RickNRoll wrote:mjoelnir wrote:planecane wrote:"Excuse?" I was pointing out that Boeing didn't intend to charge $100k for the AoA disagree warning.
To answer your question, there were other obvious indications of what was going on like stick shaker on one side only. Also, the Lion Air crew would have had absolutely no clue that an AoA disagree would have anything to do with a runaway stabilizer since MCAS was not disclosed at that time. The ET crew did recognize what they were dealing with, they just didn't respond in exactly the manner needed. In neither case would the AoA disagree alert have helped the crew to understand the situation. Would the ET crew have finished trimming out the MCAS nose down trim before they hit the cutout switches if a warning on the PFD said AoA disagree? There is no logical argument to say they would have.
Trying to babble yourself out of a concrete question. You are just making unsubstantiated statements. The AoA disagree warning would have come on straight after rotation before MCAS ambushed the frame and pilots. First harbinger of trouble. You can not know if it would have made a difference.
If Boeing would not have sabotaged the possibility of training for the MAX, pilots would have known that AoA failure and retracting the flaps would instantly lead to MCAS ambushing the safety of the airplane.
Exactly. Boeing gambled and chose to play dumb in the hope that the Lion Air accident was a once off. A full explanation of the MCAS failure mode would have made a difference.
Yes, some say mullenberg doesn't share as much blame as previous ceos while max was being designed. That may be true prior to Lion. Post Lion, B behaviour was indefensible.
Instead of focusing on making max as safe as possible then, the focus was on portraying the solution was long exising & simple.
Maybe that's why they didn't mention doing manual trim is near impossible in many conditions.