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felipekk
Posts: 13
Joined: Tue Dec 04, 2018 4:06 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 09, 2019 2:40 pm

OldAeroGuy wrote:
I think that we'll need to wait for a full report to see what Alerts were triggered.

From the traces, it appears that the L/R Airspeed Indicators differed by 10-15 KIAS and the L/R Altimeters by >500' when Flaps up was selected.. This should have triggered both Airspeed Unreliable and Altitude Disagree Alerts.

The stick shaker alone would have been a cue.


I think the report is complete in terms of alerts / indicators (but it does not seem to include the complete transcription of the CVR).
 
XRAYretired
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 09, 2019 2:52 pm

felipekk wrote:
OldAeroGuy wrote:
I think that we'll need to wait for a full report to see what Alerts were triggered.

From the traces, it appears that the L/R Airspeed Indicators differed by 10-15 KIAS and the L/R Altimeters by >500' when Flaps up was selected.. This should have triggered both Airspeed Unreliable and Altitude Disagree Alerts.

The stick shaker alone would have been a cue.


I think the report is complete in terms of alerts / indicators (but it does not seem to include the complete transcription of the CVR).

Neither Prelim. is complete in that regard by a long chalk.

Ray
 
AABusDrvr
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 09, 2019 3:35 pm

FluidFlow wrote:
seahawk wrote:
The airpseed unreliable checklist for the 737 has been criticized more than once in the past:

For example:
http://www.aaiu.ie/sites/default/files/ ... 13-017.pdf

And here is a QRH handbook for a NG http://www.737ng.co.uk/737-800%20Quick% ... QRH%29.pdf

Look at part 10.1

In addition you want to look at the performance section "Flight With Unreliable Airspeed - Climb", which says "Flaps Up, Set Max Climb Thrust"


From the report:

The Boeing Aircraft Company B737NG QRH checklists should provide
guidance for flight crew specifying the systems that might be affected
and the possible warnings generated as a consequence of a pitot
failure


Does someone on here has the QRH for the MAX in case of a AoA sensor failure?

And if so, is it lacking information for the pilots as well, especially regarding MCAS?



There is no QRH checklist for "AOA sensor failure". My airlines 737's (-800NG's and MAX8) have the AOA indicators and the comparator, so we have a QRH procedure for "AOA DISAGREE".

It states:
Condition: The AOA DISAGREE alert indicates the left and right angle of attack vanes disagree.

1. Airspeed errors and the IAS DISAGREE alert may occur.

2. Altimeter errors and the ALT DISAGREE alert may occur.
 
SEU
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 09, 2019 3:58 pm

I have just watched this - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QytfYyHmxtc

Yes, its very Biased against boeing for media and to sell it.

A few points that have been said in this "documentary":

1) Two criminal cases against boeing - What are these exactly?
2) Is it true hundreds of pilots reported issues?
3) Is it true that MCAS was nowhere in the manuals for pilots?
Last edited by SEU on Thu May 09, 2019 4:03 pm, edited 1 time in total.
 
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7BOEING7
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 09, 2019 4:02 pm

FluidFlow wrote:
seahawk wrote:
The airpseed unreliable checklist for the 737 has been criticized more than once in the past:

For example:
http://www.aaiu.ie/sites/default/files/ ... 13-017.pdf

And here is a QRH handbook for a NG http://www.737ng.co.uk/737-800%20Quick% ... QRH%29.pdf

Look at part 10.1

In addition you want to look at the performance section "Flight With Unreliable Airspeed - Climb", which says "Flaps Up, Set Max Climb Thrust"


From the report:

The Boeing Aircraft Company B737NG QRH checklists should provide
guidance for flight crew specifying the systems that might be affected
and the possible warnings generated as a consequence of a pitot
failure


Does someone on here has the QRH for the MAX in case of a AoA sensor failure?

And if so, is it lacking information for the pilots as well, especially regarding MCAS?


The AOA DISAGREE checklist for an NG has two steps:

1 Air speed errors and the IAS DISAGREE alert may occur.

2. Altitude errors and the ALTITUDE DISAGREE alert may occur.

I'm guessing the MAX says exactly the same thing.

If you get an IAS DISAGREE alert, it sends you to the AIRSPEED UNRELIABLE checklist.

This is a QRH (Quick Reference Handbook), if you put a bunch of "what ifs" in it for every possible condition, it no longer is Quick nor manageable. There is a lot of thought by a lot of people of varying disciplines put into the writing of checklists. They evolve of over the years and are generally kept as simple as possible to get the job done -- there are some exceptions.
 
DenverTed
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 09, 2019 4:02 pm

I can see why WN, UA, and AA would benefit from having the aircraft back for the second half of the summer. As long as the MCAS 2.0 is fixed, which seems straight forward, and the victims are compensated, which they most likely will be, then good to go. The only thing I don't agree with is that there wasn't a breakdown in the design process. Something as flawed as MCAS 1.0 should have been caught. Even without an FAA process, Boeing should have caught that mistake as a matter of professional pride.
 
OldAeroGuy
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 09, 2019 4:06 pm

Interesting development from Aviation Week.

"The world’s largest pilots’ union will not ask FAA to require additional mandatory simulator training on maneuvering characteristics augmentation system (MCAS) scenarios for 737 MAX pilots before they can fly, but will recommend it as part of routine recurrent training, Aviation Week has learned."

https://aviationweek.com/commercial-avi ... 6fad80be84
Airplane design is easy, the difficulty is getting them to fly - Barnes Wallis
 
DenverTed
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 09, 2019 4:15 pm

What will the sim training for a MCAS upset be? Use the electric trim, then shut off the trim swiches, or shut off the trim switches and then manual trim?
 
