According to Sully.
"I recently experienced all these warnings in a 737 MAX flight simulator during recreations of the accident flights. Even knowing what was going to happen, I could see how crews could have run out of time before they could have solved the problems. Prior to these accidents, I think it is unlikely that any US airline pilots were confronted with this scenario in simulator training," Chesley "Sully" Sullenberger told the House Transportation Committee during a hearing on the embattled plane model.
Since its quiet. Thought I'd throw together the direct quotes I could find from the Congress Sub-Committee hearing this week.
“It is clear that the original version of MCAS was fatally flawed and should never have been approved,”
"These crashes are demonstrable evidence that our current system of aircraft design and certification failed us,". "The accidents should never have happened."
Told the panel that it’s important pilots don’t have “inadvertent traps.”
"Boeing designs and engineers and manufacturers superb aircraft". "Unfortunately in the case of the Max, I'll have to agree with the Boeing CEO, they let the traveling public down in a fatal and catastrophic way."
"A huge error of omission was the fact that Boeing failed to disclose the existence of the MCAS system to the pilot community around the world,"
Carey says Boeing's failures have created a "crisis of trust" between the airplane-maker and pilots.
(NB: It is also reported elsewhere that some airline pilots were assured, post JT610, that AOA disagree was fitted and operable before take-off neither of which was quite true - and they know it now)
"Reading about it on an iPad is not even close to sufficient. Pilots must experience it physically, firsthand."(NB: I believe we know that MCAS, nor the change in Stab Trim Cut-Out Switch function were even mentioned at all in the original iPad training either)
“They need to develop a muscle memory of their experiences so that it will be immediately accessible to them in the future, even years from now, when they experience such a crisis,” “It needs to be intuitive.”
“We should all want pilots to experience these challenging situations for the first time in a simulator, not in flight with passengers and crew on board,” (NB: I believe we know the MAX Simulators, of which there was only one on the North American continent in airline hands, could not simulate MCAS or reflect actual manual Trim Wheel forces)
“We must make sure that everyone who occupies a pilot seat is fully armed with the information, knowledge, training, skill and judgment to be able to be the absolute master of the aircraft and all its component systems and of the situations simultaneously and continuously throughout the flight,”(NB: I believe we know that neither MCAS or the erroneously missing AOA Disagree alert were known before November 2018)
“I recently experienced all these warnings in a 737 MAX flight simulator during recreations of the accident flights. Even knowing what was going to happen, I could see how crews could have run out of time and altitude before they could have solved the problems. Prior to these accidents, I think it is unlikely that any US airline pilots were confronted with this scenario in simulator training,” (NB: I believe we know that Runaway Stabiliser NNC also was not on the training sylybus before February 2019)
"I can tell you firsthand that the startle factor is real and it's huge. It absolutely interferes with one's ability to quickly analyze the crisis and take corrective action,".
Capt. Carey:/Capt. Sullenberger:
"Some (U.S.) crews would have recognized it in time to recover, but some would not have," Carey testified. Sullenberger agreed, saying it's unlikely that more experienced pilots would have had different outcomes, adding, "we shouldn't have to expect pilots to compensate for flawed designs."
"These two recent crashes happened in foreign countries," said Sullenberger. "But if we do not address all the important issues and factors, they can and will happen here."