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PixelFlight
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Wed May 22, 2019 8:41 pm

planecane wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
planecane wrote:
I agree with your thought process. However, there would be a disconnect between it being an acceptable risk on the NG and the NNC being a memory item. If the failure rate is on the order of a wing falling off, why make it a memory item?

Just a guess: 737 history.
At some point in the past the runaway stabilizer could have been a concern that both contributed to create the runaway stabilizer NCC memory item and to improve the design to decrease the failure rate. The two was constructive to improve safety, not one against the other like your question might imply. I don't know if the training of this runaway stabilizer NCC memory item have decreased over time, but the only response I got about 737 runaway stabilizer training did suggest that it's far from a top concern to deliver pilots licences.


Which is why I want to know what was said on the doomed Lion Air flight between the crew members. It is important to know if runaway stabilizer even crossed their mind from the training. This is important because it is possible that decsions were made when designing MCAS that assumed runaway stabilizer was a "no brainer" for crews due to it being a memory item.

Assuming that the training for runaway stabilizer has decreased over time, it would also explain why the ET crew did not execute the NNC exactly as it was intended even though they seemed to recognize that they had a runaway stabilizer.

It is important to understand this not just for the 737 series but for all aircraft. It is no out of the realm of possibility that based on training focus from 1987 which is now glossed over, that Airbus made a design decision on the A320NEO. I'm not saying they did, but it is possible.

If this type of disconnect between documented training and actual training focus exists, a process must be put in place for engineers to be educated on current training practices for a model when they are designing updates to the model.

Agree.
The process you are talking about should already exists to comply with the quality assurance, the safety assessment activity and the certification, not counting the public promise of "even safer aircraft".
The incredible scale of the current affair exists because of the discovery that the process was disconnected and that all the layers of filters that should have identified the issue do not worked as expected..
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Wed May 22, 2019 8:42 pm

smartplane wrote:
planecane wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:

Read the thread, was posted here, why should I do that work for you?


Because none of the simulations I've seen posted have attempted to simulate recovery starting from the beginning of the MCAS runaway. If you know of one, then I'd like you to point me to it since you are using them as part of your argument that they "just managed to avoid crash." That is only relevant if they are simulating starting from the point of failure.

What's the point? None of the simulations have been on true MCAS representative simulators. Even the Boeing simulator is claimed not to accurately reflect actual manual trim loads.


To determine if following the runaway stabilizer NNC allows a crew to recover relatively easily. I guess it doesn't really matter anymore since the software update should make MCAS runaway at least a 10^-9 frequency event and will not be able to command full nose down trim anymore.
 
kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Wed May 22, 2019 9:00 pm

planecane wrote:
smartplane wrote:
planecane wrote:

Because none of the simulations I've seen posted have attempted to simulate recovery starting from the beginning of the MCAS runaway. If you know of one, then I'd like you to point me to it since you are using them as part of your argument that they "just managed to avoid crash." That is only relevant if they are simulating starting from the point of failure.

What's the point? None of the simulations have been on true MCAS representative simulators. Even the Boeing simulator is claimed not to accurately reflect actual manual trim loads.


To determine if following the runaway stabilizer NNC allows a crew to recover relatively easily. I guess it doesn't really matter anymore since the software update should make MCAS runaway at least a 10^-9 frequency event and will not be able to command full nose down trim anymore.

Frankly speaking, you didn't see fault trees which can result in trim runaway (neither did I). MCAS is not the only source of failure. Can a charged particle from supernova cause output transistor on a chip to latch up, for example? This is a quite realistic question, BTW. 1e-9 claim is a very strong statement, and things like that have to be considered. To put things in perspective - if you try something 10 times a minute and it never fails throughout your life - that means failure probability is still above 1e-9...
 
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PixelFlight
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Wed May 22, 2019 9:08 pm

BravoOne wrote:
DenverTed wrote:
Free the MAX. Is it definitively known if MCAS was needed for certification? Or was it just optional to decrease training from the NG. Is there a definitive statement on this from Boeing or the FAA?

Seems like the most basic question for Boeing or the FAA to answer to regain credibility with other agencies, and the flying public like myself.


Clearly stated on a thread under the Technical banner. It was required per the Part 25 cert. process and nothing to with eliminating additional training.

Noted from the original Boeing CSID document covering flight controls

Maneuver Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS)

"The larger diameter LEAP-1B engines on the 737 MAX degrade high-speed pitch up
characteristics compared to the 737 NG. The MCAS control law, along with a revised
vortex generator pattern, were added to the MAX to provide approach-to-stall feel forces
consistent with those required in AC 25-7B"

Yep, this was the official statement and most probably exact. But as some have already pointed out, this explanation is only coherent with a MCAS function that will correct a relatively small amount of force and thus a relatively small stab trim as it was initially implemented and described to the FAA. The fact that the MCAS was later reconfigured to be insanely strong and quick let think that it play a role in something more critical than the AC 25 feel forces (not the -7B as it was cancelled in 2011. I think this is AC 25-25A §25.143).
 
DenverTed
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Wed May 22, 2019 9:27 pm

PixelFlight wrote:
BravoOne wrote:
DenverTed wrote:
Free the MAX. Is it definitively known if MCAS was needed for certification? Or was it just optional to decrease training from the NG. Is there a definitive statement on this from Boeing or the FAA?

Seems like the most basic question for Boeing or the FAA to answer to regain credibility with other agencies, and the flying public like myself.


Clearly stated on a thread under the Technical banner. It was required per the Part 25 cert. process and nothing to with eliminating additional training.

Noted from the original Boeing CSID document covering flight controls

Maneuver Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS)

"The larger diameter LEAP-1B engines on the 737 MAX degrade high-speed pitch up
characteristics compared to the 737 NG. The MCAS control law, along with a revised
vortex generator pattern, were added to the MAX to provide approach-to-stall feel forces
consistent with those required in AC 25-7B"

Yep, this was the official statement and most probably exact. But as some have already pointed out, this explanation is only coherent with a MCAS function that will correct a relatively small amount of force and thus a relatively small stab trim as it was initially implemented and described to the FAA. The fact that the MCAS was later reconfigured to be insanely strong and quick let think that it play a role in something more critical than the AC 25 feel forces (not the -7B as it was cancelled in 2011. I think this is AC 25-25A §25.143).

So Boeing quoted the wrong subsection? Well, that's reassuring.
 
art
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Wed May 22, 2019 9:33 pm

kalvado wrote:
art wrote:
On a different tack, without discussing the minutiae of MCAS design and implementation - or any other particular system, will the scrutiny of the processes involved in MAX certification result in further elements of the 737 MAX being subject to investigation?

The logic would be that if MCAS was deemed adequate for certification but on subsequent investigation proved not to be so, how does one know that other systems deemed adequate for certification using the same methodology really were?

My impression is that Boeing and FAA are doing their best to avoid such a scenario. Which is a fairly risky gamble - but it can be justified if consequences of extended delay are too harsh.


As I understand things FAA's role is twofold - promotion of safety for US designed and manufactured aircraft and promotion of the US aviation industry. Not criticising you, but the implication of what you say is quite chilling.: safety and industry interests are not absolute - as potential commercial gain/loss increases in magnitude, the importance of safety diminishes in magnitude.
 
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PixelFlight
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Wed May 22, 2019 9:35 pm

DenverTed wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
The fact that the MCAS was later reconfigured to be insanely strong and quick let think that it play a role in something more critical than the AC 25 feel forces (not the -7B as it was cancelled in 2011. I think this is AC 25-25A §25.143).

