• 1
  • 5
  • 6
  • 7
  • 8
  • 9
  • 76
 
XRAYretired
Posts: 628
Joined: Fri Mar 15, 2019 11:21 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sat May 04, 2019 4:59 pm

planecane wrote:
Jetty wrote:
kayik wrote:
Very good reading.

:checkmark: They seem to understand MCAS

“the worst design in the history of modern commercial aviation”


That is lawsuit hyperbole. The 787 original battery was a worse design. That could have caused an unrecoverable situation.

As bad as the MCAS logic was, it was recoverable in both cases. Not even by doing a NNC. Both crews could have continued to counteract the MCAS trim with the thumb switch. Why the lion air crew stopped trimming may never be known. It takes almost no physical effort so it couldn't have been exhaustion.

The ET crew seems to have turned off the electric trim before counteracting MCAS due to a misunderstanding or misapplication of the procedure.

Either way, since it was recoverable, and relatively simply so, MCAS is not the worst design in modern aviation.

I don't believe anyone has said it is anything other than a legal case set out by the plaintiffs lawyers?

However, I bet the defendant is pleased not have selected yourself as defence lead. They would not be terribly happy with an opening position of -is it is not as bad as some of their previous designs-.

346 people, I'm sure, would have been very happy to arrive at their destination on a 787.

Ray
 
morrisond
Posts: 1391
Joined: Thu Jan 07, 2010 12:22 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sat May 04, 2019 5:27 pm

AVGeekNY wrote:
Hi all--- I'm new to Airliners as a poster but long time reader. Forgive me if this was already discussed and posted but I suggest you read an article by a guy named Gregory Travis "How the Boeing 737 Max Disaster Looks to a Software Developer (and pilot)" that was published in IEEE Spectrum. It was also republished at this link …. https://medium.com/@gregoryreedtravis/t ... b1869839b6

After reading the article I'm not really sure if the 737Max can ever be as safe as its predecessors... I hope the pilots stand strong against the pressure from corporate dollars. I'd really be interested in feedback about this article from any 737 pilots.

A few excerpts from his long and very well written article.

Why would a commercial airliner with a long history of safety and reliability experience two recent fatal crashes within minutes of takeoff? Is it, in fact, a new aircraft, with fundamentally different handling characteristics that required fundamentally different operational software — and pilot training? And given the aircraft and airline industries’ inherent interest in safety, how could a new aircraft have been introduced into fleets worldwide without the requisite training? Differences in costs — and philosophies — between hardware and software provide an explanation.


EVERTHING about the design and manufacture of the MAX was done to preserve the myth that ‘it’s just a 737.’ Re-certifying it as a new aircraft would have taken years and millions of dollars. In fact, the pilot licensed to fly the 737 in 1967 is still licensed to fly all subsequent versions of the 737”

the 737 MAX the engine nacelles themselves can, at high angles of attack, produce lift (like a wing). And the lift they produce is well ahead of the wing’s center of lift, meaning the nacelles will cause the 737 MAX at a high angle of attack to go to a higherangle of attack. This is aerodynamic malpractice of the worst kind.



That article is totally wrong - all that happens at high angles of attack is that stick forces get lighter than allowed by the FAR's - the plane will not continue to go to a higher AOA of attack without pilot input.
 
Saintor
Posts: 29
Joined: Wed Mar 13, 2019 10:35 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sat May 04, 2019 5:32 pm

planecane wrote:

The ET crew seems to have turned off the electric trim before counteracting MCAS due to a misunderstanding or misapplication of the procedure.

Either way, since it was recoverable, and relatively simply so, MCAS is not the worst design in modern aviation.


The tendency for some people to exaggerate is appalling. It will be interesting to see the results in simulators when more is known. Easily recoverable might be it. Yet it is likely that Boeing didn't provide enough back-up in their system design and training.
 
planecane
Posts: 1145
Joined: Thu Feb 09, 2017 4:58 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sat May 04, 2019 5:34 pm

Nils75cz wrote:
Two downs in less than six months. Easily to counteract. Certainly. Top of the notch design.

At what point did I say it was a top notch design? The logic was terrible.

That doesn't change the fact that, in both cases, it was recoverable. If the Lion Air crew had kept using the thumb switch to trim nose up every time MCAS started trimming nose down they would have survived. It doesn't require a top gun pilot to keep doing something that is working to maintain flight.

The ET crew did not exactly follow the runaway stabilizer NNC that they apparently knew to run because they cut off the electric trim before they balanced the control column forces by using it as prescribed in the NNC. Had they waited ten more seconds before cutting it off they would have survived.

It doesn't change the fact that the reliance on a single sensor, giving MCAS unlimited authority and having it continue to act after pilot inputs counteracted it (nose up trim commands) was a bad design that put the pilots in an emergency situation. It also doesn't change the fact that both flights should have been able to land if the pilots had taken some relatively simple actions.
Last edited by planecane on Sat May 04, 2019 5:58 pm, edited 1 time in total.
 
XRAYretired
Posts: 628
Joined: Fri Mar 15, 2019 11:21 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sat May 04, 2019 5:57 pm

planecane wrote:
Nils75cz wrote:
Two downs in less than six months. Easily to counteract. Certainly. Top of the notch design.

At what point did I say it was a top notch design? The logic was terrible.

That doesn't change the fact that, in both cases, it was recoverable. If the Lion Air crew had kept using the thumb switch to trim nose up every time MCAS started trimming nose down they would have survived. It doesn't require a top gun pilot to keep doing something that is working to maintain flight.

The ET crew did not exactly follow the runaway stabilizer NNC that they apparently knew to run because they cut off the electric trim before they balanced the control column forces by using it as prescribed in the NNC. Had they waited ten more seconds before cutting it off they would have survived.

It doesn't change the fact that the reliance on a single sensor, giving MCAS unlimited authority and having it continue to act after pilot inputs counteracted it (nose up trim commands) was a bad design that put the pilots in an emergency situation. It also doesn't change the fact that both fights should have been able to land if the pilots had taken some relatively simple actions.


Your assrtions are not facts and dont become so if you repeat them often enough.

Ray
 
Nils75cz
Posts: 12
Joined: Mon Mar 25, 2019 10:18 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sat May 04, 2019 6:00 pm

I am not authorised to say the flights could or could not have been recoverable. Are you? Maybe they could have been. But that is not the point. Let me draw your attention to the fact that design problems has made this aircraft type prone to crash. I am not happy with that.
 
planecane
Posts: 1145
Joined: Thu Feb 09, 2017 4:58 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sat May 04, 2019 6:03 pm

XRAYretired wrote:
planecane wrote:
Nils75cz wrote:
Two downs in less than six months. Easily to counteract. Certainly. Top of the notch design.

At what point did I say it was a top notch design? The logic was terrible.

That doesn't change the fact that, in both cases, it was recoverable. If the Lion Air crew had kept using the thumb switch to trim nose up every time MCAS started trimming nose down they would have survived. It doesn't require a top gun pilot to keep doing something that is working to maintain flight.

The ET crew did not exactly follow the runaway stabilizer NNC that they apparently knew to run because they cut off the electric trim before they balanced the control column forces by using it as prescribed in the NNC. Had they waited ten more seconds before cutting it off they would have survived.

