I still don't get why a 'minor' system couldn't be fed with two sensors because of the fear of additional training. There is an equation done that need to be proved. I understand that MCAS was introduced that way, but the focus here is about 1 vs 2 sensors.

Is there any regulatory stuff to support that assumption?

XRAYretired wrote:

SomebodyInTLS wrote:

WPIAeroGuy wrote:

I’ve seen this stated before, and I’m not doubting it’s true, but what is the logic behind it? Why would two sensor inputs require sim time while 1 does not? I’m not an ATP, but this seems like something that could have been added as a single slide in the 2 hour iPad training and this whole ‘coverup’ argument would be moot.

I've been saying on here for months that it's probably just a case that one can be sold to the authorities as a patch on existing STS (no additional training or certification) while the other is different enough to be classed as a new system (hence additional training and certification).

Yes. Its the only sensible conclusion. Sacrificed a dependable two sensor system for less dependable single sensor system to hide it away.

It worries me that the FAA FSB issued for the fix still references STS as if the penny hasn't dropped or the pretence continues for some reason?


Ray

Pretense of what? If MCAS is a function added to STS what is the problem referencing it?

planecane wrote:

XRAYretired wrote:

SomebodyInTLS wrote:

I've been saying on here for months that it's probably just a case that one can be sold to the authorities as a patch on existing STS (no additional training or certification) while the other is different enough to be classed as a new system (hence additional training and certification).

Yes. Its the only sensible conclusion. Sacrificed a dependable two sensor system for less dependable single sensor system to hide it away.

It worries me that the FAA FSB issued for the fix still references STS as if the penny hasn't dropped or the pretence continues for some reason?


Ray

Pretense of what? If MCAS is a function added to STS what is the problem referencing it?

Its a function hosted by the FCC that commands electric trim same as AP is, AP is not described as part of STS.

Ray

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles ... like-taint

Looking grim for the 737MAX.

It could be caught up in a tussle between the various worldwide regulators that could go on for many months.

Meanwhile Boeing are still pumping out over 40 737MAX's a month.

I hope someone at Boeing is working hard on a 737 replacement.. the Paris Airshow next month will be interesting.

flyingphil wrote:

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-10/boeing-fights-to-bring-737-max-back-from-ford-pinto-like-taint

Looking grim for the 737MAX.

It could be caught up in a tussle between the various worldwide regulators that could go on for many months.

Meanwhile Boeing are still pumping out over 40 737MAX's a month.

I hope someone at Boeing is working hard on a 737 replacement.. the Paris Airshow next month will be interesting.

Interesting article!

This one is also good:

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles ... -documents

Pilots’ unions at Southwest Airlines Co., United Continental Holdings Inc. and American Airlines Group Inc. received federal grand jury subpoenas for documents relating to Boeing Co.’s grounded 737 Max.

The Southwest Airlines Pilots Association was given until May 24 to comply with the demand from the U.S. Justice Department’s criminal division, union President Jon Weaks said Friday. The Air Line Pilots Association, which represents aviators at United and other carriers, said it also received a subpoena. The Allied Pilots Association, whose members work for American, got one as well, said a person familiar with the matter.

and it gets worse ..
https://amp.cnn.com/cnn/2019/05/10/poli ... index.html

Some emergency checklists have not been updated since 1967...

I can't imagine this will be a quick fix.. could drag on for many more months ...

flyingphil wrote:

and it gets worse ..
https://amp.cnn.com/cnn/2019/05/10/poli ... index.html

Some emergency checklists have not been updated since 1967...

I can't imagine this will be a quick fix.. could drag on for many more months ...

But wait! Were they not just making a safe plane safer?

flyingphil wrote:

and it gets worse ..
https://amp.cnn.com/cnn/2019/05/10/poli ... index.html

Some emergency checklists have not been updated since 1967...

I can't imagine this will be a quick fix.. could drag on for many more months ...

This whole situation really makes me think of the overhaul of an old, but apparently fine, 2nd hand car.

Owner tries to fix one element that suddenly failed, leading him to discover other defective components, which in turn will have to get fixed, etc etc, leading to a hefty repair that is, in fact, worth much more time and money than initially thought.

