zoom321 wrote:

International regulators & airlines will not easily let B off the hook from sim training to re-certification etc.
They, except the FAA, can now rightfully say they were lied to by B. If they let Max fly again without very tough conditions & it crashes again, they can rightfully be accused of sharing as much blame as B.
Why would they relish such a prospect ?

International regulators are involved in the process with the FAA. The FAA has brought in outside experts from NASA and the air Force. If it is determined that the MCAS 2.0 fix will prevent incidents from becoming crashes and that nothing about it requires simulator training and European regulators insist on a complete recertification, the US can (and will) retaliate and make Airbus recertify the A320NEO and A330NEO from scratch.

Some countries may require SIM training for no real reason because it sounds good to the public.

Noshow wrote:

Let's better train the pilots to hand fly the MAX without MCAS.

That collides with "no Xtra Simtime" ( and some certification requirements ).

The way conversion to MAX was handled has all the attributes of a sinister trap set for nefarious reasons.

7BOEING7 wrote:

SEU wrote:

I thought this could be a thread on its own. If not, merge it with one of the many MAX threads.

I was thinking and got worried about something for boeing.

With current models of the MAX being under scrutiny in regards to certification with the latest news showing some emergency procedures havent been updated since the 1960s, could the MAX 10s certification be under threat? What I mean by that is will pilots be allowed to fly it without full training with their current type rating. Its a lot different to the NG and other max models.
.

First the fact that "some emergency procedures have not been updated since 1967" is, I hate to say it, but FAKE NEWS -- you could probably say the same thing about the A320NEO except it would be 1987 -- that's still 30 years. Emergency procedures are updated whenever there's a new system, a new switch name, an accident where some of the blame falls on the checklist -- they are not stagnant. If there are 1 or 2 out there that haven't changed since the original 737-100 took flight it's because it's the same system and there has been no reason to change it. For example if you get an OIL FILTER BYPASS light the procedures used in 1976 (that's the farthest back I can find) are the same procedures used today -- the light means the same thing and the procedures are the same -- so????

Oh, and second, the differences are minimal, basically a non-event.

So out of my whole post, you pick up on the emergency proceedures. What do you think about the MAX 10 now. Its a lot different?

I don't usually agree with Aboulafia, but:

“They made the wrong calculation,” said Richard Aboulafia, an aerospace analyst with Teal Group, in weighing short-term liability costs versus the risk of long-term brand damage. “Just explain what went wrong with the subsystem, and explain everything about it. Make this as transparent as possible.”

But he's right here, and it matches what I've said from the beginning: the best strategy is not to try to hide from (still relatively minor, all things considered) legal liability and costs. Man up, show that you are that safety conscious and best airplane design organization that the world knows. Future opportunities and sales are far more valuable than attempting to minimize the impacts or costs of this moment's crisis.

And showing that you are on top of it does need to include admitting that mistakes were made (among mistakes by others, e.g., pilots), fixing the issue at hand, reviewing the entire plane for other issues, understanding the process problem that lead this problem, fixing that, and ... some humility. Almost all of which is missing, with the possible exception of fixing the issue at hand. But even there, the software issue is just one part of the overall problem, and Boeing has been too focused on that. I think their QRH processes are unclear and in need of revision. I also dislike the attempt to iPad train people when the real issue is multi-mode, multi-warning, potentially-multicause emergency in critical flight phase. And IMHO, crews need actual sim training to get a better feel for that. Be it B or A airplane.

And if they don't do this properly, there's a danger that MAX remains the "MAX Casualties" or "If it ain't Boeing, my nose ain't pointing down" aircraft. Remember the time before the McD merger, when there was a joke about two groups of people in the world who would fly exclusively on Boeing planes: 1. Boeing engineers and 2. McDonnel-Douglas engineers. Would we joke like that today? Probably not. But Boeing can do it, it is a great company. They have the engineers. They have the financial capability. The 737 is a great aircraft, and its new version can be the safest version. The leadership just has to let the company do this.

planecane wrote:

zoom321 wrote:

International regulators & airlines will not easily let B off the hook from sim training to re-certification etc.
They, except the FAA, can now rightfully say they were lied to by B. If they let Max fly again without very tough conditions & it crashes again, they can rightfully be accused of sharing as much blame as B.
Why would they relish such a prospect ?

International regulators are involved in the process with the FAA. The FAA has brought in outside experts from NASA and the air Force. If it is determined that the MCAS 2.0 fix will prevent incidents from becoming crashes and that nothing about it requires simulator training and European regulators insist on a complete recertification, the US can (and will) retaliate and make Airbus recertify the A320NEO and A330NEO from scratch.

Some countries may require SIM training for no real reason because it sounds good to the public.

Initally, EASA set sim training as a prerequisite for MAX certification, then forgot all about it as the planes started rolling off production line. I’m not sure their initial concerns were for “no reason “, but I am really intrigued by whatever reasons they have for not following that up!

AirlineCritic wrote:

But he's right here, and it matches what I've said from the beginning: the best strategy is not to try to hide from (still relatively minor, all things considered) legal liability and costs.

That does not work when "being open" will expose all the accummulated insidiousness of for profit intentional hiding badly designed features.

It would work with a plain defect in manufacturing or faulty design details.
But here the cause of the crashes was set up intentionally.

planecane wrote:

XRAYretired wrote:

planecane wrote:

Pretense of what? If MCAS is a function added to STS what is the problem referencing it?

Its a function hosted by the FCC that commands electric trim same as AP is, AP is not described as part of STS.

Ray

From B737Theory

Speed Trim System (STS)
An electrical stabilizer trim input automatically controls certain aircraft attitude conditions when undergoing large thrust changes in the lower speed region, such as takeoff and go-around. These conditions require high thrust settings and are especially present with a low weight aircraft and a relatively aft center of gravity where the aircraft wants to “nose up”. The STS supports the crew during these conditions when manually controlling the aircraft without the use of an autopilot by an opposite stabilizer trim, commanding a nose down force by use of the autopilot trim.

Doesn't this sound exactly like MCAS except in a different part of the flight envelope? Therefore, isn't MCAS just STS applied in a different part of the flight envelope? I don't understand the obsession with it being a problem that Boeing says MCAS is an enhancement of STS. From everything I've read, that is exactly what it is.

And BTW, STS (and MCAS) both use AP trim when in manual flight. That's why AP is not described as part of STS, because it isn't. MCAS is described as part of STS, because it is.

