, can you blame a member of the flying public for avoiding the MAX until it has proven to normalize its accident rate compared other aircraft that likely are flying the same route?
 
Interested
Posts: 647
Joined: Thu May 19, 2016 12:19 pm

Re: B737MAX Grounded Worldwide

Fri Apr 19, 2019 7:01 pm

Definition of safety engineering:

Safety engineering is the process of design o prevent accidents. Engineering Safety Concepts provide detailed approaches and modes for accident reduction by using a risk management process to identify and "design out" hazards.

Do Boeing employ "unsafety engineers"?

They've managed to "design" (I use the word loosely) a plane that "designs in" hazards

How is that possible in this day and age

They wanted a more fuel efficient plane and this is their answer?

Unacceptable. This design should never have got past the drawing board stage. It should have been rejected before any engines even got moved etc.

It's a shambolic design

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