planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sat May 25, 2019 1:58 pm

xmp125a wrote:
marcelh wrote:


Subtitle for this should be "Grandfathering bites back". As I understand, due to Boeing insistence on the fact that there is no material difference between NG and the MAX for the pilots, the old procedures have to be re-evaluated in the light of the MAX problems - because MAX depends on them (probably one of those is roller-coaster?).

No, that's not what the subtitle should be. As I speculated many times (while being accused of blaming pilots and defending Boeing) is that there is an issue with recognition of and training for runaway stabilizer on the 737 in general. I have said that I suspect a large number of crews would not recover from a runaway on an NG if the other distractions were happening simultaneously. Luckily, it seems runaway stabilizer rarely, if ever, happened on the NG or classic.

It seems reasonable that the engineers assumed that if MCAS failed it would be no big deal because runaway stabilizer was a memory item. Therefore they assumed pilots would be well versed in recognizing it and recovering from it.

A side benefit if the FAA determines that NG procedures and training need to be updated is that there won't be any difference between NG and MAX for training. If the only difference is a checklist with a slightly limited flight envelope upon AoA disagree on the MAX, MAX pilots won't need more simulator training than an NG pilot since all 737 pilots will get the new runaway stabilizer training.
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sat May 25, 2019 2:02 pm

sassiciai wrote:
Rosso wrote:
art wrote:
The question to me about the introduction of MCAS is this: why did Boeing conceal / fail to reveal the system to pilots?

If Boeing had let them know that there was something (that wasn't there on NG) that could actively trim the nose down for up to 10 seconds followed by 5 secs when it would be inert before repeating, the crew would have known what was happening if the aircraft repeatedly dropped its nose. That would have made an MCAS runaway identifiable with an easy low airspeed solution available - extend the flaps to deactivate MCAS. Not saying an NNC would not require more steps at higher airspeeds but higher airspeeds would suggest more height and more time to go through the NNC.



You don't fix engineering problems with software.

We all waited 6 years for your first post!

Spot on!!

Hope the next one is either as sharp, or sooner than 2025!


Except in every product, system or machine where there is hardware controlled by software, software is frequently used to address hardware issues. This is true in everything from a cell phone to a Mars lander. It isn't considered bad engineering to do so.
 
mjoelnir
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sat May 25, 2019 2:43 pm

I think people should turn around and have another look. A lot is talked here about training issues of the pilots. My take would be that runaway trim was always difficult and chancy to recover from. The changes to the trim system from classic to NG has exasperated this problem. The saving grace for the NG was and is that runaway trim hardly ever happens, so it is not put to the test if runaway recovery really works, especially near the ground. The MAX changed that equitation, with having a new failure mode similar to runaway trim happening quite often.
 
SRQLOT
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sat May 25, 2019 2:59 pm

Boeingphan wrote:
KDFW-TV in Dallas said in a news report a couple of days ago that it would require at least 150 hours for each grounded 3M8/3M9 to get the software updates installed, fluids and engines checked, and, presumably, for pilots to be re-trained and/or re-certified before they're back in the air. Just because someone says the grounding order could be lifted by the end of June (which I highly doubt will happen), that very likely means you might not see a 3M8/9 in the air for a couple months after the order is lifted.



“You do realize that 150hrs is nothing. At worst case you have 2 guys for less than 2 weeks worth of work and one plane is done. I keep seeing the 150hr as being some huge obstacle but my goodness its peanuts.[/quote]”


Also found this neat article today on how long it will take to just bring the airplanes back to flying condition not including the software issues. And that Southwest to get the whole fleet up will take a month.

https://www.yahoo.com/finance/news/boei ... 00998.html
 
cat3appr50
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sat May 25, 2019 3:12 pm

My oh my, all of this discussion by the FAA and others regarding the returned to service projected date for the MAX (which BTW seems to change every time the acting FAA Administrator makes a statement in the media) and yet there is no formal projected date for when the Final Accident Reports (FAR) are going to be formally issued relative to both the LT610 and ET302 accidents. Astounding!

By projection…going to get the aircraft in the air before the flying public even has a chance to read or hear the details of the FAR’s, which includes those pesky, revealing conversations in the cockpits on the CVR, etc.

Seems the FAA (and others in regulatory responsibility around the world) may not discern the public perception issues of pushing/expediting the aircraft return to service date, while the objective details of what ACTUALLY occurred, and why, per the issuance of the formal FAR’s (who knows when they will be issued, and nobody is saying) isn’t even on the horizon.
 
XRAYretired
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sat May 25, 2019 3:30 pm

morrisond wrote:
XRAYretired wrote:
morrisond wrote:

I'm sorry - I read "Tajer said the Ethiopian Airlines pilots did what they were instructed to do" - How is that not implying they followed all procedures?

That's not calling him a liar - it's just stating that he might not know all the facts.

He also calls it Anti-stall software which it is not.

How am I lying? Those were his words not the news organization.

Ray - you keep spouting personal opinions many times - which I give you proof are wrong and all we hear are crickets.

If you are implying that I am a liar - please provide an example of where I knowingly lied. Otherwise please stop with the personal attacks.

Twisting again. I did not call anyone a liar, nor would I stoop to such. I suggested you may lack credibility. My opinions are clearly stated as such, and if someone holds a different opinion I accept that is so. I will present considered evaluation of the data and interpretation, if that proves to be incorrect, or someone has a better solution then I accept it as such. I cant honestly remember anything that can be considered a 'proof'.


Hi Ray,

I think we were both guilty about not reading posts fully this morning. No - you did not call me a liar - just lacking in credibility.

I'm not making stuff up - it's all out there if you care to search for it. When I say I'm speculating (like below) I call it speculation.

For proof I can think of two things off the top of my head - You never replied many weeks ago when you asserted that the MAX dropped out of turns and that is why ET302 crashed and I gave you a possibly better explanation from the FDR traces in the preliminary report - nor when I sent you the PM on the Non-Normal airspeed procedure from another forum which I am not allowed to post here.

Then others were asserting that Pilots would never be able to handle stalls or approach to stall in an MAX as the light control forces or pitch instability as they called it would cause the pilot to pull into a stall so fast that it would be unrecoverable. I posted a video showing how much warning the pilots would have and all there were were crickets again.

I don't find the ET CEO credible at all as he continues to insist that there were no bird strikes and that all procedures were followed. Combine that with the AVHerald report that ET may never have supplied the proper procedure to its pilots - which if true - no wonder he is trying to deflect blame.

That is what they (ET) tried to do with ET409 as well - stating it was a lighting strike and not pilot error as the final report clearly shows.

I suspect we will never hear or be able to read the full CVR recording as the ET Civil Aviation Authority under pressure from ET will never release it. The FAA may not be able to release it publicly on their own.

I also find it curious how little we are hearing about the May 23 meeting. Presumably they all listened to the full CVR recordings and if there was a smoking gun further implicating Boeing I'm sure someone would have leaked something by now as there were representatives from 33 organizations there. Alternatively the recordings could have been very damning on both sets of pilots (or at least ET) but as that is against the public narrative of "It's all Boeing and the FAA's fault" we aren't hearing much at all.

All pure speculation though.


Dear friend.

I accept you have a different opinion of ET302 dropping out of a high speed turn. No further comment would have been useful. My opinion is not changed. The post you sent did not include the documents suggested. No analysis was therefore possible, no further comment was necessary or useful. None of this is 'proofs' of anything.