Well no, actually not convinced. The 'except' in your text really means except only maybe part of the last sentence in the B737theory quote actually is applicable to MCAS. The text does not support the functions of MCAS and no other credible reason for excluding such a description from the manuals has been offered other than to make it invisible.

I expect the changes being made will include a proper description.

None of the significant programmed functions of STS and MCAS coincide to any degree, as far as I can see so far (except maybe trim motor drive functions), and all of the fixes described for MCAS v2.0 are described in MCAS terms only and will have no discernible effect on STS because they are not the same system.

www.b737.org.uk/index.htm
MCAS (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System) is implemented on the 737 MAX to enhance longitudinal stability characteristics with flaps UP and at elevated Angles of Attack (AoA). The MCAS function commands nose down stabilizer to enhance pitch characteristics during steep turns with elevated load factors and during flaps up flight at airspeeds approaching stall. MCAS is activated without pilot input and only operates in manual, flaps up flight. The system is designed to allow the flight crew to use column trim switch or stabilizer aislestand cutout switches to override MCAS input. The function is commanded by the Flight Control Computer (FCC) using input data from sensors and other airplane systems.
The MCAS function becomes active when the AoA exceeds a threshold based on airspeed and altitude. MCAS will activate for up to 9.26 seconds before pausing for 5 seconds. Stabilizer incremental commands are limited to 2.5 degrees and are provided at a rate of 0.27 degrees per second. The magnitude of the stabilizer input is lower at high Mach number and greater at low Mach numbers (for the same AoA above the activation threshold).
After AoA falls below the hysteresis threshold (0.5 degrees below the activation angle), MCAS commands nose up stabilizer to return the aircraft to the trim state that existed before the MCAS activation.
The function is reset once angle of attack falls below the Angle of Attack threshold or if manual stabilizer commands are provided by the flight crew. If the original elevated AOA condition persists, the MCAS function commands another incremental stabilizer nose down command according to current aircraft Mach number at actuation.

Ray

7BOEING7 wrote:

SEU wrote:

I thought this could be a thread on its own. If not, merge it with one of the many MAX threads.

I was thinking and got worried about something for boeing.

With current models of the MAX being under scrutiny in regards to certification with the latest news showing some emergency procedures havent been updated since the 1960s, could the MAX 10s certification be under threat? What I mean by that is will pilots be allowed to fly it without full training with their current type rating. Its a lot different to the NG and other max models.
.

First the fact that "some emergency procedures have not been updated since 1967" is, I hate to say it, but FAKE NEWS -- you could probably say the same thing about the A320NEO except it would be 1987 -- that's still 30 years. Emergency procedures are updated whenever there's a new system, a new switch name, an accident where some of the blame falls on the checklist -- they are not stagnant. If there are 1 or 2 out there that haven't changed since the original 737-100 took flight it's because it's the same system and there has been no reason to change it. For example if you get an OIL FILTER BYPASS light the procedures used in 1976 (that's the farthest back I can find) are the same procedures used today -- the light means the same thing and the procedures are the same -- so????


Oh, and second, the differences are minimal, basically a non-event.

Whatever the veracity of your subsequent argument , you cant say something is a fact and then say its fake news in the same sentence (unless you sit in the White House of course)!

Ray

VV wrote:

If a new version of an aircraft is developed, I am pretty sure it has to respect the saltest regulations or things must be demonstrated to have equivalent level of safety.

So what's this fuss about grand fathering? It does not really exist any more. I am not even sure those guys who write those things have been involved in aircraft development or certification.

With respect, it sounds like you certainly haven't.

Every time you produce an update to an existing frame, all the design process takes place against a background of grandfathering. The entire philosophy is to see if changes will confirm to the previous certification standard and minimise unnecessary deviations.

When a major improvement is either necessary (e.g. in-service experience shows that original targets can't be met or mitigated by maintenance) or economically justified (selling point), then that's the only time that things may need to be certified to a newer standard.

This thread itself is the result of an attempt to make a change under grandfathering which didn't go well.

TheF15Ace wrote:

planecane wrote:

zoom321 wrote:

International regulators & airlines will not easily let B off the hook from sim training to re-certification etc.
They, except the FAA, can now rightfully say they were lied to by B. If they let Max fly again without very tough conditions & it crashes again, they can rightfully be accused of sharing as much blame as B.
Why would they relish such a prospect ?

International regulators are involved in the process with the FAA. The FAA has brought in outside experts from NASA and the air Force. If it is determined that the MCAS 2.0 fix will prevent incidents from becoming crashes and that nothing about it requires simulator training and European regulators insist on a complete recertification, the US can (and will) retaliate and make Airbus recertify the A320NEO and A330NEO from scratch.

Some countries may require SIM training for no real reason because it sounds good to the public.

FAA will need to think real hard before they go down the ''Murica can do no wrong'' path unless they want to see models like the 777X which have no US operators join the MAX in storage at Boeing Field.

If that was their attitude, they wouldn't have invited international regulators into the fold. Regarding the 777X, if international regulators try to not certify it out of spite or try to require unreasonable or unnecessary hoops for certification, you can guarantee retaliation that won't be good for Airbus in the US.

planecane wrote:

.......... international regulators try to not certify it out of spite or try to require unreasonable or unnecessary hoops for certification, you can guarantee retaliation that won't be good for Airbus in the US.

For a start I fully expect strong retaliatory pressure just to fend off the reasonable qualification requirements from outside the US.

XRAYretired wrote:

planecane wrote:

XRAYretired wrote:

Its a function hosted by the FCC that commands electric trim same as AP is, AP is not described as part of STS.

Ray

From B737Theory

Speed Trim System (STS)
An electrical stabilizer trim input automatically controls certain aircraft attitude conditions when undergoing large thrust changes in the lower speed region, such as takeoff and go-around. These conditions require high thrust settings and are especially present with a low weight aircraft and a relatively aft center of gravity where the aircraft wants to “nose up”. The STS supports the crew during these conditions when manually controlling the aircraft without the use of an autopilot by an opposite stabilizer trim, commanding a nose down force by use of the autopilot trim.

Doesn't this sound exactly like MCAS except in a different part of the flight envelope? Therefore, isn't MCAS just STS applied in a different part of the flight envelope? I don't understand the obsession with it being a problem that Boeing says MCAS is an enhancement of STS. From everything I've read, that is exactly what it is.

And BTW, STS (and MCAS) both use AP trim when in manual flight. That's why AP is not described as part of STS, because it isn't. MCAS is described as part of STS, because it is.

