morrisond wrote:

MSPNWA wrote:

XRAYretired wrote:

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-14/boeing-updates-older-737-simulators-in-wake-of-fatal-max-crashes
Confirmed NG simulator did not accurately reflect manual trim wheel forces.

Ray

Yeah, and it's easier to turn than in a real aircraft in some circumstances.

If anything that article suggests the potential issue between sim and real is less than had been speculated.

It also says the SIM was harder in some situations than real life.

So what is everyone's point? How would that have changed what happened on ET302? It would not have changed what happened on ET302 one iota.

If you take the interpretation from the Pre-lim report that they were actually trying the trim wheels - the Co-pilot if he actually tried the trim and not just Manually flicking the Electric trim - tried in total for maybe 2-3 seconds if you take into account the time it would have taken for the conversation as well.

Here is the relevant part of the prelim report

At 05:41:46, the Captain asked the First-Officer if the trim is functional. The First-Officer has replied that the trim was not working and asked if he could try it manually. The Captain told him to try. At 05:41:54, the First-Officer replied that it is not working.

There is only 8 seconds between these two.

Time for yourself how long it takes to ask someone if the trim was working and how long long it takes to ask back - should I try manually - that takes 5-6 seconds especially on headsets where you try not to talk over each other.

That would leave 2-3 seconds for the co-pilot - if he actually did try the Manual trim wheels to extend the handle and try it.

Somehow I think it entirely implausible that he accomplished that task in the time available - and if he did why so little time and effort spent on it or why did he not ask for help from the pilot or why not some remark that it is stuck.

However 2-3 seconds is long enough to try an electric trim switch.

All this however is all irrelevant anyways though as even if he did try the manual trim wheel they were well above Vmo and it's debatable how effective it would have been anyways.

Leaving it in TOGA thrust at this point was a much larger issue to the safe conclusion of the flight than not being able to control the trim.

This all being said - even if the MAX is scrapped (which is highly unlikely - and not necessary - but some on here think it's a good idea) - these Pilot training issues still exist and need to be corrected.

How can anyone on these boards not say that Pilot performance could have been better and training could be beefed up to improve safety?

The 100% it's not the Pilot's fault crowd continues to ignore these training issues and continues to ignore ET409 - a perfectly good airplane (737NG) that was flown into the ground by a Captain who went through primary 737 Training at about the same time as the ET302 Captain.

Then we also have media reports that even if ET did give it's pilot's the MCAS procedure - it was literally in an email and did not even require it's pilots to acknowledge receipt - Yes that is a real safety first culture.

However if you are comfortable flying with ET (or almost any Modern trained pilot) in instrument conditions or even Visual and facing a loss of automation then good for you.

You like gambling with your life a lot more than I like to with mine.

Interested wrote:

Did anyone you ever have a need to write lots of posts calling for better pilot training around the world for pilots UNTIL Max crashed ?

Be honest ?

par13del wrote:

Interested wrote:

Did anyone you ever have a need to write lots of posts calling for better pilot training around the world for pilots UNTIL Max crashed ?

Be honest ?

Remind us again of the Airbus A330 design issues in the Air France fatal crash.

planecane wrote:

So? Even if they find that Boeing faked all of the flight test data in 1997 and the FAA never looked at anything, there is still no justification whatsoever to ground the NG 22 years later with no design related incidents occurring over what has to be 40 million flights by now. The NG certified itself with its own safety record.

par13del wrote:

Interested wrote:

Did anyone you ever have a need to write lots of posts calling for better pilot training around the world for pilots UNTIL Max crashed ?

Be honest ?

Remind us again of the Airbus A330 design issues in the Air France fatal crash.

kalvado wrote:

par13del wrote:

Interested wrote:

Did anyone you ever have a need to write lots of posts calling for better pilot training around the world for pilots UNTIL Max crashed ?

Be honest ?

Remind us again of the Airbus A330 design issues in the Air France fatal crash.

Frankly speaking, there are no complex systems without flaws. The difference is how well analysis and tests were performed to weed out most common problems, how often those left behind show up, and what is done to eliminate them once they show up.
There are rules, regulations, best practices to minimize tragic events, but totally eliminating is not possible at this stage. Maybe some day......
And again, Boeing total meltdown IMHO occurred when they tried to downplay Lion crash. They are paying dearly for that.

Interested wrote:

morrisond wrote:

MSPNWA wrote:

Yeah, and it's easier to turn than in a real aircraft in some circumstances.

If anything that article suggests the potential issue between sim and real is less than had been speculated.

It also says the SIM was harder in some situations than real life.

So what is everyone's point? How would that have changed what happened on ET302? It would not have changed what happened on ET302 one iota.

If you take the interpretation from the Pre-lim report that they were actually trying the trim wheels - the Co-pilot if he actually tried the trim and not just Manually flicking the Electric trim - tried in total for maybe 2-3 seconds if you take into account the time it would have taken for the conversation as well.

Here is the relevant part of the prelim report

At 05:41:46, the Captain asked the First-Officer if the trim is functional. The First-Officer has replied that the trim was not working and asked if he could try it manually. The Captain told him to try. At 05:41:54, the First-Officer replied that it is not working.

There is only 8 seconds between these two.

