morrisond wrote:

SEU wrote:

morrisond wrote:

That's not a bad list for Lionair - ET should have known how to handle MCAS and it's now obvious they did not - which I highly suspect is because there Airline never told them/trained them - but that's another subject.

MCAS V2 - properly implemented shouldn't really need training as the outcome would be so benign and the counteraction so simple (return trim to normal and hit cutout switches) that it should not require SIM time.

However what the two crashes has uncovered is severe deficiencies in non-normal procedures that Pilots are required to know as Memory items.

And this does not seem to be a third world airline issue only - in the drive to cut costs this type of training has been cut to bare regulatory minimums - those Regulatory standards need to be made tougher.

Can I ask why you think the Crew should have known how to handle a faulty AOA sensor whilst the plane was flying nose down into the ground, without it being anywhere in the paper manual (page 300 or something like that)?

On Lionair it's debatable. It kind of looked like Runaway Stabilizer so it would have made sense to turn off power to the system - but yes there was no particular procedure for the symptoms they were facing. However you can't write procedures for every potential failure - at some point you have to assume a pilot would recognize a system (Electric Trim) is faulty and turn it off and fly manually. They properly counteracted MCAS 22 times. I have used the following example many times and no one has a good answer.

"If there was a fault in the Autopilot System and it tried to turn you right (or put you in a dive) 22 times - would you keep it engaged or turn it off?"

On ET at the time of the flight they should have fully known all about MCAS and the conditions that caused it and have been highly proficient on the procedure to counter it if the Airline had done the training they said they did (I think all they said was that they supplied the procedure) - however there are some reports they never even did that.

The EAD was very sparse for pilots who were being presented with a very complex set of inputs so that pilot overload was a real possibility. Boeing lists nine in the EAD. It was not a simple case to deal with no matter how many times people say it was. In both cases it occurred right after take off when there is already a very high load placed on pilots. Some people are saying they should have used the stall prevention procedure instead but Boeing makes no mention of this. They also say it can only happen during manual flight but make no mention of it only happening with flaps up.

Boeing should have issued a more complex EAD.

What to do if this happens immediately after take off.
What to do if this happens during level flight.

https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safe ... air-crash/

As for this ongoing debate, the pilots in each case only had minutes to react correctly.

There is now news out that real American pilots were not happy with Boeing response.

https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/15/boeing- ... -fall.html

Pilots at American Airlines angrily pushed Boeing officials at a tense meeting in November for a fix to its 737 Max aircraft that crashed in Indonesia in October.
They asked Boeing to take emergency action that would have likely grounded the Max, but Boeing officials resisted.
The pilots union shared an audio recording with CNBC

They knew that the response from Boeing was inadequate and they weren't foreign pilots.

morrisond wrote:

SEU wrote:

morrisond wrote:

On ET at the time of the flight they should have fully known all about MCAS and the conditions that caused it and have been highly proficient on the procedure to counter it if the Airline had done the training they said they did (I think all they said was that they supplied the procedure) - however there are some reports they never even did that.

Are we reading the same report? Also, there was no training required, the bulletin and the AD were distributed to the crew, and they had a briefing session over it. The same way it was done in just about every other airline flying the MAX.

Not to mention, they followed the procedure to a T only to realize they were put in a death trap because the procedure failed to account for situations where manual trimming was near to impossible during relatively higher speeds [ do they have fault there - NO]. Can we debate why their airspeed wasn't managed? Perhaps - but IMO, even that is a far fetched argument given the timeline of events and conflicting alerts that the crew faced.

morrisond wrote:

[...]
MCAS V2 - properly implemented shouldn't really need training as the outcome would be so benign and the counteraction so simple (return trim to normal and hit cutout switches) that it should not require SIM time.
[...]

Maybe, maybe not.

With the modified MCAS, apparently now a MAX can fly MCAS-off, even without any failures. There is no public knowledge of what it's like. Boeing probably does know. FAA should know or should find out.

Just the yoke getting a bit lighter, and only in turns, aft CG, what else? I forgot, so no big deal, no need for additional training, MAX is good to go back?

Or dangerously close to a stall with massive flow separation on the wing due to the big engine up high, with post stall characteristics much worse than, and completely different from, the NG?

Anything in between?

Nobody knows right now (outside Boeing), but it wouldn't be hard to find out. I hope they (FAA? somebody outside the US?) does the proper flight tests and finds out. I bet it takes an hour or less of test to get the big picture.

XRAYretired wrote:

He knows not what he is saying?

-Sinnett said that Boeing felt pilots did not need to know more about the system, given how unlikely it was to misfire.
"I don't know that understanding this system would've changed the outcome on this. In a million miles, you're going to maybe fly this airplane, maybe once you're going to see this, ever. So we try not to overload the crews with information that's unnecessary so they actually know the information we believe is important," he said, according to the recording obtained by CBS.-
From <https://www.businessinsider.com/boeing-played-down-737-max-second-crash-concern-pilots-audio-reports-2019-5?r=US&IR=T>

As a rough estimate. 1E6 miles ~=3500 flight hours~=1 year service. With 5000 A/C in the fleet eventually, it would be experienced ~5000 times every year.

Don't think this is what he meant - but he said it!

NB Even if he meant 1E6 flight hours, that would still work out ~280 times a year!

Would have thought he would have a more convincing grasp on the numbers for such an important meeting?

Ray

You're estimating the rate at which an individual aircraft might see the MCAS trigger.

He's talking about the rate at which an individual pilot might see the MCAS trigger.

And I think we can presume "a million hours" was a SWAG from an executive and nothing more.

I presume we'll learn more about actual failure rates when the reports come out.

morrisond wrote:

SEU wrote:

morrisond wrote:

That's not a bad list for Lionair - ET should have known how to handle MCAS and it's now obvious they did not - which I highly suspect is because there Airline never told them/trained them - but that's another subject.

MCAS V2 - properly implemented shouldn't really need training as the outcome would be so benign and the counteraction so simple (return trim to normal and hit cutout switches) that it should not require SIM time.

However what the two crashes has uncovered is severe deficiencies in non-normal procedures that Pilots are required to know as Memory items.

And this does not seem to be a third world airline issue only - in the drive to cut costs this type of training has been cut to bare regulatory minimums - those Regulatory standards need to be made tougher.

Can I ask why you think the Crew should have known how to handle a faulty AOA sensor whilst the plane was flying nose down into the ground, without it being anywhere in the paper manual (page 300 or something like that)?

On Lionair it's debatable. It kind of looked like Runaway Stabilizer so it would have made sense to turn off power to the system - but yes there was no particular procedure for the symptoms they were facing. However you can't write procedures for every potential failure - at some point you have to assume a pilot would recognize a system (Electric Trim) is faulty and turn it off and fly manually. They properly counteracted MCAS 22 times. I have used the following example many times and no one has a good answer.

"If there was a fault in the Autopilot System and it tried to turn you right (or put you in a dive) 22 times - would you keep it engaged or turn it off?"

On ET at the time of the flight they should have fully known all about MCAS and the conditions that caused it and have been highly proficient on the procedure to counter it if the Airline had done the training they said they did (I think all they said was that they supplied the procedure) - however there are some reports they never even did that.