Well no, actually not convinced. The 'except' in your text really means except only maybe part of the last sentence in the B737theory quote actually is applicable to MCAS. The text does not support the functions of MCAS and no other credible reason for excluding such a description from the manuals has been offered other than to make it invisible.

I expect the changes being made will include a proper description.

None of the significant programmed functions of STS and MCAS coincide to any degree, as far as I can see so far (except maybe trim motor drive functions), and all of the fixes described for MCAS v2.0 are described in MCAS terms only and will have no discernible effect on STS because they are not the same system.

www.b737.org.uk/index.htm
MCAS (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System) is implemented on the 737 MAX to enhance longitudinal stability characteristics with flaps UP and at elevated Angles of Attack (AoA). The MCAS function commands nose down stabilizer to enhance pitch characteristics during steep turns with elevated load factors and during flaps up flight at airspeeds approaching stall. MCAS is activated without pilot input and only operates in manual, flaps up flight. The system is designed to allow the flight crew to use column trim switch or stabilizer aislestand cutout switches to override MCAS input. The function is commanded by the Flight Control Computer (FCC) using input data from sensors and other airplane systems.
The MCAS function becomes active when the AoA exceeds a threshold based on airspeed and altitude. MCAS will activate for up to 9.26 seconds before pausing for 5 seconds. Stabilizer incremental commands are limited to 2.5 degrees and are provided at a rate of 0.27 degrees per second. The magnitude of the stabilizer input is lower at high Mach number and greater at low Mach numbers (for the same AoA above the activation threshold).
After AoA falls below the hysteresis threshold (0.5 degrees below the activation angle), MCAS commands nose up stabilizer to return the aircraft to the trim state that existed before the MCAS activation.
The function is reset once angle of attack falls below the Angle of Attack threshold or if manual stabilizer commands are provided by the flight crew. If the original elevated AOA condition persists, the MCAS function commands another incremental stabilizer nose down command according to current aircraft Mach number at actuation.

Ray

Based on the draft FSB, you will continue to be disappointed since it is referenced as part of STS. I don't really understand why this is such a big deal to you. What's the difference? How does it effect anything?

Both systems provide nose down trim input in manual flight to counteract nose up tendencies. It doesn't really matter that one is due to thrust of the NG engines and the other due to the aerodynamic effects of the MAX engine nacelles.

SomebodyInTLS wrote:

VV wrote:

If a new version of an aircraft is developed, I am pretty sure it has to respect the saltest regulations or things must be demonstrated to have equivalent level of safety.

So what's this fuss about grand fathering? It does not really exist any more. I am not even sure those guys who write those things have been involved in aircraft development or certification.

With respect, it sounds like you certainly haven't.

Every time you produce an update to an existing frame, all the design process takes place against a background of grandfathering. The entire philosophy is to see if changes will confirm to the previous certification standard and minimise unnecessary deviations.

When a major improvement is either necessary (e.g. in-service experience shows that original targets can't be met or mitigated by maintenance) or economically justified (selling point), then that's the only time that things may need to be certified to a newer standard.

This thread itself is the result of an attempt to make a change under grandfathering which didn't go well.

Very well said. That said, there have been errors before. There will be errors again.

This isn't the end of the MAX nor FAA. This doesn't excuse EASA's prior mistakes nor the fact the ARJ-21 shouldn't have been certified.

There is a huge amount of politics going on.

This is an engineering problem with a solution. It can easily be solved. Perhaps a pair more sensors.

Lightsaber

lightsaber wrote:

SomebodyInTLS wrote:

VV wrote:

If a new version of an aircraft is developed, I am pretty sure it has to respect the saltest regulations or things must be demonstrated to have equivalent level of safety.

So what's this fuss about grand fathering? It does not really exist any more. I am not even sure those guys who write those things have been involved in aircraft development or certification.

With respect, it sounds like you certainly haven't.

Every time you produce an update to an existing frame, all the design process takes place against a background of grandfathering. The entire philosophy is to see if changes will confirm to the previous certification standard and minimise unnecessary deviations.

When a major improvement is either necessary (e.g. in-service experience shows that original targets can't be met or mitigated by maintenance) or economically justified (selling point), then that's the only time that things may need to be certified to a newer standard.

This thread itself is the result of an attempt to make a change under grandfathering which didn't go well.

Very well said. That said, there have been errors before. There will be errors again.

This isn't the end of the MAX nor FAA. This doesn't excuse EASA's prior mistakes nor the fact the ARJ-21 shouldn't have been certified.

There is a huge amount of politics going on.

This is an engineering problem with a solution. It can easily be solved. Perhaps a pair more sensors.

Lightsaber

It had been an engineering problem after JT crash. After ET crash, this became an attitude problem which can no longer be resolved by engineering means.

I agree with this link, Boeing has done a horrible job in playing down the issue. Denying a public issue is silly.

https://www.bing.com/amp/s/www.latimes. ... Type%3damp

Lightsaber

Absolutely and utterly new here.. Neither pilot, engineer nor other respectable title..

15 years of following here because of my complete devotion to lovely birds flying. Dream of being a combat pilot (citizenship at that point didn't work and didn't wanna change that).

Ended up in travelbusiness flying and flying around the world. Never been completely comfortable unless you put me in the jumpseat, which I have had the DELIGHT of on numerous occasions. I have been on numerous a/c types including the Caravelle and forth on...

Sorry for not sticking to subject, so now *loving both Airbus and Boeing a/c... KIS, this topic wouldn't bee if the 737MAX was fine and dandy... There is a solution to everything, so hope Boeing find that, in memory of all who in the end lost their lives unnecessarily, big shame, will never repair in the souls of whom lost somebody.. But life must go on, so FIX it then, to be approved! Me myself.. I'll wait minimum 5 years before boarding one with a 'fix..

TheF15Ace wrote:

planecane wrote:

TheF15Ace wrote:

FAA will need to think real hard before they go down the ''Murica can do no wrong'' path unless they want to see models like the 777X which have no US operators join the MAX in storage at Boeing Field.

If that was their attitude, they wouldn't have invited international regulators into the fold. Regarding the 777X, if international regulators try to not certify it out of spite or try to require unreasonable or unnecessary hoops for certification, you can guarantee retaliation that won't be good for Airbus in the US.