Time for yourself how long it takes to ask someone if the trim was working and how long long it takes to ask back - should I try manually - that takes 5-6 seconds especially on headsets where you try not to talk over each other.

That would leave 2-3 seconds for the co-pilot - if he actually did try the Manual trim wheels to extend the handle and try it.

Somehow I think it entirely implausible that he accomplished that task in the time available - and if he did why so little time and effort spent on it or why did he not ask for help from the pilot or why not some remark that it is stuck.

However 2-3 seconds is long enough to try an electric trim switch.

All this however is all irrelevant anyways though as even if he did try the manual trim wheel they were well above Vmo and it's debatable how effective it would have been anyways.

Leaving it in TOGA thrust at this point was a much larger issue to the safe conclusion of the flight than not being able to control the trim.

This all being said - even if the MAX is scrapped (which is highly unlikely - and not necessary - but some on here think it's a good idea) - these Pilot training issues still exist and need to be corrected.

How can anyone on these boards not say that Pilot performance could have been better and training could be beefed up to improve safety?

The 100% it's not the Pilot's fault crowd continues to ignore these training issues and continues to ignore ET409 - a perfectly good airplane (737NG) that was flown into the ground by a Captain who went through primary 737 Training at about the same time as the ET302 Captain.

Then we also have media reports that even if ET did give it's pilot's the MCAS procedure - it was literally in an email and did not even require it's pilots to acknowledge receipt - Yes that is a real safety first culture.

However if you are comfortable flying with ET (or almost any Modern trained pilot) in instrument conditions or even Visual and facing a loss of automation then good for you.

You like gambling with your life a lot more than I like to with mine.

It's a pretty simple concept to me

ZERO point analysing details of pilots actions as every disaster is different anyway.

We have ZERO concerns about safety on NG.

We don't want situations on planes full stop where manual trim can crash a plane or turning automation off can make a plane more dangerous

Why introduce new risks we don't need??

So don't design planes that bring more likelihood of manual trim being needed or automation having to be turned off etc etc because of issues on the new design

Me personally I don't want any pilot training to be needed a tiny percentage more than its already needed on the NG. If they get more training great. But I want it to be irrelevant anyway.

Weve moved so far forwards in aviation safety in recent decades - why would we ever want to move backwards and relying on pilots to bail plane design out?

Weve lost before we've even started if we need better training on NG just to maintain existing safety rates that don't need better training on NG?

Surely you can understand this logic??

morrisond wrote:

par13del wrote:

Interested wrote:

Did anyone you ever have a need to write lots of posts calling for better pilot training around the world for pilots UNTIL Max crashed ?
Be honest ?

Remind us again of the Airbus A330 design issues in the Air France fatal crash.

Or the calls for better training (not me but people made them) after the Colgan crash or the Asiana SFO crash. All related to poor training and all saveable with proper training.
We almost shouldn't have had any fatal's in the last 10 years if training was doing what it was supposed too.
Quite frankly I avoided these crash threads for the last 10 years until these ones - but the mistakes have grown so bad - we need to focus on it again.
The MAX needs to be fixed but the training system needs to be fixed as well.
You will never be able to design the prefect airplane and even with the perfect airplane airplane parts will fail - Pilots need to be able to control aircraft manually - that is a minimum requirement of there training and almost all the last fatal's - Pilot's are showing they don't have the basic necessary required skills.

PW100 wrote:

morrisond wrote:

par13del wrote:

Remind us again of the Airbus A330 design issues in the Air France fatal crash.

Or the calls for better training (not me but people made them) after the Colgan crash or the Asiana SFO crash. All related to poor training and all saveable with proper training.
We almost shouldn't have had any fatal's in the last 10 years if training was doing what it was supposed too.
Quite frankly I avoided these crash threads for the last 10 years until these ones - but the mistakes have grown so bad - we need to focus on it again.
The MAX needs to be fixed but the training system needs to be fixed as well.
You will never be able to design the prefect airplane and even with the perfect airplane airplane parts will fail - Pilots need to be able to control aircraft manually - that is a minimum requirement of there training and almost all the last fatal's - Pilot's are showing they don't have the basic necessary required skills.

The MAX training system seems to be more of an issue than anything else flying today. That combined with poorly implemented MCAS system is why only the MAX is grounded. Those poorly trained pilots have no issues flying herds of NG and 320NEO day after day after day.

That is not to say that general piloting skills and training (especially outside northern hemisphere) can't be improved. But the defining difference in MAX's safety level vs NG/320NEO etc, will not be found in general piloting skills. Priorities to improve airline safety:
1) fix MCAS;
2) fix the regulatory system which allowed MCAS to be certified;
3) check if anything else escaped the same regulatory system for recent Type Certificates under that very system;
4) fix GTF engine issues;
5) fix RR turbine blade issues;
6) I must have missed several other issues . . .
7) fix worldwide pilot training issues.

I'm sure this will not stop you from continuing distracting this thread from the important issues of 1), 2) and 3).

trauha wrote:

Is the determination with which Boeing is fighting unionization, any indication of what it cares about ?

kalvado wrote:

planecane wrote:

LH452 wrote:

IF the FAA deemed the 737 Max too unstable to be used as a passenger aircraft and requested Boeing to come with a solution that later became the MCAS, how is the FAA going to accept a situation of AOA disagree that disables MCAS?