So Boeing quoted the wrong subsection? Well, that's reassuring.


Hard to conclude otherwise from the FAA official site: :scratchchin:
https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/document.information/documentID/1019709
25-7B - Flight Test Guide for Certification of Transport Category Airplanes (Cancelled)
Cancellation Notes AC 25-7C
Date Cancelled October 16, 2012
Date Issued March 29, 2011
 
torer
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Wed May 22, 2019 9:58 pm

Hard to conclude otherwise from the FAA official site: :scratchchin:
https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/document.information/documentID/1019709
25-7B - Flight Test Guide for Certification of Transport Category Airplanes (Cancelled)
Cancellation Notes AC 25-7C
Date Cancelled October 16, 2012
Date Issued March 29, 2011


Actually it can be otherwise. This is due to when Boeing are planning to build a new airplane or version of an existing airplane, I believe they agree with FAA which set of requirement to build and test to. For example if they start developing in 2011, they won’t necesary need to comply to a requirement established in 2012.
 
SEU
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Wed May 22, 2019 10:01 pm

For those getting confused. Ive done some research and come up with a list of things that are going on with the 737 MAX

As we know, both planes crashed after what appears to be a faulty AoA sensor and MCAS pitching the nose of both 737 MAXs nose down into the ground killing 350+ people in 2 crashes within 6 months. This was mainly due to a single point of failure (unheard of in aviation)

Here is a list of things we know that has come out since the crashes

Boeing didn't tell pilots about MCAS in the manuals
https://www.businessinsider.com/boeings ... ?r=US&IR=T
https://www.wsj.com/articles/behind-boe ... 1544025884

Boeing changed switches around making it more difficult to turn MCAS off
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... -off-mcas/

Boeing didnt tell the FAA about MCAS for months - some reporting that for 13 months it wasnt disclosed to the FAA
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles ... d-to-crash
https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-ethio ... KKCN1SB0L7

Boeing 737 MAX simulators didnt accurately reproduce the flying conditions of the 737 Max so pilots could never have properly trained on the plane.
https://www.ft.com/content/494354da-799 ... 85092ab560
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/17/busi ... ators.html

Pilots confronted Boeing after Lion air crash about concerns with the 737 MAX
https://www.theguardian.com/business/20 ... ines-audio
https://edition.cnn.com/videos/us/2019/ ... newday.cnn
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-48281282

Boeing knew about flaws in the MCAS and saftey system a year before the Lion air crash and did nothing
https://edition.cnn.com/2019/05/05/us/b ... index.html
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/busi ... 01341.html
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-48174797

An oversite by Boeing that the MCAS warning light was standard - it wasnt. Some airlines did have the warning light, others didnt as it came as an optional extra
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/05/busi ... light.html
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/21/busi ... ion=Footer

FAA allowed Boeing to self certify the 737 software
https://www.businessinsider.com/faa-let ... ?r=US&IR=T
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/15/us/p ... gress.html

Boeing has "fixed" the MCAS
https://www.theguardian.com/business/20 ... max-planes

Boeing CEO blames pilots despite the primarily report suggesting the pilots of ET crash followed correct procedures.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/04/busi ... lines.html
https://www.news.com.au/travel/travel-u ... eecf9309be
https://www.thestranger.com/slog/2019/0 ... -737-max-8

A lot of damming information for Boeing and I do feel these crashes could have been avoided if Boeing did things differently.
 
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PixelFlight
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Wed May 22, 2019 10:17 pm

art wrote:
As I understand things FAA's role is twofold - promotion of safety for US designed and manufactured aircraft and promotion of the US aviation industry. Not criticising you, but the implication of what you say is quite chilling.: safety and industry interests are not absolute - as potential commercial gain/loss increases in magnitude, the importance of safety diminishes in magnitude.

You are right, but the FAA have to follow the laws that describes his function:
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/49/44702
See the part (d) of 49 U.S. Code § 44702. Issuance of certificates:

(d)Delegation.—
(1) Subject to regulations, supervision, and review the Administrator may prescribe, the Administrator may delegate to a qualified private person, or to an employee under the supervision of that person, a matter related to—
(A) the examination, testing, and inspection necessary to issue a certificate under this chapter; and
(B) issuing the certificate.
(2) The Administrator may rescind a delegation under this subsection at any time for any reason the Administrator considers appropriate.
(3) A person affected by an action of a private person under this subsection may apply for reconsideration of the action by the Administrator. On the Administrator’s own initiative, the Administrator may reconsider the action of a private person at any time. If the Administrator decides on reconsideration that the action is unreasonable or unwarranted, the Administrator shall change, modify, or reverse the action. If the Administrator decides the action is warranted, the Administrator shall affirm the action.

At some point the risk was taken at the politic level to introduce a new law with the objective to reduce certification cost and time. :bomb:
 
DenverTed
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Wed May 22, 2019 10:31 pm

PixelFlight wrote:
DenverTed wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
The fact that the MCAS was later reconfigured to be insanely strong and quick let think that it play a role in something more critical than the AC 25 feel forces (not the -7B as it was cancelled in 2011. I think this is AC 25-25A §25.143).

So Boeing quoted the wrong subsection? Well, that's reassuring.


Hard to conclude otherwise from the FAA official site: :scratchchin:
https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/document.information/documentID/1019709
25-7B - Flight Test Guide for Certification of Transport Category Airplanes (Cancelled)
Cancellation Notes AC 25-7C
Date Cancelled October 16, 2012
Date Issued March 29, 2011

Thanks for that information. From longitudinal control, 21 b.(1)(b) For tests at idle power, the applicant must demonstrate that the
nose can be pitched down from any speed between the trim speed and the stall.

Apparently the MAX didn't pitch down fast enough to meet this without MCAS. I take it the most severe test condition is cg aft, stabilizer trim at full nose up incidence. Assuming "idle power" is enough to fly in that trim configuration.
 
DenverTed
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Wed May 22, 2019 10:53 pm

Now the question has been answered that MCAS was required for certification of the MAX. Next, are there any other new aircraft that are too slow to recover from a stall, that they have an auto system to move the stab or elevator to tip the nose down? 767-2C I take it? Any others, 787, A350?
 
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7BOEING7
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Wed May 22, 2019 11:34 pm

DenverTed wrote:

Apparently the MAX didn't pitch down fast enough to meet this without MCAS. I take it the most severe test condition is cg aft, stabilizer trim at full nose up incidence. Assuming "idle power" is enough to fly in that trim configuration.


First you don't have the stabilizer at full nose up incidence -- you can't get there without using manual/manual trim, it won't go there with electric/manual trim. The airplane is "trimmed" to a specific speed above the stall speed in a descent and then the pilot starts a constant rate of deceleration of 1 knot/sec by constantly increasing the back pressure. Apparently on the MAX with aft cg, in a steep turn (high angle of bank) just prior to the stall the pilot feels or the data shows there is a lightening of the controls -- with the same back pressure the pilot gets slightly more than 1 knot/sec deceleration.
 
BravoOne
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Wed May 22, 2019 11:46 pm

DenverTed wrote:
Now the question has been answered that MCAS was required for certification of the MAX. Next, are there any other new aircraft that are too slow to recover from a stall, that they have an auto system to move the stab or elevator to tip the nose down? 767-2C I take it? Any others, 787, A350?


Has nothing to do with salt recovery!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 23, 2019 12:50 am

SEU wrote:
I do feel these crashes could have been avoided if Boeing did things differently.

I'm pretty sure that's a unanimous opinion.

Even Boeing admits it made mistakes and has issued an apology and is in the process of producing a fix, so anyone who says otherwise is mistaken.

