I agree strongly on this one, but a lot of people on this site seem fine with dupeing customers and being untransparent about what aircraft type they're flying on.
At the end of the day, whether you think the MAX is safe or not, I don't see why anyone shouldn't support passengers being informed. And it's not even specific to the MAX, but should apply to all flights in general.
It sickens me to think that this might impact the reputation of the NG.
What are the airlines supposed to do? The precedent would be that every time an airliner is involved in an accident, the airline tells people when they book or board that plane?
Why does there have to be an accident to make it clear and easy to the public in the booking process what plane you will be flying on
Also when you buy a car now it has a safety rating - why not have the same for planes?
It is pretty clear on every airline website I've used if you view flight details or seat maps. The exception is Southwest where clicking on the flight number will show the information. However, with the MAX8 and -800 they probably have a decent number of on the fly swaps since that is the whole point of their fleet commonality.
As far as a safety rating, what would it be based on? Automobile safely ratings are based upon survivability in a crash, not the likelihood to be in a crash.
For aircraft you can't use hull loss rate because most are caused by factors other than the aircraft. You can't really try to do it based on design issues because all certified aircraft are supposed to meet the same safety requirements. After MCAS 2.0, the MAX won't be any less safe than the NG which has proven to be extremely safe.
Now I'm sure you will bring up the scenario of needing MCAS when it is disabled. The chain of events that would have to take place would be unbelievably unlikely. The pilots would have to be forced into an edge of envelope maneuver while diverting when they will know MCAS is unavailable and be told (by whatever NNC is created for the warning) not to perform the maneuvers that would require it.
Also, I'm 99% sure the regulations say a stall has to be recoverable. Even if lack of MCAS leads to a stall in some crazy chain of events, the pilots will be able to get out of the stall.
I would expect that after MCAS 2.0 there will never be a serious incident related to MCAS either activating erroneously or not being available. This includes the infinitesimal possibility of dual AoA failure where they are both reading an AoA below the activation trigger AND the pilots end up doing an edge of envelope maneuver. Even in that probably 1 in 10 billion scenario, a stall should still be recoverable.
Last edited by planecane
on Mon Jun 24, 2019 9:49 am, edited 1 time in total.