Out of curiosity, you yourself stated that Boeing was 60-80% to blame upthread, so why are all your threads only laying blame the pilots?

morrisond wrote:

SEU wrote:

morrisond wrote:

That's not a bad list for Lionair - ET should have known how to handle MCAS and it's now obvious they did not - which I highly suspect is because there Airline never told them/trained them - but that's another subject.

MCAS V2 - properly implemented shouldn't really need training as the outcome would be so benign and the counteraction so simple (return trim to normal and hit cutout switches) that it should not require SIM time.

However what the two crashes has uncovered is severe deficiencies in non-normal procedures that Pilots are required to know as Memory items.

And this does not seem to be a third world airline issue only - in the drive to cut costs this type of training has been cut to bare regulatory minimums - those Regulatory standards need to be made tougher.

Can I ask why you think the Crew should have known how to handle a faulty AOA sensor whilst the plane was flying nose down into the ground, without it being anywhere in the paper manual (page 300 or something like that)?

On Lionair it's debatable. It kind of looked like Runaway Stabilizer so it would have made sense to turn off power to the system - but yes there was no particular procedure for the symptoms they were facing. However you can't write procedures for every potential failure - at some point you have to assume a pilot would recognize a system (Electric Trim) is faulty and turn it off and fly manually. They properly counteracted MCAS 22 times. I have used the following example many times and no one has a good answer.

"If there was a fault in the Autopilot System and it tried to turn you right (or put you in a dive) 22 times - would you keep it engaged or turn it off?"

On ET at the time of the flight they should have fully known all about MCAS and the conditions that caused it and have been highly proficient on the procedure to counter it if the Airline had done the training they said they did (I think all they said was that they supplied the procedure) - however there are some reports they never even did that.

Stuck in the worn grove again eh. Thought you'd turned a leaf for a while. Missed your usual first line of Boeing should have done better but...

Please dont call the dead pilots out for not having the sense.
Please dont call the Ethiopian CEO a liar without any evidence. Especially since you know full well his statement that the pilots had been given the information etc. and you know that the report you are referring to is contrary to the Preliminary Report and thereby discredited at least in part.

Good of you to recognise "many" repeats. The analogy doesn't hold water since Pilots would know Autopilot exists as a system and was capable of the deed. Pilots had no knowledge that MCAS existed never mind that it would keep pushing the nose down even when counteracted.

I think one of the plaintiffs legals put it succinctly:
“The FAA is wrong to push the narrative that the pilots were responsible for the two disasters because the Boeing MCAS created the hazardous condition that caused the two crashes and the system actually fought against the efforts of the pilots who were trying to save the airplanes. That is why it is so awful to hear Mr. Elwell blame the pilots for the accidents. Modern aviation safety systems are designed to prevent pilot error from causing the loss of an airplane. The MCAS does the opposite – it creates the hazardous condition and induces the pilot error."

https://www.eturbonews.com/252204/shock ... 737-8-max/

Ray

bgm wrote:

morrisond wrote:

SEU wrote:

Can I ask why you think the Crew should have known how to handle a faulty AOA sensor whilst the plane was flying nose down into the ground, without it being anywhere in the paper manual (page 300 or something like that)?

On Lionair it's debatable. It kind of looked like Runaway Stabilizer so it would have made sense to turn off power to the system - but yes there was no particular procedure for the symptoms they were facing. However you can't write procedures for every potential failure - at some point you have to assume a pilot would recognize a system (Electric Trim) is faulty and turn it off and fly manually. They properly counteracted MCAS 22 times. I have used the following example many times and no one has a good answer.

"If there was a fault in the Autopilot System and it tried to turn you right (or put you in a dive) 22 times - would you keep it engaged or turn it off?"

On ET at the time of the flight they should have fully known all about MCAS and the conditions that caused it and have been highly proficient on the procedure to counter it if the Airline had done the training they said they did (I think all they said was that they supplied the procedure) - however there are some reports they never even did that.

Out of curiosity, you yourself stated that Boeing was 60-80% to blame upthread, so why are all your threads only laying blame the pilots?

Because on the Boeing part being 60-80% responsible there is not too much to debate - they seriously screwed up - some on here keep insisting though the Pilots are blameless and there is nothing they could do to save the plane and the training system is perfectly fine - It is not.

XRAYretired wrote:

morrisond wrote:

SEU wrote:

Can I ask why you think the Crew should have known how to handle a faulty AOA sensor whilst the plane was flying nose down into the ground, without it being anywhere in the paper manual (page 300 or something like that)?

On Lionair it's debatable. It kind of looked like Runaway Stabilizer so it would have made sense to turn off power to the system - but yes there was no particular procedure for the symptoms they were facing. However you can't write procedures for every potential failure - at some point you have to assume a pilot would recognize a system (Electric Trim) is faulty and turn it off and fly manually. They properly counteracted MCAS 22 times. I have used the following example many times and no one has a good answer.

"If there was a fault in the Autopilot System and it tried to turn you right (or put you in a dive) 22 times - would you keep it engaged or turn it off?"

On ET at the time of the flight they should have fully known all about MCAS and the conditions that caused it and have been highly proficient on the procedure to counter it if the Airline had done the training they said they did (I think all they said was that they supplied the procedure) - however there are some reports they never even did that.

Stuck in the worn grove again eh. Thought you'd turned a leaf for a while. Missed your usual first line of Boeing should have done better but...

Please dont call the dead pilots out for not having the sense.
Please dont call the Ethiopian CEO a liar without any evidence. Especially since you know full well his statement that the pilots had been given the information etc. and you know that the report you are referring to is contrary to the Preliminary Report and thereby discredited at least in part.

Good of you to recognise "many" repeats. The analogy doesn't hold water since Pilots would know Autopilot exists as a system and was capable of the deed. Pilots had no knowledge that MCAS existed never mind that it would keep pushing the nose down even when counteracted.

I think one of the plaintiffs legals put it succinctly:
“The FAA is wrong to push the narrative that the pilots were responsible for the two disasters because the Boeing MCAS created the hazardous condition that caused the two crashes and the system actually fought against the efforts of the pilots who were trying to save the airplanes. That is why it is so awful to hear Mr. Elwell blame the pilots for the accidents. Modern aviation safety systems are designed to prevent pilot error from causing the loss of an airplane. The MCAS does the opposite – it creates the hazardous condition and induces the pilot error."

https://www.eturbonews.com/252204/shock ... 737-8-max/

Ray

Thank you for a bit of reason. It is 100% not the pilots fault that the plane was in a bad way. How dare anyone suggest the pilots were at fault. I understand the FAA and Boeing have to take a stand point to deflect the blame to cover their own backs, its business at the end of the day.

I actually believe they asked trump to ground it not the other way around. Think about it, if boeing and FAA can say they were against the grounding from the start and only grounded it when the POTUS asked them to, they can carry on the narrative that they truely believe the 737MAX to be a safe aircraft, and blame pilots etc to lower the financial damage. Sadly for boeing and their staff the rest of the world probably wont buy their crap anymore.

XRAYretired wrote:

morrisond wrote:

SEU wrote:

Can I ask why you think the Crew should have known how to handle a faulty AOA sensor whilst the plane was flying nose down into the ground, without it being anywhere in the paper manual (page 300 or something like that)?