It's a nice list, but I don't think people should believe everything they read in the media.

Right now we have FBI and DoJ investigators who can also read the media sources, but are also armed with subpoenas that allow them to turn up things the media simply cannot and with the ability to cross check many sources the media does not have.

That will be the report that matters, IMHO.
Wake up to find out that you are the eyes of the world
The heart has its beaches, its homeland and thoughts of its own
Wake now, discover that you are the song that the morning brings
The heart has its seasons, its evenings and songs of its own
 
DenverTed
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 23, 2019 1:58 am

BravoOne wrote:
DenverTed wrote:
Now the question has been answered that MCAS was required for certification of the MAX. Next, are there any other new aircraft that are too slow to recover from a stall, that they have an auto system to move the stab or elevator to tip the nose down? 767-2C I take it? Any others, 787, A350?


Has nothing to do with salt recovery!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Like salt harvesting?

So the MAX was certifiable without MCAS?

Looks like there is no clear answer to that question.
 
RickNRoll
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 23, 2019 2:34 am

Revelation wrote:
SEU wrote:
I do feel these crashes could have been avoided if Boeing did things differently.

I'm pretty sure that's a unanimous opinion.

Even Boeing admits it made mistakes and has issued an apology and is in the process of producing a fix, so anyone who says otherwise is mistaken.

It's a nice list, but I don't think people should believe everything they read in the media.

Right now we have FBI and DoJ investigators who can also read the media sources, but are also armed with subpoenas that allow them to turn up things the media simply cannot and with the ability to cross check many sources the media does not have.

That will be the report that matters, IMHO.
As with AF447 we have just about speculated on everything that can be speculated on. People have aired their opinions. Now we just have to wait for the facts to come out.
 
DenverTed
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 23, 2019 2:37 am

7BOEING7 wrote:
DenverTed wrote:

Apparently the MAX didn't pitch down fast enough to meet this without MCAS. I take it the most severe test condition is cg aft, stabilizer trim at full nose up incidence. Assuming "idle power" is enough to fly in that trim configuration.


First you don't have the stabilizer at full nose up incidence -- you can't get there without using manual/manual trim, it won't go there with electric/manual trim. The airplane is "trimmed" to a specific speed above the stall speed in a descent and then the pilot starts a constant rate of deceleration of 1 knot/sec by constantly increasing the back pressure. Apparently on the MAX with aft cg, in a steep turn (high angle of bank) just prior to the stall the pilot feels or the data shows there is a lightening of the controls -- with the same back pressure the pilot gets slightly more than 1 knot/sec deceleration.


OK, sounds good. The stall test for which MCAS applies is a constant thrust 30 degree bank. Then my question is what is the range of incidence for which MCAS is needed. I've read that the rate of MCAS was .6 degrees per sec changed to 2.4 degrees per sec running for 9 sec shut off for 5 sec., so then it seems relevant to know what's the range of the stab, what's the range of electric stab, what's the range of MCAS 1.0, and what's the new range of MCAS 2.0? Or maybe people like me in the shallow end of the pool should leave the details to Boeing and the FAA? No, if they can't explain it, it's not that complicated.
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 23, 2019 2:43 am

DenverTed wrote:
BravoOne wrote:
DenverTed wrote:
Now the question has been answered that MCAS was required for certification of the MAX. Next, are there any other new aircraft that are too slow to recover from a stall, that they have an auto system to move the stab or elevator to tip the nose down? 767-2C I take it? Any others, 787, A350?


Has nothing to do with salt recovery!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Like salt harvesting?

So the MAX was certifiable without MCAS?

Looks like there is no clear answer to that question.

MCAS is not for recovering from a stall, it is to prevent it getting easier to get to a stall under certain conditions.

As far as being certifiable without MCAS, your probably have to file a freedom of information act request for the certification documents to get the answer. I'd have to assume it was either necessary for certification it to keep the MAX on the same type certificate as earlier 737s. I don't think they threw in a system like that for fun.

For a similar functionality to MCAS an Airbus FBW has no force changes in the sidestick so the FCC just moves the elevator or trim as necessary to maintain the desired fight characteristics. The 777 and 787 would adjust the force required to overcome the artificial feel of the control column.
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 23, 2019 2:53 am

DenverTed wrote:
7BOEING7 wrote:
DenverTed wrote:

Apparently the MAX didn't pitch down fast enough to meet this without MCAS. I take it the most severe test condition is cg aft, stabilizer trim at full nose up incidence. Assuming "idle power" is enough to fly in that trim configuration.


First you don't have the stabilizer at full nose up incidence -- you can't get there without using manual/manual trim, it won't go there with electric/manual trim. The airplane is "trimmed" to a specific speed above the stall speed in a descent and then the pilot starts a constant rate of deceleration of 1 knot/sec by constantly increasing the back pressure. Apparently on the MAX with aft cg, in a steep turn (high angle of bank) just prior to the stall the pilot feels or the data shows there is a lightening of the controls -- with the same back pressure the pilot gets slightly more than 1 knot/sec deceleration.


OK, sounds good. The stall test for which MCAS applies is a constant thrust 30 degree bank. Then my question is what is the range of incidence for which MCAS is needed. I've read that the rate of MCAS was .6 degrees per sec changed to 2.4 degrees per sec running for 9 sec shut off for 5 sec., so then it seems relevant to know what's the range of the stab, what's the range of electric stab, what's the range of MCAS 1.0, and what's the new range of MCAS 2.0? Or maybe people like me in the shallow end of the pool should leave the details to Boeing and the FAA? No, if they can't explain it, it's not that complicated.

I don't know what you are reading but you need better sources. The rate of MCAS is 0.27 degrees per second to a maximum of 2.5 degrees per cycle. Unfortunately, it was able to kick in for additional cycles and get to 5 degrees nose down. The original design was 0.6 degrees total per cycle. I don't think the rate was any different. Even if they hadn't changed it to 2.5 degrees it still could have ended up full nose down due to unlimited cycles.
 
airnorth
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 23, 2019 3:17 am

The requirement for the MCAS has been cited a number of times in this thread. Exactly where I don't know, but its in here somewhere, it was much discussed a few days ago.

Oh, and I just figured out the salt reference, lol!
 
DenverTed
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 23, 2019 3:45 am

planecane wrote:

As far as being certifiable without MCAS, your probably have to file a freedom of information act request for the certification documents to get the answer. I'd have to assume it was either necessary for certification it to keep the MAX on the same type certificate as earlier 737s. I don't think they threw in a system like that for fun.


Freedom of information act? Me, personally? I'm lazy. If that question is definitively answered, Europe, China, and Canada should ground the MAX until it is, IMO. All of this stonewalling and obfuscation is Boeing's time and Boeing's dime.

In March they said they would be flying when? 6 weeks? haha Canada hedged and said July 1, haha

Now we're talking Sept 1, maybe Jan 1. Personally I like the MAX, but if the facts are hidden, it doesn't fly, end of story.
 
kayik
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 23, 2019 5:44 am

FAA raises possibility of long delay to 737 Max approval...

Daniel Elwell, the acting FAA chief, said “If it takes a year to find everything we need to give us the confidence to lift the [grounding] order so be it.”



https://www.ft.com/content/e9581b40-7cd ... 85092ab560
 
FluidFlow
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 23, 2019 5:57 am

For people with no FT access:

https://www.investing.com/news/stock-market-news/canada-europe-to-choose-when-737-max-is-safe-as-regulators-meet-1876259

"It's a constant give and take until it is exactly right," Deputy FAA Administrator Dan Elwell told reporters of the discussions with Boeing. "It's taking as long as it takes to be right," he said, adding: "I'm not tied to a timetable."