It's all for show if they are expected to be in lockstep with the FAA. If retaliation won't be good for Airbus in the US then you can be sure that the return salvo will be equally bad for Boeing in Europe and wherever else in the world that decides not to blindly follow the FAA lead any longer. But hey if the FAA wants to continue portraying themselves as Boeing's lapdog both domestically and abroad they are more than free to do so.

So you have knowledge that it is all for show? The international regulators are willingly participating in the show? Then, breaking with the FAA after the show will accomplish what, exactly? That makes no sense at all.

If they were being used for show, the international regulators would opt out of the process and deal with Boeing directly under their own terms.

frmrCapCadet wrote:

Stricter certification processes does not need to be a matter of retaliation. If the international committee recommends more analysis of the MAX it will be appropriate to extend analyses of the whole bunch of re-dos. (and there is no evidence that the rest need to be grounded - just maybe a closer look at them)

If they apply that logic, wouldn't it follow that logically, if MCAS was missed on the MAX then something could be lurking on the A320NEO or A330NEO that hasn't manifested yet. If that is a possibility then shouldn't they be grounded and fully recertified without grandfathering?

I don't think that should happen but, what is the difference (from a certification standpoint) between the MAX and those other aircraft? Yes, the MAX engine location was moved but the Airbus NEOs surely had more changes than just slapping new engines on. If regulators determine that the MAX needs to be recertified then all similarly certified aircraft do as well. It can't be applied only to the MAX just because an issue manifested itself. The argument to do it would be to find something that hasn't manifested yet because the MCAS issue is known and the fix can be certified separately.

Revelation wrote:

lightsaber wrote:

I agree with this link, Boeing has done a horrible job in playing down the issue. Denying a public issue is silly.

https://www.bing.com/amp/s/www.latimes. ... Type%3damp

Lightsaber

Yes, this is a re-post of the article ( By Julie Johnsson | Bloomberg | May 10, 2019 | 12:55 PM ) commented on yesterday by myself and others.

The current Boeing management didn't conceive of MCAS, but they do own the crisis management of the resulting accidents, as well as the recovery strategy, and they are in a very vulnerable position.

They've gambled that they can take the line that at most Boeing is guilty of putting too much workload on the pilots and ignore any suggestion that the root causes lie deeper in Boeing's approach to designing and marketing the MAX.

It's a huge gamble, and in the end, it's one that could blow up in their faces, taking most of the "C suite" down with it.

I think if we get past the July/August time frame without MAX flying in most of the world's markets, they will be the fall guys.

On the other hand, they are gambling on the "too big to fail" logic that resulted in forgiving the unforgivable greed of most of the world's financial institutions.

In the end their approach might "work", but will still leave a bad taste in their entire customer base, airlines and passengers both.

Basically they are playing power politics, and they may be able to prevail, but it will tarnish if not trash their reputation in the process.

Yet in the end it's the approach that if successful gets MAX flying the soonest with the least financial damage to Boeing, so they double down on the bet every time they speak.

I guess this is why the people in the C suite get the big bucks...

Well said. I would add that there is one more gamble: that the rest of design has no significant issues. God forbids that happens, but one more crash with any fraction of design contribution would mean that C-suit is only the minor of all casualties.

planecane wrote:

XRAYretired wrote:

planecane wrote:

From B737Theory


Doesn't this sound exactly like MCAS except in a different part of the flight envelope? Therefore, isn't MCAS just STS applied in a different part of the flight envelope? I don't understand the obsession with it being a problem that Boeing says MCAS is an enhancement of STS. From everything I've read, that is exactly what it is.

And BTW, STS (and MCAS) both use AP trim when in manual flight. That's why AP is not described as part of STS, because it isn't. MCAS is described as part of STS, because it is.

Well no, actually not convinced. The 'except' in your text really means except only maybe part of the last sentence in the B737theory quote actually is applicable to MCAS. The text does not support the functions of MCAS and no other credible reason for excluding such a description from the manuals has been offered other than to make it invisible.

I expect the changes being made will include a proper description.

None of the significant programmed functions of STS and MCAS coincide to any degree, as far as I can see so far (except maybe trim motor drive functions), and all of the fixes described for MCAS v2.0 are described in MCAS terms only and will have no discernible effect on STS because they are not the same system.

www.b737.org.uk/index.htm
MCAS (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System) is implemented on the 737 MAX to enhance longitudinal stability characteristics with flaps UP and at elevated Angles of Attack (AoA). The MCAS function commands nose down stabilizer to enhance pitch characteristics during steep turns with elevated load factors and during flaps up flight at airspeeds approaching stall. MCAS is activated without pilot input and only operates in manual, flaps up flight. The system is designed to allow the flight crew to use column trim switch or stabilizer aislestand cutout switches to override MCAS input. The function is commanded by the Flight Control Computer (FCC) using input data from sensors and other airplane systems.
The MCAS function becomes active when the AoA exceeds a threshold based on airspeed and altitude. MCAS will activate for up to 9.26 seconds before pausing for 5 seconds. Stabilizer incremental commands are limited to 2.5 degrees and are provided at a rate of 0.27 degrees per second. The magnitude of the stabilizer input is lower at high Mach number and greater at low Mach numbers (for the same AoA above the activation threshold).
After AoA falls below the hysteresis threshold (0.5 degrees below the activation angle), MCAS commands nose up stabilizer to return the aircraft to the trim state that existed before the MCAS activation.
The function is reset once angle of attack falls below the Angle of Attack threshold or if manual stabilizer commands are provided by the flight crew. If the original elevated AOA condition persists, the MCAS function commands another incremental stabilizer nose down command according to current aircraft Mach number at actuation.

Ray

Based on the draft FSB, you will continue to be disappointed since it is referenced as part of STS. I don't really understand why this is such a big deal to you. What's the difference? How does it effect anything?

Both systems provide nose down trim input in manual flight to counteract nose up tendencies. It doesn't really matter that one is due to thrust of the NG engines and the other due to the aerodynamic effects of the MAX engine nacelles.

I'm sure it doesn't matter to anyone who wishes to gloss over the events as quickly as possible. The devil is in the detail.

Ray

kalvado wrote:

Revelation wrote:

Yes, this is a re-post of the article ( By Julie Johnsson | Bloomberg | May 10, 2019 | 12:55 PM ) commented on yesterday by myself and others.

The current Boeing management didn't conceive of MCAS, but they do own the crisis management of the resulting accidents, as well as the recovery strategy, and they are in a very vulnerable position.

They've gambled that they can take the line that at most Boeing is guilty of putting too much workload on the pilots and ignore any suggestion that the root causes lie deeper in Boeing's approach to designing and marketing the MAX.