On Lionair it's debatable. It kind of looked like Runaway Stabilizer so it would have made sense to turn off power to the system - but yes there was no particular procedure for the symptoms they were facing. However you can't write procedures for every potential failure - at some point you have to assume a pilot would recognize a system (Electric Trim) is faulty and turn it off and fly manually. They properly counteracted MCAS 22 times. I have used the following example many times and no one has a good answer.

"If there was a fault in the Autopilot System and it tried to turn you right (or put you in a dive) 22 times - would you keep it engaged or turn it off?"

On ET at the time of the flight they should have fully known all about MCAS and the conditions that caused it and have been highly proficient on the procedure to counter it if the Airline had done the training they said they did (I think all they said was that they supplied the procedure) - however there are some reports they never even did that.

Stuck in the worn grove again eh. Thought you'd turned a leaf for a while. Missed your usual first line of Boeing should have done better but...

Please dont call the dead pilots out for not having the sense.
Please dont call the Ethiopian CEO a liar without any evidence. Especially since you know full well his statement that the pilots had been given the information etc. and you know that the report you are referring to is contrary to the Preliminary Report and thereby discredited at least in part.

Good of you to recognise "many" repeats. The analogy doesn't hold water since Pilots would know Autopilot exists as a system and was capable of the deed. Pilots had no knowledge that MCAS existed never mind that it would keep pushing the nose down even when counteracted.

I think one of the plaintiffs legals put it succinctly:
“The FAA is wrong to push the narrative that the pilots were responsible for the two disasters because the Boeing MCAS created the hazardous condition that caused the two crashes and the system actually fought against the efforts of the pilots who were trying to save the airplanes. That is why it is so awful to hear Mr. Elwell blame the pilots for the accidents. Modern aviation safety systems are designed to prevent pilot error from causing the loss of an airplane. The MCAS does the opposite – it creates the hazardous condition and induces the pilot error."

https://www.eturbonews.com/252204/shock ... 737-8-max/

Ray

It doesn't mean I need to believe the Ethiopian CEO - they might have given the pilots the procedure but it's pretty obvious they didn't know it that well. The AVHerald article is a real smoking gun that needs to be investigated. I'm sure it will come out in the trials.

On Lionair - I get it - it was something new - I'm just more curious why they didn't think to turn it off (Electric Trim) - it seems like it would have been a natural reaction and that might have been what the Pilot eventually decided to do if given enough time and the Co-pilot hadn't failed to properly counteract MCAS.

Revelation wrote:

XRAYretired wrote:

He knows not what he is saying?

-Sinnett said that Boeing felt pilots did not need to know more about the system, given how unlikely it was to misfire.
"I don't know that understanding this system would've changed the outcome on this. In a million miles, you're going to maybe fly this airplane, maybe once you're going to see this, ever. So we try not to overload the crews with information that's unnecessary so they actually know the information we believe is important," he said, according to the recording obtained by CBS.-
From <https://www.businessinsider.com/boeing-played-down-737-max-second-crash-concern-pilots-audio-reports-2019-5?r=US&IR=T>

As a rough estimate. 1E6 miles ~=3500 flight hours~=1 year service. With 5000 A/C in the fleet eventually, it would be experienced ~5000 times every year.

Don't think this is what he meant - but he said it!

NB Even if he meant 1E6 flight hours, that would still work out ~280 times a year!

Would have thought he would have a more convincing grasp on the numbers for such an important meeting?

Ray

You're estimating the rate at which an individual aircraft might see the MCAS trigger.

He's talking about the rate at which an individual pilot might see the MCAS trigger.

And I think we can presume "a million hours" was a SWAG from an executive and nothing more.

I presume we'll learn more about actual failure rates when the reports come out.

Don't doubt it is SWAG as you say. Just interesting he could find no real numbers to use and the one he did actually use is contrary to what he was trying to portray. 1E6 miles is the same no matter how many pilots its spread between its not far off ~1 A/C in 1 year service.

Ray

XRAYretired wrote:

morrisond wrote:

SEU wrote:

Can I ask why you think the Crew should have known how to handle a faulty AOA sensor whilst the plane was flying nose down into the ground, without it being anywhere in the paper manual (page 300 or something like that)?

On Lionair it's debatable. It kind of looked like Runaway Stabilizer so it would have made sense to turn off power to the system - but yes there was no particular procedure for the symptoms they were facing. However you can't write procedures for every potential failure - at some point you have to assume a pilot would recognize a system (Electric Trim) is faulty and turn it off and fly manually. They properly counteracted MCAS 22 times. I have used the following example many times and no one has a good answer.

"If there was a fault in the Autopilot System and it tried to turn you right (or put you in a dive) 22 times - would you keep it engaged or turn it off?"

On ET at the time of the flight they should have fully known all about MCAS and the conditions that caused it and have been highly proficient on the procedure to counter it if the Airline had done the training they said they did (I think all they said was that they supplied the procedure) - however there are some reports they never even did that.

Stuck in the worn grove again eh. Thought you'd turned a leaf for a while. Missed your usual first line of Boeing should have done better but...

Please dont call the dead pilots out for not having the sense.
Please dont call the Ethiopian CEO a liar without any evidence. Especially since you know full well his statement that the pilots had been given the information etc. and you know that the report you are referring to is contrary to the Preliminary Report and thereby discredited at least in part.

Good of you to recognise "many" repeats. The analogy doesn't hold water since Pilots would know Autopilot exists as a system and was capable of the deed. Pilots had no knowledge that MCAS existed never mind that it would keep pushing the nose down even when counteracted.

I think one of the plaintiffs legals put it succinctly:
“The FAA is wrong to push the narrative that the pilots were responsible for the two disasters because the Boeing MCAS created the hazardous condition that caused the two crashes and the system actually fought against the efforts of the pilots who were trying to save the airplanes. That is why it is so awful to hear Mr. Elwell blame the pilots for the accidents. Modern aviation safety systems are designed to prevent pilot error from causing the loss of an airplane. The MCAS does the opposite – it creates the hazardous condition and induces the pilot error."

https://www.eturbonews.com/252204/shock ... 737-8-max/

Ray

With this, the other nations will mistrust the FAA even more.

SEU wrote:

XRAYretired wrote:

morrisond wrote:

On Lionair it's debatable. It kind of looked like Runaway Stabilizer so it would have made sense to turn off power to the system - but yes there was no particular procedure for the symptoms they were facing. However you can't write procedures for every potential failure - at some point you have to assume a pilot would recognize a system (Electric Trim) is faulty and turn it off and fly manually. They properly counteracted MCAS 22 times. I have used the following example many times and no one has a good answer.

"If there was a fault in the Autopilot System and it tried to turn you right (or put you in a dive) 22 times - would you keep it engaged or turn it off?"

On ET at the time of the flight they should have fully known all about MCAS and the conditions that caused it and have been highly proficient on the procedure to counter it if the Airline had done the training they said they did (I think all they said was that they supplied the procedure) - however there are some reports they never even did that.

Stuck in the worn grove again eh. Thought you'd turned a leaf for a while. Missed your usual first line of Boeing should have done better but...