Asked if it is realistic that the 737 MAX could be flying again by August, Elwell declined to be specific.

"If you said October I wouldn't even say that, only because we haven't finished determining exactly what the training requirements will be," Elwell said. "If it takes a year to find everything we need to give us the confidence to lift the (grounding) order so be it."


Also really interesting:

Elwell rejected any idea that he was trying to win consensus with international regulators over the path to re-approving the MAX at the meeting. "We have to be the first to lift the order. We are the state of design," he said.


"From our point of view, if we all work together and we all reach the same aim, fine. If we don't, we'll choose our own time to decide when the planes are safe to fly again," Canada's Garneau told Reuters in an interview.

A spokesman for the European Aviation Safety Agency said on Wednesday that it would complete an additional independent design review of the plane once the FAA approves Boeing's proposed changes and establishes "adequate training of Boeing MAX flight crews."


So the possibility for a grounding in the US until beyond October seems relatively high after this announcements and in the rest of the world it could possibly be even later (probably 2020). Ryanair seem to "confirm" this with the following statement:

https://simpleflying.com/ryanair-737-max-delivery-delayed/
 
davidjohnson6
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 23, 2019 8:03 am

The comments from the FAA are just politics and I doubt anything shpuld be read into them. The FAA have looked bad for months in public and want the 737 Max back in the air fast.

The FAA has a meeting with other regulators today. If the FAA want them to look kindly on this, then being modest and not imposing deadlines in the press is more likely to win friends amongst other regulators. Furthermore saying 'no specific timetable' can always be changed to 'the plane returns to service today' if EASA relents - nobody would blame the FAA for such an outcome
 
FluidFlow
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 23, 2019 8:10 am

The American Airline pilot union is blaming Boeing for the second crash:

https://edition.cnn.com/2019/05/23/business/american-airlines-boeing-pilots-union/index.html
 
XRAYretired
Posts: 367
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 23, 2019 8:16 am

planecane wrote:
DenverTed wrote:
7BOEING7 wrote:

First you don't have the stabilizer at full nose up incidence -- you can't get there without using manual/manual trim, it won't go there with electric/manual trim. The airplane is "trimmed" to a specific speed above the stall speed in a descent and then the pilot starts a constant rate of deceleration of 1 knot/sec by constantly increasing the back pressure. Apparently on the MAX with aft cg, in a steep turn (high angle of bank) just prior to the stall the pilot feels or the data shows there is a lightening of the controls -- with the same back pressure the pilot gets slightly more than 1 knot/sec deceleration.


OK, sounds good. The stall test for which MCAS applies is a constant thrust 30 degree bank. Then my question is what is the range of incidence for which MCAS is needed. I've read that the rate of MCAS was .6 degrees per sec changed to 2.4 degrees per sec running for 9 sec shut off for 5 sec., so then it seems relevant to know what's the range of the stab, what's the range of electric stab, what's the range of MCAS 1.0, and what's the new range of MCAS 2.0? Or maybe people like me in the shallow end of the pool should leave the details to Boeing and the FAA? No, if they can't explain it, it's not that complicated.

I don't know what you are reading but you need better sources. The rate of MCAS is 0.27 degrees per second to a maximum of 2.5 degrees per cycle. Unfortunately, it was able to kick in for additional cycles and get to 5 degrees nose down. The original design was 0.6 degrees total per cycle. I don't think the rate was any different. Even if they hadn't changed it to 2.5 degrees it still could have ended up full nose down due to unlimited cycles.

Its the rate of change (Trim Motor speed) that counts. Original design was 0.065deg/sec and was changed to 0.27deg/sec which happens to equate to 0.6 deg. and 2.5 deg. in total for a 9.26 second cycle. The intent of the change was move the stabilizer more quickly not further since the design would inhibit trim once the AOA angle got to 0.5deg. below the MCAS threshold value (unless in fault condition of course).

Ray
Last edited by XRAYretired on Thu May 23, 2019 8:42 am, edited 1 time in total.
 
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AirlineCritic
Posts: 1618
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 23, 2019 9:32 am

rheinwaldner wrote:
I don't believe that anybody is happy about any aspect of the MAX grounding.

It is clear, that on-topic posts in this thread predominantly won't paint a nice picture of Boeing. That is inevitable. Similar like the A380 production stop thread about Airbus.

This thread here by nature is a hard topic for Boeing, so even from neutral commenters a lot of critical voices should be expected and Boeing and their supporters IMO simply need to bear it. Would there be no failure on Boeings side, there would be no complaints. But if the level of Boeings failure and the level of warranted complaints are in a balance, the result would obviously be some hard stuff for faithful Boeing fans.

But what we see on the other hand is a large majority of posts by Boeing apologists who try to distribute blame away from Boeing. Go and count the posts that would belong in the ET crash thread! The posts in this thread are about 70-90% off topic. The zeal how you and other posters try to make this thread appear more pleasant for Boeing than deserved, is admirable. But please don't forget, the MAX grounding is unprecedented in impact, duration and financial damage. A bit more self reflection and humility would make Boeings position much more friendly.

As explained earlier: training (and hence safety overall) in general is good enough. On a worldwide scale aviation safety is exceptional (and better than ever). The MAX is grounded because it had dangerous and serious design flaws. The design was so bad and lacking totally the usual fault tolerance, that with an unseen rate pilots were trapped in it. It was to be expected, that the worst pilots were trapped first. But this is not the point. The point is, that the same kind of pilots happily contributed and contribute to the supreme safety records of the NG and the A320s. Therefore the common denominator was not bad training, it was the MAX. Therefore the MAX is grounded and all this is not painting a nice picture of the rushed development and certification. Bear it like a man!


FWIW, I very much agree with what Rheinwaldner is writing above.

There can be plenty of smoke and mirrors in this thread, and looks like some people have taken as their day job to post comments that try to deflect what really happened here. What's the goal, the create an impression that "most" posters think in some way? You have to wonder what makes people want to do that.

At the end of the day, no matter what the training situation is in the world, the stats for one aircraft model are way off from others, and not in a good way. Yes, the flights (probably) could have been saved by crew that acted in a very specific way. How foreseeable was that at the time, however? Even on this forum we're gone from the "but maintenance" to "just cut it off" to "obviously you should have adjusted first before cutting off" to "too much speed, they should have paid more attention to speed" and even the latest "don't raise flaps". What's common to these is that the posters -- months after the incident -- believe that crew should have followed a *particular* course of action among a set of many and raise that as a reason why it is a crew fault.

What seems to be happening here is that the poster crowd is trying to find a fault by the pilots. And it is easy. Curiously, very little attention is paid to the IMHO big mistakes in aircraft design, certification, and training requirements. A feature that points nose down in a critical phase of flight and no redundant design? A million things are thrown to the pilots in that same critical phase of flight and you're expected to figure which problem you have and react in seconds, and *no training*? Or else, the wrath of the a.net fanboys is upon you. Come on!

Plenty of blame to go around. But, I'd rather be a Boeing engineer or manager with guilt but with commitment that I will do better, than an investment banker posting in a.net or CEO trying to explain why nothing was wrong and there's nothing to fix. While at the same time fixing things! And we all should be thankful that we're not one of the 350 people dead as a result of all these mistakes.

Like Rheinwaldner said, take it like an adult and get on to fix your mess. Accidents are not 100.000000% preventable but when something happens, lets fix it and make sure it never happens again. And that responsibility lies on multiple shoulders. Pointing fingers to other guys does not help the process. At all.
 
uta999
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 23, 2019 9:43 am

Grounding likely to be much longer than some believe.