It doesn't change the fact that the reliance on a single sensor, giving MCAS unlimited authority and having it continue to act after pilot inputs counteracted it (nose up trim commands) was a bad design that put the pilots in an emergency situation. It also doesn't change the fact that both fights should have been able to land if the pilots had taken some relatively simple actions.


Your assrtions are not facts and dont become so if you repeat them often enough.

Ray

Based on the FDR plots in the preliminary reports they are facts. Feel free to use the data of what was actually happening during both flights to dispute my assertions.

Was the Lion Air flight in a nose dive while they continued to give nose up trim commands with the thumb switch? Did they not stop commanding ANU at which point MCAS took over?

Was the stabilizer not moving nose up until the point the ET crew cut off the electric trim?
 
Nils75cz
Posts: 12
Joined: Mon Mar 25, 2019 10:18 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sat May 04, 2019 6:20 pm

As a matter of fact, I am interested. I am certainly not Interested though. I find this matter concerning. I am quite unhappy about the duopoly BA-AI . A duopoly is almost a monopoly with all the backdraws known. And I am quite sure we are confronted with one of these right now in this case.
 
IADFCO
Posts: 129
Joined: Sun May 22, 2016 4:20 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sat May 04, 2019 6:31 pm

Before the grounding is lifted, I think it's very important to have a good understanding of what happens when MCAS is deactived. If I understand correctly, in case of "AoA disagree" MCAS will now deactivate. So, following a sensor failure, e.g., a bird strike, a MAX might be in a flaps up, aft-CG, turning flight condition at a "high" (not clear how high) angle of attack, i.e., the conditions for which apparently MCAS was designed, but now without MCAS.

What happens next? Nobody knows for a fact, except for Boeing and perhaps the FAA.

Does the yoke just "lighten" a little, slightly differently from the NG, and it's not a big deal from an engineering or piloting viewpoint, although apparently it was a big deal from the PR and contractual (the $1 million penalty for extra training) point of view?

Or the yoke lightening in some cases (and faster than in an NG) could precipitate a stall, with a much worse (compared with an NG) flow separation picture on the wing, triggered by the bigger engine in a higher position, and much harder to recover from than in an NG?

Reality is probably somewhere between these two extremes but, again, nobody knows with hard data. Hopefully some of these data will surface in litigation. Also, does anybody know (I am an engineer, not a lawyer) if the FAA records concerning the certification of the MAX are "FOIAble"? (i.e., subject to the US "Freedom Of Information Act", so anybody could request them)
 
XRAYretired
Posts: 628
Joined: Fri Mar 15, 2019 11:21 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sat May 04, 2019 6:54 pm

planecane wrote:
XRAYretired wrote:
planecane wrote:
At what point did I say it was a top notch design? The logic was terrible.

That doesn't change the fact that, in both cases, it was recoverable. If the Lion Air crew had kept using the thumb switch to trim nose up every time MCAS started trimming nose down they would have survived. It doesn't require a top gun pilot to keep doing something that is working to maintain flight.

The ET crew did not exactly follow the runaway stabilizer NNC that they apparently knew to run because they cut off the electric trim before they balanced the control column forces by using it as prescribed in the NNC. Had they waited ten more seconds before cutting it off they would have survived.

It doesn't change the fact that the reliance on a single sensor, giving MCAS unlimited authority and having it continue to act after pilot inputs counteracted it (nose up trim commands) was a bad design that put the pilots in an emergency situation. It also doesn't change the fact that both fights should have been able to land if the pilots had taken some relatively simple actions.


Your assrtions are not facts and dont become so if you repeat them often enough.

Ray

Based on the FDR plots in the preliminary reports they are facts. Feel free to use the data of what was actually happening during both flights to dispute my assertions.

Was the Lion Air flight in a nose dive while they continued to give nose up trim commands with the thumb switch? Did they not stop commanding ANU at which point MCAS took over?

Was the stabilizer not moving nose up until the point the ET crew cut off the electric trim?


I'll let you go through the 5 threads and ~15000 posts to discover the crdible agruments rathert han me.

Ray
 
MrBretz
Posts: 396
Joined: Tue Jun 14, 2016 9:13 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sat May 04, 2019 7:48 pm

If you are kicked off this forum and comeback as another name, like has been admitted 3 posts above, do they ban you again?
 
Nils75cz
Posts: 12
Joined: Mon Mar 25, 2019 10:18 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sat May 04, 2019 8:01 pm

MrBretz, you are off topic. And by all respect, you obviously don't understand the difference between interested and Interested.
 
Saintor
Posts: 29
Joined: Wed Mar 13, 2019 10:35 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sat May 04, 2019 8:07 pm

morrisond wrote:
This seems like Deja Vue - did either one of you above use to go by the username Interested? Saintor or Nils?


I don't understand why I have been dragged in this nonsense and I am not interested. Back to the subject.
 
User avatar
JerseyFlyer
Posts: 1380
Joined: Fri May 25, 2007 7:24 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sat May 04, 2019 8:08 pm

IADFCO wrote:
Before the grounding is lifted, I think it's very important to have a good understanding of what happens when MCAS is deactived. If I understand correctly, in case of "AoA disagree" MCAS will now deactivate. So, following a sensor failure, e.g., a bird strike, a MAX might be in a flaps up, aft-CG, turning flight condition at a "high" (not clear how high) angle of attack, i.e., the conditions for which apparently MCAS was designed, but now without MCAS.

What happens next? Nobody knows for a fact, except for Boeing and perhaps the FAA.


I am not yet clear whether MCAS was necessary to achieve MAX certification.

Or was it necessary only to achieve cheaper pilot transition training?

If the latter, the cheapness has been achieved at a most expensive price.
 
User avatar
Classa64
Posts: 299
Joined: Fri Apr 03, 2015 5:40 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sat May 04, 2019 8:16 pm

planecane wrote:
It also doesn't change the fact that both flights should have been able to land if the pilots had taken some relatively simple actions.
[/quote]

Which goes for every plane that has gone down right?

Its an all around sad and complex situation, none of us were in the front seats when it all went sideways, none of us knows what they were going through or thinking.
"Freedom is the miles i'm rolling on"
 
smartplane
Posts: 1024
Joined: Fri Aug 03, 2018 9:23 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sat May 04, 2019 8:38 pm

morrisond wrote:
AVGeekNY wrote:
Hi all--- I'm new to Airliners as a poster but long time reader. Forgive me if this was already discussed and posted but I suggest you read an article by a guy named Gregory Travis "How the Boeing 737 Max Disaster Looks to a Software Developer (and pilot)" that was published in IEEE Spectrum. It was also republished at this link …. https://medium.com/@gregoryreedtravis/t ... b1869839b6

After reading the article I'm not really sure if the 737Max can ever be as safe as its predecessors... I hope the pilots stand strong against the pressure from corporate dollars. I'd really be interested in feedback about this article from any 737 pilots.

A few excerpts from his long and very well written article.

