Jamie514 wrote:morrisond wrote:Jamie514 wrote:
If only you applied that type of critical thinking to the statements from Boeing that you treat as gospel.
I'm not treating them as Gospel - I said they might be lying.
However I'm pretty sure the Lawyers would never have allowed Mullenburg to say what he did the other day unless they were sure they designed to the existing standards and requirements. Were those existing standards and requirements sufficient - Obviously no as they also assumed a basic level of Pilot competency that does not exist.
The Shareholders lawsuits will be massive if he is intentionally found to be lying.
I'm pretty sure Ethiopians lawyers would never have allowed their official twitter to say what it did in March unless they were sure the training delivered was to the existing standard and requirement. Were those existing standards and requirements sufficient? Probably not. According to Reuters (which has a sterling reputation) the APA have the nerve to be calling for more training than what is being proposed now let alone what Boeing offered in MCAS for Dummies last fall.
Has AVHerald actually concluded that Pilot training provided by Ethiopian was the primary cause of the crash? Far as I could see, he only sees it as a POSSIBLE contributing factor, which I would agree with.
I would bet Ethiopian Airlines is not as worried about getting sued as Boeing.
"On Apr 11th 2019 The Aviation Herald received a full copy of the Flight Operations Manual (FOM), Revision 18B released on Nov 30th 2018, which is currently being used by Ethiopian Airlines (verified in April 2019 to be current). Although Boeing had issued an operator's bulletin on Nov 6th 2018, which was put into Emergency Airworthiness Directive 2018-23-51 dated Nov 7th 2018 requiring the stab trim runaway procedure to be incorporated into the FOM ahead of the sign off of this version of the FOM (the entire document is on file but not available for publishing), there is no trace of such an addition in the entire 699 pages of the FOM.
Quite the opposite, in section 2.6 of the FOM "Operational Irregularities" the last revision is provided as Revision 18 dated "Nov 1st 2017".
According to information The Aviation Herald had received in March 2019, the Airline Management needed to be reminded to distribute the Boeing Operator's Bulletin as well as the EAD to their pilots, eventually the documents were distributed to the flight crew. However, it was never verified, whether those documents had arrived, were read or had been understood. No deeper explanation of the MCAS, mentioned but not explained in both documents, was offered.
It turned out, that only very cursory knowledge about the stab trim runaway procedure exists amongst the flight crew of Ethiopian Airlines even 5 months after the EAD was distributed. In particular, none of the conditions suggesting an MCAS related stab trim runaway was known with any degree of certainty. In that context the recommendation by the accident flight's first officer to use the TRIM CUTOUT switches suggests, that he was partially aware of the contents of the EAD and reproduced some but not all of the provisions and not all of the procedure, which may or may not explain some of the obvious omissions in following the procedure in full."