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ACCS300
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed May 08, 2019 5:19 am

Agreed, while the production was a bit dramatic, the facts were there and the American Airlines pilot as well as the Australian pilot seemed very credible and their concerns extremely valid. I'm beginning to have my doubts that this plane will actually fly again without major design and software changes and full re-certification.
 
bgm
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed May 08, 2019 5:29 am

IADFCO wrote:
@777Jet: thanks for the link -- it worked here in the US.

Both as a person and as an aerospace engineer working in flight dynamics and control, I found it very hard to watch. 350 people are not supposed to die that way.


+1

Those fiercely defending Boeing regarding the 737 MAX fiasco really should watch that documentary. Both chilling and eye-opening.
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1989worstyear
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed May 08, 2019 5:57 am

WIederling wrote:
seahawk wrote:
If you need to compare Boeing with Airbus, it shows that Boeing is in a crisis. Boeing should be the unchallenged global leader in commercial aviation.


Hmm.
they had their time ( mostly on borrowed IP ) when no viable competition was available.

US dominance was a post WWII "trashed European infrastructure" short term effect.
Without creating a similar situation MAGA will have no leverage.


:confused:

They've been continually challenged since 1988 with the A320 which, by the way, has remained unchanged for 30 years airframe and system-wise.

If Joe Sutter or Bernard Ziegler were 40 years younger and working today at their respective companies, they would have been laughed out of the building. Risk taking in this industry has been on life support since the '90s, and I'm afraid this complacency regarding "warmed over" designs is starting to spread to Airbus' product line (they just currently have the better warmed-over NB family with the NEO).

EDIT: Meant to say Bernard Ziegler - I'm getting my Airbus execs mixed up :oops:
Stuck at age 15 thanks to the certification date of the A320-200 and my parents' decision to postpone having a kid by 3 years. At least there's Dignitas...
 
WIederling
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed May 08, 2019 7:17 am

1989worstyear wrote:
WIederling wrote:
seahawk wrote:
If you need to compare Boeing with Airbus, it shows that Boeing is in a crisis. Boeing should be the unchallenged global leader in commercial aviation.


Hmm.
they had their time ( mostly on borrowed IP ) when no viable competition was available.

US dominance was a post WWII "trashed European infrastructure" short term effect.
Without creating a similar situation MAGA will have no leverage.


:confused:

They've been continually challenged since 1988 with the A320 which, by the way, has remained unchanged for 30 years airframe and system-wise.

If Joe Sutter or Bernard Ziegler were 40 years younger and working today at their respective companies, they would have been laughed out of the building. Risk taking in this industry has been on life support since the '90s, and I'm afraid this complacency regarding "warmed over" designs is starting to spread to Airbus' product line (they just currently have the better warmed-over NB family with the NEO).

EDIT: Meant to say Bernard Ziegler - I'm getting my Airbus execs mixed up :oops:

Taking risks makes sense inversely proportional to market share.

That said, what kind of massive tech "overstep" do you see with the ( partly clean sheet ) newish entrants?
( SS100, C-Series, MRJ, ERJ, ...)

Lots of things "new" are not much more than PR gimmicks.
Laminar flow nacelle ? actually nothing more than extending laminar flow for a couple more % along the structure.
"vast number of quantum step improvements" ? 787 doesn't show more than the engine improvements in overall performance.
....
Airbus over time has spent significant amounts of money on "under the hood" facelifts.
they sell well. money must have been well spent. :-)

You'll see step changes with moving to a mostly laminar flow wing.

Then, what kind of step change risk do you expect. BWB? I think not.
Murphy is an optimist
 
1989worstyear
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed May 08, 2019 8:18 am

WIederling wrote:
1989worstyear wrote:
WIederling wrote:

Hmm.
they had their time ( mostly on borrowed IP ) when no viable competition was available.

US dominance was a post WWII "trashed European infrastructure" short term effect.
Without creating a similar situation MAGA will have no leverage.


:confused:

They've been continually challenged since 1988 with the A320 which, by the way, has remained unchanged for 30 years airframe and system-wise.

If Joe Sutter or Bernard Ziegler were 40 years younger and working today at their respective companies, they would have been laughed out of the building. Risk taking in this industry has been on life support since the '90s, and I'm afraid this complacency regarding "warmed over" designs is starting to spread to Airbus' product line (they just currently have the better warmed-over NB family with the NEO).

EDIT: Meant to say Bernard Ziegler - I'm getting my Airbus execs mixed up :oops:

Taking risks makes sense inversely proportional to market share.

That said, what kind of massive tech "overstep" do you see with the ( partly clean sheet ) newish entrants?
( SS100, C-Series, MRJ, ERJ, ...)

Lots of things "new" are not much more than PR gimmicks.
Laminar flow nacelle ? actually nothing more than extending laminar flow for a couple more % along the structure.
"vast number of quantum step improvements" ? 787 doesn't show more than the engine improvements in overall performance.
....
Airbus over time has spent significant amounts of money on "under the hood" facelifts.
they sell well. money must have been well spent. :-)

You'll see step changes with moving to a mostly laminar flow wing.

Then, what kind of step change risk do you expect. BWB? I think not.


A 30 year old A320-200 is nearly identical to a CEO rolling off the line today. The "significant amounts of money on 'under the hood' facelifts" could be applied to any longer-lived type built by either OEM (like the 767), so I'm not convinced Airbus is immune to the same complacency Boeing has been in for exactly 20 years.

Regarding the A220 and MRJ, it will be interesting to see how they fare over the next 10 years in their respective segments, but I'm not expecting much in the larger NB sector until somebody pulls the trigger with something like the laminar flow wing, or a breakthrough with electric/hybrid power plants magically appears.

At least the former exists in experimental form - now it's time to convince the board to apply it :veryhappy: :

https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news ... uel-saving
Stuck at age 15 thanks to the certification date of the A320-200 and my parents' decision to postpone having a kid by 3 years. At least there's Dignitas...
 
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teme82
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed May 08, 2019 9:06 am

bgm wrote:
IADFCO wrote:
@777Jet: thanks for the link -- it worked here in the US.

Both as a person and as an aerospace engineer working in flight dynamics and control, I found it very hard to watch. 350 people are not supposed to die that way.


+1

Those fiercely defending Boeing regarding the 737 MAX fiasco really should watch that documentary. Both chilling and eye-opening.

+1
After seeing this documentary I think we all should see that. It was really big eye-opener.
Flying high and low
 
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Revelation
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed May 08, 2019 11:16 am

JayinKitsap wrote:
As the A380 design went into certification there was a whole lot of screw ups - wiring, wing strengthening, the list seemed endless. As the 787 was rolled out there were fastener shortages, fastener drill hole size problems, batteries, the list seemed endless. I recall the 787 has something like 100,000 lines of code. Each system has to be thought out with a lot of what ifs, but there are always a lot of things that are not thought out.

Boeing has screwed up with the Max big time, but I am sure it was not intentional, the big controller is Boeing has and will be paying a huge price for this screw up. Time will tell if they fix their culture, for decades it was nicknamed the "Lazy B" as a place to work, that does not produce the best of anything.

It sure does produce the best of many things.

777 is best of breed, and after its teething pains, 787 also is best of breed, and 777x has a good chance to be best in its category.

Oh, and by the way, people do not seem to be refusing to get on NG era 737s in meaningful numbers due to some sort of Boeing taint.

JayinKitsap wrote:
BoeingGuy wrote:
RickNRoll wrote:
Muilenburg had to resign.


Actually I don’t want to see him resign. Internally he’s trying to get some things back on track, such as with the “Boeing Behaviors” mindset. He’s far better than Condit, Stoneciper, or McSlimeball. I’d be afraid to see who’d replace Dennis. Another greedy clown from 3M who runs the company into the ground for his own gain, again?


Muilenberg is by far the best CEO since the merger with McD, he arrived in 2015, about 9 months prior to the MAX first flight. Many programs are improving, he is probably the best chance to getting things back running right, but it takes time.

He may get a pass on the MAX launch era due to his late arrival, but right now his career trajectory is tied to how Boeing handled both the JT and ET crashes and the post-crash recovery.

He owns the decisions that led to the current damage control strategy, and if this strategy fails to get MAX back in the air on the presumed July/August time frame, IMHO his career is in great jeopardy.

