Lufthansa
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Tue Jun 11, 2019 5:01 pm

Revelation wrote:
snowkarl wrote:
Revelation wrote:
It's about the lift the MAX's nacelles generate at high angle of attack due to complex airflow between nacelle, pylon and wing, rather than "engine too big".

Obviously. But this is pedantry. The only reason the MAX has a tendancy to pitch town due to the high aoa is because they wanted to mount more efficient engines in a frame that was in fact too small.

Complexity is the opposite of pedantry.

You are presuming facts not in evidence, such as there could have been a way to mount the LEAP onto 737 and not need MCAS, such as a different nacelle or pylon design, yet they reached for MCAS rather than try other nacelle or pylon designs when they encountered the pitch up (not down) issue because it appeared to be the quickest way forward.

Engineering is all about trade offs. You don't get to build an all new plane just because integrating a new engine is complicated, because building an all new airplane comes with side effects like losing much of your market share and customer base due to the time needed to develop an all new airplane. Of course another thing you don't get to do is undersell the complexity of the engine integration and botch the implementation.



Which of course did wonderful for the MD-90 and MD-11 sales. The A320s results, despite using what's basically the same engine speaks for itself.
Just like Airbus didn't role out a 3rd generation of the A300 and produced the A330 instead, Boeing needs to do something similar.
a new centre section and landing gear allowing a larger ground clearance, removing all the 1960s systems, full fly by wire and re-establishing the centre of
gravity to eliminate the need for MCARS. The rest of the stuff they could probably use from the existing 737. Just the internal parts of flight controls etc
need to be modernised more. This may or may not involve a new wing depending exactly what they plan to do.
 
sillystrings
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Tue Jun 11, 2019 5:08 pm

Revelation wrote:
Interested wrote:
Do we really need trade offs that reduce safety and end up killing people.

If somebody intended to reduce safety and intended to kill people you might have a point.

They didn't, so you don't.

Now, back on to my ignore list you go.

There is quite a difference between "end up killing people" and "intended to kill people".
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Tue Jun 11, 2019 5:10 pm

DenverTed wrote:
What's the new MCAS input, just AOA based on two sensors instead of one? Or is speed or something else now an input?


I'm pretty sure speed was always an input. That's how the algorithm would know what AoA to trigger at. The issue is that the failed sensors failed at an AoA reading that would trigger at any speed.
 
OldAeroGuy
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Tue Jun 11, 2019 5:17 pm

seb76 wrote:
What is (conveniently?) missing in this comparison is the initial size of the JT8D had when the fuselage was designed compared to the LEAP 1B of today...
it was 48" and the same fuselage

LEAP 1B Fan/Fuselage Width: 46.7%
JT8D Fan/Fuselage Width: 32,5%

Still convinced that it has a neglectible influence on the aerodynamics of the airframe?


No, what I really think is that there is a poor correlation between fan diameter/fuselage diameter ratio and overall configuration aerodynamic impacts.

If there was a significant relationship, the A320neo would really be in trouble, particularly with the geared Pratts..
Airplane design is easy, the difficulty is getting them to fly - Barnes Wallis
 
AABusDrvr
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Tue Jun 11, 2019 6:09 pm

PW100 wrote:
AABusDrvr wrote:
PW100 wrote:
[
Does the 737 (MAX) have an AOA DISAGREE NNC?

Yes, the MAX has an AOA DISAGREE NNC. It’s exactly the same as the procedure for the NG.

OK Thanks.
Is that also a memory item?



That would be operator/regulator specific, but I highly doubt it's a memory item. At my airline we have zero memory QRH/NNC procedures on the 737.
 
Interested
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Tue Jun 11, 2019 6:18 pm

sillystrings wrote:
Revelation wrote:
Interested wrote:
Do we really need trade offs that reduce safety and end up killing people.

If somebody intended to reduce safety and intended to kill people you might have a point.

They didn't, so you don't.

Now, back on to my ignore list you go.

There is quite a difference between "end up killing people" and "intended to kill people".


Yes lack of class to twist words like that to make a point revelation. No need. Not for someone as bright as you are.
 
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Revelation
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Tue Jun 11, 2019 6:30 pm

sillystrings wrote:
Revelation wrote:
Interested wrote:
Do we really need trade offs that reduce safety and end up killing people.

If somebody intended to reduce safety and intended to kill people you might have a point.

They didn't, so you don't.

Now, back on to my ignore list you go.

There is quite a difference between "end up killing people" and "intended to kill people".

Context, my friend.

They are different in isolation but not different after you factor in the pre-condition "trade off that reduce safety".
Wake up to find out that you are the eyes of the world
The heart has its beaches, its homeland and thoughts of its own
Wake now, discover that you are the song that the morning brings
The heart has its seasons, its evenings and songs of its own
 
AirBoat
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Tue Jun 11, 2019 7:03 pm

Can anyone confirm when MCAS was implemented.
I got the idea the light control forces were noticed during flight testing.
This is a bit late in the day. It leaves only one option. A software fix.
Any structural or aero fix would have taken years to do.
As for the higher mounted engine causing more pitch up. Not logical, it should cause less pitch up , unless the new engine has much more thrust.
 
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7BOEING7
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Tue Jun 11, 2019 7:22 pm

PW100 wrote:
AABusDrvr wrote:
Yes, the MAX has an AOA DISAGREE NNC. It’s exactly the same as the procedure for the NG.

OK Thanks.
Is that also a memory item?


The AOA DISAGREE NNC has no memory items -- it just advises that you may have an IAS DISGAREE alert and/or an ALT DISAGREE alert as well as airspeed and/or altitude errors. The IAS DISAGREE NNC sends you to the Airspeed Unreliable NNC which has memory items. I guess ideally facing a lone stick shaker and one or more of the alerts displayed on the PFD rather than paging thru the QRH a crew would immediately execute the Airspeed Unreliable NNC.


AABusDrvr wrote:
That would be operator/regulator specific, but I highly doubt it's a memory item. At my airline we have zero memory QRH/NNC procedures on the 737.


I'll start with OMG. So if you have a rapid depressurization you pull out the QRH and do a "read and do"? Or am I misunderstanding what you mean by "zero memory"?
 
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PixelFlight
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Tue Jun 11, 2019 7:34 pm

OldAeroGuy wrote:
seb76 wrote:
What is (conveniently?) missing in this comparison is the initial size of the JT8D had when the fuselage was designed compared to the LEAP 1B of today...
it was 48" and the same fuselage

LEAP 1B Fan/Fuselage Width: 46.7%
JT8D Fan/Fuselage Width: 32,5%

Still convinced that it has a neglectible influence on the aerodynamics of the airframe?


No, what I really think is that there is a poor correlation between fan diameter/fuselage diameter ratio and overall configuration aerodynamic impacts.

If there was a significant relationship, the A320neo would really be in trouble, particularly with the geared Pratts..

You are certainly right. I think that almost any engine size could be mounted ideally on almost any fuselage/wings while not on the ground. The 737 MAX issue is that the ground clearance and the "same type rating" design goal forced Boeing to mount the engine more higher and forward compared to an ideal position.
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Tue Jun 11, 2019 7:41 pm

AirBoat wrote:
Can anyone confirm when MCAS was implemented.
I got the idea the light control forces were noticed during flight testing.
This is a bit late in the day. It leaves only one option. A software fix.
Any structural or aero fix would have taken years to do.
As for the higher mounted engine causing more pitch up. Not logical, it should cause less pitch up , unless the new engine has much more thrust.

