kalvado
Posts: 1894
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Fri May 10, 2019 10:04 am

BoeingGuy wrote:
seahawk wrote:
In the end it boils down to the risk analysis for a MCAS failure. If the whistle blowers are too believed, it does not look good for Boeing, as the risk seems to have been intentionally downplayed.


No it wasn’t. More BS being posted on A.net.

As I’ve explained before, the Fault Hazard Analysis showed the failure was within a safe margin because it assumed the flight crew would correctly perform the Uncommanded Stab Trim procedure, which has been well trained on every Boeing model since the beginning of time.

Were there errors or incorrect assumption in that analysis? We’ll let the investigators made that determination.

But no risk was intentionally downplayed.

The real facts never make a good story though.

I know at least one “whistle blower” and the guy is a total jerk-off. He was laid off from Boeing because he contributed very little work. What work he did do was of poor quality too. And HE dropped the ball on some MCAS analysis, himself. Left Boeing with sour grapes, so he goes and talks to the media to get revenge. A number of things he stated, such as staffing numbers in his old team, are complete fiction.

Stop digging, PLEASE!

Everyone is happy with blaming MBAs in management and want to let engineers do their job.
Wha you say is that boeing's engineers are uncapable of understanding a concept of dual failure, trim runaway and airspeed disagree simultaneously - while an indicator, pointing at the root cause - which may or may not have hepled - is removed! All while relying on a rarely trained procedure for the crew, where very high failure rate is expected.
What you say goes well beyond the concept of "safety culture problem".
 
kalvado
Posts: 1894
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Fri May 10, 2019 10:16 am

747megatop wrote:
Shockingly (or should i rather say UNshockingly); company made a cost benefit analysis on a spreadsheet and arrived at a decision of "well..deaths are just a cost of doing business versus spending money to fix the problem". In a nutshell GM put a price on a life.

Putting price on human life is a routine engineering practice, and the number is not that high. Moreover, people do routinely price their own life.
One of the ways of getting that number is looking at how much more pax are willing pay for tickets on the airline with a better safety record, effectively getting higher crash risk for some monetary savings.
 
FluidFlow
Posts: 260
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Fri May 10, 2019 11:52 am

kalvado wrote:
747megatop wrote:
Shockingly (or should i rather say UNshockingly); company made a cost benefit analysis on a spreadsheet and arrived at a decision of "well..deaths are just a cost of doing business versus spending money to fix the problem". In a nutshell GM put a price on a life.

Putting price on human life is a routine engineering practice, and the number is not that high. Moreover, people do routinely price their own life.
One of the ways of getting that number is looking at how much more pax are willing pay for tickets on the airline with a better safety record, effectively getting higher crash risk for some monetary savings.


If you want to check the "cost" of a life, check out your car insurance. Where I am from you can add a accident insurance (covers health costs of you and your passengers). This is limited in case of death do 20'000. So the insurance will actually put a price on a life and the same is done in for airline insurance. It will be stated how much life is worth.
 
kalvado
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Fri May 10, 2019 12:00 pm

FluidFlow wrote:
kalvado wrote:
747megatop wrote:
Shockingly (or should i rather say UNshockingly); company made a cost benefit analysis on a spreadsheet and arrived at a decision of "well..deaths are just a cost of doing business versus spending money to fix the problem". In a nutshell GM put a price on a life.

Putting price on human life is a routine engineering practice, and the number is not that high. Moreover, people do routinely price their own life.
One of the ways of getting that number is looking at how much more pax are willing pay for tickets on the airline with a better safety record, effectively getting higher crash risk for some monetary savings.


If you want to check the "cost" of a life, check out your car insurance. Where I am from you can add a accident insurance (covers health costs of you and your passengers). This is limited in case of death do 20'000. So the insurance will actually put a price on a life and the same is done in for airline insurance. It will be stated how much life is worth.

This is not a true price of life, more like an apology and funeral stipend.
A good metrics is how much people are willing to spend to get a lower chance of death (or get paid for a risk). How many homes in your area have fire extinguisher (if that is not mandated) vs how much roofer earns (the most workplace death-prone profession in US)
Back to the topic on hand: so far MAX crash rate warrants $20 to $100 per segment discount on a ticket based on extra risk. So yes, those who say that people will board MAX if the price is lower do have a good reason to say so.
 
FluidFlow
Posts: 260
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Fri May 10, 2019 12:32 pm

kalvado wrote:
FluidFlow wrote:
kalvado wrote:
Putting price on human life is a routine engineering practice, and the number is not that high. Moreover, people do routinely price their own life.
One of the ways of getting that number is looking at how much more pax are willing pay for tickets on the airline with a better safety record, effectively getting higher crash risk for some monetary savings.


If you want to check the "cost" of a life, check out your car insurance. Where I am from you can add a accident insurance (covers health costs of you and your passengers). This is limited in case of death do 20'000. So the insurance will actually put a price on a life and the same is done in for airline insurance. It will be stated how much life is worth.

This is not a true price of life, more like an apology and funeral stipend.
A good metrics is how much people are willing to spend to get a lower chance of death (or get paid for a risk). How many homes in your area have fire extinguisher (if that is not mandated) vs how much roofer earns (the most workplace death-prone profession in US)
Back to the topic on hand: so far MAX crash rate warrants $20 to $100 per segment discount on a ticket based on extra risk. So yes, those who say that people will board MAX if the price is lower do have a good reason to say so.


The car insurance example was just an easy way to show how life is valued and a number almost every one can check out.

And for flight tickets, an unsafe aircraft actually would lead to higher prices to operate the aircraft. Additionally the tickets have to be discounted to be sold if passengers decide to board them only if the price is cheap.

For example: Aircraft A has a crash probability of 0.1 and Aircraft B of 0.2. All other parameters are equal (passengers, unit cost, etc.)

The insurance policy for Aircraft B is double the amount of aircraft one. To obtain the same ROI the tickets for Aircraft B have to be higher.

Underwriting will not only take into account if an airplane or airline is certified as safe or not by the FAA, the algorithms will also take into account hull loss/damage rate and costs and calculate the costs for the insurer. This will be passed on to the operator. To offset this additional costs Boeing will have to discount the aircraft.
Last edited by FluidFlow on Fri May 10, 2019 12:36 pm, edited 2 times in total.
 
User avatar
Revelation
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Fri May 10, 2019 12:48 pm

xmp125a wrote:
Now, FAA outsourcing work to Boeing employees basically breaks that process at several places, I know it has been going on for long time, but in case of MCAS the system obviously broke down completely.

It will be interesting to see if any/all of the various committees/investigations/tribunals agree with this conclusion.

It will be a challenge for those inside the system to admit they need to undo something they value.

BoeingGuy wrote:
As I’ve explained before, the Fault Hazard Analysis showed the failure was within a safe margin because it assumed the flight crew would correctly perform the Uncommanded Stab Trim procedure, which has been well trained on every Boeing model since the beginning of time.

Does the Uncommanded Stab Trim procedure fall into the "trained once when qualifying to fly the 737" or "trained on a recurring basis" bucket?

BoeingGuy wrote:
Were there errors or incorrect assumption in that analysis? We’ll let the investigators made that determination.

I hope the system is willing to admit any mistakes they find beyond the surface level "we did everything by the books" statements we keep getting from Boeing.

Some times you have to realize the books specify the minimum acceptable behavior and it really is in your own interest to do more.

BoeingGuy wrote:
But no risk was intentionally downplayed.

The real facts never make a good story though.

I know at least one “whistle blower” and the guy is a total jerk-off. He was laid off from Boeing because he contributed very little work. What work he did do was of poor quality too. And HE dropped the ball on some MCAS analysis, himself. Left Boeing with sour grapes, so he goes and talks to the media to get revenge. A number of things he stated, such as staffing numbers in his old team, are complete fiction.

After reading your posts here and after reading the recently posted Bloomberg article, I knew at least one part of the article would hit close to home.

It will be interesting if these sources can substantiate what they are saying, or if it all falls into the uncorroborated/hearsay bucket.

