14ccKemiskt wrote:

WSJ raises the issue that wary passengers might avoid the plane for some time after the grounding is lifted.

Personally, I would not wanna get onboard a MAX until at least one year of crash-free operation has passed.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-max-co ... 1557669848

Price changes people’s minds pretty quickly. If they are looking to book and a MAX flight is even $10 cheaper people will change their mind.

Jshank83 wrote:

14ccKemiskt wrote:

WSJ raises the issue that wary passengers might avoid the plane for some time after the grounding is lifted.

Personally, I would not wanna get onboard a MAX until at least one year of crash-free operation has passed.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-max-co ... 1557669848

Price changes people’s minds pretty quickly. If they are looking to book and a MAX flight is even $10 cheaper people will change their mind.

I'm sure some will avoid it but most won't know a MAX from an NG (or from an A320). I also expect there to be a lag from the lifting of the grounding (when there will be news) to when the MAX goes back into service.

Initially due to the news some people may inquire to find out if they are on a MAX and they won't be. A month or two later it will be a very low percentage of people that even remember what model to ask about.

For example, my neighbor told me about a trip he recently took "on one of those planes that crashed." His trip was on Delta.

planecane, I had a similar experience a few years ago. Some friends flew to Europe. I asked if it was an A330. I got a blank stare. Then I asked the airline. They weren’t sure. Once the MAX flies again, most people will forget. I am not saying that’s right. I am just saying it will be forgotten by most folks. Hey, I used to call the DC10 the Deathstar. But I still got on it.

FTMCPIUS wrote:

rj777 wrote:

Ok, so say that Boeing does re-brand the Max as Trump suggests.... what will they call it? -800 and -900 are already taken.....the -10 would be ok.... but what about the other 2.

737-MX 8/9/10

Max sounds kinda cheesy anyway.

No matter what Boeing calls it...Other than on the airworthiness certificates and manufacturer serial plates inside the aircraft, you can bet the airlines will begin to refer to their entire fleets of 737s as vaguely and as homogenously as possible where the law allows so as to not outwardly identify individual subtypes when not absolutely necessary.

Public timetables/schedules: "737"

"Choose your seat" tool at online booking: "737" (Seatguru.com, etc will offer hints on how to determine if the seatmap you see at booking is that of a "MAX"/whatever new name Boeing comes up with.)

Side of plane: "737" (or no title at all)

Seatback safety card: "737" (if allowable by law)

Onboard safety briefing: "the safety features of our 'Boeing 737' aircraft" (if allowable by law)

Airline reservation/ticket/gate agents will be instructed to advise customers inquiring about the subtype of their specific aircraft that the only information they have available is that it is a "737".

The rest of us with aviation "insider" knowledge will still know what, where, and how to look for the info, but the general public will be none the wiser as the aircraft are brought back through rotation.

Of course, there will be the occasional smart kid with an aviation passion (or an adult a*hole ) who loudly draws attention to the 737 MAX right outside the gate window and causes a panic at the agent counter...But such will probably be few and far between.

KFLLCFII wrote:

FTMCPIUS wrote:

rj777 wrote:

Ok, so say that Boeing does re-brand the Max as Trump suggests.... what will they call it? -800 and -900 are already taken.....the -10 would be ok.... but what about the other 2.

737-MX 8/9/10

Max sounds kinda cheesy anyway.

No matter what Boeing calls it...Other than on the airworthiness certificates and manufacturer serial plates inside the aircraft, you can bet the airlines will begin to refer to their entire fleets of 737s as vaguely and as homogenously as possible where the law allows so as to not outwardly identify individual subtypes when not absolutely necessary.

Yes, this might actually happen.

Or worse, maybe the whole industry agrees on that it shall not be "up to the individual passenger to judge if the aircraft is safe". Airlines, authorities and manufacturers would then remove ALL information to passengers on what aircraft manufacturer and model they are to fly/flying on. (This is the case already for example for many train services, so it is not that far out.)

14ccKemiskt wrote:

Or worse, maybe the whole industry agrees on that it shall not be "up to the individual passenger to judge if the aircraft is safe". Airlines, authorities and manufacturers would then remove ALL information to passengers on what aircraft manufacturer and model they are to fly/flying on. (This is the case already for example for many train services, so it is not that far out.)

Would mainly benefit airlines that have not buy questionable aircraft type. All that birds have public identification and are tracked worldwide, for example with ADS-B.

rj777 wrote:

Ok, so say that Boeing does re-brand the Max as Trump suggests.... what will they call it? -800 and -900 are already taken.....the -10 would be ok.... but what about the other 2.

What about a shortened rebranding from the bottom? I expect the "big number trend" (-9X, -1000, etc.) to be gone soon anyways, or to simply run out of options...

737 MAX 7 => 737-1
737 MAX 8 => 737-2
etc...

Or even restart the "A; B" fashion, like with the 747-200B, the A300B, etc. (737A; 737B)

So many options

In agree to alot of statements here, i worked at manchester airport in the UK for 10 years on check-in/ boarding for various different airlines as i was a handling agent and most passengers are clueless of airline and aircraft, majority of the package holiday passengers probably won't even know whats gone on, maybe sched passengers will know a little more.

planecane wrote:

XRAYretired wrote:

planecane wrote:

Gloss over the events? How does documenting MCAS as being a function of STS gloss over the events?

How does a grounding of at least 1/3 of a year gloss over anything?

You mean the failure to document MCAS in any meaningful way leading to the failure to advise operators and pilots of its existence? you appear to have glossed over again. All of which may be indicative of the witting or unwitting strategy and design choices. Well I will continue to explore the whats and whys.

NB. Dont think it was your decision to ground.

Ray

Ray

Pilots didn't need to know of its existence. They only needed to know that uncommanded nose down trim on the MAX was to be treated as a runaway stabilizer. The Lion Air crew did not know this. However, I await the final report with the full CVR transcript because I have trouble believing that they discussed the situation and determined that the trim movement wasn't continuous so it isn't a runaway stabilizer.

The ET crew did and should have used that information to run the NNC as prescribed.