I don't know when but it was prior to flight testing. Trim rate was increased and activation parameters were expanded during flight testing (which led to removal of g force sensor input as a second sensor).
 
strfyr51
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Tue Jun 11, 2019 8:00 pm

planecane wrote:
DenverTed wrote:
What's the new MCAS input, just AOA based on two sensors instead of one? Or is speed or something else now an input?


I'm pretty sure speed was always an input. That's how the algorithm would know what AoA to trigger at. The issue is that the failed sensors failed at an AoA reading that would trigger at any speed.

That's the problem The Single AOA sensor was the input to the MCAS, and lo and Behold? the AOA indication is now an "option". when is should be Standard Equipment.
I believe the Pilots who crashed would have had a fighting chance had the indication been here so they would know what the problem WAS, and what was amiss. No system No matter how High Tech is infallible..
 
AirBoat
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Tue Jun 11, 2019 8:04 pm

Ok so possibly the aero wind tunnel model testing and the computer cfd modelling showed up an anomaly and they hoped for the best.

From the above effects of MCAS one item that is being ignored is: it leads to increasing control forces ,i.e. it trims nose down and forces the elevator down as well and increases yoke forces.
When the electric trim is disabled, does the mcas effect on the yoke also get cancelled? If not then the pilots are still passengers.
 
XRAYretired
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Tue Jun 11, 2019 8:06 pm

planecane wrote:
AirBoat wrote:
Can anyone confirm when MCAS was implemented.
I got the idea the light control forces were noticed during flight testing.
This is a bit late in the day. It leaves only one option. A software fix.
Any structural or aero fix would have taken years to do.
As for the higher mounted engine causing more pitch up. Not logical, it should cause less pitch up , unless the new engine has much more thrust.

I don't know when but it was prior to flight testing. Trim rate was increased and activation parameters were expanded during flight testing (which led to removal of g force sensor input as a second sensor).

According to NYT.

In 2012, the chief test pilot for the Max had a problem.
During the early development of the 737 Max, the pilot, Ray Craig, a silver-haired retired Navy airman, was trying out high-speed situations on a flight simulator, like maneuvers to avoid an obstacle or to escape a powerful vortex from another plane...…….would have preferred an aerodynamic fix such as vortex generators, thin fins on the wings. But engineers who tested the Max design in a wind tunnel weren’t convinced they would work.....
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/01/busi ... crash.html
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Tue Jun 11, 2019 8:23 pm

XRAYretired wrote:
planecane wrote:
AirBoat wrote:
Can anyone confirm when MCAS was implemented.
I got the idea the light control forces were noticed during flight testing.
This is a bit late in the day. It leaves only one option. A software fix.
Any structural or aero fix would have taken years to do.
As for the higher mounted engine causing more pitch up. Not logical, it should cause less pitch up , unless the new engine has much more thrust.

I don't know when but it was prior to flight testing. Trim rate was increased and activation parameters were expanded during flight testing (which led to removal of g force sensor input as a second sensor).

According to NYT.

In 2012, the chief test pilot for the Max had a problem.
During the early development of the 737 Max, the pilot, Ray Craig, a silver-haired retired Navy airman, was trying out high-speed situations on a flight simulator, like maneuvers to avoid an obstacle or to escape a powerful vortex from another plane...…….would have preferred an aerodynamic fix such as vortex generators, thin fins on the wings. But engineers who tested the Max design in a wind tunnel weren’t convinced they would work.....
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/01/busi ... crash.html


So years before flight testing.
 
AABusDrvr
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Tue Jun 11, 2019 8:42 pm

7BOEING7 wrote:
PW100 wrote:
AABusDrvr wrote:
Yes, the MAX has an AOA DISAGREE NNC. It’s exactly the same as the procedure for the NG.

OK Thanks.
Is that also a memory item?


The AOA DISAGREE NNC has no memory items -- it just advises that you may have an IAS DISGAREE alert and/or an ALT DISAGREE alert as well as airspeed and/or altitude errors. The IAS DISAGREE NNC sends you to the Airspeed Unreliable NNC which has memory items. I guess ideally facing a lone stick shaker and one or more of the alerts displayed on the PFD rather than paging thru the QRH a crew would immediately execute the Airspeed Unreliable NNC.


AABusDrvr wrote:
That would be operator/regulator specific, but I highly doubt it's a memory item. At my airline we have zero memory QRH/NNC procedures on the 737.


I'll start with OMG. So if you have a rapid depressurization you pull out the QRH and do a "read and do"? Or am I misunderstanding what you mean by "zero memory"?


There are some things we are expected to know, like to don the oxygen masks for a loss of pressurization, or cabin smoke/fumes. But after that, we reference a laminated card in the cockpit, with the immediate action items on it. Once those are complete, we reference the QRH.

We have no formal "memory items" or red box items we are required to know.

In your example, for CABIN ALTITUDE WARNING or rapid depressurization, we would don the O2 masks, select 100%, and establish crew communications (those things fall under "basic pilot stuff"). Then the PM will pull out the reference card, and check if the approiate checklist is on the card or not. If it's on the card, we read and do it from there. At the end of that procedure, we go to the QRH, and start into it where the reference card left off.

Less chances to screw something up that way.
 
smartplane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Tue Jun 11, 2019 9:04 pm

PW100 wrote:
Interested wrote:
I'm confused now?? Please educate me some more?
You told us everything Boeing do is validated by FAA??

Correct. When Boeing implements this change, it needs to be validated by FAA (or delegated authority). Every change, from the most "simple" bolt/washer/nut, to any piece of software, even seat fabric change, must be validated and approved by the relevant authorities (FAA for Boeing, EASA for Airbus).


Interested wrote:
How can such a basic error like this happen in the first place?

Good question. Perhaps it was a function of insufficient oversight, too much delegated authority combined with poor reporting channels. I'm sure the FAA will have a good look at this. Because, while I remain convinced the issue itself is overblown, FAA definitely will want to know how this was not caught in the various levels of oversight.


Interested wrote:
Why didn't Boeing tell anybody about this mistake they had made until AFTER the first crash?

Perhaps because of the interaction with MCAS, and MCAS being in the centre focus of the investigation.
Safety critical findings must be reported immediately to the authorities. Non-safety critical issues are usually not reported immediately, but will find their way to the authorities when the changes is proposed for certification.
Apparently Boeing found this non-safety critical. Which in itself is not strange. MCAS 1.0 on the other hand . . .



Interested wrote:
If there is moe shocking stuff I've not read about yet then Boeing must be even worse than I could ever imagine possible?

And it is my believe that this question is the reason why the un-grounding is taking so long. If the piss poor MCAS was not caught by the certification checks and balances, what else might have escaped?
Can other authorities (EASA, TCCA, CAAC, etc) trust FAA certification process when it wasn't able to detect something so fundamentally wrong as MCAS?
And to a lesser extent, I'll happily give you that, the AoA issue. If at all, the AoA issue increases the doubts these agencies have grown against FAA and Boeing. As an old Dutch saying goes: Trust arrives by foot, leaves by horse. I guess the meaning of that is rather obvious.