There will be a NNC to follow with MCAS disabled. Probably something similar to the Yaw Damper disengaged NNC except with parameters to avoid the need for MCAS. For reference, the Yaw Damper disengaged NNC states:

3 Avoid areas of predicted moderate or severe
turbulence. If turbulence is encountered and
passenger comfort becomes affected, reduce
airspeed and/or descend to a lower altitude.

4 Do not exceed flaps 30 if the crosswind exceeds 30
knots.

An instruction in the MCAS disengaged NNC would probably be something like:

Do not exceed a pitch attidue of 15 while flaps UP is seected.

I just made up the pitch attitude because I don't know at what point MCAS is needed in normal operation. The NNC may include an instruction to return to nearest airport. I'd think it likely will due to the other things like single side stick shaker happening due to the AoA sensor failure.

Avoid is a weak measure. MCAS apparently may be needed in case of evasive maneuvers, so "request clear-out of airspace" is more like it. JFK and LGA controllers will certainly LOVE these requests.

GalaxyFlyer wrote:

kalvado wrote:

planecane wrote:

There will be a NNC to follow with MCAS disabled. Probably something similar to the Yaw Damper disengaged NNC except with parameters to avoid the need for MCAS. For reference, the Yaw Damper disengaged NNC states:




An instruction in the MCAS disengaged NNC would probably be something like:

Do not exceed a pitch attidue of 15 while flaps UP is seected.

I just made up the pitch attitude because I don't know at what point MCAS is needed in normal operation. The NNC may include an instruction to return to nearest airport. I'd think it likely will due to the other things like single side stick shaker happening due to the AoA sensor failure.

Avoid is a weak measure. MCAS apparently may be needed in case of evasive maneuvers, so "request clear-out of airspace" is more like it. JFK and LGA controllers will certainly LOVE these requests.

Why the ridiculous trolling?

GalaxyFlyer wrote:

NYC is Class B airspace, everybody is under positive control. There’s no need to “clear the airspace”, your comments are just uninformed nonsense

morrisond wrote:

MSPNWA wrote:

XRAYretired wrote:

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-14/boeing-updates-older-737-simulators-in-wake-of-fatal-max-crashes
Confirmed NG simulator did not accurately reflect manual trim wheel forces.

Ray

Yeah, and it's easier to turn than in a real aircraft in some circumstances.

If anything that article suggests the potential issue between sim and real is less than had been speculated.

It also says the SIM was harder in some situations than real life.

So what is everyone's point? How would that have changed what happened on ET302? It would not have changed what happened on ET302 one iota.

planecane wrote:

PW100 wrote:

morrisond wrote:

Or the calls for better training (not me but people made them) after the Colgan crash or the Asiana SFO crash. All related to poor training and all saveable with proper training.
We almost shouldn't have had any fatal's in the last 10 years if training was doing what it was supposed too.
Quite frankly I avoided these crash threads for the last 10 years until these ones - but the mistakes have grown so bad - we need to focus on it again.
The MAX needs to be fixed but the training system needs to be fixed as well.
You will never be able to design the prefect airplane and even with the perfect airplane airplane parts will fail - Pilots need to be able to control aircraft manually - that is a minimum requirement of there training and almost all the last fatal's - Pilot's are showing they don't have the basic necessary required skills.

The MAX training system seems to be more of an issue than anything else flying today. That combined with poorly implemented MCAS system is why only the MAX is grounded. Those poorly trained pilots have no issues flying herds of NG and 320NEO day after day after day.

That is not to say that general piloting skills and training (especially outside northern hemisphere) can't be improved. But the defining difference in MAX's safety level vs NG/320NEO etc, will not be found in general piloting skills. Priorities to improve airline safety:
1) fix MCAS;
2) fix the regulatory system which allowed MCAS to be certified;
3) check if anything else escaped the same regulatory system for recent Type Certificates under that very system;
4) fix GTF engine issues;
5) fix RR turbine blade issues;
6) I must have missed several other issues . . .
7) fix worldwide pilot training issues.

I'm sure this will not stop you from continuing distracting this thread from the important issues of 1), 2) and 3).

Improving training on all aircraft should be a very high priority. The pilots are the final backup to any non-normal situation. The fact that the 737NG and A320 have had a historically low rate of failures that need to be dealt with doesn't mean that training shouldn't be improved. With the good designs of the 737NG, A320, A330/340, 777, 787 (post battery fix), CRJ700/800/900, etc. combined with training being at the proper level, the hull loss rates of those models should be near zero. Although they are very low, only the 787 and CRJ rates are actually zero. I didn't include the A350 because it hasn't (as of last available data) reached 1 million flights yet.

I want worldwide training to be at a level where all pilots are skilled enough to save planes unless there are extreme situations like structural failures from explosions or dual engine failure at low altitude. If training had been at that level, I am confident that the Lion Air and ET crews would have been able to recover from MCAS, regardless of how horrifically poor the design of MCAS was.