In the future they still don't need to know of its existence. They only need to know to run the AoA disagree NNC that gets updated with the software revision.

If an engine goes out the crew doesn't need to know why, they just need to know what to do. Same with MCAS.

You chose to debate the point not I. but you continue only to defelect from your chosen debate. Reminder:
'failure to document MCAS in any meaningful way leading to the failure to advise operators and pilots of its existence? you appear to have glossed over again. All of which may be indicative of the witting or unwitting strategy and design choices'


NB. If you have been given an advanced preview of a new AOA Disagree NNC, would you like to share it? Does it prove the point?

NB2. All knew that powerplant is fitted to the A/C and its failure modes, it is documented. None new MCAS was fitted or its failure modes because it was not documented. Your analogy does not hold water.

Ray

Is it good enough to assume stuff in aircraft design?

Reading certain comments and articles, it seems that Boeing assumed that pilots would know how to handle uncommanded trim also assumed that the one sensor design is therefore safe enough.

Is this standard practice in aircraft design, manufacturing and certification to assume something is good enough and safe?

In my opinion Boeing should either know it is safe and pilots know how to react or if Boeing does not know if it is safe and pilots do not know how to react, they should make sure that they get the infor-mation together and then provide it to said pilots.

Assumptions can only be made if there is data undermining this assumption. As the assumption was proven wrong by the two crashes it is important to revisit the data on which this assumption was made of and change your design accordingly.

I am actually not worried, that the new MCAS will be ok, I am really worried that Boeing made more bad assumptions.

planecane wrote:

14ccKemiskt wrote:

planecane wrote:

Pilots didn't need to know of its existence. They only needed to know that uncommanded nose down trim on the MAX was to be treated as a runaway stabilizer. The Lion Air crew did not know this. However, I await the final report with the full CVR transcript because I have trouble believing that they discussed the situation and determined that the trim movement wasn't continuous so it isn't a runaway stabilizer.

The ET crew did and should have used that information to run the NNC as prescribed.

In the future they still don't need to know of its existence. They only need to know to run the AoA disagree NNC that gets updated with the software revision.

If an engine goes out the crew doesn't need to know why, they just need to know what to do. Same with MCAS.

In the future, any pilot that hears the sentence "you don't need to know" from a planemaker will likely avoid their planes.

The pilots do not need to know what is under the hood of any plane. They need to recognize failures and be trained on the procedure to recover.

If an engine goes out, it doesn't matter if it was due to geese being ingested or a fuel valve getting stuck closed. The procedure will be the same.

In fact, knowing too much detail about MCAS might have been what caused the ET crew to cut off the electric trim to soon. Instead of just performing the runaway stabilizer NNC, it's possible that they remembered all of the focus on MCAS and the cutoff switches and jumped to that at the wrong time.

All knew that powerplant is fitted to the A/C and its failure modes, it is documented. None knew MCAS was fitted or its failure modes because it was not documented. Your analogy does not hold water.

In the future, the MCAS system will be properly documented (just like the powerplant!) and, of course, competently designed.

Your 'fact' is not a fact just trotting out the discredited Boeing line - too much information is bad Egon -. Without wishing to re-run 5 threads, ~20000 posts, (and I'm not going to) there are credible alternatives to the picture you paint for the ET302 crew.

Ray

morrisond wrote:

kalvado wrote:

planecane wrote:

I agree to an extent, which is why I wouldn't support grounding the A320NEO series for a recertification. However, an argument can be made that if the flights where the failures occurred by crews that would have recognized the situation as a runaway stabilizer and run the NNC exactly as documented, the statistics would show the MAX to be just as safe even though the bad design would still exist. I'm not trying to open the crew vs. design discussion, just trying to say that statistics can be misleading.

And what if fairy could stop those planes before they hit the ground, then crashes wouldn't happen. Or if Harry Potter was in the cabin and said "Wingardium Leviosa".
Any of your arguments could work - actually did work - after the first crash. By now we have statistically significant evidence.

Yes we have statistically significant results that after every MAX pilot in the world should have known about MCAS and how to counter it (after Lionair and the bulletin was Published on Nov 8) - they (ET) still managed to not follow the published procedure (and a few others) and still crash the plane.

That does not say anything about the safety of the MAX - that says something about the Worldwide standard (or lack thereof) of training.

Lionair almost got it right - they just had to turn off the system that misacted 22 times. So is the new World Standard 23? Everything under 23 it's the plane designers fault - over 23 the Pilot?

No profession in the world would survive with that level of failure.

You realize that the false narrative you are peddling (solely blaming the pilots) is an exercise in futility. The pilots do share a small portion of the blame, but Boeing takes the vast majority. You can keep harking the same mantra defending your 'cousins south of the border' but very few people are buying it. It's just looking more and more silly.

bgm wrote:

morrisond wrote:

kalvado wrote:

And what if fairy could stop those planes before they hit the ground, then crashes wouldn't happen. Or if Harry Potter was in the cabin and said "Wingardium Leviosa".
Any of your arguments could work - actually did work - after the first crash. By now we have statistically significant evidence.

Yes we have statistically significant results that after every MAX pilot in the world should have known about MCAS and how to counter it (after Lionair and the bulletin was Published on Nov 8) - they (ET) still managed to not follow the published procedure (and a few others) and still crash the plane.

That does not say anything about the safety of the MAX - that says something about the Worldwide standard (or lack thereof) of training.

Lionair almost got it right - they just had to turn off the system that misacted 22 times. So is the new World Standard 23? Everything under 23 it's the plane designers fault - over 23 the Pilot?

No profession in the world would survive with that level of failure.

You realize that the false narrative you are peddling (solely blaming the pilots) is an exercise in futility. The pilots do share a small portion of the blame, but Boeing takes the vast majority. You can keep harking the same mantra defending your 'cousins south of the border' but very few people are buying it. It's just looking more and more silly.

100%, people need to stop solely focusing on the pilots here. The plane was at fault. I watched a youtube video about how the pilots had seconds to flick through a paper manual before the MCAS put the plane into a nose dive. They had a 737 pilot in a simulator replicate the time span the pilots had to figure it out, they simply didnt have the time because the plane was nosediving into the ground every 5 seconds.