I have never offered any opinion on stall characteristics or entry conditions of Cessna or 737 since it is clear there was no stall except perhaps in the final turns, and I have no knowledge or experience of same anyway.

As regards the CEO I have simply asked that you not call him a liar without evidence and have pointed out that your assertion/speculations regarding documentation available to the pilots is contrary to the Official Preliminary Report as are the relevant parts of the AvH article. Your response was to suggest the Official Preliminary Report was a 'fabrication'. I do not support that suggestion primarily because the NTSB would not allow it.

You brought up ET409 to support assertions/accusations regarding CEO and the Official Preliminary Report. The Ethiopians did not write the ET409 report only post an objection that is their right if they wish, even if this is possibly partially politically motivated. This does not support supposed or insinuated Lies and Fabrications in the case of ET302 in my view.

It is not required or common in my experience for CVR to be published and then mostly only tit-bits. I would not expect anything before the final reports, and maybe nothing at all.

Perhaps those involved in the closed May 23rd meeting just have some integrity.

I reserve my right to respond to perceived unjustified or derogatory comments particularly where those disparaged are not here to defend themselves, including dead pilots. I also reserve the right to offer alternatives or opinions to opinions, assertions or statements declared fact if I perceive it useful in the search for information and reality in whichever way they fall.

I also reserve the right to have a laugh and a giggle occasionally, providing no harm is done!

Ray
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sat May 25, 2019 3:46 pm

mjoelnir wrote:
I think people should turn around and have another look. A lot is talked here about training issues of the pilots. My take would be that runaway trim was always difficult and chancy to recover from. The changes to the trim system from classic to NG has exasperated this problem. The saving grace for the NG was and is that runaway trim hardly ever happens, so it is not put to the test if runaway recovery really works, especially near the ground. The MAX changed that equitation, with having a new failure mode similar to runaway trim happening quite often.


I don't think the conclusion is that "runaway trim was always difficult and chancy to recover from." I think it is relatively easy to recover from if pilots are well trained to recognize it and apply the NNC. I think the issue is that, because it hardly ever, if ever, happens on the NG (or even the classic) that the training for it was put on the back burner. Also, the procedure probably hadn't been reviewed since the 1970's.
 
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PW100
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sat May 25, 2019 3:59 pm

morrisond wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:
morrisond wrote:

Yes I'm sure Boeing designed a plane on purpose to crash as that does such good things for it's bottom line. All designs are a compromise between safety, efficiency and cost and sometimes engineers make mistakes based on bad assumptions that pilots are able to handle the situations they supposedly are trained for.
How is asking for improved training standards for pilots Smoke and Mirrors? I would support it for Boeing and the FAA as well to make the whole system safer.
I'm just not so myopic to think that there are only issues with Boeing and the FAA as some would like to believe.

It is really quite uninteresting if Boeing design a plane that killed over 300 people on purpose or negligence, the result is the same.
I call it smoke and mirrors, because your calls for training start at the wrong end. Training at Boeing is needed for how to design save frames. It will help pilots if they are not supposed to fly death traps.
In regards to training for pilots flying Boeing frames, you also start at the wrong end. Training for pilots flying an manufacturers frames are based on the manufacturers recommendation. If the manufacturer recommends minimal training and sabotages the possibility that pilots are trained on all the peculiarities of said manufacturers frames, you again have to start with the manufacturer.

I don't really care how we get to more training - as long as there is more training.


How ironic that Boeing aimed (and is stil aiming) for minimum training to fly the MAX.

Setting decent training standards for MAX would probably fix 80-95% of the so called "declining pilot standards worldwide".

So yes, mostly smoke and mirrors indeed.
Immigration officer: "What's the purpose of your visit to the USA?" Spotter: "Shooting airliners with my Canon!"
 
DenverTed
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sat May 25, 2019 4:04 pm

Rosso wrote:
art wrote:
The question to me about the introduction of MCAS is this: why did Boeing conceal / fail to reveal the system to pilots?

If Boeing had let them know that there was something (that wasn't there on NG) that could actively trim the nose down for up to 10 seconds followed by 5 secs when it would be inert before repeating, the crew would have known what was happening if the aircraft repeatedly dropped its nose. That would have made an MCAS runaway identifiable with an easy low airspeed solution available - extend the flaps to deactivate MCAS. Not saying an NNC would not require more steps at higher airspeeds but higher airspeeds would suggest more height and more time to go through the NNC.



You don't fix engineering problems with software.

Is it up for debate as to whether that is legal? I assume MCAS was needed for certification for longitudinal stability, and this was a perfectly legal fix. I'm curious as to what other aircraft use software for longitudinal stability similar to the MAX. The 767-2C since it has MCAS. What others, 787, A350, A320neo? Any aircraft with larger engines with more area forward of the wing, and a short moment arm to the stab, like the A319neo?

Point being, which aircraft are 'fixed with software'. And it would be interesting to see a comparison among them in longitudinal stability. If the MAX is the worst, I would be interested to know that, but don't take that as fact without any proof.
 
DenverTed
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sat May 25, 2019 4:15 pm

mjoelnir wrote:
I think people should turn around and have another look. A lot is talked here about training issues of the pilots. My take would be that runaway trim was always difficult and chancy to recover from. The changes to the trim system from classic to NG has exasperated this problem. The saving grace for the NG was and is that runaway trim hardly ever happens, so it is not put to the test if runaway recovery really works, especially near the ground. The MAX changed that equitation, with having a new failure mode similar to runaway trim happening quite often.

After the LionAir crash, that seemed to be the wisdom, hit the switches and use the manual trim wheel. But how many 'runaway trim' cases could they show where the crew saved the plane from severe mistrim with the wheel?
Always seemed nebulous to me, but since there was a toggle switch under the pilots thumb that overrode MCAS, that always seemed like a foolproof solution to me, and I had no thought that a grounding was a rational response given that, at that time.
 
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aerolimani
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sat May 25, 2019 4:18 pm

planecane wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:
I think people should turn around and have another look. A lot is talked here about training issues of the pilots. My take would be that runaway trim was always difficult and chancy to recover from. The changes to the trim system from classic to NG has exasperated this problem. The saving grace for the NG was and is that runaway trim hardly ever happens, so it is not put to the test if runaway recovery really works, especially near the ground. The MAX changed that equitation, with having a new failure mode similar to runaway trim happening quite often.


I don't think the conclusion is that "runaway trim was always difficult and chancy to recover from." I think it is relatively easy to recover from if pilots are well trained to recognize it and apply the NNC. I think the issue is that, because it hardly ever, if ever, happens on the NG (or even the classic) that the training for it was put on the back burner. Also, the procedure probably hadn't been reviewed since the 1970's.

Perhaps the procedure is not so difficult, but rather, it seems that sufficiently speedy recognition is the problem. This is what can make the situation dangerous. Indeed, the FAA is not so certain that all is well.

I wish there were direct quotes, and not just paraphrasing. Nonetheless, I have confidence in the WSJ reporting. From the article linked further upthread:

Some previously developed cockpit procedures are partly based on Boeing’s earlier assumptions that pilots would respond in just a few seconds to erroneous nose-down commands, the officials said, and the FAA is evaluating how realistic that might be.

