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User avatar
Revelation
Posts: 24809
Joined: Wed Feb 09, 2005 9:37 pm

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Sat Dec 07, 2019 3:16 pm

mjoelnir wrote:
Quote: Boeing “failed to adequately oversee its suppliers,” then presented the resulting planes to the FAA as safe despite those known problems, according to the allegations. Boeing gave those safety assurances on paperwork required for planes to fly in the United States, on export certificates, and in one case a statement that the planes conformed with military requirements, the FAA alleges.

This is the kind of thing that if shown to be true will get people fined and even thrown in jail ala Dieselgate. It'll be interesting to watch this unfold. It doesn't seem to have the same kind of "plausible deniability" that MCAS has been able to keep intact. The paperwork is there to establish accountability, and if the paperwork presents a falsehood, the people involved should be fined and/or jailed based on what the law allows.
Wake up to find out that you are the eyes of the world
The heart has its beaches, its homeland and thoughts of its own
Wake now, discover that you are the song that the morning brings
The heart has its seasons, its evenings and songs of its own
 
B777LRF
Posts: 2736
Joined: Sun Nov 02, 2008 4:23 am

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Sat Dec 07, 2019 4:26 pm

mjoelnir wrote:
I find the proposed fine laughable.


If the repercussions of cutting corners and/or deliberately failing to meet design standards are met with such weak consequences, the motivation to do better will be severely lacking. As has been proved time and again, management of large corporations react to one thing, and one thing only: Money.

Therefore the conversation should have gone as follows:

FAA: Hi Boeing, tell us how much profit you're making on each aeroplane. Open your books fully to our auditors.
Boeing: Eh, that's a trade secret, no can do
FAA: Your choice, the TC for the affected aircraft type is herewith withdrawn until such time you present the numbers

2 second later
Boeing: Hi FAA, here are the numbers. It's x,x million per aircraft
FAA: Thank you, and how many with non-conforming parts did you deliver despite knowing of the non-conformity?
Boeing: Eh, we don't know, can't say for sure, it's highly complex, yada yada yada
FAA: Your choice, the TC remains suspended

1 second later
Boeing: 83 is being the number
FAA: Excellent. The fine is 2 times X,X millions times the number of aircraft delivered. TC will be reinstated when you've paid
Boeing: We'll appeal and sue!
FAA: That's your choice, the TC remains suspended
Boeing: Where would you like us to transfer the funds too?
FAA: Our usual account, thanks. Now, for the other part
Boeing: The other part, but, but, but how about the TC
FAA: In a minute. Now give us the names of every single employee involved in the decision process leading up to you delivering non-conforming aircraft
Boeing: All of them?
FAA: Indeed, and your org. chart as it was when this went down
Boeing: Org chart?
FAA: Of course, we need to get to the top of this. Someone's going to have a day in court, we'd like to know who it was
Boeing: Sh1t
FAA: Quite right, you fracked it up good and well and that comes with consequences. Names, please
Boeing: Here's the file
FAA: Thank you very much, the TC has been reinstated, see you in a criminal court of law
Signature. You just read one.
 
smartplane
Posts: 1567
Joined: Fri Aug 03, 2018 9:23 pm

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Sat Dec 07, 2019 6:26 pm

Boeing weren't well advised. Instead of being open with regulators and customers, senior management followed standard (not just at Boeing) corporate practice of deny, defend, divert and deflect.

After strenuously trying to keep MAX terms of reference restricted to MCAS, presumably claiming no other issues existed, that gate was kicked down. The next battle lines to fall were the NG and X.

Now MAX-related efforts are directed at separating actions to end the grounding, with authorities wanting other MAX (and NG) deficiencies / changes to be documented with a rectification timetable, while Boeing simply wants to discuss / progress later, with the focus on mitigation.

A potentially bigger issue, is if MAX-type generous latitudes have been given the green light by Boeing and / or FAA for the X, hence the current review of documentation, and identification of 'hands' that have touched the MAX / NG / X in both organisations.
 
caljn
Posts: 258
Joined: Sun Oct 14, 2007 9:37 pm

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Sat Dec 07, 2019 6:29 pm

Yes, OP and all commenters are well in a position to make such a judgement.
 
patrickjp93
Posts: 648
Joined: Thu Aug 22, 2019 12:00 pm

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Sat Dec 07, 2019 6:38 pm

B777LRF wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:
I find the proposed fine laughable.