I just love all these armchair 'pilots' who seem to think the ET crew should have recognised what was going on, and done the runaway trim checklist.

Let's think about what was going on in that flight deck. A brand new aircraft, normal take-off, alarms sound / shaker, followed by repeated pitching down like a roller-coaster, while probably 500' above the ground. The a/c was quite heavy and flying in tropical heat from a high altitude airport and its associated terrain. Factor in MCAS did not exist publicly, nor that it would repeatedly nose-down at least ten times. Reaching for a manual or iPad probably impossible. It was lucky they kept her in the air as long as they did.

The MAX should not fly again. Boeing are putting a sticky plaster on a leg amputation.

http://aviationweek.com/commercial-avia ... uns-pilots

Aviation Week is not one for sensationalism... Well worth a read.

To be fair it isn't only armchair pilots - but all I would say is that hindsight is a wonderful thing.

uta999 wrote:

I just love all these armchair 'pilots' who seem to think the ET crew should have recognised what was going on, and done the runaway trim checklist.

Let's think about what was going on in that flight deck. A brand new aircraft, normal take-off, alarms sound / shaker, followed by repeated pitching down like a roller-coaster, while probably 500' above the ground. The a/c was quite heavy and flying in tropical heat from a high altitude airport and its associated terrain. Factor in MCAS did not exist publicly, nor that it would repeatedly nose-down at least ten times. Reaching for a manual or iPad probably impossible. It was lucky they kept her in the air as long as they did.

The MAX should not fly again. Boeing are putting a sticky plaster on a leg amputation.

I wouldnt go that far, but I agree with what you are saying. Pilots should never have been in that situation in the first place. People act like they had 15-20 minutes to work out what was going on. They had seconds. Probably less than it takes to write out a post on this thread.

The MAX will fly again, but I believe it will or should have a brand type certification and requires pilots to have full training. The MAX is night and day vs the -100 that came out a while ago. Boeing of course should take the hit, pay for the training and re-cert and just focus on a replacement ASAP.

flyingphil wrote:

http://aviationweek.com/commercial-aviation/ethiopian-max-crash-simulator-scenario-stuns-pilots

Aviation Week is not one for sensationalism... Well worth a read.

Perfect word.

This article is something people should read if they are trying to grasp the "Its third world pilots, Boeing are faultless" and making themsleves feel better.

Boeing is at fault. Period.

YYZLGA wrote:

It's definitely having a knock-on effect. I just had to deal with a travel agent for some people who invited me to something, and she told me she was had changed my booking to switch me onto a different flight because the original booking was a 737-800. I stifled my laugh, since the flight she switched me onto was much more convenient.

I went to get my hair cut at the weekend and was genuinely surprised when the guy asked out of the blue if the 737 was doing Airbus any favours!

Edit: just remembered - I was at a wedding last month and chatting to someone I'd never met who was a filmmaker in advertisiing. When he heard what my line of work was he wanted an in-depth description of the entire 737 situation. What happened, why it happened, who was at fault, what can be done about it, etc. etc. Very surprising. Being an engineer usually just gets you a polite smile and a nod at social gatherings...

frmrCapCadet wrote:

Stricter certification processes does not need to be a matter of retaliation. If the international committee recommends more analysis of the MAX it will be appropriate to extend analyses of the whole bunch of re-dos. (and there is no evidence that the rest need to be grounded - just maybe a closer look at them)

Yes, this is linked to my "to big to fail" comment.

If the certification of MAX is found to be dodgy, then the emphasis will shift from the vendor to the regulator, and when that happens, this MAX situation acts to undermine the entire industry.

There's a good reason why Airbus came out saying they hoped the MAX would soon fly again -- Airbus suffers if the MAX situation brings doubt on the industry as a whole.

planecane wrote:

If they apply that logic, wouldn't it follow that logically, if MCAS was missed on the MAX then something could be lurking on the A320NEO or A330NEO that hasn't manifested yet. If that is a possibility then shouldn't they be grounded and fully recertified without grandfathering?

I don't think that should happen but, what is the difference (from a certification standpoint) between the MAX and those other aircraft? Yes, the MAX engine location was moved but the Airbus NEOs surely had more changes than just slapping new engines on. If regulators determine that the MAX needs to be recertified then all similarly certified aircraft do as well. It can't be applied only to the MAX just because an issue manifested itself. The argument to do it would be to find something that hasn't manifested yet because the MCAS issue is known and the fix can be certified separately.

Yes, the industry as a whole fears some of the things being conjured to address the MAX situation will result in collateral damage.

kalvado wrote:

Well said. I would add that there is one more gamble: that the rest of design has no significant issues. God forbids that happens, but one more crash with any fraction of design contribution would mean that C-suit is only the minor of all casualties.

Sure, Boeing is on the hot seat right now and another accident would be quite grave, but IMHO it'd be worse if a similar undiscovered flaw caused an A320neo to crash, because it'd instantly undermine the confidence the public has in the entire industry.

AirlineCritic wrote:

Great comments, Revelation! I'll add though that there's another twist, which is whether the "C suite" is after short or long term damage minimization. FWIW, my personal opinion (just as an interested observer) is that they are going for too much short term in this case. Minimizing the cost for this and the next quarter is not as valuable as minimising costs and maximising sales for the next forty quarters. And THAT is what we're potentially talking about here.

Interesting point.

Boeing's strategy could very well win the battle but lose the war.

Basically we should be able to see if this is so by seeing if the MAX backlog declines without replenishment.

Given they have ~5 years of backlog and contracts are hard to break they have a moderately sized buffer.

If they get half way through that buffer and no new orders are coming in, they have quite a big problem.

SEU wrote:

flyingphil wrote:

http://aviationweek.com/commercial-aviation/ethiopian-max-crash-simulator-scenario-stuns-pilots

Aviation Week is not one for sensationalism... Well worth a read.

Perfect word.