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-48371100
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art
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 23, 2019 10:20 am

General question for those in the know, please: do purchase contracts for aircraft sold in USA contain provisions for compensation if the regulating authority prevents the aircraft being used by the purchaser? eg the type is grounded

If the purchaser is due compensation, does it simply cover the financial cost of ownership (eg $80 million invested in the aircraft sitting on the ground), does it cover cost of finding a temporary replacement (eg short term lease costs), does it cover loss of profit (eg could not carry 100,000 pax at a profit because the means to carry them was sitting on the ground)?

Late addition: would the cost of training beyond that specified as necessary when the purchase contract was made be met by the seller (eg FAA demands additional training before pilots can fly the type again)?
Last edited by art on Thu May 23, 2019 10:33 am, edited 1 time in total.
 
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InsideMan
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 23, 2019 10:25 am

davidjohnson6 wrote:
The comments from the FAA are just politics and I doubt anything shpuld be read into them. The FAA have looked bad for months in public and want the 737 Max back in the air fast.



I would argue the opposite is true. The FAA will want to be 100% certain that the MAX is safe to regain the trust of the flying public and to make sure other regulators do not find anything the FAA missed. They will be super thorough this time around....
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 23, 2019 10:41 am

InsideMan wrote:
davidjohnson6 wrote:
The comments from the FAA are just politics and I doubt anything shpuld be read into them. The FAA have looked bad for months in public and want the 737 Max back in the air fast.



I would argue the opposite is true. The FAA will want to be 100% certain that the MAX is safe to regain the trust of the flying public and to make sure other regulators do not find anything the FAA missed. They will be super thorough this time around....


I don't think it is either. The spokesman said that the reason he can't give a timeframe is that they haven't defined the training requirements yet. Why aren't they taken at their word? There are two parts to the ungrounding, the software change and any necessary training requirements. If the training reqirements haven't been defined yet, the time to implement them can't be known.
 
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hilram
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 23, 2019 11:48 am

FluidFlow wrote:
The American Airline pilot union is blaming Boeing for the second crash:

https://edition.cnn.com/2019/05/23/business/american-airlines-boeing-pilots-union/index.html

Shame they don't follow this thread. Then they would have learned that it's all about those 3rd world pilots and their lack of training. Whilst of course, no particular training for the MAX is really needed, a 90 minute iPad Crash Course (no pun intended) will do just fine.

(/sarcasm)
Flown on: A319, 320, 321, 332, 333, 343 | B732, 734, 735, 736, 73G, 738, 743, 744, 772, 77W | BAe-146 | DHC-6, 7, 8 | F50 | E195 | MD DC-9 41, MD-82, MD-87
 
ArgentoSystems
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 23, 2019 12:16 pm

InsideMan wrote:
davidjohnson6 wrote:
The comments from the FAA are just politics and I doubt anything shpuld be read into them. The FAA have looked bad for months in public and want the 737 Max back in the air fast.



I would argue the opposite is true. The FAA will want to be 100% certain that the MAX is safe to regain the trust of the flying public and to make sure other regulators do not find anything the FAA missed. They will be super thorough this time around....

+1. It is one thing to rubber stamp the design firmly believing it is solid. But now situation has changed. More over, with criminal investigation in progress, no one person would want to rush certification this time.
 
frmrCapCadet
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 23, 2019 1:12 pm

Note that the FAA statement seems to include that the US could certify the plane first, and the rest of the world would certify after their regulatory agencies have done their due research. Also note that the FAA is not seeing foreign hesitations as unfriendly, indeed welcoming them.
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 23, 2019 1:29 pm

frmrCapCadet wrote:
Note that the FAA statement seems to include that the US could certify the plane first, and the rest of the world would certify after their regulatory agencies have done their due research. Also note that the FAA is not seeing foreign hesitations as unfriendly, indeed welcoming them.

Definitely not reading A.Net.

On another note, the cost of the grounding may be more expensive than the cost of paying airlines for additional training, since most purchases are made in tranches, they can pay the penalty for the current purchases and modify contracts for new purchases.
The grounding covers much more claimants than the airlines so biting the bullet for the penalty on increased training for the initial users should be much less expensive that a continued grounding, based on the time so far, we may already be past the cross over point.
 
BravoOne
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 23, 2019 1:34 pm

DenverTed wrote:
BravoOne wrote:
DenverTed wrote:
Now the question has been answered that MCAS was required for certification of the MAX. Next, are there any other new aircraft that are too slow to recover from a stall, that they have an auto system to move the stab or elevator to tip the nose down? 767-2C I take it? Any others, 787, A350?


Has nothing to do with salt recovery!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Like salt harvesting?

So the MAX was certifiable without MCAS?

Looks like there is no clear answer to that question.



Sorry for the spelling error. The MAX is not certifiable without a MCAS as I understnd it.
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 23, 2019 2:10 pm

AirlineCritic wrote:
rheinwaldner wrote:
I don't believe that anybody is happy about any aspect of the MAX grounding.

It is clear, that on-topic posts in this thread predominantly won't paint a nice picture of Boeing. That is inevitable. Similar like the A380 production stop thread about Airbus.

This thread here by nature is a hard topic for Boeing, so even from neutral commenters a lot of critical voices should be expected and Boeing and their supporters IMO simply need to bear it. Would there be no failure on Boeings side, there would be no complaints. But if the level of Boeings failure and the level of warranted complaints are in a balance, the result would obviously be some hard stuff for faithful Boeing fans.

But what we see on the other hand is a large majority of posts by Boeing apologists who try to distribute blame away from Boeing. Go and count the posts that would belong in the ET crash thread! The posts in this thread are about 70-90% off topic. The zeal how you and other posters try to make this thread appear more pleasant for Boeing than deserved, is admirable. But please don't forget, the MAX grounding is unprecedented in impact, duration and financial damage. A bit more self reflection and humility would make Boeings position much more friendly.

As explained earlier: training (and hence safety overall) in general is good enough. On a worldwide scale aviation safety is exceptional (and better than ever). The MAX is grounded because it had dangerous and serious design flaws. The design was so bad and lacking totally the usual fault tolerance, that with an unseen rate pilots were trapped in it. It was to be expected, that the worst pilots were trapped first. But this is not the point. The point is, that the same kind of pilots happily contributed and contribute to the supreme safety records of the NG and the A320s. Therefore the common denominator was not bad training, it was the MAX. Therefore the MAX is grounded and all this is not painting a nice picture of the rushed development and certification. Bear it like a man!


FWIW, I very much agree with what Rheinwaldner is writing above.

There can be plenty of smoke and mirrors in this thread, and looks like some people have taken as their day job to post comments that try to deflect what really happened here. What's the goal, the create an impression that "most" posters think in some way? You have to wonder what makes people want to do that.

At the end of the day, no matter what the training situation is in the world, the stats for one aircraft model are way off from others, and not in a good way. Yes, the flights (probably) could have been saved by crew that acted in a very specific way. How foreseeable was that at the time, however? Even on this forum we're gone from the "but maintenance" to "just cut it off" to "obviously you should have adjusted first before cutting off" to "too much speed, they should have paid more attention to speed" and even the latest "don't raise flaps". What's common to these is that the posters -- months after the incident -- believe that crew should have followed a *particular* course of action among a set of many and raise that as a reason why it is a crew fault.