If the repercussions of cutting corners and/or deliberately failing to meet design standards are met with such weak consequences, the motivation to do better will be severely lacking. As has been proved time and again, management of large corporations react to one thing, and one thing only: Money.

Therefore the conversation should have gone as follows:

FAA: Hi Boeing, tell us how much profit you're making on each aeroplane. Open your books fully to our auditors.
Boeing: Eh, that's a trade secret, no can do
FAA: Your choice, the TC for the affected aircraft type is herewith withdrawn until such time you present the numbers

2 second later
Boeing: Hi FAA, here are the numbers. It's x,x million per aircraft
FAA: Thank you, and how many with non-conforming parts did you deliver despite knowing of the non-conformity?
Boeing: Eh, we don't know, can't say for sure, it's highly complex, yada yada yada
FAA: Your choice, the TC remains suspended

1 second later
Boeing: 83 is being the number
FAA: Excellent. The fine is 2 times X,X millions times the number of aircraft delivered. TC will be reinstated when you've paid
Boeing: We'll appeal and sue!
FAA: That's your choice, the TC remains suspended
Boeing: Where would you like us to transfer the funds too?
FAA: Our usual account, thanks. Now, for the other part
Boeing: The other part, but, but, but how about the TC
FAA: In a minute. Now give us the names of every single employee involved in the decision process leading up to you delivering non-conforming aircraft
Boeing: All of them?
FAA: Indeed, and your org. chart as it was when this went down
Boeing: Org chart?
FAA: Of course, we need to get to the top of this. Someone's going to have a day in court, we'd like to know who it was
Boeing: Sh1t
FAA: Quite right, you fracked it up good and well and that comes with consequences. Names, please
Boeing: Here's the file
FAA: Thank you very much, the TC has been reinstated, see you in a criminal court of law


You're hilarious. No regulator in any country operates or has ever operated this way, and with good reason: you'd kill the industry over the tiniest mistakes.

The FAA as positioned is just fine, and the EASA is equally chummy/in bed with Airbus, so this idea of it being a Boeing-only problem or American-only problem really needs to be put to bed. If we had held Airbus to the same standards to ground a type after every crash, the A330 program would have killed itself. Yet, everyone is saying Boeing should have voluntarily grounded the 737 MAX after the Lion Air crash. Then we had several (and many of them the same) A.netters saying the 737 NG should be grounded worldwide over the pickle fork issue.

Regulators do not exist to put firms out of business. That's for the market to do. Regulators exist to establish rules, guide firms in compliance, and be impartial in disputes among competing firms.

Furthermore, you represent your theoretical case as if it's cut and dry, which this most certainly is not, and most cases aren't.

The market is entirely self-regulating in terms of Boeing's sales. The MAX disaster has affected sales for all of their types, so their motivation to do better is enormous. You don't need the regulator being unduly vindictive. Again, if we held the EASA and Airbus to that standard, Airbus would have gone bankrupt at least twice.
 
patrickjp93
Posts: 648
Joined: Thu Aug 22, 2019 12:00 pm

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Sat Dec 07, 2019 6:43 pm

smartplane wrote:
A potentially bigger issue, is if MAX-type generous latitudes have been given the green light by Boeing and / or FAA for the X, hence the current review of documentation, and identification of 'hands' that have touched the MAX / NG / X in both organisations.


Even though these were separate, concurrent projects led by completely different sets of management and engineers... See, this is why conspiracy theorists deserve to be laughed at. We know the MAX was a rush to market, and the project timeline is much shorter than the 777X. We know the 777X is also the darling of Everett, not Renton. The 777X changes are also far more modest and visibly less precarious than the MAX's.
 
mjoelnir
Posts: 9411
Joined: Sun Feb 03, 2013 11:06 pm

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Sat Dec 07, 2019 6:57 pm

patrickjp93 wrote:
B777LRF wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:
I find the proposed fine laughable.


If the repercussions of cutting corners and/or deliberately failing to meet design standards are met with such weak consequences, the motivation to do better will be severely lacking. As has been proved time and again, management of large corporations react to one thing, and one thing only: Money.