This article is something people should read if they are trying to grasp the "Its third world pilots, Boeing are faultless" and making themsleves feel better.

Boeing is at fault. Period.

I think you are exaggerating.

People examining the pilot's behavior are not saying Boeing is faultless.

Boeing itself is not saying it's faultless.

The criticism of the pilots is not because they are "third world".

AF447's pilots and AF itself were heavily criticized over training issues and the pilots involved were first world French elites and as white as the driven snow.

LH caught heavy criticism after one of their pilots intentionally drove an Airbus into the side of a mountain and he too was as first world as can be and as white as white can be.

Your comment about people making themselves feel better seems to apply to you as well.

People are making issues about pilot training are not making issues about the origin or race of the pilots.

It's just social and other kinds of media that knows this triggers people, so out it comes, and people who want to see discrimination feel better about themselves.

And of course slagging a US based international corporation also makes a certain cross section of readership feel better about themselves as well.

planecane wrote:

Jshank83 wrote:

14ccKemiskt wrote:

WSJ raises the issue that wary passengers might avoid the plane for some time after the grounding is lifted.

Personally, I would not wanna get onboard a MAX until at least one year of crash-free operation has passed.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-max-co ... 1557669848

Price changes people’s minds pretty quickly. If they are looking to book and a MAX flight is even $10 cheaper people will change their mind.

I'm sure some will avoid it but most won't know a MAX from an NG (or from an A320). I also expect there to be a lag from the lifting of the grounding (when there will be news) to when the MAX goes back into service.

Initially due to the news some people may inquire to find out if they are on a MAX and they won't be. A month or two later it will be a very low percentage of people that even remember what model to ask about.

For example, my neighbor told me about a trip he recently took "on one of those planes that crashed." His trip was on Delta.

I agree with your points as well. A year from now I doubt There is much noticeable impact

bgm wrote:

morrisond wrote:

kalvado wrote:

And what if fairy could stop those planes before they hit the ground, then crashes wouldn't happen. Or if Harry Potter was in the cabin and said "Wingardium Leviosa".
Any of your arguments could work - actually did work - after the first crash. By now we have statistically significant evidence.

Yes we have statistically significant results that after every MAX pilot in the world should have known about MCAS and how to counter it (after Lionair and the bulletin was Published on Nov 8) - they (ET) still managed to not follow the published procedure (and a few others) and still crash the plane.

That does not say anything about the safety of the MAX - that says something about the Worldwide standard (or lack thereof) of training.

Lionair almost got it right - they just had to turn off the system that misacted 22 times. So is the new World Standard 23? Everything under 23 it's the plane designers fault - over 23 the Pilot?

No profession in the world would survive with that level of failure.

You realize that the false narrative you are peddling (solely blaming the pilots) is an exercise in futility. The pilots do share a small portion of the blame, but Boeing takes the vast majority. You can keep harking the same mantra defending your 'cousins south of the border' but very few people are buying it. It's just looking more and more silly.

Nope - I have said Boeing is 60-80% of the blame - I apologize if it appears I get a little one sided sometimes It's usually in response to Posts that go 100% the other way that say It's all Boeing's fault and Training and pilots had no contribution to the terrible outcome.

And I'm not blaming the pilots - I am blaming the Worldwide training system - there is a huge difference in the two. Pilots can only do what they are taught.

Revelation wrote:

SEU wrote:

flyingphil wrote:

http://aviationweek.com/commercial-aviation/ethiopian-max-crash-simulator-scenario-stuns-pilots

Aviation Week is not one for sensationalism... Well worth a read.

Perfect word.

This article is something people should read if they are trying to grasp the "Its third world pilots, Boeing are faultless" and making themsleves feel better.

Boeing is at fault. Period.

I think you are exaggerating.

People examining the pilot's behavior are not saying Boeing is faultless.

Boeing itself is not saying it's faultless.

The criticism of the pilots is not because they are "third world".

AF447's pilots and AF itself were heavily criticized over training issues and the pilots involved were first world French elites and as white as the driven snow.

LH caught heavy criticism after one of their pilots intentionally drove an Airbus into the side of a mountain and he too was as first world as can be and as white as white can be.

Your comment about people making themselves feel better seems to apply to you as well.

People are making issues about pilot training are not making issues about the origin or race of the pilots.

It's just social and other kinds of media that knows this triggers people, so out it comes, and people who want to see discrimination feel better about themselves.

And of course slagging a US based international corporation also makes a certain cross section of readership feel better about themselves as well.

Great post.

Indonesia is not third world country and if boeing selling plane that only required first world's pilot to fly the plane then,..... big lawsuit is coming from all second and third world countries. Indonesia is done with 737max, they will buy A320. B737max is doomed. Boeing need to completely redesign B737 to gain public trust. There is no 100% assurance from Boeing that the fix for Max series is 100% done. Boeing is at 100% fault in this matter. Selling a defective plane is a crime and resulted in 300 death.

PixelFlight wrote:

morrisond wrote:

That does not say anything about the safety of the MAX - that says something about the Worldwide standard (or lack thereof) of training.

What training are you talking about ? Nobody agree on the procedure the JT610 and the ET302 should have followed. Even the few on this list that still mainly blame the pilots point to procedures others than the Boeing officially published procedure for an erratic high AoA value on the 737-8/9 MAX, and that procedure is badly redacted, with illogical text order, with missing critical information like the maximum delay to use the cutoff switch after the last manual electric trim, and strict imperative requirement to use of the manual electrical trim before cutoff at high speed. This is so flawed that the MCAS is now modified to not require a such training. How can you still blame the pilots that lost there lives doing there work when the appropriate training was actively avoided and will still be avoided ?

If the worldwide standard of training was so bad, there would be similar crash statistic at take off regardless of the aircraft type and brand, and the 737-8/9 MAX would not be grounded for a software fix. It's normal to speculate first, but at some point you have to accept the reality of a massive mount of sources that constantly point to a management, design and certification failure to improve the safety.

I have never denied that there have been many failures in design and certification. Both need to be improved along with training. Fortunately because of Designs being so generally safe and reliable these days deficiencies in training are only apparent thankfully not that often. But the deficiencies in training exist - just like they do in design and certification.