It's a huge gamble, and in the end, it's one that could blow up in their faces, taking most of the "C suite" down with it.

I think if we get past the July/August time frame without MAX flying in most of the world's markets, they will be the fall guys.

On the other hand, they are gambling on the "too big to fail" logic that resulted in forgiving the unforgivable greed of most of the world's financial institutions.

In the end their approach might "work", but will still leave a bad taste in their entire customer base, airlines and passengers both.

Basically they are playing power politics, and they may be able to prevail, but it will tarnish if not trash their reputation in the process.

Yet in the end it's the approach that if successful gets MAX flying the soonest with the least financial damage to Boeing, so they double down on the bet every time they speak.

I guess this is why the people in the C suite get the big bucks...

Great comments, Revelation! I'll add though that there's another twist, which is whether the "C suite" is after short or long term damage minimization. FWIW, my personal opinion (just as an interested observer) is that they are going for too much short term in this case. Minimizing the cost for this and the next quarter is not as valuable as minimising costs and maximising sales for the next forty quarters. And THAT is what we're potentially talking about here.

planecane wrote:

frmrCapCadet wrote:

Stricter certification processes does not need to be a matter of retaliation. If the international committee recommends more analysis of the MAX it will be appropriate to extend analyses of the whole bunch of re-dos. (and there is no evidence that the rest need to be grounded - just maybe a closer look at them)

If they apply that logic, wouldn't it follow that logically, if MCAS was missed on the MAX then something could be lurking on the A320NEO or A330NEO that hasn't manifested yet. If that is a possibility then shouldn't they be grounded and fully recertified without grandfathering?

I don't think that should happen but, what is the difference (from a certification standpoint) between the MAX and those other aircraft? Yes, the MAX engine location was moved but the Airbus NEOs surely had more changes than just slapping new engines on. If regulators determine that the MAX needs to be recertified then all similarly certified aircraft do as well. It can't be applied only to the MAX just because an issue manifested itself. The argument to do it would be to find something that hasn't manifested yet because the MCAS issue is known and the fix can be certified separately.

Look at it this way:
statistics is the ultimate proof. But it is unrealistic to fly empty planes around long enough to gather enough statistics; so certification is designed to explore many options in a short timeframe without 2000 frame-years of flying.
So far, MAX is statistically proven to be unsafe, that is the ultimate proof. Moreover, that indicates that certification process was not rigorous enough to detect those issues.
Unlike the criminal process, where the rule is assuming innocent until proven guilty, the approach is different: not allowed in service until proven safe. And there is no such proof for MAX either via quality certification or via statistics.
Other designs you mention have statistical evidence to put on the table - something MAX will not have for another 3-5 years.

XRAYretired wrote:

planecane wrote:

XRAYretired wrote:

Well no, actually not convinced. The 'except' in your text really means except only maybe part of the last sentence in the B737theory quote actually is applicable to MCAS. The text does not support the functions of MCAS and no other credible reason for excluding such a description from the manuals has been offered other than to make it invisible.

I expect the changes being made will include a proper description.

None of the significant programmed functions of STS and MCAS coincide to any degree, as far as I can see so far (except maybe trim motor drive functions), and all of the fixes described for MCAS v2.0 are described in MCAS terms only and will have no discernible effect on STS because they are not the same system.
www.b737.org.uk/index.htm
MCAS (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System) is implemented on the 737 MAX to enhance longitudinal stability characteristics with flaps UP and at elevated Angles of Attack (AoA). The MCAS function commands nose down stabilizer to enhance pitch characteristics during steep turns with elevated load factors and during flaps up flight at airspeeds approaching stall. MCAS is activated without pilot input and only operates in manual, flaps up flight. The system is designed to allow the flight crew to use column trim switch or stabilizer aislestand cutout switches to override MCAS input. The function is commanded by the Flight Control Computer (FCC) using input data from sensors and other airplane systems.
The MCAS function becomes active when the AoA exceeds a threshold based on airspeed and altitude. MCAS will activate for up to 9.26 seconds before pausing for 5 seconds. Stabilizer incremental commands are limited to 2.5 degrees and are provided at a rate of 0.27 degrees per second. The magnitude of the stabilizer input is lower at high Mach number and greater at low Mach numbers (for the same AoA above the activation threshold).
After AoA falls below the hysteresis threshold (0.5 degrees below the activation angle), MCAS commands nose up stabilizer to return the aircraft to the trim state that existed before the MCAS activation.
The function is reset once angle of attack falls below the Angle of Attack threshold or if manual stabilizer commands are provided by the flight crew. If the original elevated AOA condition persists, the MCAS function commands another incremental stabilizer nose down command according to current aircraft Mach number at actuation.

Ray

Based on the draft FSB, you will continue to be disappointed since it is referenced as part of STS. I don't really understand why this is such a big deal to you. What's the difference? How does it effect anything?

Both systems provide nose down trim input in manual flight to counteract nose up tendencies. It doesn't really matter that one is due to thrust of the NG engines and the other due to the aerodynamic effects of the MAX engine nacelles.

I'm sure it doesn't matter to anyone who wishes to gloss over the events as quickly as possible. The devil is in the detail.

Ray

Gloss over the events? How does documenting MCAS as being a function of STS gloss over the events?

How does a grounding of at least 1/3 of a year gloss over anything?

kalvado wrote:

planecane wrote:

frmrCapCadet wrote:

Stricter certification processes does not need to be a matter of retaliation. If the international committee recommends more analysis of the MAX it will be appropriate to extend analyses of the whole bunch of re-dos. (and there is no evidence that the rest need to be grounded - just maybe a closer look at them)

If they apply that logic, wouldn't it follow that logically, if MCAS was missed on the MAX then something could be lurking on the A320NEO or A330NEO that hasn't manifested yet. If that is a possibility then shouldn't they be grounded and fully recertified without grandfathering?

I don't think that should happen but, what is the difference (from a certification standpoint) between the MAX and those other aircraft? Yes, the MAX engine location was moved but the Airbus NEOs surely had more changes than just slapping new engines on. If regulators determine that the MAX needs to be recertified then all similarly certified aircraft do as well. It can't be applied only to the MAX just because an issue manifested itself. The argument to do it would be to find something that hasn't manifested yet because the MCAS issue is known and the fix can be certified separately.