Therefore the conversation should have gone as follows:

FAA: Hi Boeing, tell us how much profit you're making on each aeroplane. Open your books fully to our auditors.
Boeing: Eh, that's a trade secret, no can do
FAA: Your choice, the TC for the affected aircraft type is herewith withdrawn until such time you present the numbers

2 second later
Boeing: Hi FAA, here are the numbers. It's x,x million per aircraft
FAA: Thank you, and how many with non-conforming parts did you deliver despite knowing of the non-conformity?
Boeing: Eh, we don't know, can't say for sure, it's highly complex, yada yada yada
FAA: Your choice, the TC remains suspended

1 second later
Boeing: 83 is being the number
FAA: Excellent. The fine is 2 times X,X millions times the number of aircraft delivered. TC will be reinstated when you've paid
Boeing: We'll appeal and sue!
FAA: That's your choice, the TC remains suspended
Boeing: Where would you like us to transfer the funds too?
FAA: Our usual account, thanks. Now, for the other part
Boeing: The other part, but, but, but how about the TC
FAA: In a minute. Now give us the names of every single employee involved in the decision process leading up to you delivering non-conforming aircraft
Boeing: All of them?
FAA: Indeed, and your org. chart as it was when this went down
Boeing: Org chart?
FAA: Of course, we need to get to the top of this. Someone's going to have a day in court, we'd like to know who it was
Boeing: Sh1t
FAA: Quite right, you fracked it up good and well and that comes with consequences. Names, please
Boeing: Here's the file
FAA: Thank you very much, the TC has been reinstated, see you in a criminal court of law


You're hilarious. No regulator in any country operates or has ever operated this way, and with good reason: you'd kill the industry over the tiniest mistakes.

The FAA as positioned is just fine, and the EASA is equally chummy/in bed with Airbus, so this idea of it being a Boeing-only problem or American-only problem really needs to be put to bed. If we had held Airbus to the same standards to ground a type after every crash, the A330 program would have killed itself. Yet, everyone is saying Boeing should have voluntarily grounded the 737 MAX after the Lion Air crash. Then we had several (and many of them the same) A.netters saying the 737 NG should be grounded worldwide over the pickle fork issue.

Regulators do not exist to put firms out of business. That's for the market to do. Regulators exist to establish rules, guide firms in compliance, and be impartial in disputes among competing firms.

Furthermore, you represent your theoretical case as if it's cut and dry, which this most certainly is not, and most cases aren't.

The market is entirely self-regulating in terms of Boeing's sales. The MAX disaster has affected sales for all of their types, so their motivation to do better is enormous. You don't need the regulator being unduly vindictive. Again, if we held the EASA and Airbus to that standard, Airbus would have gone bankrupt at least twice.


If it happend like told in the news, than we do not talk about a tiny mistake, but an obvious criminal act. It is just that the USA justice system is quite active in regards to foreign companies, but very passive in regards to USA companies.

I get a bit tired with this because the FAA is in bed with Boeing, EASA has to be in bed with Airbus too. Put up some proof or stop this nonsense talk.
 
patrickjp93
Posts: 648
Joined: Thu Aug 22, 2019 12:00 pm

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Sat Dec 07, 2019 7:05 pm

mjoelnir wrote:
patrickjp93 wrote:
B777LRF wrote:

If the repercussions of cutting corners and/or deliberately failing to meet design standards are met with such weak consequences, the motivation to do better will be severely lacking. As has been proved time and again, management of large corporations react to one thing, and one thing only: Money.