Even if he does pull off the recovery, I can imagine the decision to keep flying after JT and trying to keep flying after ET will damage his career trajectory.

The only saving grace he has is the "too big to fail" inertia behind MAX. Even Airbus is saying MAX needs to get back into the air in a timely fashion. Those pushing for a deep dive review of Boeing's design process are going to get a bunch of push back from every other player in the aviation ecosystem, because every other airplane was developed under the current international regulatory framework and no insider wants to open Pandora's box.
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RawSushi
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed May 08, 2019 12:06 pm

OldProp wrote:
I hate to make this sound too simple, but Boeing is under pressure to produce a lot of airplanes in as little time as possible. Anyone in manufacturing will tell you problems arise, seen and unseen, when these quick(er) deadlines have to be met. New inexperienced employees are hired, corners are cut, and new processes are introduced. And not only that, vendors are also under the gun to supply parts on time. I would bet the farm Boeing has gotten some "bad" parts from them for the same reasons.

Then there is "Lean" manufacturing. Don't get me wrong, lean manufacturing is a proven time and money saver, but it leads to the workers signing off their own work and eliminating that second eye in most cases. So when my boss tells me he needed that job done yesterday, I say it's finished even though it's less than perfect. I want to keep my job. It may, or may not, get looked at further down the production line.

Hopefully Boeing has learned from its recent wakeup call.


I agree. It really is just as simple as this. The 737 MAX was a rush job, and these things happen when it's a rush job. Companies do what they were formed to do, which is to make as much money as possible for the shareholders. The custodian of public interest (i.e. safety) in this case is the FAA, so they have to take a big part of the blame. Every time we get mad at Boeing for doing something bad... always remember... FAA allowed them to do it.
 
kalvado
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed May 08, 2019 12:11 pm

Revelation wrote:

777 is best of breed, and after its teething pains, 787 also is best of breed, and 777x has a good chance to be best in its category..

In 777X rollout thread someone lectured me that Boening is a great company, with similar praise to 777 and 787, and "a best narrowbody ever" on top of that.
ET crashed 2 days later.
Was that you, by any chance?
 
morrisond
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed May 08, 2019 12:50 pm

RawSushi wrote:
OldProp wrote:
I hate to make this sound too simple, but Boeing is under pressure to produce a lot of airplanes in as little time as possible. Anyone in manufacturing will tell you problems arise, seen and unseen, when these quick(er) deadlines have to be met. New inexperienced employees are hired, corners are cut, and new processes are introduced. And not only that, vendors are also under the gun to supply parts on time. I would bet the farm Boeing has gotten some "bad" parts from them for the same reasons.

Then there is "Lean" manufacturing. Don't get me wrong, lean manufacturing is a proven time and money saver, but it leads to the workers signing off their own work and eliminating that second eye in most cases. So when my boss tells me he needed that job done yesterday, I say it's finished even though it's less than perfect. I want to keep my job. It may, or may not, get looked at further down the production line.

Hopefully Boeing has learned from its recent wakeup call.


I agree. It really is just as simple as this. The 737 MAX was a rush job, and these things happen when it's a rush job. Companies do what they were formed to do, which is to make as much money as possible for the shareholders. The custodian of public interest (i.e. safety) in this case is the FAA, so they have to take a big part of the blame. Every time we get mad at Boeing for doing something bad... always remember... FAA allowed them to do it.


Rush job may be the incorrect term - it was almost 6 years from Launch to Certification. For a simple derivative that is a long time.

A hack job where they didn't put as much thought into as they should would probably be a better description but they had plenty of time.
 
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Revelation
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed May 08, 2019 2:07 pm

kalvado wrote:
Revelation wrote:
777 is best of breed, and after its teething pains, 787 also is best of breed, and 777x has a good chance to be best in its category..

In 777X rollout thread someone lectured me that Boening is a great company, with similar praise to 777 and 787, and "a best narrowbody ever" on top of that.
ET crashed 2 days later.
Was that you, by any chance?

I'm not lecturing, I'm not even responding to any post by you, and I did not respond to the post you mentioned.

I'm just refuting the claim that JayinKitsap made that Boeing does not produce the best of anything.

I don't think 737 will be tainted for all time due to these crashes just in the same way the A320 wasn't tainted by the alleged design issues that led to the Habsheim crash ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_296 ) or the Warsaw crash ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lufthansa_Flight_2904 ).

Time will tell how history judges the 737 family as a whole and the MAX in particular.

People thought exploding batteries would doom the 787, and clearly they did not.

A more long term perspective is what will end up being applied, IMHO.
Wake up to find out that you are the eyes of the world
The heart has its beaches, its homeland and thoughts of its own
Wake now, discover that you are the song that the morning brings
The heart has its seasons, its evenings and songs of its own
 
bgm
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed May 08, 2019 2:21 pm

Revelation wrote:
kalvado wrote:
Revelation wrote:
777 is best of breed, and after its teething pains, 787 also is best of breed, and 777x has a good chance to be best in its category..

In 777X rollout thread someone lectured me that Boening is a great company, with similar praise to 777 and 787, and "a best narrowbody ever" on top of that.
ET crashed 2 days later.
Was that you, by any chance?

I'm not lecturing, I'm not even responding to any post by you, and I did not respond to the post you mentioned.

I'm just refuting the claim that JayinKitsap made that Boeing does not produce the best of anything.

I don't think 737 will be tainted for all time due to these crashes just in the same way the A320 wasn't tainted by the alleged design issues that led to the Habsheim crash ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_296 ) or the Warsaw crash ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lufthansa_Flight_2904 ).

Time will tell how history judges the 737 family as a whole and the MAX in particular.

People thought exploding batteries would doom the 787, and clearly they did not.

A more long term perspective is what will end up being applied, IMHO.


The difference with the 737 MAX crashes is the brazenly appalling negligence by Boeing. Rushing it through, cutting corners, implementing MCAS without notifying airlines & pilots, installing a deadly system that relied on inputs from one sensor. When the crashes happened, they used the 3rd world stereotypes to automatically shift the blame to the pilots.

If it was up to Boeing and the FAA, these death traps would still be in the skies putting thousands of lives at risk.
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PlanesNTrains
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed May 08, 2019 2:26 pm

kalvado wrote:
Revelation wrote:

777 is best of breed, and after its teething pains, 787 also is best of breed, and 777x has a good chance to be best in its category..

In 777X rollout thread someone lectured me that Boening is a great company, with similar praise to 777 and 787, and "a best narrowbody ever" on top of that.
ET crashed 2 days later.
Was that you, by any chance?


What a bizarre, self-indulgent flame.

morrisond wrote:
Rush job may be the incorrect term - it was almost 6 years from Launch to Certification. For a simple derivative that is a long time.

A hack job where they didn't put as much thought into as they should would probably be a better description but they had plenty of time.


I agree. I think it's become a bit of a habit on here to just throw things out about Boeing and the MAX. There's enough wrong with either that making stuff up or inaccurately portraying what led to where we're at seems unnecessary. With the MAX, Boeing had plenty of time to get it right or make other decisions. They chose not to.
-Dave


MAX’d out on MAX threads. If you are starting a thread, and it’s about the MAX - stop. There’s already a thread that covers it.
 
kalvado
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed May 08, 2019 2:30 pm

PlanesNTrains wrote:
kalvado wrote:
Revelation wrote:

777 is best of breed, and after its teething pains, 787 also is best of breed, and 777x has a good chance to be best in its category..

In 777X rollout thread someone lectured me that Boening is a great company, with similar praise to 777 and 787, and "a best narrowbody ever" on top of that.
ET crashed 2 days later.
Was that you, by any chance?


What a bizarre, self-indulgent flame.

morrisond wrote:
Rush job may be the incorrect term - it was almost 6 years from Launch to Certification. For a simple derivative that is a long time.

A hack job where they didn't put as much thought into as they should would probably be a better description but they had plenty of time.


I agree. I think it's become a bit of a habit on here to just throw things out about Boeing and the MAX. There's enough wrong with either that making stuff up or inaccurately portraying what led to where we're at seems unnecessary. With the MAX, Boeing had plenty of time to get it right or make other decisions. They chose not to.

My main point there was that praising someone in case of problems is counterproductive. People took jokes regarding past Boeing's problems as offensive - well, I wonder what is the feeling about ongoing things.
Boeing in in deep shit, from inside and outside. Recognizing that is the first step towards resolving those issues. Painful, but unavoidable.
 