The highest level FAA compliance maturity is accorded to Boeing, which completely underpins the level of self-approval for the MAX and X, is there should be three internal checks and balances, not one. A Boeing insider on here has confirmed one person check may be an issue.

It is this trail that is being followed by the FAA, NTSB and FBI, and is the current focus of interviews.
 
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7BOEING7
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Tue Jun 11, 2019 9:09 pm

AirBoat wrote:
From the above effects of MCAS one item that is being ignored is: it leads to increasing control forces ,i.e. it trims nose down and forces the elevator down as well and increases yoke forces.
When the electric trim is disabled, does the mcas effect on the yoke also get cancelled? If not then the pilots are still passengers.


MCAS trims the stabilizer nose down, which can be overcome by the pilot trimming nose up. It does not force the elevator down or increase the yoke forces. When the electric trim is disabled MCAS can no longer trim the stabilizer nose down.
 
SEU
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Tue Jun 11, 2019 9:17 pm

7BOEING7 wrote:
AirBoat wrote:
From the above effects of MCAS one item that is being ignored is: it leads to increasing control forces ,i.e. it trims nose down and forces the elevator down as well and increases yoke forces.
When the electric trim is disabled, does the mcas effect on the yoke also get cancelled? If not then the pilots are still passengers.


MCAS trims the stabilizer nose down, which can be overcome by the pilot trimming nose up. It does not force the elevator down or increase the yoke forces. When the electric trim is disabled MCAS can no longer trim the stabilizer nose down.


There was nothing telling the pilots what it was as the light wasnt there, by the time they flicked through 200 odd pages to find the answer to something that even ETs MAX Simulator (which boeing has now admitted didnt act like a MAX in flight) couldnt teach them, they were dead.
 
h1fl1er
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Tue Jun 11, 2019 9:22 pm

AirBoat wrote:
Can anyone confirm when MCAS was implemented.
I got the idea the light control forces were noticed during flight testing.
This is a bit late in the day. It leaves only one option. A software fix.
Any structural or aero fix would have taken years to do.
As for the higher mounted engine causing more pitch up. Not logical, it should cause less pitch up , unless the new engine has much more thrust.


no...was years earlier. MCAS is simply intended to preserve control force gradient in one tiny portion of the flight envelope. it was a system quite literally never really intended to ever need to go active. it's unclear whether the NG could be certified under the version of the FARs that mandates the current force gradient. 767s for the .mil have the mcas as well.

these flights crashed because of a software glitch; it's literally that simple, combined with grossly inexperienced pilots

There was nothing telling the pilots what it was as the light wasnt there, by the time they flicked through 200 odd pages to find the answer to something that even ETs MAX Simulator (which boeing has now admitted didnt act like a MAX in flight) couldnt teach them, they were dead.


not exactly. on the doomed lion flight, the captain kept the plaine in the air using electric trim switches over and over again. he handed the plane to the copilot who for reasons that nobody will ever know, absolutely failed to do the same

et's pilots it doesn't matter how much sim time if you let your speed run away from you. these crashes are similar to af447 where an inexperienced pilot was abruptly handed a plane in trying circumstances and made a series of fatal errors. nobody can explain why the French guy pulled the stick continuously up into a stall.he had the altimeter scrolling on his MFD right in front of his face, along with attitude indicators. everything was there to tell him he was going wrong but still he did it. if the captain of lion and 447 were at the helm, everyone lives

the truth exposed here is that sudden automation failures on commercial planes frequently result in craters
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Tue Jun 11, 2019 9:29 pm

h1fl1er wrote:
AirBoat wrote:
Can anyone confirm when MCAS was implemented.
I got the idea the light control forces were noticed during flight testing.
This is a bit late in the day. It leaves only one option. A software fix.
Any structural or aero fix would have taken years to do.
As for the higher mounted engine causing more pitch up. Not logical, it should cause less pitch up , unless the new engine has much more thrust.


no...was years earlier. MCAS is simply intended to preserve control force gradient in one tiny portion of the flight envelope. it was a system quite literally never really intended to ever need to go active. it's unclear whether the NG could be certified under the version of the FARs that mandates the current force gradient. 767s for the .mil have the mcas as well.

these flights crashed because of a software glitch; it's literally that simple, combined with grossly inexperienced pilots


Isn't the military 767 MCAS just for refueling operations?
 
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7BOEING7
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Tue Jun 11, 2019 9:30 pm

strfyr51 wrote:
That's the problem The Single AOA sensor was the input to the MCAS, and lo and Behold? the AOA indication is now an "option". when is should be Standard Equipment
I believe the Pilots who crashed would have had a fighting chance had the indication been here so they would know what the problem WAS, and what was amiss. No system No matter how High Tech is infallible..


The AOA DISAGREE alert would have been no use to the Lion Air crew. They had a fighting chance; they were “in control” of the airplane for several minutes and 1) didn't turn off a system that was continuing to malfunction, 2) the Captain turned control over to the copilot apparently without advising him of the requirement to continuously trim nose up.

If the ET crew had been intimately familiar with the bulletin which indicated they did not have the alert they may have been able to save the airplane but it appears they were the proverbial deer in the headlights before MCAS was even activated.
 
beechnut
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Tue Jun 11, 2019 9:57 pm

h1fl1er wrote:
et's pilots it doesn't matter how much sim time if you let your speed run away from you.


I think this is being grossly unfair to the ET pilots. They likely had to contend with rapidly increasing airspeed and stick forces when MCAS activated with only a few thousand feet of altitude in which to sort out what was happening.

The AF 447 pilots let it go all the way down from FL370 or something, all the way to sea level, without recognizing that they were stalled.

Beech
 
snowkarl
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Tue Jun 11, 2019 10:04 pm

h1fl1er wrote:
AirBoat wrote:
Can anyone confirm when MCAS was implemented.
I got the idea the light control forces were noticed during flight testing.
This is a bit late in the day. It leaves only one option. A software fix.
Any structural or aero fix would have taken years to do.
As for the higher mounted engine causing more pitch up. Not logical, it should cause less pitch up , unless the new engine has much more thrust.


no...was years earlier. MCAS is simply intended to preserve control force gradient in one tiny portion of the flight envelope. it was a system quite literally never really intended to ever need to go active. it's unclear whether the NG could be certified under the version of the FARs that mandates the current force gradient. 767s for the .mil have the mcas as well.

these flights crashed because of a software glitch; it's literally that simple, combined with grossly inexperienced pilots

There was nothing telling the pilots what it was as the light wasnt there, by the time they flicked through 200 odd pages to find the answer to something that even ETs MAX Simulator (which boeing has now admitted didnt act like a MAX in flight) couldnt teach them, they were dead.


not exactly. on the doomed lion flight, the captain kept the plaine in the air using electric trim switches over and over again. he handed the plane to the copilot who for reasons that nobody will ever know, absolutely failed to do the same

et's pilots it doesn't matter how much sim time if you let your speed run away from you. these crashes are similar to af447 where an inexperienced pilot was abruptly handed a plane in trying circumstances and made a series of fatal errors. nobody can explain why the French guy pulled the stick continuously up into a stall.he had the altimeter scrolling on his MFD right in front of his face, along with attitude indicators. everything was there to tell him he was going wrong but still he did it. if the captain of lion and 447 were at the helm, everyone lives

the truth exposed here is that sudden automation failures on commercial planes frequently result in craters


Again blaming 'inexperienced' pilots.. on the ET flight the first officer with less than 50% of the hours required to fly a 737 in the US actually recognized the problem faster than the veteran pilot with 5000+ hours. It had nothing to do with experience but the extreme negligence on Boeing's part not to rectify their mistake immediately after the Lion crash as well and not even sufficiently brief pilots and airlines on the actual dangers the trim deficiencies could actually create. The fact that people are still on this line of argumentation is simply astonishing because there is not a single credible person in the entire airline world making this argument - only on anonymous forums are people doing so - which is very telling.