The optimistic kind predicting the 737 MAX to get back in the air in 2 months time have been proven wrong, and I assume it will go on as the case worsens with new elements coming up. The MCAS issue was the breach that is now allowing the flood to jeopardize the whole ship. Good luck with that! Pandora box at its finest.

oschkosch wrote:

flyingphil wrote:

and it gets worse ..
https://amp.cnn.com/cnn/2019/05/10/poli ... index.html

Some emergency checklists have not been updated since 1967...

I can't imagine this will be a quick fix.. could drag on for many more months ...

But wait! Were they not just making a safe plane safer?

To be fair, it's probably because a lot of the systems haven't been updated since 1967... I guess at this point we can call it great-grandfathering?

bgm wrote:

oschkosch wrote:

flyingphil wrote:

and it gets worse ..
https://amp.cnn.com/cnn/2019/05/10/poli ... index.html

Some emergency checklists have not been updated since 1967...

I can't imagine this will be a quick fix.. could drag on for many more months ...

But wait! Were they not just making a safe plane safer?

To be fair, it's probably because a lot of the systems haven't been updated since 1967... I guess at this point we can call it great-grandfathering?

Yes, MAX is 'G4'. Wonder if the Chinese are in the mix for 'G5'!

bgm wrote:

oschkosch wrote:

flyingphil wrote:

and it gets worse ..
https://amp.cnn.com/cnn/2019/05/10/poli ... index.html

Some emergency checklists have not been updated since 1967...

I can't imagine this will be a quick fix.. could drag on for many more months ...

But wait! Were they not just making a safe plane safer?

To be fair, it's probably because a lot of the systems haven't been updated since 1967... I guess at this point we can call it great-grandfathering?

How would you call using round wheels? great-great-great-great-great-great-grandfathering?

VV wrote:

How would you call using round wheels?

A smoother ride?

bgm wrote:

oschkosch wrote:

flyingphil wrote:

and it gets worse ..
https://amp.cnn.com/cnn/2019/05/10/poli ... index.html

Some emergency checklists have not been updated since 1967...

I can't imagine this will be a quick fix.. could drag on for many more months ...

But wait! Were they not just making a safe plane safer?

To be fair, it's probably because a lot of the systems haven't been updated since 1967

As far as I know the English language hasn’t changed since 1967. Or is it that they will be requested to add some „you know“s, some YouTube-links and some emoticons so that it’s up to date. :-/

flyingphil wrote:

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-10/boeing-fights-to-bring-737-max-back-from-ford-pinto-like-taint

Looking grim for the 737MAX.

It could be caught up in a tussle between the various worldwide regulators that could go on for many months.

Meanwhile Boeing are still pumping out over 40 737MAX's a month.

I hope someone at Boeing is working hard on a 737 replacement.. the Paris Airshow next month will be interesting.

TFA says:

Chief Executive Officer Dennis Muilenburg and commercial-airplane chief Kevin McAllister have been hosting regular conference calls with airline executives. And the company has invited Max operators and lessors to a half-dozen sessions around the world to discuss the specifics of the software changes, along with the logistics of taking planes out of storage.

I think it's beginning to look grim for Muilenburg and McAllister.

They may not have been the ones in charge when MCAS was conceived, but they are the ones who were in charge when it crashed, and thus they own the crisis management phase.

As noted, it's dragging out longer than they predicted, and it's still very much at question if the updated dates can be held, and in the end, scapegoats must be found.

I think Boeing and the 737 are too big to fail, but Muilenburg and McAllister and many of their lieutenants and corporals aren't.

The more I read the more I think Boeing has lost vast amounts of customer confidence that could haunt them for years. Deservedly so. The article I posted by Greg Travis that posted last week from IEEE spectrum was really on target.

flyingphil wrote:

and it gets worse ..
https://amp.cnn.com/cnn/2019/05/10/poli ... index.html

Some emergency checklists have not been updated since 1967...

I can't imagine this will be a quick fix.. could drag on for many more months ...

For the media, right?

More misinformation that will tell the average reader to believe that both crews followed the runaway stabilizer checklist. Neither did, but the media will not tell you this important piece of information, of course.

The article can be summed up as creating a sensational story when there isn't one.

This is a surprise. Despite the problems, Boeing is not suffering badly as of yet.

https://www.fool.com/investing/2019/04/ ... 7-max.aspx

NightStar wrote:

This is a surprise. Despite the problems, Boeing is not suffering badly as of yet.

https://www.fool.com/investing/2019/04/ ... 7-max.aspx

Just a guess that Q1 was still a little too early for exposure to the unraveling of the bad news.