IIRC at least one of the named sources says he's been subpoenaed.
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frmrCapCadet
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Fri May 10, 2019 2:21 pm

From today's Bloomberg article (there are two, I recommend both)
The relentless message: Shareholders would henceforth come first at Boeing. The important thing was not to get “overly focused on the box,” Hopkins said in a 2000 interview with Bloomberg. “The box”—the plane itself—“is obviously important, but customers are assuming the box is of great quality.” This was heresy to engineers, to whom the box was everything. The strike that year was formally over wages and benefits, but workers described it as a referendum on management.


Don't get overly concerned about the box, the owners don't care about boxes, they just want money
Screw the workers who make boxes, we are about the owners
We really don't care about engineers, they design boxes, we want ($$$$)
So we got huge maybe illegal tax breaks, screw the people of the state - we can move to another
Customers (Airlines) assume quality - they are pretty dumb and we can fool them

150 people just died in a accident - Chicago we got problems. Chicago says they don't
350 people die - Chicago - are you there? Chicago AENewman - what, me worry?

What is overdue is a discussion of corporations (didn't exist when the US constitution was written), the economy, the legal system, and life in general

It's not just about the money.
Buffet: the airline business...has eaten up capital...like..no other (business)
 
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Revelation
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Fri May 10, 2019 3:01 pm

frmrCapCadet wrote:
What is overdue is a discussion of corporations (didn't exist when the US constitution was written), the economy, the legal system, and life in general

TL; DR: What's wrong with Boeing's safety culture is excessive greed.
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kalvado
Posts: 1894
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Fri May 10, 2019 3:07 pm

Revelation wrote:
frmrCapCadet wrote:
What is overdue is a discussion of corporations (didn't exist when the US constitution was written), the economy, the legal system, and life in general

TL; DR: What's wrong with Boeing's safety culture is excessive greed.

Greed is a poor justification for safety lapses for the company in a safety-critical business. Boeing will pay way more for this mess than they saved from any cut corners. It seems they will pay about the cost of clean sheet design for 737 replacement. It doesn't take a lot of calculations to figure out that cutting corners is pricey.
It is more about short-sighted approach, without considering long-term consequences - and belief that it always worked, and it will always work.
 
BoeingGuy
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Fri May 10, 2019 3:33 pm

XRAYretired wrote:
BoeingGuy wrote:
seahawk wrote:
In the end it boils down to the risk analysis for a MCAS failure. If the whistle blowers are too believed, it does not look good for Boeing, as the risk seems to have been intentionally downplayed.


No it wasn’t. More BS being posted on A.net.

As I’ve explained before, the Fault Hazard Analysis showed the failure was within a safe margin because it assumed the flight crew would correctly perform the Uncommanded Stab Trim procedure, which has been well trained on every Boeing model since the beginning of time.

Were there errors or incorrect assumption in that analysis? We’ll let the investigators made that determination.

But no risk was intentionally downplayed.

The real facts never make a good story though.

I know at least one “whistle blower” and the guy is a total jerk-off. He was laid off from Boeing because he contributed very little work. What work he did do was of poor quality too. And HE dropped the ball on some MCAS analysis, himself. Left Boeing with sour grapes, so he goes and talks to the media to get revenge. A number of things he stated, such as staffing numbers in his old team, are complete fiction.


Thought you had nothing whatsoever to do with MCAS? So, you can tell us if and why a competent two sensor system was pinched from the tankers and converted to an incompetent single sensor system?

Fatuous, ill-tempered and uncorroborated attacks on individuals not present to defend themselves is reprehensible. Just as abhorrent as bad-mouthing the pilots.

Assume you've put your name forward for the follow up TV programmes and look forward to the interviews.


No it’s not. That guy is out bashing Boeing on CNN and other places. I happen to know he got laid off for inept work performance and left very angry and bitter.

I also know that he personally dropped the ball on one aspect of MCAS evaluation that might have exposed potential problems before the accident. He’s the last person who should be talking to the press criticizing others about MCAS.

I also know that at least one statement he made about his organization going from 30 to 15 because Boeing was getting rid of engineers is false. There are about 80 or more in that area. Two engineers got laid of a few years ago - he being one. Both had severe work performance issues. That area is actually growing and hiring now.

He’s out talking in the press. I don’t believe he’s a credible source for reasons I’ve stated. Notice how another “whistle blower” quoted in the press in the past few days also got laid off from Boeing after over 20 years? Good performing employees don’t get laid off.
 
planecane
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Fri May 10, 2019 3:44 pm

WIederling wrote:
planecane wrote:
I don't give this whistleblower much credence unless somebody can explain why making MCAS less likely to fail, relying on 2 sensors, would require simulator training. It doesn't make sense.


Handling AoA disagree would have turned into mandatory curriculum.
( not any longer a bespoke customer option where the customer is responsible for training/using that feature.)
No way around mentioning MCAS as (safety) dependent on AoA disagree ... tin of worms. $1m per plane. humans are only $60k per :-)


Training, yes. SIMULATOR training? For what? An instruction to stay away from the edges of the flight envelope and divert?
 
greendot
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Fri May 10, 2019 3:44 pm

BoeingGuy wrote:
seahawk wrote:
In the end it boils down to the risk analysis for a MCAS failure. If the whistle blowers are too believed, it does not look good for Boeing, as the risk seems to have been intentionally downplayed.


No it wasn’t. More BS being posted on A.net.

As I’ve explained before, the Fault Hazard Analysis showed the failure was within a safe margin because it assumed the flight crew would correctly perform the Uncommanded Stab Trim procedure, which has been well trained on every Boeing model since the beginning of time.

Were there errors or incorrect assumption in that analysis? We’ll let the investigators made that determination.

But no risk was intentionally downplayed.

The real facts never make a good story though.

I know at least one “whistle blower” and the guy is a total jerk-off. He was laid off from Boeing because he contributed very little work. What work he did do was of poor quality too. And HE dropped the ball on some MCAS analysis, himself. Left Boeing with sour grapes, so he goes and talks to the media to get revenge. A number of things he stated, such as staffing numbers in his old team, are complete fiction.


Is it still the stab cutout switches on the center pedestal?

Since you seem to be a Boeing guy, what do you think of this? https://youtu.be/vWxxtzBTxGU

I really want to know if this report has credibility.
 
greendot
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Fri May 10, 2019 3:51 pm

747megatop wrote:
greendot wrote:
747megatop wrote:
Unfortunately, that is a product of runaway Capitalism my friend. Shareholders, profits and share prices first. Another industry + another company - The GM fiasco with a faulty ignition switch that would have cost less than a $ to fix; but was not fixed due to a "business decision".

https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/gm-re ... lem-n51731

Shockingly (or should i rather say UNshockingly); company made a cost benefit analysis on a spreadsheet and arrived at a decision of "well..deaths are just a cost of doing business versus spending money to fix the problem". In a nutshell GM put a price on a life - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pwt1Dc2XD6Q

Question is; did Boeing do the same given that they knew about the problem 1 year before Lion Air - https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/05/us/boein ... index.html

Hopefully these are exceptions and not the norm.



Keep in mind that Capitalism is not the real problem. It's merely a financial model. Capitalism is NOT a form of government nor is it the way to make decisions. Capitalism merely gives one person the freedom to deliver a service for compensation at an agreed upon rate. Capitalism says absolutely nothing about the need to have publicly traded companies, laws governing corporations, and government benevolent management of capitalism. Also, Capitalism was never intended to be used exclusively without regard to morality and ethics. The corporate legal framework gives the corporation the ability to run itself poorly or well. A company can choose to run its operations with morals and ethics or it can do so only using spreadsheets. Take a guess which one was relevant here. There are plenty of corporations, small businesses, and self-employed people who run their businesses with the highest standards and morals and ethics. Unfortunately people blame capitalism when in fact they need to blame individual people.

Also, we don't have true capitalism in the USA - we have corporatism. It's a combination of Capitalism plus government intervention, both good and bad. One of the worst examples of corporatism is the vaccine industry where you can't sue vaccine makers by law. Again, this was never something prescribed by capitalism. Quite simply, capitalism says nothing about this configuration of market forces and government.


Which is why i said RUNWAWAY capitalism. Anyways, I don't want to get drawn into capitalism or capitalism vs socialism etc. etc.


Even the phrase Runaway Capitalism is inaccurate. This has nothing to do with capitalism. It's about human greed, arrogance, complacency, lies, government, etc. Even using the word capitalism is akin to blaming Algebra. Runaway Algebra.
 