JayinKitsap
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed May 08, 2019 3:25 pm

Revelation wrote:
JayinKitsap wrote:
Boeing has screwed up with the Max big time, but I am sure it was not intentional, the big controller is Boeing has and will be paying a huge price for this screw up. Time will tell if they fix their culture, for decades it was nicknamed the "Lazy B" as a place to work, that does not produce the best of anything.

It sure does produce the best of many things.

777 is best of breed, and after its teething pains, 787 also is best of breed, and 777x has a good chance to be best in its category.

Oh, and by the way, people do not seem to be refusing to get on NG era 737s in meaningful numbers due to some sort of Boeing taint.
.


I apologize for being harsh and also not differentiating. Boeing has had parts of its workforce and management over the decades that just punched the clock, while others were pushing hard to be the best possible. During the time Shrontz was CEO Boeing was humming along doing quite well, the company was managed by engineers dedicated to the product. Condit did not manage the strain of merging the Boeing and McD cultures well and began the MBA management vs engineer management. He also was the captain of the ship when the Darleen Druyun fiasco hit the first tanker contract, there were also the production problems where there was a full line stop to get everything back together. Stonecipher started to improve the culture but was also caught in scandal. This period saw the spinoff of Spirit and the move to just be an assembler vs doing things in house. During his and McNerney's period, Boeing put together the concept for the 787 having its suppliers design major elements vs being designed in house completely. The back tracking to buy back or change who builds what on the 787 was a total disaster.

Meanwhile, Alan Mulally was the leader that brought the excellent 777 program from first concept to the 77W introduction. He went on to Ford in 2006, I consider him to be one of the best CEO's ever. What would Boeing have been if he led Boeing instead of McNerney.

Boeing has produced 'best in class' planes with very few not still in production (707, 727, 757), this actually is incredible in a high tech field.
 
PlanesNTrains
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed May 08, 2019 3:25 pm

kalvado wrote:
PlanesNTrains wrote:
kalvado wrote:
In 777X rollout thread someone lectured me that Boening is a great company, with similar praise to 777 and 787, and "a best narrowbody ever" on top of that.
ET crashed 2 days later.
Was that you, by any chance?


What a bizarre, self-indulgent flame.

morrisond wrote:
Rush job may be the incorrect term - it was almost 6 years from Launch to Certification. For a simple derivative that is a long time.

A hack job where they didn't put as much thought into as they should would probably be a better description but they had plenty of time.


I agree. I think it's become a bit of a habit on here to just throw things out about Boeing and the MAX. There's enough wrong with either that making stuff up or inaccurately portraying what led to where we're at seems unnecessary. With the MAX, Boeing had plenty of time to get it right or make other decisions. They chose not to.

My main point there was that praising someone in case of problems is counterproductive. People took jokes regarding past Boeing's problems as offensive - well, I wonder what is the feeling about ongoing things.
Boeing in in deep shit, from inside and outside. Recognizing that is the first step towards resolving those issues. Painful, but unavoidable.


Who are you to lecture other people? Who are you to point to someone and tie them into some sort of bigger narrative you're trying to push? If you don't like what a poster says, call them out at that time (i.e. addressing past comments). Don't start blanket pointing fingers and lecturing.
Last edited by PlanesNTrains on Wed May 08, 2019 3:29 pm, edited 1 time in total.
-Dave


MAX’d out on MAX threads. If you are starting a thread, and it’s about the MAX - stop. There’s already a thread that covers it.
 
PlanesNTrains
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed May 08, 2019 3:28 pm

JayinKitsap wrote:
Revelation wrote:
JayinKitsap wrote:
Boeing has screwed up with the Max big time, but I am sure it was not intentional, the big controller is Boeing has and will be paying a huge price for this screw up. Time will tell if they fix their culture, for decades it was nicknamed the "Lazy B" as a place to work, that does not produce the best of anything.

It sure does produce the best of many things.

777 is best of breed, and after its teething pains, 787 also is best of breed, and 777x has a good chance to be best in its category.

Oh, and by the way, people do not seem to be refusing to get on NG era 737s in meaningful numbers due to some sort of Boeing taint.
.


I apologize for being harsh and also not differentiating. Boeing has had parts of its workforce and management over the decades that just punched the clock, while others were pushing hard to be the best possible. During the time Shrontz was CEO Boeing was humming along doing quite well, the company was managed by engineers dedicated to the product. Condit did not manage the strain of merging the Boeing and McD cultures well and began the MBA management vs engineer management. He also was the captain of the ship when the Darleen Druyun fiasco hit the first tanker contract, there were also the production problems where there was a full line stop to get everything back together. Stonecipher started to improve the culture but was also caught in scandal. This period saw the spinoff of Spirit and the move to just be an assembler vs doing things in house. During his and McNerney's period, Boeing put together the concept for the 787 having its suppliers design major elements vs being designed in house completely. The back tracking to buy back or change who builds what on the 787 was a total disaster.

Meanwhile, Alan Mulally was the leader that brought the excellent 777 program from first concept to the 77W introduction. He went on to Ford in 2006, I consider him to be one of the best CEO's ever. What would Boeing have been if he led Boeing instead of McNerney.

Boeing has produced 'best in class' planes with very few not still in production (707, 727, 757), this actually is incredible in a high tech field.


I really liked Mulally, but IIRC he was involved in the 787 program at a critical time and left shortly before it all started hitting the fan. I always sort of wondered what he knew and how he was involved in that fiasco? Having said that, he seemed like the real deal.
-Dave


MAX’d out on MAX threads. If you are starting a thread, and it’s about the MAX - stop. There’s already a thread that covers it.
 
F9Animal
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed May 08, 2019 3:33 pm

planecane wrote:
F9Animal wrote:
Quick opinion regarding the MAX tragedies. Every top executive at Boeing that knew about the problems with the MAX should face over 300 counts of murder. Each should face extradition to both Indonesia and Ethopia to stand trial as far as I am concerned.

Make ZERO mistake about it... The top brass of Boeing holds 110,000% responsibility for the safety issues. I worked for Boeing, and I can tell you right now.... They are all about profit, and that's the culture they hold dearly in the tower in Chicago. Ram these planes out, go as Lean as possible, increase production, hurry, and be ethical. Oh, and outsource this, outsource that! Then they cram those stupid "Ethics" training classes on factory workers, because most of the execs have been nailed for violating the ethics standards. Any manager caught sleeping with their secretaries on their desk in the factories are reassigned to "Special Duty" assignments.

None of this falls on any of the plane builders or the engineers. It all falls directly on every top brass at Boeing. Sorry all fan boys of Boeing jets.... But that's the flat truth. The top brass murdered those people! Period.

So don't blame the engineers that designed the system? I can bet that none of the executives had any idea what MCAS was or that it existed until the Lion Air crash. This crap about the execs caring about profit instead of safely is nonsense. A company that sells aircraft can't make a profit if they are unsafe.

What killed those people was bad software design and really bad validation putting pilots in an emergency situation and then those pilots not reacting properly to recover, especially in the case of the ET crash where they knew what they were dealing with. The bad design is the responsibility of the engineers that designed it and the engineering managers that oversaw it.

The executives are responsible for not having good enough engineering and program managers working for them. The execs responsible for oversight of the MAX program should be terminated but nobody is guilty of murder and nobody is getting extradited to Indonesia or Ethiopia.

Your post sounds like you are a disgruntled former employee.


First and foremost, I am far from being a disgruntled former employee. I am however very passionate about aircraft safety. Something that every single one of us should be very passionate about. Keep in mind, a majority of the engineers have been outsourced, which lies directly on who? And then we must remember that alot of these planes are now sent to China for final checks. All of these moves belong directly on the shoulders of the big wigs. And the fact the execs knew there was a problem over a year ago is alarming! Again, I believe a judge and a jury should make decisions here. Factory workers and engineers cannot stop production, but when they point out a flaw, the execs make that decision. Once they knew about the problem, production should have stopped until they fixed it. Period. I will go to my grave pointing my finger at the top brass. They murdered those people, and it was done for profit.
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F9Animal
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed May 08, 2019 3:34 pm

And I can guarantee you the CEO of Boeing will never step foot in Ethiopia or Indonesia now.
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DenverTed
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed May 08, 2019 3:47 pm

How about the Airbus sidestick, should it be improved to A220 standards with linked control and pressure feedback? Safety versus cost?
 
dtw2hyd
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed May 08, 2019 3:55 pm

planecane wrote:
So don't blame the engineers that designed the system? I can bet that none of the executives had any idea what MCAS was or that it existed until the Lion Air crash.
.