If pilots are put into positions where numerous alerts are going off with seemingly contradictory messages and you tell them to solve an issue they've not even been described, let alone trained in, it's fairly obvious there will be crashes due to the obviously unacceptable and dangerous position created for the crews. Not to mention pilots in this very thread are not even in agreement on how they should have acted months after the accident, which suggests the 'pilot error' discourse isn't quite as simple and absolving of Boeing as some would suggest.

Moreover, a glitch is in no way, shape or form an accurate way to describe MCAS or the software that caused the crashes. A glitch is simply a code or software error where an action is performed contrary to its designed purpose - the MAX software was designed to act exactly as it acted. Hence it's not a glitch but a creative, engineering mistake which should never ever have passed preliminary testing, let alone complete certification and review.
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Tue Jun 11, 2019 11:02 pm

snowkarl wrote:
h1fl1er wrote:
AirBoat wrote:
Can anyone confirm when MCAS was implemented.
I got the idea the light control forces were noticed during flight testing.
This is a bit late in the day. It leaves only one option. A software fix.
Any structural or aero fix would have taken years to do.
As for the higher mounted engine causing more pitch up. Not logical, it should cause less pitch up , unless the new engine has much more thrust.


no...was years earlier. MCAS is simply intended to preserve control force gradient in one tiny portion of the flight envelope. it was a system quite literally never really intended to ever need to go active. it's unclear whether the NG could be certified under the version of the FARs that mandates the current force gradient. 767s for the .mil have the mcas as well.

these flights crashed because of a software glitch; it's literally that simple, combined with grossly inexperienced pilots

There was nothing telling the pilots what it was as the light wasnt there, by the time they flicked through 200 odd pages to find the answer to something that even ETs MAX Simulator (which boeing has now admitted didnt act like a MAX in flight) couldnt teach them, they were dead.


not exactly. on the doomed lion flight, the captain kept the plaine in the air using electric trim switches over and over again. he handed the plane to the copilot who for reasons that nobody will ever know, absolutely failed to do the same

et's pilots it doesn't matter how much sim time if you let your speed run away from you. these crashes are similar to af447 where an inexperienced pilot was abruptly handed a plane in trying circumstances and made a series of fatal errors. nobody can explain why the French guy pulled the stick continuously up into a stall.he had the altimeter scrolling on his MFD right in front of his face, along with attitude indicators. everything was there to tell him he was going wrong but still he did it. if the captain of lion and 447 were at the helm, everyone lives

the truth exposed here is that sudden automation failures on commercial planes frequently result in craters


Again blaming 'inexperienced' pilots.. on the ET flight the first officer with less than 50% of the hours required to fly a 737 in the US actually recognized the problem faster than the veteran pilot with 5000+ hours. It had nothing to do with experience but the extreme negligence on Boeing's part not to rectify their mistake immediately after the Lion crash as well and not even sufficiently brief pilots and airlines on the actual dangers the trim deficiencies could actually create. The fact that people are still on this line of argumentation is simply astonishing because there is not a single credible person in the entire airline world making this argument - only on anonymous forums are people doing so - which is very telling.

If pilots are put into positions where numerous alerts are going off with seemingly contradictory messages and you tell them to solve an issue they've not even been described, let alone trained in, it's fairly obvious there will be crashes due to the obviously unacceptable and dangerous position created for the crews. Not to mention pilots in this very thread are not even in agreement on how they should have acted months after the accident, which suggests the 'pilot error' discourse isn't quite as simple and absolving of Boeing as some would suggest.

Moreover, a glitch is in no way, shape or form an accurate way to describe MCAS or the software that caused the crashes. A glitch is simply a code or software error where an action is performed contrary to its designed purpose - the MAX software was designed to act exactly as it acted. Hence it's not a glitch but a creative, engineering mistake which should never ever have passed preliminary testing, let alone complete certification and review.


You need to go read the other forum that is full of 737 pilots and the posts by Captains on this thread. They all agreed that Boeing really screwed up but they also agree at least the ET crew made major mistakes.

Look at the full report on ET409 if you would like a non-Ethiopian view on the outcome of ET's training system. A pilot who went through training at about the same time as the ET302 Captain.
 
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aerolimani
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Tue Jun 11, 2019 11:09 pm

AABusDrvr wrote:
7BOEING7 wrote:
PW100 wrote:
OK Thanks.
Is that also a memory item?


The AOA DISAGREE NNC has no memory items -- it just advises that you may have an IAS DISGAREE alert and/or an ALT DISAGREE alert as well as airspeed and/or altitude errors. The IAS DISAGREE NNC sends you to the Airspeed Unreliable NNC which has memory items. I guess ideally facing a lone stick shaker and one or more of the alerts displayed on the PFD rather than paging thru the QRH a crew would immediately execute the Airspeed Unreliable NNC.


AABusDrvr wrote:
That would be operator/regulator specific, but I highly doubt it's a memory item. At my airline we have zero memory QRH/NNC procedures on the 737.


I'll start with OMG. So if you have a rapid depressurization you pull out the QRH and do a "read and do"? Or am I misunderstanding what you mean by "zero memory"?


There are some things we are expected to know, like to don the oxygen masks for a loss of pressurization, or cabin smoke/fumes. But after that, we reference a laminated card in the cockpit, with the immediate action items on it. Once those are complete, we reference the QRH.

We have no formal "memory items" or red box items we are required to know.

In your example, for CABIN ALTITUDE WARNING or rapid depressurization, we would don the O2 masks, select 100%, and establish crew communications (those things fall under "basic pilot stuff"). Then the PM will pull out the reference card, and check if the approiate checklist is on the card or not. If it's on the card, we read and do it from there. At the end of that procedure, we go to the QRH, and start into it where the reference card left off.

Less chances to screw something up that way.

So, after some here have heavily criticized the pilots for not responding immediately with “memory items” to the alerts they received upon takeoff, we now have a 737 pilot telling us that they may not have had memory items to run. Is this correct? It does rather cast a a different light on their actions.
 
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aerolimani
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Tue Jun 11, 2019 11:21 pm

aerolimani wrote:
AABusDrvr wrote:
7BOEING7 wrote:


The AOA DISAGREE NNC has no memory items -- it just advises that you may have an IAS DISGAREE alert and/or an ALT DISAGREE alert as well as airspeed and/or altitude errors. The IAS DISAGREE NNC sends you to the Airspeed Unreliable NNC which has memory items. I guess ideally facing a lone stick shaker and one or more of the alerts displayed on the PFD rather than paging thru the QRH a crew would immediately execute the Airspeed Unreliable NNC.