WayexTDI
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Fri May 10, 2019 3:55 pm

BoeingGuy wrote:
No it’s not. That guy is out bashing Boeing on CNN and other places. I happen to know he got laid off for inept work performance and left very angry and bitter.

[...]Two engineers got laid of a few years ago - he being one. Both had severe work performance issues. That area is actually growing and hiring now.

Unless you were his manager or are in HR, you do not know for a fact the actual reason he was let go, neither should you.
This would be a clear violation of privacy, for which he could go back to Boeing, sue and win.
Remember that what you write becomes public information and can be used, often against you.

BoeingGuy wrote:
Notice how another “whistle blower” quoted in the press in the past few days also got laid off from Boeing after over 20 years? Good performing employees don’t get laid off.

Good employees get laid off all the time, for very obscure reasons and usually to satisfy shareholders (workforce reduction, wages too high, etc).
When someone gets laid off, it doesn't necessarily means they're bad employees. Similarly, some poor performing employees can stay in place (when they should have been gone years before) if their salary is low enough and they do what they're told to without questioning; it's sad, but exists too often.
 
xmp125a
Posts: 233
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Fri May 10, 2019 4:34 pm

BoeingGuy wrote:
xmp125a wrote:
TheFlyingDisk wrote:
It's rather telling that the Lion Air aircraft had a similar problem on the previous flight, but the pilots on that flight was able to save the plane & land safely. Unfortunately this story doesn't get as much attention in the media as all the other stories about the MAX.


First, I’ve heard that it might be mis-reported that it was the jumpseat rider who is the one who actually remembered how to do a well trained procedure that is fundamental to every Boeing model. It may actually have been on of the flying pilots. So that shots down your highly intelligent comment that it took a 3rd pilot to actually remember how to correctly perform a basic emergency procedure.


No, I know something about programming embedded system and a bit about safety critical systems. The original design was absurd and should be recognized as such by any competent embedded system engineers. There are TWO sensors, system used only one, and then swapped them after every boot.

If such system was not identified as absurdly flawed in Boeing, then something is very rotten within Boeing and that is the key problem here. MAX should be allowed to return to the skies only after this rot is properly aired and ensured that rest of the MAX was not subject to such rotten decision process.

Let me quote something from Therac-25 case:

"AECL personnel, as well as machine operators, initially did not believe complaints. This was likely due to overconfidence"

Full Therac 25 story here. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Therac-25 Remarkable how we see the same behaviour decades later.
 
kalvado
Posts: 1894
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Fri May 10, 2019 4:35 pm

BoeingGuy wrote:
kalvado wrote:
BoeingGuy wrote:

No it wasn’t. More BS being posted on A.net.

As I’ve explained before, the Fault Hazard Analysis showed the failure was within a safe margin because it assumed the flight crew would correctly perform the Uncommanded Stab Trim procedure, which has been well trained on every Boeing model since the beginning of time.

Were there errors or incorrect assumption in that analysis? We’ll let the investigators made that determination.

But no risk was intentionally downplayed.

The real facts never make a good story though.

I know at least one “whistle blower” and the guy is a total jerk-off. He was laid off from Boeing because he contributed very little work. What work he did do was of poor quality too. And HE dropped the ball on some MCAS analysis, himself. Left Boeing with sour grapes, so he goes and talks to the media to get revenge. A number of things he stated, such as staffing numbers in his old team, are complete fiction.

Stop digging, PLEASE!

Everyone is happy with blaming MBAs in management and want to let engineers do their job.
Wha you say is that boeing's engineers are uncapable of understanding a concept of dual failure, trim runaway and airspeed disagree simultaneously - while an indicator, pointing at the root cause - which may or may not have hepled - is removed! All while relying on a rarely trained procedure for the crew, where very high failure rate is expected.
What you say goes well beyond the concept of "safety culture problem".


That not what I said at all. Some people have comprehension issues on this site.

No, it is really what you say is too damning to believe.
You say that safety analysis assumed pilots would handle MCAS as trim runaway. Fine, practice shows that they didn't, but it happens.
Now what you don't say is that a single point of failure can cause TWO problems - trim runaway and airspeed disagree. and that is a HUGE design flaw. OK, O, ET crew shouldn't raize flaps - but next flight would get a bird with flaps up, or hail damage or something else.
Now you imply this was considered and deemed acceptable. With AoA sensor MTBF quoted as 7e4 hours. That is totally damning. For safety culture, for engineering qualifications, for MAX design as a whole.
 
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enzo011
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Fri May 10, 2019 4:44 pm

planecane wrote:
WIederling wrote:
planecane wrote:
I don't give this whistleblower much credence unless somebody can explain why making MCAS less likely to fail, relying on 2 sensors, would require simulator training. It doesn't make sense.


Handling AoA disagree would have turned into mandatory curriculum.
( not any longer a bespoke customer option where the customer is responsible for training/using that feature.)
No way around mentioning MCAS as (safety) dependent on AoA disagree ... tin of worms. $1m per plane. humans are only $60k per :-)


Training, yes. SIMULATOR training? For what? An instruction to stay away from the edges of the flight envelope and divert?



If there is a new alert about AOA disagree between 2 sensors and a new sound to indicate that in the cockpit, how do you train pilots to recognize it and follow whatever procedure you write up without Sim training? If the procedure is to disable MCAS in that case, how does the aircraft handle and how do you train this in a manual?
 
dakota123
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Fri May 10, 2019 4:44 pm

kalvado wrote:
BoeingGuy wrote:
seahawk wrote:
In the end it boils down to the risk analysis for a MCAS failure. If the whistle blowers are too believed, it does not look good for Boeing, as the risk seems to have been intentionally downplayed.


No it wasn’t. More BS being posted on A.net.

As I’ve explained before, the Fault Hazard Analysis showed the failure was within a safe margin because it assumed the flight crew would correctly perform the Uncommanded Stab Trim procedure, which has been well trained on every Boeing model since the beginning of time.

Were there errors or incorrect assumption in that analysis? We’ll let the investigators made that determination.

But no risk was intentionally downplayed.

The real facts never make a good story though.

I know at least one “whistle blower” and the guy is a total jerk-off. He was laid off from Boeing because he contributed very little work. What work he did do was of poor quality too. And HE dropped the ball on some MCAS analysis, himself. Left Boeing with sour grapes, so he goes and talks to the media to get revenge. A number of things he stated, such as staffing numbers in his old team, are complete fiction.

Stop digging, PLEASE!

Everyone is happy with blaming MBAs in management and want to let engineers do their job.
Wha you say is that boeing's engineers are uncapable of understanding a concept of dual failure, trim runaway and airspeed disagree simultaneously - while an indicator, pointing at the root cause - which may or may not have hepled - is removed! All while relying on a rarely trained procedure for the crew, where very high failure rate is expected.
What you say goes well beyond the concept of "safety culture problem".


Airspeed disagree came first. Ridiculously easy "procedure", look at the standby and decide which of the cap and FO is accurate. Either cross scan, or cede to the other. Or, if you have a doubt as to which is accurate, rely on the standby. Duh. One thing you don't do is leave the throttles pretty much firewalled. If you've done more than about, oh, say, two, takeoffs, you'll see that that ain't how it's done. If you've done as many as those guys are supposed to have done, even if you don't follow Boeing's procedure, you'll have an idea of what to set.

I'll not go into the trim question, been hashed to death, other than to say that if you've spent more than an hour as PF, trimming is like walking. Or breathing. High failure rate expected? Absolutely not, both about as basic of issues as there are, especially airspeed disagree. If a those are in this day and age high failure rate scenarios, God help us all.

(Ridiculous that it's necessary to add this to every damn post, but yes, for the record, I believe Boeing made some mistakes, particularly not limiting MCAS to one activation per event.)
“And If I claim to be a wise man, well surely it means that I don’t know”
 
kalvado
Posts: 1894
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Fri May 10, 2019 4:50 pm

dakota123 wrote:
kalvado wrote:
BoeingGuy wrote:

No it wasn’t. More BS being posted on A.net.

As I’ve explained before, the Fault Hazard Analysis showed the failure was within a safe margin because it assumed the flight crew would correctly perform the Uncommanded Stab Trim procedure, which has been well trained on every Boeing model since the beginning of time.

Were there errors or incorrect assumption in that analysis? We’ll let the investigators made that determination.

