Aviation737 wrote:Does anyone know when the grounding will be lifted?
Not even Boeing themselves. different dates are thrown around, June, July, August... time will tell.
Moderators: richierich, ua900, PanAm_DC10, hOMSaR
Aviation737 wrote:Does anyone know when the grounding will be lifted?
morrisond wrote:SEU wrote:morrisond wrote:
That's not a bad list for Lionair - ET should have known how to handle MCAS and it's now obvious they did not - which I highly suspect is because there Airline never told them/trained them - but that's another subject.
MCAS V2 - properly implemented shouldn't really need training as the outcome would be so benign and the counteraction so simple (return trim to normal and hit cutout switches) that it should not require SIM time.
However what the two crashes has uncovered is severe deficiencies in non-normal procedures that Pilots are required to know as Memory items.
And this does not seem to be a third world airline issue only - in the drive to cut costs this type of training has been cut to bare regulatory minimums - those Regulatory standards need to be made tougher.
Can I ask why you think the Crew should have known how to handle a faulty AOA sensor whilst the plane was flying nose down into the ground, without it being anywhere in the paper manual (page 300 or something like that)?
On Lionair it's debatable. It kind of looked like Runaway Stabilizer so it would have made sense to turn off power to the system - but yes there was no particular procedure for the symptoms they were facing. However you can't write procedures for every potential failure - at some point you have to assume a pilot would recognize a system (Electric Trim) is faulty and turn it off and fly manually. They properly counteracted MCAS 22 times. I have used the following example many times and no one has a good answer.
"If there was a fault in the Autopilot System and it tried to turn you right (or put you in a dive) 22 times - would you keep it engaged or turn it off?"
On ET at the time of the flight they should have fully known all about MCAS and the conditions that caused it and have been highly proficient on the procedure to counter it if the Airline had done the training they said they did (I think all they said was that they supplied the procedure) - however there are some reports they never even did that.
Pilots at American Airlines angrily pushed Boeing officials at a tense meeting in November for a fix to its 737 Max aircraft that crashed in Indonesia in October.
They asked Boeing to take emergency action that would have likely grounded the Max, but Boeing officials resisted.
The pilots union shared an audio recording with CNBC
morrisond wrote:SEU wrote:morrisond wrote:
On ET at the time of the flight they should have fully known all about MCAS and the conditions that caused it and have been highly proficient on the procedure to counter it if the Airline had done the training they said they did (I think all they said was that they supplied the procedure) - however there are some reports they never even did that.
morrisond wrote:[...]
MCAS V2 - properly implemented shouldn't really need training as the outcome would be so benign and the counteraction so simple (return trim to normal and hit cutout switches) that it should not require SIM time.
[...]
XRAYretired wrote:He knows not what he is saying?
-Sinnett said that Boeing felt pilots did not need to know more about the system, given how unlikely it was to misfire.
"I don't know that understanding this system would've changed the outcome on this. In a million miles, you're going to maybe fly this airplane, maybe once you're going to see this, ever. So we try not to overload the crews with information that's unnecessary so they actually know the information we believe is important," he said, according to the recording obtained by CBS.-
From <https://www.businessinsider.com/boeing-played-down-737-max-second-crash-concern-pilots-audio-reports-2019-5?r=US&IR=T>
As a rough estimate. 1E6 miles ~=3500 flight hours~=1 year service. With 5000 A/C in the fleet eventually, it would be experienced ~5000 times every year.
Don't think this is what he meant - but he said it!
NB Even if he meant 1E6 flight hours, that would still work out ~280 times a year!
Would have thought he would have a more convincing grasp on the numbers for such an important meeting?
Ray
morrisond wrote:SEU wrote:morrisond wrote:
That's not a bad list for Lionair - ET should have known how to handle MCAS and it's now obvious they did not - which I highly suspect is because there Airline never told them/trained them - but that's another subject.
MCAS V2 - properly implemented shouldn't really need training as the outcome would be so benign and the counteraction so simple (return trim to normal and hit cutout switches) that it should not require SIM time.
However what the two crashes has uncovered is severe deficiencies in non-normal procedures that Pilots are required to know as Memory items.
And this does not seem to be a third world airline issue only - in the drive to cut costs this type of training has been cut to bare regulatory minimums - those Regulatory standards need to be made tougher.
Can I ask why you think the Crew should have known how to handle a faulty AOA sensor whilst the plane was flying nose down into the ground, without it being anywhere in the paper manual (page 300 or something like that)?
On Lionair it's debatable. It kind of looked like Runaway Stabilizer so it would have made sense to turn off power to the system - but yes there was no particular procedure for the symptoms they were facing. However you can't write procedures for every potential failure - at some point you have to assume a pilot would recognize a system (Electric Trim) is faulty and turn it off and fly manually. They properly counteracted MCAS 22 times. I have used the following example many times and no one has a good answer.
"If there was a fault in the Autopilot System and it tried to turn you right (or put you in a dive) 22 times - would you keep it engaged or turn it off?"
On ET at the time of the flight they should have fully known all about MCAS and the conditions that caused it and have been highly proficient on the procedure to counter it if the Airline had done the training they said they did (I think all they said was that they supplied the procedure) - however there are some reports they never even did that.
morrisond wrote:SEU wrote:morrisond wrote:
That's not a bad list for Lionair - ET should have known how to handle MCAS and it's now obvious they did not - which I highly suspect is because there Airline never told them/trained them - but that's another subject.