I'll start with OMG. So if you have a rapid depressurization you pull out the QRH and do a "read and do"? Or am I misunderstanding what you mean by "zero memory"?


There are some things we are expected to know, like to don the oxygen masks for a loss of pressurization, or cabin smoke/fumes. But after that, we reference a laminated card in the cockpit, with the immediate action items on it. Once those are complete, we reference the QRH.

We have no formal "memory items" or red box items we are required to know.

In your example, for CABIN ALTITUDE WARNING or rapid depressurization, we would don the O2 masks, select 100%, and establish crew communications (those things fall under "basic pilot stuff"). Then the PM will pull out the reference card, and check if the approiate checklist is on the card or not. If it's on the card, we read and do it from there. At the end of that procedure, we go to the QRH, and start into it where the reference card left off.

Less chances to screw something up that way.

So, after some here have heavily criticized the pilots for not responding immediately with “memory items” to the alerts they received upon takeoff, we now have a 737 pilot telling us that they may not have had memory items to run. Is this correct? It does rather cast a a different light on their actions.

Further to this, I recognize that it doesn’t negate idea that better training may be beneficial. However, it does rather shift some more of that onus away from the ET pilots (RIP), and put a little more focus on what is required by the airlines, the aviation authorities, and the manufacturers.
 
klkla
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Wed Jun 12, 2019 12:04 am

A quick question...

Was the stick shaker active for both pilots in the ET crash?

If not, wouldn't that be one of the first things to alert the crew that AOA indicator was wrong for one of them? And if that's the case how would they determine what the correct AOA was so that they could make the correct decisions?
 
AABusDrvr
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Wed Jun 12, 2019 12:05 am

aerolimani wrote:
AABusDrvr wrote:
7BOEING7 wrote:


The AOA DISAGREE NNC has no memory items -- it just advises that you may have an IAS DISGAREE alert and/or an ALT DISAGREE alert as well as airspeed and/or altitude errors. The IAS DISAGREE NNC sends you to the Airspeed Unreliable NNC which has memory items. I guess ideally facing a lone stick shaker and one or more of the alerts displayed on the PFD rather than paging thru the QRH a crew would immediately execute the Airspeed Unreliable NNC.




I'll start with OMG. So if you have a rapid depressurization you pull out the QRH and do a "read and do"? Or am I misunderstanding what you mean by "zero memory"?


There are some things we are expected to know, like to don the oxygen masks for a loss of pressurization, or cabin smoke/fumes. But after that, we reference a laminated card in the cockpit, with the immediate action items on it. Once those are complete, we reference the QRH.

We have no formal "memory items" or red box items we are required to know.

In your example, for CABIN ALTITUDE WARNING or rapid depressurization, we would don the O2 masks, select 100%, and establish crew communications (those things fall under "basic pilot stuff"). Then the PM will pull out the reference card, and check if the approiate checklist is on the card or not. If it's on the card, we read and do it from there. At the end of that procedure, we go to the QRH, and start into it where the reference card left off.

Less chances to screw something up that way.

So, after some here have heavily criticized the pilots for not responding immediately with “memory items” to the alerts they received upon takeoff, we now have a 737 pilot telling us that they may not have had memory items to run. Is this correct? It does rather cast a a different light on their actions.


Memory items or not, the crew still has to fly the airplane. Knowing whats a reasonable pitch/power setting for your current phase of flight falls under that.

Like I said above, SOP's/checklists/memory items can vary greatly between carriers, and even between different fleets at the same carrier. Some will use the factory procedures and checklists, and others will tailor everything to their specific operations. Everything still has to mirror the factory developed procedures.

If ET used, and trained memory items, the crew would be expected to do things that way. Our procedures are the same as the Boeing "memory items" we just are not required to commit them to memory. When I started on the 737, everything was a memory item, so I still know them from memory, but I wouldn't do it that way, since it's not our SOP any longer.
 
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7BOEING7
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Wed Jun 12, 2019 12:42 am

aerolimani wrote:
AABusDrvr wrote:
7BOEING7 wrote:


The AOA DISAGREE NNC has no memory items -- it just advises that you may have an IAS DISGAREE alert and/or an ALT DISAGREE alert as well as airspeed and/or altitude errors. The IAS DISAGREE NNC sends you to the Airspeed Unreliable NNC which has memory items. I guess ideally facing a lone stick shaker and one or more of the alerts displayed on the PFD rather than paging thru the QRH a crew would immediately execute the Airspeed Unreliable NNC.




I'll start with OMG. So if you have a rapid depressurization you pull out the QRH and do a "read and do"? Or am I misunderstanding what you mean by "zero memory"?


There are some things we are expected to know, like to don the oxygen masks for a loss of pressurization, or cabin smoke/fumes. But after that, we reference a laminated card in the cockpit, with the immediate action items on it. Once those are complete, we reference the QRH.

We have no formal "memory items" or red box items we are required to know.

In your example, for CABIN ALTITUDE WARNING or rapid depressurization, we would don the O2 masks, select 100%, and establish crew communications (those things fall under "basic pilot stuff"). Then the PM will pull out the reference card, and check if the approiate checklist is on the card or not. If it's on the card, we read and do it from there. At the end of that procedure, we go to the QRH, and start into it where the reference card left off.

Less chances to screw something up that way.

So, after some here have heavily criticized the pilots for not responding immediately with “memory items” to the alerts they received upon takeoff, we now have a 737 pilot telling us that they may not have had memory items to run. Is this correct? It does rather cast a a different light on their actions.


No it is not correct.

There are "memory"/"immediate action" items to run. In AABusDrvr's case the immediate action items are on a card (you're not spending time looking thru the QRH). His airline with permission of their regulatory authority has permission to use the card instead of memorizing the steps. Same steps, basically the same thing -- "IMMEDIATE ACTION".
 
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7BOEING7
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Wed Jun 12, 2019 1:01 am

klkla wrote:
A quick question...

Was the stick shaker active for both pilots in the ET crash?

If not, wouldn't that be one of the first things to alert the crew that AOA indicator was wrong for one of them? And if that's the case how would they determine what the correct AOA was so that they could make the correct decisions?


No

Most pilots don't care what the correct AOA is because they do not have an AOA indicator displayed on the PFD (primary Flight Display), it's optional -- the two AOA vanes are not. If a pilot fies fighters in the military he is taught how to fly using AOA -- most pilots are not taught how to fly using AOA.