AVGeekNY wrote:

NightStar wrote:

This is a surprise. Despite the problems, Boeing is not suffering badly as of yet.

https://www.fool.com/investing/2019/04/ ... 7-max.aspx

Just a guess that Q1 was still a little too early for exposure to the unraveling of the bad news.

Its good PR that, "first few months of 2019" the max was grounded after that.

Still an interesting read though, I think the Airbus backlog is making it difficult for them to sell A320s 4-5-6 years down the line, hence the orders for the A350 mainly

flyingphil wrote:

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-10/boeing-fights-to-bring-737-max-back-from-ford-pinto-like-taint

Looking grim for the 737MAX.

It could be caught up in a tussle between the various worldwide regulators that could go on for many months.

Meanwhile Boeing are still pumping out over 40 737MAX's a month.

I hope someone at Boeing is working hard on a 737 replacement.. the Paris Airshow next month will be interesting.

How did you draw these conclusions from that article? There are representatives from many countries convened to review the issue. The FAA has brought in NASA and air Force experts. I expect that approval for lifting the grounding will be relatively lock step among all countries. Whether that is in August 2019 or 2020 I can't speculate.

One thing I guarantee is that there will be no announcement of a 737 replacement at the Paris air show.

This i probably old news, but the claim that MCAS relied on only one AoA sensor was a deliberate design choice in order to avoid extra training for pilots, since new two-sensor features would require just that, is horrifying.

https://youtu.be/QytfYyHmxtc?t=35m23s

bgm wrote:

VV wrote:

How would you call using round wheels?

A smoother ride?

Old system can be still very valid and still fully compliant with the rules or have the same level of safety.

If a new version of an aircraft is developed, I am pretty sure it has to respect the saltest regulations or things must be demonstrated to have equivalent level of safety.

So what's this fuss about grand fathering? It does not really exist any more. I am not even sure those guys who write those things have been involved in aircraft development or certification.

14ccKemiskt wrote:

This i probably old news, but the claim that MCAS relied on only one AoA sensor was a deliberate design choice in order to avoid extra training for pilots, since new two-sensor features would require just that, is horrifying.

https://youtu.be/QytfYyHmxtc?t=35m23s

And doesn't make any sense, especially because the FAA doesn't appear to require any sim training for MCAS 2.0 -- see discussion going on around near the end of previous page.

SEU wrote:

AVGeekNY wrote:

NightStar wrote:

This is a surprise. Despite the problems, Boeing is not suffering badly as of yet.

https://www.fool.com/investing/2019/04/ ... 7-max.aspx

Just a guess that Q1 was still a little too early for exposure to the unraveling of the bad news.

Its good PR that, "first few months of 2019" the max was grounded after that.

Still an interesting read though, I think the Airbus backlog is making it difficult for them to sell A320s 4-5-6 years down the line, hence the orders for the A350 mainly

And it wouldn’t necessarily be in Airbus’s interest to try too hard to take advantage anyway. There have been one or two insightful articles on why Airbus doesn’t want this issue to become a catastrophe for the 737 program. Apart from the fact that due to Airbus’s backlog they can’t really take that much advantage in the short term even if airlines were willing to jump ship, if the MAX were to continue receiving bad publicity and the program deemed a lost cause by Boeing, it would force them to go full steam ahead with the NSA right away. Which in turn would force A to react.

Far better and cheaper to maintain the very profitable current status quo than for things to get so bad for B they decide to ditch the MAX.

flyingphil wrote:

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-10/boeing-fights-to-bring-737-max-back-from-ford-pinto-like-taint

It could be caught up in a tussle between the various worldwide regulators that could go on for many months.

If there is a tussle, will be between the FAA and the rest of the World.

EU, Japan, Canada and China airworthiness authorities will reach consensus before the FAA 23 May meeting. Have already met twice in the UK, and meet again immediately before the 23rd, and again after. FAA must be aware of their expectations and have addressed them. And Boeing too.

14ccKemiskt wrote:

This i probably old news, but the claim that MCAS relied on only one AoA sensor was a deliberate design choice in order to avoid extra training for pilots, since new two-sensor features would require just that, is horrifying.

https://youtu.be/QytfYyHmxtc?t=35m23s

That video really over-dramatized the situation, especially coming from that host.

XRAYretired wrote:

planecane wrote:

XRAYretired wrote:

Yes. Its the only sensible conclusion. Sacrificed a dependable two sensor system for less dependable single sensor system to hide it away.