DenverTed
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 09, 2019 4:20 pm

Not being a pilot, but after LionAir, I didn't think a grounding was needed, just based on I figured all MAX pilots would pay attention to it, and the ways to beat an MCAS malfunction. Use the electric trim switches to override MCAS, what more was there to it? If that fails, deploy the flaps to shut off MCAS. I'm curious why the flaps were not talked about in the AD.
 
AABusDrvr
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 09, 2019 4:43 pm

7BOEING7 wrote:
FluidFlow wrote:
seahawk wrote:
The airpseed unreliable checklist for the 737 has been criticized more than once in the past:

For example:
http://www.aaiu.ie/sites/default/files/ ... 13-017.pdf

And here is a QRH handbook for a NG http://www.737ng.co.uk/737-800%20Quick% ... QRH%29.pdf

Look at part 10.1

In addition you want to look at the performance section "Flight With Unreliable Airspeed - Climb", which says "Flaps Up, Set Max Climb Thrust"


From the report:

The Boeing Aircraft Company B737NG QRH checklists should provide
guidance for flight crew specifying the systems that might be affected
and the possible warnings generated as a consequence of a pitot
failure


Does someone on here has the QRH for the MAX in case of a AoA sensor failure?

And if so, is it lacking information for the pilots as well, especially regarding MCAS?


The AOA DISAGREE checklist for an NG has two steps:

1 Air speed errors and the IAS DISAGREE alert may occur.

2. Altitude errors and the ALTITUDE DISAGREE alert may occur.

I'm guessing the MAX says exactly the same thing.

If you get an IAS DISAGREE alert, it sends you to the AIRSPEED UNRELIABLE checklist.

This is a QRH (Quick Reference Handbook), if you put a bunch of "what ifs" in it for every possible condition, it no longer is Quick nor manageable. There is a lot of thought by a lot of people of varying disciplines put into the writing of checklists. They evolve of over the years and are generally kept as simple as possible to get the job done -- there are some exceptions.


To those arguing over semantics of the various QRH NNC procedures, and what is the proper procedure to apply. I've never used a factory Boeing manual of any kind, as my airline uses it's own manuals. But for every transport airplane I've ever flown there has been a statement very similar to the following in the manuals. I would guess the Boeing factory, and ET manuals are the same. This is that airmanship stuff that was addressed before.

"Checklists cannot be created for all conceivable situations and are not intended to replace good judgment. In some situations, at the captain’s discretion, checklist deviation(s) may be necessary."

DenverTed wrote:
What will the sim training for a MCAS upset be? Use the electric trim, then shut off the trim swiches, or shut off the trim switches and then manual trim?


We will have to wait for the final AD, but my guess is there will not be any change to the current procedures. And honestly, as a current 737NG pilot, who has also flown the MAX, I don't see any need, other than "feels" for any additional simulator training. The additional systems training should cover everything that needs to be addressed.
 
xmp125a
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 09, 2019 4:47 pm

DenverTed wrote:
Not being a pilot, but after LionAir, I didn't think a grounding was needed, just based on I figured all MAX pilots would pay attention to it, and the ways to beat an MCAS malfunction. Use the electric trim switches to override MCAS, what more was there to it? If that fails, deploy the flaps to shut off MCAS. I'm curious why the flaps were not talked about in the AD.


We were through this before. At airspeed at which manual trim is not working, you cannot deploy flaps.

Seriously, why go through these loopholes JUST TO AVOID TRAINING? They should put the "MCAS off" switch in the cockpit, make use of both AoA sensors, and tell pilots about it, and this would be essentially non issue. Now with AoA disagree shutting the MCAS off I wonder if this is good to happen automatically, if MCAS guarantees certification without sim training. At least the pilot should initiate MCAS shutdown and be aware from then on that he has no MCAS protection.

And, I am appalled that for some (Boeing, and some experts) the proper design still comes second after the "no sim training requirement". Design it properly, if it requires training after that, then pilots will need training, period. I still hope international cert organizations will push hard on this.
 
OldAeroGuy
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 09, 2019 4:47 pm

AABusDrvr wrote:
"Checklists cannot be created for all conceivable situations and are not intended to replace good judgment. In some situations, at the captain’s discretion, checklist deviation(s) may be necessary."


Yep, couldn't agree more.
Airplane design is easy, the difficulty is getting them to fly - Barnes Wallis
 
OldAeroGuy
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 09, 2019 4:53 pm

DenverTed wrote:
What will the sim training for a MCAS upset be? Use the electric trim, then shut off the trim swiches, or shut off the trim switches and then manual trim?


All of the above, just as it is for a Stab Runaway.

- Use electric trim put the airplane in stabilized, trimmed flight, then shut off the STAB swiches

- Use manual trim for the remainder of the flight.
Airplane design is easy, the difficulty is getting them to fly - Barnes Wallis
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 09, 2019 5:06 pm

DenverTed wrote:
Not being a pilot, but after LionAir, I didn't think a grounding was needed, just based on I figured all MAX pilots would pay attention to it, and the ways to beat an MCAS malfunction. Use the electric trim switches to override MCAS, what more was there to it? If that fails, deploy the flaps to shut off MCAS. I'm curious why the flaps were not talked about in the AD.