MCAS V2 - properly implemented shouldn't really need training as the outcome would be so benign and the counteraction so simple (return trim to normal and hit cutout switches) that it should not require SIM time.
However what the two crashes has uncovered is severe deficiencies in non-normal procedures that Pilots are required to know as Memory items.
And this does not seem to be a third world airline issue only - in the drive to cut costs this type of training has been cut to bare regulatory minimums - those Regulatory standards need to be made tougher.
Can I ask why you think the Crew should have known how to handle a faulty AOA sensor whilst the plane was flying nose down into the ground, without it being anywhere in the paper manual (page 300 or something like that)?
On Lionair it's debatable. It kind of looked like Runaway Stabilizer so it would have made sense to turn off power to the system - but yes there was no particular procedure for the symptoms they were facing. However you can't write procedures for every potential failure - at some point you have to assume a pilot would recognize a system (Electric Trim) is faulty and turn it off and fly manually. They properly counteracted MCAS 22 times. I have used the following example many times and no one has a good answer.
"If there was a fault in the Autopilot System and it tried to turn you right (or put you in a dive) 22 times - would you keep it engaged or turn it off?"
On ET at the time of the flight they should have fully known all about MCAS and the conditions that caused it and have been highly proficient on the procedure to counter it if the Airline had done the training they said they did (I think all they said was that they supplied the procedure) - however there are some reports they never even did that.
bgm wrote:morrisond wrote:SEU wrote:
Can I ask why you think the Crew should have known how to handle a faulty AOA sensor whilst the plane was flying nose down into the ground, without it being anywhere in the paper manual (page 300 or something like that)?
On Lionair it's debatable. It kind of looked like Runaway Stabilizer so it would have made sense to turn off power to the system - but yes there was no particular procedure for the symptoms they were facing. However you can't write procedures for every potential failure - at some point you have to assume a pilot would recognize a system (Electric Trim) is faulty and turn it off and fly manually. They properly counteracted MCAS 22 times. I have used the following example many times and no one has a good answer.
"If there was a fault in the Autopilot System and it tried to turn you right (or put you in a dive) 22 times - would you keep it engaged or turn it off?"
On ET at the time of the flight they should have fully known all about MCAS and the conditions that caused it and have been highly proficient on the procedure to counter it if the Airline had done the training they said they did (I think all they said was that they supplied the procedure) - however there are some reports they never even did that.
Out of curiosity, you yourself stated that Boeing was 60-80% to blame upthread, so why are all your threads only laying blame the pilots?
XRAYretired wrote:morrisond wrote:SEU wrote:
Can I ask why you think the Crew should have known how to handle a faulty AOA sensor whilst the plane was flying nose down into the ground, without it being anywhere in the paper manual (page 300 or something like that)?
On Lionair it's debatable. It kind of looked like Runaway Stabilizer so it would have made sense to turn off power to the system - but yes there was no particular procedure for the symptoms they were facing. However you can't write procedures for every potential failure - at some point you have to assume a pilot would recognize a system (Electric Trim) is faulty and turn it off and fly manually. They properly counteracted MCAS 22 times. I have used the following example many times and no one has a good answer.
"If there was a fault in the Autopilot System and it tried to turn you right (or put you in a dive) 22 times - would you keep it engaged or turn it off?"
On ET at the time of the flight they should have fully known all about MCAS and the conditions that caused it and have been highly proficient on the procedure to counter it if the Airline had done the training they said they did (I think all they said was that they supplied the procedure) - however there are some reports they never even did that.
Stuck in the worn grove again eh. Thought you'd turned a leaf for a while. Missed your usual first line of Boeing should have done better but...
Please dont call the dead pilots out for not having the sense.
Please dont call the Ethiopian CEO a liar without any evidence. Especially since you know full well his statement that the pilots had been given the information etc. and you know that the report you are referring to is contrary to the Preliminary Report and thereby discredited at least in part.
Good of you to recognise "many" repeats. The analogy doesn't hold water since Pilots would know Autopilot exists as a system and was capable of the deed. Pilots had no knowledge that MCAS existed never mind that it would keep pushing the nose down even when counteracted.
I think one of the plaintiffs legals put it succinctly:
“The FAA is wrong to push the narrative that the pilots were responsible for the two disasters because the Boeing MCAS created the hazardous condition that caused the two crashes and the system actually fought against the efforts of the pilots who were trying to save the airplanes. That is why it is so awful to hear Mr. Elwell blame the pilots for the accidents. Modern aviation safety systems are designed to prevent pilot error from causing the loss of an airplane. The MCAS does the opposite – it creates the hazardous condition and induces the pilot error."
https://www.eturbonews.com/252204/shock ... 737-8-max/
Ray
XRAYretired wrote:morrisond wrote:SEU wrote:
Can I ask why you think the Crew should have known how to handle a faulty AOA sensor whilst the plane was flying nose down into the ground, without it being anywhere in the paper manual (page 300 or something like that)?
On Lionair it's debatable. It kind of looked like Runaway Stabilizer so it would have made sense to turn off power to the system - but yes there was no particular procedure for the symptoms they were facing. However you can't write procedures for every potential failure - at some point you have to assume a pilot would recognize a system (Electric Trim) is faulty and turn it off and fly manually. They properly counteracted MCAS 22 times. I have used the following example many times and no one has a good answer.