Taking off is not hard - landing is the bigger issue - all the runway overruns tell me that more training is needed - Pilots seem to not have the hand flying skills and/or judgement they need to successfully land or go around as they seem to be relying on Computers way too much in this critical phase of flight.

The disturbing thing is that the design goal is not to require supplement education or keep supplement education at a minimum, whereas the design in itself requires yet unheard of skills. Or at least in modern aviation unheard of skills. How can you blame the pilots, even if pilot mistakes were made, when the design was made with the intention not to overload the pilots with information, or better yet, not to overload them with unexpected procedures vs. 737NG?

AirwayBill wrote:

rj777 wrote:

Ok, so say that Boeing does re-brand the Max as Trump suggests.... what will they call it? -800 and -900 are already taken.....the -10 would be ok.... but what about the other 2.

What about a shortened rebranding from the bottom? I expect the "big number trend" (-9X, -1000, etc.) to be gone soon anyways, or to simply run out of options...

737 MAX 7 => 737-1
737 MAX 8 => 737-2
etc...

Or even restart the "A; B" fashion, like with the 747-200B, the A300B, etc. (737A; 737B)

So many options

737 ZOM referring to resurrection?

Isn't there a contradiction between not requiring special education and yet point to lacking competence?

rj777 wrote:

Ok, so say that Boeing does re-brand the Max as Trump suggests.... what will they call it? -800 and -900 are already taken.....the -10 would be ok.... but what about the other 2.

Boeing 737NEO?

flyingphil wrote:

http://aviationweek.com/commercial-aviation/ethiopian-max-crash-simulator-scenario-stuns-pilots

Aviation Week is not one for sensationalism... Well worth a read.

But Boeing says all you need to do is flip a switch & you're home free.

nehalem wrote:

rj777 wrote:

Ok, so say that Boeing does re-brand the Max as Trump suggests.... what will they call it? -800 and -900 are already taken.....the -10 would be ok.... but what about the other 2.

Boeing 737NEO?

Why not. Boeing was using the term "Airbus" to describe one of its 747 models -- later Airbus used it to name the company.

7BOEING7 wrote:

nehalem wrote:

rj777 wrote:

Ok, so say that Boeing does re-brand the Max as Trump suggests.... what will they call it? -800 and -900 are already taken.....the -10 would be ok.... but what about the other 2.

Boeing 737NEO?

Why not. Boeing was using the term "Airbus" to describe one of its 747 models -- later Airbus used it to name the company.

Airbus would have a field day with that one!

morrisond wrote:

I have never denied that there have been many failures in design and certification. Both need to be improved along with training. Fortunately because of Designs being so generally safe and reliable these days deficiencies in training are only apparent thankfully not that often. But the deficiencies in training exist - just like they do in design and certification.

Please comment on this quote from Aviation Week https://aviationweek.com/commercial-aviation/ethiopian-max-crash-simulator-scenario-stuns-pilots:

simulator session flown by a U.S.-based Boeing 737 MAX crew that mimicked a key portion of the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 (ET302) accident sequence suggests that the Ethiopian crew faced a near-impossible task of getting their 737 MAX 8 back under control, and underscores the importance of pilots understanding severe runaway trim recovery procedures.

The key point to understand here is that the "severe runaway trim" situation is far more possible on the 737-8/9 MAX due to MCASv1, and his repetitive actions make the situation even more critical. This require more training than for the previous 737. What we observed is not a general deficiencies in training for all aircraft but the lack of more training for a specific aircraft that expose a new specific failure mode. If you disagree with that, then this imply that the lack of training include any aircraft that have a horizontal stabilizer trim.

PixelFlight wrote:

morrisond wrote:

I have never denied that there have been many failures in design and certification. Both need to be improved along with training. Fortunately because of Designs being so generally safe and reliable these days deficiencies in training are only apparent thankfully not that often. But the deficiencies in training exist - just like they do in design and certification.

Please comment on this quote from Aviation Week https://aviationweek.com/commercial-aviation/ethiopian-max-crash-simulator-scenario-stuns-pilots:

simulator session flown by a U.S.-based Boeing 737 MAX crew that mimicked a key portion of the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 (ET302) accident sequence suggests that the Ethiopian crew faced a near-impossible task of getting their 737 MAX 8 back under control, and underscores the importance of pilots understanding severe runaway trim recovery procedures.

The key point to understand here is that the "severe runaway trim" situation is far more possible on the 737-8/9 MAX due to MCASv1, and his repetitive actions make the situation even more critical. This require more training than for the previous 737. What we observed is not a general deficiencies in training for all aircraft but the lack of more training for a specific aircraft that expose a new specific failure mode. If you disagree with that, then this imply that the lack of training include any aircraft that have a horizontal stabilizer trim.

I'm pretty sure the ability to control your airspeed through use of the thrust levers is a requirement of any pilot on any aircraft.

It doesn't matter if Runaway trim is more possible on the MAX - on both flights they failed to counter it properly. Lionair more understandable - ET not so much.

PixelFlight wrote:

morrisond wrote:

I have never denied that there have been many failures in design and certification. Both need to be improved along with training. Fortunately because of Designs being so generally safe and reliable these days deficiencies in training are only apparent thankfully not that often. But the deficiencies in training exist - just like they do in design and certification.

Please comment on this quote from Aviation Week https://aviationweek.com/commercial-aviation/ethiopian-max-crash-simulator-scenario-stuns-pilots:

simulator session flown by a U.S.-based Boeing 737 MAX crew that mimicked a key portion of the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 (ET302) accident sequence suggests that the Ethiopian crew faced a near-impossible task of getting their 737 MAX 8 back under control, and underscores the importance of pilots understanding severe runaway trim recovery procedures.

The key point to understand here is that the "severe runaway trim" situation is far more possible on the 737-8/9 MAX due to MCASv1, and his repetitive actions make the situation even more critical. This require more training than for the previous 737. What we observed is not a general deficiencies in training for all aircraft but the lack of more training for a specific aircraft that expose a new specific failure mode. If you disagree with that, then this imply that the lack of training include any aircraft that have a horizontal stabilizer trim.

