planecane wrote:PixelFlight wrote:planecane wrote:I agree with your thought process. However, there would be a disconnect between it being an acceptable risk on the NG and the NNC being a memory item. If the failure rate is on the order of a wing falling off, why make it a memory item?
Just a guess: 737 history.
At some point in the past the runaway stabilizer could have been a concern that both contributed to create the runaway stabilizer NCC memory item and to improve the design to decrease the failure rate. The two was constructive to improve safety, not one against the other like your question might imply. I don't know if the training of this runaway stabilizer NCC memory item have decreased over time, but the only response I got about 737 runaway stabilizer training did suggest that it's far from a top concern to deliver pilots licences.
Which is why I want to know what was said on the doomed Lion Air flight between the crew members. It is important to know if runaway stabilizer even crossed their mind from the training. This is important because it is possible that decsions were made when designing MCAS that assumed runaway stabilizer was a "no brainer" for crews due to it being a memory item.
Assuming that the training for runaway stabilizer has decreased over time, it would also explain why the ET crew did not execute the NNC exactly as it was intended even though they seemed to recognize that they had a runaway stabilizer.
It is important to understand this not just for the 737 series but for all aircraft. It is no out of the realm of possibility that based on training focus from 1987 which is now glossed over, that Airbus made a design decision on the A320NEO. I'm not saying they did, but it is possible.
If this type of disconnect between documented training and actual training focus exists, a process must be put in place for engineers to be educated on current training practices for a model when they are designing updates to the model.
The process you are talking about should already exists to comply with the quality assurance, the safety assessment activity and the certification, not counting the public promise of "even safer aircraft".
The incredible scale of the current affair exists because of the discovery that the process was disconnected and that all the layers of filters that should have identified the issue do not worked as expected..