"If there was a fault in the Autopilot System and it tried to turn you right (or put you in a dive) 22 times - would you keep it engaged or turn it off?"
On ET at the time of the flight they should have fully known all about MCAS and the conditions that caused it and have been highly proficient on the procedure to counter it if the Airline had done the training they said they did (I think all they said was that they supplied the procedure) - however there are some reports they never even did that.
Stuck in the worn grove again eh. Thought you'd turned a leaf for a while. Missed your usual first line of Boeing should have done better but...
Please dont call the dead pilots out for not having the sense.
Please dont call the Ethiopian CEO a liar without any evidence. Especially since you know full well his statement that the pilots had been given the information etc. and you know that the report you are referring to is contrary to the Preliminary Report and thereby discredited at least in part.
Good of you to recognise "many" repeats. The analogy doesn't hold water since Pilots would know Autopilot exists as a system and was capable of the deed. Pilots had no knowledge that MCAS existed never mind that it would keep pushing the nose down even when counteracted.
I think one of the plaintiffs legals put it succinctly:
“The FAA is wrong to push the narrative that the pilots were responsible for the two disasters because the Boeing MCAS created the hazardous condition that caused the two crashes and the system actually fought against the efforts of the pilots who were trying to save the airplanes. That is why it is so awful to hear Mr. Elwell blame the pilots for the accidents. Modern aviation safety systems are designed to prevent pilot error from causing the loss of an airplane. The MCAS does the opposite – it creates the hazardous condition and induces the pilot error."
https://www.eturbonews.com/252204/shock ... 737-8-max/
Ray
Revelation wrote:XRAYretired wrote:He knows not what he is saying?
-Sinnett said that Boeing felt pilots did not need to know more about the system, given how unlikely it was to misfire.
"I don't know that understanding this system would've changed the outcome on this. In a million miles, you're going to maybe fly this airplane, maybe once you're going to see this, ever. So we try not to overload the crews with information that's unnecessary so they actually know the information we believe is important," he said, according to the recording obtained by CBS.-
From <https://www.businessinsider.com/boeing-played-down-737-max-second-crash-concern-pilots-audio-reports-2019-5?r=US&IR=T>
As a rough estimate. 1E6 miles ~=3500 flight hours~=1 year service. With 5000 A/C in the fleet eventually, it would be experienced ~5000 times every year.
Don't think this is what he meant - but he said it!
NB Even if he meant 1E6 flight hours, that would still work out ~280 times a year!
Would have thought he would have a more convincing grasp on the numbers for such an important meeting?
Ray
You're estimating the rate at which an individual aircraft might see the MCAS trigger.
He's talking about the rate at which an individual pilot might see the MCAS trigger.
And I think we can presume "a million hours" was a SWAG from an executive and nothing more.
I presume we'll learn more about actual failure rates when the reports come out.
XRAYretired wrote:morrisond wrote:SEU wrote:
Can I ask why you think the Crew should have known how to handle a faulty AOA sensor whilst the plane was flying nose down into the ground, without it being anywhere in the paper manual (page 300 or something like that)?
On Lionair it's debatable. It kind of looked like Runaway Stabilizer so it would have made sense to turn off power to the system - but yes there was no particular procedure for the symptoms they were facing. However you can't write procedures for every potential failure - at some point you have to assume a pilot would recognize a system (Electric Trim) is faulty and turn it off and fly manually. They properly counteracted MCAS 22 times. I have used the following example many times and no one has a good answer.
"If there was a fault in the Autopilot System and it tried to turn you right (or put you in a dive) 22 times - would you keep it engaged or turn it off?"
On ET at the time of the flight they should have fully known all about MCAS and the conditions that caused it and have been highly proficient on the procedure to counter it if the Airline had done the training they said they did (I think all they said was that they supplied the procedure) - however there are some reports they never even did that.
Stuck in the worn grove again eh. Thought you'd turned a leaf for a while. Missed your usual first line of Boeing should have done better but...
Please dont call the dead pilots out for not having the sense.
Please dont call the Ethiopian CEO a liar without any evidence. Especially since you know full well his statement that the pilots had been given the information etc. and you know that the report you are referring to is contrary to the Preliminary Report and thereby discredited at least in part.
Good of you to recognise "many" repeats. The analogy doesn't hold water since Pilots would know Autopilot exists as a system and was capable of the deed. Pilots had no knowledge that MCAS existed never mind that it would keep pushing the nose down even when counteracted.
I think one of the plaintiffs legals put it succinctly:
“The FAA is wrong to push the narrative that the pilots were responsible for the two disasters because the Boeing MCAS created the hazardous condition that caused the two crashes and the system actually fought against the efforts of the pilots who were trying to save the airplanes. That is why it is so awful to hear Mr. Elwell blame the pilots for the accidents. Modern aviation safety systems are designed to prevent pilot error from causing the loss of an airplane. The MCAS does the opposite – it creates the hazardous condition and induces the pilot error."
https://www.eturbonews.com/252204/shock ... 737-8-max/
Ray
SEU wrote:XRAYretired wrote:morrisond wrote:
On Lionair it's debatable. It kind of looked like Runaway Stabilizer so it would have made sense to turn off power to the system - but yes there was no particular procedure for the symptoms they were facing. However you can't write procedures for every potential failure - at some point you have to assume a pilot would recognize a system (Electric Trim) is faulty and turn it off and fly manually. They properly counteracted MCAS 22 times. I have used the following example many times and no one has a good answer.