Therefore the conversation should have gone as follows:

FAA: Hi Boeing, tell us how much profit you're making on each aeroplane. Open your books fully to our auditors.
Boeing: Eh, that's a trade secret, no can do
FAA: Your choice, the TC for the affected aircraft type is herewith withdrawn until such time you present the numbers

2 second later
Boeing: Hi FAA, here are the numbers. It's x,x million per aircraft
FAA: Thank you, and how many with non-conforming parts did you deliver despite knowing of the non-conformity?
Boeing: Eh, we don't know, can't say for sure, it's highly complex, yada yada yada
FAA: Your choice, the TC remains suspended

1 second later
Boeing: 83 is being the number
FAA: Excellent. The fine is 2 times X,X millions times the number of aircraft delivered. TC will be reinstated when you've paid
Boeing: We'll appeal and sue!
FAA: That's your choice, the TC remains suspended
Boeing: Where would you like us to transfer the funds too?
FAA: Our usual account, thanks. Now, for the other part
Boeing: The other part, but, but, but how about the TC
FAA: In a minute. Now give us the names of every single employee involved in the decision process leading up to you delivering non-conforming aircraft
Boeing: All of them?
FAA: Indeed, and your org. chart as it was when this went down
Boeing: Org chart?
FAA: Of course, we need to get to the top of this. Someone's going to have a day in court, we'd like to know who it was
Boeing: Sh1t
FAA: Quite right, you fracked it up good and well and that comes with consequences. Names, please
Boeing: Here's the file
FAA: Thank you very much, the TC has been reinstated, see you in a criminal court of law


You're hilarious. No regulator in any country operates or has ever operated this way, and with good reason: you'd kill the industry over the tiniest mistakes.

The FAA as positioned is just fine, and the EASA is equally chummy/in bed with Airbus, so this idea of it being a Boeing-only problem or American-only problem really needs to be put to bed. If we had held Airbus to the same standards to ground a type after every crash, the A330 program would have killed itself. Yet, everyone is saying Boeing should have voluntarily grounded the 737 MAX after the Lion Air crash. Then we had several (and many of them the same) A.netters saying the 737 NG should be grounded worldwide over the pickle fork issue.

Regulators do not exist to put firms out of business. That's for the market to do. Regulators exist to establish rules, guide firms in compliance, and be impartial in disputes among competing firms.

Furthermore, you represent your theoretical case as if it's cut and dry, which this most certainly is not, and most cases aren't.

The market is entirely self-regulating in terms of Boeing's sales. The MAX disaster has affected sales for all of their types, so their motivation to do better is enormous. You don't need the regulator being unduly vindictive. Again, if we held the EASA and Airbus to that standard, Airbus would have gone bankrupt at least twice.


If it happend like told in the news, than we do not talk about a tiny mistake, but an obvious criminal act. It is just that the USA justice system is quite active in regards to foreign companies, but very passive in regards to USA companies.

I get a bit tired with this because the FAA is in bed with Boeing, EASA has to be in bed with Airbus too. Put up some proof or stop this nonsense talk.


The EASA allows large latitudes for self-certification and delegation as well. This is widely documented on leeham and other longstanding publications. Please quit drumming up sensationalist BS. It doesn't help the discussion or the tensions. If the FAA were in bed with Boeing, we would have seen them revoke the A330's certificate twice.

And this is not going to be found to be a crime or deliberate skirting of rules. Sensationalist mainstream news is more clickbait headlines than news. The JATR publications so far don't delve into culture in any substantive way other than to condemn it despite not providing ANY corroborating documentation to support the claims. And given the FAA and boeing have both taken substantive issue with almost 1/3 of the findings, I'm willing to bet it's political malfeasance on the part of JATR.
 
1989worstyear
Posts: 887
Joined: Sun Dec 04, 2016 6:53 pm

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Tue Dec 10, 2019 5:48 am

:shakehead: Not sure if this needs a new thread but I thought it was relevant:

https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/fo ... 7-n1098536

Aside from the typical msm sensationalism, this does not look good.
Stuck at age 15 thanks to the certification date of the A320-200 and my parents' decision to postpone having a kid by 3 years. At least there's Dignitas...
 
1989worstyear
Posts: 887
Joined: Sun Dec 04, 2016 6:53 pm

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Tue Dec 10, 2019 5:50 am

patrickjp93 wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:
patrickjp93 wrote:

You're hilarious. No regulator in any country operates or has ever operated this way, and with good reason: you'd kill the industry over the tiniest mistakes.

The FAA as positioned is just fine, and the EASA is equally chummy/in bed with Airbus, so this idea of it being a Boeing-only problem or American-only problem really needs to be put to bed. If we had held Airbus to the same standards to ground a type after every crash, the A330 program would have killed itself. Yet, everyone is saying Boeing should have voluntarily grounded the 737 MAX after the Lion Air crash. Then we had several (and many of them the same) A.netters saying the 737 NG should be grounded worldwide over the pickle fork issue.