I don't blame the pilots for the MAX crashes. The blame goes in order of:

1) Terrible, borderline incompetent system design by Boeing that caused an unacceptable failure rate of a critical control surface
2) Unacceptable oversight of certification of said system by the FAA
3) Lion Air maintenance and maintenance system for Lion Air crash
4) Inadquate pilot training that left neither crew with the knowlege or skill to recover from a severe, non-normal situation

kalvado wrote:

GalaxyFlyer wrote:

NYC is Class B airspace, everybody is under positive control. There’s no need to “clear the airspace”, your comments are just uninformed nonsense

So there are no emergencies or goarounds in NYC?

Weatherwatcher1 wrote:

smartplane wrote:

Weatherwatcher1 wrote:

Deliveries can’t happen because the airplane does not have a valid type certificate since it was suspended. Without a type certificate, airworthiness certificates for each airplane produced can’t be issued. Therefore no deliveries can be made. The airworthiness certificate (which is posted in the flight deck of the airplane) is usually issued about one day before the airplane delivers after completing test flights. That is the technical reason deliveries cannot happen, not insurance.

Before an individual airplane has its airworthiness ticket, airplanes can be flown under the production certificate. This is not because of political influence. Airplanes need to fly prior to the type and airworthiness certificates. There are still requirements and approvals needed before planes can fly but it is covered under a different set of regulations. New features, designs, modifications etc are always being made and flown prior to final approval of the certification plans. There are certification plans required, which require FAA approval.

Insurance and Political Influence of the FAA aren’t technically accurate assertions regarding why airplanes can’t be delivered, so please do not spread inaccurate information when you don’t understand the process.

Aren't technically accurate?

New build aircraft do not NEED to fly when the model type has been suspended. Boeing have made the decision to continue manufacturing and to store remotely.

Boeing will have extended their existing insurance cover to fly aircraft for which airworthiness certificates CANNOT be issued, very different than awaiting airworthiness certificates, as part of a defined process of manufacture through to delivery.

To fly, operate or land in European airspace, a commercial aircraft requires hull and liability insurance. Only an OEM would have this cover for an aircraft pre-issue of an airworthiness certificate.

There are technical distinctions between a commercial aircraft which has never had an airworthiness certificate issued but is in process, has not had an airworthiness certificate issued and cannot have one issued because of a global grounding, and has had an airworthiness certificate issued which has been suspended due to a global grounding.

Surely a global grounding trumps delivery flights, so now only 1-2 aircraft should be flying to develop solutions? If the MAX was also assembled in China and Europe, would they be permitting storage flights? The fact storage flights are possible, suggests political interference.

Ferrying new builds seems to make a mockery of the intent of a grounding, and certainly changes the meaning we understood post 9/11.

Did you read the regulations? It isn’t a mockery.

14ccKemiskt wrote:

Agree with this. I predict NMA will be abandoned now in favour of a new narrow body launched within 2–3 years that can take the A320/A321/XLR more or less head on while still delivering cheap 737s fore quite some time.

Polot wrote:

XRAYretired wrote:

Weatherwatcher1 wrote:

Did you read the regulations? It isn’t a mockery



https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news ... ts-737-max

Ferry flights and test flights are covered under different regulations. The article quotes the actual regulations. Ferry flight permits are issued all the time including in Europe and China for airplanes not in an airworthy condition to transport passengers. Again, please don’t spread inaccurate information suggesting there is political influence if you haven’t actually read the regulations.

Not always as straight forward as it might be perhaps!

'It seems France and Germany changed their rules in a hurry while the plane was in the air, as Norwegian said it had permission to reposition the empty plane from EU air traffic organisation Eurocontrol and the European Aviation Safety Agency, but explained: "Just before entering German airspace both the German and French authorities sent a notice that prohibited repositioning flights of the Boeing 737 MAX in their airspace.'
https://www.gizmodo.co.uk/2019/06/germa ... ly-over-it

Ray

That’s what happens when not everyone (Eurocontrol, EASA, and the individual governments) are not on the same page. But the European FAA equivalent (EASA) allowed it. Political interference???

All the talk about liability/insurance is just bolstering to appear more informed about the specific matter. Boeing or the airlines are not going to fly the planes, even on ferry/storage flights, without insurance, so obviously someone is covering them.

planecane wrote:

PW100 wrote:

morrisond wrote:

Or the calls for better training (not me but people made them) after the Colgan crash or the Asiana SFO crash. All related to poor training and all saveable with proper training.
We almost shouldn't have had any fatal's in the last 10 years if training was doing what it was supposed too.
Quite frankly I avoided these crash threads for the last 10 years until these ones - but the mistakes have grown so bad - we need to focus on it again.
The MAX needs to be fixed but the training system needs to be fixed as well.
You will never be able to design the prefect airplane and even with the perfect airplane airplane parts will fail - Pilots need to be able to control aircraft manually - that is a minimum requirement of there training and almost all the last fatal's - Pilot's are showing they don't have the basic necessary required skills.

The MAX training system seems to be more of an issue than anything else flying today. That combined with poorly implemented MCAS system is why only the MAX is grounded. Those poorly trained pilots have no issues flying herds of NG and 320NEO day after day after day.