U.S. regulators are reassessing whether Boeing’s proposed software fix for the MAX—combined with potentially revised emergency procedures and checklists—would give pilots somewhat more time to react, roughly 20 seconds.
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sat May 25, 2019 4:20 pm

DenverTed wrote:
Rosso wrote:
art wrote:
The question to me about the introduction of MCAS is this: why did Boeing conceal / fail to reveal the system to pilots?

If Boeing had let them know that there was something (that wasn't there on NG) that could actively trim the nose down for up to 10 seconds followed by 5 secs when it would be inert before repeating, the crew would have known what was happening if the aircraft repeatedly dropped its nose. That would have made an MCAS runaway identifiable with an easy low airspeed solution available - extend the flaps to deactivate MCAS. Not saying an NNC would not require more steps at higher airspeeds but higher airspeeds would suggest more height and more time to go through the NNC.



You don't fix engineering problems with software.

Is it up for debate as to whether that is legal? I assume MCAS was needed for certification for longitudinal stability, and this was a perfectly legal fix. I'm curious as to what other aircraft use software for longitudinal stability similar to the MAX. The 767-2C since it has MCAS. What others, 787, A350, A320neo? Any aircraft with larger engines with more area forward of the wing, and a short moment arm to the stab, like the A319neo?

Point being, which aircraft are 'fixed with software'. And it would be interesting to see a comparison among them in longitudinal stability. If the MAX is the worst, I would be interested to know that, but don't take that as fact without any proof.


All FBW aircraft (A320 and above for Airbus, 777 and above for Boeing) fly via software. The distinction about controlling the elevator vs the trim is somewhat irrelevant. It is still software controlling the control surfaces. It isn't the use of software that is the problem. It was the flawed logic and fault tree analysis.

One could argue that if Boeing had updated the elevator feel computer to be able to handle the MCAS function that it would have been worse in the case of a failure. In that case the EFC would have kept requiring more force no matter what the trim was. Failures would probably have been much more rare since such a major change to the EFC would have gotten a lot more scrutiny in the design.
 
DenverTed
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sat May 25, 2019 4:20 pm

morrisond wrote:
Virtual737 wrote:
For those of you that are still giving Boeing's failures 3 words of narrative but the pilot's actions and the training of the airlines several thousand words:

https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/may/23/boeing-737-max-crashes-american-airlines-pilots-union-mcas

AA's pilot Union is basically slating Boeing for apportioning any blame whatsoever on the pilots due to both the initial design (or lack of) philosophy and the fact that their members had been complaining to Boeing for MONTHS.

Fair use excerpt:

"Tajer said the Ethiopian Airlines pilots did what they were instructed to do, but that Boeing’s controversial anti-stall software (MCAS) forced the plane into such an aggressive nosedive that the pilots could not recover. “They had wired that thing so that it was irrecoverable. It just blew us away,” Tajer said."


It would be a lot easier to find Tajer credible if he actually knew that they didn't follow all procedures and that it is not anti-stall software.

What is the best description? Longitudinal stability software? or Longitudinal stability at high AOA software? Always good to use the correct terminology. I called it a jackscrew on an ST article, and was corrected several times that it was a ballscrew. But both of those are specific types of something else. It is the mechanical device that controls the incidence of the stab. I believe the correct term to use is linear actuator.
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sat May 25, 2019 4:25 pm

aerolimani wrote:
planecane wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:
I think people should turn around and have another look. A lot is talked here about training issues of the pilots. My take would be that runaway trim was always difficult and chancy to recover from. The changes to the trim system from classic to NG has exasperated this problem. The saving grace for the NG was and is that runaway trim hardly ever happens, so it is not put to the test if runaway recovery really works, especially near the ground. The MAX changed that equitation, with having a new failure mode similar to runaway trim happening quite often.


I don't think the conclusion is that "runaway trim was always difficult and chancy to recover from." I think it is relatively easy to recover from if pilots are well trained to recognize it and apply the NNC. I think the issue is that, because it hardly ever, if ever, happens on the NG (or even the classic) that the training for it was put on the back burner. Also, the procedure probably hadn't been reviewed since the 1970's.

Perhaps the procedure is not so difficult, but rather, it seems that sufficiently speedy recognition is the problem. This is what can make the situation dangerous. Indeed, the FAA is not so certain that all is well.

I wish there were direct quotes, and not just paraphrasing. Nonetheless, I have confidence in the WSJ reporting. From the article linked further upthread:

Some previously developed cockpit procedures are partly based on Boeing’s earlier assumptions that pilots would respond in just a few seconds to erroneous nose-down commands, the officials said, and the FAA is evaluating how realistic that might be.

U.S. regulators are reassessing whether Boeing’s proposed software fix for the MAX—combined with potentially revised emergency procedures and checklists—would give pilots somewhat more time to react, roughly 20 seconds.

I agree and the recognition part is what I assume has been lacking in training (probably for 30 years or more). The recovery should be easy if recognized quickly. I bet if you threw me into a simulator and said, "here comes a runaway stabilizer" that I'd be able to trim to neutral control column forces and flip the cutout switches.

As a failure that can have such a disastrous conclusion, pilots of all 737s should be trained on runaway stabilizer as well as they are trained for an engine out at Vr. It should be second nature and instinctive. Even if it only happens once in 100 million flights, it should not lead to a crash since it is a known failure mode with a known recovery procedure.
 
DenverTed
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sat May 25, 2019 4:30 pm

aerolimani wrote:
planecane wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:
I think people should turn around and have another look. A lot is talked here about training issues of the pilots. My take would be that runaway trim was always difficult and chancy to recover from. The changes to the trim system from classic to NG has exasperated this problem. The saving grace for the NG was and is that runaway trim hardly ever happens, so it is not put to the test if runaway recovery really works, especially near the ground. The MAX changed that equitation, with having a new failure mode similar to runaway trim happening quite often.


I don't think the conclusion is that "runaway trim was always difficult and chancy to recover from." I think it is relatively easy to recover from if pilots are well trained to recognize it and apply the NNC. I think the issue is that, because it hardly ever, if ever, happens on the NG (or even the classic) that the training for it was put on the back burner. Also, the procedure probably hadn't been reviewed since the 1970's.

Perhaps the procedure is not so difficult, but rather, it seems that sufficiently speedy recognition is the problem. This is what can make the situation dangerous. Indeed, the FAA is not so certain that all is well.

I wish there were direct quotes, and not just paraphrasing. Nonetheless, I have confidence in the WSJ reporting. From the article linked further upthread:

Some previously developed cockpit procedures are partly based on Boeing’s earlier assumptions that pilots would respond in just a few seconds to erroneous nose-down commands, the officials said, and the FAA is evaluating how realistic that might be.

U.S. regulators are reassessing whether Boeing’s proposed software fix for the MAX—combined with potentially revised emergency procedures and checklists—would give pilots somewhat more time to react, roughly 20 seconds.

Yes, unless 'runaway' is defined, they don't get to skate by on 'any good pilot should know any runaway'
Runaway in the classic sense where the trim moves uncommanded continuously in any direction seems self explanatory.
How to recognize a mach trim runaway, what are the symptoms?
How to recognize a speed trim runaway, what are the symptoms"
How to recognize a MCAS runaway, what are the symptoms?
What's a reasonable recognition time?
 
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aerolimani
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sat May 25, 2019 4:38 pm

planecane wrote:
aerolimani wrote:
planecane wrote:

I don't think the conclusion is that "runaway trim was always difficult and chancy to recover from." I think it is relatively easy to recover from if pilots are well trained to recognize it and apply the NNC. I think the issue is that, because it hardly ever, if ever, happens on the NG (or even the classic) that the training for it was put on the back burner. Also, the procedure probably hadn't been reviewed since the 1970's.