That pretty much exonerates everyone involved.

planecane wrote:
A company that sells aircraft can't make a profit if they are unsafe.
.

Yes, it can make a profit as long as nothing bad happens and MAX did. That is called gambling.
 
planecane
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed May 08, 2019 4:01 pm

F9Animal wrote:
planecane wrote:
F9Animal wrote:
Quick opinion regarding the MAX tragedies. Every top executive at Boeing that knew about the problems with the MAX should face over 300 counts of murder. Each should face extradition to both Indonesia and Ethopia to stand trial as far as I am concerned.

Make ZERO mistake about it... The top brass of Boeing holds 110,000% responsibility for the safety issues. I worked for Boeing, and I can tell you right now.... They are all about profit, and that's the culture they hold dearly in the tower in Chicago. Ram these planes out, go as Lean as possible, increase production, hurry, and be ethical. Oh, and outsource this, outsource that! Then they cram those stupid "Ethics" training classes on factory workers, because most of the execs have been nailed for violating the ethics standards. Any manager caught sleeping with their secretaries on their desk in the factories are reassigned to "Special Duty" assignments.

None of this falls on any of the plane builders or the engineers. It all falls directly on every top brass at Boeing. Sorry all fan boys of Boeing jets.... But that's the flat truth. The top brass murdered those people! Period.

So don't blame the engineers that designed the system? I can bet that none of the executives had any idea what MCAS was or that it existed until the Lion Air crash. This crap about the execs caring about profit instead of safely is nonsense. A company that sells aircraft can't make a profit if they are unsafe.

What killed those people was bad software design and really bad validation putting pilots in an emergency situation and then those pilots not reacting properly to recover, especially in the case of the ET crash where they knew what they were dealing with. The bad design is the responsibility of the engineers that designed it and the engineering managers that oversaw it.

The executives are responsible for not having good enough engineering and program managers working for them. The execs responsible for oversight of the MAX program should be terminated but nobody is guilty of murder and nobody is getting extradited to Indonesia or Ethiopia.

Your post sounds like you are a disgruntled former employee.


First and foremost, I am far from being a disgruntled former employee. I am however very passionate about aircraft safety. Something that every single one of us should be very passionate about. Keep in mind, a majority of the engineers have been outsourced, which lies directly on who? And then we must remember that alot of these planes are now sent to China for final checks. All of these moves belong directly on the shoulders of the big wigs. And the fact the execs knew there was a problem over a year ago is alarming! Again, I believe a judge and a jury should make decisions here. Factory workers and engineers cannot stop production, but when they point out a flaw, the execs make that decision. Once they knew about the problem, production should have stopped until they fixed it. Period. I will go to my grave pointing my finger at the top brass. They murdered those people, and it was done for profit.

Is the problem you are saying they knew about over a year ago the disappearance of the AoA disagree warning or are you saying the execs knew that a single AoA sensor failure could lead to a runaway stabilizer that pilots wouldn't recognize as such?
 
Jamie514
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed May 08, 2019 4:03 pm

DenverTed wrote:
How about the Airbus sidestick, should it be improved to A220 standards with linked control and pressure feedback? Safety versus cost?


how about utterly incomparable crash rate?
 
impilot
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed May 08, 2019 4:13 pm

DenverTed wrote:
How about the Airbus sidestick, should it be improved to A220 standards with linked control and pressure feedback? Safety versus cost?

What do you mean by linked control and pressure feedback? I don’t think they are “linked” like the G500/G600 sidesticks. If the left one moves, the right one remains stationary. AFAIK the A220 only differs from the other airbuses in that it doesn’t autotrim in the pitch axis...hence the trim switch. The guys I talked to who have flown the a220 and the airbus said the a220 is kind of wonky by not autotrimming...just takes a little to get used to it. The F16 sidestick barely moves and is fine. The airbus sidestick isn’t active is just fine. I do kind of wish the a220 (and airbus) had the g500/g600 active sidesticks that are linked (electronically, not mechanically), but then again that can open up a whole new set of failures and problems. I got used to the airbus sidestick and not physically seeing the stick move and don’t think twice about it now.
 
Taeks
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture

Wed May 08, 2019 4:36 pm

WayexTDI wrote:
Not to discount the issues, but it's also possible that all this surfaces now due to the MAX issues. It seems all eyes are on Boeing right now, and every single issue gets blown out of proportion (i.e., the media found they needed to add "Miami Air International is a charter airline operating a fleet of the Boeing 737-800, different from the 737 MAX 8 aircraft that has been grounded following two fatal crashes involving that plane", which is irrelevant to that specific incident).


As a journalist, I actually applaud the distinction between the 737-800 and the Max 8 amid the NAS Jacksonville incident. For people outside the aviation bubble, they don't know the difference in aircraft variants and the 737 moniker could lead to more perception problems without proper clarification. I am usually critical of the media incorrectly covering aviation, but in this instance I think the clarification was needed.
 
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Dutchy
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed May 08, 2019 4:44 pm

greendot wrote:
Dutchy wrote:
greendot wrote:
I'm also saying that it's MBA's that can't innovate... they're not smart enough to. They just manage. All the MBA's in the world wouldn't have dreamed up the 747, much less designed it. But, anyone could be an MBA and manage something already in place.


I don't agree with that. A good MBA realizes what kind of company it is running and will act accordingly. A bad MBA will work form quarter to quarter results, not good for a company dependent on long term strategies and investment like building aircraft.


How can you not agree with that?

Does an MBA design a new law of physics that allows design of aircraft?

Did an MBA design the jet engine?

Did an MBA design the first electric airplane?

Does an MBA have the ability to design the I.T. infrastructure needed to run an airline?

Does an MBA have the massive knowledgeset required to pilot aircraft?

MBA's are just managers. They have absolutely no special abilities that anyone can't easily learn. They are highly replaceable. They should be placed in permanently subordinate positions along with other low skillset people. The best people to manage a company are continuous improvement people who have entire methodologies used to model and implement complex operations. However, even these people should be kept at a permanent second level to people with vision and scientific/engineering knowledge. This is the optimal configuration because these types can invent and forecast whereas an MBA really only can understand the bottom line of a financial analysis. A trained monkey can compare A to B and choose a course of action from that. But it takes an innovator to create option C, redefining the entire market around that. Look at how Boeing is just run by MBAs now -- all they can do is take existing inventions and sell them in slightly modified configurations. When is the last time Boeing really innovated? Have they done anything even remotely comparable to making the first jet bomber, the first jet tanker, and the first jet airliner? The best they've been able to do is take existing engineering knowledge and optimize it under financial schemes using sub-contractors in a decentralized way to spread risk. Wow. Meanwhile, guys with engineering knowledge like Elon Musk launch a car into space and land a rocket on a launchpad, all of which he as the CEO or President understands from a scientific capacity. An MBA skillset by itself is nowhere near sufficient in today's world. That's why your average airline still flies craft designed on principles that haven't fundamentally progressed since DaVinci's first sketches. Airplanes still use Bournelli's laws and Newton's laws and are still essentially action-reaction based vehicles. An MBA will never be able to design some new engine exploiting a new law of physics previously unknown.


Hey man, hold your horses, fundamentally we are in agreement, I am just a little bit less hard on these MBA types. I believe there should be a healthy balance. Most engineers processes a remarkable skillset, but more important the way they tent to think about problems, problem solving ability. That said, most engineers don't know squad from business side of things. So you need both to create a healthy company. Grossly simplified: put too much envisages on the bean counters - MBA type - and you will see short term focus on profit and disregard for innovation and long term survival. Put an engineer in charge and you will see that it leads to an uncompetitive product. There needs to be a healthy tention between these two blood groups within a company.
Many happy landings, greetings from The Netherlands!
 
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bikerthai
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed May 08, 2019 4:57 pm

kalvado wrote:
Boeing in in deep shit, from inside and outside. Recognizing that is the first step towards resolving those issues. Painful, but unavoidable.