Flaps were not talked about because:

1) They can not be deployed at all speeds and
2) MCAS can be counteracted with the trim switch on the yoke and
3) once it is counteracted, the electric trim can be cut off which turns off MCAS.
 
planecane
Posts: 1570
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 09, 2019 5:18 pm

xmp125a wrote:
DenverTed wrote:
Not being a pilot, but after LionAir, I didn't think a grounding was needed, just based on I figured all MAX pilots would pay attention to it, and the ways to beat an MCAS malfunction. Use the electric trim switches to override MCAS, what more was there to it? If that fails, deploy the flaps to shut off MCAS. I'm curious why the flaps were not talked about in the AD.


We were through this before. At airspeed at which manual trim is not working, you cannot deploy flaps.

Seriously, why go through these loopholes JUST TO AVOID TRAINING? They should put the "MCAS off" switch in the cockpit, make use of both AoA sensors, and tell pilots about it, and this would be essentially non issue. Now with AoA disagree shutting the MCAS off I wonder if this is good to happen automatically, if MCAS guarantees certification without sim training. At least the pilot should initiate MCAS shutdown and be aware from then on that he has no MCAS protection.

And, I am appalled that for some (Boeing, and some experts) the proper design still comes second after the "no sim training requirement". Design it properly, if it requires training after that, then pilots will need training, period. I still hope international cert organizations will push hard on this.


Training for what? A potential 2.5 degree uncommanded nose down trim that doesn't occur again and only occurs if both AoA sensors fail simultaneously, both giving false nose high indications within 5 degrees of each other? The procedure in this now extremely unlikely event will be to trim back to neutral with the thumb switch. I don't want to be on an aircraft where the pilot needs special simulator training for this.
 
DenverTed
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 09, 2019 5:18 pm

They don't want a switch that cuts power to MCAS, speed trim, and mach trim, (in the event one of those goes wonky) but still leaves power for electric trim? What's a speed trim malfunction look like? Does it have authority over the full range of the trim? Would it be intermittent? Has it ever happened?
 
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seahawk
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 09, 2019 5:33 pm

Training is much less of a problem than changing the instruments, the software and switches.

Every MAX needs the AoA disagree warning
and the software needs to consider both sensors
imho a switch to cut off all automatic trim systems without cutting of manul electric trim would make sense too.
 
xmp125a
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 09, 2019 5:38 pm

planecane wrote:
xmp125a wrote:
And, I am appalled that for some (Boeing, and some experts) the proper design still comes second after the "no sim training requirement". Design it properly, if it requires training after that, then pilots will need training, period. I still hope international cert organizations will push hard on this.


Training for what? A potential 2.5 degree uncommanded nose down trim that doesn't occur again and only occurs if both AoA sensors fail simultaneously, both giving false nose high indications within 5 degrees of each other? The procedure in this now extremely unlikely event will be to trim back to neutral with the thumb switch. I don't want to be on an aircraft where the pilot needs special simulator training for this.


It has been stated by multiple sources now (latest I've seen the anonymous Boeing employee in Australian 60 minutes report) that the awfully stupid reliance on one sensor was due to certification issues. That engineers knew it was awful and it was conscius decision to rely on one sensor only, as the two sensor design would need recertification.

See here: https://youtu.be/QytfYyHmxtc?t=2120 "We knew that FAA would not certify 2 sensor setup without level D training"

I would somehow be more at ease if it would turn out that accidentally they outsourced this design to a chimpanzee, than hearing that this was done INTENTIONALLY with "no sim training required" in mind. No wonder FBI is investigating Boeing (and that anonymous employee is apparently working with the FBI).
 
xmp125a
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 09, 2019 5:46 pm

DenverTed wrote:
I can see why WN, UA, and AA would benefit from having the aircraft back for the second half of the summer. As long as the MCAS 2.0 is fixed, which seems straight forward, and the victims are compensated, which they most likely will be, then good to go. The only thing I don't agree with is that there wasn't a breakdown in the design process. Something as flawed as MCAS 1.0 should have been caught. Even without an FAA process, Boeing should have caught that mistake as a matter of professional pride.


I think a CEO of any company that is caught in such absurd oversight (or intentionally dangerous design) when designing safety critical system should resign immediately. Because this means that the system of checks totally broke down when Sales can command Engineering to violate long-standing safety standards just to catch impossible sales deadlines.

This is rotten, truly rotten and MCAS is not issue anymore. Boeing clearing up their oversight mess should be condition on returning 737MAX to the skies, not MCAS redesign. MCAS is history... the issue now is how rotten is the boeing corporate culture and what else inside company has been infected by such thinking.
 
XRAYretired
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 09, 2019 8:33 pm

Revelations (perceived true or not) arise from media sources just about every day that are worthy of dissemination and discussion, in my view. Significant meetings are scheduled for 15th (6 days hence) and 23rd May that will no doubt also be source of information, briefed or leaked, that will also be worthy of dissemination and discussion.

I vote keep the thread open.