That is not to say that general piloting skills and training (especially outside northern hemisphere) can't be improved. But the defining difference in MAX's safety level vs NG/320NEO etc, will not be found in general piloting skills. Priorities to improve airline safety:
1) fix MCAS;
2) fix the regulatory system which allowed MCAS to be certified;
3) check if anything else escaped the same regulatory system for recent Type Certificates under that very system;
4) fix GTF engine issues;
5) fix RR turbine blade issues;
6) I must have missed several other issues . . .
7) fix worldwide pilot training issues.

I'm sure this will not stop you from continuing distracting this thread from the important issues of 1), 2) and 3).

Improving training on all aircraft should be a very high priority. The pilots are the final backup to any non-normal situation. The fact that the 737NG and A320 have had a historically low rate of failures that need to be dealt with doesn't mean that training shouldn't be improved. With the good designs of the 737NG, A320, A330/340, 777, 787 (post battery fix), CRJ700/800/900, etc. combined with training being at the proper level, the hull loss rates of those models should be near zero. Although they are very low, only the 787 and CRJ rates are actually zero. I didn't include the A350 because it hasn't (as of last available data) reached 1 million flights yet.

I want worldwide training to be at a level where all pilots are skilled enough to save planes unless there are extreme situations like structural failures from explosions or dual engine failure at low altitude. If training had been at that level, I am confident that the Lion Air and ET crews would have been able to recover from MCAS, regardless of how horrifically poor the design of MCAS was.

I don't blame the pilots for the MAX crashes. The blame goes in order of:

1) Terrible, borderline incompetent system design by Boeing that caused an unacceptable failure rate of a critical control surface
2) Unacceptable oversight of certification of said system by the FAA
3) Lion Air maintenance and maintenance system for Lion Air crash
4) Inadquate pilot training that left neither crew with the knowlege or skill to recover from a severe, non-normal situation

ArgentoSystems wrote:

FluidFlow wrote:

An educated guess here: Boeing and Airbus have special Insurance for any test/ferry/experimental/whatever flight. This insurance most probably only covers third party liability and is relatively expensive. For the airlines itself I think that A&B would actually give a guarantee to cover if something happens. No insurance company would have their name or their money on a flight like this. Thats a hot potato, likeü a coverage for a nuclear power plant.

Boeing does not need any insurance for these flights. They are big enough to self-insure.

morrisond wrote:

planecane wrote:

PW100 wrote:

The MAX training system seems to be more of an issue than anything else flying today. That combined with poorly implemented MCAS system is why only the MAX is grounded. Those poorly trained pilots have no issues flying herds of NG and 320NEO day after day after day.

That is not to say that general piloting skills and training (especially outside northern hemisphere) can't be improved. But the defining difference in MAX's safety level vs NG/320NEO etc, will not be found in general piloting skills. Priorities to improve airline safety:
1) fix MCAS;
2) fix the regulatory system which allowed MCAS to be certified;
3) check if anything else escaped the same regulatory system for recent Type Certificates under that very system;
4) fix GTF engine issues;
5) fix RR turbine blade issues;
6) I must have missed several other issues . . .
7) fix worldwide pilot training issues.

I'm sure this will not stop you from continuing distracting this thread from the important issues of 1), 2) and 3).

Improving training on all aircraft should be a very high priority. The pilots are the final backup to any non-normal situation. The fact that the 737NG and A320 have had a historically low rate of failures that need to be dealt with doesn't mean that training shouldn't be improved. With the good designs of the 737NG, A320, A330/340, 777, 787 (post battery fix), CRJ700/800/900, etc. combined with training being at the proper level, the hull loss rates of those models should be near zero. Although they are very low, only the 787 and CRJ rates are actually zero. I didn't include the A350 because it hasn't (as of last available data) reached 1 million flights yet.

I want worldwide training to be at a level where all pilots are skilled enough to save planes unless there are extreme situations like structural failures from explosions or dual engine failure at low altitude. If training had been at that level, I am confident that the Lion Air and ET crews would have been able to recover from MCAS, regardless of how horrifically poor the design of MCAS was.

I don't blame the pilots for the MAX crashes. The blame goes in order of:

1) Terrible, borderline incompetent system design by Boeing that caused an unacceptable failure rate of a critical control surface
2) Unacceptable oversight of certification of said system by the FAA
3) Lion Air maintenance and maintenance system for Lion Air crash
4) Inadquate pilot training that left neither crew with the knowlege or skill to recover from a severe, non-normal situation

Great post - you said it a lot better I could.

morrisond wrote:

par13del wrote:

Interested wrote:

Did anyone you ever have a need to write lots of posts calling for better pilot training around the world for pilots UNTIL Max crashed ?

Be honest ?

Remind us again of the Airbus A330 design issues in the Air France fatal crash.

Or the calls for better training (not me but people made them) after the Colgan crash or the Asiana SFO crash. All related to poor training and all saveable with proper training.

We almost shouldn't have had any fatal's in the last 10 years if training was doing what it was supposed too.

Quite frankly I avoided these crash threads for the last 10 years until these ones - but the mistakes have grown so bad - we need to focus on it again.

The MAX needs to be fixed but the training system needs to be fixed as well.

You will never be able to design the prefect airplane and even with the perfect airplane airplane parts will fail - Pilots need to be able to control aircraft manually - that is a minimum requirement of there training and almost all the last fatal's - Pilot's are showing they don't have the basic necessary required skills.