Please dont call the dead pilots out for not having the sense.
Please dont call the Ethiopian CEO a liar without any evidence. Especially since you know full well his statement that the pilots had been given the information etc. and you know that the report you are referring to is contrary to the Preliminary Report and thereby discredited at least in part.

Good of you to recognise "many" repeats. The analogy doesn't hold water since Pilots would know Autopilot exists as a system and was capable of the deed. Pilots had no knowledge that MCAS existed never mind that it would keep pushing the nose down even when counteracted.

I think one of the plaintiffs legals put it succinctly:
“The FAA is wrong to push the narrative that the pilots were responsible for the two disasters because the Boeing MCAS created the hazardous condition that caused the two crashes and the system actually fought against the efforts of the pilots who were trying to save the airplanes. That is why it is so awful to hear Mr. Elwell blame the pilots for the accidents. Modern aviation safety systems are designed to prevent pilot error from causing the loss of an airplane. The MCAS does the opposite – it creates the hazardous condition and induces the pilot error."

https://www.eturbonews.com/252204/shock ... 737-8-max/

Ray

Thank you for a bit of reason. It is 100% not the pilots fault that the plane was in a bad way. How dare anyone suggest the pilots were at fault. I understand the FAA and Boeing have to take a stand point to deflect the blame to cover their own backs, its business at the end of the day.

I actually believe they asked trump to ground it not the other way around. Think about it, if boeing and FAA can say they were against the grounding from the start and only grounded it when the POTUS asked them to, they can carry on the narrative that they truely believe the 737MAX to be a safe aircraft, and blame pilots etc to lower the financial damage. Sadly for boeing and their staff the rest of the world probably wont buy their crap anymore.

It's posts like this why I keep posting. Yes the plane was in a bad way - No one is debating that.

However the crashes also uncovered serious deficiencies in Pilot training. That is not blaming the Pilots for the crash.

You have to look at this through a different lense. If MCAS had been more robust from the get go (Maybe two Sensors) and the crews were fully informed of the existence of MCAS and how to counteract it (Supposedly ET had this level of knowledge) but the system still failed (a flock of birds took out both AOA vanes) and the plane crashed - how would you view the crews actions in that scenario?

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... x-crashes/

The lead Republican on the US House Committee, relying on a study essentially financed by Boeing stockholders, announces just about all the problems were with poor pilots, as opposed to good good American pilots. (snarky note - is this going to become Republican orthodoxy?) American airline pilots (and other IIRC) have strongly disagreed that the Ethiopian pilots were/are mostly responsible.

I would further say that if Boeing wants to sell planes to the rest of the world they need to suck it up and accept that they are 60-80% responsible. This also means settlement of suits and payments to airlines. Likely $5 billion if they are lucky.

morrisond wrote:

SEU wrote:

XRAYretired wrote:

Stuck in the worn grove again eh. Thought you'd turned a leaf for a while. Missed your usual first line of Boeing should have done better but...

Please dont call the dead pilots out for not having the sense.
Please dont call the Ethiopian CEO a liar without any evidence. Especially since you know full well his statement that the pilots had been given the information etc. and you know that the report you are referring to is contrary to the Preliminary Report and thereby discredited at least in part.

Good of you to recognise "many" repeats. The analogy doesn't hold water since Pilots would know Autopilot exists as a system and was capable of the deed. Pilots had no knowledge that MCAS existed never mind that it would keep pushing the nose down even when counteracted.

I think one of the plaintiffs legals put it succinctly:
“The FAA is wrong to push the narrative that the pilots were responsible for the two disasters because the Boeing MCAS created the hazardous condition that caused the two crashes and the system actually fought against the efforts of the pilots who were trying to save the airplanes. That is why it is so awful to hear Mr. Elwell blame the pilots for the accidents. Modern aviation safety systems are designed to prevent pilot error from causing the loss of an airplane. The MCAS does the opposite – it creates the hazardous condition and induces the pilot error."

https://www.eturbonews.com/252204/shock ... 737-8-max/

Ray

Thank you for a bit of reason. It is 100% not the pilots fault that the plane was in a bad way. How dare anyone suggest the pilots were at fault. I understand the FAA and Boeing have to take a stand point to deflect the blame to cover their own backs, its business at the end of the day.

I actually believe they asked trump to ground it not the other way around. Think about it, if boeing and FAA can say they were against the grounding from the start and only grounded it when the POTUS asked them to, they can carry on the narrative that they truely believe the 737MAX to be a safe aircraft, and blame pilots etc to lower the financial damage. Sadly for boeing and their staff the rest of the world probably wont buy their crap anymore.

It's posts like this why I keep posting. Yes the plane was in a bad way - No one is debating that.

However the crashes also uncovered serious deficiencies in Pilot training. That is not blaming the Pilots for the crash.

You have to look at this through a different lense. If MCAS had been more robust from the get go (Maybe two Sensors) and the crews were fully informed of the existence of MCAS and how to counteract it (Supposedly ET had this level of knowledge) but the system still failed (a flock of birds took out both AOA vanes) and the plane crashed - how would you view the crews actions in that scenario?

You know, the real big deal here is that Boeing does not know how good or bad the training is. They just assumed the training is good. How is this even remotely acceptable that they sell aircraft to airlines with bad training and do not request good training or mandate training before they sell them. It is their name on the aircraft that crashed.

The manufacturer should know what skills are needed to fly their aircraft and not just assume the pilots have that skills without checking and testing it.

What else did Boeing assumed while constructing the MAX without actually knowing it? That is absolutely scary.
The reason i even think that there are more deficiencies in the design is that if MCAS would be the only thing to hide, they should disclose the whole certification process and design specs and own the full blame for MCAS and the crashes and move on. That would regain trust. This whole hide and seek they play is just leading to more trust issues and only makes sense if there are more problems with the MAX that are hidden.

morrisond wrote:

It's posts like this why I keep posting. Yes the plane was in a bad way - No one is debating that.

However the crashes also uncovered serious deficiencies in Pilot training. That is not blaming the Pilots for the crash.

You have to look at this through a different lense. If MCAS had been more robust from the get go (Maybe two Sensors) and the crews were fully informed of the existence of MCAS and how to counteract it (Supposedly ET had this level of knowledge) but the system still failed (a flock of birds took out both AOA vanes) and the plane crashed - how would you view the crews actions in that scenario?

There are three significant changes to MCAS software being worked on by Boeing:

1) To give the system input from both angle-of-attack sensors, Currently MCAS only uses data from the angle of attack sensor on the side of the active FCC, (see AoA source). The system will have split vane monitor and Mid Value Select (MVS) input. This will both enhance detection of erroneous AoA vane behaviour and the MVS signal selection will pick the average of ADIRU L & R and the previous MVS output. If the output of the two AoA vanes differ by more than 5.5 degrees MCAS will be disabled.

2) To limit how much MCAS can move the horizontal stab to guarantee sufficient handling capability using elevator alone. In its original report, Boeing said that MCAS could move the horizontal stabilizer a maximum of 0.6 degrees. However, after the Lion Air crash, it told airlines that MCAS could actually move it 2.5 degrees, or half the physical maximum. Boeing reportedly increased the limit because flight tests showed that a more powerful movement was needed at high AoA rather than at high Mach.