What seems to be happening here is that the poster crowd is trying to find a fault by the pilots. And it is easy. Curiously, very little attention is paid to the IMHO big mistakes in aircraft design, certification, and training requirements. A feature that points nose down in a critical phase of flight and no redundant design? A million things are thrown to the pilots in that same critical phase of flight and you're expected to figure which problem you have and react in seconds, and *no training*? Or else, the wrath of the a.net fanboys is upon you. Come on!

Plenty of blame to go around. But, I'd rather be a Boeing engineer or manager with guilt but with commitment that I will do better, than an investment banker posting in a.net or CEO trying to explain why nothing was wrong and there's nothing to fix. While at the same time fixing things! And we all should be thankful that we're not one of the 350 people dead as a result of all these mistakes.

Like Rheinwaldner said, take it like an adult and get on to fix your mess. Accidents are not 100.000000% preventable but when something happens, lets fix it and make sure it never happens again. And that responsibility lies on multiple shoulders. Pointing fingers to other guys does not help the process. At all.


Yes but ignoring the issues that have also become apparent in training are not helpful for safety either as many are trying to do.

Yes the stats are way off for the MAX and Boeing really screwed up the design - but it sure did uncover some training deficiencies as well. Are you honestly saying that Pilots shouldn't be required at least as a minimum to know how to control there airspeed manually? Just doing that would probably have resulted in an successful flight for ET.

ET had 50% of the Fatal Accidents in the last ten years with Pilot error at least a contributing factor. I am referring to AF447, Colgan 3407, ET409 and ET302.

They have .5% of the Worldwide fleet with 50% of the incidents - that's 100X the Worldwide average - there's some stats for you - but no the Ethiopian CEO says the pilots followed "all procedures" which is blatantly obvious from the Preliminary report they did not. They blamed ET409 on lightning. If you read the ET409 Final report it's quite obvious that the Pilot's manual flying skills were decidedly sub-par.

ET302 and ET409 Pilots went through 737 NG type training at about the same time.

I have no doubt that ET has great training system to teach Pilots how to use the Automated systems - but with 50% of the fatals in the last 10 years while manually flying ET training does not look so good.

Just to reaffirm - It's Boeing's fault that these incidents happened - but ET302 at least with the procedures they were required to know (and if ET actually informed them of the MCAS procedures) as part of there licensing should have saved the flight.

Also just to reaffirm my stance - this is not just a third world problem - as evidenced by the AF and Colgan incidents - as well as the many examples pilots have posted on these forums as well as others of basic procedures that are just no longer being taught and a general lack of knowledge on Airplane systems that newer pilots have worldwide.

The training system has gotten way too complacent and lax and needs improvement. With sufficient training, design and oversight it is conceivable that the existing low fatality rates grow even smaller - but you have to improve all three areas - design, oversight and training.
 
kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 23, 2019 2:35 pm

morrisond wrote:
AirlineCritic wrote:
rheinwaldner wrote:
I don't believe that anybody is happy about any aspect of the MAX grounding.

It is clear, that on-topic posts in this thread predominantly won't paint a nice picture of Boeing. That is inevitable. Similar like the A380 production stop thread about Airbus.

This thread here by nature is a hard topic for Boeing, so even from neutral commenters a lot of critical voices should be expected and Boeing and their supporters IMO simply need to bear it. Would there be no failure on Boeings side, there would be no complaints. But if the level of Boeings failure and the level of warranted complaints are in a balance, the result would obviously be some hard stuff for faithful Boeing fans.

But what we see on the other hand is a large majority of posts by Boeing apologists who try to distribute blame away from Boeing. Go and count the posts that would belong in the ET crash thread! The posts in this thread are about 70-90% off topic. The zeal how you and other posters try to make this thread appear more pleasant for Boeing than deserved, is admirable. But please don't forget, the MAX grounding is unprecedented in impact, duration and financial damage. A bit more self reflection and humility would make Boeings position much more friendly.

As explained earlier: training (and hence safety overall) in general is good enough. On a worldwide scale aviation safety is exceptional (and better than ever). The MAX is grounded because it had dangerous and serious design flaws. The design was so bad and lacking totally the usual fault tolerance, that with an unseen rate pilots were trapped in it. It was to be expected, that the worst pilots were trapped first. But this is not the point. The point is, that the same kind of pilots happily contributed and contribute to the supreme safety records of the NG and the A320s. Therefore the common denominator was not bad training, it was the MAX. Therefore the MAX is grounded and all this is not painting a nice picture of the rushed development and certification. Bear it like a man!


FWIW, I very much agree with what Rheinwaldner is writing above.

There can be plenty of smoke and mirrors in this thread, and looks like some people have taken as their day job to post comments that try to deflect what really happened here. What's the goal, the create an impression that "most" posters think in some way? You have to wonder what makes people want to do that.

At the end of the day, no matter what the training situation is in the world, the stats for one aircraft model are way off from others, and not in a good way. Yes, the flights (probably) could have been saved by crew that acted in a very specific way. How foreseeable was that at the time, however? Even on this forum we're gone from the "but maintenance" to "just cut it off" to "obviously you should have adjusted first before cutting off" to "too much speed, they should have paid more attention to speed" and even the latest "don't raise flaps". What's common to these is that the posters -- months after the incident -- believe that crew should have followed a *particular* course of action among a set of many and raise that as a reason why it is a crew fault.

What seems to be happening here is that the poster crowd is trying to find a fault by the pilots. And it is easy. Curiously, very little attention is paid to the IMHO big mistakes in aircraft design, certification, and training requirements. A feature that points nose down in a critical phase of flight and no redundant design? A million things are thrown to the pilots in that same critical phase of flight and you're expected to figure which problem you have and react in seconds, and *no training*? Or else, the wrath of the a.net fanboys is upon you. Come on!

Plenty of blame to go around. But, I'd rather be a Boeing engineer or manager with guilt but with commitment that I will do better, than an investment banker posting in a.net or CEO trying to explain why nothing was wrong and there's nothing to fix. While at the same time fixing things! And we all should be thankful that we're not one of the 350 people dead as a result of all these mistakes.

Like Rheinwaldner said, take it like an adult and get on to fix your mess. Accidents are not 100.000000% preventable but when something happens, lets fix it and make sure it never happens again. And that responsibility lies on multiple shoulders. Pointing fingers to other guys does not help the process. At all.


Yes but ignoring the issues that have also become apparent in training are not helpful for safety either as many are trying to do.

Yes the stats are way off for the MAX and Boeing really screwed up the design - but it sure did uncover some training deficiencies as well. Are you honestly saying that Pilots shouldn't be required at least as a minimum to know how to control there airspeed manually? Just doing that would probably have resulted in an successful flight for ET.

ET had 50% of the Fatal Accidents in the last ten years with Pilot error at least a contributing factor. I am referring to AF447, Colgan 3407, ET409 and ET302.

They have .5% of the Worldwide fleet with 50% of the incidents - that's 100X the Worldwide average - there's some stats for you - but no the Ethiopian CEO says the pilots followed "all procedures" which is blatantly obvious from the Preliminary report they did not. They blamed ET409 on lightning. If you read the ET409 Final report it's quite obvious that the Pilot's manual flying skills were decidedly sub-par.

ET302 and ET409 Pilots went through 737 NG type training at about the same time.

I have no doubt that ET has great training system to teach Pilots how to use the Automated systems - but with 50% of the fatals in the last 10 years while manually flying ET training does not look so good.

Just to reaffirm - It's Boeing's fault that these incidents happened - but ET302 at least with the procedures they were required to know (and if ET actually informed them of the MCAS procedures) as part of there licensing should have saved the flight.