Why would a commercial airliner with a long history of safety and reliability experience two recent fatal crashes within minutes of takeoff? Is it, in fact, a new aircraft, with fundamentally different handling characteristics that required fundamentally different operational software — and pilot training? And given the aircraft and airline industries’ inherent interest in safety, how could a new aircraft have been introduced into fleets worldwide without the requisite training? Differences in costs — and philosophies — between hardware and software provide an explanation.


EVERTHING about the design and manufacture of the MAX was done to preserve the myth that ‘it’s just a 737.’ Re-certifying it as a new aircraft would have taken years and millions of dollars. In fact, the pilot licensed to fly the 737 in 1967 is still licensed to fly all subsequent versions of the 737”

the 737 MAX the engine nacelles themselves can, at high angles of attack, produce lift (like a wing). And the lift they produce is well ahead of the wing’s center of lift, meaning the nacelles will cause the 737 MAX at a high angle of attack to go to a higherangle of attack. This is aerodynamic malpractice of the worst kind.



That article is totally wrong - all that happens at high angles of attack is that stick forces get lighter than allowed by the FAR's - the plane will not continue to go to a higher AOA of attack without pilot input.

Having read, and re-read your MAX-related posts, for a 'financial professional with a keen interest in Aviation as I do have my Private Pilots License - although I haven't flown in about 10 years', you certainly hold consistently firm, one-sided views.
 
WIederling
Posts: 8888
Joined: Sun Sep 13, 2015 2:15 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sat May 04, 2019 8:46 pm

smartplane wrote:
................... you certainly hold consistently firm, one-sided views.


You can be right or can be wrong. This might be seen as one sided if you are strongly partisan ?
Murphy is an optimist
 
smartplane
Posts: 1024
Joined: Fri Aug 03, 2018 9:23 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sat May 04, 2019 8:51 pm

Good on Interested and others championing future passengers, silenced / over-ruled Boeing employees, silenced pilots with MAX experience, and the passengers and crew who died, rather than dis-crediting them, and parroting overt / covert Boeing media releases.

Diversity of views is great, whether right or wrong, from every angle of an issue. Those keen on shutting down discussions, ignoring, talking over, discrediting posters, discrediting articles.... their agenda is pretty clear, and intelligent readers will discount or ignore those contributions.

Wouldn't it be fascinating to know which members and posters have complained about posts on the four MAX grounding related threads, and the reasons given?

Tough being a moderator here at the moment.
 
morrisond
Posts: 1391
Joined: Thu Jan 07, 2010 12:22 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sat May 04, 2019 10:37 pm

smartplane wrote:
morrisond wrote:
AVGeekNY wrote:
Hi all--- I'm new to Airliners as a poster but long time reader. Forgive me if this was already discussed and posted but I suggest you read an article by a guy named Gregory Travis "How the Boeing 737 Max Disaster Looks to a Software Developer (and pilot)" that was published in IEEE Spectrum. It was also republished at this link …. https://medium.com/@gregoryreedtravis/t ... b1869839b6

After reading the article I'm not really sure if the 737Max can ever be as safe as its predecessors... I hope the pilots stand strong against the pressure from corporate dollars. I'd really be interested in feedback about this article from any 737 pilots.

A few excerpts from his long and very well written article.

Why would a commercial airliner with a long history of safety and reliability experience two recent fatal crashes within minutes of takeoff? Is it, in fact, a new aircraft, with fundamentally different handling characteristics that required fundamentally different operational software — and pilot training? And given the aircraft and airline industries’ inherent interest in safety, how could a new aircraft have been introduced into fleets worldwide without the requisite training? Differences in costs — and philosophies — between hardware and software provide an explanation.


EVERTHING about the design and manufacture of the MAX was done to preserve the myth that ‘it’s just a 737.’ Re-certifying it as a new aircraft would have taken years and millions of dollars. In fact, the pilot licensed to fly the 737 in 1967 is still licensed to fly all subsequent versions of the 737”

the 737 MAX the engine nacelles themselves can, at high angles of attack, produce lift (like a wing). And the lift they produce is well ahead of the wing’s center of lift, meaning the nacelles will cause the 737 MAX at a high angle of attack to go to a higherangle of attack. This is aerodynamic malpractice of the worst kind.



That article is totally wrong - all that happens at high angles of attack is that stick forces get lighter than allowed by the FAR's - the plane will not continue to go to a higher AOA of attack without pilot input.

Having read, and re-read your MAX-related posts, for a 'financial professional with a keen interest in Aviation as I do have my Private Pilots License - although I haven't flown in about 10 years', you certainly hold consistently firm, one-sided views.


No - I have always held lots of blame to go around - If I've had an Agenda it's to get people to realize that training has been lacking Worldwide and needs to be looked at - along with Boeing and the FAA
 
kalvado
Posts: 2014
Joined: Wed Mar 01, 2006 4:29 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sat May 04, 2019 10:58 pm

morrisond wrote:
No - I have always held lots of blame to go around - If I've had an Agenda it's to get people to realize that training has been lacking Worldwide and needs to be looked at - along with Boeing and the FAA

training seems as efficient as it can be. It is hard, if at all possible, to train instant responses. And you're proposing totally unrealistic spending.
WHat may make sense, though, is better engineering education (there is some progress lately, but it is slow). A much more cost efficient approach.
 
WPIAeroGuy
Posts: 312
Joined: Tue Aug 21, 2007 11:52 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sat May 04, 2019 11:55 pm

kalvado wrote:
morrisond wrote:
No - I have always held lots of blame to go around - If I've had an Agenda it's to get people to realize that training has been lacking Worldwide and needs to be looked at - along with Boeing and the FAA

training seems as efficient as it can be. It is hard, if at all possible, to train instant responses. And you're proposing totally unrealistic spending.
WHat may make sense, though, is better engineering education (there is some progress lately, but it is slow). A much more cost efficient approach.


This isn't going to be a popular opinion, but based on the information that's been released so far, I think the crews of both flights were at least as much at fault as Boeing. I had originally considered the situations they were presented as extremely challenging and unfortunate. However, I'm having trouble reconciling the idea that if the MCAS activation had been an 'ordinary' runaway trim, would the crews have reacted differently? There's been lots of talk about how MCAS was intermittent, and how the total stab travel changed from 0.6 to 2.5 units. However, to me these facts are obfuscating the more general idea that somehow a stab trim runaway (i.e. constant trim down to the stops) is considered recoverable, but MCAS activation (which has LESS overall authority than a true runaway because it occurs in intervals, and can be stopped by the thumb switches), is somehow unrecoverable. So either the 737 is unrecoverable with stab runaway, or the pilots aren't trained well enough to recover from one. I'm sure the final reports will give us all the answers, but I think we need to look at the bigger picture, beyond MCAS implementation. MCAS should not affect the airplane any differently than a stab trim runaway, which for 50 years of 737s was not a known design issue.
-WPIAeroGuy
 
User avatar
7BOEING7
Posts: 3039
Joined: Fri Oct 12, 2012 5:28 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 05, 2019 12:33 am

WPIAeroGuy wrote:
kalvado wrote:
morrisond wrote:
No - I have always held lots of blame to go around - If I've had an Agenda it's to get people to realize that training has been lacking Worldwide and needs to be looked at - along with Boeing and the FAA

training seems as efficient as it can be. It is hard, if at all possible, to train instant responses. And you're proposing totally unrealistic spending.
WHat may make sense, though, is better engineering education (there is some progress lately, but it is slow). A much more cost efficient approach.