Perhaps the procedure is not so difficult, but rather, it seems that sufficiently speedy recognition is the problem. This is what can make the situation dangerous. Indeed, the FAA is not so certain that all is well.

I wish there were direct quotes, and not just paraphrasing. Nonetheless, I have confidence in the WSJ reporting. From the article linked further upthread:

Some previously developed cockpit procedures are partly based on Boeing’s earlier assumptions that pilots would respond in just a few seconds to erroneous nose-down commands, the officials said, and the FAA is evaluating how realistic that might be.

U.S. regulators are reassessing whether Boeing’s proposed software fix for the MAX—combined with potentially revised emergency procedures and checklists—would give pilots somewhat more time to react, roughly 20 seconds.

I agree and the recognition part is what I assume has been lacking in training (probably for 30 years or more). The recovery should be easy if recognized quickly. I bet if you threw me into a simulator and said, "here comes a runaway stabilizer" that I'd be able to trim to neutral control column forces and flip the cutout switches.

As a failure that can have such a disastrous conclusion, pilots of all 737s should be trained on runaway stabilizer as well as they are trained for an engine out at Vr. It should be second nature and instinctive. Even if it only happens once in 100 million flights, it should not lead to a crash since it is a known failure mode with a known recovery procedure.

And, training begins with accurate documentation from Boeing. Elsewhere in the article, they shine a rather unflattering light on the procedural inconsistencies over the years. It is unflattering to both Boeing and the FAA.

Mr. Tajer said the existing checklist for the trim wheel procedure, which is what pilots reference and train to, might not include all the information aviators need. For example, some Boeing manuals say two pilots may be needed to manually turn the wheel. But other material provided to airlines for their manuals say merely that the wheel could be difficult to turn.

Over the years, FAA rules for approving new planes or derivatives of existing models typically barred emergency procedures requiring two pilots. “There’s signs of a potential weakness of that checklist,” Mr. Tajer said.
 
kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sat May 25, 2019 5:07 pm

cat3appr50 wrote:
My oh my, all of this discussion by the FAA and others regarding the returned to service projected date for the MAX (which BTW seems to change every time the acting FAA Administrator makes a statement in the media) and yet there is no formal projected date for when the Final Accident Reports (FAR) are going to be formally issued relative to both the LT610 and ET302 accidents. Astounding!

By projection…going to get the aircraft in the air before the flying public even has a chance to read or hear the details of the FAR’s, which includes those pesky, revealing conversations in the cockpits on the CVR, etc.

Seems the FAA (and others in regulatory responsibility around the world) may not discern the public perception issues of pushing/expediting the aircraft return to service date, while the objective details of what ACTUALLY occurred, and why, per the issuance of the formal FAR’s (who knows when they will be issued, and nobody is saying) isn’t even on the horizon.

The typical timeline for a final report is 1 year and more. Just waiting for those reports for the sake of reports will hurt Boeing big time...
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sat May 25, 2019 11:49 pm

Virtual737 wrote:
For those of you that are still giving Boeing's failures 3 words of narrative but the pilot's actions and the training of the airlines several thousand words:

Why not just post what you want to post instead of making such a lame assessment of what others post?

Everyone knows Boeing failed. Boeing admits Boeing failed. Most posters pointing out issues about the pilots and their airlines and their training openly state that Boeing failed.

Why post thousands of words to state what we already know and what Boeing admits? Why insist on an equal word count? Because it makes you feel better? Jeez...
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GalaxyFlyer
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 26, 2019 12:26 am

Trimming is about second or third one learns during pilot training. It shouldn’t require an AD to tell pilots to put the plane in trim. Trim is like managing thrust. In UPT, if you weren’t “in trim” they’d just reach under your arm and push up hard to get you to release the stick, followed by an abrupt nose going in up or down reinforcing the importance of trim. Then, you start formation and really discover the need for trim. IPs would wear out the thumb in their gloves trimming.

GF
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 26, 2019 12:28 am

DenverTed wrote:
aerolimani wrote:
planecane wrote:

I don't think the conclusion is that "runaway trim was always difficult and chancy to recover from." I think it is relatively easy to recover from if pilots are well trained to recognize it and apply the NNC. I think the issue is that, because it hardly ever, if ever, happens on the NG (or even the classic) that the training for it was put on the back burner. Also, the procedure probably hadn't been reviewed since the 1970's.

Perhaps the procedure is not so difficult, but rather, it seems that sufficiently speedy recognition is the problem. This is what can make the situation dangerous. Indeed, the FAA is not so certain that all is well.

I wish there were direct quotes, and not just paraphrasing. Nonetheless, I have confidence in the WSJ reporting. From the article linked further upthread:

Some previously developed cockpit procedures are partly based on Boeing’s earlier assumptions that pilots would respond in just a few seconds to erroneous nose-down commands, the officials said, and the FAA is evaluating how realistic that might be.

U.S. regulators are reassessing whether Boeing’s proposed software fix for the MAX—combined with potentially revised emergency procedures and checklists—would give pilots somewhat more time to react, roughly 20 seconds.

Yes, unless 'runaway' is defined, they don't get to skate by on 'any good pilot should know any runaway'
Runaway in the classic sense where the trim moves uncommanded continuously in any direction seems self explanatory.
How to recognize a mach trim runaway, what are the symptoms?
How to recognize a speed trim runaway, what are the symptoms"
How to recognize a MCAS runaway, what are the symptoms?
What's a reasonable recognition time?


The symptoms are simple—it’s out of trim and you didn’t put it out of trim.

GF
 
planecane
Posts: 991
Joined: Thu Feb 09, 2017 4:58 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 26, 2019 1:14 am

cat3appr50 wrote:
My oh my, all of this discussion by the FAA and others regarding the returned to service projected date for the MAX (which BTW seems to change every time the acting FAA Administrator makes a statement in the media) and yet there is no formal projected date for when the Final Accident Reports (FAR) are going to be formally issued relative to both the LT610 and ET302 accidents. Astounding!

By projection…going to get the aircraft in the air before the flying public even has a chance to read or hear the details of the FAR’s, which includes those pesky, revealing conversations in the cockpits on the CVR, etc.

Seems the FAA (and others in regulatory responsibility around the world) may not discern the public perception issues of pushing/expediting the aircraft return to service date, while the objective details of what ACTUALLY occurred, and why, per the issuance of the formal FAR’s (who knows when they will be issued, and nobody is saying) isn’t even on the horizon.


First of all, normally when planes crash, the model keeps flying while the public doesn't get the FAR yet.

Second, the FAA (and I'm sure other regulators) have access to the CVR (at the very least the transcripts but most likely copies of the recordings) and FDR data. They know exactly what happened. From the preliminary reports it is clear what happened. An AoA sensor failed, caused an MCAS induced runaway stabilizer and the crews were unable to recover. Since changes are being made to MCAS to prevent the same sequence of events resulting from a single AoA sensor failure and even from a dual AoA sensor failure, answering exactly what caused the AoA sensor failures is irrelevant for the return to service.