Ray
 
AirBoat
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 09, 2019 9:08 pm

my take on this:
MCAS was put in to prevent a certain AOA value being exceeded, due to more powerful engines. (does anyone know this value, and what can the NG do?)
When there is an AOA disagree MCAS is deactivated.
Now there is no safe way to fly this aircraft as the pilots have no idea as to what the AOA limit is...(now which sensor do you believe, the high value is going to cause you to dive, and the low one might be ok..)
Under instrument flying conditions this could get really difficult.
The safe option is 3 sensors.
FX
 
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c933103
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 09, 2019 10:35 pm

This report summarized response from various Chinese airlines:
http://www.sohu.com/a/312849171_115479?sec=wd
Xiamen airlines (now have 10 Max) decided to lease two 757 back to fill the capacity. They previously retired all of their 757 last year and sold them away and the capacity was supposed to be filled by 737Max.
China Eastern (have 14 Max together with Shanghai airlines) is now borrowing six 737NG from China United Airlines for their operation at Shanghai. Those aircraft are capacity that China United Airlines couldn't fully utilize at Beijing Nanyuan Airport and was waiting for the opening of the new Beijing Daxing Airport.
China Southern (have 24 Max) commented that if the 737 Max grounding extended to July/August then they will move some widebodies from international flights to domestic flights and also delay the retirement of some frames. They would also like to accelerate the introduction of new aircraft to fill the capacity difference but they expect the speed will be lower than the original plan
9Air, subsidiary of Juneyao Airlines, only have 1 Max for now but they were planning to introduce five new Max in the Q3-Q4 this year. They are now trying to change those into introducing 737NG instead, before it is rather difficult to find short term operational lease with just two to three months short notice, and in principal they would not acquire used aircrafts. Juneyao airlines also said that Airbus production capacity will not be able to fill the 737 Max's market demand in the next two years.
Spring Airlines (have an all Airbus fleet in China with no Max aircraft) said that there are the Max incident have also impacted them because it make Airbus delivery schedule problem become even more severe than before the incident and they are trying to renew lease of their existing aircrafts as much as possible. They expect if the 737 Max problem can be resolved within this year or even Q3 at the earliest then it won't cause big problem to them, or else if the Max problem still couldn't be resolved by the end of the year or even extend toward next year then there will be a big problem.
It's pointless to attempt winning internet debate.
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sgrow787
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 10, 2019 1:20 am

XRAYretired wrote:
sgrow787 wrote:
(1) New News: AOA Disagree Alert logic was not working correctly (turns off when the logic detects AOA option not installed). Boeing engineers (but not senior management!) knew about it a year before the first crash but didn't tell anybody about it.
(2) If Source Selection logic is triggered by the Disagree logic, then .... is this now a possible root cause for incorrect trigger of MCAS in both accidents?
Disagree? -----yes----> Source Selection -----> Use good AOA sensor (discarding bad)
Disagree? -----no ----> Use onside AOA sensor (hey we don't have a disagree, so AOA-onside must be good if it doesn't disagree with AOA-offside) ----> let's use AOA-onside even if it may be bad** ----> CRASH


So all that Disagree logic (threshold and hysteresis logic) and all that Source Selection logic (to determine which sensor is good) goes down the drain (ie not used) because someone tied in (at the last minute?) an AOA install option. Which in their minds would have to mean "hey, if you don't think you need this option, well then you better have some really good pilots to deal with what we're gonna give you next".

**Wait, I didn't mean to say that. I didn't. I meant to say, hey, we put alot of resources into that Disagree logic when I was on the team. I know it works. Besides why would they screw that up? Anyway, they need this stuff shipped tomorrow, and I'm not getting any attaboys for finding problems at this stage. So what I mean is.... I'm on the Source Selection project, and that disagree stuff is... well not my problem. It's not. I can't do everything. Right? Right!!?? Right.


I think you are conflating the FCC and PFD that are entirely separate. The PFD will not be commanding the FCC to only perform those tasks it wishes to display the output of!

Ray


It's very reasonable to consider the disagree logic is in the FCC, along with source selection logic, and that the PFD in a all-glass cockpit is simply to display data.

One wonders if senior management knew (come on!) of the issue, but failed to notify the FAA and airlines because they knew that would result in an immediate grounding. And if they were convinced that MCAS was some minor enhancement to make a safe plane safer, or for whatever reason something no one should know about, well then it's reasonable to consider they chose to wait for something real, like a crash, before letting the SHTF. What would have been the impact of sales had they had a grounding just months after first flight? Those are signed contracts with penalties for withdrawing. An earlier grounding means less signed contracts.

Anyway, we've been looking for a reason to believe that a mult-sensor redundancy was at least attempted (because it's just baffling to think otherwise), but due to compressed schedule, wasn't fully tested and certified. The above fits that reasoning. And Boeing hasn't said the magic words that unequivocally mean a single-sensor design was intended. Words like "MCAS was updated to _look at_ two sensors rather than one" doesn't mean jack as far as I'm concerned. That could mean anything, including a multi-sensor design that had an overlooked and untested bug in it. With the bug, yeah, the wrong data gets source selected for MCAS, so they aren't exactly lying when they say MCAS v1 used one sensor. But if it wasn't designed to use one sensor, but to use two sensors, then we're getting to the real problem - senior management deciding to cut corners despite impact to safety, not allowing the test phase and certification phase to complete themselves naturally. And we know they did a risk assessment for the Max before even starting on any work, and someone had to come up with the numbers for worst case scenarios for a project on a compressed schedule.
Just one sensor,
Oh just one se-en-sor,
Just one sensor,
Ooh ooh oo-ooh
Oo-oo-ooh.
 
IADFCO
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 10, 2019 3:30 am

According to AW&ST, https://aviationweek.com/commercial-avi ... nd-737-max (free registration required):

"The public has until May 15 to comment on the draft FSB report. Approving it will be a key step in getting the MAX fleet back in the air, along with having regulators sign off on changes to the MCAS software that Boeing is finalizing.