But no risk was intentionally downplayed.

The real facts never make a good story though.

I know at least one “whistle blower” and the guy is a total jerk-off. He was laid off from Boeing because he contributed very little work. What work he did do was of poor quality too. And HE dropped the ball on some MCAS analysis, himself. Left Boeing with sour grapes, so he goes and talks to the media to get revenge. A number of things he stated, such as staffing numbers in his old team, are complete fiction.

Stop digging, PLEASE!

Everyone is happy with blaming MBAs in management and want to let engineers do their job.
Wha you say is that boeing's engineers are uncapable of understanding a concept of dual failure, trim runaway and airspeed disagree simultaneously - while an indicator, pointing at the root cause - which may or may not have hepled - is removed! All while relying on a rarely trained procedure for the crew, where very high failure rate is expected.
What you say goes well beyond the concept of "safety culture problem".


Airspeed disagree came first. Ridiculously easy "procedure", look at the standby and decide which of the cap and FO is accurate. Either cross scan, or cede to the other. Or, if you have a doubt as to which is accurate, rely on the standby. Duh. One thing you don't do is leave the throttles pretty much firewalled. If you've done more than about, oh, say, two, takeoffs, you'll see that that ain't how it's done. If you've done as many as those guys are supposed to have done, even if you don't follow Boeing's procedure, you'll have an idea of what to set.

I'll not go into the trim question, been hashed to death, other than to say that if you've spent more than an hour as PF, trimming is like walking. Or breathing. High failure rate expected? Absolutely not, both about as basic of issues as there are, especially airspeed disagree. If a those are in this day and age high failure rate scenarios, God help us all.

(Ridiculous that it's necessary to add this to every damn post, but yes, for the record, I believe Boeing made some mistakes, particularly not limiting MCAS to one activation per event.)

You're focusing on a single accident, I am looking at engineering side. You may blame ET crew for anything. Engineering falw they exposed is 100 times worse than any of their actions. Boeing attitude demonstrated here is 10000 times worse. If that is typical attitude at Boeing, then they have no right to exist as an airspace business.
 
xmp125a
Posts: 233
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Fri May 10, 2019 5:04 pm

kalvado wrote:
No, it is really what you say is too damning to believe.
You say that safety analysis assumed pilots would handle MCAS as trim runaway. Fine, practice shows that they didn't, but it happens.
Now what you don't say is that a single point of failure can cause TWO problems - trim runaway and airspeed disagree. and that is a HUGE design flaw. OK, O, ET crew shouldn't raize flaps - but next flight would get a bird with flaps up, or hail damage or something else.
Now you imply this was considered and deemed acceptable. With AoA sensor MTBF quoted as 7e4 hours. That is totally damning. For safety culture, for engineering qualifications, for MAX design as a whole.


Am I the only sensing a irony in Boeing blaming insufficient training of pilots for ET and LionAir crashes on one side, but doing everything to prevent further training? on the other side???
 
planecane
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Fri May 10, 2019 5:08 pm

enzo011 wrote:
planecane wrote:
WIederling wrote:

Handling AoA disagree would have turned into mandatory curriculum.
( not any longer a bespoke customer option where the customer is responsible for training/using that feature.)
No way around mentioning MCAS as (safety) dependent on AoA disagree ... tin of worms. $1m per plane. humans are only $60k per :-)


Training, yes. SIMULATOR training? For what? An instruction to stay away from the edges of the flight envelope and divert?



If there is a new alert about AOA disagree between 2 sensors and a new sound to indicate that in the cockpit, how do you train pilots to recognize it and follow whatever procedure you write up without Sim training? If the procedure is to disable MCAS in that case, how does the aircraft handle and how do you train this in a manual?


If both sensors were used, MCAS would disable itself upon disagree like it will with the software update. The alert won't be a new sound, just a message on the PFD possibly with a sound that already exists for other alerts. The flying without MCAS will be a warning to keep away from the edge of the flight envelope. The main point being missed with respect to MCAS is that nobody should really be getting to an approach to stall like that in normal operations.

To answer your main question, we should ask a pilot that flys the NG with the disagree warning and ask what type of simulator training they do specifically for that alert.

I think people severely overestimate what pilots train for in simulators.
 
DenverTed
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Fri May 10, 2019 5:16 pm

Should Boeing or the FAA safety check systems have caught it or was it excusable design, and similar can and will happen in the future, because it is beyond foresight?
1-single sensor vs. dual sensor for MCAS?
2-the full range on the stab of MCAS? What was the flight regime of MCAS? The entire range of incidence of the stab?
3-multiple deployments of MCAS?
4-was the term "runaway" ever defined? Continuous? Intermittent? What does a speed trim malfunction look like?
 
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Revelation
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Fri May 10, 2019 5:31 pm

WayexTDI wrote:
BoeingGuy wrote:
No it’s not. That guy is out bashing Boeing on CNN and other places. I happen to know he got laid off for inept work performance and left very angry and bitter.

[...]Two engineers got laid of a few years ago - he being one. Both had severe work performance issues. That area is actually growing and hiring now.

Unless you were his manager or are in HR, you do not know for a fact the actual reason he was let go, neither should you.
This would be a clear violation of privacy, for which he could go back to Boeing, sue and win.

Engineering largely is a meritocracy. It's hard to hide ineptness. The paperwork may say something different, but that's not particularly relevant, IMHO.

WayexTDI wrote:
BoeingGuy wrote:
Notice how another “whistle blower” quoted in the press in the past few days also got laid off from Boeing after over 20 years? Good performing employees don’t get laid off.

Good employees get laid off all the time, for very obscure reasons and usually to satisfy shareholders (workforce reduction, wages too high, etc).
When someone gets laid off, it doesn't necessarily means they're bad employees. Similarly, some poor performing employees can stay in place (when they should have been gone years before) if their salary is low enough and they do what they're told to without questioning; it's sad, but exists too often.

All true, and I'd add ageism to your list, but all this still allows for an employee getting laid off for ineptness with the paperwork saying something else.

I was once in an uncomfortable position of watching a small number of salaried employees getting laid off due to a "workforce reduction", whilst me and many other contract employees who were much more expensive were kept on. Everyone knew the small number of salaried employees laid off were the least productive workers in the organization. Everyone knew the company would have saved more money cutting expensive contract workers. Yet the official announcement said "workforce reduction" rather than "culling the herd".
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Wake now, discover that you are the song that the morning brings
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BoeingGuy
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Fri May 10, 2019 5:41 pm

xmp125a wrote:
kalvado wrote:
No, it is really what you say is too damning to believe.
You say that safety analysis assumed pilots would handle MCAS as trim runaway. Fine, practice shows that they didn't, but it happens.
Now what you don't say is that a single point of failure can cause TWO problems - trim runaway and airspeed disagree. and that is a HUGE design flaw. OK, O, ET crew shouldn't raize flaps - but next flight would get a bird with flaps up, or hail damage or something else.
Now you imply this was considered and deemed acceptable. With AoA sensor MTBF quoted as 7e4 hours. That is totally damning. For safety culture, for engineering qualifications, for MAX design as a whole.


Am I the only sensing a irony in Boeing blaming insufficient training of pilots for ET and LionAir crashes on one side, but doing everything to prevent further training? on the other side???


Not sure where Boeing is blaming insufficient training of those pilots. Still more half-truths and sensationalism being posted. How did aviation exist in the days before “experts” could post on social media?
 
dakota123
Posts: 233
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Fri May 10, 2019 5:44 pm

kalvado wrote:
dakota123 wrote:
kalvado wrote:
Stop digging, PLEASE!

Everyone is happy with blaming MBAs in management and want to let engineers do their job.
Wha you say is that boeing's engineers are uncapable of understanding a concept of dual failure, trim runaway and airspeed disagree simultaneously - while an indicator, pointing at the root cause - which may or may not have hepled - is removed! All while relying on a rarely trained procedure for the crew, where very high failure rate is expected.
What you say goes well beyond the concept of "safety culture problem".


Airspeed disagree came first. Ridiculously easy "procedure", look at the standby and decide which of the cap and FO is accurate. Either cross scan, or cede to the other. Or, if you have a doubt as to which is accurate, rely on the standby. Duh. One thing you don't do is leave the throttles pretty much firewalled. If you've done more than about, oh, say, two, takeoffs, you'll see that that ain't how it's done. If you've done as many as those guys are supposed to have done, even if you don't follow Boeing's procedure, you'll have an idea of what to set.