Hyperboles makes for colorful discussion but does not necessarily depict the situation at hand.

Yes, the Boeing MAX will cause disruption to both production and reputation. But Boeing is no where near being in trouble any more than it was during the 9/11 crisis. Heck GM was in more trouble when they took the government bail out.

As for reputation, if Toyota can recover from their air bag or unintended acceleration issues, then Boeing can recover from this. Some here say that Boeing safety culture has declined from the past. Well, they may be the ones who have not heard of the Air Lauda 767 T/R deployment or the rudder jack screw. Things happens. When designing complex system, even the best minds can not account for everything and things get missed, specially if you have people coming and going all the time. Unfortunately in this instances the checks in the system did not work 100%.

As for lambasting the executives, you can do it all you want. I am not defending them, but understand that they will not admit to anything until all the lawsuits are complete. Then belatedly, they can bear their souls and take responsibility. Until then they can only give condolences.

bt
Intelligent seeks knowledge. Enlightened seeks wisdom.
 
A3801000
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed May 08, 2019 5:44 pm

While we are mostly discussing the MAX, maybe we should have a look at what came out of Boeing over the last years and decades wrt 'safety culture':

- 787, grounded
- 748, nearly grounded and big flutter problems
- 767 (Tanker) client refused over 2 periods to take up any of them because of quality problems
- MAX, grounded

Coincidences? A pattern? Money savings?

I am not the one to judge but if I were a airline and Boeing would ask me to sign up for a upcoming new plane, well
 
WIederling
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed May 08, 2019 5:57 pm

DenverTed wrote:
How about the Airbus sidestick, should it be improved to A220 standards with linked control and pressure feedback? Safety versus cost?


it doesn't really make sense in scope of the Airbus FBW philosophy.
You don't wrestle the plane you command a flight state ( roll rate, ... )
Murphy is an optimist
 
BoeingGuy
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed May 08, 2019 6:10 pm

F9Animal wrote:
planecane wrote:
F9Animal wrote:
Quick opinion regarding the MAX tragedies. Every top executive at Boeing that knew about the problems with the MAX should face over 300 counts of murder. Each should face extradition to both Indonesia and Ethopia to stand trial as far as I am concerned.

Make ZERO mistake about it... The top brass of Boeing holds 110,000% responsibility for the safety issues. I worked for Boeing, and I can tell you right now.... They are all about profit, and that's the culture they hold dearly in the tower in Chicago. Ram these planes out, go as Lean as possible, increase production, hurry, and be ethical. Oh, and outsource this, outsource that! Then they cram those stupid "Ethics" training classes on factory workers, because most of the execs have been nailed for violating the ethics standards. Any manager caught sleeping with their secretaries on their desk in the factories are reassigned to "Special Duty" assignments.

None of this falls on any of the plane builders or the engineers. It all falls directly on every top brass at Boeing. Sorry all fan boys of Boeing jets.... But that's the flat truth. The top brass murdered those people! Period.

So don't blame the engineers that designed the system? I can bet that none of the executives had any idea what MCAS was or that it existed until the Lion Air crash. This crap about the execs caring about profit instead of safely is nonsense. A company that sells aircraft can't make a profit if they are unsafe.

What killed those people was bad software design and really bad validation putting pilots in an emergency situation and then those pilots not reacting properly to recover, especially in the case of the ET crash where they knew what they were dealing with. The bad design is the responsibility of the engineers that designed it and the engineering managers that oversaw it.

The executives are responsible for not having good enough engineering and program managers working for them. The execs responsible for oversight of the MAX program should be terminated but nobody is guilty of murder and nobody is getting extradited to Indonesia or Ethiopia.

Your post sounds like you are a disgruntled former employee.


First and foremost, I am far from being a disgruntled former employee. I am however very passionate about aircraft safety. Something that every single one of us should be very passionate about. Keep in mind, a majority of the engineers have been outsourced, which lies directly on who? And then we must remember that alot of these planes are now sent to China for final checks. All of these moves belong directly on the shoulders of the big wigs. And the fact the execs knew there was a problem over a year ago is alarming! Again, I believe a judge and a jury should make decisions here. Factory workers and engineers cannot stop production, but when they point out a flaw, the execs make that decision. Once they knew about the problem, production should have stopped until they fixed it. Period. I will go to my grave pointing my finger at the top brass. They murdered those people, and it was done for profit.


Although I agree with many of your points, a few things are not correct. Almost no engineers on the 737 Max are outsourced. No-one murdered anyone for profit. That’s an oft repeated and absurd notion.

The simple fact is the Fault Hazard Analyses assumes the crew would follow the well trained procedure to select the Stab Cutout Switches if the stabilizer is doing something incorrect. Unfortunately, history showed that was not correct.

Those assumptions are being called into question in general. You have accidents like OZ and TK where the crews can’t even show the simplest of airmanship and properly fly the airplane.
 
greendot
Posts: 213
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed May 08, 2019 6:41 pm

impilot wrote:
DenverTed wrote:
How about the Airbus sidestick, should it be improved to A220 standards with linked control and pressure feedback? Safety versus cost?

What do you mean by linked control and pressure feedback? I don’t think they are “linked” like the G500/G600 sidesticks. If the left one moves, the right one remains stationary. AFAIK the A220 only differs from the other airbuses in that it doesn’t autotrim in the pitch axis...hence the trim switch. The guys I talked to who have flown the a220 and the airbus said the a220 is kind of wonky by not autotrimming...just takes a little to get used to it. The F16 sidestick barely moves and is fine. The airbus sidestick isn’t active is just fine. I do kind of wish the a220 (and airbus) had the g500/g600 active sidesticks that are linked (electronically, not mechanically), but then again that can open up a whole new set of failures and problems. I got used to the airbus sidestick and not physically seeing the stick move and don’t think twice about it now.


As an Airbus pilot (with lots of experience in Boeings going back to the 707!), I don't care if the sticks are physically linked or not. You get notification of dual inputs from the system. Also, dual inputs are algebraically summed so that even with the dual input warning, if you guy pushes up, and the other pushes down, the inputs are canceled out (assuming equal proportion of input). Furthermore, there are plenty of PFD cues to show you what the other guy is doing. I don't care about it not being linked.. it's not an upgrade as the original poster said.

I think many of the people talking about linked controls don't understand that the sidestick is simply a legacy carryover. It's a familiar man-machine interface. They don't realize that the Airbus doesn't even need a cockpit in any traditional sense. You could fly the Airbus product using a keyboard and mouse, including all the control panels. You could even fly it using a voice recognition interface such as Siri. The cockpit is there to flip virtual software switches. When you press a button, you're changing a variable in memory which the software responds to. It's a far superior model that has benefits such as less moving parts, a lower reliance on mechanical devices that fail often, and the ability to more easily design things. For example, while the 737Max requires some addon system to push the nose down to prevent a stall (MCAS), with lots of modes of failure. The Airbus has stall protections as a derivative system. It's a software derived feature that takes inputs from existing physical sensors including multiple AOA sensors, pitot tubes, and attitude sensors (from ADIRS). The beauty of it is that the Airbus product doesn't have some crappy addon alpha protection system. Instead, it has software derived Alpha protection combined with energy warnings that look at speed and attitude. If Alpha protection fails, low energy and stability warnings are still available. The best part is that it's all presented in an intuitive way to the pilot. There's no engaging a trim brake and pulling two switches on the center pedestal to disengage the master trim, then figuring out how to cancel some addon system.
 
WayexTDI
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed May 08, 2019 6:42 pm

BoeingGuy wrote:
The simple fact is the Fault Hazard Analyses assumes the crew would follow the well trained procedure to select the Stab Cutout Switches if the stabilizer is doing something incorrect. Unfortunately, history showed that was not correct.

Those assumptions are being called into question in general. You have accidents like OZ and TK where the crews can’t even show the simplest of airmanship and properly fly the airplane.

The issue is that some pilots (via their unions) of very well established airlines (WN - Southwest Arlines & AA - American Airlines) have claimed they were not trained on the system (prior to the Lion Air crash); thus would not know to disconnect it.