The 737 rudder reversal crashes happened in 1991 and 1996. The public was flying around in 737s for 4 years after the second similar crash with no conclusion of the cause of either.
 
zoom321
Posts: 38
Joined: Sat Mar 09, 2019 3:05 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 26, 2019 2:21 am

GalaxyFlyer wrote:
Trimming is about second or third one learns during pilot training. It shouldn’t require an AD to tell pilots to put the plane in trim. Trim is like managing thrust. In UPT, if you weren’t “in trim” they’d just reach under your arm and push up hard to get you to release the stick, followed by an abrupt nose going in up or down reinforcing the importance of trim. Then, you start formation and really discover the need for trim. IPs would wear out the thumb in their gloves trimming.

GF

That's not a problem, the problem is that the tool you're trying to use to put the plane in trim, the manual trim, is broken.
 
DenverTed
Posts: 242
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 26, 2019 3:04 am

GalaxyFlyer wrote:
DenverTed wrote:
aerolimani wrote:
Perhaps the procedure is not so difficult, but rather, it seems that sufficiently speedy recognition is the problem. This is what can make the situation dangerous. Indeed, the FAA is not so certain that all is well.

I wish there were direct quotes, and not just paraphrasing. Nonetheless, I have confidence in the WSJ reporting. From the article linked further upthread:


Yes, unless 'runaway' is defined, they don't get to skate by on 'any good pilot should know any runaway'
Runaway in the classic sense where the trim moves uncommanded continuously in any direction seems self explanatory.
How to recognize a mach trim runaway, what are the symptoms?
How to recognize a speed trim runaway, what are the symptoms"
How to recognize a MCAS runaway, what are the symptoms?
What's a reasonable recognition time?


The symptoms are simple—it’s out of trim and you didn’t put it out of trim.

GF

Old version, 737 flight crew operations manual:
Runaway Stabilizer, Condition: Uncommanded stabilizer trim movement occurs continuously.
New version:
Runaway Stabilizer, Condition: It's out of trim and you didn't put it out of trim.

Works for me.
 
mjoelnir
Posts: 8361
Joined: Sun Feb 03, 2013 11:06 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 26, 2019 7:56 am

Revelation wrote:
Virtual737 wrote:
For those of you that are still giving Boeing's failures 3 words of narrative but the pilot's actions and the training of the airlines several thousand words:

Why not just post what you want to post instead of making such a lame assessment of what others post?

Everyone knows Boeing failed. Boeing admits Boeing failed. Most posters pointing out issues about the pilots and their airlines and their training openly state that Boeing failed.

Why post thousands of words to state what we already know and what Boeing admits? Why insist on an equal word count? Because it makes you feel better? Jeez...


The discussion would be perhaps slightly different, if Boeing would actually have accepted fault, As it is, they have not. And most or a big part of the posters here are busy pointing the finger away from Boeing.
 
mjoelnir
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 26, 2019 8:06 am

planecane wrote:
cat3appr50 wrote:
My oh my, all of this discussion by the FAA and others regarding the returned to service projected date for the MAX (which BTW seems to change every time the acting FAA Administrator makes a statement in the media) and yet there is no formal projected date for when the Final Accident Reports (FAR) are going to be formally issued relative to both the LT610 and ET302 accidents. Astounding!

By projection…going to get the aircraft in the air before the flying public even has a chance to read or hear the details of the FAR’s, which includes those pesky, revealing conversations in the cockpits on the CVR, etc.

Seems the FAA (and others in regulatory responsibility around the world) may not discern the public perception issues of pushing/expediting the aircraft return to service date, while the objective details of what ACTUALLY occurred, and why, per the issuance of the formal FAR’s (who knows when they will be issued, and nobody is saying) isn’t even on the horizon.


First of all, normally when planes crash, the model keeps flying while the public doesn't get the FAR yet.

.


That seems only to be normal with the USA and FAA, in regards to keeping flying, when an unknown technical defect is assumed.
 
Noshow
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 26, 2019 8:14 am

Boeing should just tell the airline pilots how exactly the MAX behaves in slow flight and how to handle it in manual flight without MCAS in order to fly out of it manually. If pilots would know they could be prepared and handle it themselves. No MCAS needed anymore. Maybe the FAA can even give it a stick feel certification waiver if there is specific pilot training against upsets made available instead?

A "protection" that leads to two crashes does more harm than good. Take it out, train the crews instead. If pilots need a separate MAX type rating so be it. This cannot go on forever.
Last edited by Noshow on Sun May 26, 2019 8:17 am, edited 1 time in total.
 
bgm
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 26, 2019 8:14 am

Revelation wrote:
Virtual737 wrote:
For those of you that are still giving Boeing's failures 3 words of narrative but the pilot's actions and the training of the airlines several thousand words:

Why not just post what you want to post instead of making such a lame assessment of what others post?

Everyone knows Boeing failed. Boeing admits Boeing failed. Most posters pointing out issues about the pilots and their airlines and their training openly state that Boeing failed.

Why post thousands of words to state what we already know and what Boeing admits? Why insist on an equal word count? Because it makes you feel better? Jeez...


The problem is that if someone was reading this thread, all these see from certain posters is blame being assigned to pilots. The optics are terrible and makes it look like there is a strong agenda to just blame the pilots instead of Boeing, which is wrong even by your own admission.

It's just brushed under the carpet the fact that Boeing is largely responsible for this terrible event and then focus on the pilot's actions. I understand that there is a lot of American pride among certain posters, but I think it would be wise to try and grasp just how seriously Boeing screwed up, and the long term implications of the poor decisions that were made implementing MCAS, using only 1 sensor, not informing airlines & pilots etc.

Going forward Boeing is not going to get over this if they just sit in denial and keep blaming the dead pilots. They need to admit their mistakes (and I mean fully admit) and then work from there towards making the great, safe, pioneering airplanes they have always made.
████ ███ █ ███████ ██ █ █████ ██ ████ [redacted]
 
Alfons
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 26, 2019 10:04 am

bgm wrote:
I understand that there is a lot of American pride among certain posters,


I don't think it's American pride. Because if you really had pride, you'd want to take care that such causes of events could simply not happen again, so the country you live in, and the company you support, can shine again. Just to repeat ad nauseam that the other ones are bad, will repeat history (like in wars), and then your pride is worth a toilet paper.
 
RickNRoll
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 26, 2019 10:07 am

Revelation wrote:
Virtual737 wrote:
For those of you that are still giving Boeing's failures 3 words of narrative but the pilot's actions and the training of the airlines several thousand words:

Why not just post what you want to post instead of making such a lame assessment of what others post?

Everyone knows Boeing failed. Boeing admits Boeing failed. Most posters pointing out issues about the pilots and their airlines and their training openly state that Boeing failed.

Why post thousands of words to state what we already know and what Boeing admits? Why insist on an equal word count? Because it makes you feel better? Jeez...


Boeing had a chance to show their attitued at the congressional investigation. They quite readily went along the with blame the pilots line of argument.
 
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PixelFlight
Posts: 495
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 26, 2019 10:14 am

DenverTed wrote:
Old version, 737 flight crew operations manual:
Runaway Stabilizer, Condition: Uncommanded stabilizer trim movement occurs continuously.
New version:
Runaway Stabilizer, Condition: It's out of trim and you didn't put it out of trim.

Works for me.

From a safety point of view, you can't analyse only the pilots task. Each task that the pilots have to do is there because there is a cause. In the case of a NCC the cause is a risk of failure. And each risk of failure probability need to be evaluated to comply with the mandatory certification. The 737-8/9 MAX design look like there hacked around the original safety process: there observed that a NCC already exists for a similar consequence of an other risk, and concluded that the design can safely expose a new risk with similar consequence.