This isn't going to be a popular opinion, but based on the information that's been released so far, I think the crews of both flights were at least as much at fault as Boeing. I had originally considered the situations they were presented as extremely challenging and unfortunate. However, I'm having trouble reconciling the idea that if the MCAS activation had been an 'ordinary' runaway trim, would the crews have reacted differently? There's been lots of talk about how MCAS was intermittent, and how the total stab travel changed from 0.6 to 2.5 units. However, to me these facts are obfuscating the more general idea that somehow a stab trim runaway (i.e. constant trim down to the stops) is considered recoverable, but MCAS activation (which has LESS overall authority than a true runaway because it occurs in intervals, and can be stopped by the thumb switches), is somehow unrecoverable. So either the 737 is unrecoverable with stab runaway, or the pilots aren't trained well enough to recover from one. I'm sure the final reports will give us all the answers, but I think we need to look at the bigger picture, beyond MCAS implementation. MCAS should not affect the airplane any differently than a stab trim runaway, which for 50 years of 737s was not a known design issue.


The one big difference with runaway trim is that if you hold the column in position to maintain attitude, ideally that stops the runaway — doesn’t work for MCAS.

But I agree with what you say.
 
kalvado
Posts: 2014
Joined: Wed Mar 01, 2006 4:29 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 05, 2019 12:36 am

WPIAeroGuy wrote:
kalvado wrote:
morrisond wrote:
No - I have always held lots of blame to go around - If I've had an Agenda it's to get people to realize that training has been lacking Worldwide and needs to be looked at - along with Boeing and the FAA

training seems as efficient as it can be. It is hard, if at all possible, to train instant responses. And you're proposing totally unrealistic spending.
WHat may make sense, though, is better engineering education (there is some progress lately, but it is slow). A much more cost efficient approach.


This isn't going to be a popular opinion, but based on the information that's been released so far, I think the crews of both flights were at least as much at fault as Boeing. I had originally considered the situations they were presented as extremely challenging and unfortunate. However, I'm having trouble reconciling the idea that if the MCAS activation had been an 'ordinary' runaway trim, would the crews have reacted differently? There's been lots of talk about how MCAS was intermittent, and how the total stab travel changed from 0.6 to 2.5 units. However, to me these facts are obfuscating the more general idea that somehow a stab trim runaway (i.e. constant trim down to the stops) is considered recoverable, but MCAS activation (which has LESS overall authority than a true runaway because it occurs in intervals, and can be stopped by the thumb switches), is somehow unrecoverable. So either the 737 is unrecoverable with stab runaway, or the pilots aren't trained well enough to recover from one. I'm sure the final reports will give us all the answers, but I think we need to look at the bigger picture, beyond MCAS implementation. MCAS should not affect the airplane any differently than a stab trim runaway, which for 50 years of 737s was not a known design issue.

This is all great discussion until you consider cost implications. Yes, 737NG seems to have a significant design flaw which didn't manifest itself - or we don't know it did, that may be an interesting development. This basically means that safety margins of other features covered the gap. My understanding that this happens more often that we would want.
Now if you want a Chuck Eager in each cockpit because it may make things a touch better - forget it. It will make things worse.
But @morrisond talks about certain numbers for training - and those are as stupid as many feel-good ideas coming from the government, if not worse.
 
WPIAeroGuy
Posts: 312
Joined: Tue Aug 21, 2007 11:52 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 05, 2019 12:40 am

7BOEING7 wrote:
WPIAeroGuy wrote:
kalvado wrote:
training seems as efficient as it can be. It is hard, if at all possible, to train instant responses. And you're proposing totally unrealistic spending.
WHat may make sense, though, is better engineering education (there is some progress lately, but it is slow). A much more cost efficient approach.




This isn't going to be a popular opinion, but based on the information that's been released so far, I think the crews of both flights were at least as much at fault as Boeing. I had originally considered the situations they were presented as extremely challenging and unfortunate. However, I'm having trouble reconciling the idea that if the MCAS activation had been an 'ordinary' runaway trim, would the crews have reacted differently? There's been lots of talk about how MCAS was intermittent, and how the total stab travel changed from 0.6 to 2.5 units. However, to me these facts are obfuscating the more general idea that somehow a stab trim runaway (i.e. constant trim down to the stops) is considered recoverable, but MCAS activation (which has LESS overall authority than a true runaway because it occurs in intervals, and can be stopped by the thumb switches), is somehow unrecoverable. So either the 737 is unrecoverable with stab runaway, or the pilots aren't trained well enough to recover from one. I'm sure the final reports will give us all the answers, but I think we need to look at the bigger picture, beyond MCAS implementation. MCAS should not affect the airplane any differently than a stab trim runaway, which for 50 years of 737s was not a known design issue.


The one big difference with runaway trim is that if you hold the column in position to maintain attitude, ideally that stops the runaway — doesn’t work for MCAS.

But I agree with what you say.


Good point, I forgot about the column cutout switch.
-WPIAeroGuy
 
morrisond
Posts: 1391
Joined: Thu Jan 07, 2010 12:22 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 05, 2019 12:45 am

kalvado wrote:
morrisond wrote:
No - I have always held lots of blame to go around - If I've had an Agenda it's to get people to realize that training has been lacking Worldwide and needs to be looked at - along with Boeing and the FAA

training seems as efficient as it can be. It is hard, if at all possible, to train instant responses. And you're proposing totally unrealistic spending.
WHat may make sense, though, is better engineering education (there is some progress lately, but it is slow). A much more cost efficient approach.



Did you miss the post from Zeke where he said that at a lot of Airlines - Non-Normal Procedures are rarely taught if at all after the initial type rating?

Yes I know my proposal of Three hours per month is probably way more than needed - my point though was that it would raise the cost of an airline ticket by only $5 - basically the monthly fluctuation in the cost of fuel for that ticket.

That is not a lot - and that would probably raise the level of Pilot Proficiency to an incredible level.

However I'm sure 2-3 hours every quarter would be more than sufficient and that would add about a buck to an airline ticket. That's a good trade.
 
xmp125a
Posts: 247
Joined: Mon Mar 11, 2019 6:38 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 05, 2019 12:48 am

planecane wrote:
That is lawsuit hyperbole. The 787 original battery was a worse design. That could have caused an unrecoverable situation.

(deleted)

Either way, since it was recoverable, and relatively simply so, MCAS is not the worst design in modern aviation.


Nope. It is.

1) The 787 battery problem was the problem of novel design, and novel technology (nearly fully electrical airplane systems). A ton of unknown unknowns.
2) The 737MAX MCAS problem is a problem that would never appear if basic design guidelines for embedded computer systems that are valid for 40+ years would have been observed. Since they weren't, the MCAS v1 design was so brutally stupid that it beggars belief. Let's forget about being safety critical and part of an commercial airplane, and let's focus on kindergarten-level basics:
2.1) There are two sensors available, but the code uses only one. WHY? Seriously, even simple averaging of two sensors would give marginally better overall robustness...
2.2) To really fck with the minds of the someone who would try to troubleshoot broken sensor/connection using a common sense, it alternates between sensors for each flight (yes I know that wrong AoA would manifest with erroneus stick shaker on the one side only). So if the sensor is faulty, 737MAX gets suicide tendencies on each odd or even flight, with one flight between where MCAS behaves normally.