American Airlines back in the 90's required an AOA display in the cockpit on all the 737's and 777's. They don't use it to fly the airplanes on a day to day basis but with an airspeed issue it comes in handy.
 
acechip
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Wed Jun 12, 2019 2:16 am

morrisond wrote:
snowkarl wrote:
h1fl1er wrote:

no...was years earlier. MCAS is simply intended to preserve control force gradient in one tiny portion of the flight envelope. it was a system quite literally never really intended to ever need to go active. it's unclear whether the NG could be certified under the version of the FARs that mandates the current force gradient. 767s for the .mil have the mcas as well.

these flights crashed because of a software glitch; it's literally that simple, combined with grossly inexperienced pilots



not exactly. on the doomed lion flight, the captain kept the plaine in the air using electric trim switches over and over again. he handed the plane to the copilot who for reasons that nobody will ever know, absolutely failed to do the same

et's pilots it doesn't matter how much sim time if you let your speed run away from you. these crashes are similar to af447 where an inexperienced pilot was abruptly handed a plane in trying circumstances and made a series of fatal errors. nobody can explain why the French guy pulled the stick continuously up into a stall.he had the altimeter scrolling on his MFD right in front of his face, along with attitude indicators. everything was there to tell him he was going wrong but still he did it. if the captain of lion and 447 were at the helm, everyone lives

the truth exposed here is that sudden automation failures on commercial planes frequently result in craters


Again blaming 'inexperienced' pilots.. on the ET flight the first officer with less than 50% of the hours required to fly a 737 in the US actually recognized the problem faster than the veteran pilot with 5000+ hours. It had nothing to do with experience but the extreme negligence on Boeing's part not to rectify their mistake immediately after the Lion crash as well and not even sufficiently brief pilots and airlines on the actual dangers the trim deficiencies could actually create. The fact that people are still on this line of argumentation is simply astonishing because there is not a single credible person in the entire airline world making this argument - only on anonymous forums are people doing so - which is very telling.

If pilots are put into positions where numerous alerts are going off with seemingly contradictory messages and you tell them to solve an issue they've not even been described, let alone trained in, it's fairly obvious there will be crashes due to the obviously unacceptable and dangerous position created for the crews. Not to mention pilots in this very thread are not even in agreement on how they should have acted months after the accident, which suggests the 'pilot error' discourse isn't quite as simple and absolving of Boeing as some would suggest.

Moreover, a glitch is in no way, shape or form an accurate way to describe MCAS or the software that caused the crashes. A glitch is simply a code or software error where an action is performed contrary to its designed purpose - the MAX software was designed to act exactly as it acted. Hence it's not a glitch but a creative, engineering mistake which should never ever have passed preliminary testing, let alone complete certification and review.


You need to go read the other forum that is full of 737 pilots and the posts by Captains on this thread. They all agreed that Boeing really screwed up but they also agree at least the ET crew made major mistakes.

Look at the full report on ET409 if you would like a non-Ethiopian view on the outcome of ET's training system. A pilot who went through training at about the same time as the ET302 Captain.


Ok- so the manufacturer makes an airplane that it is essentially a 50 year warmed-over model, and currently design-deficient under certain flight regimes, about which there isn't sufficient training or information provided to the airline. And then when a crash happens because of this deficiency, you blame the pilots ? If the pilots all over the world had known in detail about MCAS when the deliveries began in 2017, I am sure that there would have been huge amount of feedback, and probably saved the 346 lives.
 
speedking
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Wed Jun 12, 2019 2:29 am

The quest to make it possible for everybody to fly. Needs to be cheap. Tickets, planes, training, pilots. All cheap.
Cheap is not good. Need government to regulate. Is like socialism. Instead of winning, all are losing.
For those who have, is there an option?
 
h1fl1er
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Wed Jun 12, 2019 3:22 am

acechip wrote:
Ok- so the manufacturer makes an airplane that it is essentially a 50 year warmed-over model, and currently design-deficient under certain flight regimes, about which there isn't sufficient training or information provided to the airline. And then when a crash happens because of this deficiency, you blame the pilots ? If the pilots all over the world had known in detail about MCAS when the deliveries began in 2017, I am sure that there would have been huge amount of feedback, and probably saved the 346 lives.


I've read this statement now 1000 times. what training exactly were they supposed to have received? "oh btw there's this software flaw that is going to try to fly the plane into the ground if one AOA sensor goes bad"?

no pilot who heard about mcas would have paid attention because they'd have said "this is in a small corner of the flight envelope I will never be in"

seriously. they'd have written it off as unimportant. nobody expected it to ever actually start running unless a pilot was flying manual in a high speed turn or something near a stall which should basically never happen. software implementation, a glitch, caused it to become active when it shouldn't have and continue to try to nose down over and over again based on the same faulty input.

at the same time this persistent software glitch combined with the lion copilots failure or inability to continue to use thumb switches as his captain had just done for several minutes, over and over again. or the et crew to keep their speed under control

nobody is saying boeing built a death trap in the public sphere either yet it is all over this forum page aftetr page

the truth nobody wants to hear is that when automation fails it frequently results in craters. nobody else could land on the Hudson other than that one guy either. the vast majority of pilots crash in these situations. the rason for this is because when automation fails things have already gone way outside the control capability of the automated system, outside what the engineers had thought of. and so it's a tough situation and expecting 30 yo pilots with paltry hours to fly the plane isn't realistic becase even experienced pilots have lousy odds

the truth is that this 50 year old warmed over design has been incredibly safe because of the automation and these crashes are notable because of how rare they are.
 
DenverTed
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Wed Jun 12, 2019 5:50 am

h1fl1er wrote:
it's unclear whether the NG could be certified under the version of the FARs that mandates the current force gradient. 767s for the .mil have the mcas as well.


Yes, would the NG need MCAS if it were certified today? Since MCAS was designed to meet a force gradient spec., what is the force gradient of the -700, -900, MAX 7 to MAX 10? That would explain a lot.
 
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scbriml
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Wed Jun 12, 2019 6:02 am

DenverTed wrote:
Yes, would the NG need MCAS if it were certified today? Since MCAS was designed to meet a force gradient spec., what is the force gradient of the -700, -900, MAX 7 to MAX 10? That would explain a lot.


With respect, I think that's a somewhat pointless question.

My understanding is that MCAS was required on MAX in order to make it fly "just like an NG" so it could use the same type-certification as the NG and no additional pilot training (other than a short iPad course) would be required.
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14ccKemiskt
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Wed Jun 12, 2019 6:32 am

Long interview with Delta's Ed Bastian regarding the Max situation. He says the industry has been traumatized by the affair.

https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/6/11/18 ... ax-scandal
 
asdf
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Wed Jun 12, 2019 6:42 am

DenverTed wrote:
h1fl1er wrote:
it's unclear whether the NG could be certified under the version of the FARs that mandates the current force gradient. 767s for the .mil have the mcas as well.


Yes, would the NG need MCAS if it were certified today? Since MCAS was designed to meet a force gradient spec., what is the force gradient of the -700, -900, MAX 7 to MAX 10? That would explain a lot.


you find it dozens of dozens times explained here in the thread

its all about the size of the engines
they don't fit under the wings because the wings have less clearance below the wings than other planes like the bus 320 and others

B extended the landing gear once to fit the larger engines on the NG years ago
but they can't extend it any more now

so they needed to move the engines in front of the wing to get them fixed on that bird
and that is the problem

I am pretty sure there is no aircraft designer who would fix engines like that if he had the choice
because it makes the planes flight characteristic questionable

some say its all only about certification
others say its simply not safe

fact is B needs on the MAX electronic aids to compensate the momentum which arises because of that not suitable position of the engines - not below but - in front of the wings

all the other stuff like MCAS, AOA-problems, AOA-indicator, to less elevator authority and else are simply a result of the engines, fixed at a unsuitable point because they would not have enough ground clearance otherwise
 
Passedv1
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Wed Jun 12, 2019 7:02 am

klkla wrote:
A quick question...