Just to save you a lot of repeated argument:
There is a pretty specific procedure for unreliable airspeed, which includes keeping flaps down hence avoiding activation of MCAS. I am not positive ET would be OK if that procedure is used, but that is a lengthly separate question.
They did choose to deviate from the procedure, which could be a sign of great airmanship or lack of training, or just being lost, or all of those. Looks like they will be fine with what they did in NG. They were on a MAX, and that ended badly.
There would be no such a dilemma if birdstrike occurred 30 seconds later, standard procedure would kill them anyway.

Some people conclude that training was a significant issue with training. Probably. Or maybe not.

AirwayBill wrote:

rj777 wrote:

Ok, so say that Boeing does re-brand the Max as Trump suggests.... what will they call it? -800 and -900 are already taken.....the -10 would be ok.... but what about the other 2.

What about a shortened rebranding from the bottom? I expect the "big number trend" (-9X, -1000, etc.) to be gone soon anyways, or to simply run out of options...

737 MAX 7 => 737-1
737 MAX 8 => 737-2
etc...

Or even restart the "A; B" fashion, like with the 747-200B, the A300B, etc. (737A; 737B)

So many options

What about 737 NNO (new name option)?

nehalem wrote:

rj777 wrote:

Ok, so say that Boeing does re-brand the Max as Trump suggests.... what will they call it? -800 and -900 are already taken.....the -10 would be ok.... but what about the other 2.

Boeing 737NEO?

Why not go with the same naming the 787s do? 737-8, 737-9, etc.? Seems like a no-brainer to me.

zoom321 wrote:

flyingphil wrote:

http://aviationweek.com/commercial-aviation/ethiopian-max-crash-simulator-scenario-stuns-pilots

Aviation Week is not one for sensationalism... Well worth a read.

But Boeing says all you need to do is flip a switch & you're home free.

No, that isn't what Boeing says. Boeing says to run the runaway stabilizer NNC which includes flipping a switch AFTER balancing control forces with manual (electric) trim.

The ET crew may have misunderstood and THOUGHT that was what Boeing was saying and flipped the switch too soon.

kalvado wrote:

PixelFlight wrote:

morrisond wrote:

I have never denied that there have been many failures in design and certification. Both need to be improved along with training. Fortunately because of Designs being so generally safe and reliable these days deficiencies in training are only apparent thankfully not that often. But the deficiencies in training exist - just like they do in design and certification.

Please comment on this quote from Aviation Week https://aviationweek.com/commercial-aviation/ethiopian-max-crash-simulator-scenario-stuns-pilots:

simulator session flown by a U.S.-based Boeing 737 MAX crew that mimicked a key portion of the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 (ET302) accident sequence suggests that the Ethiopian crew faced a near-impossible task of getting their 737 MAX 8 back under control, and underscores the importance of pilots understanding severe runaway trim recovery procedures.

The key point to understand here is that the "severe runaway trim" situation is far more possible on the 737-8/9 MAX due to MCASv1, and his repetitive actions make the situation even more critical. This require more training than for the previous 737. What we observed is not a general deficiencies in training for all aircraft but the lack of more training for a specific aircraft that expose a new specific failure mode. If you disagree with that, then this imply that the lack of training include any aircraft that have a horizontal stabilizer trim.

Just to save you a lot of repeated argument:
There is a pretty specific procedure for unreliable airspeed, which includes keeping flaps down hence avoiding activation of MCAS. I am not positive ET would be OK if that procedure is used, but that is a lengthly separate question.
They did choose to deviate from the procedure, which could be a sign of great airmanship or lack of training, or just being lost, or all of those. Looks like they will be fine with what they did in NG. They were on a MAX, and that ended badly.
There would be no such a dilemma if birdstrike occurred 30 seconds later, standard procedure would kill them anyway.

Some people conclude that training was a significant issue with training. Probably. Or maybe not.

Well, not quite. Airspeed Unrelaible QRH 10.2 points you to the performance tables. The applicable table for climb is Flaps UP, Max climb thrust.
www.737ng.co.uk/737-800%20Quick%20Refer ... QRH%29.pdf

We have 4 crews who all apparently all did this when encountering similar circumstances.

One poster tried to close down this thread when this information was first posted although, probably just a coincidence.

Ray

However that was superseded by the Generic Boeing Instruction from 2015 on all Boeing models - this is a Memory item.

"A few days back I received a new procedure in my 737 QRH, for airspeed unreliable. We now have a set of thrust settings in combination with a specific pitch attitude, as memory items.
Config flaps up: 4 degrees pitch up, and 75% N1
Config flaps extended: 10 degrees pitch up and 80% N1

These pitch and power settings provide a simple reference setting for the crew to use for a short period of time while the initial steps of the checklist are accomplished. These settings do not ensure a level flight or constant airspeed at any particular altitude/airspeed/weight combination. However, they do ensure that at any and all weight/altitude combinations, the aircraft will accelerate from low speeds, and slow from a high speeds, as we cannot assume the aircraft is in stable flight when the NNC is run. It is more likely that the crew or the autopilot has destabilized the airplane as a result of erroneous airspeed indications prior to identification of the need to run the NNC. These memory item pitch and power settings often result in a significant climb (from lower altitudes) and can also result in a gradual descent (from higher altitudes)."

morrisond wrote:

However that was superseded by the Generic Boeing Instruction from 2015 on all Boeing models - this is a Memory item.

"A few days back I received a new procedure in my 737 QRH, for airspeed unreliable. We now have a set of thrust settings in combination with a specific pitch attitude, as memory items.
Config flaps up: 4 degrees pitch up, and 75% N1
Config flaps extended: 10 degrees pitch up and 80% N1

These pitch and power settings provide a simple reference setting for the crew to use for a short period of time while the initial steps of the checklist are accomplished. These settings do not ensure a level flight or constant airspeed at any particular altitude/airspeed/weight combination. However, they do ensure that at any and all weight/altitude combinations, the aircraft will accelerate from low speeds, and slow from a high speeds, as we cannot assume the aircraft is in stable flight when the NNC is run. It is more likely that the crew or the autopilot has destabilized the airplane as a result of erroneous airspeed indications prior to identification of the need to run the NNC. These memory item pitch and power settings often result in a significant climb (from lower altitudes) and can also result in a gradual descent (from higher altitudes)."