Let's stop here. If anyone would present to me such design (I work with embedded systems as well) as final solution for a non safety critical system, I could only assume they were joking or intentionally want to sabotage my operation and make me work as long as possible to debug any issues.

That this crap actually happened at one of the two biggest airplane manufacturers in the world, for a safety critical system, when upgrading the grandfathered design is mind boggling and totally not comparable to 787 battery issues.

And that's why 737MAX should be grounded until Boeing lays bare the exact sequence of events during the design, verification and certification phase that led to MCAS v1. For Christ's sake, the sequence of events that makes clear that system is safety critical is not that long. Wasn't there any engineer involved in MCAS v1 design, that would ask, "ok, what happens if one sensor is faulty and MCAS repeatedly trims 2.4 degrees down"? At the end, Ethiopian was flying with nose 40 degrees downwards with column at the max back position!
 
morrisond
Posts: 1391
Joined: Thu Jan 07, 2010 12:22 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 05, 2019 12:48 am

kalvado wrote:
WPIAeroGuy wrote:
kalvado wrote:
training seems as efficient as it can be. It is hard, if at all possible, to train instant responses. And you're proposing totally unrealistic spending.
WHat may make sense, though, is better engineering education (there is some progress lately, but it is slow). A much more cost efficient approach.


This isn't going to be a popular opinion, but based on the information that's been released so far, I think the crews of both flights were at least as much at fault as Boeing. I had originally considered the situations they were presented as extremely challenging and unfortunate. However, I'm having trouble reconciling the idea that if the MCAS activation had been an 'ordinary' runaway trim, would the crews have reacted differently? There's been lots of talk about how MCAS was intermittent, and how the total stab travel changed from 0.6 to 2.5 units. However, to me these facts are obfuscating the more general idea that somehow a stab trim runaway (i.e. constant trim down to the stops) is considered recoverable, but MCAS activation (which has LESS overall authority than a true runaway because it occurs in intervals, and can be stopped by the thumb switches), is somehow unrecoverable. So either the 737 is unrecoverable with stab runaway, or the pilots aren't trained well enough to recover from one. I'm sure the final reports will give us all the answers, but I think we need to look at the bigger picture, beyond MCAS implementation. MCAS should not affect the airplane any differently than a stab trim runaway, which for 50 years of 737s was not a known design issue.

This is all great discussion until you consider cost implications. Yes, 737NG seems to have a significant design flaw which didn't manifest itself - or we don't know it did, that may be an interesting development. This basically means that safety margins of other features covered the gap. My understanding that this happens more often that we would want.
Now if you want a Chuck Eager in each cockpit because it may make things a touch better - forget it. It will make things worse.
But @morrisond talks about certain numbers for training - and those are as stupid as many feel-good ideas coming from the government, if not worse.



So what standard of training would be sufficient for you? No training on Non-normal procedures after the initial type rating? The perfect airplane can be designed so who needs pilots?

BTW that's probably the attitude of the Engineers at Boeing who designed MCAS - they probably thought their design was flawless. Engineers can and will make mistakes - you need well trained Engineers and pilots to have the safest system possible.
Last edited by morrisond on Sun May 05, 2019 12:50 am, edited 1 time in total.
 
kalvado
Posts: 2014
Joined: Wed Mar 01, 2006 4:29 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 05, 2019 12:49 am

WPIAeroGuy wrote:
7BOEING7 wrote:
WPIAeroGuy wrote:



This isn't going to be a popular opinion, but based on the information that's been released so far, I think the crews of both flights were at least as much at fault as Boeing. I had originally considered the situations they were presented as extremely challenging and unfortunate. However, I'm having trouble reconciling the idea that if the MCAS activation had been an 'ordinary' runaway trim, would the crews have reacted differently? There's been lots of talk about how MCAS was intermittent, and how the total stab travel changed from 0.6 to 2.5 units. However, to me these facts are obfuscating the more general idea that somehow a stab trim runaway (i.e. constant trim down to the stops) is considered recoverable, but MCAS activation (which has LESS overall authority than a true runaway because it occurs in intervals, and can be stopped by the thumb switches), is somehow unrecoverable. So either the 737 is unrecoverable with stab runaway, or the pilots aren't trained well enough to recover from one. I'm sure the final reports will give us all the answers, but I think we need to look at the bigger picture, beyond MCAS implementation. MCAS should not affect the airplane any differently than a stab trim runaway, which for 50 years of 737s was not a known design issue.


The one big difference with runaway trim is that if you hold the column in position to maintain attitude, ideally that stops the runaway — doesn’t work for MCAS.

But I agree with what you say.


Good point, I forgot about the column cutout switch.


You guys are focusing on microproblems of design. Look at the bigger picture:
if your opinion about training being (in)sufficient can be changed by a function of a switch which isn't even directly accessible to a pilot - you cannot build any proactive approach on such discussion. Very reactive and micromanaging at most.
 
kalvado
Posts: 2014
Joined: Wed Mar 01, 2006 4:29 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 05, 2019 12:53 am

morrisond wrote:
kalvado wrote:
WPIAeroGuy wrote:

This isn't going to be a popular opinion, but based on the information that's been released so far, I think the crews of both flights were at least as much at fault as Boeing. I had originally considered the situations they were presented as extremely challenging and unfortunate. However, I'm having trouble reconciling the idea that if the MCAS activation had been an 'ordinary' runaway trim, would the crews have reacted differently? There's been lots of talk about how MCAS was intermittent, and how the total stab travel changed from 0.6 to 2.5 units. However, to me these facts are obfuscating the more general idea that somehow a stab trim runaway (i.e. constant trim down to the stops) is considered recoverable, but MCAS activation (which has LESS overall authority than a true runaway because it occurs in intervals, and can be stopped by the thumb switches), is somehow unrecoverable. So either the 737 is unrecoverable with stab runaway, or the pilots aren't trained well enough to recover from one. I'm sure the final reports will give us all the answers, but I think we need to look at the bigger picture, beyond MCAS implementation. MCAS should not affect the airplane any differently than a stab trim runaway, which for 50 years of 737s was not a known design issue.

This is all great discussion until you consider cost implications. Yes, 737NG seems to have a significant design flaw which didn't manifest itself - or we don't know it did, that may be an interesting development. This basically means that safety margins of other features covered the gap. My understanding that this happens more often that we would want.
Now if you want a Chuck Eager in each cockpit because it may make things a touch better - forget it. It will make things worse.
But @morrisond talks about certain numbers for training - and those are as stupid as many feel-good ideas coming from the government, if not worse.



So what standard of training would be sufficient for you? No training on Non-normal procedures after the initial type rating? The perfect airplane can be designed so who needs pilots?