FAA said it will consider the public’s input before making a final decision on the FSB’s contents. “We are looking forward to reviewing all of the comments,” the agency said."

I have looked everywhere on the FAA web site, including using the "search" function, but I haven't been able to find any information on this and, in particular, on how to file a comment. Does anybody know how to do it?

Thanks
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 10, 2019 4:18 am

IADFCO wrote:
According to AW&ST, https://aviationweek.com/commercial-avi ... nd-737-max (free registration required):

"The public has until May 15 to comment on the draft FSB report. Approving it will be a key step in getting the MAX fleet back in the air, along with having regulators sign off on changes to the MCAS software that Boeing is finalizing.

FAA said it will consider the public’s input before making a final decision on the FSB’s contents. “We are looking forward to reviewing all of the comments,” the agency said."

I have looked everywhere on the FAA web site, including using the "search" function, but I haven't been able to find any information on this and, in particular, on how to file a comment. Does anybody know how to do it?

Thanks


I'd imagine if you can find the draft report that the information on where to comment is there. It will almost certainly be a mailing address. They'd get way too many comments if it was a web page form.

If you do comment and want them to take it seriously I'd recommend commenting specifically on things in the draft and avoid over the top stuff that appears in this thread. For example I don't think "the 737MAX is a death trap and shouldn't be allowed to fly until all Boeing executives are sent to prison" will be taken seriously.

Edit: I was wrong, you can email. Here is the page https://www.faa.gov/aircraft/draft_docs/fsb/.
 
jh380
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 10, 2019 4:20 am

IADFCO wrote:
According to AW&ST,
I have looked everywhere on the FAA web site, including using the "search" function, but I haven't been able to find any information on this and, in particular, on how to file a comment. Does anybody know how to do it?

Thanks

I believe this to be the link. Backed into it from Google.
https://www.faa.gov/aircraft/draft_docs/fsb/
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 10, 2019 4:41 am

jh380 wrote:
IADFCO wrote:
According to AW&ST,
I have looked everywhere on the FAA web site, including using the "search" function, but I haven't been able to find any information on this and, in particular, on how to file a comment. Does anybody know how to do it?

Thanks

I believe this to be the link. Backed into it from Google.
https://www.faa.gov/aircraft/draft_docs/fsb/

Also, this document isn't very exciting. It isn't a report about MCAS or anything else. It's just basically the differences in an the 737 models. The draft is basically just adding reference to MCAS as a difference.
 
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7BOEING7
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 10, 2019 5:18 am

Here are the highlihts:

"2 INTRODUCTION Aircraft Evaluation Groups (AEG) are responsible for working with aircraft manufacturers and modifiers during the development and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) certification of new and modified aircraft to determine: 1) the pilot type rating; 2) flightcrew member training, checking, and currency requirements; and 3) operational suitability.

3 HIGHLIGHTS OF CHANGE The purpose of this revision is to add the B-737-7, B-737-8200, and Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS). In Appendix 3, the Design Differences Table from the Boeing 737-800 to the Boeing 737-8 is revised to include ATA 27 Flight Controls addition of MCAS.

In March 2019, the FSB conducted an evaluation of the modified Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) for training and checking differences determination. The system enhancement is incorporated on all MAX series aircraft. The MCAS system was found to be operationally suitable.

B-737-MAX Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS). The Speed Trim System (STS) provides speed and pitch augmentation. Speed stability augmentation is provided by the Speed Trim function of STS. Pitch stability augmentation is provided by the MCAS function of STS. MCAS ground training must address system description, functionality, associated failure conditions, and flight crew alerting. These items must be included in initial, upgrade, transition, differences, and recurrent training.

9.8.9 The FSB found Level B training to be sufficient for initial, transition, and upgrade training between the B-737-NG and B-737-MAX series aircraft. Ground training for the B-737-NG to the B-737-MAX must include the following special emphasis areas:

a) Maneuvering Characteristic Augmentation System function of the Speed Trim System.
b) Flight control system to address the Elevator Jam Landing Assist system.
c) Landing Attitude Modifier (LAM) to address the two LAM system functions and associated flight spoiler deployments.
d) Gear handle operation to address normal and non-normal procedures.
e) Flight crew alerting"
 
xmp125a
Posts: 292
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 10, 2019 6:37 am

SEU wrote:
I have just watched this - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QytfYyHmxtc

Yes, its very Biased against boeing for media and to sell it.

A few points that have been said in this "documentary":

1) Two criminal cases against boeing - What are these exactly?
2) Is it true hundreds of pilots reported issues?
3) Is it true that MCAS was nowhere in the manuals for pilots?


3) is absolutely true, verified and no one disputes it. 1) There is not criminal case, (it cannot be so soon, because the investigation needs to complete first), but there are 2 criminal investigations. One by FBI, other by DOT, afaik. Don't know about 2) but it seems it would be prudent not dispute those claims so easily!
 
XRAYretired
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 10, 2019 7:34 am

sgrow787 wrote:
XRAYretired wrote:
sgrow787 wrote:
(1) New News: AOA Disagree Alert logic was not working correctly (turns off when the logic detects AOA option not installed). Boeing engineers (but not senior management!) knew about it a year before the first crash but didn't tell anybody about it.
(2) If Source Selection logic is triggered by the Disagree logic, then .... is this now a possible root cause for incorrect trigger of MCAS in both accidents?
Disagree? -----yes----> Source Selection -----> Use good AOA sensor (discarding bad)
Disagree? -----no ----> Use onside AOA sensor (hey we don't have a disagree, so AOA-onside must be good if it doesn't disagree with AOA-offside) ----> let's use AOA-onside even if it may be bad** ----> CRASH


So all that Disagree logic (threshold and hysteresis logic) and all that Source Selection logic (to determine which sensor is good) goes down the drain (ie not used) because someone tied in (at the last minute?) an AOA install option. Which in their minds would have to mean "hey, if you don't think you need this option, well then you better have some really good pilots to deal with what we're gonna give you next".