In addition we now discover that the NCC for the original risk was so rare that pilots are not assured to get the appropriate training to handle it. Double strikes... :crackup:
 
planecane
Posts: 991
Joined: Thu Feb 09, 2017 4:58 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 26, 2019 10:31 am

mjoelnir wrote:
planecane wrote:
cat3appr50 wrote:
My oh my, all of this discussion by the FAA and others regarding the returned to service projected date for the MAX (which BTW seems to change every time the acting FAA Administrator makes a statement in the media) and yet there is no formal projected date for when the Final Accident Reports (FAR) are going to be formally issued relative to both the LT610 and ET302 accidents. Astounding!

By projection…going to get the aircraft in the air before the flying public even has a chance to read or hear the details of the FAR’s, which includes those pesky, revealing conversations in the cockpits on the CVR, etc.

Seems the FAA (and others in regulatory responsibility around the world) may not discern the public perception issues of pushing/expediting the aircraft return to service date, while the objective details of what ACTUALLY occurred, and why, per the issuance of the formal FAR’s (who knows when they will be issued, and nobody is saying) isn’t even on the horizon.


First of all, normally when planes crash, the model keeps flying while the public doesn't get the FAR yet.

.


That seems only to be normal with the USA and FAA, in regards to keeping flying, when an unknown technical defect is assumed.


The rest of the world didn't ground the 737 due to the rudder reversal issue either.
 
silentbob
Posts: 1573
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 26, 2019 11:21 am

Noshow wrote:
Boeing should just tell the airline pilots how exactly the MAX behaves in slow flight and how to handle it in manual flight without MCAS in order to fly out of it manually. If pilots would know they could be prepared and handle it themselves. No MCAS needed anymore. Maybe the FAA can even give it a stick feel certification waiver if there is specific pilot training against upsets made available instead?

A "protection" that leads to two crashes does more harm than good. Take it out, train the crews instead. If pilots need a separate MAX type rating so be it. This cannot go on forever.


That seems logical to me, though I would think a specific audible alert or light specific to that issue might be advisable. Then again, that assumes the underlying instability MCAS was meant to address isn't so bad that it can be controlled without software.
 
morrisond
Posts: 1171
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 26, 2019 12:05 pm

PixelFlight wrote:
DenverTed wrote:
Old version, 737 flight crew operations manual:
Runaway Stabilizer, Condition: Uncommanded stabilizer trim movement occurs continuously.
New version:
Runaway Stabilizer, Condition: It's out of trim and you didn't put it out of trim.

Works for me.

From a safety point of view, you can't analyse only the pilots task. Each task that the pilots have to do is there because there is a cause. In the case of a NCC the cause is a risk of failure. And each risk of failure probability need to be evaluated to comply with the mandatory certification. The 737-8/9 MAX design look like there hacked around the original safety process: there observed that a NCC already exists for a similar consequence of an other risk, and concluded that the design can safely expose a new risk with similar consequence.

In addition we now discover that the NCC for the original risk was so rare that pilots are not assured to get the appropriate training to handle it. Double strikes... :crackup:


Pixelflight - I agree with your post - I'm just expanding on it - I think - if I understood what you are trying to say.

Yes - but they were required to have the training they needed under there Initial Type rating on the type - it's a required Memory Procedure - not one they are supposed to look up in a Manual.

It's highly likely Lionair would have made it if they had run the Runaway Stabilizer Procedure - they were never out of of trim for 22 instances of MCAS they knew how to counter MCAS's (at least the Pilot did) - all they had to do was hit the switches and turn off the wonky system - no matter what was causing it to go bonkers. Yes it didn't present classically - but sometimes you have to think outside the box - you can't write a procedure and make it a memory item for every potential failure or variation of failure.

On ET they missed many things and they (supposedly) even had a full explanation of what MCAS can do and how to handle it. I argue they were never trained on it. That makes a lot more sense than what we think was going on in the cockpit.

It is Boeing's fault that the design was not very robust and MCAS's unlimited authority was really stupid in hindsight - but its use and certification assumed that the Pilots knew the required procedures as part of their type rating. Rightly or wrongly that seems to be what Boeing and the FAA are hanging their hat on and in a strict legal sense they might be right unless someone finds a smoking gun where an internal Engineer or someone from the FAA wrote an email - saying the Single sensor solution was way more risky/more failure consequences than assumed and/or that the current state of pilot training was insufficient to handle an AOA failure that lead to an MCAS activation.

But then what Pilot standard are you certifying too?

I've asked that many times and the one's on here who keep saying it has nothing to do with the pilots - please answer this question. What type of fault/parts failure should Pilot's be expected to handle as part of their type rating?

Then in addition to getting Boeing's internal processes fixed, and the FAA overhauled the world's regulatory agencies can work on what Pilots are required to know and then all commercial designs can be redesigned to this new lower standard of pilot proficiency, or training has to be monitored to ensure it is up to the assumed standard or improved.

However It doesn't seem like I will ever win "Pilot's need more training" argument on here so here is a new one - bring on Autoflight as much as possible and install a Cirrus like CAPS (Airframe Parachute) on all future designs - so when HAL screws up there is human to pull the circuit boards and hit the Big Red Oh Sh*t button to deploy the chute.
 
kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 26, 2019 12:24 pm

morrisond wrote:
But then what Pilot standard are you certifying too?

I've asked that many times and the one's on here who keep saying it has nothing to do with the pilots - please answer this question. What type of fault/parts failure should Pilot's be expected to handle as part of their type rating?

That is part of the design, where the manufacturer identifies possible faults, their probability and severity, lays out the training curriculum.
Since MCAS failure modes wasn't properly analyzed and their probabilities and severity were not properly determined - due to lack of engineering qualification at the manufacturer; was not properly communicated, and as a result, was not properly trained.
So, of course, you may design for a genius with engineering degrees and balls of steel. Spacecraft basically have to be designed that way, so training for a single flight takes months and years.
When you aim at selling ten thousand of frames to be operated by hundreds thousands of pilots, you don't assume engineering degrees for pilots. You lay out a proper training protocol, and verify procedures - again, requires some qualification on manufacturer side..
 
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par13del
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 26, 2019 1:11 pm

bgm wrote:

The problem is that if someone was reading this thread, all these see from certain posters is blame being assigned to pilots. The optics are terrible and makes it look like there is a strong agenda to just blame the pilots instead of Boeing, which is wrong even by your own admission.

I seriously doubt that, not sure whether the software on the site exist to do a compare, but I would suspect that for every post that says the pilots are at fault their is a corresponding one saying Boeing is a murderer and has blood on its hands and persons should be in jail, the rhetoric has been chilling to say the least.
Give you some additional perspective, what is the biggest complaint about this site in the last few years, the constant A versus B battle.
So you really believe that a B a/c goes down with lives lost not once but twice and the optics on this web site will be B defenders out numbering the A prosecutors?
I don't think so and yes, I have no source or link to justify, just my years on the site, so a personal opinion.
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 26, 2019 1:22 pm

RickNRoll wrote:
Revelation wrote:
Virtual737 wrote:
For those of you that are still giving Boeing's failures 3 words of narrative but the pilot's actions and the training of the airlines several thousand words:

Why not just post what you want to post instead of making such a lame assessment of what others post?

Everyone knows Boeing failed. Boeing admits Boeing failed. Most posters pointing out issues about the pilots and their airlines and their training openly state that Boeing failed.