Look at it this way:
statistics is the ultimate proof. But it is unrealistic to fly empty planes around long enough to gather enough statistics; so certification is designed to explore many options in a short timeframe without 2000 frame-years of flying.
So far, MAX is statistically proven to be unsafe, that is the ultimate proof. Moreover, that indicates that certification process was not rigorous enough to detect those issues.
Unlike the criminal process, where the rule is assuming innocent until proven guilty, the approach is different: not allowed in service until proven safe. And there is no such proof for MAX either via quality certification or via statistics.
Other designs you mention have statistical evidence to put on the table - something MAX will not have for another 3-5 years.

I agree to an extent, which is why I wouldn't support grounding the A320NEO series for a recertification. However, an argument can be made that if the flights where the failures occurred by crews that would have recognized the situation as a runaway stabilizer and run the NNC exactly as documented, the statistics would show the MAX to be just as safe even though the bad design would still exist. I'm not trying to open the crew vs. design discussion, just trying to say that statistics can be misleading.

planecane wrote:

frmrCapCadet wrote:

Stricter certification processes does not need to be a matter of retaliation. If the international committee recommends more analysis of the MAX it will be appropriate to extend analyses of the whole bunch of re-dos. (and there is no evidence that the rest need to be grounded - just maybe a closer look at them)

If they apply that logic, wouldn't it follow that logically, if MCAS was missed on the MAX then something could be lurking on the A320NEO or A330NEO that hasn't manifested yet. If that is a possibility then shouldn't they be grounded and fully recertified without grandfathering?

I don't think that should happen but, what is the difference (from a certification standpoint) between the MAX and those other aircraft? Yes, the MAX engine location was moved but the Airbus NEOs surely had more changes than just slapping new engines on. If regulators determine that the MAX needs to be recertified then all similarly certified aircraft do as well. It can't be applied only to the MAX just because an issue manifested itself. The argument to do it would be to find something that hasn't manifested yet because the MCAS issue is known and the fix can be certified separately.

There is no logic at all in right now suggesting that safe products of other jurisdictions need to be subject to the same scrutiny that Boeing/FAA would itself not be under had MAX not crashed twice already.

planecane wrote:

XRAYretired wrote:

planecane wrote:

Based on the draft FSB, you will continue to be disappointed since it is referenced as part of STS. I don't really understand why this is such a big deal to you. What's the difference? How does it effect anything?

Both systems provide nose down trim input in manual flight to counteract nose up tendencies. It doesn't really matter that one is due to thrust of the NG engines and the other due to the aerodynamic effects of the MAX engine nacelles.

I'm sure it doesn't matter to anyone who wishes to gloss over the events as quickly as possible. The devil is in the detail.

Ray

Gloss over the events? How does documenting MCAS as being a function of STS gloss over the events?

How does a grounding of at least 1/3 of a year gloss over anything?

You mean the failure to document MCAS in any meaningful way leading to the failure to advise operators and pilots of its existence? you appear to have glossed over again. All of which may be indicative of the witting or unwitting strategy and design choices. Well I will continue to explore the whats and whys.

NB. Dont think it was your decision to ground.

Ray

Ray

planecane wrote:

kalvado wrote:

planecane wrote:

If they apply that logic, wouldn't it follow that logically, if MCAS was missed on the MAX then something could be lurking on the A320NEO or A330NEO that hasn't manifested yet. If that is a possibility then shouldn't they be grounded and fully recertified without grandfathering?

I don't think that should happen but, what is the difference (from a certification standpoint) between the MAX and those other aircraft? Yes, the MAX engine location was moved but the Airbus NEOs surely had more changes than just slapping new engines on. If regulators determine that the MAX needs to be recertified then all similarly certified aircraft do as well. It can't be applied only to the MAX just because an issue manifested itself. The argument to do it would be to find something that hasn't manifested yet because the MCAS issue is known and the fix can be certified separately.

Look at it this way:
statistics is the ultimate proof. But it is unrealistic to fly empty planes around long enough to gather enough statistics; so certification is designed to explore many options in a short timeframe without 2000 frame-years of flying.
So far, MAX is statistically proven to be unsafe, that is the ultimate proof. Moreover, that indicates that certification process was not rigorous enough to detect those issues.
Unlike the criminal process, where the rule is assuming innocent until proven guilty, the approach is different: not allowed in service until proven safe. And there is no such proof for MAX either via quality certification or via statistics.
Other designs you mention have statistical evidence to put on the table - something MAX will not have for another 3-5 years.

I agree to an extent, which is why I wouldn't support grounding the A320NEO series for a recertification. However, an argument can be made that if the flights where the failures occurred by crews that would have recognized the situation as a runaway stabilizer and run the NNC exactly as documented, the statistics would show the MAX to be just as safe even though the bad design would still exist. I'm not trying to open the crew vs. design discussion, just trying to say that statistics can be misleading.

And what if fairy could stop those planes before they hit the ground, then crashes wouldn't happen. Or if Harry Potter was in the cabin and said "Wingardium Leviosa".
Any of your arguments could work - actually did work - after the first crash. By now we have statistically significant evidence.

planecane wrote:

zoom321 wrote:

......the US can (and will) retaliate and make Airbus recertify the A320NEO and A330NEO from scratch...

El Toro poo poo. This isn't the kindergarten sandbox. Have you not noticed that Airbus is building airplanes in the US, and are about to begin building a second series of aircraft here? Why would our regulators take a dump on our own tax base?

AirlineCritic wrote:

I'll add though that there's another twist, which is whether the "C suite" is after short or long term damage minimization. FWIW, my personal opinion (just as an interested observer) is that they are going for too much short term in this case. Minimizing the cost for this and the next quarter is not as valuable as minimising costs and maximising sales for the next forty quarters. And THAT is what we're potentially talking about here.

That's the problem with senior management in most multinationals. Preoccupation with short-term value maximisation for shareholders and self, at the cost of employees, customers and company prospects. MCAS is a product of such thinking, just like share buybacks, which robs companies of cash for R&D and future products.

AirlineCritic wrote:

I don't usually agree with Aboulafia, but:

“They made the wrong calculation,” said Richard Aboulafia, an aerospace analyst with Teal Group, in weighing short-term liability costs versus the risk of long-term brand damage. “Just explain what went wrong with the subsystem, and explain everything about it. Make this as transparent as possible.”

But he's right here, and it matches what I've said from the beginning: the best strategy is not to try to hide from (still relatively minor, all things considered) legal liability and costs. Man up, show that you are that safety conscious and best airplane design organization that the world knows. Future opportunities and sales are far more valuable than attempting to minimize the impacts or costs of this moment's crisis.