**Wait, I didn't mean to say that. I didn't. I meant to say, hey, we put alot of resources into that Disagree logic when I was on the team. I know it works. Besides why would they screw that up? Anyway, they need this stuff shipped tomorrow, and I'm not getting any attaboys for finding problems at this stage. So what I mean is.... I'm on the Source Selection project, and that disagree stuff is... well not my problem. It's not. I can't do everything. Right? Right!!?? Right.


I think you are conflating the FCC and PFD that are entirely separate. The PFD will not be commanding the FCC to only perform those tasks it wishes to display the output of!

Ray


It's very reasonable to consider the disagree logic is in the FCC, along with source selection logic, and that the PFD in a all-glass cockpit is simply to display data.

One wonders if senior management knew (come on!) of the issue, but failed to notify the FAA and airlines because they knew that would result in an immediate grounding. And if they were convinced that MCAS was some minor enhancement to make a safe plane safer, or for whatever reason something no one should know about, well then it's reasonable to consider they chose to wait for something real, like a crash, before letting the SHTF. What would have been the impact of sales had they had a grounding just months after first flight? Those are signed contracts with penalties for withdrawing. An earlier grounding means less signed contracts.

Anyway, we've been looking for a reason to believe that a mult-sensor redundancy was at least attempted (because it's just baffling to think otherwise), but due to compressed schedule, wasn't fully tested and certified. The above fits that reasoning. And Boeing hasn't said the magic words that unequivocally mean a single-sensor design was intended. Words like "MCAS was updated to _look at_ two sensors rather than one" doesn't mean jack as far as I'm concerned. That could mean anything, including a multi-sensor design that had an overlooked and untested bug in it. With the bug, yeah, the wrong data gets source selected for MCAS, so they aren't exactly lying when they say MCAS v1 used one sensor. But if it wasn't designed to use one sensor, but to use two sensors, then we're getting to the real problem - senior management deciding to cut corners despite impact to safety, not allowing the test phase and certification phase to complete themselves naturally. And we know they did a risk assessment for the Max before even starting on any work, and someone had to come up with the numbers for worst case scenarios for a project on a compressed schedule.


MCASv1.0 was a gamble in my view, either conciously or unconciously taken. Following the Lion Air event they appear to have doubled down on the gamble conciously betting they could get the fix in before any further event in my view. 346 people lost.

Ray
 
Noshow
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 10, 2019 7:46 am

Why is there not much support for more pilot training concerning MAX and trim anomaly handling at this time? If some come to the conclusion already that the pilots are to blame wouldn't better training be the next thing to implement?

It feels like "they" just want it to be ungrounded and nothing else changes? This will neither convince foreign authorities nor the flying public.
 
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flyingphil
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 10, 2019 9:37 am

So.. after the blame game is over and the final reports are out..

# what will the 737MAX fix be? Just a software fix? or something more substantial.. adding a third AOA vane? Structural modifications?

# so the FAA gets leaned on by the industry and gives a green light, but with what conditions?
# then you have the pilots unions.. American & Southwest pilots are clearly not happy
# then the the other worldwide regulators have to give the green light.. they wont just accept the FAA’s word
# what about the insurance premiums?

Anyone care to put an estimate of when we can expect to see the 737MAX flying over your town? maybe with your family onboard?

The Paris Airshow is coming up in a months time.. not sure that I would want to be on the Boeing stand.
 
kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 10, 2019 10:29 am

flyingphil wrote:
So.. after the blame game is over and the final reports are out..

# what will the 737MAX fix be? Just a software fix? or something more substantial.. adding a third AOA vane? Structural modifications?

IMHO at this point, it is something like:
65% software and training modifications, plane flying by fall
30% for aerodynamic changes, return to service mid-2020 to early 2021.
5% for all frames buyback and storage in desert.
 
Babyshark
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 10, 2019 11:21 am

Apologize if already posted but I’m in a hurry, ignore it if it was

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features ... ced-safety
 
aircatalonia
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 10, 2019 12:16 pm

What is the earliest date these planes could be back in the air? Any chance they could be flying by the end of August?
 
kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 10, 2019 12:23 pm

aircatalonia wrote:
What is the earliest date these planes could be back in the air? Any chance they could be flying by the end of August?

If everything goes very well, August is possible. Right now estimates are that reviews which just started will take 3 months; which puts most optimistic estimates on late July.
Some expect late May for FAA rubber stamping software fix, but that is IMHO highly unrealistic in the existing situation.
 
DeltaWings
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 10, 2019 12:44 pm

As it seems, the new engines are too big for the 737 design. Boeing should consider making a quad out of it. Four small engines should fit easily underneath the wings.
Anyway, the 737 Max name is mud now.
Boeing should rename it to the 707 Max.
Homer: Marge, it takes two to lie. One to lie and one to listen.
 
Andy33
Posts: 2567
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 10, 2019 12:55 pm

aircatalonia wrote:
What is the earliest date these planes could be back in the air? Any chance they could be flying by the end of August?


