With MCAS 2.0, do we really want pilots wasting valuable simulator time practicing some very unlikely case where MCAS is disabled and they end up doing an extreme maneuver that reduces stick force a little bit and makes it slightly easier to end up in a stall attitude? Especially since a stall should be easily recoverable anyway.
If the picture is as rosy as you make it to be, sure. But I would like to be a little more cautious.
First of all, an evasive maneuver resulting in a tight wind-up turn is fortunately unlikely, but it is also plausible and it would occur in emergency conditions, where the lives of crew and passengers could be in immediate danger. If extra MAX specific flight training is not OK, and simulator training is also not OK, that means that your pilot would experience the "little bit" of stick force change for the first time in his or her life right during that emergency maneuver. I wouldn't want to be on that plane.
"Slightly easier to end up in a stall attitude"? "Easily recoverable anyway"? Maybe, maybe not. The picture that is slowly (excruciatingly slowly) emerging from the leaks is that the pitching moment generated by the engine nacelle is, if not a red herring, probably only a part of the picture. More and more the big question mark seems to be what the engine does to the wing airflow around and post stall. Dominic Gates's latest article adds a new technical tidbit:
"[...] The lack of smooth feel was caused by the jet's tendency to pitch up, influenced by shock waves that form over the wing at high speeds and the extra lift surface provided by the pods around the MAX's engines [...]
While the problem was narrow in scope, it proved difficult to cope with. The engineers first tried tweaking the plane's aerodynamic shape, according to two workers familiar with the testing. They placed vortex generators -- small metal vanes on the wings -- to help modify the flow of air, trying them in different locations, in different quantities and at different angles. They also explored altering the shape of the wing.
Two people familiar with the discussions said 737 MAX chief test pilot Ray Craig preferred such a physical solution to solve the plane's aerodynamics. [...]
But the aerodynamic solutions didn't produce enough effect, the two people said, and so the engineers turned to MCAS. [...]"
The transonic effects (shock stall?) had never been mentioned before. The impossibility to fix the aerodynamic problem at the root had.
Anyway, all of this is easy to check. With MCAS 2.0 operating normally, perform a high speed wind up turn through stall, and recover. A few extra minutes of flight test and we'll know if this is a problem and how big. I hope the FAA or someone else does it.