And showing that you are on top of it does need to include admitting that mistakes were made (among mistakes by others, e.g., pilots), fixing the issue at hand, reviewing the entire plane for other issues, understanding the process problem that lead this problem, fixing that, and ... some humility. Almost all of which is missing, with the possible exception of fixing the issue at hand. But even there, the software issue is just one part of the overall problem, and Boeing has been too focused on that. I think their QRH processes are unclear and in need of revision. I also dislike the attempt to iPad train people when the real issue is multi-mode, multi-warning, potentially-multicause emergency in critical flight phase. And IMHO, crews need actual sim training to get a better feel for that. Be it B or A airplane.

And if they don't do this properly, there's a danger that MAX remains the "MAX Casualties" or "If it ain't Boeing, my nose ain't pointing down" aircraft. Remember the time before the McD merger, when there was a joke about two groups of people in the world who would fly exclusively on Boeing planes: 1. Boeing engineers and 2. McDonnel-Douglas engineers. Would we joke like that today? Probably not. But Boeing can do it, it is a great company. They have the engineers. They have the financial capability. The 737 is a great aircraft, and its new version can be the safest version. The leadership just has to let the company do this.

The only people that will remember this or care are the victims’ families of the two crashes, aviation buffs and those within the industry. The traveling public will quickly forget. They have an attention span shorter than a goldfish. http://time.com/3858309/attention-spans-goldfish/ Time Magazine

No one will really care or remember. The Max will still sell like crazy. The average person flying in five years won’t know the difference between an Airbus, Boeing or Embraer.

planecane wrote:

frmrCapCadet wrote:

Stricter certification processes does not need to be a matter of retaliation. If the international committee recommends more analysis of the MAX it will be appropriate to extend analyses of the whole bunch of re-dos. (and there is no evidence that the rest need to be grounded - just maybe a closer look at them)

If they apply that logic, wouldn't it follow that logically, if MCAS was missed on the MAX then something could be lurking on the A320NEO or A330NEO that hasn't manifested yet. If that is a possibility then shouldn't they be grounded and fully recertified without grandfathering?

I don't think that should happen but, what is the difference (from a certification standpoint) between the MAX and those other aircraft? Yes, the MAX engine location was moved but the Airbus NEOs surely had more changes than just slapping new engines on. If regulators determine that the MAX needs to be recertified then all similarly certified aircraft do as well. It can't be applied only to the MAX just because an issue manifested itself. The argument to do it would be to find something that hasn't manifested yet because the MCAS issue is known and the fix can be certified separately.

I don’t think either should be grounded or have been grounded in the case of the Max. Mass hysteria ruled the day thanks to 24-7 news coverage. Much of it fake. There were other options that could have been taken to prevent a third crash and allow the Max to fly. China played politics and out maneuvered the US and the rest of the world.

lightsaber wrote:

SomebodyInTLS wrote:

VV wrote:

If a new version of an aircraft is developed, I am pretty sure it has to respect the saltest regulations or things must be demonstrated to have equivalent level of safety.

So what's this fuss about grand fathering? It does not really exist any more. I am not even sure those guys who write those things have been involved in aircraft development or certification.

With respect, it sounds like you certainly haven't.

Every time you produce an update to an existing frame, all the design process takes place against a background of grandfathering. The entire philosophy is to see if changes will confirm to the previous certification standard and minimise unnecessary deviations.

When a major improvement is either necessary (e.g. in-service experience shows that original targets can't be met or mitigated by maintenance) or economically justified (selling point), then that's the only time that things may need to be certified to a newer standard.

This thread itself is the result of an attempt to make a change under grandfathering which didn't go well.

Very well said. That said, there have been errors before. There will be errors again.

This isn't the end of the MAX nor FAA. This doesn't excuse EASA's prior mistakes nor the fact the ARJ-21 shouldn't have been certified.

There is a huge amount of politics going on.

This is an engineering problem with a solution. It can easily be solved. Perhaps a pair more sensors.

Lightsaber

Agreed. Great post. Airbus has had their own issues in the past with designs and not sharing full disclosure on some of the issues resulting in crash(s). Both Boeing and Airbus will again have issues in the future. We just can engineer something so complex as to project every single possibility. We are much better than ever and and will improve but sometimes things are missed or not understood during design.

Ok, so say that Boeing does re-brand the Max as Trump suggests.... what will they call it? -800 and -900 are already taken.....the -10 would be ok.... but what about the other 2.

rj777 wrote:

Ok, so say that Boeing does re-brand the Max as Trump suggests.... what will they call it? -800 and -900 are already taken.....the -10 would be ok.... but what about the other 2.

-8 and -9?

MD80Ttail wrote:

We are much better than ever and and will improve but sometimes things are missed or not understood during design.

Or things are rushed under pressure to compete and undisclosed systems are installed without notifying pilots in order to save money, causing catastrophic results?

WSJ raises the issue that wary passengers might avoid the plane for some time after the grounding is lifted.

Personally, I would not wanna get onboard a MAX until at least one year of crash-free operation has passed.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-max-co ... 1557669848

rj777 wrote:

Ok, so say that Boeing does re-brand the Max as Trump suggests.... what will they call it? -800 and -900 are already taken.....the -10 would be ok.... but what about the other 2.

737-MX 8/9/10

Max sounds kinda cheesy anyway.

XRAYretired wrote:

planecane wrote:

XRAYretired wrote:

I'm sure it doesn't matter to anyone who wishes to gloss over the events as quickly as possible. The devil is in the detail.

Ray

Gloss over the events? How does documenting MCAS as being a function of STS gloss over the events?

How does a grounding of at least 1/3 of a year gloss over anything?

You mean the failure to document MCAS in any meaningful way leading to the failure to advise operators and pilots of its existence? you appear to have glossed over again. All of which may be indicative of the witting or unwitting strategy and design choices. Well I will continue to explore the whats and whys.

NB. Dont think it was your decision to ground.

Ray

Ray

Pilots didn't need to know of its existence. They only needed to know that uncommanded nose down trim on the MAX was to be treated as a runaway stabilizer. The Lion Air crew did not know this. However, I await the final report with the full CVR transcript because I have trouble believing that they discussed the situation and determined that the trim movement wasn't continuous so it isn't a runaway stabilizer.

The ET crew did and should have used that information to run the NNC as prescribed.