3) A modification to the activation and resynchronisation schedule. MCAS will be limited to operate only for one cycle per high AoA event, rather than multiple. At present it will operate for 10s, pause for 5s and repeat for as often as it senses the high AoA condition is present. Furthermore the logic for MCAS to command a nose up stab trim to return to trim following pilot eletric trim intervention or exceeding the forward column cutout switch, will also now be improved.

Part 1 will not apply on your scenario, but part 2 and 3 will apply on your scenario. This will make the pilots able to not go down using just the elevator and allow them to adjust the stab trim using the manual electric trim just once to fix the problem, without using the cutoff switches. This will be simpler than what the JT610 and ET302 faced, and both correctly used the elevator and the electric trim, so we already known that the training and pilots skill are appropriate for that scenario.

Thanks for that scenario that show how much it was the good decision to ground the 737-8/9 MAX instead of blaming the pilots and/or the training.

PixelFlight wrote:

There are three significant changes to MCAS software being worked on by Boeing:

Being worked on or already tested and submitted to the FAA for review and approval?
I am unsure as I have seem comments that they have already completed test flights with the updates, whether they have submitted to the FAA is where I am in doubt, I have seen reports where it is said they were submitted, others not.

morrisond wrote:

keesje wrote:

PW100 wrote:

In fact, indications are that the very junior FO, actually was quite up to his task . . .

A minor detail.

(Or am I speculating here? )

The FO got it partially right. He called for the trim cut-off but forgot to mention the part about returning the flight to in-trim before hitting the switches.

That's probably more indicative that he was recalling the Runaway Horizontal Stabilizer procedure.

Since you repeat it, I'll repeat it as well: there is no evidence that uptrimming was stopped by crew intervention. Claiming "he forgot it" is an assumption at this stage.

If I remember correctly, Boeing instructions (enforced) by AD), was just a (friendly . . . ) reminder that Runaway Horizontal Stabilizer procedure must be followed at certain conditions such as (but not limited to) Stcikshaker disagree, Airspeed disagree, AoA disagree etc. So therefore I'm not sure how to understand the second part of your message above?

kalvado wrote:

AABusDrvr wrote:

This has always been the lament of the new pilot. I know things are different in other parts of the world, but in North America, those that want it bad enough, find a way.

When I was starting out, we became flight instructors, charter or freight pilots, towed banners, or did tours. I even know one guy who flew cadavers for a funeral home. We all learned the hard lessons in airplanes that were much smaller, slower and lighter than an airliner. We scared only ourselves when we made bad decisions.

I think this is where the problem is.
A lot of US pilots are trained by those barely above initial level, things are not systematically learned but picked up by try-and-fail. Crash rate in GA is unbelievable. Some still survive.
So hours of survival are the only professional metrics.
Education requirements for professional pilots are... funny. BA in arts is good enough, no technical background required. My impression is that the phrase "trained pilot" doesn't mean "educated professional", but sounds more like "trained circus lion". Of course, no amount of hours builts a true professional that way...

To obtain an FAA flight instructor certificate one is required to have 250 hours total flight time. The ET302 preliminary report says the first officer had 361 hours total time, with 207 hours in the Boeing 737. If he started with the airline right after he completed his academy training, that would indicate he had a whopping 154 hours when he started with the airline.

So 154 hours is fine to be a first officer on a 737, but a 250 hour flight instructor is "barely above initial level"?

Aircraft handling skills and technical knowledge are not usually the problem, in any aircraft accident. The issue is more often judgement, or what the industry likes to call "aeronautical decision making". You cant teach that in a classroom, or a simulator. You have to have personal experience. Often times, just because something is legal, and within limits of your SOP's doesn't make it the smart and safest course of action.

I own and fly a general aviation airplane, and still hold my flight instructors certificate. In the U.S., GA does have a higher accident rate than commercial flying. Taking into consideration the number, and types of GA flight operations in the states, the accident rate is far from "unbelievable".

The absolute worst pilots I've ever flown with were "educated professionals". Career changers, that left whatever profession they had been doing most of their lives, to become pilots.

morrisond wrote:

On Lionair it's debatable. It kind of looked like Runaway Stabilizer so it would have made sense to turn off power to the system - but yes there was no particular procedure for the symptoms they were facing. However you can't write procedures for every potential failure - at some point you have to assume a pilot would recognize a system (Electric Trim) is faulty and turn it off and fly manually. They properly counteracted MCAS 22 times. I have used the following example many times and no one has a good answer.

"If there was a fault in the Autopilot System and it tried to turn you right (or put you in a dive) 22 times - would you keep it engaged or turn it off?"

I'll give you a (potential) answer:
They were facing (severe) pitch control difficulties.
They knew electric pitch trimming was working for them (22 times successful).
Why cut something off that is working for you, when you don't know if there are any other (workable) alternatives?

AABusDrvr wrote:

kalvado wrote:

AABusDrvr wrote:

This has always been the lament of the new pilot. I know things are different in other parts of the world, but in North America, those that want it bad enough, find a way.

When I was starting out, we became flight instructors, charter or freight pilots, towed banners, or did tours. I even know one guy who flew cadavers for a funeral home. We all learned the hard lessons in airplanes that were much smaller, slower and lighter than an airliner. We scared only ourselves when we made bad decisions.

I think this is where the problem is.
A lot of US pilots are trained by those barely above initial level, things are not systematically learned but picked up by try-and-fail. Crash rate in GA is unbelievable. Some still survive.
So hours of survival are the only professional metrics.
Education requirements for professional pilots are... funny. BA in arts is good enough, no technical background required. My impression is that the phrase "trained pilot" doesn't mean "educated professional", but sounds more like "trained circus lion". Of course, no amount of hours builts a true professional that way...

To obtain an FAA flight instructor certificate one is required to have 250 hours total flight time. The ET302 preliminary report says the first officer had 361 hours total time, with 207 hours in the Boeing 737. If he started with the airline right after he completed his academy training, that would indicate he had a whopping 154 hours when he started with the airline.

So 154 hours is fine to be a first officer on a 737, but a 250 hour flight instructor is "barely above initial level"?

Aircraft handling skills and technical knowledge are not usually the problem, in any aircraft accident. The issue is more often judgement, or what the industry likes to call "aeronautical decision making". You cant teach that in a classroom, or a simulator. You have to have personal experience. Often times, just because something is legal, and within limits of your SOP's doesn't make it the smart and safest course of action.

I own and fly a general aviation airplane, and still hold my flight instructors certificate. In the U.S., GA does have a higher accident rate than commercial flying. Taking into consideration the number, and types of GA flight operations in the states, the accident rate is far from "unbelievable".

The absolute worst pilots I've ever flown with were "educated professionals". Career changers, that left whatever profession they had been doing most of their lives, to become pilots.

In addition to what you stated, in North America, you get a pretty large pool of pilots from the Military, which in other parts of the world is not the case (probably a luxury) Therefore, having that restriction, you can imagine will have a tremendous strain on the already extremely tight labor market.

FluidFlow wrote:

You know, the real big deal here is that Boeing does not know how good or bad the training is. They just assumed the training is good. How is this even remotely acceptable that they sell aircraft to airlines with bad training and do not request good training or mandate training before they sell them. It is their name on the aircraft that crashed.