It worries me that the FAA FSB issued for the fix still references STS as if the penny hasn't dropped or the pretence continues for some reason?


Ray

Pretense of what? If MCAS is a function added to STS what is the problem referencing it?

Its a function hosted by the FCC that commands electric trim same as AP is, AP is not described as part of STS.

Ray

From B737Theory

Speed Trim System (STS)
An electrical stabilizer trim input automatically controls certain aircraft attitude conditions when undergoing large thrust changes in the lower speed region, such as takeoff and go-around. These conditions require high thrust settings and are especially present with a low weight aircraft and a relatively aft center of gravity where the aircraft wants to “nose up”. The STS supports the crew during these conditions when manually controlling the aircraft without the use of an autopilot by an opposite stabilizer trim, commanding a nose down force by use of the autopilot trim.

Doesn't this sound exactly like MCAS except in a different part of the flight envelope? Therefore, isn't MCAS just STS applied in a different part of the flight envelope? I don't understand the obsession with it being a problem that Boeing says MCAS is an enhancement of STS. From everything I've read, that is exactly what it is.

And BTW, STS (and MCAS) both use AP trim when in manual flight. That's why AP is not described as part of STS, because it isn't. MCAS is described as part of STS, because it is.

I thought this could be a thread on its own. If not, merge it with one of the many MAX threads.

I was thinking and got worried about something for boeing.

With current models of the MAX being under scrutiny in regards to certification with the latest news showing some emergency procedures havent been updated since the 1960s, could the MAX 10s certification be under threat? What I mean by that is will pilots be allowed to fly it without full training with their current type rating. Its a lot different to the NG and other max models.

This could get a lot worse for Boeing the more and more I think about it. It could potentially eat the max 10 EIS date as well.

planecane wrote:

XRAYretired wrote:

From B737Theory

Speed Trim System (STS)
An electrical stabilizer trim input automatically controls certain aircraft attitude conditions when undergoing large thrust changes in the lower speed region, such as takeoff and go-around. These conditions require high thrust settings and are especially present with a low weight aircraft and a relatively aft center of gravity where the aircraft wants to “nose up”. The STS supports the crew during these conditions when manually controlling the aircraft without the use of an autopilot by an opposite stabilizer trim, commanding a nose down force by use of the autopilot trim.

Doesn't this sound exactly like MCAS except in a different part of the flight envelope? Therefore, isn't MCAS just STS applied in a different part of the flight envelope? I don't understand the obsession with it being a problem that Boeing says MCAS is an enhancement of STS. From everything I've read, that is exactly what it is.

And BTW, STS (and MCAS) both use AP trim when in manual flight. That's why AP is not described as part of STS, because it isn't. MCAS is described as part of STS, because it is.

Must be powerful reasons why MCAS was named separately, when initially it started life as STS Mk2, and then kept firmly in the shade for certification.

Presumably, FAA said STS is finished from grandfathering perspective on the NG. No further developments, so MCAS couldn't be STS enhanced.

As far as I know there is no MCAS on the Max 10.

Every derivative and new model is going to come under much greater scrutiny. The question is from when and by how much?

The 10, by default, is going to be the subject of special attention.

We have already seen Airbus senior management using terms like commonsense, measured, carefully considered.........

Corporate speak for don't burn either A or B..

Of course companies building brand new designs are keen to see the playing fields levelled. Not only do A & B have volume and existing customers on their side, but use grandfathering to create almost insurmountable barriers for new entrants.

The times they are a changing.

The MAX 10 is the least of Boeing’s concerns.

oschkosch wrote:

flyingphil wrote:

and it gets worse ..
https://amp.cnn.com/cnn/2019/05/10/poli ... index.html

Some emergency checklists have not been updated since 1967...

I can't imagine this will be a quick fix.. could drag on for many more months ...

But wait! Were they not just making a safe plane safer?

Do you have some sort of data to counter the excellent safety record of the Boeing 737?

7BOEING7 wrote:

14ccKemiskt wrote:

This i probably old news, but the claim that MCAS relied on only one AoA sensor was a deliberate design choice in order to avoid extra training for pilots, since new two-sensor features would require just that, is horrifying.

https://youtu.be/QytfYyHmxtc?t=35m23s

And doesn't make any sense, especially because the FAA doesn't appear to require any sim training for MCAS 2.0 -- see discussion going on around near the end of previous page.