14ccKemiskt wrote:

planecane wrote:

PW100 wrote:

The MAX training system seems to be more of an issue than anything else flying today. That combined with poorly implemented MCAS system is why only the MAX is grounded. Those poorly trained pilots have no issues flying herds of NG and 320NEO day after day after day.

That is not to say that general piloting skills and training (especially outside northern hemisphere) can't be improved. But the defining difference in MAX's safety level vs NG/320NEO etc, will not be found in general piloting skills. Priorities to improve airline safety:
1) fix MCAS;
2) fix the regulatory system which allowed MCAS to be certified;
3) check if anything else escaped the same regulatory system for recent Type Certificates under that very system;
4) fix GTF engine issues;
5) fix RR turbine blade issues;
6) I must have missed several other issues . . .
7) fix worldwide pilot training issues.

I'm sure this will not stop you from continuing distracting this thread from the important issues of 1), 2) and 3).

Improving training on all aircraft should be a very high priority. The pilots are the final backup to any non-normal situation. The fact that the 737NG and A320 have had a historically low rate of failures that need to be dealt with doesn't mean that training shouldn't be improved. With the good designs of the 737NG, A320, A330/340, 777, 787 (post battery fix), CRJ700/800/900, etc. combined with training being at the proper level, the hull loss rates of those models should be near zero. Although they are very low, only the 787 and CRJ rates are actually zero. I didn't include the A350 because it hasn't (as of last available data) reached 1 million flights yet.

I want worldwide training to be at a level where all pilots are skilled enough to save planes unless there are extreme situations like structural failures from explosions or dual engine failure at low altitude. If training had been at that level, I am confident that the Lion Air and ET crews would have been able to recover from MCAS, regardless of how horrifically poor the design of MCAS was.

I don't blame the pilots for the MAX crashes. The blame goes in order of:

1) Terrible, borderline incompetent system design by Boeing that caused an unacceptable failure rate of a critical control surface
2) Unacceptable oversight of certification of said system by the FAA
3) Lion Air maintenance and maintenance system for Lion Air crash
4) Inadquate pilot training that left neither crew with the knowlege or skill to recover from a severe, non-normal situation

Agree with this. I predict NMA will be abandoned now in favour of a new narrow body launched within 2–3 years that can take the A320/A321/XLR more or less head on while still delivering cheap 737s fore quite some time.

Jouhou wrote:

14ccKemiskt wrote:

planecane wrote:

Improving training on all aircraft should be a very high priority. The pilots are the final backup to any non-normal situation. The fact that the 737NG and A320 have had a historically low rate of failures that need to be dealt with doesn't mean that training shouldn't be improved. With the good designs of the 737NG, A320, A330/340, 777, 787 (post battery fix), CRJ700/800/900, etc. combined with training being at the proper level, the hull loss rates of those models should be near zero. Although they are very low, only the 787 and CRJ rates are actually zero. I didn't include the A350 because it hasn't (as of last available data) reached 1 million flights yet.

I want worldwide training to be at a level where all pilots are skilled enough to save planes unless there are extreme situations like structural failures from explosions or dual engine failure at low altitude. If training had been at that level, I am confident that the Lion Air and ET crews would have been able to recover from MCAS, regardless of how horrifically poor the design of MCAS was.

I don't blame the pilots for the MAX crashes. The blame goes in order of:

1) Terrible, borderline incompetent system design by Boeing that caused an unacceptable failure rate of a critical control surface
2) Unacceptable oversight of certification of said system by the FAA
3) Lion Air maintenance and maintenance system for Lion Air crash
4) Inadquate pilot training that left neither crew with the knowlege or skill to recover from a severe, non-normal situation

Agree with this. I predict NMA will be abandoned now in favour of a new narrow body launched within 2–3 years that can take the A320/A321/XLR more or less head on while still delivering cheap 737s fore quite some time.

I predict the NMA will be more 757 sized than 767 sized because of it. Before they worried about cannibalizing their own sales, now they probably aren't so worried about it.

par13del wrote:

So no new news for the international regulators, no leaks of information or is that only an American thing?
We know the FAA has the fix, any word on their timeline for reviewing the fix? Once done we know test flights will follow then a period for review before approval or rejection, that would at least give us a better indication of timing and next step, versus what we have now.
Is there no one available for the fifth estate to offer "incentives" for breaking news?

14ccKemiskt wrote:

FAA won't let this one go easy. Boeing abused their trust and will now have to pay dearly o regain it.

I would not be surprised if the 737 Max will have to go through a full recertification process.

par13del wrote:

So no new news for the international regulators, no leaks of information or is that only an American thing?

Federal Aviation Administration, barring last-minute schedule changes or unexpected hurdles, as early as this week has tentative plans to begin test flights of proposed software fixes to the MAX fleet, according to people familiar with the matter.

The long-anticipated certification tests, these people said, have been planned with the support of European and Canadian regulators. They could take a week or more to complete, according to one person briefed on the anticipated timeline, and would be followed by additional weeks of FAA experts analyzing and formally documenting the test results.