In which country? It is entirely possible that different countries will impose different conditions for a lifting of the ban, which will take more or less time to implement.
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 10, 2019 1:43 pm

Babyshark wrote:
Apologize if already posted but I’m in a hurry, ignore it if it was

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features ... ced-safety


That's a good article and very indicative of Corporate America at this point in time - Short term gains are everything damn the long term.
 
IADFCO
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 10, 2019 2:58 pm

@jh380, @planecane: many thanks for the link -- you saved me who knows how much time on the phone trying to get that information from the FAA.

After reading the proposed changes, my reaction has been: is that all?

IMHO, one key missing item is what happens when MCAS is deactivated, and what level of training is needed to cope with that situation.

Based on Boeing's presentation as reported here: https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safe ... r-737-max/ (does anybody know if there is some official source, e.g., a Boeing document?), MCAS can now be deactivated in at least two cases: (i) in the case of an "AOA Disagree" due to sensor failure, and (ii) in normal operation, no failures, no AoA Disagree", after one activation. Then, the aircraft would be flying without the augmentation that MCAS is supposed to provide, and was deemed necessary by Boeing, otherwise the system presumably wouldn't have been installed in the first place. Are the handling characteristics close enough to, say, those of the NG, that computer based training, no simulator or actual flight, is deemed sufficient?
 
GalaxyFlyer
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 10, 2019 3:25 pm

I read the Bloomberg article and it also points the FAA’s limitation in evaluating designs. A six-year regional pilot with no engineering or flight test background in charge of evaluating training. Really? Anyone want to guess how long it took to bowl her over?

GF
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 10, 2019 3:26 pm

IADFCO wrote:
@jh380, @planecane: many thanks for the link -- you saved me who knows how much time on the phone trying to get that information from the FAA.

After reading the proposed changes, my reaction has been: is that all?

IMHO, one key missing item is what happens when MCAS is deactivated, and what level of training is needed to cope with that situation.

Based on Boeing's presentation as reported here: https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safe ... r-737-max/ (does anybody know if there is some official source, e.g., a Boeing document?), MCAS can now be deactivated in at least two cases: (i) in the case of an "AOA Disagree" due to sensor failure, and (ii) in normal operation, no failures, no AoA Disagree", after one activation. Then, the aircraft would be flying without the augmentation that MCAS is supposed to provide, and was deemed necessary by Boeing, otherwise the system presumably wouldn't have been installed in the first place. Are the handling characteristics close enough to, say, those of the NG, that computer based training, no simulator or actual flight, is deemed sufficient?


Other than the controls getting a little light as you approach stall - and only if you are at light weights and full aft COG - No the MAX will not handle any differently.

There is no reason to expect that any pilot can't handle it - it just doesn't meet the FAR's. I would understand if the forces went negative - but there are no reports on that.

No different than going through an area of turbulence where the controls get light. It should not make it materially less safe at all.
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 10, 2019 3:27 pm

GalaxyFlyer wrote:
I read the Bloomberg article and it also points the FAA’s limitation in evaluating designs. A six-year regional pilot with no engineering or flight test background in charge of evaluating training. Really? Anyone want to guess how long it took to bowl her over?

GF


10 minutes?
 
xmp125a
Posts: 292
Joined: Mon Mar 11, 2019 6:38 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 10, 2019 4:47 pm

morrisond wrote:
Babyshark wrote:
Apologize if already posted but I’m in a hurry, ignore it if it was

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features ... ced-safety


That's a good article and very indicative of Corporate America at this point in time - Short term gains are everything damn the long term.


I don't buy the argument that to be competitive with Airbus and profitable, they should cut corners as much as the article indicates. After all, as far as I know, Airbus produces its airplanes in Europe, pretty famous for its high taxation, strong regulation and strong unionization. And the production does not take place in cheap parts of EU (that would be Eastern Europe), it takes place in Germany, France, Spain and UK.The other plants are in USA (!), but only from 2011 on, and the plant in China was opened only recently (2015).

So how come Boeing is struggling so hard to compete with Airbus? Struggle that last for 20 years now, if Bloomberg is right? My bet is, that the management (or successive managements) made blunder after blunder (even worse blunder than A380) and all this was swept under the carpet by tightening the belt as described in the Bloomberg article. For example, Boeing did NOT expect Airbus will develop A320neo, and this was purely management blunder. Then upgrade to 737 was fast tracked and Engineering put under pressure, because not their fault and management's fault.

All these problems finally boiled over with 737MAX, with MCAS as one of manifestations. Therefore I still don't think MCAS is one-off blunder. If safety culture is compromised, there is basically very small probability they made only one "safety compromise".
 
xmp125a
Posts: 292
Joined: Mon Mar 11, 2019 6:38 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 10, 2019 4:58 pm

DeltaWings wrote:
As it seems, the new engines are too big for the 737 design. Boeing should consider making a quad out of it.


The goal is higher efficiency, not lower! Two engine airplanes are more efficient than four engine planes of same size, and the key component of the efficiency is high bypass ratio, e.g. how much more air is pushed around the jet core in comparison with how much air actually enters the jet core. High bypass ratios require large fans, therefore larger engines are more efficient. This gets to the core of the 737 frame's obsolescence - because the frame is low on the ground, it has no slides for overwing exits. So raising the frame would require emergency exit redesign. And so on, and on...
 