At what point do Boeing, WN, AA, etc. finally throw in the towel and cut their losses by agreeing to sim training (level D or whatever) for the MAX? I imagine Boeing and the airlines can work out some financial arrangement re the zillions of dollars Boeing supposedly would owe if the airlines couldn't transition crew to the MAX with just an iPad. The current situation has got to be costing all parties a lot in dollars (as an American politician once said a few decades ago: "A billion here, a billion there; pretty soon it adds up to real money.") and business goodwill. And, truth be told, AA, WN, and other airlines are sort of "un-idicted co-conspirators" since they originally exerted their share of pressure on Boeing to make a 21st Century version of the 737 that pilots could step into with virtually no transition training and start making money for their employers (I believe that AA publicly announced they were buying the MAX before Boeing publicly announced they were going to be making it).

Everett Dirksen was the politician.


GF

SEU wrote:

I thought this could be a thread on its own. If not, merge it with one of the many MAX threads.

I was thinking and got worried about something for boeing.

With current models of the MAX being under scrutiny in regards to certification with the latest news showing some emergency procedures havent been updated since the 1960s, could the MAX 10s certification be under threat? What I mean by that is will pilots be allowed to fly it without full training with their current type rating. Its a lot different to the NG and other max models.
.

First the fact that "some emergency procedures have not been updated since 1967" is, I hate to say it, but FAKE NEWS -- you could probably say the same thing about the A320NEO except it would be 1987 -- that's still 30 years. Emergency procedures are updated whenever there's a new system, a new switch name, an accident where some of the blame falls on the checklist -- they are not stagnant. If there are 1 or 2 out there that haven't changed since the original 737-100 took flight it's because it's the same system and there has been no reason to change it. For example if you get an OIL FILTER BYPASS light the procedures used in 1976 (that's the farthest back I can find) are the same procedures used today -- the light means the same thing and the procedures are the same -- so????

Oh, and second, the differences are minimal, basically a non-event.

7BOEING7 wrote:

SEU wrote:

I thought this could be a thread on its own. If not, merge it with one of the many MAX threads.

I was thinking and got worried about something for boeing.

With current models of the MAX being under scrutiny in regards to certification with the latest news showing some emergency procedures havent been updated since the 1960s, could the MAX 10s certification be under threat? What I mean by that is will pilots be allowed to fly it without full training with their current type rating. Its a lot different to the NG and other max models.
.

First the fact that "some emergency procedures have not been updated since 1967" is, I hate to say it, but FAKE NEWS -- you could probably say the same thing about the A320NEO except it would be 1987 -- that's still 30 years. Emergency procedures are updated whenever there's a new system, a new switch name, an accident where some of the blame falls on the checklist -- they are not stagnant. If there are 1 or 2 out there that haven't changed since the original 737-100 took flight it's because it's the same system and there has been no reason to change it. For example if you get an OIL FILTER BYPASS light the procedures used in 1976 (that's the farthest back I can find) are the same procedures used today -- the light means the same thing and the procedures are the same -- so????

Oh, and second, the differences are minimal, basically a non-event.

Yes, an emergency descent is still an emergency descent. It doesn't matter if it is 1967 or 2019.

I happened to hear Richard Quest of CNN describe the "AoA Disagree" brouhaha as "a bit of a red herring". It was nice to hear a news person with an understanding of the actual issues and not going for the easy headline.

res training - surely there could be something between a $15 million simulator and a $700 iPad. I suspect that an XBox using a custom Flight Simulator plus a custom bit of hardware could be build for well under $100K, maybe a fraction of that. And a Boeing test pilot could explain any differences between an actual MAX versus a simulated MAX experiencing MCAS in its various failure modes. It would be well to build a little muscle memory in that memory check list.

hivue wrote:

7BOEING7 wrote:

14ccKemiskt wrote:

This i probably old news, but the claim that MCAS relied on only one AoA sensor was a deliberate design choice in order to avoid extra training for pilots, since new two-sensor features would require just that, is horrifying.

https://youtu.be/QytfYyHmxtc?t=35m23s

And doesn't make any sense, especially because the FAA doesn't appear to require any sim training for MCAS 2.0 -- see discussion going on around near the end of previous page.