"If there was a fault in the Autopilot System and it tried to turn you right (or put you in a dive) 22 times - would you keep it engaged or turn it off?"
On ET at the time of the flight they should have fully known all about MCAS and the conditions that caused it and have been highly proficient on the procedure to counter it if the Airline had done the training they said they did (I think all they said was that they supplied the procedure) - however there are some reports they never even did that.
Stuck in the worn grove again eh. Thought you'd turned a leaf for a while. Missed your usual first line of Boeing should have done better but...
Please dont call the dead pilots out for not having the sense.
Please dont call the Ethiopian CEO a liar without any evidence. Especially since you know full well his statement that the pilots had been given the information etc. and you know that the report you are referring to is contrary to the Preliminary Report and thereby discredited at least in part.
Good of you to recognise "many" repeats. The analogy doesn't hold water since Pilots would know Autopilot exists as a system and was capable of the deed. Pilots had no knowledge that MCAS existed never mind that it would keep pushing the nose down even when counteracted.
I think one of the plaintiffs legals put it succinctly:
“The FAA is wrong to push the narrative that the pilots were responsible for the two disasters because the Boeing MCAS created the hazardous condition that caused the two crashes and the system actually fought against the efforts of the pilots who were trying to save the airplanes. That is why it is so awful to hear Mr. Elwell blame the pilots for the accidents. Modern aviation safety systems are designed to prevent pilot error from causing the loss of an airplane. The MCAS does the opposite – it creates the hazardous condition and induces the pilot error."
https://www.eturbonews.com/252204/shock ... 737-8-max/
Ray
Thank you for a bit of reason. It is 100% not the pilots fault that the plane was in a bad way. How dare anyone suggest the pilots were at fault. I understand the FAA and Boeing have to take a stand point to deflect the blame to cover their own backs, its business at the end of the day.
I actually believe they asked trump to ground it not the other way around. Think about it, if boeing and FAA can say they were against the grounding from the start and only grounded it when the POTUS asked them to, they can carry on the narrative that they truely believe the 737MAX to be a safe aircraft, and blame pilots etc to lower the financial damage. Sadly for boeing and their staff the rest of the world probably wont buy their crap anymore.
morrisond wrote:SEU wrote:XRAYretired wrote:
Stuck in the worn grove again eh. Thought you'd turned a leaf for a while. Missed your usual first line of Boeing should have done better but...
Please dont call the dead pilots out for not having the sense.
Please dont call the Ethiopian CEO a liar without any evidence. Especially since you know full well his statement that the pilots had been given the information etc. and you know that the report you are referring to is contrary to the Preliminary Report and thereby discredited at least in part.
Good of you to recognise "many" repeats. The analogy doesn't hold water since Pilots would know Autopilot exists as a system and was capable of the deed. Pilots had no knowledge that MCAS existed never mind that it would keep pushing the nose down even when counteracted.
I think one of the plaintiffs legals put it succinctly:
“The FAA is wrong to push the narrative that the pilots were responsible for the two disasters because the Boeing MCAS created the hazardous condition that caused the two crashes and the system actually fought against the efforts of the pilots who were trying to save the airplanes. That is why it is so awful to hear Mr. Elwell blame the pilots for the accidents. Modern aviation safety systems are designed to prevent pilot error from causing the loss of an airplane. The MCAS does the opposite – it creates the hazardous condition and induces the pilot error."
https://www.eturbonews.com/252204/shock ... 737-8-max/
Ray
Thank you for a bit of reason. It is 100% not the pilots fault that the plane was in a bad way. How dare anyone suggest the pilots were at fault. I understand the FAA and Boeing have to take a stand point to deflect the blame to cover their own backs, its business at the end of the day.
I actually believe they asked trump to ground it not the other way around. Think about it, if boeing and FAA can say they were against the grounding from the start and only grounded it when the POTUS asked them to, they can carry on the narrative that they truely believe the 737MAX to be a safe aircraft, and blame pilots etc to lower the financial damage. Sadly for boeing and their staff the rest of the world probably wont buy their crap anymore.
It's posts like this why I keep posting. Yes the plane was in a bad way - No one is debating that.
However the crashes also uncovered serious deficiencies in Pilot training. That is not blaming the Pilots for the crash.
You have to look at this through a different lense. If MCAS had been more robust from the get go (Maybe two Sensors) and the crews were fully informed of the existence of MCAS and how to counteract it (Supposedly ET had this level of knowledge) but the system still failed (a flock of birds took out both AOA vanes) and the plane crashed - how would you view the crews actions in that scenario?
morrisond wrote:It's posts like this why I keep posting. Yes the plane was in a bad way - No one is debating that.
However the crashes also uncovered serious deficiencies in Pilot training. That is not blaming the Pilots for the crash.
You have to look at this through a different lense. If MCAS had been more robust from the get go (Maybe two Sensors) and the crews were fully informed of the existence of MCAS and how to counteract it (Supposedly ET had this level of knowledge) but the system still failed (a flock of birds took out both AOA vanes) and the plane crashed - how would you view the crews actions in that scenario?
PixelFlight wrote:There are three significant changes to MCAS software being worked on by Boeing:
morrisond wrote:keesje wrote:PW100 wrote:In fact, indications are that the very junior FO, actually was quite up to his task . . .