There are simple numbers, which tell that cost-efficient improvement must cost 10-20 cents per ticket. Anything above would make more sense to invest elsewhere.
If you cannot achieve very significant accident reduction on that budget, don't bother.
 
xmp125a
Posts: 247
Joined: Mon Mar 11, 2019 6:38 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 05, 2019 12:53 am

morrisond wrote:
No - I have always held lots of blame to go around - If I've had an Agenda it's to get people to realize that training has been lacking Worldwide and needs to be looked at - along with Boeing and the FAA


Since there are firm indices that insistence of the AMERICAN airlines on no sim training was factor in BOEING'S decision to minimize training requirements of 737MAX the issue with training is obviously not only "worldwide", it sadly is at home in USA. That "3rd world" pilots and passengers paid the ultimate price for the decision "let's minimize training" is, in a way, pretty absurd.
 
User avatar
par13del
Posts: 9046
Joined: Sun Dec 18, 2005 9:14 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 05, 2019 1:02 am

JerseyFlyer wrote:
I am not yet clear whether MCAS was necessary to achieve MAX certification.

In these threads, that ship has sailed a long time ago.
The experts say it is / was required by the FAA FAR'S.
The non-experts say MCAS is deadly because it was done on the cheap.

So in either case, it is required as a cheap company would not pay extra money to put in software if it was not required.
 
User avatar
par13del
Posts: 9046
Joined: Sun Dec 18, 2005 9:14 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 05, 2019 1:16 am

xmp125a wrote:
Since there are firm indices that insistence of the AMERICAN airlines on no sim training was factor in BOEING'S decision to minimize training requirements of 737MAX the issue with training is obviously not only "worldwide", it sadly is at home in USA. That "3rd world" pilots and passengers paid the ultimate price for the decision "let's minimize training" is, in a way, pretty absurd.

Hmm... that would be surprising since we have been reading since the Iraq invasion and its aftermath that American influence has been waning in the world, so what the US does in its country has been loosing influence on the rest of the world.

Perhaps one of the outcomes of this should be that Boeing should take over the training of all 737 pilots, at least a two week course, they may even be able to eliminate the "cultural issues" which some claim led to some perfectly good a/c being put on the ground.
Just a thought.
 
morrisond
Posts: 1391
Joined: Thu Jan 07, 2010 12:22 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 05, 2019 1:26 am

kalvado wrote:
morrisond wrote:
kalvado wrote:
This is all great discussion until you consider cost implications. Yes, 737NG seems to have a significant design flaw which didn't manifest itself - or we don't know it did, that may be an interesting development. This basically means that safety margins of other features covered the gap. My understanding that this happens more often that we would want.
Now if you want a Chuck Eager in each cockpit because it may make things a touch better - forget it. It will make things worse.
But @morrisond talks about certain numbers for training - and those are as stupid as many feel-good ideas coming from the government, if not worse.



So what standard of training would be sufficient for you? No training on Non-normal procedures after the initial type rating? The perfect airplane can be designed so who needs pilots?

There are simple numbers, which tell that cost-efficient improvement must cost 10-20 cents per ticket. Anything above would make more sense to invest elsewhere.
If you cannot achieve very significant accident reduction on that budget, don't bother.


So then I take it that you don't believe that Non-Normal procedures should be practised at all after Initial Type Rating. Sorry but that's really stupid.

I doubt we will ever know but I suspect Non-normal procedures were not drilled at all after Initial Type Rating at either Lionair or ET. It may be the only reason the Co-Pilot knew to cut off the trim switches was because he only got his initial type rating a few months previously.

The ET pilot did his initial type rating on the 737 in 2011.
 
kalvado
Posts: 2014
Joined: Wed Mar 01, 2006 4:29 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 05, 2019 1:29 am

par13del wrote:
xmp125a wrote:
Since there are firm indices that insistence of the AMERICAN airlines on no sim training was factor in BOEING'S decision to minimize training requirements of 737MAX the issue with training is obviously not only "worldwide", it sadly is at home in USA. That "3rd world" pilots and passengers paid the ultimate price for the decision "let's minimize training" is, in a way, pretty absurd.

Hmm... that would be surprising since we have been reading since the Iraq invasion and its aftermath that American influence has been waning in the world, so what the US does in its country has been loosing influence on the rest of the world.

Perhaps one of the outcomes of this should be that Boeing should take over the training of all 737 pilots, at least a two week course, they may even be able to eliminate the "cultural issues" which some claim led to some perfectly good a/c being put on the ground.
Just a thought.

And again: same pilots were flying nominally same type with quite impressive safety record. Despite sometimes pretty obvious problems with routine tasks.
Those routine tasks have to be trained. The requirement that training goes above and beyond is not an industrial approach.
Boeing is fighting for their immediate cash by shifting the issue to training - and may even win this battle - a pyrrhic victory in a long run.
 
kalvado
Posts: 2014
Joined: Wed Mar 01, 2006 4:29 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 05, 2019 1:40 am

morrisond wrote:
kalvado wrote:
morrisond wrote:


So what standard of training would be sufficient for you? No training on Non-normal procedures after the initial type rating? The perfect airplane can be designed so who needs pilots?

There are simple numbers, which tell that cost-efficient improvement must cost 10-20 cents per ticket. Anything above would make more sense to invest elsewhere.
If you cannot achieve very significant accident reduction on that budget, don't bother.


So then I take it that you don't believe that Non-Normal procedures should be practised at all after Initial Type Rating. Sorry but that's really stupid.

I doubt we will ever know but I suspect Non-normal procedures were not drilled at all after Initial Type Rating at either Lionair or ET. It may be the only reason the Co-Pilot knew to cut off the trim switches was because he only got his initial type rating a few months previously.

The ET pilot did his initial type rating on the 737 in 2011.

Tiered approach, my friend. There are probability and severity, as well as responce time.
The most probable severe problem requiring instant responce currently considered is an engine failure, specifically failure at a critical point of time - on takeoff, on problematic approach, far away from land - and those are procedures requiring the most attention. There are other common enough and severe enough things that require memorizing. There can be only that many of those.
If there are too many such problems - too bad, go back to design stage. If there is a severe and uncommon (<1e-9) failure - sadly we have to accept that as a lottery.
Human memory is finite, you cannot keep coming up with more and more scenarios that require memorizing. Here come checklists. Which require that problem can be diagnosed, and there is enough time for that. E.g. airplane doesn't try to crash immediately.
 
WPIAeroGuy
Posts: 312
Joined: Tue Aug 21, 2007 11:52 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 05, 2019 1:44 am

kalvado wrote:
WPIAeroGuy wrote:
7BOEING7 wrote:

The one big difference with runaway trim is that if you hold the column in position to maintain attitude, ideally that stops the runaway — doesn’t work for MCAS.

But I agree with what you say.


Good point, I forgot about the column cutout switch.


You guys are focusing on microproblems of design. Look at the bigger picture:
if your opinion about training being (in)sufficient can be changed by a function of a switch which isn't even directly accessible to a pilot - you cannot build any proactive approach on such discussion. Very reactive and micromanaging at most.


So what's your global solution? Tell engineers not to make mistakes? This wasn't a math error. You can't have every fault tree assuming pilots don't perform procedures correctly. Boeing presumed the pilots could properly handle a stab trim runaway. Experience has shown us that isn't true. But good luck finding a textbook that covered that scenario.
-WPIAeroGuy
 
kalvado
Posts: 2014
Joined: Wed Mar 01, 2006 4:29 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 05, 2019 1:54 am

WPIAeroGuy wrote:
kalvado wrote:
WPIAeroGuy wrote:

Good point, I forgot about the column cutout switch.