Muilenberg (Boeing CEO) went as far as blaming the crashes on the pilot for not completely following procedure; while not inherently wrong, this sort of statement is extremely uncalled for. This is almost as if he said "our planes are safe with superhuman pilots flying them, if you're not a superpilot, you will crash it". That's not the safety philosophy of aviation.
 
greendot
Posts: 213
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed May 08, 2019 6:53 pm

BoeingGuy wrote:
F9Animal wrote:
planecane wrote:
So don't blame the engineers that designed the system? I can bet that none of the executives had any idea what MCAS was or that it existed until the Lion Air crash. This crap about the execs caring about profit instead of safely is nonsense. A company that sells aircraft can't make a profit if they are unsafe.

What killed those people was bad software design and really bad validation putting pilots in an emergency situation and then those pilots not reacting properly to recover, especially in the case of the ET crash where they knew what they were dealing with. The bad design is the responsibility of the engineers that designed it and the engineering managers that oversaw it.

The executives are responsible for not having good enough engineering and program managers working for them. The execs responsible for oversight of the MAX program should be terminated but nobody is guilty of murder and nobody is getting extradited to Indonesia or Ethiopia.

Your post sounds like you are a disgruntled former employee.


First and foremost, I am far from being a disgruntled former employee. I am however very passionate about aircraft safety. Something that every single one of us should be very passionate about. Keep in mind, a majority of the engineers have been outsourced, which lies directly on who? And then we must remember that alot of these planes are now sent to China for final checks. All of these moves belong directly on the shoulders of the big wigs. And the fact the execs knew there was a problem over a year ago is alarming! Again, I believe a judge and a jury should make decisions here. Factory workers and engineers cannot stop production, but when they point out a flaw, the execs make that decision. Once they knew about the problem, production should have stopped until they fixed it. Period. I will go to my grave pointing my finger at the top brass. They murdered those people, and it was done for profit.


Although I agree with many of your points, a few things are not correct. Almost no engineers on the 737 Max are outsourced. No-one murdered anyone for profit. That’s an oft repeated and absurd notion.

The simple fact is the Fault Hazard Analyses assumes the crew would follow the well trained procedure to select the Stab Cutout Switches if the stabilizer is doing something incorrect. Unfortunately, history showed that was not correct.

Those assumptions are being called into question in general. You have accidents like OZ and TK where the crews can’t even show the simplest of airmanship and properly fly the airplane.


That assumes the pilot is able to properly diagnose the problem as being a stab trim system issue in the first place. If you're climbing out with an aircraft rapidly going towards a nose down attitude at low altitude, the last thing you're going to do is to spend more than a split second to monitor systems. You don't know if you're in some kind of undetected stall condition, you don't know if you have significant icing on the wings, you don't know if you've lost thrust, you don't know if you have a flight control physical malfunction, etc. All you know is that flying the airplane comes first.

As a pilot, I really hate it when manufacturers and airlines try to brush off things to some nebulous concept of "airmanship". If we make an analogue to the medical industry, they make wrong diagnosis virtually ALL the time. There are an infinite number of variables so you can't explicitly rely on real time "doctorship" or "airmanship" as an explanation for failure. Manufacturers and the government pick and choose where they recognize this problem. For example, calculation of V1 speeds makes assumptions as to human diagnosis and reaction time. Takeoff numbers have an X second response time built into the calculations. Did this ever happen with MCAS? Some things are given extraordinary attention yet others are ignored and brushed off to "airmanship". As an engineer myself, I attribute this to bad design. In engineering school, I took plenty of classes that integrated human factors and design choices. One of the things that we have learned as engineers is that systems need to be simple for the end user because anything that can happen, does happen. I distinctly remember the example of the Therac-25 where a software flaw led to deaths: https://hackaday.com/2015/10/26/killed-by-a-machine-the-therac-25/ It's pretty clear that the idiot MBA's at Boeing never studied engineering and all the various disciplines that go into making intelligent decisions. I highly suggest that EVERYONE read about the Therac-25.
 
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smithbs
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed May 08, 2019 7:08 pm

One impact of the MAX: My a.net foes list has exploded in size. Has calm and rational discussion been completely thrown out? As an engineer AND a MBA, this is beyond ridiculous.
 
BoeingGuy
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed May 08, 2019 8:32 pm

WayexTDI wrote:
BoeingGuy wrote:
The simple fact is the Fault Hazard Analyses assumes the crew would follow the well trained procedure to select the Stab Cutout Switches if the stabilizer is doing something incorrect. Unfortunately, history showed that was not correct.

Those assumptions are being called into question in general. You have accidents like OZ and TK where the crews can’t even show the simplest of airmanship and properly fly the airplane.

The issue is that some pilots (via their unions) of very well established airlines (WN - Southwest Arlines & AA - American Airlines) have claimed they were not trained on the system (prior to the Lion Air crash); thus would not know to disconnect it.

Muilenberg (Boeing CEO) went as far as blaming the crashes on the pilot for not completely following procedure; while not inherently wrong, this sort of statement is extremely uncalled for. This is almost as if he said "our planes are safe with superhuman pilots flying them, if you're not a superpilot, you will crash it". That's not the safety philosophy of aviation.


Do you ever let up on your constant biased attacks against Boeing? It’s really getting old.

You also don’t have a grasp of the issue. The Uncommanded Stabilizer procedure is a memory recall item on every Boeing model since the beginning of time. If you don’t like what the Stab Trim is doing then cut it out.

They wouldn’t have to be trained on MCAS. Just the fact that the stab trim was doing something that they didn’t like. So yes, the assumption was that the know how to disconnect it.
 
BoeingGuy
Posts: 6259
Joined: Fri Dec 10, 2010 6:01 pm

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed May 08, 2019 8:35 pm

greendot wrote:
BoeingGuy wrote:
F9Animal wrote:

First and foremost, I am far from being a disgruntled former employee. I am however very passionate about aircraft safety. Something that every single one of us should be very passionate about. Keep in mind, a majority of the engineers have been outsourced, which lies directly on who? And then we must remember that alot of these planes are now sent to China for final checks. All of these moves belong directly on the shoulders of the big wigs. And the fact the execs knew there was a problem over a year ago is alarming! Again, I believe a judge and a jury should make decisions here. Factory workers and engineers cannot stop production, but when they point out a flaw, the execs make that decision. Once they knew about the problem, production should have stopped until they fixed it. Period. I will go to my grave pointing my finger at the top brass. They murdered those people, and it was done for profit.


Although I agree with many of your points, a few things are not correct. Almost no engineers on the 737 Max are outsourced. No-one murdered anyone for profit. That’s an oft repeated and absurd notion.

The simple fact is the Fault Hazard Analyses assumes the crew would follow the well trained procedure to select the Stab Cutout Switches if the stabilizer is doing something incorrect. Unfortunately, history showed that was not correct.

Those assumptions are being called into question in general. You have accidents like OZ and TK where the crews can’t even show the simplest of airmanship and properly fly the airplane.


That assumes the pilot is able to properly diagnose the problem as being a stab trim system issue in the first place. If you're climbing out with an aircraft rapidly going towards a nose down attitude at low altitude, the last thing you're going to do is to spend more than a split second to monitor systems. You don't know if you're in some kind of undetected stall condition, you don't know if you have significant icing on the wings, you don't know if you've lost thrust, you don't know if you have a flight control physical malfunction, etc. All you know is that flying the airplane comes first.

As a pilot, I really hate it when manufacturers and airlines try to brush off things to some nebulous concept of "airmanship". If we make an analogue to the medical industry, they make wrong diagnosis virtually ALL the time. There are an infinite number of variables so you can't explicitly rely on real time "doctorship" or "airmanship" as an explanation for failure. Manufacturers and the government pick and choose where they recognize this problem. For example, calculation of V1 speeds makes assumptions as to human diagnosis and reaction time. Takeoff numbers have an X second response time built into the calculations. Did this ever happen with MCAS? Some things are given extraordinary attention yet others are ignored and brushed off to "airmanship". As an engineer myself, I attribute this to bad design. In engineering school, I took plenty of classes that integrated human factors and design choices. One of the things that we have learned as engineers is that systems need to be simple for the end user because anything that can happen, does happen. I distinctly remember the example of the Therac-25 where a software flaw led to deaths: https://hackaday.com/2015/10/26/killed-by-a-machine-the-therac-25/ It's pretty clear that the idiot MBA's at Boeing never studied engineering and all the various disciplines that go into making intelligent decisions. I highly suggest that EVERYONE read about the Therac-25.