A minor detail.
(Or am I speculating here? )
The FO got it partially right. He called for the trim cut-off but forgot to mention the part about returning the flight to in-trim before hitting the switches.
That's probably more indicative that he was recalling the Runaway Horizontal Stabilizer procedure.
kalvado wrote:AABusDrvr wrote:This has always been the lament of the new pilot. I know things are different in other parts of the world, but in North America, those that want it bad enough, find a way.
When I was starting out, we became flight instructors, charter or freight pilots, towed banners, or did tours. I even know one guy who flew cadavers for a funeral home. We all learned the hard lessons in airplanes that were much smaller, slower and lighter than an airliner. We scared only ourselves when we made bad decisions.
I think this is where the problem is.
A lot of US pilots are trained by those barely above initial level, things are not systematically learned but picked up by try-and-fail. Crash rate in GA is unbelievable. Some still survive.
So hours of survival are the only professional metrics.
Education requirements for professional pilots are... funny. BA in arts is good enough, no technical background required. My impression is that the phrase "trained pilot" doesn't mean "educated professional", but sounds more like "trained circus lion". Of course, no amount of hours builts a true professional that way...
morrisond wrote:On Lionair it's debatable. It kind of looked like Runaway Stabilizer so it would have made sense to turn off power to the system - but yes there was no particular procedure for the symptoms they were facing. However you can't write procedures for every potential failure - at some point you have to assume a pilot would recognize a system (Electric Trim) is faulty and turn it off and fly manually. They properly counteracted MCAS 22 times. I have used the following example many times and no one has a good answer.
"If there was a fault in the Autopilot System and it tried to turn you right (or put you in a dive) 22 times - would you keep it engaged or turn it off?"
AABusDrvr wrote:kalvado wrote:AABusDrvr wrote:This has always been the lament of the new pilot. I know things are different in other parts of the world, but in North America, those that want it bad enough, find a way.
When I was starting out, we became flight instructors, charter or freight pilots, towed banners, or did tours. I even know one guy who flew cadavers for a funeral home. We all learned the hard lessons in airplanes that were much smaller, slower and lighter than an airliner. We scared only ourselves when we made bad decisions.
I think this is where the problem is.
A lot of US pilots are trained by those barely above initial level, things are not systematically learned but picked up by try-and-fail. Crash rate in GA is unbelievable. Some still survive.
So hours of survival are the only professional metrics.
Education requirements for professional pilots are... funny. BA in arts is good enough, no technical background required. My impression is that the phrase "trained pilot" doesn't mean "educated professional", but sounds more like "trained circus lion". Of course, no amount of hours builts a true professional that way...
To obtain an FAA flight instructor certificate one is required to have 250 hours total flight time. The ET302 preliminary report says the first officer had 361 hours total time, with 207 hours in the Boeing 737. If he started with the airline right after he completed his academy training, that would indicate he had a whopping 154 hours when he started with the airline.
So 154 hours is fine to be a first officer on a 737, but a 250 hour flight instructor is "barely above initial level"?
Aircraft handling skills and technical knowledge are not usually the problem, in any aircraft accident. The issue is more often judgement, or what the industry likes to call "aeronautical decision making". You cant teach that in a classroom, or a simulator. You have to have personal experience. Often times, just because something is legal, and within limits of your SOP's doesn't make it the smart and safest course of action.
I own and fly a general aviation airplane, and still hold my flight instructors certificate. In the U.S., GA does have a higher accident rate than commercial flying. Taking into consideration the number, and types of GA flight operations in the states, the accident rate is far from "unbelievable".
The absolute worst pilots I've ever flown with were "educated professionals". Career changers, that left whatever profession they had been doing most of their lives, to become pilots.
FluidFlow wrote:You know, the real big deal here is that Boeing does not know how good or bad the training is. They just assumed the training is good. How is this even remotely acceptable that they sell aircraft to airlines with bad training and do not request good training or mandate training before they sell them. It is their name on the aircraft that crashed.
The manufacturer should know what skills are needed to fly their aircraft and not just assume the pilots have that skills without checking and testing it.
What else did Boeing assumed while constructing the MAX without actually knowing it? That is absolutely scary.
The reason i even think that there are more deficiencies in the design is that if MCAS would be the only thing to hide, they should disclose the whole certification process and design specs and own the full blame for MCAS and the crashes and move on. That would regain trust. This whole hide and seek they play is just leading to more trust issues and only makes sense if there are more problems with the MAX that are hidden.
“The assumption is that the flight crews have been trained,” Mr. Sinnett said in the meeting. He added later: “Rightly or wrongly, that was the design criteria and that’s how the airplane was certified with the system and pilot working together.”
National authorities lack uniformity in pilot training regulation. Airbus safety experts also see “strange things in poor countries where air transport is growing very fast—suspiciously quick pilot qualification and fraudulent flight-hour accounting.” They are addressing the problem at the airline level.
AABusDrvr wrote:kalvado wrote:AABusDrvr wrote:This has always been the lament of the new pilot. I know things are different in other parts of the world, but in North America, those that want it bad enough, find a way.
When I was starting out, we became flight instructors, charter or freight pilots, towed banners, or did tours. I even know one guy who flew cadavers for a funeral home. We all learned the hard lessons in airplanes that were much smaller, slower and lighter than an airliner. We scared only ourselves when we made bad decisions.