In the future they still don't need to know of its existence. They only need to know to run the AoA disagree NNC that gets updated with the software revision.

If an engine goes out the crew doesn't need to know why, they just need to know what to do. Same with MCAS.

planecane wrote:

Pilots didn't need to know of its existence.

I don't recall a single pilot in agreement with that - the ones I see quoted feel betrayed by being kept in the dark.

kalvado wrote:

planecane wrote:

kalvado wrote:

Look at it this way:
statistics is the ultimate proof. But it is unrealistic to fly empty planes around long enough to gather enough statistics; so certification is designed to explore many options in a short timeframe without 2000 frame-years of flying.
So far, MAX is statistically proven to be unsafe, that is the ultimate proof. Moreover, that indicates that certification process was not rigorous enough to detect those issues.
Unlike the criminal process, where the rule is assuming innocent until proven guilty, the approach is different: not allowed in service until proven safe. And there is no such proof for MAX either via quality certification or via statistics.
Other designs you mention have statistical evidence to put on the table - something MAX will not have for another 3-5 years.

I agree to an extent, which is why I wouldn't support grounding the A320NEO series for a recertification. However, an argument can be made that if the flights where the failures occurred by crews that would have recognized the situation as a runaway stabilizer and run the NNC exactly as documented, the statistics would show the MAX to be just as safe even though the bad design would still exist. I'm not trying to open the crew vs. design discussion, just trying to say that statistics can be misleading.

And what if fairy could stop those planes before they hit the ground, then crashes wouldn't happen. Or if Harry Potter was in the cabin and said "Wingardium Leviosa".
Any of your arguments could work - actually did work - after the first crash. By now we have statistically significant evidence.

Yes we have statistically significant results that after every MAX pilot in the world should have known about MCAS and how to counter it (after Lionair and the bulletin was Published on Nov 8) - they (ET) still managed to not follow the published procedure (and a few others) and still crash the plane.

That does not say anything about the safety of the MAX - that says something about the Worldwide standard (or lack thereof) of training.

Lionair almost got it right - they just had to turn off the system that misacted 22 times. So is the new World Standard 23? Everything under 23 it's the plane designers fault - over 23 the Pilot?

No profession in the world would survive with that level of failure.

morrisond wrote:

That does not say anything about the safety of the MAX - that says something about the Worldwide standard (or lack thereof) of training.

What training are you talking about ? Nobody agree on the procedure the JT610 and the ET302 should have followed. Even the few on this list that still mainly blame the pilots point to procedures others than the Boeing officially published procedure for an erratic high AoA value on the 737-8/9 MAX, and that procedure is badly redacted, with illogical text order, with missing critical information like the maximum delay to use the cutoff switch after the last manual electric trim, and strict imperative requirement to use of the manual electrical trim before cutoff at high speed. This is so flawed that the MCAS is now modified to not require a such training. How can you still blame the pilots that lost there lives doing there work when the appropriate training was actively avoided and will still be avoided ?

If the worldwide standard of training was so bad, there would be similar crash statistic at take off regardless of the aircraft type and brand, and the 737-8/9 MAX would not be grounded for a software fix. It's normal to speculate first, but at some point you have to accept the reality of a massive mount of sources that constantly point to a management, design and certification failure to improve the safety.

planecane wrote:

XRAYretired wrote:

planecane wrote:

Gloss over the events? How does documenting MCAS as being a function of STS gloss over the events?

How does a grounding of at least 1/3 of a year gloss over anything?

You mean the failure to document MCAS in any meaningful way leading to the failure to advise operators and pilots of its existence? you appear to have glossed over again. All of which may be indicative of the witting or unwitting strategy and design choices. Well I will continue to explore the whats and whys.

NB. Dont think it was your decision to ground.

Ray

Ray

Pilots didn't need to know of its existence. They only needed to know that uncommanded nose down trim on the MAX was to be treated as a runaway stabilizer. The Lion Air crew did not know this. However, I await the final report with the full CVR transcript because I have trouble believing that they discussed the situation and determined that the trim movement wasn't continuous so it isn't a runaway stabilizer.

The ET crew did and should have used that information to run the NNC as prescribed.

In the future they still don't need to know of its existence. They only need to know to run the AoA disagree NNC that gets updated with the software revision.

If an engine goes out the crew doesn't need to know why, they just need to know what to do. Same with MCAS.

In the future, any pilot that hears the sentence "you don't need to know" from a planemaker will likely avoid their planes.

I have just sent a comment to the FAA, and I encourage all of you who feel that the current draft is missing something to do the same. I believe that these comments will become part of the public record. I am reposting here the link:

https://www.faa.gov/aircraft/draft_docs/fsb/

all the necessary information is on that page. The deadline is this Wednesday, May 15.

It's definitely having a knock-on effect. I just had to deal with a travel agent for some people who invited me to something, and she told me she was had changed my booking to switch me onto a different flight because the original booking was a 737-800. I stifled my laugh, since the flight she switched me onto was much more convenient.

14ccKemiskt wrote:

planecane wrote:

XRAYretired wrote:

You mean the failure to document MCAS in any meaningful way leading to the failure to advise operators and pilots of its existence? you appear to have glossed over again. All of which may be indicative of the witting or unwitting strategy and design choices. Well I will continue to explore the whats and whys.

NB. Dont think it was your decision to ground.

Ray

Ray

Pilots didn't need to know of its existence. They only needed to know that uncommanded nose down trim on the MAX was to be treated as a runaway stabilizer. The Lion Air crew did not know this. However, I await the final report with the full CVR transcript because I have trouble believing that they discussed the situation and determined that the trim movement wasn't continuous so it isn't a runaway stabilizer.

The ET crew did and should have used that information to run the NNC as prescribed.

In the future they still don't need to know of its existence. They only need to know to run the AoA disagree NNC that gets updated with the software revision.

If an engine goes out the crew doesn't need to know why, they just need to know what to do. Same with MCAS.

In the future, any pilot that hears the sentence "you don't need to know" from a planemaker will likely avoid their planes.

The pilots do not need to know what is under the hood of any plane. They need to recognize failures and be trained on the procedure to recover.

If an engine goes out, it doesn't matter if it was due to geese being ingested or a fuel valve getting stuck closed. The procedure will be the same.

In fact, knowing too much detail about MCAS might have been what caused the ET crew to cut off the electric trim to soon. Instead of just performing the runaway stabilizer NNC, it's possible that they remembered all of the focus on MCAS and the cutoff switches and jumped to that at the wrong time.