At what point do Boeing, WN, AA, etc. finally throw in the towel and cut their losses by agreeing to sim training (level D or whatever) for the MAX? I imagine Boeing and the airlines can work out some financial arrangement re the zillions of dollars Boeing supposedly would owe if the airlines couldn't transition crew to the MAX with just an iPad. The current situation has got to be costing all parties a lot in dollars (as an American politician once said a few decades ago: "A billion here, a billion there; pretty soon it adds up to real money.") and business goodwill. And, truth be told, AA, WN, and other airlines are sort of "un-idicted co-conspirators" since they originally exerted their share of pressure on Boeing to make a 21st Century version of the 737 that pilots could step into with virtually no transition training and start making money for their employers (I believe that AA publicly announced they were buying the MAX before Boeing publicly announced they were going to be making it).

With MCAS 2.0 please explain exactly what they would be training in the SIM for. People keep insisting on this need for SIM training in order to lift the grounding. If it is needed, I'd like somebody who is actually an expert (pilot, instructor, etc.) to say it is needed and explain why.

MCAS 2.0 will only activate erroneously if BOTH AoA sensors fail indicating nose high AND are within 5° of each other. This is incredibly unlikely. If it does happen, it will trim down a maximum of 2.5° one time and will be interrupted and stopped by a pilot trim input. So, what needs to be simulated?

Future MCAS 2.0 will be deactivated after one cycle (not sure if just for the moment or the rest of the entire flight) but then the airplane will fly „unprotected“ by MCAS 2.0.

This system degradation combined with the MAX’s raw flight behavior (easy elevator feel close to a stall) should be trained in the sim to practically prepare the pilots for it.

Noshow wrote:

Future MCAS 2.0 will be deactivated after one cycle (not sure if just for the moment or the rest of the entire flight) but then the airplane will fly „unprotected“ by MCAS 2.0.

This system degradation combined with the MAX’s raw flight behavior (easy elevator feel close to a stall) should be trained in the sim to practically prepare the pilots for it.

In normal operations nobody should be flying in the part of the envelope that MCAS activates in. My assumption would be that in the event of AoA disagree (in which case MCAS is disabled) the checklist will include slowing to a speed where MCAS isn't needed. I used speed as an example because I think I remember MCAS described as intended for high speed, high thrust, high AoA situations.

Honestly, if ALPA is not requesting SIM training you have to assume there is no need for it. A pilot union isn't going to just be OK with flying the MAX without SIM training if a significant number of pilots feel it is needed for safe operations.

I think Boeing may have to eat the US$1M/frame charge, which is going to hurt. Right now, it seems as if they are trying to have their cake and eat it, too. They want a fix that isn't going to mean sim training, but I'm not sure that the various international regulators are going to let that happen, and US customers aren't going to buy a model that needs to be modified before it can be sold internationally.

Slow manual flight with flaps up (departure, go around) might be the more likely scenario?

Noshow wrote:

Slow manual flight with flaps up (departure, go around) might be the more likely scenario?

I hope and pray that I'm never on any aircraft that is approaching the edge of the flight envelope and stall during climb out or a go around.

STS activates in those scenarios but I don't believe MCAS is designed for that. For sure MCAS doesn't activate with flaps out which is the configuration for the first phase of climb or go around.

I am talking about right afterwards. Then the flaps are up.

TTailedTiger wrote:

Do you have some sort of data to counter the excellent safety record of the Boeing 737?

Boeing made that comment in relation to the MAX 7/8. This whole thread and the issue that Boeing faces is about the MAX 7/8. There is quite a bit of data to counter a claim that it has an excellent safety record.

Noshow wrote:

I am talking about right afterwards. Then the flaps are up.

Yes, but the aircraft should not be anywhere near the AoA where MCAS is designed to operate at that point. Therefore, if it is disabled the pilots would not need to do anything different.

DocLightning wrote:

I think Boeing may have to eat the US$1M/frame charge, which is going to hurt. Right now, it seems as if they are trying to have their cake and eat it, too. They want a fix that isn't going to mean sim training, but I'm not sure that the various international regulators are going to let that happen, and US customers aren't going to buy a model that needs to be modified before it can be sold internationally.

The fix won't be any different. There may be foreign countries that require SIM training if the FAA doesn't but the aircraft will be the same.

International regulators & airlines will not easily let B off the hook from sim training to re-certification etc.
They, except the FAA, can now rightfully say they were lied to by B. If they let Max fly again without very tough conditions & it crashes again, they can rightfully be accused of sharing as much blame as B.
Why would they relish such a prospect ?