Also just to reaffirm my stance - this is not just a third world problem - as evidenced by the AF and Colgan incidents - as well as the many examples pilots have posted on these forums as well as others of basic procedures that are just no longer being taught and a general lack of knowledge on Airplane systems that newer pilots have worldwide.

The training system has gotten way too complacent and lax and needs improvement. With sufficient training, design and oversight it is conceivable that the existing low fatality rates grow even smaller - but you have to improve all three areas - design, oversight and training.

Yes of course, training is a big deal. I would say each and every Boeing engineer needs a college degree and a mandatory handwash before dealing with paperwork. It is, actually, cheaper and more efficient.
 
Sooner787
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 23, 2019 2:50 pm

If Boeing had it's hopes pinned on an August return to service and the grounding drags out
past that, at what point does Boeing further reduce Max production rates or even temporarily halt production?
 
User avatar
ITMercure
Posts: 70
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 23, 2019 3:06 pm

"ET had 50% of the Fatal Accidents in the last ten years with Pilot error at least a contributing factor. I am referring to AF447, Colgan 3407, ET409 and ET302."

How on earth do you come to that conclusion? You're picking 4 accidents, two of which were ET airplanes, in a 10-year timeframe during which - unfortunately - dozens of other accidents happened worldwide with pilot error a contributing factor.

Am I missing someting or did you really do that?
 
morrisond
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Joined: Thu Jan 07, 2010 12:22 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 23, 2019 3:21 pm

ITMercure wrote:
"ET had 50% of the Fatal Accidents in the last ten years with Pilot error at least a contributing factor. I am referring to AF447, Colgan 3407, ET409 and ET302."

How on earth do you come to that conclusion? You're picking 4 accidents, two of which were ET airplanes, in a 10-year timeframe during which - unfortunately - dozens of other accidents happened worldwide with pilot error a contributing factor.

Am I missing someting or did you really do that?


It was quite tongue in cheek - based on others previously extrapolating MAX crash rates far into the future saying 100's would crash.

That being said for Airbus, Boeing, Embraer and BBD types thankfully the number of fatals for commercial aircraft flights in the last 10 years has been incredibly low - once you take out the suicide, Hijacking, terrorist events and runway excursions.

You might find a few more in here https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_a ... l_aircraft
 
XRAYretired
Posts: 367
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 23, 2019 3:23 pm

ITMercure wrote:
"ET had 50% of the Fatal Accidents in the last ten years with Pilot error at least a contributing factor. I am referring to AF447, Colgan 3407, ET409 and ET302."

How on earth do you come to that conclusion? You're picking 4 accidents, two of which were ET airplanes, in a 10-year timeframe during which - unfortunately - dozens of other accidents happened worldwide with pilot error a contributing factor.

Am I missing someting or did you really do that?


If you look up the chain, you will find this (AirlineCritic).
There can be plenty of smoke and mirrors in this thread, and looks like some people have taken as their day job to post comments that try to deflect what really happened here. What's the goal, the create an impression that "most" posters think in some way? You have to wonder what makes people want to do that.
 
frmrCapCadet
Posts: 2844
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 23, 2019 3:24 pm

Because the U.S. is where the MAX was designed and issued its initial certification, which was then separately validated by regulators around the world, the ungrounding of the aircraft must follow a similar pattern, Elwell said. When its analysis is complete, the U.S. will certify the fix and lift the grounding, then other countries must validate the FAA’s work and make their own decisions, he said.


Gates, in today's Seattle Times.

Also Boeing fires/accepts resignation of head of 787 production in Charleston. Problems weren't 'fake news'.
Buffet: the airline business...has eaten up capital...like..no other (business)
 
UALWN
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 23, 2019 3:31 pm

morrisond wrote:
ET had 50% of the Fatal Accidents in the last ten years with Pilot error at least a contributing factor. I am referring to AF447, Colgan 3407, ET409 and ET302.

No more accidents had pilot error as a contributing factor? Are you suggesting, for instance, that OZ214 in SFO was exclusively Boeing's fault? What about Flydubai's 738 in Russia? Or Aeroflot's recent SSJ crash?
AT7/111/146/Avro/CRJ/CR9/EMB/ERJ/E75/F50/100/L15/DC9/D10/M8X/717/727/737/747/757/767/777/787/AB6/310/32X/330/340/350/380
 
bgm
Posts: 1982
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 23, 2019 3:33 pm

XRAYretired wrote:
ITMercure wrote:
"ET had 50% of the Fatal Accidents in the last ten years with Pilot error at least a contributing factor. I am referring to AF447, Colgan 3407, ET409 and ET302."

How on earth do you come to that conclusion? You're picking 4 accidents, two of which were ET airplanes, in a 10-year timeframe during which - unfortunately - dozens of other accidents happened worldwide with pilot error a contributing factor.

Am I missing someting or did you really do that?


If you look up the chain, you will find this (AirlineCritic).
There can be plenty of smoke and mirrors in this thread, and looks like some people have taken as their day job to post comments that try to deflect what really happened here. What's the goal, the create an impression that "most" posters think in some way? You have to wonder what makes people want to do that.


Indeed. There have been several Americans (and 1 Canuck) throwing mud with the hope that something will stick. Fortunately, nobody is buying their smoke and mirrors BS, and the reality is that Boeing is at fault and will be paying the hefty price for cutting corners. As the old saying goes, penny wise and pound foolish.
A pilot cannot be expected to compensate for a flawed design.
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 23, 2019 3:34 pm

frmrCapCadet wrote:
Gates, in today's Seattle Times.

Also Boeing fires/accepts resignation of head of 787 production in Charleston. Problems weren't 'fake news'.

Which problems, the ones that were known about with 787's to a certain Middle East carrier....the fake news here may be that they are using the MAX grounding to settle scores.
Quality issues at Charleston have been around for a while and was / is public knowledge, why fire someone now and not then..that would be the real fake news.
Any fake news around the 767 tanker tool giveaway issue, if they fire someone there we would be cooking with gas.
 
DenverTed
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 23, 2019 4:54 pm

For me, the problem was MCAS and they fixed it fairly easily, so I would hop back on board tomorrow. But out of natural curiosity, I would like to know the specifics of how the MAX differs from the NG in terms of longitudinal stability. Obviously, the larger more forward engines being the driving factor. What is the stall angle of the MAX versus the NG? What was the critical AOA that triggered MCAS? What did the stability curve look like at that angle? For MCAS 2.0, what are the limits on the angle of the stab that it can operate within?
Also I'd like an explanation from Boeing how they missed it. In the design of MCAS, presumably several people chose and checked the parameters, like going on for 9 seconds and turning off for 5 seconds. How did they miss limiting how many repetitions, or limiting the range of the stab to not operate in the nose down range where it wasn't needed to begin with? They limited it to not work with the flaps down, so obviously there were a lot of conscious decisions being made as to the limits of MCAS.

How did they miss the obvious? Boeing has to explain and account for an inexcusable void in what should be a foolproof in house design process.
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 23, 2019 5:17 pm

DenverTed wrote:
For me, the problem was MCAS and they fixed it fairly easily, so I would hop back on board tomorrow. But out of natural curiosity, I would like to know the specifics of how the MAX differs from the NG in terms of longitudinal stability. Obviously, the larger more forward engines being the driving factor. What is the stall angle of the MAX versus the NG? What was the critical AOA that triggered MCAS? What did the stability curve look like at that angle? For MCAS 2.0, what are the limits on the angle of the stab that it can operate within?
Also I'd like an explanation from Boeing how they missed it. In the design of MCAS, presumably several people chose and checked the parameters, like going on for 9 seconds and turning off for 5 seconds. How did they miss limiting how many repetitions, or limiting the range of the stab to not operate in the nose down range where it wasn't needed to begin with? They limited it to not work with the flaps down, so obviously there were a lot of conscious decisions being made as to the limits of MCAS.