Well written post. Although I haven’t always agreed with your negativism towards Boeing, your points in this post are very valid.
 
DenverTed
Posts: 243
Joined: Wed Mar 27, 2019 11:12 pm

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed May 08, 2019 9:11 pm

greendot said, "I highly suggest that EVERYONE read about the Therac-25."

Now, what are the questions that should be asked about the MCAS design process?
Last edited by DenverTed on Wed May 08, 2019 9:17 pm, edited 2 times in total.
 
DenverTed
Posts: 243
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed May 08, 2019 9:12 pm

We know what the pilots did. What was the process that MCAS was designed and checked? I figure it was not the most exciting piece of work, and did not receive the attention it deserved and slipped through the cracks. Still, there should always be multiple people checking other peoples work.
 
WayexTDI
Posts: 1084
Joined: Fri Sep 21, 2018 4:38 pm

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed May 08, 2019 9:23 pm

BoeingGuy wrote:
WayexTDI wrote:
BoeingGuy wrote:
The simple fact is the Fault Hazard Analyses assumes the crew would follow the well trained procedure to select the Stab Cutout Switches if the stabilizer is doing something incorrect. Unfortunately, history showed that was not correct.

Those assumptions are being called into question in general. You have accidents like OZ and TK where the crews can’t even show the simplest of airmanship and properly fly the airplane.

The issue is that some pilots (via their unions) of very well established airlines (WN - Southwest Arlines & AA - American Airlines) have claimed they were not trained on the system (prior to the Lion Air crash); thus would not know to disconnect it.

Muilenberg (Boeing CEO) went as far as blaming the crashes on the pilot for not completely following procedure; while not inherently wrong, this sort of statement is extremely uncalled for. This is almost as if he said "our planes are safe with superhuman pilots flying them, if you're not a superpilot, you will crash it". That's not the safety philosophy of aviation.


Do you ever let up on your constant biased attacks against Boeing? It’s really getting old.

You also don’t have a grasp of the issue. The Uncommanded Stabilizer procedure is a memory recall item on every Boeing model since the beginning of time. If you don’t like what the Stab Trim is doing then cut it out.

They wouldn’t have to be trained on MCAS. Just the fact that the stab trim was doing something that they didn’t like. So yes, the assumption was that the know how to disconnect it.

Do you ever let up your constant bias towards Boeing? It is evident that you are playing the ostrich (hide your head in the sand) that you cannot even see the problem.

Boeing WILL fix the MAX issue, Boeing WILL fix the other issues they are facing now.
But, as numerous others have pointed out, they are only doing it AFTER someone rub their nose in the problem; instead of being proactive with safety, the impression as of right now is that Boeing is only reactive to it, and just deflects as much as possible until they are blatantly proven wrong.

I get it, you work for them and it's hard to hear that about your employer; you might even take it personally if you are in a position that could have played a part in that.
We do not accuse you personally of misconduct; we accuse Boeing, collectively, of misconduct and Boeing's management of blaming the problems on others (operators, maintenance, pilots) instead of finding the source of the issue).
 
BoeingGuy
Posts: 6259
Joined: Fri Dec 10, 2010 6:01 pm

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed May 08, 2019 10:28 pm

WayexTDI wrote:
BoeingGuy wrote:
WayexTDI wrote:
The issue is that some pilots (via their unions) of very well established airlines (WN - Southwest Arlines & AA - American Airlines) have claimed they were not trained on the system (prior to the Lion Air crash); thus would not know to disconnect it.

Muilenberg (Boeing CEO) went as far as blaming the crashes on the pilot for not completely following procedure; while not inherently wrong, this sort of statement is extremely uncalled for. This is almost as if he said "our planes are safe with superhuman pilots flying them, if you're not a superpilot, you will crash it". That's not the safety philosophy of aviation.


Do you ever let up on your constant biased attacks against Boeing? It’s really getting old.

You also don’t have a grasp of the issue. The Uncommanded Stabilizer procedure is a memory recall item on every Boeing model since the beginning of time. If you don’t like what the Stab Trim is doing then cut it out.

They wouldn’t have to be trained on MCAS. Just the fact that the stab trim was doing something that they didn’t like. So yes, the assumption was that the know how to disconnect it.

Do you ever let up your constant bias towards Boeing? It is evident that you are playing the ostrich (hide your head in the sand) that you cannot even see the problem.

Boeing WILL fix the MAX issue, Boeing WILL fix the other issues they are facing now.
But, as numerous others have pointed out, they are only doing it AFTER someone rub their nose in the problem; instead of being proactive with safety, the impression as of right now is that Boeing is only reactive to it, and just deflects as much as possible until they are blatantly proven wrong.

I get it, you work for them and it's hard to hear that about your employer; you might even take it personally if you are in a position that could have played a part in that.
We do not accuse you personally of misconduct; we accuse Boeing, collectively, of misconduct and Boeing's management of blaming the problems on others (operators, maintenance, pilots) instead of finding the source of the issue).


Do you how many Safety Review Board meetings I've seen where even the rarest one-off benign incident is approved for fix by management?

Quite honestly, if the only thing that had occurred with MCAS was the day-before near miss Lion Air incident, I bet the review board would have determined it a safety issue and a design change works have been made.

All this drama that you and others spew about how safety is sacrificed for profits is BS. Some assumptions that turned out to be incorrect about crew recognition of the problem may have been made, but there is no systemic lack of regard for safety as so many people like to dramatize.

And yes in fact maintenance and pilot action does share some blame. Lion Air dispatched an non-airworthy airplane with an improperly installed or qualified AOA Vane in which the proper maintenance calibrations weren’t even done. This was the day after a similar incident. The AOA was in error sitting at the gate due to this lapse in maintenance. Are you suggesting they gave no responsibility?

The Ethiopian pilots left the engines at full takeoff thrust even though it is supposed to cutback to climb thrust at about 1000 feet. The engines aren’t even certified to stay at takeoff thrust more than 5 minutes, unless an engine fails and terrain requires it. This inexplicable omission prevented them from regaining control with the manual trim wheels.

Sure the MCAS design could have been robust, but there were in fact maintenance and pilot errors that contributed.
 
DDR
Posts: 1591
Joined: Sat Sep 28, 2013 11:09 pm

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed May 08, 2019 10:51 pm

smithbs wrote:
One impact of the MAX: My a.net foes list has exploded in size. Has calm and rational discussion been completely thrown out? As an engineer AND a MBA, this is beyond ridiculous.


I'm right there with you. Some of these posters are beyond ridiculous.
 
SEU
Posts: 146
Joined: Wed Mar 13, 2019 7:21 pm

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed May 08, 2019 10:59 pm

A3801000 wrote:
While we are mostly discussing the MAX, maybe we should have a look at what came out of Boeing over the last years and decades wrt 'safety culture':

- 787, grounded
- 748, nearly grounded and big flutter problems
- 767 (Tanker) client refused over 2 periods to take up any of them because of quality problems
- MAX, grounded

Coincidences? A pattern? Money savings?

I am not the one to judge but if I were a airline and Boeing would ask me to sign up for a upcoming new plane, well


I havent heard about the 747 and 767 issues, when did they happen?
 
smartplane
Posts: 1024
Joined: Fri Aug 03, 2018 9:23 pm

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed May 08, 2019 11:03 pm

BoeingGuy wrote:
WayexTDI wrote:
BoeingGuy wrote:

Do you ever let up on your constant biased attacks against Boeing? It’s really getting old.

You also don’t have a grasp of the issue. The Uncommanded Stabilizer procedure is a memory recall item on every Boeing model since the beginning of time. If you don’t like what the Stab Trim is doing then cut it out.

They wouldn’t have to be trained on MCAS. Just the fact that the stab trim was doing something that they didn’t like. So yes, the assumption was that the know how to disconnect it.

Do you ever let up your constant bias towards Boeing? It is evident that you are playing the ostrich (hide your head in the sand) that you cannot even see the problem.

Boeing WILL fix the MAX issue, Boeing WILL fix the other issues they are facing now.
But, as numerous others have pointed out, they are only doing it AFTER someone rub their nose in the problem; instead of being proactive with safety, the impression as of right now is that Boeing is only reactive to it, and just deflects as much as possible until they are blatantly proven wrong.