I'll not go into the trim question, been hashed to death, other than to say that if you've spent more than an hour as PF, trimming is like walking. Or breathing. High failure rate expected? Absolutely not, both about as basic of issues as there are, especially airspeed disagree. If a those are in this day and age high failure rate scenarios, God help us all.

(Ridiculous that it's necessary to add this to every damn post, but yes, for the record, I believe Boeing made some mistakes, particularly not limiting MCAS to one activation per event.)

You're focusing on a single accident, I am looking at engineering side. You may blame ET crew for anything. Engineering falw they exposed is 100 times worse than any of their actions. Boeing attitude demonstrated here is 10000 times worse. If that is typical attitude at Boeing, then they have no right to exist as an airspace business.


OK, but you're coming at the engineering aspect from (at least in part) a faulty point of view.

Aerospace is in my family, so have always been close to it. Have certainly engaged my fair share of engineers, I know whom I prefer to work with, and who I wouldn't touch with a ten foot pole What BoeingGuy said is right, good engineers tend to (not always, tend to) get picked up for the next gig. That said, my view is that Boeing does need to re-focus on engineering -- it does feel generally like something is not right. (And frankly hasn't been since the engineers were pretty much forced to unionize.) I do believe that MBAs and finance majors have generally wrecked this country by focusing on the wrong things. Airplanes are inherently different products than most everything else and for a company like Boeing, and shareholder value should be a secondary concern, the RESULT of engineering excellence, not the primary driver. It should be part of the company's manifesto so shareholders know what the investing rules are, just as one knows when one is buying into a green or "ethical" company. Would that I were king...
“And If I claim to be a wise man, well surely it means that I don’t know”
 
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Dutchy
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Fri May 10, 2019 6:53 pm

kalvado wrote:
If Boeing knew about MCAS issue, then they screwed up and own it.
If Boeing didn't know how MCAS works, itmaybe someone else problem.


Or if Boeing should have known about MCAS problem.
Many happy landings, greetings from The Netherlands!
 
BravoOne
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Fri May 10, 2019 7:18 pm

arfbool wrote:
The most salient quote from the 60 minutes report for me is:

"The Boeing whistleblower who is working with the FBI confirmed that making the MCAS flight control system reliant on only one sensor was a deliberate decision to avoid the need for expensive LEVEL D or flight simulator training. "MCAS was designed using data from only one of the sensors because we knew the FAA would not have certified a two sensor system without Level D training.""

https://youtu.be/QytfYyHmxtc?t=2120

Can someone elaborate what that means? If true the reasoning is shocking.


Cannot imagine why a single or dual sensor would have ANY impact on the requirement for sim time. Sounds like more misinformation found on the web.
 
kalvado
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Fri May 10, 2019 7:55 pm

BravoOne wrote:
arfbool wrote:
The most salient quote from the 60 minutes report for me is:

"The Boeing whistleblower who is working with the FBI confirmed that making the MCAS flight control system reliant on only one sensor was a deliberate decision to avoid the need for expensive LEVEL D or flight simulator training. "MCAS was designed using data from only one of the sensors because we knew the FAA would not have certified a two sensor system without Level D training.""

https://youtu.be/QytfYyHmxtc?t=2120

Can someone elaborate what that means? If true the reasoning is shocking.


Cannot imagine why a single or dual sensor would have ANY impact on the requirement for sim time. Sounds like more misinformation found on the web.

It is a strange logic, but here is what I understand:
if there is a minor system on the aircraft, which has negligible, if any, effect on flight safety, it's OK to let pilot read it once and forget. It is also OK for such system to be designed as somewhat faulty, not a big deal.
If there is a system with significant effect on flight safety, then design requirements also increase. Same with pilots -they must be actively aware of the system, and be very aware of actions in case of a failure. That implies sim training.

Now MCAS is proven to be a significant flight risk through crazy failure mode. Eliminating the failure mode is a must - but that also means that system failure is flight safety critical, and pilots must be very aware - and see above.
I am not sure if FAA/EASA would be happy with some middle ground logic; so far what I read is that once something is critical - it is critical all the way.
 
BravoOne
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Fri May 10, 2019 8:22 pm

The Boeing whistle blower is full of you know what. Simply not a correct assessment as written or reported.
 
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QuarkFly
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Sat May 11, 2019 1:17 am

Yes something is wrong with Boeing's safety culture. For the Max, it equivalent to Chevrolet still making the 1955 Chevy Bel-Air...

...Stretching it, putting in a modern engine, some fancy electronic gauges and anti-lock brakes...But never really moving off the same old 1950's era chassis, steering and doors...and getting the Feds to grandfather in lousy crash test data.
Always take the Red Eye if possible
 
NWADTWE16
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Sat May 11, 2019 2:19 am

How in the world this company has not seen the CEO and many more forced out yet is beyond me. Clean house, repair the issues, start caring about your product!

Boeing is an American joke right now, and I've said it before. I am not flying any newer Boeings that could've been made under work conditions this management team had/has created.

I've flown 757's recently exclusively due to my routes but in upcoming international trips, I went with VS on the 744, A320 within Europe (even moved off a KLM 738 to AF A319 after this happened), and out of my way to be on the comfy A380 coming home. Many will say my arguments are odd, but I am a paying passenger and this is how I am responding. I am not the only one.
I haven't been everywhere, but it's on my list!
 
NightStar
Posts: 10
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Sat May 11, 2019 2:34 am

[/quote]

What is overdue is a discussion of corporations (didn't exist when the US constitution was written), the economy, the legal system, and life in general

[/quote]

Corporations are much older. Primitive forms of corporations existed in Roman times and the first legal entities as known today came about in the early 1600's. The Royal Dutch East India Company and the world's first stock exchange were created in Amsterdam in 1602. The people who wrote the Constitution knew all about them.
 
planecane
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Sat May 11, 2019 4:38 am

WayexTDI wrote:
Unless you were his manager or are in HR, you do not know for a fact the actual reason he was let go, neither should you.
This would be a clear violation of privacy, for which he could go back to Boeing, sue and win.
Remember that what you write becomes public information and can be used, often against you.


Where are you coming up with this from? There is no right to privacy with respect to termination of employment. A company can put a billboard up that says why they fired somebody if they wanted to.
 
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enzo011
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Sat May 11, 2019 5:11 am

planecane wrote:
If both sensors were used, MCAS would disable itself upon disagree like it will with the software update. The alert won't be a new sound, just a message on the PFD possibly with a sound that already exists for other alerts. The flying without MCAS will be a warning to keep away from the edge of the flight envelope. The main point being missed with respect to MCAS is that nobody should really be getting to an approach to stall like that in normal operations.

To answer your main question, we should ask a pilot that flys the NG with the disagree warning and ask what type of simulator training they do specifically for that alert.

I think people severely overestimate what pilots train for in simulators.



That sounds reasonable. No additional sim training needed, but it does bring up so many more questions I am sure has been asked before and answered and going around in circles, like if it is that simple why not include it from the start?

As for asking a NG pilot, unless the NG has 2 AOA sensors that may give different inputs I see no reason to ask them what they would do in a situation they will never find themselves in or train for. We are talking about something new from the NG to the MAX, right? An additional AOA sensor that will also give inputs to the system and alert pilots that there may be information that is wrong given to the system that could activate the MCAS on the aircraft. Just using a different AOA and only use one of the 2 functioning probes will still cause erroneous data to be sent to the aircraft if that probe is faulty. That solves nothing.
 
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Sat May 11, 2019 5:16 am

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Agrajag
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Sat May 11, 2019 6:37 am

In my world, i am required to view issues through the prism of Negligence/non-Negligence. Put simply, my own personal thought exercise is as follows. 1. Is there a body of reasonable opinion (relevantly qualified and experienced opinion) that would state that the MCAS system as originally designed and implemented was sound? Ive seen no evidence that this body of opinion exists. The FAA does not count as I think it will be shown that they were just as Negligent as Boeing in this matter. 2. Is there sufficient evidence of a causative link between the Negligence and the loss? Yes. 3. Would I assess the prospects of successfully arguing this case before an intelligent and impartial Judge as being greater than 50%? Yes. (thankfully no Jury in my Jurisdiction). I find this whole situation shocking and Boeing's attitude disgusting. What have they become? Where is the pride?
The plural of anecdote is anecdotes, not data.
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A3801000
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Sat May 11, 2019 6:56 am

Agrajag wrote:
Where is the pride?