How did they miss the obvious? Boeing has to explain and account for an inexcusable void in what should be a foolproof in house design process.


They didn't miss it, they made the very bad assumption that an MCAS failure would be recognized as a runaway stabilizer and easily corrected by applying the runaway stabilizer NNC. Having it not work with flaps deployed wasn't some safety thing. That parameter existing leads to the conclusion that with flaps deployed, the aerodynamics of the wing are changed to the point where the engine nacelles no longer provide the additional nose up pitch (or at least not enough to have an effect on the weight of the control column).

Some of the other items you ask for are probably confidential. The stall angle varies with airspeed and altitude. I don't think it would be that different between MAX and NG since they have the same wing. MCAS was added to make it require more force on the column to reach the stall angle in certain situations since the lift provided by the nacelles made it the force required to pitch up further "lighter" on the MAX than the NG in certain situations.

As far as I've seen, MCAS 2.0 still has the same trim change rate and the same 2.5 degrees maximum trim change per cycle. However, it will only perform one cycle per "event." It will only be able to erroneously activate if BOTH AoA sensors fail and indicate false nose up attitude AND they both fail within 5.5 degrees of each other. It will be extremely unlikely for that to happen. If it does, MCAS will kick in for one cycle and attempt to pitch down for 9 seconds. An interruption by the pilot pressing the thumb switch in the opposite direction (opposite requirement not confirmed but assumed) then MCAS will stop commanding. If the AoA doesn't get out of the trigger range, it will still be the same event so it will not activate again.
 
mjoelnir
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Thu May 23, 2019 5:19 pm

morrisond wrote:
AirlineCritic wrote:
rheinwaldner wrote:
I don't believe that anybody is happy about any aspect of the MAX grounding.

It is clear, that on-topic posts in this thread predominantly won't paint a nice picture of Boeing. That is inevitable. Similar like the A380 production stop thread about Airbus.

This thread here by nature is a hard topic for Boeing, so even from neutral commenters a lot of critical voices should be expected and Boeing and their supporters IMO simply need to bear it. Would there be no failure on Boeings side, there would be no complaints. But if the level of Boeings failure and the level of warranted complaints are in a balance, the result would obviously be some hard stuff for faithful Boeing fans.

But what we see on the other hand is a large majority of posts by Boeing apologists who try to distribute blame away from Boeing. Go and count the posts that would belong in the ET crash thread! The posts in this thread are about 70-90% off topic. The zeal how you and other posters try to make this thread appear more pleasant for Boeing than deserved, is admirable. But please don't forget, the MAX grounding is unprecedented in impact, duration and financial damage. A bit more self reflection and humility would make Boeings position much more friendly.

As explained earlier: training (and hence safety overall) in general is good enough. On a worldwide scale aviation safety is exceptional (and better than ever). The MAX is grounded because it had dangerous and serious design flaws. The design was so bad and lacking totally the usual fault tolerance, that with an unseen rate pilots were trapped in it. It was to be expected, that the worst pilots were trapped first. But this is not the point. The point is, that the same kind of pilots happily contributed and contribute to the supreme safety records of the NG and the A320s. Therefore the common denominator was not bad training, it was the MAX. Therefore the MAX is grounded and all this is not painting a nice picture of the rushed development and certification. Bear it like a man!


FWIW, I very much agree with what Rheinwaldner is writing above.

There can be plenty of smoke and mirrors in this thread, and looks like some people have taken as their day job to post comments that try to deflect what really happened here. What's the goal, the create an impression that "most" posters think in some way? You have to wonder what makes people want to do that.

At the end of the day, no matter what the training situation is in the world, the stats for one aircraft model are way off from others, and not in a good way. Yes, the flights (probably) could have been saved by crew that acted in a very specific way. How foreseeable was that at the time, however? Even on this forum we're gone from the "but maintenance" to "just cut it off" to "obviously you should have adjusted first before cutting off" to "too much speed, they should have paid more attention to speed" and even the latest "don't raise flaps". What's common to these is that the posters -- months after the incident -- believe that crew should have followed a *particular* course of action among a set of many and raise that as a reason why it is a crew fault.

What seems to be happening here is that the poster crowd is trying to find a fault by the pilots. And it is easy. Curiously, very little attention is paid to the IMHO big mistakes in aircraft design, certification, and training requirements. A feature that points nose down in a critical phase of flight and no redundant design? A million things are thrown to the pilots in that same critical phase of flight and you're expected to figure which problem you have and react in seconds, and *no training*? Or else, the wrath of the a.net fanboys is upon you. Come on!

Plenty of blame to go around. But, I'd rather be a Boeing engineer or manager with guilt but with commitment that I will do better, than an investment banker posting in a.net or CEO trying to explain why nothing was wrong and there's nothing to fix. While at the same time fixing things! And we all should be thankful that we're not one of the 350 people dead as a result of all these mistakes.

Like Rheinwaldner said, take it like an adult and get on to fix your mess. Accidents are not 100.000000% preventable but when something happens, lets fix it and make sure it never happens again. And that responsibility lies on multiple shoulders. Pointing fingers to other guys does not help the process. At all.


Yes but ignoring the issues that have also become apparent in training are not helpful for safety either as many are trying to do.

Yes the stats are way off for the MAX and Boeing really screwed up the design - but it sure did uncover some training deficiencies as well. Are you honestly saying that Pilots shouldn't be required at least as a minimum to know how to control there airspeed manually? Just doing that would probably have resulted in an successful flight for ET.

ET had 50% of the Fatal Accidents in the last ten years with Pilot error at least a contributing factor. I am referring to AF447, Colgan 3407, ET409 and ET302.

They have .5% of the Worldwide fleet with 50% of the incidents - that's 100X the Worldwide average - there's some stats for you - but no the Ethiopian CEO says the pilots followed "all procedures" which is blatantly obvious from the Preliminary report they did not. They blamed ET409 on lightning. If you read the ET409 Final report it's quite obvious that the Pilot's manual flying skills were decidedly sub-par.

ET302 and ET409 Pilots went through 737 NG type training at about the same time.

I have no doubt that ET has great training system to teach Pilots how to use the Automated systems - but with 50% of the fatals in the last 10 years while manually flying ET training does not look so good.

Just to reaffirm - It's Boeing's fault that these incidents happened - but ET302 at least with the procedures they were required to know (and if ET actually informed them of the MCAS procedures) as part of there licensing should have saved the flight.

Also just to reaffirm my stance - this is not just a third world problem - as evidenced by the AF and Colgan incidents - as well as the many examples pilots have posted on these forums as well as others of basic procedures that are just no longer being taught and a general lack of knowledge on Airplane systems that newer pilots have worldwide.

The training system has gotten way too complacent and lax and needs improvement. With sufficient training, design and oversight it is conceivable that the existing low fatality rates grow even smaller - but you have to improve all three areas - design, oversight and training.


Still in the smoke and mirror business?

How about mandatory training for Boeing engineers that work safety relevant work on airplanes? How about a ban at Boeing for money managers to overrule engineers in safety critical cases? How about Boeing not ambushing pilots with Boeing made dangerous emergencies? How about Boeing not producing frames that do its best to kill crew and passengers? How about Boeing promoting pilot training instead of sabotaging it?

These two accident are the result of Boeing's negligent design resulting from Boeing's greed.

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