The manufacturer should know what skills are needed to fly their aircraft and not just assume the pilots have that skills without checking and testing it.

What else did Boeing assumed while constructing the MAX without actually knowing it? That is absolutely scary.

The reason i even think that there are more deficiencies in the design is that if MCAS would be the only thing to hide, they should disclose the whole certification process and design specs and own the full blame for MCAS and the crashes and move on. That would regain trust. This whole hide and seek they play is just leading to more trust issues and only makes sense if there are more problems with the MAX that are hidden.

I think both Boeing and Airbus are concerned about inconsistent pilot training quality.

You may want to read AvWeek's article Airbus Takes Aim At Inconsistent Pilot Training Quality which extensively quotes Jean-Michel Bigarre, head of global flight training at Airbus, among others, or our related thread ( viewtopic.php?t=1418885 ).

I think both vendors know they cannot control pilot training quality. I think they develop aircraft to meet the existing regulations, and the regulators verify all aspects of the design, including required training and changes to established procedures.

The NYT article had this quote from Boeing VP Mike Sinnett:

“The assumption is that the flight crews have been trained,” Mr. Sinnett said in the meeting. He added later: “Rightly or wrongly, that was the design criteria and that’s how the airplane was certified with the system and pilot working together.”

We should take him at his word. Rightly or wrongly, this is how things are done.

Interestingly enough, earlier in this thread we were told we should accept that the ET and JT pilots were qualified because their national regulators had issued them licenses with appropriate type ratings, and now we read the airframe makers shouldn't accept the judgement of the national regulator.

The AvWeek article has the following quote:

National authorities lack uniformity in pilot training regulation. Airbus safety experts also see “strange things in poor countries where air transport is growing very fast—suspiciously quick pilot qualification and fraudulent flight-hour accounting.” They are addressing the problem at the airline level.

So an Airbus safety expert was willing to tell AvWeek that they had concerns about "fraudulent flight-hour accounting", and this quote happened after both the JT and ET crashes had happened.

This all seems to be a giant grey area. I think none of the airframe vendors want to accept responsibility for pilot training. They want to develop their systems and their check lists and their training requirements and then let the regulators own the problem of making sure pilots are meeting the standards. It's not at all clear to me that the current MAX situation will cause this to change. I think the regulators don't want to be viewed as ineffectual, and I don't think the vendors want the responsibility.

And if anyone wants to have a go at me for racism, feel free to read what I've written on a.net about the lily white AF447 pilots.

par13del wrote:

PixelFlight wrote:

There are three significant changes to MCAS software being worked on by Boeing:

Being worked on or already tested and submitted to the FAA for review and approval?
I am unsure as I have seem comments that they have already completed test flights with the updates, whether they have submitted to the FAA is where I am in doubt, I have seen reports where it is said they were submitted, others not.

This was the description that I copy/past from here: http://www.b737.org.uk/mcas.htm#fix
I hope that site is up to date with the last publicly available information.

morrisond wrote:

There are serious flaws in the Worldwide Training system as evidence by these crashes.

There is a serious flaw in the Boeing 737 MAX and that is the MCAS system.

MartijnNL wrote:

morrisond wrote:

There are serious flaws in the Worldwide Training system as evidence by these crashes.

There is a serious flaw in the Boeing 737 MAX and that is the MCAS system.

I totally agree.

And the FAA certification system as well as the training system - all three are deficient.

Boeing says it has completed the development of updated software for the 737 Max

https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/16/boeing- ... ter%7Cmain

kalvado wrote:

Aviation737 wrote:

Does anyone know when the grounding will be lifted?

Not even Boeing themselves. different dates are thrown around, June, July, August... time will tell.

As recent as three weeks ago they were telling insiders sometime in June. That looks to be very optimistic, at best.

morrisond wrote:

MartijnNL wrote:

morrisond wrote:

There are serious flaws in the Worldwide Training system as evidence by these crashes.

There is a serious flaw in the Boeing 737 MAX and that is the MCAS system.

I totally agree.

And the FAA certification system as well as the training system - all three are deficient.

The training system is just fine.

If training was deficient as you assert, then all planes would be crashing with the level of incidence of the MAX, it would be a perfectly normal rate of crashing and would not be grounded due to its abhorrent safety record.

The only thing these crashes and subsequent grounding have exposed is that as the knowledge of the (horribly designed and blind-eye certified) MCAS emerged to the public, that Boeing was arrogant and misleading to persist in the no-extra-training mantra when they had in reality introduced a series of deadly failure modes the likes of which not seen in decades. Even Lionair with their garbage safety record has almost exclusively suffered landing problems. How many other planes has ET lost in the last 15 years due to mishandling? How many 737 worldwide were ever lost to runaway stab?

But don't let reality get in the way of your continued delusion. Really, no wonder some here suspect there are paid propagandists online. The continued and persistent reality denial is very next level.

RossW wrote:

Boeing says it has completed the development of updated software for the 737 Max

https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/16/boeing- ... ter%7Cmain

Since Boeing themselves said that a fix was in the works already in november, it apparently took them at least six (!) months to implement. One wonders why it took so long time.

Jamie514 wrote:

How many other planes has ET lost in the last 15 years due to mishandling?

Well, there was this one 9 years ago in 2010.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethiopian ... Flight_409

The official cause in the report:

"The final investigation report released by the Lebanese Ministry of Public Works and Transport, presented on 17 January 2012, stated that "the probable causes of the accident were the flight crew's mismanagement of the aircraft's speed, altitude, headings and attitude through inconsistent flight control inputs resulting in a loss of control and their failure to abide by CRM [Crew Resource Management] principles of mutual support and calling deviations"."

ET disputed the results attributing the crash to "shoot-down, sabotage, or lightning strike" but no evidence was found to support ET's contention.

Jamie514 wrote:

morrisond wrote:

MartijnNL wrote:

There is a serious flaw in the Boeing 737 MAX and that is the MCAS system.

I totally agree.

And the FAA certification system as well as the training system - all three are deficient.

The training system is just fine.

If training was deficient as you assert, then all planes would be crashing with the level of incidence of the MAX, it would be a perfectly normal rate of crashing and would not be grounded due to its abhorrent safety record.

The only thing these crashes and subsequent grounding have exposed is that as the knowledge of the (horribly designed and blind-eye certified) MCAS emerged to the public, that Boeing was arrogant and misleading to persist in the no-extra-training mantra when they had in reality introduced a series of deadly failure modes the likes of which not seen in decades. Even Lionair with their garbage safety record has almost exclusively suffered landing problems. How many other planes has ET lost in the last 15 years due to mishandling? How many 737 worldwide were ever lost to runaway stab?

But don't let reality get in the way of your continued delusion. Really, no wonder some here suspect there are paid propagandists online. The continued and persistent reality denial is very next level.

Luckily the deficiency in training is not that apparent as planes are so safe and reliable. It's really rare when things go wrong - but then it would be nice to have pilots who actually knew the proper procedures.

How about ET flight 409 from 2010 - It sounds like ET and and the Ethiopian Civil Aviation Authority were in cahoots on this one too - denying there was anything wrong with ET's training system or the Pilots lack of experience was a contributing issue.