I get it, you work for them and it's hard to hear that about your employer; you might even take it personally if you are in a position that could have played a part in that.
We do not accuse you personally of misconduct; we accuse Boeing, collectively, of misconduct and Boeing's management of blaming the problems on others (operators, maintenance, pilots) instead of finding the source of the issue).


Do you how many Safety Review Board meetings I've seen where even the rarest one-off benign incident is approved for fix by management?

Quite honestly, if the only thing that had occurred with MCAS was the day-before near miss Lion Air incident, I bet the review board would have determined it a safety issue and a design change works have been made.

All this drama that you and others spew about how safety is sacrificed for profits is BS. Some assumptions that turned out to be incorrect about crew recognition of the problem may have been made, but there is no systemic lack of regard for safety as so many people like to dramatize.

And yes in fact maintenance and pilot action does share some blame. Lion Air dispatched an non-airworthy airplane with an improperly installed or qualified AOA Vane in which the proper maintenance calibrations weren’t even done. This was the day after a similar incident. The AOA was in error sitting at the gate due to this lapse in maintenance. Are you suggesting they gave no responsibility?

But the SRB failed in this instance.

With this safety focus at Boeing, surely Lion's Boeing Customer Service Director (Airbus terminology) should have been monitoring this aircraft's service history, and been in daily contact with Lion, providing assistance / escalating resolution of the problems, and giving a heads up on how a faulty AoA could impact flight / MCAS?
 
BoeingGuy
Posts: 6259
Joined: Fri Dec 10, 2010 6:01 pm

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed May 08, 2019 11:18 pm

smartplane wrote:
BoeingGuy wrote:
WayexTDI wrote:
Do you ever let up your constant bias towards Boeing? It is evident that you are playing the ostrich (hide your head in the sand) that you cannot even see the problem.

Boeing WILL fix the MAX issue, Boeing WILL fix the other issues they are facing now.
But, as numerous others have pointed out, they are only doing it AFTER someone rub their nose in the problem; instead of being proactive with safety, the impression as of right now is that Boeing is only reactive to it, and just deflects as much as possible until they are blatantly proven wrong.

I get it, you work for them and it's hard to hear that about your employer; you might even take it personally if you are in a position that could have played a part in that.
We do not accuse you personally of misconduct; we accuse Boeing, collectively, of misconduct and Boeing's management of blaming the problems on others (operators, maintenance, pilots) instead of finding the source of the issue).


Do you how many Safety Review Board meetings I've seen where even the rarest one-off benign incident is approved for fix by management?

Quite honestly, if the only thing that had occurred with MCAS was the day-before near miss Lion Air incident, I bet the review board would have determined it a safety issue and a design change works have been made.

All this drama that you and others spew about how safety is sacrificed for profits is BS. Some assumptions that turned out to be incorrect about crew recognition of the problem may have been made, but there is no systemic lack of regard for safety as so many people like to dramatize.

And yes in fact maintenance and pilot action does share some blame. Lion Air dispatched an non-airworthy airplane with an improperly installed or qualified AOA Vane in which the proper maintenance calibrations weren’t even done. This was the day after a similar incident. The AOA was in error sitting at the gate due to this lapse in maintenance. Are you suggesting they gave no responsibility?

But the SRB failed in this instance.

With this safety focus at Boeing, surely Lion's Boeing Customer Service Director (Airbus terminology) should have been monitoring this aircraft's service history, and been in daily contact with Lion, providing assistance / escalating resolution of the problems, and giving a heads up on how a faulty AoA could impact flight / MCAS?


Well SRB never had a chance. The accident was the next day after the first incident and a fix was immediately started. The fix begin being worked on the day after Lion Air. It’s just very tragic that ET also had to happen before it’s implemented.
 
kalvado
Posts: 1805
Joined: Wed Mar 01, 2006 4:29 am

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed May 08, 2019 11:30 pm

BoeingGuy wrote:

Do you how many Safety Review Board meetings I've seen where even the rarest one-off benign incident is approved for fix by management?

Quite honestly, if the only thing that had occurred with MCAS was the day-before near miss Lion Air incident, I bet the review board would have determined it a safety issue and a design change works have been made.
.

Hours spent in those meetings is not a safety or performance metrics. Two planes which bite the dust is the safety metrics. Billions of dollars Boeing is loosing is the performance metrics.
If your best argument is the number of meetings you attended - this is the problem right there.
 
Ugly51
Posts: 110
Joined: Thu Jul 28, 2016 7:48 am

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Thu May 09, 2019 12:17 am

The simulator bits are absolutely frightening. There I fixed that for you.
 
BoeingGuy
Posts: 6259
Joined: Fri Dec 10, 2010 6:01 pm

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Thu May 09, 2019 12:38 am

kalvado wrote:
BoeingGuy wrote:

Do you how many Safety Review Board meetings I've seen where even the rarest one-off benign incident is approved for fix by management?

Quite honestly, if the only thing that had occurred with MCAS was the day-before near miss Lion Air incident, I bet the review board would have determined it a safety issue and a design change works have been made.
.

Hours spent in those meetings is not a safety or performance metrics. Two planes which bite the dust is the safety metrics. Billions of dollars Boeing is loosing is the performance metrics.
If your best argument is the number of meetings you attended - this is the problem right there.


Sounds like you didn’t read or understand my point at all. If the only thing you got out of my post is about sitting in meetings, it went right over your head.
 
smartplane
Posts: 1024
Joined: Fri Aug 03, 2018 9:23 pm

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Thu May 09, 2019 1:23 am

BoeingGuy wrote:
smartplane wrote:
BoeingGuy wrote:

Do you how many Safety Review Board meetings I've seen where even the rarest one-off benign incident is approved for fix by management?

Quite honestly, if the only thing that had occurred with MCAS was the day-before near miss Lion Air incident, I bet the review board would have determined it a safety issue and a design change works have been made.

All this drama that you and others spew about how safety is sacrificed for profits is BS. Some assumptions that turned out to be incorrect about crew recognition of the problem may have been made, but there is no systemic lack of regard for safety as so many people like to dramatize.

And yes in fact maintenance and pilot action does share some blame. Lion Air dispatched an non-airworthy airplane with an improperly installed or qualified AOA Vane in which the proper maintenance calibrations weren’t even done. This was the day after a similar incident. The AOA was in error sitting at the gate due to this lapse in maintenance. Are you suggesting they gave no responsibility?

But the SRB failed in this instance.

With this safety focus at Boeing, surely Lion's Boeing Customer Service Director (Airbus terminology) should have been monitoring this aircraft's service history, and been in daily contact with Lion, providing assistance / escalating resolution of the problems, and giving a heads up on how a faulty AoA could impact flight / MCAS?


Well SRB never had a chance. The accident was the next day after the first incident and a fix was immediately started. The fix begin being worked on the day after Lion Air. It’s just very tragic that ET also had to happen before it’s implemented.

Did communication about the fix to operators and airworthiness operators also go out the day after Lion Air?
 
rigo
Posts: 160
Joined: Thu Sep 01, 2005 11:52 am

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Thu May 09, 2019 1:29 am

The more we learn about the 737MAX and the 787 quality issues, the more it looks like the obsession with cutting costs and cutting corners has indeed gone too far. Which really brings questions about the 777X. I'm not anti Boeing, I routinely fly on 737NGs and 777s with zero concern, but I wouldn't board an MAX and I confess that I have been actively avoiding 787 flights for some time now. I'm not sure when I will feel perfectly comfortable flying on a recent Boeing model again.
 
BoeingGuy
Posts: 6259
Joined: Fri Dec 10, 2010 6:01 pm

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Thu May 09, 2019 3:12 am

rigo wrote:
The more we learn about the 737MAX and the 787 quality issues, the more it looks like the obsession with cutting costs and cutting corners has indeed gone too far. Which really brings questions about the 777X. I'm not anti Boeing, I routinely fly on 737NGs and 777s with zero concern, but I wouldn't board an MAX and I confess that I have been actively avoiding 787 flights for some time now. I'm not sure when I will feel perfectly comfortable flying on a recent Boeing model again.


I’m not worried about the 777X design. I’m fairly familiar with it. It’s a pretty robust solid airplane. I can’t speak for the factory, although I think the CHS 787 quality issues are a bit over dramatized. That sells newspapers. I’m personally stoked for my next 787 flight, as I was for my last one.

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