ArgentoSystems wrote:

par13del wrote:

So no new news for the international regulators, no leaks of information or is that only an American thing?

according to people familiar with the matter:

Federal Aviation Administration, barring last-minute schedule changes or unexpected hurdles, as early as this week has tentative plans to begin test flights of proposed software fixes to the MAX fleet, according to people familiar with the matter.

The long-anticipated certification tests, these people said, have been planned with the support of European and Canadian regulators. They could take a week or more to complete, according to one person briefed on the anticipated timeline, and would be followed by additional weeks of FAA experts analyzing and formally documenting the test results.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-ceo ... 1560697321

Agrajag wrote:

https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/jun/16/boeing-max-737-jet-crisis-we-shouldve-been-more-open-says-ceo

Every time he opens his mouth its an insult to those who died.

"“When I make comments about the previous design and how we followed those processes, that’s something we put a lot of thought and depth of analysis into. That doesn’t mean that it can’t be improved.”

"clearly we can make improvements"

It is a disgrace.

planecane wrote:

Can we now put to rest the theory about the FAA going about this on its own and the meetings with worldwide regulators was some kind of dog and pony show? Also, can we also put to rest the notition that there is going to be a complete recertification of the MAX?

planecane wrote:

ArgentoSystems wrote:

par13del wrote:

So no new news for the international regulators, no leaks of information or is that only an American thing?

according to people familiar with the matter:

Federal Aviation Administration, barring last-minute schedule changes or unexpected hurdles, as early as this week has tentative plans to begin test flights of proposed software fixes to the MAX fleet, according to people familiar with the matter.

The long-anticipated certification tests, these people said, have been planned with the support of European and Canadian regulators. They could take a week or more to complete, according to one person briefed on the anticipated timeline, and would be followed by additional weeks of FAA experts analyzing and formally documenting the test results.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-ceo ... 1560697321

Can we now put to rest the theory about the FAA going about this on its own and the meetings with worldwide regulators was some kind of dog and pony show?

smartplane wrote:

planecane wrote:

ArgentoSystems wrote:

according to people familiar with the matter:

https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-ceo ... 1560697321

Can we now put to rest the theory about the FAA going about this on its own and the meetings with worldwide regulators was some kind of dog and pony show?

oschkosch wrote:

Agrajag wrote:

https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/jun/16/boeing-max-737-jet-crisis-we-shouldve-been-more-open-says-ceo

Every time he opens his mouth its an insult to those who died.

"“When I make comments about the previous design and how we followed those processes, that’s something we put a lot of thought and depth of analysis into. That doesn’t mean that it can’t be improved.”

"clearly we can make improvements"

It is a disgrace.

I heard that he is not even attending Paris Air Show the coming week.

Gesendet von meinem SM-G950F mit Tapatalk

morrisond wrote:

Interested wrote:

morrisond wrote:

It also says the SIM was harder in some situations than real life.

So what is everyone's point? How would that have changed what happened on ET302? It would not have changed what happened on ET302 one iota.

If you take the interpretation from the Pre-lim report that they were actually trying the trim wheels - the Co-pilot if he actually tried the trim and not just Manually flicking the Electric trim - tried in total for maybe 2-3 seconds if you take into account the time it would have taken for the conversation as well.

Here is the relevant part of the prelim report

At 05:41:46, the Captain asked the First-Officer if the trim is functional. The First-Officer has replied that the trim was not working and asked if he could try it manually. The Captain told him to try. At 05:41:54, the First-Officer replied that it is not working.

There is only 8 seconds between these two.

Time for yourself how long it takes to ask someone if the trim was working and how long long it takes to ask back - should I try manually - that takes 5-6 seconds especially on headsets where you try not to talk over each other.

That would leave 2-3 seconds for the co-pilot - if he actually did try the Manual trim wheels to extend the handle and try it.

Somehow I think it entirely implausible that he accomplished that task in the time available - and if he did why so little time and effort spent on it or why did he not ask for help from the pilot or why not some remark that it is stuck.

However 2-3 seconds is long enough to try an electric trim switch.

All this however is all irrelevant anyways though as even if he did try the manual trim wheel they were well above Vmo and it's debatable how effective it would have been anyways.

Leaving it in TOGA thrust at this point was a much larger issue to the safe conclusion of the flight than not being able to control the trim.

This all being said - even if the MAX is scrapped (which is highly unlikely - and not necessary - but some on here think it's a good idea) - these Pilot training issues still exist and need to be corrected.

How can anyone on these boards not say that Pilot performance could have been better and training could be beefed up to improve safety?

The 100% it's not the Pilot's fault crowd continues to ignore these training issues and continues to ignore ET409 - a perfectly good airplane (737NG) that was flown into the ground by a Captain who went through primary 737 Training at about the same time as the ET302 Captain.

Then we also have media reports that even if ET did give it's pilot's the MCAS procedure - it was literally in an email and did not even require it's pilots to acknowledge receipt - Yes that is a real safety first culture.

However if you are comfortable flying with ET (or almost any Modern trained pilot) in instrument conditions or even Visual and facing a loss of automation then good for you.

You like gambling with your life a lot more than I like to with mine.

It's a pretty simple concept to me

ZERO point analysing details of pilots actions as every disaster is different anyway.

