Who is going to define mistakes in design and certification flow, Boeing, the FAA? Whistle blowers are all over so details should be easy to find.
Then all similar situation will also require specifics, so far we have no specifics and or details.
Non-disclosure, trade secrets and what not. So far, Boeing remains the company which edited out the list of hot-and-high airports in US from the public document. Tells you something about their attitude towards information.
Redactions from public documents does not mean a company is hiding things from regulators. The public doesn't have a right to know proprietary information. Even in a criminal case such information can be sealed by a judge to protect proprietary information.
What on Earth does which airports Boeing considers to be "hot and high" with respect to 737 performance have to do with safety?
Some posters in this thread have lost all sense of logic. Boeing made a gross miscalculation in how pilots would respond to an MCAS failure. They used this miscalculation as the basis for other poor decisions. However, even if the FAA was fully staffed with expert pilots and engineers and had done all of the certification testing and analysis, I suspect that MCAS 1.0 would have still made it through.
I say this because expert pilots would assume that any pilot would easily recognize a runaway stabilizer and the expert engineers would listen to those pilots.
As evidenced by the investigative reporting there wasn't a disregard for safety. They thought it was safe. Even the goal of no simulator training didn't preclude a 2 sensor solution. The original incarnation with the AoA and g force sensor had the remote possibility of not activating when needed and there wasn't going to be simulator training for that.
It seems the primary reason to go with a single AoA sensor was dispatch reliability. Not the $1 million per aircraft to WN if simulator training was required.
With MCAS 2.0, do we really want pilots wasting valuable simulator time practicing some very unlikely case where MCAS is disabled and they end up doing an extreme maneuver that reduces stick force a little bit and makes it slightly easier to end up in a stall attitude? Especially since a stall should be easily recoverable anyway.
Restrictions on configurations etc. for 'Hot & Airports' is all about safety, nothing else. The poster was pointing out aspects of Boeing actions that do not engender trust.
Several 'expert' pilots are on record as posted in these threads that disagree with your runaway stabilizer easily recognisable remark, especially in already trying circumstances.
In my opinion, assuming this quote is genuine etc, it is a good example of what could be considered a disregard for safety:
"It wasn't like it was there to cover some safety or certification requirement," the person said. "The trigger isn't a safeguard. It tells (the system) when to operate." https://insurancenewsnet.com/oarticle/t ... RIBpG5Fzct
Personally, I wouldn't buy a lawnmower with that persons name on it.
As I pointed out yesterday the MAX MMEL does not include AOA Sensor and therefore one sensor down is a 'no despatch'. (Single AOA sensor despatch was in the NG MMEL). - Despatch Reliability does not then seem to hold water as the latest concocted 'reason' for incompetent design.
I suspect there was never going to be any simulator training, no matter what, because the commercial imperatives set would appear to be Cert under the existing Technical Certificate and no simulator training.
At least Runaway Stabiliser NNC is now on the training syllabus. If the pilots want additional time on the simulator, I say give it to them.