I think this is where the problem is.
A lot of US pilots are trained by those barely above initial level, things are not systematically learned but picked up by try-and-fail. Crash rate in GA is unbelievable. Some still survive.
So hours of survival are the only professional metrics.
Education requirements for professional pilots are... funny. BA in arts is good enough, no technical background required. My impression is that the phrase "trained pilot" doesn't mean "educated professional", but sounds more like "trained circus lion". Of course, no amount of hours builts a true professional that way...
To obtain an FAA flight instructor certificate one is required to have 250 hours total flight time. The ET302 preliminary report says the first officer had 361 hours total time, with 207 hours in the Boeing 737. If he started with the airline right after he completed his academy training, that would indicate he had a whopping 154 hours when he started with the airline.
So 154 hours is fine to be a first officer on a 737, but a 250 hour flight instructor is "barely above initial level"?
Aircraft handling skills and technical knowledge are not usually the problem, in any aircraft accident. The issue is more often judgement, or what the industry likes to call "aeronautical decision making". You cant teach that in a classroom, or a simulator. You have to have personal experience. Often times, just because something is legal, and within limits of your SOP's doesn't make it the smart and safest course of action.
I own and fly a general aviation airplane, and still hold my flight instructors certificate. In the U.S., GA does have a higher accident rate than commercial flying. Taking into consideration the number, and types of GA flight operations in the states, the accident rate is far from "unbelievable".
The absolute worst pilots I've ever flown with were "educated professionals". Career changers, that left whatever profession they had been doing most of their lives, to become pilots.
par13del wrote:PixelFlight wrote:There are three significant changes to MCAS software being worked on by Boeing:
Being worked on or already tested and submitted to the FAA for review and approval?
I am unsure as I have seem comments that they have already completed test flights with the updates, whether they have submitted to the FAA is where I am in doubt, I have seen reports where it is said they were submitted, others not.
morrisond wrote:There are serious flaws in the Worldwide Training system as evidence by these crashes.
MartijnNL wrote:morrisond wrote:There are serious flaws in the Worldwide Training system as evidence by these crashes.
There is a serious flaw in the Boeing 737 MAX and that is the MCAS system.
kalvado wrote:Aviation737 wrote:Does anyone know when the grounding will be lifted?
Not even Boeing themselves. different dates are thrown around, June, July, August... time will tell.
morrisond wrote:MartijnNL wrote:morrisond wrote:There are serious flaws in the Worldwide Training system as evidence by these crashes.
There is a serious flaw in the Boeing 737 MAX and that is the MCAS system.
I totally agree.
And the FAA certification system as well as the training system - all three are deficient.
RossW wrote:Boeing says it has completed the development of updated software for the 737 Max
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/16/boeing- ... ter%7Cmain
Jamie514 wrote:How many other planes has ET lost in the last 15 years due to mishandling?
Jamie514 wrote:morrisond wrote:MartijnNL wrote:There is a serious flaw in the Boeing 737 MAX and that is the MCAS system.
I totally agree.
And the FAA certification system as well as the training system - all three are deficient.
The training system is just fine.
If training was deficient as you assert, then all planes would be crashing with the level of incidence of the MAX, it would be a perfectly normal rate of crashing and would not be grounded due to its abhorrent safety record.
The only thing these crashes and subsequent grounding have exposed is that as the knowledge of the (horribly designed and blind-eye certified) MCAS emerged to the public, that Boeing was arrogant and misleading to persist in the no-extra-training mantra when they had in reality introduced a series of deadly failure modes the likes of which not seen in decades. Even Lionair with their garbage safety record has almost exclusively suffered landing problems. How many other planes has ET lost in the last 15 years due to mishandling? How many 737 worldwide were ever lost to runaway stab?
But don't let reality get in the way of your continued delusion. Really, no wonder some here suspect there are paid propagandists online. The continued and persistent reality denial is very next level.
XRAYretired wrote:morrisond wrote:SEU wrote:
Can I ask why you think the Crew should have known how to handle a faulty AOA sensor whilst the plane was flying nose down into the ground, without it being anywhere in the paper manual (page 300 or something like that)?
On Lionair it's debatable. It kind of looked like Runaway Stabilizer so it would have made sense to turn off power to the system - but yes there was no particular procedure for the symptoms they were facing. However you can't write procedures for every potential failure - at some point you have to assume a pilot would recognize a system (Electric Trim) is faulty and turn it off and fly manually. They properly counteracted MCAS 22 times. I have used the following example many times and no one has a good answer.
"If there was a fault in the Autopilot System and it tried to turn you right (or put you in a dive) 22 times - would you keep it engaged or turn it off?"
On ET at the time of the flight they should have fully known all about MCAS and the conditions that caused it and have been highly proficient on the procedure to counter it if the Airline had done the training they said they did (I think all they said was that they supplied the procedure) - however there are some reports they never even did that.
Stuck in the worn grove again eh. Thought you'd turned a leaf for a while. Missed your usual first line of Boeing should have done better but...
Please dont call the dead pilots out for not having the sense.
Please dont call the Ethiopian CEO a liar without any evidence. Especially since you know full well his statement that the pilots had been given the information etc. and you know that the report you are referring to is contrary to the Preliminary Report and thereby discredited at least in part.