Why post thousands of words to state what we already know and what Boeing admits? Why insist on an equal word count? Because it makes you feel better? Jeez...

Boeing had a chance to show their attitued at the congressional investigation. They quite readily went along the with blame the pilots line of argument.

I guess Congress should have gone with the word count rule, right?

You do understand that this isn't an either/or situation and Boeing could have made mistakes and the pilots could have made mistakes too, right?

You do understand that the two accident reports will have a discussion what the pilots and their airlines could have done better, right?
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frmrCapCadet
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 26, 2019 1:48 pm

I have asked before, surely it is possible to have something between an iPad and a $15Million simulator. Flight Simulator with some used 737 hardware could be set up for specific training routines such as Runaway Stabilizer. While the first one could cost a million subsequent versions likely under a $100K. A senior pilot could both set this up, and explain its limitations. Muscle memory for running a memory procedure is a known effective training tool.
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Virtual737
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 26, 2019 1:52 pm

Revelation wrote:
Virtual737 wrote:
For those of you that are still giving Boeing's failures 3 words of narrative but the pilot's actions and the training of the airlines several thousand words:

Why not just post what you want to post instead of making such a lame assessment of what others post?


I did post what I wanted to post.

Revelation wrote:
instead of making such a lame assessment


in your opinion

Revelation wrote:
Boeing admits Boeing failed.


I must have missed that. Stating "we own it and we know how to fix it" in regards to the MCAS issues is not admitting failure, especially when it is almost immediately followed by "We've confirmed that [the MCAS system] was designed per our standards, certified per our standards, and we're confident in that process. So, it operated according to those design and certification standards. So, we haven't seen a technical slip or gap in terms of the fundamental design and certification of the approach." when asked if Boeing's design was a "mistake".

Revelation wrote:
Why insist on an equal word count?


Where did I insist on that?

Revelation wrote:
Because it makes you feel better?


I'll let you know if it happens.

Revelation wrote:
Jeez...


Something we agree on.
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 26, 2019 2:49 pm

Virtual737 wrote:
Revelation wrote:
Boeing admits Boeing failed.

I must have missed that.

Here's 15.9 million results: https://www.google.com/search?q=boeing+apology

Virtual737 wrote:
Revelation wrote:
Why insist on an equal word count?

Where did I insist on that?

For those of you that are still giving Boeing's failures 3 words of narrative but the pilot's actions and the training of the airlines several thousand words
Wake up to find out that you are the eyes of the world
The heart has its beaches, its homeland and thoughts of its own
Wake now, discover that you are the song that the morning brings
The heart has its seasons, its evenings and songs of its own
 
TheF15Ace
Posts: 279
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 26, 2019 3:12 pm

Revelation wrote:
Virtual737 wrote:
Revelation wrote:
Boeing admits Boeing failed.

I must have missed that.

Here's 15.9 million results: https://www.google.com/search?q=boeing+apology



And soon afterwards

https://www.google.com/search?q=boeing+blames+pilots
 
mjoelnir
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 26, 2019 3:17 pm

Revelation wrote:
Virtual737 wrote:
Revelation wrote:
Boeing admits Boeing failed.

I must have missed that.

Here's 15.9 million results: https://www.google.com/search?q=boeing+apology

Virtual737 wrote:
Revelation wrote:
Why insist on an equal word count?

Where did I insist on that?

For those of you that are still giving Boeing's failures 3 words of narrative but the pilot's actions and the training of the airlines several thousand words


Muilenburg said sorry, but he was very careful not to admit fault.
 
Virtual737
Posts: 587
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 26, 2019 3:23 pm

Revelation wrote:
Virtual737 wrote:
Revelation wrote:
Boeing admits Boeing failed.

I must have missed that.

Here's 15.9 million results: https://www.google.com/search?q=boeing+apology

Virtual737 wrote:
Revelation wrote:
Why insist on an equal word count?

Where did I insist on that?

For those of you that are still giving Boeing's failures 3 words of narrative but the pilot's actions and the training of the airlines several thousand words


I'm sorry, I assumed that English was your first language.

Muilenburg said that "We at Boeing are sorry for the lives lost....". I am sorry for those lost lives too, but that doesn't mean I accept any blame or fault. He then went on to say that MCAS responded to erroneous AoA inputs (note that he didn't at any point say that MCAS was to blame and had previously said that the design and certification was as per expectations and regulations. There is an important difference between what he said and what would most definitely be construed as an admission of error.

I will however concede that the media reported his statement as an acceptance of blame.

As for the "insisting on equality of word count" game... I have better things to do, so I'll refer you again to the first line of this reply.
 
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aerolimani
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 26, 2019 3:27 pm

planecane wrote:
I'd like to request that the anti-Boeing and/or anti-American posters please stop using the MCAS related MAX crashes to "get" Boeing or "put the U.S.A. in its place." I'd suggest the moderators lock this thread and start a news/facts only thread on the grounding. The only reason that I keep responding to things that I view as wrong is that I'm sure there is non-aviation media that reads this site for background information on MAX stories and I don't want them taking opinions or incorrect statements as facts and presenting them to the "average Joe" audience.

People on both sides of this issue seem to believe that they have to keep the back-and-forth going, with some altruistic sense that the “outside world” needs to be presented with a balanced (in their view) accounting of the situation.

Forget the outside world. Have a meaningful discussion between each other. Nothing sounds more like you have a biased agenda than when you say you’re doing this because of how the “outside world” might perceive the situation, were they to consult this thread for information.
 
IADFCO
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 26, 2019 3:55 pm

silentbob wrote:
Noshow wrote:
Boeing should just tell the airline pilots how exactly the MAX behaves in slow flight and how to handle it in manual flight without MCAS in order to fly out of it manually. If pilots would know they could be prepared and handle it themselves. No MCAS needed anymore. Maybe the FAA can even give it a stick feel certification waiver if there is specific pilot training against upsets made available instead?

A "protection" that leads to two crashes does more harm than good. Take it out, train the crews instead. If pilots need a separate MAX type rating so be it. This cannot go on forever.


That seems logical to me, though I would think a specific audible alert or light specific to that issue might be advisable. Then again, that assumes the underlying instability MCAS was meant to address isn't so bad that it can be controlled without software.


furthermore, MCAS 2.0 will turn itself off *by design* after activating once. So, after the "protection" is needed once, it will not be available again (not clear for how long).
 
GalaxyFlyer
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 26, 2019 4:00 pm

zoom321 wrote:
GalaxyFlyer wrote:
Trimming is about second or third one learns during pilot training. It shouldn’t require an AD to tell pilots to put the plane in trim. Trim is like managing thrust. In UPT, if you weren’t “in trim” they’d just reach under your arm and push up hard to get you to release the stick, followed by an abrupt nose going in up or down reinforcing the importance of trim. Then, you start formation and really discover the need for trim. IPs would wear out the thumb in their gloves trimming.

GF

That's not a problem, the problem is that the tool you're trying to use to put the plane in trim, the manual trim, is broken.


But, the manual ELECTRIC trim (yoke switches) was not broken and the FDR traces show functional inputs that were too brief to position the stab into a trimmed condition. Pilots were simply not aggressive enough and the the stab get so far out of position that the wheels wouldn’t work under the aerodynamic loads. If your flight SOP is autopilot ON at 400’ and OFF at 200’ on an ILS (an all too frequent training or laziness outcome), you’ll use the trim switches to the degree necessary during various speed and configuration changes. In fact, you probably get away never trimming. Trimming is not Chuck Yeager skills, either.