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... 37-367118/

It's quite scary and damning that ET didn't seem to learn anything from Flight 409 - it sounds like it's Pilots faced a lot of the same issues as ET -302

Quite fankly this lends a lot of credence to what a lot of us are saying what happened on ET-302

If you look back at the Lion Air thread we have come a long way from examining the weather and the quality of the airline. Might be good to read it again with the benefit of hindsight

XRAYretired wrote:

morrisond wrote:

SEU wrote:

Can I ask why you think the Crew should have known how to handle a faulty AOA sensor whilst the plane was flying nose down into the ground, without it being anywhere in the paper manual (page 300 or something like that)?

On Lionair it's debatable. It kind of looked like Runaway Stabilizer so it would have made sense to turn off power to the system - but yes there was no particular procedure for the symptoms they were facing. However you can't write procedures for every potential failure - at some point you have to assume a pilot would recognize a system (Electric Trim) is faulty and turn it off and fly manually. They properly counteracted MCAS 22 times. I have used the following example many times and no one has a good answer.

"If there was a fault in the Autopilot System and it tried to turn you right (or put you in a dive) 22 times - would you keep it engaged or turn it off?"

On ET at the time of the flight they should have fully known all about MCAS and the conditions that caused it and have been highly proficient on the procedure to counter it if the Airline had done the training they said they did (I think all they said was that they supplied the procedure) - however there are some reports they never even did that.

Stuck in the worn grove again eh. Thought you'd turned a leaf for a while. Missed your usual first line of Boeing should have done better but...

Please dont call the dead pilots out for not having the sense.
Please dont call the Ethiopian CEO a liar without any evidence. Especially since you know full well his statement that the pilots had been given the information etc. and you know that the report you are referring to is contrary to the Preliminary Report and thereby discredited at least in part.

Good of you to recognise "many" repeats. The analogy doesn't hold water since Pilots would know Autopilot exists as a system and was capable of the deed. Pilots had no knowledge that MCAS existed never mind that it would keep pushing the nose down even when counteracted.

I think one of the plaintiffs legals put it succinctly:
“The FAA is wrong to push the narrative that the pilots were responsible for the two disasters because the Boeing MCAS created the hazardous condition that caused the two crashes and the system actually fought against the efforts of the pilots who were trying to save the airplanes. That is why it is so awful to hear Mr. Elwell blame the pilots for the accidents. Modern aviation safety systems are designed to prevent pilot error from causing the loss of an airplane. The MCAS does the opposite – it creates the hazardous condition and induces the pilot error."

https://www.eturbonews.com/252204/shock ... 737-8-max/

Ray

Hi Ray - See the Flightglobal report on ET 409 I linked too above. It seems like ET and the ET Civil aviation Authority being in cahoots has a history.

14ccKemiskt wrote:

Since Boeing themselves said that a fix was in the works already in november, it apparently took them at least six (!) months to implement. One wonders why it took so long time.

Because they learned their lesson after their MCAS 1 slap-dash patch and decided to take time to do it right for MCAS 2?

OldAeroGuy wrote:

Jamie514 wrote:

How many other planes has ET lost in the last 15 years due to mishandling?

Well, there was this one 9 years ago in 2010.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethiopian ... Flight_409

The official cause in the report:

"The final investigation report released by the Lebanese Ministry of Public Works and Transport, presented on 17 January 2012, stated that "the probable causes of the accident were the flight crew's mismanagement of the aircraft's speed, altitude, headings and attitude through inconsistent flight control inputs resulting in a loss of control and their failure to abide by CRM [Crew Resource Management] principles of mutual support and calling deviations"."

ET disputed the results attributing the crash to "shoot-down, sabotage, or lightning strike" but no evidence was found to support ET's contention.

Exactly. One crash, almost a decade ago. That sort of accident rate undermines the whole "training is obviously lacking" argument.

morrisond wrote:

You have to look at this through a different lense. If MCAS had been more robust from the get go (Maybe two Sensors) and the crews were fully informed of the existence of MCAS and how to counteract it (Supposedly ET had this level of knowledge) but the system still failed (a flock of birds took out both AOA vanes) and the plane crashed - how would you view the crews actions in that scenario?

It started earlier than that.

Boeing designed an aircraft which was a step backwards from the NG.

To mask / conceal (which was the intent, given the absence of MCAS documentation and training, and late, non-notified changes), they slapped on poorly designed, executed and tested software.

And the accident is then 20-40% the fault of the crew. Just how bad would the OEM have to be to carry more blame?

This is a landmark case. The first trial by social media of a mega corporation.

Boeing and their crisis management consultants may be keeping the lid on staff knowledge and pilot near misses for now, but.....

Presumably massive lobbying pressure on EASA and other certifying authorities with aircraft manufacturing to be 'reasonable' or....

Jamie514 wrote:

OldAeroGuy wrote:

Jamie514 wrote:

How many other planes has ET lost in the last 15 years due to mishandling?

Well, there was this one 9 years ago in 2010.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethiopian ... Flight_409

The official cause in the report:

"The final investigation report released by the Lebanese Ministry of Public Works and Transport, presented on 17 January 2012, stated that "the probable causes of the accident were the flight crew's mismanagement of the aircraft's speed, altitude, headings and attitude through inconsistent flight control inputs resulting in a loss of control and their failure to abide by CRM [Crew Resource Management] principles of mutual support and calling deviations"."

ET disputed the results attributing the crash to "shoot-down, sabotage, or lightning strike" but no evidence was found to support ET's contention.

Exactly. One crash, almost a decade ago. That sort of accident rate undermines the whole "training is obviously lacking" argument.

You need to read the Flightglobal article.

morrisond wrote:

Jamie514 wrote:

morrisond wrote:

I totally agree.

And the FAA certification system as well as the training system - all three are deficient.

The training system is just fine.

If training was deficient as you assert, then all planes would be crashing with the level of incidence of the MAX, it would be a perfectly normal rate of crashing and would not be grounded due to its abhorrent safety record.

The only thing these crashes and subsequent grounding have exposed is that as the knowledge of the (horribly designed and blind-eye certified) MCAS emerged to the public, that Boeing was arrogant and misleading to persist in the no-extra-training mantra when they had in reality introduced a series of deadly failure modes the likes of which not seen in decades. Even Lionair with their garbage safety record has almost exclusively suffered landing problems. How many other planes has ET lost in the last 15 years due to mishandling? How many 737 worldwide were ever lost to runaway stab?

But don't let reality get in the way of your continued delusion. Really, no wonder some here suspect there are paid propagandists online. The continued and persistent reality denial is very next level.

Luckily the deficiency in training is not that apparent as planes are so safe and reliable. It's really rare when things go wrong - but then it would be nice to have pilots who actually knew the proper procedures.

How about ET flight 409 from 2010 - It sounds like ET and and the Ethiopian Civil Aviation Authority were in cahoots on this one too - denying there was anything wrong with ET's training system or the Pilots lack of experience was a contributing issue.