Good of you to recognise "many" repeats. The analogy doesn't hold water since Pilots would know Autopilot exists as a system and was capable of the deed. Pilots had no knowledge that MCAS existed never mind that it would keep pushing the nose down even when counteracted.
I think one of the plaintiffs legals put it succinctly:
“The FAA is wrong to push the narrative that the pilots were responsible for the two disasters because the Boeing MCAS created the hazardous condition that caused the two crashes and the system actually fought against the efforts of the pilots who were trying to save the airplanes. That is why it is so awful to hear Mr. Elwell blame the pilots for the accidents. Modern aviation safety systems are designed to prevent pilot error from causing the loss of an airplane. The MCAS does the opposite – it creates the hazardous condition and induces the pilot error."
https://www.eturbonews.com/252204/shock ... 737-8-max/
Ray
14ccKemiskt wrote:RossW wrote:Boeing says it has completed the development of updated software for the 737 Max
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/16/boeing- ... ter%7Cmain
Since Boeing themselves said that a fix was in the works already in november, it apparently took them at least six (!) months to implement. One wonders why it took so long time.
14ccKemiskt wrote:Since Boeing themselves said that a fix was in the works already in november, it apparently took them at least six (!) months to implement. One wonders why it took so long time.
OldAeroGuy wrote:Jamie514 wrote:How many other planes has ET lost in the last 15 years due to mishandling?
Well, there was this one 9 years ago in 2010.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethiopian ... Flight_409
The official cause in the report:
"The final investigation report released by the Lebanese Ministry of Public Works and Transport, presented on 17 January 2012, stated that "the probable causes of the accident were the flight crew's mismanagement of the aircraft's speed, altitude, headings and attitude through inconsistent flight control inputs resulting in a loss of control and their failure to abide by CRM [Crew Resource Management] principles of mutual support and calling deviations"."
ET disputed the results attributing the crash to "shoot-down, sabotage, or lightning strike" but no evidence was found to support ET's contention.
morrisond wrote:You have to look at this through a different lense. If MCAS had been more robust from the get go (Maybe two Sensors) and the crews were fully informed of the existence of MCAS and how to counteract it (Supposedly ET had this level of knowledge) but the system still failed (a flock of birds took out both AOA vanes) and the plane crashed - how would you view the crews actions in that scenario?
Jamie514 wrote:OldAeroGuy wrote:Jamie514 wrote:How many other planes has ET lost in the last 15 years due to mishandling?
Well, there was this one 9 years ago in 2010.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethiopian ... Flight_409
The official cause in the report:
"The final investigation report released by the Lebanese Ministry of Public Works and Transport, presented on 17 January 2012, stated that "the probable causes of the accident were the flight crew's mismanagement of the aircraft's speed, altitude, headings and attitude through inconsistent flight control inputs resulting in a loss of control and their failure to abide by CRM [Crew Resource Management] principles of mutual support and calling deviations"."
ET disputed the results attributing the crash to "shoot-down, sabotage, or lightning strike" but no evidence was found to support ET's contention.
Exactly. One crash, almost a decade ago. That sort of accident rate undermines the whole "training is obviously lacking" argument.
morrisond wrote:Jamie514 wrote:morrisond wrote:
I totally agree.
And the FAA certification system as well as the training system - all three are deficient.
The training system is just fine.
If training was deficient as you assert, then all planes would be crashing with the level of incidence of the MAX, it would be a perfectly normal rate of crashing and would not be grounded due to its abhorrent safety record.
The only thing these crashes and subsequent grounding have exposed is that as the knowledge of the (horribly designed and blind-eye certified) MCAS emerged to the public, that Boeing was arrogant and misleading to persist in the no-extra-training mantra when they had in reality introduced a series of deadly failure modes the likes of which not seen in decades. Even Lionair with their garbage safety record has almost exclusively suffered landing problems. How many other planes has ET lost in the last 15 years due to mishandling? How many 737 worldwide were ever lost to runaway stab?
But don't let reality get in the way of your continued delusion. Really, no wonder some here suspect there are paid propagandists online. The continued and persistent reality denial is very next level.
Luckily the deficiency in training is not that apparent as planes are so safe and reliable. It's really rare when things go wrong - but then it would be nice to have pilots who actually knew the proper procedures.
How about ET flight 409 from 2010 - It sounds like ET and and the Ethiopian Civil Aviation Authority were in cahoots on this one too - denying there was anything wrong with ET's training system or the Pilots lack of experience was a contributing issue.
https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... 37-367118/
It's quite scary and damning that ET didn't seem to learn anything from Flight 409 - it sounds like it's Pilots faced a lot of the same issues as ET -302
Quite fankly this lends a lot of credence to what a lot of us are saying what happened on ET-302
smartplane wrote:morrisond wrote:You have to look at this through a different lense. If MCAS had been more robust from the get go (Maybe two Sensors) and the crews were fully informed of the existence of MCAS and how to counteract it (Supposedly ET had this level of knowledge) but the system still failed (a flock of birds took out both AOA vanes) and the plane crashed - how would you view the crews actions in that scenario?
It started earlier than that.
Boeing designed an aircraft which was a step backwards from the NG.
To mask / conceal (which was the intent, given the absence of MCAS documentation and training, and late, non-notified changes), they slapped on poorly designed, executed and tested software.
And the accident is then 20-40% the fault of the crew. Just how bad would the OEM have to be to carry more blame?