We have ZERO concerns about safety on NG.

We don't want situations on planes full stop where manual trim can crash a plane or turning automation off can make a plane more dangerous

Why introduce new risks we don't need??

So don't design planes that bring more likelihood of manual trim being needed or automation having to be turned off etc etc because of issues on the new design

Me personally I don't want any pilot training to be needed a tiny percentage more than its already needed on the NG. If they get more training great. But I want it to be irrelevant anyway.

Weve moved so far forwards in aviation safety in recent decades - why would we ever want to move backwards and relying on pilots to bail plane design out?

Weve lost before we've even started if we need better training on NG just to maintain existing safety rates that don't need better training on NG?

Surely you can understand this logic??

It's not better training on an MAX vs NG.

It's better training on all aircraft.

You have a 330, a 777, an Dash 8-400, multiple Overruns on lots of different frames, and the MAX where some fatalities have occurred where better training on Manual flight would have saved lives.

Why can't you understand this logic?

And once again People ignore the questions - how would more accurately modelled trim wheel forces in the NG have resulted in no MAX fatalities?

There are reports on here where 737 pilots have used the trim wheel in sims (or don't know they have fold out handles) since initial type rating.

Those are training issues.

Boeing, the FAA and Training needs to be looked at.

Sancho99504 wrote:

morrisond wrote:

Interested wrote:

It's a pretty simple concept to me

ZERO point analysing details of pilots actions as every disaster is different anyway.

We have ZERO concerns about safety on NG.

We don't want situations on planes full stop where manual trim can crash a plane or turning automation off can make a plane more dangerous

Why introduce new risks we don't need??

So don't design planes that bring more likelihood of manual trim being needed or automation having to be turned off etc etc because of issues on the new design

Me personally I don't want any pilot training to be needed a tiny percentage more than its already needed on the NG. If they get more training great. But I want it to be irrelevant anyway.

Weve moved so far forwards in aviation safety in recent decades - why would we ever want to move backwards and relying on pilots to bail plane design out?

Weve lost before we've even started if we need better training on NG just to maintain existing safety rates that don't need better training on NG?

Surely you can understand this logic??

It's not better training on an MAX vs NG.

It's better training on all aircraft.

You have a 330, a 777, an Dash 8-400, multiple Overruns on lots of different frames, and the MAX where some fatalities have occurred where better training on Manual flight would have saved lives.

Why can't you understand this logic?

And once again People ignore the questions - how would more accurately modelled trim wheel forces in the NG have resulted in no MAX fatalities?

There are reports on here where 737 pilots have used the trim wheel in sims (or don't know they have fold out handles) since initial type rating.

Those are training issues.

Boeing, the FAA and Training needs to be looked at.

I feel that, after reading post trips on some of these overruns, getthereitis seems to be the biggest culprit. Instead of going around, being put back into the queue, reestablishing the approach, landing, writing a report on the go around, etc., these pilots pushed the envelope. That is a sign of impatience, which you can't train away. You can deter the behavior with stiff punishment, but patience isn't trainable.

Colgan 3407 should have diverted or at the minimum, held until conditions improved.
Miami Air 293 should have gone around
Southwest 1455 should have gone around
Southwest 1248 should have gone around
Southwest 278......
American 331


This list is quite long.

planecane wrote:

There are many people on here that have said these things. The article talks about the EASA and Canadian CAA being involved in the planning of the test flights, therefore I quoted it to show people that the FAA isn't just giving "lip service" to having worldwide regulators involved. Also, if a complete recertification was on the table, they wouldn't be working together to test the MCAS software fix because it wouldn't matter at this point if it passes or not. It would be part of a certification flight test regimen.

GalaxyFlyer wrote:

Sancho99504 wrote:

morrisond wrote:

It's not better training on an MAX vs NG.

It's better training on all aircraft.

You have a 330, a 777, an Dash 8-400, multiple Overruns on lots of different frames, and the MAX where some fatalities have occurred where better training on Manual flight would have saved lives.

Why can't you understand this logic?

And once again People ignore the questions - how would more accurately modelled trim wheel forces in the NG have resulted in no MAX fatalities?

There are reports on here where 737 pilots have used the trim wheel in sims (or don't know they have fold out handles) since initial type rating.

Those are training issues.

Boeing, the FAA and Training needs to be looked at.

I feel that, after reading post trips on some of these overruns, getthereitis seems to be the biggest culprit. Instead of going around, being put back into the queue, reestablishing the approach, landing, writing a report on the go around, etc., these pilots pushed the envelope. That is a sign of impatience, which you can't train away. You can deter the behavior with stiff punishment, but patience isn't trainable.

Colgan 3407 should have diverted or at the minimum, held until conditions improved.
Miami Air 293 should have gone around
Southwest 1455 should have gone around
Southwest 1248 should have gone around
Southwest 278......
American 331


This list is quite long.

Colgan 3407 didn’t need to divert or hold because weather wasn’t an issue that night.

GF

Sooner787 wrote:

FluidFlow wrote:

Oman Air is not really happy with Boeing right now.

“We will not allow the aircraft to fly if we have not found an acceptable answer to all our questions, whatever the FAA does” — Patrick Ky, EASA director