You guys are focusing on microproblems of design. Look at the bigger picture:
if your opinion about training being (in)sufficient can be changed by a function of a switch which isn't even directly accessible to a pilot - you cannot build any proactive approach on such discussion. Very reactive and micromanaging at most.


So what's your global solution? Tell engineers not to make mistakes? This wasn't a math error. You can't have every fault tree assuming pilots don't perform procedures correctly. Boeing presumed the pilots could properly handle a stab trim runaway. Experience has shown us that isn't true. But good luck finding a textbook that covered that scenario.

Somehow same types of pilots fly A320, 7373NG, 777, 787 without significant issues. So there has to be something different here, you know.
 
shmerik
Posts: 8
Joined: Sun May 05, 2019 2:28 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 05, 2019 2:41 am

Not a pilot - software engineer that started my career at a small company that produced hardware-in-the-loop testing and certification solutions for major aerospace and defense organizations. I experienced first-hand the sort of pressures and poor communications/management between entities that leads to audits/test results/certifications be pushed through too fast and in incomplete forms and to be honest it made me wonder if we wouldn't start to see failures like this tragedy unfold in the near future.

From the information available my gut feeling tells me that the systems design on the MAX was intentional, not an instance of well-meaning engineers making a mistake. There's the change of the rate of trim applied made late in the testing stages (from 0.6 units to 2.5 units per time period?) and the seeming lack of any sort of sanity checks in the MCAS system that just seems impossible to miss. There are very basic things that can be done in software even beyond bringing in more sensors to fall back on such as checking the values that come before (is it ever possible for AOA to jump over from 14 to 75 degrees in under a second?). This is something that should have been glaringly obvious to all involved in the process and if there was genuinely no bad intentions on Boeing's part then what this suggests is serious organizational rot. In either case I would hesitate to put confidence in other aspects of the design if this system is such a mess.

I've yet to see a satisfactory explanation behind the changes to the trim cutout switches. Sure, I've read that they are always used at the same time but how does that justify neutering the behavior but leaving the two switches except for different labels? In what world does it make sense to get rid of the ability to cutout the plane's automation (STS, MCAS, probably others that I'm not familiar with) while still allowing the pilot to enter trim commands using the stab motor? What does this improve upon the original design of the switches? A change like this involves multiple engineering departments in order to implement and everything is documented and cross checked along the way. I'm very curious as to what the justification is here.

And the mysterious short blips of trim shortly before MCAS dealt it's final blow... From following along in this thread and others I've come to the knowledge that trimming away pressure in the control column is one of the most basic aspects of flying that there is. The failures to get completely back into trim and then the final blips suggest to me that something else is wrong. From what I see other pilots saying it sounds like the equivalent of someone in the path of an oncoming semi-truck applying very slight turns of the steering wheel to get out of the way (sorry for the clumsy metaphor). If airline training has taken such a deep dive in quality over the years as to lead to pilots that don't have supposed basic airmanship skills, doesn't this imply that we should expect to see a steep increase in the amount of pilot errors leading to accidents?

So far they have been confined to two hulls of the same make and model within the first years of it entering into flight...

If you read all of that then thanks for taking the time to consider the viewpoint of someone from outside the profession. I've become somewhat obsessed with this MAX fiasco because just like it highlights the importance of airmanship to some pilots here, to me it highlights the importance of systems design and good engineering practices in the software and technology world. It is cheap and easy to alter products by manipulating lines of code but we must keep in mind that the impact that it has on the word is just as real as that of the other more "material" engineering professions.


morrisond wrote:
kalvado wrote:
WPIAeroGuy wrote:
BTW that's probably the attitude of the Engineers at Boeing who designed MCAS - they probably thought their design was flawless. Engineers can and will make mistakes - you need well trained Engineers and pilots to have the safest system possible.


If this is actually the case then we should all be very hesitant to use any of Boeing's products made at the same time or later than the MAX. As xmp125a described, what we know about the implementation of the MCAS would be rejected in a junior year embedded systems engineering course, how it ended up as part of an actual 737 is astounding.
 
MSPNWA
Posts: 3430
Joined: Thu Apr 23, 2009 2:48 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 05, 2019 2:43 am

kalvado wrote:
Somehow same types of pilots fly A320, 7373NG, 777, 787 without significant issues. So there has to be something different here, you know.


Again, what's your solution when engineers make mistakes?
 
kalvado
Posts: 2014
Joined: Wed Mar 01, 2006 4:29 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 05, 2019 2:47 am

MSPNWA wrote:
kalvado wrote:
Somehow same types of pilots fly A320, 7373NG, 777, 787 without significant issues. So there has to be something different here, you know.


Again, what's your solution when engineers make mistakes?

To begin with - not denying such mistakes as Boeing is doing.
 
MSPNWA
Posts: 3430
Joined: Thu Apr 23, 2009 2:48 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 05, 2019 2:54 am

kalvado wrote:
To begin with - not denying such mistakes as Boeing is doing.

That's not a solution.

I guess it needs to be asked again - what's your solution?
 
kalvado
Posts: 2014
Joined: Wed Mar 01, 2006 4:29 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 05, 2019 3:14 am

MSPNWA wrote:
kalvado wrote:
To begin with - not denying such mistakes as Boeing is doing.

That's not a solution.

I guess it needs to be asked again - what's your solution?


My solution - based on other high profile failures in technology industries - is holding companies liable for following development standards as declared, i.e. for the verifiable procedure rather than somewhat unpredictable result; and minimizing liability considerations in the incident and accident analysis to minimizes consequences of such mistakes. Both should reduce the power of unprofessional influence on development.
First part is about changing of certification paradigm - from checking result to checking if result is a solid one. Second... Not sure how to do it on a company basis; but it is similar to holding pilots harmless for honest mistakes if they are properly disclosed. Some sort of liability insurance with limitations on court action?
 
morrisond
Posts: 1391
Joined: Thu Jan 07, 2010 12:22 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 05, 2019 3:17 am

kalvado wrote:
MSPNWA wrote:
kalvado wrote:
To begin with - not denying such mistakes as Boeing is doing.

That's not a solution.

I guess it needs to be asked again - what's your solution?


My solution - based on other high profile failures in technology industries - is holding companies liable for following development standards as declared, i.e. for the verifiable procedure rather than somewhat unpredictable result; and minimizing liability considerations in the incident and accident analysis to minimizes consequences of such mistakes. Both should reduce the power of unprofessional influence on development.
First part is about changing of certification paradigm - from checking result to checking if result is a solid one. Second... Not sure how to do it on a company basis; but it is similar to holding pilots harmless for honest mistakes if they are properly disclosed. Some sort of liability insurance with limitations on court action?


So what happens when a part breaks in your perfectly designed airplane? Things do break - you need well trained pilots.
 
kalvado
Posts: 2014
Joined: Wed Mar 01, 2006 4:29 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 05, 2019 3:25 am

morrisond wrote:
kalvado wrote:
MSPNWA wrote:
That's not a solution.