Great!. Are you able to share docs or relevant parts thereof?

Ray

XRAYretired wrote:

kalvado wrote:

PixelFlight wrote:

Please comment on this quote from Aviation Week https://aviationweek.com/commercial-aviation/ethiopian-max-crash-simulator-scenario-stuns-pilots:

The key point to understand here is that the "severe runaway trim" situation is far more possible on the 737-8/9 MAX due to MCASv1, and his repetitive actions make the situation even more critical. This require more training than for the previous 737. What we observed is not a general deficiencies in training for all aircraft but the lack of more training for a specific aircraft that expose a new specific failure mode. If you disagree with that, then this imply that the lack of training include any aircraft that have a horizontal stabilizer trim.

Just to save you a lot of repeated argument:
There is a pretty specific procedure for unreliable airspeed, which includes keeping flaps down hence avoiding activation of MCAS. I am not positive ET would be OK if that procedure is used, but that is a lengthly separate question.
They did choose to deviate from the procedure, which could be a sign of great airmanship or lack of training, or just being lost, or all of those. Looks like they will be fine with what they did in NG. They were on a MAX, and that ended badly.
There would be no such a dilemma if birdstrike occurred 30 seconds later, standard procedure would kill them anyway.

Some people conclude that training was a significant issue with training. Probably. Or maybe not.

Well, not quite. Airspeed Unrelaible QRH 10.2 points you to the performance tables. The applicable table for climb is Flaps UP, Max climb thrust.
http://www.737ng.co.uk/737-800%20Quick% ... QRH%29.pdf

We have 4 crews who all apparently all did this when encountering similar circumstances.

One poster tried to close down this thread when this information was first posted although, probably just a coincidence.

Ray

The climb table you referenced above is for a 280KT/.76 M climb. Thats not the chart you would be using, if you were in the terminal area, intending to return and land. The "Terminal Area" table at the bottom of that page would be the correct table.

An informal poll of every first officer I've flown with recently has had 100% "unreliable airspeed" as the answer, when asked, "If you got a stick shaker right after rotation, what QRH procedure would you start with".

AABusDrvr wrote:

XRAYretired wrote:

kalvado wrote:

Just to save you a lot of repeated argument:
There is a pretty specific procedure for unreliable airspeed, which includes keeping flaps down hence avoiding activation of MCAS. I am not positive ET would be OK if that procedure is used, but that is a lengthly separate question.
They did choose to deviate from the procedure, which could be a sign of great airmanship or lack of training, or just being lost, or all of those. Looks like they will be fine with what they did in NG. They were on a MAX, and that ended badly.
There would be no such a dilemma if birdstrike occurred 30 seconds later, standard procedure would kill them anyway.

Some people conclude that training was a significant issue with training. Probably. Or maybe not.

Well, not quite. Airspeed Unrelaible QRH 10.2 points you to the performance tables. The applicable table for climb is Flaps UP, Max climb thrust.
http://www.737ng.co.uk/737-800%20Quick% ... QRH%29.pdf

We have 4 crews who all apparently all did this when encountering similar circumstances.

One poster tried to close down this thread when this information was first posted although, probably just a coincidence.

Ray

The climb table you referenced above is for a 280KT/.76 M climb. Thats not the chart you would be using, if you were in the terminal area, intending to return and land. The "Terminal Area" table at the bottom of that page would be the correct table.

An informal poll of every first officer I've flown with recently has had 100% "unreliable airspeed" as the answer, when asked, "If you got a stick shaker right after rotation, what QRH procedure would you start with".

OK. Thanks for the info.

Can you speculate as to why 4 crews appeared to follow the former with 3 subsequently intending to return?
Ta.
Ray

It's funny. I said at the time that if the thing were actually grounded, Boeing and the US airlines would be lucky to have it back flying passengers by November, assuming that the problem was well-understood and that it could be countered mostly with a software fix. I am still thinking that that's the timetable, and that seems to be where we are heading.

I laughed when Parker said it would be back in the air as soon as the FAA allowed it. No way that AA is going to go it alone without at least a few international airlines agreeing. (Of course, it now seems like the FAA, government agency that it is, is unlikely to authorize a return to service in the US until at least some of the major international regulators also agree, so the point may be moot.) It's funny how overly-optimistic people are about the possibility of a recovery after a grounding; it's hard to overestimate the amount of inertia that kicks in. Not making a value judgment about that, just a realistic observation. In my view, Boeing rushed MCAS into service as a quick thoughtless fix for their Silicon-Valley-like marketing overpromises -- something that wouldn't have been expected in the engineering-driven company that it was years ago -- and now it has to be treated as an unreliable participant in the process of certifying the fix.

uta999 wrote:

I just love all these armchair 'pilots' who seem to think the ET crew should have recognised what was going on, and done the runaway trim checklist.

Let's think about what was going on in that flight deck. A brand new aircraft, normal take-off, alarms sound / shaker, followed by repeated pitching down like a roller-coaster, while probably 500' above the ground. The a/c was quite heavy and flying in tropical heat from a high altitude airport and its associated terrain. Factor in MCAS did not exist publicly, nor that it would repeatedly nose-down at least ten times. Reaching for a manual or iPad probably impossible. It was lucky they kept her in the air as long as they did.

The MAX should not fly again. Boeing are putting a sticky plaster on a leg amputation.

A few things: "tropical" heat doesn't exist at high elevations by definition. Humidity is crazy low at 7000' elevation. Also, terrain was never identified as a factor, and the aircraft got as high as 6000' above the ground.

MCAS can't engage with the flaps down, so the MCAS events didn't start anywhere close to 500' AGL.