Was the stick shaker active for both pilots in the ET crash?

If not, wouldn't that be one of the first things to alert the crew that AOA indicator was wrong for one of them? And if that's the case how would they determine what the correct AOA was so that they could make the correct decisions?


Since the controls are linked, if either shaker activates it is felt by both pilots. When you test the system on the ground at IAS 0, it is possible to discern that only one activated and which one activated. It would not be obvious in flight that only one was activating.
 
Interested
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Wed Jun 12, 2019 7:24 am

snowkarl wrote:
h1fl1er wrote:
AirBoat wrote:
Can anyone confirm when MCAS was implemented.
I got the idea the light control forces were noticed during flight testing.
This is a bit late in the day. It leaves only one option. A software fix.
Any structural or aero fix would have taken years to do.
As for the higher mounted engine causing more pitch up. Not logical, it should cause less pitch up , unless the new engine has much more thrust.


no...was years earlier. MCAS is simply intended to preserve control force gradient in one tiny portion of the flight envelope. it was a system quite literally never really intended to ever need to go active. it's unclear whether the NG could be certified under the version of the FARs that mandates the current force gradient. 767s for the .mil have the mcas as well.

these flights crashed because of a software glitch; it's literally that simple, combined with grossly inexperienced pilots

There was nothing telling the pilots what it was as the light wasnt there, by the time they flicked through 200 odd pages to find the answer to something that even ETs MAX Simulator (which boeing has now admitted didnt act like a MAX in flight) couldnt teach them, they were dead.


not exactly. on the doomed lion flight, the captain kept the plaine in the air using electric trim switches over and over again. he handed the plane to the copilot who for reasons that nobody will ever know, absolutely failed to do the same

et's pilots it doesn't matter how much sim time if you let your speed run away from you. these crashes are similar to af447 where an inexperienced pilot was abruptly handed a plane in trying circumstances and made a series of fatal errors. nobody can explain why the French guy pulled the stick continuously up into a stall.he had the altimeter scrolling on his MFD right in front of his face, along with attitude indicators. everything was there to tell him he was going wrong but still he did it. if the captain of lion and 447 were at the helm, everyone lives

the truth exposed here is that sudden automation failures on commercial planes frequently result in craters


Again blaming 'inexperienced' pilots.. on the ET flight the first officer with less than 50% of the hours required to fly a 737 in the US actually recognized the problem faster than the veteran pilot with 5000+ hours. It had nothing to do with experience but the extreme negligence on Boeing's part not to rectify their mistake immediately after the Lion crash as well and not even sufficiently brief pilots and airlines on the actual dangers the trim deficiencies could actually create. The fact that people are still on this line of argumentation is simply astonishing because there is not a single credible person in the entire airline world making this argument - only on anonymous forums are people doing so - which is very telling.

Moreover, a glitch is in no way, shape or form an accurate way to describe MCAS or the software that caused the crashes. A glitch is simply a code or software error where an action is performed contrary to its designed purpose - the MAX software was designed to act exactly as it acted. Hence it's not a glitch but a creative, engineering mistake which should never ever have passed preliminary testing, let alone complete certification and review.


Very well said on both counts. It's the planes that are grounded. Not airlines or pilots. And it's certainly not just a software glitch.
 
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Momo1435
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Wed Jun 12, 2019 7:43 am

Interested wrote:
Very well said on both counts. It's the planes that are grounded. Not airlines or pilots. And the software patch Boeing promised to fix the glitch within 2 weeks (that they had already been working on since Lion air) never materialised did it?

The Software patch is there, it's only the certification that takes longer then Boeing expected.

I think that the technical issues of the MAX and the issues surrounding the certification are 2 different processes. The fix for the software is there, and will probably be working as it should making the MAX safe to fly again. Remember that it was not the instability caused by the engine placement that caused the crashes, it was the botched MCAS software. And we will only see more and more software in future planes, so the fact that software is needed should not be seen as the core problem as long as the software is properly designed. But now there are doubts about the initial certification process the handbrakes are pulled on a quick certification on the MCAS fix. This is what Ed Bastian means with the industry being in shock, it's much more then just Boeing messing up the software. It's much more important to know how this was not caught by the industry before the crashes even happened.

And when it comes to this discussion in this thread I would say that the main issue is that it's too reactive. The pilot error talk is fueled by claims that the MAX is completely unsafe, which is already a reaction to claims that nothing is wrong. So it just goes round in circles, only resulting in more insinuations and personal attacks every time this circle is completed. This makes it pretty much impossible to follow this thread for people who just want to read new information and proper insights surrounding on the grounding of the MAX.
 
Interested
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Wed Jun 12, 2019 8:25 am

Momo1435 wrote:
Interested wrote:
Very well said on both counts. It's the planes that are grounded. Not airlines or pilots. And the software patch Boeing promised to fix the glitch within 2 weeks (that they had already been working on since Lion air) never materialised did it?

The Software patch is there, it's only the certification that takes longer then Boeing expected.

I think that the technical issues of the MAX and the issues surrounding the certification are 2 different processes. The fix for the software is there, and will probably be working as it should making the MAX safe to fly again. Remember that it was not the instability caused by the engine placement that caused the crashes, it was the botched MCAS software. And we will only see more and more software in future planes, so the fact that software is needed should not be seen as the core problem as long as the software is properly designed. But now there are doubts about the initial certification process the handbrakes are pulled on a quick certification on the MCAS fix. This is what Ed Bastian means with the industry being in shock, it's much more then just Boeing messing up the software. It's much more important to know how this was not caught by the industry before the crashes even happened.

And when it comes to this discussion in this thread I would say that the main issue is that it's too reactive. The pilot error talk is fueled by claims that the MAX is completely unsafe, which is already a reaction to claims that nothing is wrong. So it just goes round in circles, only resulting in more insinuations and personal attacks every time this circle is completed. This makes it pretty much impossible to follow this thread for people who just want to read new information and proper insights surrounding on the grounding of the MAX.


Of course the plane isnt "completely unsafe"

Aren't we faced though with a very unusual situation where we have a grandfathered plane that was initially (at least) far less safe than the plane it grandfathered? That's why we have two disasters and a grounding on our hands.

I'm sure it's accepted that the grandfathering system on planes is there (in a very large part) to build on safety of the previous plane and hopefully improve on it?

I can't see how even with the very best software, communication, manuals and/or training from now on that this plane can ever be as safe as the plane it grandfathered? The are inherent extra risks and things that can go wrong that just weren't there before.

So the question surely has to be - how those new risks can be minimised to the nth degree and once they are is the extra risk acceptable?

I think the problem is magnified as there will be at least 5,000 of these planes flying 25,000 times plus per day if all goes to plan. So far we've had 2 crashes with less than 400 of these planes even built and flying.

So even minimal increase in risk can become a significant number in terms of potential disasters

What actually is an acceptable increase in risk from needing MCAS and all that comes with it to allow this plane in the air ?

0.000001 per cent more chance of a crash compared to NG after all the extra software work, training and communication is done etc - at first glance to me would seem brilliant figures and a great result from where we are now IMO

But I multiply that out over 25,000 flights per day around the world in the future and that's still 9 extra crashes per year! Nobody would accept those stats of course.