GF
Last edited by GalaxyFlyer on Sun May 26, 2019 4:01 pm, edited 1 time in total.
 
planecane
Posts: 991
Joined: Thu Feb 09, 2017 4:58 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 26, 2019 4:10 pm

GalaxyFlyer wrote:
zoom321 wrote:
GalaxyFlyer wrote:
Trimming is about second or third one learns during pilot training. It shouldn’t require an AD to tell pilots to put the plane in trim. Trim is like managing thrust. In UPT, if you weren’t “in trim” they’d just reach under your arm and push up hard to get you to release the stick, followed by an abrupt nose going in up or down reinforcing the importance of trim. Then, you start formation and really discover the need for trim. IPs would wear out the thumb in their gloves trimming.

GF

That's not a problem, the problem is that the tool you're trying to use to put the plane in trim, the manual trim, is broken.


But, the manual ELECTRIC trim (yoke switches) was not broken and the FDR traces show functional inputs that were too brief to position the stab into a trimmed condition. Pilots were simply not aggressive enough and the the stab get so far out of position that the wheels wouldn’t work under the aerodynamic loads. If your flight SOP is autopilot ON at 400’ and OFF at 200’ on an ILS (an all too frequent training or laziness outcome), you’ll use the trim switches to the degree necessary during various speed and configuration changes. In fact, you probably get away never trimming. Trimming is not Chuck Yeager skills, either.

GF


This is the most perplexing thing to me about the Lion Air crash. The ET crash I can understand a misunderstanding of the recovery procedure leading to cutting off electric trim before getting back in trim. Lion Air is perplexing to me. A few years ago, I had a session in a 737-800 simulator as a birthday present. I have never flown an aircraft in my life. The session was with a real flight instructor. The very first thing he taught me was follow the flight director and trim out the control column forces. It was very easy and natural. Pull back or push forward on the column and then hit the switch to trim out the forces.

Even if you have no idea why it is happening, if you are flying and every 5 seconds after you trim, there is more force required to maintain level flight, why wouldn't you just keep trimming to balance the forces? Forget about any procedure or recognizing runaway or whatever. The electric trim worked. They used it 22 time to counteract MCAS. What would make a pilot NOT trim out the forces? If they had just kept flying "normally" and trimming with the thumb switch, they would have reached a point where they deployed the flaps and it would have stopped happening. It's not like the thumb switch takes any phycial effort.
 
DenverTed
Posts: 242
Joined: Wed Mar 27, 2019 11:12 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 26, 2019 5:12 pm

planecane wrote:
GalaxyFlyer wrote:
zoom321 wrote:
That's not a problem, the problem is that the tool you're trying to use to put the plane in trim, the manual trim, is broken.


But, the manual ELECTRIC trim (yoke switches) was not broken and the FDR traces show functional inputs that were too brief to position the stab into a trimmed condition. Pilots were simply not aggressive enough and the the stab get so far out of position that the wheels wouldn’t work under the aerodynamic loads. If your flight SOP is autopilot ON at 400’ and OFF at 200’ on an ILS (an all too frequent training or laziness outcome), you’ll use the trim switches to the degree necessary during various speed and configuration changes. In fact, you probably get away never trimming. Trimming is not Chuck Yeager skills, either.

GF


This is the most perplexing thing to me about the Lion Air crash. The ET crash I can understand a misunderstanding of the recovery procedure leading to cutting off electric trim before getting back in trim. Lion Air is perplexing to me. A few years ago, I had a session in a 737-800 simulator as a birthday present. I have never flown an aircraft in my life. The session was with a real flight instructor. The very first thing he taught me was follow the flight director and trim out the control column forces. It was very easy and natural. Pull back or push forward on the column and then hit the switch to trim out the forces.

Even if you have no idea why it is happening, if you are flying and every 5 seconds after you trim, there is more force required to maintain level flight, why wouldn't you just keep trimming to balance the forces? Forget about any procedure or recognizing runaway or whatever. The electric trim worked. They used it 22 time to counteract MCAS. What would make a pilot NOT trim out the forces? If they had just kept flying "normally" and trimming with the thumb switch, they would have reached a point where they deployed the flaps and it would have stopped happening. It's not like the thumb switch takes any phycial effort.

If it were two U.S. crashes, the same question would be there, why didn't they just use the toggle switch under their thumb? I think that's why there was no grounding after LionAir. Once the problem was known, the solution was very simple. If nose down, electric trim toggle switch up.
 
DenverTed
Posts: 242
Joined: Wed Mar 27, 2019 11:12 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 26, 2019 5:26 pm

Virtual737 wrote:
I must have missed that. Stating "we own it and we know how to fix it" in regards to the MCAS issues is not admitting failure, especially when it is almost immediately followed by "We've confirmed that [the MCAS system] was designed per our standards, certified per our standards, and we're confident in that process. So, it operated according to those design and certification standards. So, we haven't seen a technical slip or gap in terms of the fundamental design and certification of the approach." when asked if Boeing's design was a "mistake".


The design team shouldn't have had the experience and foresight to realize that having unlimited repetitions of MCAS and MCAS working in the range of low nose up or nose down incidence on the stabilizer where it was not needed could be problematic? I don't buy that for a second.

Boeing can say what they want in public. If this mistake costs them 5B, I believe they will analyze their process to make sure they close the gap.
 
GalaxyFlyer
Posts: 3352
Joined: Fri Jan 01, 2016 4:44 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 26, 2019 5:29 pm

Of course, that would be the question. As I’ve said, the pilots did NOT cause the crash but might, and arguably, should have been able to contain both the pitch and pitch excursions. That’s a difficult question that I’d hope would be fully explored, but I’m not optimistic. The drive toward automation blinkers many from that issue.

I’d guess, but no empirical evidence, that Americans do, or have in my experience, hand fly more, especially the currently older generation did. My last mob hand flew thru the teens or low 20s and usually had the plane trimmed up hands off, centered on the FD bars before engaging the autopilot. It was a matter of pride that autopilot engagement was unfelt.

GF
 
DenverTed
Posts: 242
Joined: Wed Mar 27, 2019 11:12 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 26, 2019 5:47 pm

frmrCapCadet wrote:
I have asked before, surely it is possible to have something between an iPad and a $15Million simulator. Flight Simulator with some used 737 hardware could be set up for specific training routines such as Runaway Stabilizer. While the first one could cost a million subsequent versions likely under a $100K. A senior pilot could both set this up, and explain its limitations. Muscle memory for running a memory procedure is a known effective training tool.

Personally I think the more training is theater. They fixed it, there's not much more to it. I'm ready to fly on a MAX no problem.
I just don't understand the resistance to low cost transparent incremental improvement of safety. Boeing's design process for MCAS should be as transparent as the pilot's actions. Where did they error, how will they improve in the future?
How expensive is it to change words? Shouldn't runaway trim now be replaced with malfunctioning trim? Shouldn't "continuous" be replaced with continuous or intermittent? Shouldn't the runaway trim procedure now say "use electric trim to neutralize column forces"

Should Boeing restore the AutoPilot trim cutout switch that was on the NG? What if the Mach trim or speed trim goes haywire?
When they removed it, why not just have one switch? Clean and logical or cluttered and inexplicable design?

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