After the Lion Air crash, MCAS operation, behavior, and remedies were documented succinctly in a Boeing bulletin already posted on A.net. The behavior of ET306 was very consistent with this bulletin.

I fail to understand how one could conclude that it shouldn't fly again. The aircraft is fine. However, Boeing needs to fix the firmware and have it reviewed, as well as revise its training procedures. It also needs to take a long, hard look how it got into this predicament, and ensure it never happens again. That much I'll agree with.

Cnn believes it will take a long while!

The 737 Max does not appear close to flying again. Aviation experts doubt global regulators will act in concert to approve the 737 Max for flight, because serious questions remain about how and why the FAA approved the 737 Max for flight and whether it rushed the certification process.


https://edition.cnn.com/2019/05/13/busi ... index.html

Gesendet von meinem SM-G950F mit Tapatalk

XRAYretired wrote:

AABusDrvr wrote:

XRAYretired wrote:

Well, not quite. Airspeed Unrelaible QRH 10.2 points you to the performance tables. The applicable table for climb is Flaps UP, Max climb thrust.
http://www.737ng.co.uk/737-800%20Quick% ... QRH%29.pdf

We have 4 crews who all apparently all did this when encountering similar circumstances.

One poster tried to close down this thread when this information was first posted although, probably just a coincidence.

Ray

The climb table you referenced above is for a 280KT/.76 M climb. Thats not the chart you would be using, if you were in the terminal area, intending to return and land. The "Terminal Area" table at the bottom of that page would be the correct table.

An informal poll of every first officer I've flown with recently has had 100% "unreliable airspeed" as the answer, when asked, "If you got a stick shaker right after rotation, what QRH procedure would you start with".

OK. Thanks for the info.

Can you speculate as to why 4 crews appeared to follow the former with 3 subsequently intending to return?
Ta.
Ray

Let me start by saying I don't lay blame on the crews in either of these incidents. I've flown both A and B airplanes, not a "fan boy" for either, it just happens I currently fly the 737. IMHO, Boeing (and the FAA) dropped the ball bad with the design, and implementation of the MCAS. I do however, scratch my head at some of the actions of both crews. The full CVR transcripts would help understand things tremendously.

I won't even speculate on an answer to why the crews acted as they did, other than their training and experience led them to believe the actions they took, were correct at the time.

I'd like to know why the Lion Air captain was able to maintain control of the airplane for several minutes, and many MCAS trim command cycles, but when he passed control to the first officer, he wasn't able to keep the airplane flying.

Or why the ET crew couldn't, or didn't get the airplane back in trim with the normal stab trim. The Lion air captain at least, was seemingly able to do this several times.

I will never understand why the ET crew tried to engage the autopilot three times with an active stick shaker. Or why they never got the power back from the takeoff thrust setting. Pitch+Power=Performance is as true in a 737, as it is in a Cub.

There isn't any real procedural guidance about retracting the flaps, but I don't believe in a similar situation I would. Two reasons here, first is I know with flaps 1 or 5, I have more maneuver margin than if the wing is clean. Second would be that if I had a continuous, false stick shaker right after takeoff, I'm going to go right back and land. No reason to clean up, and accelerate, as long as I can assure terrain clearance, and it would appear the ET crew did climb high enough to do that.

I don't understand why any of these crews didn't do the "RUNAWAY STABILIZER" NNC, when the stab trim kept doing something other than what they told it to do. Maybe the check list needs to be renamed "UNCOMMANDED STABILIZER MOTION" or something like that.

When everything is working properly, the MAX is a great airplane to fly. I do hope they get this mess sorted out, and the airplanes resume flying before long.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/timeline-f ... 1557758701

According to this article, many believe it 737 MAX will be grounded until August at least.

AABusDrvr wrote:

XRAYretired wrote:

AABusDrvr wrote:

The climb table you referenced above is for a 280KT/.76 M climb. Thats not the chart you would be using, if you were in the terminal area, intending to return and land. The "Terminal Area" table at the bottom of that page would be the correct table.

An informal poll of every first officer I've flown with recently has had 100% "unreliable airspeed" as the answer, when asked, "If you got a stick shaker right after rotation, what QRH procedure would you start with".

OK. Thanks for the info.

Can you speculate as to why 4 crews appeared to follow the former with 3 subsequently intending to return?
Ta.
Ray

Let me start by saying I don't lay blame on the crews in either of these incidents. I've flown both A and B airplanes, not a "fan boy" for either, it just happens I currently fly the 737. IMHO, Boeing (and the FAA) dropped the ball bad with the design, and implementation of the MCAS. I do however, scratch my head at some of the actions of both crews. The full CVR transcripts would help understand things tremendously.

I won't even speculate on an answer to why the crews acted as they did, other than their training and experience led them to believe the actions they took, were correct at the time.

I'd like to know why the Lion Air captain was able to maintain control of the airplane for several minutes, and many MCAS trim command cycles, but when he passed control to the first officer, he wasn't able to keep the airplane flying.

Or why the ET crew couldn't, or didn't get the airplane back in trim with the normal stab trim. The Lion air captain at least, was seemingly able to do this several times.

I will never understand why the ET crew tried to engage the autopilot three times with an active stick shaker. Or why they never got the power back from the takeoff thrust setting. Pitch+Power=Performance is as true in a 737, as it is in a Cub.

There isn't any real procedural guidance about retracting the flaps, but I don't believe in a similar situation I would. Two reasons here, first is I know with flaps 1 or 5, I have more maneuver margin than if the wing is clean. Second would be that if I had a continuous, false stick shaker right after takeoff, I'm going to go right back and land. No reason to clean up, and accelerate, as long as I can assure terrain clearance, and it would appear the ET crew did climb high enough to do that.

I don't understand why any of these crews didn't do the "RUNAWAY STABILIZER" NNC, when the stab trim kept doing something other than what they told it to do. Maybe the check list needs to be renamed "UNCOMMANDED STABILIZER MOTION" or something like that.

When everything is working properly, the MAX is a great airplane to fly. I do hope they get this mess sorted out, and the airplanes resume flying before long.

Thanks, appreciated.

Ray