WPIAeroGuy
Posts: 323
Joined: Tue Aug 21, 2007 11:52 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 10, 2019 8:07 pm

xmp125a wrote:

See here: https://youtu.be/QytfYyHmxtc?t=2120 "We knew that FAA would not certify 2 sensor setup without level D training"


I’ve seen this stated before, and I’m not doubting it’s true, but what is the logic behind it? Why would two sensor inputs require sim time while 1 does not? I’m not an ATP, but this seems like something that could have been added as a single slide in the 2 hour iPad training and this whole ‘coverup’ argument would be moot.
-WPIAeroGuy
 
kalvado
Posts: 2823
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 10, 2019 8:11 pm

WPIAeroGuy wrote:
xmp125a wrote:

See here: https://youtu.be/QytfYyHmxtc?t=2120 "We knew that FAA would not certify 2 sensor setup without level D training"


I’ve seen this stated before, and I’m not doubting it’s true, but what is the logic behind it? Why would two sensor inputs require sim time while 1 does not? I’m not an ATP, but this seems like something that could have been added as a single slide in the 2 hour iPad training and this whole ‘coverup’ argument would be moot.

I wrote it elsewhere. This is my understanding, and don't blame me too hard if I am wrong:

if there is a minor system on the aircraft, which has negligible, if any, effect on flight safety, it's OK to let pilot read it once and forget. It is also OK for such system to be designed as somewhat faulty, not a big deal. E.g. depend on one not so reliable sensor.
If there is a system with a significant effect on flight safety, then design requirements also increase. Same with pilots -they must be actively aware of the system and be very aware of actions in case of a failure. That implies sim training.

Now MCAS is proven to be a significant flight risk through crazy failure mode. Eliminating the failure mode is a must - but that also means that system failure is flight safety critical, and pilots must be very aware - and see above.
I am not sure if FAA/EASA would be happy with some middle ground logic; so far what I read is that once something is critical - it is critical all the way.
 
User avatar
SomebodyInTLS
Posts: 1847
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 10, 2019 8:16 pm

WPIAeroGuy wrote:
xmp125a wrote:

See here: https://youtu.be/QytfYyHmxtc?t=2120 "We knew that FAA would not certify 2 sensor setup without level D training"


I’ve seen this stated before, and I’m not doubting it’s true, but what is the logic behind it? Why would two sensor inputs require sim time while 1 does not? I’m not an ATP, but this seems like something that could have been added as a single slide in the 2 hour iPad training and this whole ‘coverup’ argument would be moot.


I've been saying on here for months that it's probably just a case that one can be sold to the authorities as a patch on existing STS (no additional training or certification) while the other is different enough to be classed as a new system (hence additional training and certification).
"As with most things related to aircraft design, it's all about the trade-offs and much more nuanced than A.net likes to make out."
 
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7BOEING7
Posts: 3039
Joined: Fri Oct 12, 2012 5:28 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 10, 2019 8:33 pm

kalvado wrote:
WPIAeroGuy wrote:
xmp125a wrote:

See here: https://youtu.be/QytfYyHmxtc?t=2120 "We knew that FAA would not certify 2 sensor setup without level D training"


I’ve seen this stated before, and I’m not doubting it’s true, but what is the logic behind it? Why would two sensor inputs require sim time while 1 does not? I’m not an ATP, but this seems like something that could have been added as a single slide in the 2 hour iPad training and this whole ‘coverup’ argument would be moot.

I wrote it elsewhere. This is my understanding, and don't blame me too hard if I am wrong:

if there is a minor system on the aircraft, which has negligible, if any, effect on flight safety, it's OK to let pilot read it once and forget. It is also OK for such system to be designed as somewhat faulty, not a big deal. E.g. depend on one not so reliable sensor.
If there is a system with a significant effect on flight safety, then design requirements also increase. Same with pilots -they must be actively aware of the system and be very aware of actions in case of a failure. That implies sim training.

Now MCAS is proven to be a significant flight risk through crazy failure mode. Eliminating the failure mode is a must - but that also means that system failure is flight safety critical, and pilots must be very aware - and see above.
I am not sure if FAA/EASA would be happy with some middle ground logic; so far what I read is that once something is critical - it is critical all the way.


That's interesting, because with the "modified" MCAS, which is probably what it would have been +/- if it had been done correctly to begin with, the FSB is only going to require Level B training and "emphasis" -- no sim work. And ALPA appears to agree. I'm guessing something was lost in translation -- It sounds more likely that if the FAA had know the issues with MCAS 1, they would have required sim training if they allowed it to be certified in it's original form.
 
XRAYretired
Posts: 870
Joined: Fri Mar 15, 2019 11:21 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Fri May 10, 2019 8:59 pm

SomebodyInTLS wrote:
WPIAeroGuy wrote:
xmp125a wrote:

See here: https://youtu.be/QytfYyHmxtc?t=2120 "We knew that FAA would not certify 2 sensor setup without level D training"


I’ve seen this stated before, and I’m not doubting it’s true, but what is the logic behind it? Why would two sensor inputs require sim time while 1 does not? I’m not an ATP, but this seems like something that could have been added as a single slide in the 2 hour iPad training and this whole ‘coverup’ argument would be moot.


I've been saying on here for months that it's probably just a case that one can be sold to the authorities as a patch on existing STS (no additional training or certification) while the other is different enough to be classed as a new system (hence additional training and certification).


Yes. Its the only sensible conclusion. Sacrificed a dependable two sensor system for less dependable single sensor system to hide it away.

It worries me that the FAA FSB issued for the fix still references STS as if the penny hasn't dropped or the pretence continues for some reason?


Ray

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