It isn't about 'pride', it is all about money.
Look at US cars. The don't sell in europe because of price, they are actually cheap, very cheap. But they are designed to do the absolute minimum to safe costs. They use fuel like they don't care about future generations, they can't really be driven any faster then let's say 120 km/h etc. Cheapest to design, cheapest to build but still ok. Kind of a 'That'll do'.
Problem is that other countries can produce such cars too, but much cheaper. And again other countries decided to build high quality cars, advanced engines, no big difference if driven 120 or 240 km/h.
It seems that Boeing is going the 'cheap' way too. Not intentionally designing or building 'cheap' planes but 'that'll do' planes. The battery problems in the 787? Could have easily been solved earlier, but would have taken more money and more time. MCAS in the MAX, same. Flutter and software problems in the 748, again the same. And also the reduction of costs in production seems to show: FOD problems during manufacturing for the 787 and the 767 Tanker seems to show that.
Is it 'safety culture'? Or is it 'maximum profit' culture?
IMO Boeing needs to turn around for the long term and start designing and building highest quality again. 'Cheap' planes are or will be available soon from other countries (China/Russia).
I hope the do turn around but I have my doubts.
 
morrisond
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Sat May 11, 2019 11:13 am

A3801000 wrote:
They use fuel like they don't care about future generations, they can't really be driven any faster then let's say 120 km/h etc. Cheapest to design, cheapest to build but still ok. Kind of a 'That'll do'.
Problem is that other countries can produce such cars too, but much cheaper. And again other countries decided to build high quality cars, advanced engines, no big difference if driven 120 or 240 km/h.
It seems that Boeing is going the 'cheap' way too. Not intentionally designing or building 'cheap' planes but 'that'll do' planes. The battery problems in the 787? Could have easily been solved earlier, but would have taken more money and more time. MCAS in the MAX, same. Flutter and software problems in the 748, again the same. And also the reduction of costs in production seems to show: FOD problems during manufacturing for the 787 and the 767 Tanker seems to show that.
Is it 'safety culture'? Or is it 'maximum profit' culture?
IMO Boeing needs to turn around for the long term and start designing and building highest quality again. 'Cheap' planes are or will be available soon from other countries (China/Russia).
I hope the do turn around but I have my doubts.


I'm Canadian but I'm going to defend my American Cousins. Please stop with the American bashing and attacks. Not all Americans are the same.

American cars can't be driven beyond 120km/h and can't go 240 km/h? You obviously do not know much about American Vehicles like the Camaro/Mustang/Corvette or the Chrysler/JEEP SRT models - even there generic cars are safe at high speeds and in general can get to high speeds and safe highway speeds easier anyways as they don't have puny motors like some of the European Cars base cars.

BTW - Most American small cars are based off Cars designed for Europe by Ford or Fiat. Even Gas guzzling Full size SUV's and trucks are perfectly stable at 160 km/h - although I don't know why you need to go faster than that - Fuel Economy goes in the Toilet and how good is that for the Environment and BTW I believe the highest limit in North America is 130 km/h.

Yes I remember now - Europe has brought the world the oh so clean diesel engine. How much damage has been done to the Environment due to all the emissions cheating. I'm sure Diesels are super clean above 160km/h.

If Tesla hadn't been funded by American Capitalism Electric Cars would not be where there are either. Where was Europe's leadership on this?

In terms of Boeing's hyper focus on Profitability - they are not building cheap planes. The Carbon technology on the 787 cost billions to develop - The battery system on the 787 was very expensive to design - it did not save money - it was meant to be lighter to save Airlines money.

Part of their focus on Profitability has been directly related to Airbus and there predatory pricing practises in their quest to get market share. Combined with Large bags of cash (I'm sure Boeing hands out bags of cash as well but Airbus seems to have taken it to a new level) to win orders.

Finally let me remind you - Boeing was ready to spend billions developing a clean sheet for the 737 back in 2011 - but the airlines voted no and wanted a re-enginged version of what they have. They got what they ordered. Albeit with one bad system.

They will most likely launch a new State of the are NMA/NSA soon that will cost billions with probably unprecedented safety and I would bet Airbus will respond with warmed over versions of the A320 which will be 50 years old at that point.
 
Some1Somewhere
Posts: 27
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Sat May 11, 2019 11:53 am

planecane wrote:
arfbool wrote:
The most salient quote from the 60 minutes report for me is:

"The Boeing whistleblower who is working with the FBI confirmed that making the MCAS flight control system reliant on only one sensor was a deliberate decision to avoid the need for expensive LEVEL D or flight simulator training. "MCAS was designed using data from only one of the sensors because we knew the FAA would not have certified a two sensor system without Level D training.""

https://youtu.be/QytfYyHmxtc?t=2120

Can someone elaborate what that means? If true the reasoning is shocking.


I don't give this whistleblower much credence unless somebody can explain why making MCAS less likely to fail, relying on 2 sensors, would require simulator training. It doesn't make sense.

The suggestion is that if you have 2-3 sensors, the computers can now detect and warn the pilot of a failure in the system. So you need a new warning light (or re-use 'AOA disagree'), and new procedures for what to do in the event of an MCAS failure. Those potentially need sim time.

Even if it fails into a 'safe' state, you now have a plane that flies differently in near-stall, and regulators might demand testing/training on that. Of course, that's the case with MCAS v1 as well if you disable the trim, but that's not something that was publicised.
 
WIederling
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Sat May 11, 2019 12:17 pm

morrisond wrote:
A3801000 wrote:
They use fuel like they don't care about future generations, they can't really be driven any faster then let's say 120 km/h etc. Cheapest to design, cheapest to build but still ok. Kind of a 'That'll do'.
Problem is that other countries can produce such cars too, but much cheaper. And again other countries decided to build high quality cars, advanced engines, no big difference if driven 120 or 240 km/h.
It seems that Boeing is going the 'cheap' way too. Not intentionally designing or building 'cheap' planes but 'that'll do' planes. The battery problems in the 787? Could have easily been solved earlier, but would have taken more money and more time. MCAS in the MAX, same. Flutter and software problems in the 748, again the same. And also the reduction of costs in production seems to show: FOD problems during manufacturing for the 787 and the 767 Tanker seems to show that.
Is it 'safety culture'? Or is it 'maximum profit' culture?
IMO Boeing needs to turn around for the long term and start designing and building highest quality again. 'Cheap' planes are or will be available soon from other countries (China/Russia).
I hope the do turn around but I have my doubts.


I'm Canadian but I'm going to defend my American Cousins. Please stop with the American bashing and attacks. Not all Americans are the same.

American cars can't be driven beyond 120km/h and can't go 240 km/h? You obviously do not know much about American Vehicles like the Camaro/Mustang/Corvette or the Chrysler/JEEP SRT models - even there generic cars are safe at high speeds and in general can get to high speeds and safe highway speeds easier anyways as they don't have puny motors like some of the European Cars base cars.

BTW - Most American small cars are based off Cars designed for Europe by Ford or Fiat. Even Gas guzzling Full size SUV's and trucks are perfectly stable at 160 km/h - although I don't know why you need to go faster than that - Fuel Economy goes in the Toilet and how good is that for the Environment and BTW I believe the highest limit in North America is 130 km/h.

Yes I remember now - Europe has brought the world the oh so clean diesel engine. How much damage has been done to the Environment due to all the emissions cheating. I'm sure Diesels are super clean above 160km/h.

If Tesla hadn't been funded by American Capitalism Electric Cars would not be where there are either. Where was Europe's leadership on this?

In terms of Boeing's hyper focus on Profitability - they are not building cheap planes. The Carbon technology on the 787 cost billions to develop - The battery system on the 787 was very expensive to design - it did not save money - it was meant to be lighter to save Airlines money.

Part of their focus on Profitability has been directly related to Airbus and there predatory pricing practises in their quest to get market share. Combined with Large bags of cash (I'm sure Boeing hands out bags of cash as well but Airbus seems to have taken it to a new level) to win orders.