We know there are extra risks involved with MCAS. We all surely have to accept that if the plane is to fly again - but realistically what's the lowest that those extra risks can be reduced to compared to the NG plane without MCAS?

0.0000001 per cent extra risk of a crash compared to NG due to MCAS still gives 1 MCAS crash per year in the future with 5,000 max 737 planes in the air. Still clearly unacceptable by modern aviation expectations.

The numbers scare me.

Isn't that a real tough ask that Boeing and co are up against?

How do they get the inherent extra risks from having MCAS on the plane below those what seem tiny extra risk levels to me above?

The CEO has promised Max 737 will be one of the safest planes in the air in the future. How can it possibly be as safe as NG? And if not what extra risk level is acceptable?

As an outsider looking in this seems a very tough question to answer.

Is my maths right?

Have I missed anything?
 
xmp125a
Posts: 231
Joined: Mon Mar 11, 2019 6:38 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Wed Jun 12, 2019 9:20 am

SEU wrote:
There was nothing telling the pilots what it was as the light wasnt there, by the time they flicked through 200 odd pages to find the answer to something that even ETs MAX Simulator (which boeing has now admitted didnt act like a MAX in flight) couldnt teach them, they were dead.


To me the question is very simple (Boeing had made it very simple by insisting that there only superficial differences between 737NG and 737MAX, like different position of switches, etc)

So the question is Had the LionAir and ET crew been sitting in 737NG, not 737MAX and everything else would be the same - e.g. AoA failure, flight parameters, and their response, WOULD THEY CRASH?

I think the answer to this is pretty simple. They would not. So they were trained for safe operation of NG, but not for the safe operation of MAX. The key Boeing argument "no additional training" goes down the toilet. The longer they insist on it, the worse they look.

The question about pilot training is immaterial in this case, if it is established that their action in NG would not result in accident, but in MAX it resulted in loss of life.
 
Noshow
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Joined: Wed Jun 15, 2016 3:20 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Wed Jun 12, 2019 9:40 am

The longer it takes the more it starts to feel uncomfortable to fly on a MAX to me I have to say. It should get some new certification as a different type after being modified as required. Just insisting on it being so similar to the NG doesn't cut it for me. Train the pilots properly and when they are happy we are good to go again. Grounding it for longer times will be more expensive than everything else.
 
Interested
Posts: 647
Joined: Thu May 19, 2016 12:19 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Wed Jun 12, 2019 9:54 am

Noshow wrote:
The longer it takes the more it starts to feel uncomfortable to fly on a MAX to me I have to say. It should get some new certification as a different type after being modified as required. Just insisting on it being so similar to the NG doesn't cut it for me. Train the pilots properly and when they are happy we are good to go again. Grounding it for longer times will be more expensive than everything else.


Training the pilots properly to me is just icing on the cake

Whatever they do needs to ensure pilots of this plane aren't ever faced with MCAS issues again

It needs to be watertight. If pilots are having to intervene to deal with MCAS issues again in the future then we've got problems

We know pilots will mess up at times. We can't give them the chance.
 
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PixelFlight
Posts: 478
Joined: Thu Nov 08, 2018 11:09 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Wed Jun 12, 2019 9:56 am

speedking wrote:
The quest to make it possible for everybody to fly. Needs to be cheap. Tickets, planes, training, pilots. All cheap.
Cheap is not good. Need government to regulate. Is like socialism. Instead of winning, all are losing.
For those who have, is there an option?

Corporate, top executive, and shareholders profits vs ability to invest in long term concurrence, internal competences, and safety assessment is more in line with the actual issue.
If you analyse the political aspect of the issue, you might find the Title 49 of the United States Code (49 USC) 44702(d) relevant: https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/USC ... 7-sec44702 and https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/ ... ht-1287902

Since long time in human history, regulation (formal or cultural) is proportional to the amount of organization in a society, regardless of there political organisation/orientation and even if this give different historical success. I am confident that the actual top most capitalist societies are far more formally regulated than anything before in the human history. Where profit from each regulation is the key point. The 737 MAX issue is suspected to be linked to an _additional_ regulation introducing a less than satisfactory safety certification delegation.
 
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PixelFlight
Posts: 478
Joined: Thu Nov 08, 2018 11:09 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Wed Jun 12, 2019 10:09 am

h1fl1er wrote:
no pilot who heard about mcas would have paid attention because they'd have said "this is in a small corner of the flight envelope I will never be in"

seriously. they'd have written it off as unimportant. nobody expected it to ever actually start running unless a pilot was flying manual in a high speed turn or something near a stall which should basically never happen. software implementation, a glitch, caused it to become active when it shouldn't have and continue to try to nose down over and over again based on the same faulty input.

There failed to do a proper failure mode analysis of the MCAS down to a AoA erratic high value. The story is complicated to understand why there failed to do that failure mode analysis, and is either complicated to agree how this failure mode could possibly have been mitigated by all the pilots, but as some point it's just exactly that: a proper failure mode analysis was not done. The EAD is crystal clear on this.
 
planecane
Posts: 872
Joined: Thu Feb 09, 2017 4:58 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Wed Jun 12, 2019 10:16 am

xmp125a wrote:
SEU wrote:
There was nothing telling the pilots what it was as the light wasnt there, by the time they flicked through 200 odd pages to find the answer to something that even ETs MAX Simulator (which boeing has now admitted didnt act like a MAX in flight) couldnt teach them, they were dead.


To me the question is very simple (Boeing had made it very simple by insisting that there only superficial differences between 737NG and 737MAX, like different position of switches, etc)

So the question is Had the LionAir and ET crew been sitting in 737NG, not 737MAX and everything else would be the same - e.g. AoA failure, flight parameters, and their response, WOULD THEY CRASH?

I think the answer to this is pretty simple. They would not. So they were trained for safe operation of NG, but not for the safe operation of MAX. The key Boeing argument "no additional training" goes down the toilet. The longer they insist on it, the worse they look.

The question about pilot training is immaterial in this case, if it is established that their action in NG would not result in accident, but in MAX it resulted in loss of life.


However, in the hypothetical situation where they had a runaway stabilizer on the NG along with the other parameters, I believe that they still would have crashed. I don't think you can say that they were well trained for the safe operation of the NG. I think the few orders of magnitude higher incidence of runaway stabilizer on the MAX due to MCAS makes it appear that your statement is true.
 
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scbriml
Posts: 17144
Joined: Wed Jul 02, 2003 10:37 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Wed Jun 12, 2019 10:34 am

14ccKemiskt wrote:
Long interview with Delta's Ed Bastian regarding the Max situation. He says the industry has been traumatized by the affair.

https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/6/11/18 ... ax-scandal


Ed "Delta doesn't fly the MAX" Bastian says industry traumatised. :scratchchin:
Time flies like an arrow. Fruit flies like a banana!
There are 10 types of people in the World - those that understand binary and those that don't.
 
Interested
Posts: 647
Joined: Thu May 19, 2016 12:19 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Wed Jun 12, 2019 10:36 am

So we need the incidence or having to use trim on Max 737 to be as low as on the NG to be able to maintain safety levels?

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