I guess it needs to be asked again - what's your solution?


My solution - based on other high profile failures in technology industries - is holding companies liable for following development standards as declared, i.e. for the verifiable procedure rather than somewhat unpredictable result; and minimizing liability considerations in the incident and accident analysis to minimizes consequences of such mistakes. Both should reduce the power of unprofessional influence on development.
First part is about changing of certification paradigm - from checking result to checking if result is a solid one. Second... Not sure how to do it on a company basis; but it is similar to holding pilots harmless for honest mistakes if they are properly disclosed. Some sort of liability insurance with limitations on court action?


So what happens when a part breaks in your perfectly designed airplane? Things do break - you need well trained pilots.

In a perfectly designed airplane, there is such a thing as "redundancy". There are also "life safe" and "fail safe" concepts to apply.
So the answer to your question is simple: report to maintenance after uneventful arrival.
 
MSPNWA
Posts: 3430
Joined: Thu Apr 23, 2009 2:48 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 05, 2019 3:43 am

kalvado wrote:
My solution - based on other high profile failures in technology industries - is holding companies liable for following development standards as declared, i.e. for the verifiable procedure rather than somewhat unpredictable result; and minimizing liability considerations in the incident and accident analysis to minimizes consequences of such mistakes. Both should reduce the power of unprofessional influence on development.
First part is about changing of certification paradigm - from checking result to checking if result is a solid one. Second... Not sure how to do it on a company basis; but it is similar to holding pilots harmless for honest mistakes if they are properly disclosed. Some sort of liability insurance with limitations on court action?


Once again that's not a solution that answers the question of when engineers make a mistake. You can say " I don't know". It's an acceptable answer in this complex situation.
 
Planetalk
Posts: 434
Joined: Thu Aug 27, 2015 5:12 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 05, 2019 3:48 am

Saintor wrote:
planecane wrote:

The ET crew seems to have turned off the electric trim before counteracting MCAS due to a misunderstanding or misapplication of the procedure.

Either way, since it was recoverable, and relatively simply so, MCAS is not the worst design in modern aviation.


The tendency for some people to exaggerate is appalling. It will be interesting to see the results in simulators when more is known. Easily recoverable might be it. Yet it is likely that Boeing didn't provide enough back-up in their system design and training.


Sim tests have already been done and even pilots, American pilots(!) who were fully briefed and knew exactly what was coming and how to react, reported they were surprised how difficult it was and that they struggled.

Nothing like keyboard warriors telling us how easy it was to recover. The world decided to ground a completely safe plane according to some here and and Boeing have admitted fault (which will cost them billions) for no reason. These people never give up showing their ignorance do they?
 
kalvado
Posts: 2014
Joined: Wed Mar 01, 2006 4:29 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 05, 2019 3:52 am

MSPNWA wrote:
kalvado wrote:
My solution - based on other high profile failures in technology industries - is holding companies liable for following development standards as declared, i.e. for the verifiable procedure rather than somewhat unpredictable result; and minimizing liability considerations in the incident and accident analysis to minimizes consequences of such mistakes. Both should reduce the power of unprofessional influence on development.
First part is about changing of certification paradigm - from checking result to checking if result is a solid one. Second... Not sure how to do it on a company basis; but it is similar to holding pilots harmless for honest mistakes if they are properly disclosed. Some sort of liability insurance with limitations on court action?


Once again that's not a solution that answers the question of when engineers make a mistake. You can say " I don't know". It's an acceptable answer in this complex situation.

Your answer is training. My answer is - pray hard.
Untrained, non-envisioned or unrecognized failure is a crash by default. Training didn't help TWA880, JAL123, AF4590 and many other flights. Moreover, training COULD NOT help those.
There is a very narrow range of cases where unpredicted failure could be saved by the crew - and as hard as it sounds, training for those cases is not cost efficient, this is the area of diminishing return.
 
Planetalk
Posts: 434
Joined: Thu Aug 27, 2015 5:12 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 05, 2019 3:52 am

kalvado wrote:
morrisond wrote:
kalvado wrote:

My solution - based on other high profile failures in technology industries - is holding companies liable for following development standards as declared, i.e. for the verifiable procedure rather than somewhat unpredictable result; and minimizing liability considerations in the incident and accident analysis to minimizes consequences of such mistakes. Both should reduce the power of unprofessional influence on development.
First part is about changing of certification paradigm - from checking result to checking if result is a solid one. Second... Not sure how to do it on a company basis; but it is similar to holding pilots harmless for honest mistakes if they are properly disclosed. Some sort of liability insurance with limitations on court action?


So what happens when a part breaks in your perfectly designed airplane? Things do break - you need well trained pilots.

In a perfectly designed airplane, there is such a thing as "redundancy". There are also "life safe" and "fail safe" concepts to apply.
So the answer to your question is simple: report to maintenance after uneventful arrival.


This guy is on my foe list but since they insist on replying to every other damn post I can't avoid them. The number of factual inaccuracies they've asserted is quite staggering. And never an acknowledgement when corrected.

They're still banging on about training without a shred.of evidence? God help us. This forum really has gone downhill.
 
MSPNWA
Posts: 3430
Joined: Thu Apr 23, 2009 2:48 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 05, 2019 3:58 am

kalvado wrote:
Your answer is training. My answer is - pray hard.
Untrained, non-envisioned or unrecognized failure is a crash by default. Training didn't help TWA880, JAL123, AF4590 and many other flights. Moreover, training COULD NOT help those.
There is a very narrow range of cases where unpredicted failure could be saved by the crew - and as hard as it sounds, training for those cases is not cost efficient, this is the area of diminishing return.


Wow, and you have the nerve to be on your soapbox when your solution is that? Surely you're joking?

And where have I stated my solution? Don't bother looking, you won't find it.

Interesting how your claimed "very narrow range" includes two particular flights in just the last 6 months....
 
IADFCO
Posts: 129
Joined: Sun May 22, 2016 4:20 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun May 05, 2019 4:21 am

Very personal opinion, of course, but a self-imposed limit of one or two postings per thread per day sure would be nice...
  • 1
  • 5
  • 6
  • 7
  • 8
  • 9
  • 76

Popular Searches On Airliners.net

Top Photos of Last:   24 Hours  •  48 Hours  •  7 Days  •  30 Days  •  180 Days  •  365 Days  •  All Time

Military Aircraft Every type from fighters to helicopters from air forces around the globe

Classic Airliners Props and jets from the good old days

Flight Decks Views from inside the cockpit

Aircraft Cabins Passenger cabin shots showing seat arrangements as well as cargo aircraft interior

Cargo Aircraft Pictures of great freighter aircraft

Government Aircraft Aircraft flying government officials

Helicopters Our large helicopter section. Both military and civil versions

Blimps / Airships Everything from the Goodyear blimp to the Zeppelin

Night Photos Beautiful shots taken while the sun is below the horizon

Accidents Accident, incident and crash related photos

Air to Air Photos taken by airborne photographers of airborne aircraft

Special Paint Schemes Aircraft painted in beautiful and original liveries

Airport Overviews Airport overviews from the air or ground

Tails and Winglets Tail and Winglet closeups with beautiful airline logos