Finally let me remind you - Boeing was ready to spend billions developing a clean sheet for the 737 back in 2011 - but the airlines voted no and wanted a re-enginged version of what they have. They got what they ordered. Albeit with one bad system.

They will most likely launch a new State of the are NMA/NSA soon that will cost billions with probably unprecedented safety and I would bet Airbus will respond with warmed over versions of the A320 which will be 50 years old at that point.


That is not completely wrong. But it is quite a rewrite on what happened at the time. "Geschichtsklitterung".
Murphy is an optimist
 
WayexTDI
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Sat May 11, 2019 2:06 pm

planecane wrote:
WayexTDI wrote:
Unless you were his manager or are in HR, you do not know for a fact the actual reason he was let go, neither should you.
This would be a clear violation of privacy, for which he could go back to Boeing, sue and win.
Remember that what you write becomes public information and can be used, often against you.


Where are you coming up with this from? There is no right to privacy with respect to termination of employment. A company can put a billboard up that says why they fired somebody if they wanted to.

Are you kidding? If you publicly disclose why an employee has been let go, it will cause harm to the employee carrier, preventing him from finding another job; at this point, he will sue his previous employer for defamation, libel and the such and win.

That's the reason why HR limits the information they tell when a potential employer calls about a previous employee: yes, he/she worked here from this date to this date.
That's also the reason why you are instructed to transfer the request to HR when someone outside the company asks you what happened to a former employee: if you tell them, you can be disciplined.

Just try and see; if the former employee holds a grudge, you'll be sure to be called during the ligitation.
 
NightStar
Posts: 10
Joined: Thu May 09, 2019 11:17 am

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Sat May 11, 2019 3:20 pm

https://www.fool.com/investing/2019/04/ ... 7-max.aspx

It would appear that so far Boeing hasn't suffered a great deal during this fiasco. During the first quarter of 2019 Boeing still beat Airbus in orders. Airbus has lost more orders this year than Boeing has. Airbus is now in the red, which means they have more cancellations than orders. Astonishing. Of course, both companies have more than enough orders to carry them on for several years so it doesn't really matter at present. Time will tell whether Boeing starts suffering badly with cancellations but so far they have not. I still say that Boeing needs to show the world that they are taking action and start firing people. They need the churn. The FAA needs to ensure no nasty surprises like this happens again
 
planecane
Posts: 1085
Joined: Thu Feb 09, 2017 4:58 pm

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Sat May 11, 2019 3:30 pm

WayexTDI wrote:
planecane wrote:
WayexTDI wrote:
Unless you were his manager or are in HR, you do not know for a fact the actual reason he was let go, neither should you.
This would be a clear violation of privacy, for which he could go back to Boeing, sue and win.
Remember that what you write becomes public information and can be used, often against you.


Where are you coming up with this from? There is no right to privacy with respect to termination of employment. A company can put a billboard up that says why they fired somebody if they wanted to.

Are you kidding? If you publicly disclose why an employee has been let go, it will cause harm to the employee carrier, preventing him from finding another job; at this point, he will sue his previous employer for defamation, libel and the such and win.

That's the reason why HR limits the information they tell when a potential employer calls about a previous employee: yes, he/she worked here from this date to this date.
That's also the reason why you are instructed to transfer the request to HR when someone outside the company asks you what happened to a former employee: if you tell them, you can be disciplined.

Just try and see; if the former employee holds a grudge, you'll be sure to be called during the ligitation.

You are confusing policies that companies may have with laws. Libel requires making FALSE statements. Find me one case of somebody successfully sueing a former employer for releasing information about why they were terminated.
 
superjeff
Posts: 1247
Joined: Fri Feb 05, 2010 2:14 am

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Sat May 11, 2019 4:00 pm

TheFlyingDisk wrote:
ElroyJetson wrote:
This happens every time their is a high profile crash. I remember the DC-10 hysteria in the late 1970's.

Boeing made mistakes with the max but they do not build unsafe aircraft. Neither does Airbus. The problems will be fixed. People need to chill. Nobody wanted or expected this to happen.


I have to agree. The media is taking things out of proportion at the moment.

Yes, 300 people died, but the verdict on the cause of their deaths is still months away. Maybe Boeing shoulder some of the responsibility, maybe the pilot shoulder a bit of that same responsibility, maybe the airlines share some of the responsibility as well, but until the reports are released all that we have now is conjecture.



I don't think the issue is about the cause of the crash - we won't have a definitive answer to either of these two until the investigations are completed. But I do agree that there is a question about Boeing's internal culture, which appears to go back years. Do you remember the United 737-200 that crashed before landing in Colorado Springs (COS) or the US Airw 737-300 that did the same while landing in Pittsburgh (PIT)? The figured out later when an Eastwind Airlines 737-200 had the same thing happen over Trenton, New Jersey, but miraculously recovered. Turned out to be a rudder problem. But Boeing denied any problems, and, at least in the US Air incident, tried to blame US Air. That was a major reason why US never ordered any other Boeing equipment until their merger with American.

In short, I think it is a valid comment to question Boeing's internal culture.
 
BravoOne
Posts: 3524
Joined: Fri Apr 12, 2013 2:27 pm

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Sat May 11, 2019 4:26 pm

arfbool wrote:
The most salient quote from the 60 minutes report for me is:

"The Boeing whistleblower who is working with the FBI confirmed that making the MCAS flight control system reliant on only one sensor was a deliberate decision to avoid the need for expensive LEVEL D or flight simulator training. "MCAS was designed using data from only one of the sensors because we knew the FAA would not have certified a two sensor system without Level D training.""

https://youtu.be/QytfYyHmxtc?t=2120

Can someone elaborate what that means? If true the reasoning is shocking.



Again...this is simply a false statement regarding the Level D sim requirements. 60 minus or for that any cable news show is not a reliable resource regarding this subject.
 
planecane
Posts: 1085
Joined: Thu Feb 09, 2017 4:58 pm

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Sat May 11, 2019 6:07 pm

enzo011 wrote:
planecane wrote:
If both sensors were used, MCAS would disable itself upon disagree like it will with the software update. The alert won't be a new sound, just a message on the PFD possibly with a sound that already exists for other alerts. The flying without MCAS will be a warning to keep away from the edge of the flight envelope. The main point being missed with respect to MCAS is that nobody should really be getting to an approach to stall like that in normal operations.

To answer your main question, we should ask a pilot that flys the NG with the disagree warning and ask what type of simulator training they do specifically for that alert.

I think people severely overestimate what pilots train for in simulators.



That sounds reasonable. No additional sim training needed, but it does bring up so many more questions I am sure has been asked before and answered and going around in circles, like if it is that simple why not include it from the start?

As for asking a NG pilot, unless the NG has 2 AOA sensors that may give different inputs I see no reason to ask them what they would do in a situation they will never find themselves in or train for. We are talking about something new from the NG to the MAX, right? An additional AOA sensor that will also give inputs to the system and alert pilots that there may be information that is wrong given to the system that could activate the MCAS on the aircraft. Just using a different AOA and only use one of the 2 functioning probes will still cause erroneous data to be sent to the aircraft if that probe is faulty. That solves nothing.


The NG has 2 AoA sensors. Southwest for sure has the disagree warning on their NGs.

As for why they didn't go with the simple solution from the start, I believe the STS only uses one input on the NG and, IIRC the AP also only uses sensors from one side.

Despite the nitpicking of some about the wording, MCAS is a function of the STS software. Since it only used one AoA sensor, so did MCAS.

STS never caused MCAS-like issues possibly because it is only active at low speeds. I'm not sure how much authority STS has over trim but possibly not as much as MCAS and possibly a lower rate? In any case, STS never failed in a way that resulted in a crash so the engineers didn't see any reason that MCAS would. If MCAS activated erroneously they assumed the pilots would recognize it as a runaway stabilizer and run the NNC for that situation. Had both crews done so and followed the NNC exactly they would have recovered.

Unfortunately, for a multitude of reasons, neither crew did. The lion air crew didn't recognize the situation as a runaway stabilizer. The ET crew seemed to but then cut off the electric trim too soon.
 