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... 37-367118/

It's quite scary and damning that ET didn't seem to learn anything from Flight 409 - it sounds like it's Pilots faced a lot of the same issues as ET -302

Quite fankly this lends a lot of credence to what a lot of us are saying what happened on ET-302

Quite frankly relying on one single event a decade ago is not a strong argument at all. It doesn't offer any explanation to their decade of otherwise safe ops in between or why manufacturer best practices in making planes so "safe and reliable" were not adhered to this time.

smartplane wrote:

morrisond wrote:

You have to look at this through a different lense. If MCAS had been more robust from the get go (Maybe two Sensors) and the crews were fully informed of the existence of MCAS and how to counteract it (Supposedly ET had this level of knowledge) but the system still failed (a flock of birds took out both AOA vanes) and the plane crashed - how would you view the crews actions in that scenario?

It started earlier than that.

Boeing designed an aircraft which was a step backwards from the NG.

To mask / conceal (which was the intent, given the absence of MCAS documentation and training, and late, non-notified changes), they slapped on poorly designed, executed and tested software.

And the accident is then 20-40% the fault of the crew. Just how bad would the OEM have to be to carry more blame?

This is a landmark case. The first trial by social media of a mega corporation.

Boeing and their crisis management consultants may be keeping the lid on staff knowledge and pilot near misses for now, but.....

Presumably massive lobbying pressure on EASA and other certifying authorities with aircraft manufacturing to be 'reasonable' or....

Your answer has nothing to do with the question I asked.

Jamie514 wrote:

morrisond wrote:

Jamie514 wrote:

The training system is just fine.

If training was deficient as you assert, then all planes would be crashing with the level of incidence of the MAX, it would be a perfectly normal rate of crashing and would not be grounded due to its abhorrent safety record.

The only thing these crashes and subsequent grounding have exposed is that as the knowledge of the (horribly designed and blind-eye certified) MCAS emerged to the public, that Boeing was arrogant and misleading to persist in the no-extra-training mantra when they had in reality introduced a series of deadly failure modes the likes of which not seen in decades. Even Lionair with their garbage safety record has almost exclusively suffered landing problems. How many other planes has ET lost in the last 15 years due to mishandling? How many 737 worldwide were ever lost to runaway stab?

But don't let reality get in the way of your continued delusion. Really, no wonder some here suspect there are paid propagandists online. The continued and persistent reality denial is very next level.

Luckily the deficiency in training is not that apparent as planes are so safe and reliable. It's really rare when things go wrong - but then it would be nice to have pilots who actually knew the proper procedures.

How about ET flight 409 from 2010 - It sounds like ET and and the Ethiopian Civil Aviation Authority were in cahoots on this one too - denying there was anything wrong with ET's training system or the Pilots lack of experience was a contributing issue.

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... 37-367118/

It's quite scary and damning that ET didn't seem to learn anything from Flight 409 - it sounds like it's Pilots faced a lot of the same issues as ET -302

Quite fankly this lends a lot of credence to what a lot of us are saying what happened on ET-302

Quite frankly relying on one single event a decade ago is not a strong argument at all. It doesn't offer any explanation to their decade of otherwise safe ops in between or why manufacturer best practices in making planes so "safe and reliable" were not adhered to this time.

Modern airliners are so reliable this may have been the first time one of there crews was faced with a difficult situation in the decade, but it surely points a finger at the training culture (or lack thereof) at ET.

morrisond wrote:

Jamie514 wrote:

morrisond wrote:

Luckily the deficiency in training is not that apparent as planes are so safe and reliable. It's really rare when things go wrong - but then it would be nice to have pilots who actually knew the proper procedures.

How about ET flight 409 from 2010 - It sounds like ET and and the Ethiopian Civil Aviation Authority were in cahoots on this one too - denying there was anything wrong with ET's training system or the Pilots lack of experience was a contributing issue.

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... 37-367118/

It's quite scary and damning that ET didn't seem to learn anything from Flight 409 - it sounds like it's Pilots faced a lot of the same issues as ET -302

Quite fankly this lends a lot of credence to what a lot of us are saying what happened on ET-302

Quite frankly relying on one single event a decade ago is not a strong argument at all. It doesn't offer any explanation to their decade of otherwise safe ops in between or why manufacturer best practices in making planes so "safe and reliable" were not adhered to this time.

Modern airliners are so reliable this may have been the first time one of there crews was faced with a difficult situation in the decade, but it surely points a finger at the training culture (or lack thereof) at ET.

Southwest keeps having pesky problems sliding into the EMAS, right off the airfield, or hitting down so hard at LGA that the plane is written off. Do you also want to see them improve their safety culture or lack thereof?

Boeing is ready to get it up in the air.
https://boeing.mediaroom.com/news-relea ... tem=130434

PixelPilot wrote:

Boeing is ready to get it up in the air.
https://boeing.mediaroom.com/news-relea ... tem=130434

Boeing is. Are the FAA? Are the other regulators? Are the pilots? Are the passengers?

StTim wrote:

PixelPilot wrote:

Boeing is ready to get it up in the air.
https://boeing.mediaroom.com/news-relea ... tem=130434

Boeing is. Are the FAA? Are the other regulators? Are the pilots? Are the passengers?

DO you think I have a crystal ball or something? Or anybody for that matter?

PixelPilot wrote:

StTim wrote:

PixelPilot wrote:

Boeing is ready to get it up in the air.
https://boeing.mediaroom.com/news-relea ... tem=130434

Boeing is. Are the FAA? Are the other regulators? Are the pilots? Are the passengers?

DO you think I have a crystal ball or something? Or anybody for that matter?

True - if you could answer those questions accurately I would be asking you for the lottery numbers!

Boeing making the right noises. Whether this fix is enough will be seen.

StTim wrote:

PixelPilot wrote:

StTim wrote:

Boeing is. Are the FAA? Are the other regulators? Are the pilots? Are the passengers?

DO you think I have a crystal ball or something? Or anybody for that matter?

True - if you could answer those questions accurately I would be asking you for the lottery numbers!

4,9,15,18,28,43

morrisond wrote:

Jamie514 wrote:

morrisond wrote:

Luckily the deficiency in training is not that apparent as planes are so safe and reliable. It's really rare when things go wrong - but then it would be nice to have pilots who actually knew the proper procedures.

How about ET flight 409 from 2010 - It sounds like ET and and the Ethiopian Civil Aviation Authority were in cahoots on this one too - denying there was anything wrong with ET's training system or the Pilots lack of experience was a contributing issue.

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... 37-367118/

It's quite scary and damning that ET didn't seem to learn anything from Flight 409 - it sounds like it's Pilots faced a lot of the same issues as ET -302

Quite fankly this lends a lot of credence to what a lot of us are saying what happened on ET-302

Quite frankly relying on one single event a decade ago is not a strong argument at all. It doesn't offer any explanation to their decade of otherwise safe ops in between or why manufacturer best practices in making planes so "safe and reliable" were not adhered to this time.

Modern airliners are so reliable this may have been the first time one of there crews was faced with a difficult situation in the decade, but it surely points a finger at the training culture (or lack thereof) at ET.

Modem airliners are supposed to be this reliable. It's not something that they area gracious enough to do for us out of the goodness of their own hearts or because they area just a bunch of nice guys,

Boeing made high risk decisions with the design of MCAS. MCAS 2.0 shows Boeing was capable all along of reducing those risks,

When AA pilots became aware odd the high risk decisions Boeing had exposed then to they made it very clear on audio recordings that exist that they were angry with Boeing for placing them in this situation.