This is a landmark case. The first trial by social media of a mega corporation.
Boeing and their crisis management consultants may be keeping the lid on staff knowledge and pilot near misses for now, but.....
Presumably massive lobbying pressure on EASA and other certifying authorities with aircraft manufacturing to be 'reasonable' or....
Jamie514 wrote:morrisond wrote:Jamie514 wrote:
The training system is just fine.
If training was deficient as you assert, then all planes would be crashing with the level of incidence of the MAX, it would be a perfectly normal rate of crashing and would not be grounded due to its abhorrent safety record.
The only thing these crashes and subsequent grounding have exposed is that as the knowledge of the (horribly designed and blind-eye certified) MCAS emerged to the public, that Boeing was arrogant and misleading to persist in the no-extra-training mantra when they had in reality introduced a series of deadly failure modes the likes of which not seen in decades. Even Lionair with their garbage safety record has almost exclusively suffered landing problems. How many other planes has ET lost in the last 15 years due to mishandling? How many 737 worldwide were ever lost to runaway stab?
But don't let reality get in the way of your continued delusion. Really, no wonder some here suspect there are paid propagandists online. The continued and persistent reality denial is very next level.
Luckily the deficiency in training is not that apparent as planes are so safe and reliable. It's really rare when things go wrong - but then it would be nice to have pilots who actually knew the proper procedures.
How about ET flight 409 from 2010 - It sounds like ET and and the Ethiopian Civil Aviation Authority were in cahoots on this one too - denying there was anything wrong with ET's training system or the Pilots lack of experience was a contributing issue.
https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... 37-367118/
It's quite scary and damning that ET didn't seem to learn anything from Flight 409 - it sounds like it's Pilots faced a lot of the same issues as ET -302
Quite fankly this lends a lot of credence to what a lot of us are saying what happened on ET-302
Quite frankly relying on one single event a decade ago is not a strong argument at all. It doesn't offer any explanation to their decade of otherwise safe ops in between or why manufacturer best practices in making planes so "safe and reliable" were not adhered to this time.
morrisond wrote:Jamie514 wrote:morrisond wrote:
Luckily the deficiency in training is not that apparent as planes are so safe and reliable. It's really rare when things go wrong - but then it would be nice to have pilots who actually knew the proper procedures.
How about ET flight 409 from 2010 - It sounds like ET and and the Ethiopian Civil Aviation Authority were in cahoots on this one too - denying there was anything wrong with ET's training system or the Pilots lack of experience was a contributing issue.
https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... 37-367118/
It's quite scary and damning that ET didn't seem to learn anything from Flight 409 - it sounds like it's Pilots faced a lot of the same issues as ET -302
Quite fankly this lends a lot of credence to what a lot of us are saying what happened on ET-302
Quite frankly relying on one single event a decade ago is not a strong argument at all. It doesn't offer any explanation to their decade of otherwise safe ops in between or why manufacturer best practices in making planes so "safe and reliable" were not adhered to this time.
Modern airliners are so reliable this may have been the first time one of there crews was faced with a difficult situation in the decade, but it surely points a finger at the training culture (or lack thereof) at ET.
PixelPilot wrote:Boeing is ready to get it up in the air.
https://boeing.mediaroom.com/news-relea ... tem=130434
StTim wrote:PixelPilot wrote:Boeing is ready to get it up in the air.
https://boeing.mediaroom.com/news-relea ... tem=130434
Boeing is. Are the FAA? Are the other regulators? Are the pilots? Are the passengers?
PixelPilot wrote:StTim wrote:PixelPilot wrote:Boeing is ready to get it up in the air.
https://boeing.mediaroom.com/news-relea ... tem=130434
Boeing is. Are the FAA? Are the other regulators? Are the pilots? Are the passengers?
DO you think I have a crystal ball or something? Or anybody for that matter?
StTim wrote:PixelPilot wrote:StTim wrote:Boeing is. Are the FAA? Are the other regulators? Are the pilots? Are the passengers?
DO you think I have a crystal ball or something? Or anybody for that matter?
True - if you could answer those questions accurately I would be asking you for the lottery numbers!
morrisond wrote:Modem airliners are supposed to be this reliable. It's not something that they area gracious enough to do for us out of the goodness of their own hearts or because they area just a bunch of nice guys,Jamie514 wrote:morrisond wrote:
Luckily the deficiency in training is not that apparent as planes are so safe and reliable. It's really rare when things go wrong - but then it would be nice to have pilots who actually knew the proper procedures.
How about ET flight 409 from 2010 - It sounds like ET and and the Ethiopian Civil Aviation Authority were in cahoots on this one too - denying there was anything wrong with ET's training system or the Pilots lack of experience was a contributing issue.
https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... 37-367118/
It's quite scary and damning that ET didn't seem to learn anything from Flight 409 - it sounds like it's Pilots faced a lot of the same issues as ET -302
Quite fankly this lends a lot of credence to what a lot of us are saying what happened on ET-302
Quite frankly relying on one single event a decade ago is not a strong argument at all. It doesn't offer any explanation to their decade of otherwise safe ops in between or why manufacturer best practices in making planes so "safe and reliable" were not adhered to this time.
Modern airliners are so reliable this may have been the first time one of there crews was faced with a difficult situation in the decade, but it surely points a finger at the training culture (or lack thereof) at ET.