WingsOfLove
Posts: 109
Joined: Thu Mar 15, 2018 12:54 am

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Sat May 11, 2019 7:48 pm

NightStar wrote:
https://www.fool.com/investing/2019/04/13/boeing-crushes-airbus-q1-aircraft-orders-737-max.aspx

Airbus has lost more orders this year than Boeing has


"The net order total is even worse for Boeing (NYSE: BA) which, after cutting more than 200 orders from its books in relation to the suspended operations of India’s Jet Airways, saw its official net order total fall to a deficit of 119 jets through the first quarter."

https://www.bizjournals.com/seattle/new ... april.html

Airbus is negative 58 through April. Boeing has only reported cancellations for 1Q.
 
morrisond
Posts: 1225
Joined: Thu Jan 07, 2010 12:22 am

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Sat May 11, 2019 9:40 pm

WingsOfLove wrote:
NightStar wrote:
https://www.fool.com/investing/2019/04/13/boeing-crushes-airbus-q1-aircraft-orders-737-max.aspx

Airbus has lost more orders this year than Boeing has


"The net order total is even worse for Boeing (NYSE: BA) which, after cutting more than 200 orders from its books in relation to the suspended operations of India’s Jet Airways, saw its official net order total fall to a deficit of 119 jets through the first quarter."

https://www.bizjournals.com/seattle/new ... april.html

Airbus is negative 58 through April. Boeing has only reported cancellations for 1Q.


So Airbus is the first loser then?
 
mga707
Posts: 178
Joined: Thu Jun 21, 2018 5:52 am

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Sat May 11, 2019 10:42 pm

morrisond wrote:

I'm Canadian but I'm going to defend my American Cousins. Please stop with the American bashing and attacks. Not all Americans are the same.

American cars can't be driven beyond 120km/h and can't go 240 km/h? You obviously do not know much about American Vehicles like the Camaro/Mustang/Corvette or the Chrysler/JEEP SRT models - even there generic cars are safe at high speeds and in general can get to high speeds and safe highway speeds easier anyways as they don't have puny motors like some of the European Cars base cars.

BTW - Most American small cars are based off Cars designed for Europe by Ford or Fiat. Even Gas guzzling Full size SUV's and trucks are perfectly stable at 160 km/h - although I don't know why you need to go faster than that - Fuel Economy goes in the Toilet and how good is that for the Environment and BTW I believe the highest limit in North America is 130 km/h.

Yes I remember now - Europe has brought the world the oh so clean diesel engine. How much damage has been done to the Environment due to all the emissions cheating. I'm sure Diesels are super clean above 160km/h.

If Tesla hadn't been funded by American Capitalism Electric Cars would not be where there are either. Where was Europe's leadership on this?

In terms of Boeing's hyper focus on Profitability - they are not building cheap planes. The Carbon technology on the 787 cost billions to develop - The battery system on the 787 was very expensive to design - it did not save money - it was meant to be lighter to save Airlines money.

Part of their focus on Profitability has been directly related to Airbus and there predatory pricing practises in their quest to get market share. Combined with Large bags of cash (I'm sure Boeing hands out bags of cash as well but Airbus seems to have taken it to a new level) to win orders.

Finally let me remind you - Boeing was ready to spend billions developing a clean sheet for the 737 back in 2011 - but the airlines voted no and wanted a re-enginged version of what they have. They got what they ordered. Albeit with one bad system.

They will most likely launch a new State of the are NMA/NSA soon that will cost billions with probably unprecedented safety and I would bet Airbus will respond with warmed over versions of the A320 which will be 50 years old at that point.


For those of us 'Mericans of 'a certain age', your post reminds me (and probably others) of Canadian broadcaster Gordon Sinclair's 1973 recitation simply titled 'Americans-a Canadian's Opinion' that became a surprise hit single in narrated by fellow Canadian Byron MacGregor in early 1974. And coincidentally, Sinclair's opinion piece mentioned the Boeing 747, Douglas DC-10, and Lockheed L-1011.
Well said--thank you!
 
JayinKitsap
Posts: 1438
Joined: Sat Nov 26, 2005 9:55 am

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Sat May 11, 2019 11:18 pm

Thank you for this post - excellent points.

The US auto industry is variable - some car designed are for the lowest price point possible, or for a specific market. The Taurus was designed as a good 'family' car, reliable, safer than required, presentable but $5K or more less than other middle market cars. It sold for 45 years.

Your point on the Camero/Mustang/Corvette - they are hot cars with amazing performance.

The excellence is in US Trucks and SUV's. I have a 2004 Tahoe with almost 200K miles on it, no repairs except oil changes in the last 25K miles, it is happy to launch my pretty big boat in the salt water. Super comfortable, holds lots of stuff, tows, and yes only gets 16 MPG on the highway at 70 MPH. It has been to 110 MPH (175 kph).

German cars are excellent but also expensive, I go for the Japanese cars when I buy as they are better value. Would I buy a British, French, Italian, or Swedish car - er no - how they design does not suit my style.

Yes Boeing does not build cheap planes, Boeing values are better than the competition as the years wear by. Boeing planes get converted into freighters for another 5+ years of flying. But as all businesses they must turn a profit, at least 10% consistently or they start to die, below 5% all future R & D is probably gone. They must innovate to stay ahead of the competition as the competition is in hot battle on price. Aviation is a pretty smart market, the buyers know and understand all the costs of operation, the revenue differences, and the true performance. Selections are based on variances of 1 to 2%, that difference gets priced in for the life of the plane.

morrisond wrote:
A3801000 wrote:
They use fuel like they don't care about future generations, they can't really be driven any faster then let's say 120 km/h etc. Cheapest to design, cheapest to build but still ok. Kind of a 'That'll do'.
Problem is that other countries can produce such cars too, but much cheaper. And again other countries decided to build high quality cars, advanced engines, no big difference if driven 120 or 240 km/h.
It seems that Boeing is going the 'cheap' way too. Not intentionally designing or building 'cheap' planes but 'that'll do' planes. The battery problems in the 787? Could have easily been solved earlier, but would have taken more money and more time. MCAS in the MAX, same. Flutter and software problems in the 748, again the same. And also the reduction of costs in production seems to show: FOD problems during manufacturing for the 787 and the 767 Tanker seems to show that.
Is it 'safety culture'? Or is it 'maximum profit' culture?
IMO Boeing needs to turn around for the long term and start designing and building highest quality again. 'Cheap' planes are or will be available soon from other countries (China/Russia).
I hope the do turn around but I have my doubts.


I'm Canadian but I'm going to defend my American Cousins. Please stop with the American bashing and attacks. Not all Americans are the same.

American cars can't be driven beyond 120km/h and can't go 240 km/h? You obviously do not know much about American Vehicles like the Camaro/Mustang/Corvette or the Chrysler/JEEP SRT models - even there generic cars are safe at high speeds and in general can get to high speeds and safe highway speeds easier anyways as they don't have puny motors like some of the European Cars base cars.

BTW - Most American small cars are based off Cars designed for Europe by Ford or Fiat. Even Gas guzzling Full size SUV's and trucks are perfectly stable at 160 km/h - although I don't know why you need to go faster than that - Fuel Economy goes in the Toilet and how good is that for the Environment and BTW I believe the highest limit in North America is 130 km/h.

Yes I remember now - Europe has brought the world the oh so clean diesel engine. How much damage has been done to the Environment due to all the emissions cheating. I'm sure Diesels are super clean above 160km/h.

If Tesla hadn't been funded by American Capitalism Electric Cars would not be where there are either. Where was Europe's leadership on this?

In terms of Boeing's hyper focus on Profitability - they are not building cheap planes. The Carbon technology on the 787 cost billions to develop - The battery system on the 787 was very expensive to design - it did not save money - it was meant to be lighter to save Airlines money.

Part of their focus on Profitability has been directly related to Airbus and there predatory pricing practises in their quest to get market share. Combined with Large bags of cash (I'm sure Boeing hands out bags of cash as well but Airbus seems to have taken it to a new level) to win orders.

Finally let me remind you - Boeing was ready to spend billions developing a clean sheet for the 737 back in 2011 - but the airlines voted no and wanted a re-enginged version of what they have. They got what they ordered. Albeit with one bad system.

They will most likely launch a new State of the are NMA/NSA soon that will cost billions with probably unprecedented safety and I would bet Airbus will respond with warmed over versions of the A320 which will be 50 years old at that point.

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