Regulators do not exist to put firms out of business. That's for the market to do. Regulators exist to establish rules, guide firms in compliance, and be impartial in disputes among competing firms.

Furthermore, you represent your theoretical case as if it's cut and dry, which this most certainly is not, and most cases aren't.

The market is entirely self-regulating in terms of Boeing's sales. The MAX disaster has affected sales for all of their types, so their motivation to do better is enormous. You don't need the regulator being unduly vindictive. Again, if we held the EASA and Airbus to that standard, Airbus would have gone bankrupt at least twice.


If it happend like told in the news, than we do not talk about a tiny mistake, but an obvious criminal act. It is just that the USA justice system is quite active in regards to foreign companies, but very passive in regards to USA companies.

I get a bit tired with this because the FAA is in bed with Boeing, EASA has to be in bed with Airbus too. Put up some proof or stop this nonsense talk.


The EASA allows large latitudes for self-certification and delegation as well. This is widely documented on leeham and other longstanding publications. Please quit drumming up sensationalist BS. It doesn't help the discussion or the tensions. If the FAA were in bed with Boeing, we would have seen them revoke the A330's certificate twice.

And this is not going to be found to be a crime or deliberate skirting of rules. Sensationalist mainstream news is more clickbait headlines than news. The JATR publications so far don't delve into culture in any substantive way other than to condemn it despite not providing ANY corroborating documentation to support the claims. And given the FAA and boeing have both taken substantive issue with almost 1/3 of the findings, I'm willing to bet it's political malfeasance on the part of JATR.


Why the 330?
Stuck at age 15 thanks to the certification date of the A320-200 and my parents' decision to postpone having a kid by 3 years. At least there's Dignitas...
 
virage
Posts: 50
Joined: Wed Dec 29, 2010 11:59 am

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Tue Dec 10, 2019 6:39 am

Not sure if Boeing's safety culture is suffering, but its safety philosophy is second to none.

In particular, natural-feeling controls are a big safety factor, frequently overlooked in this day and age. From that perspective Boeing is far ahead of competition.

Just ask any pilot to compare the ease of manual landing in severe crosswind with a yoke (Boeing) against a sidestick (Airbus). Twitching this Airbus wiener with your non-dominant hand is pretty miserable. A yoke is much safer as it's more intuitive, provides a natural feedback, and is invariant with respect to left-right hand dominance.
 
Some1Somewhere
Posts: 45
Joined: Thu Jun 25, 2015 2:22 pm

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Tue Dec 10, 2019 7:04 am

Oh god not that argument again.
 
mjoelnir
Posts: 9411
Joined: Sun Feb 03, 2013 11:06 pm

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Tue Dec 10, 2019 8:26 am

patrickjp93 wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:
patrickjp93 wrote:

You're hilarious. No regulator in any country operates or has ever operated this way, and with good reason: you'd kill the industry over the tiniest mistakes.

The FAA as positioned is just fine, and the EASA is equally chummy/in bed with Airbus, so this idea of it being a Boeing-only problem or American-only problem really needs to be put to bed. If we had held Airbus to the same standards to ground a type after every crash, the A330 program would have killed itself. Yet, everyone is saying Boeing should have voluntarily grounded the 737 MAX after the Lion Air crash. Then we had several (and many of them the same) A.netters saying the 737 NG should be grounded worldwide over the pickle fork issue.

Regulators do not exist to put firms out of business. That's for the market to do. Regulators exist to establish rules, guide firms in compliance, and be impartial in disputes among competing firms.

Furthermore, you represent your theoretical case as if it's cut and dry, which this most certainly is not, and most cases aren't.

The market is entirely self-regulating in terms of Boeing's sales. The MAX disaster has affected sales for all of their types, so their motivation to do better is enormous. You don't need the regulator being unduly vindictive. Again, if we held the EASA and Airbus to that standard, Airbus would have gone bankrupt at least twice.


If it happend like told in the news, than we do not talk about a tiny mistake, but an obvious criminal act. It is just that the USA justice system is quite active in regards to foreign companies, but very passive in regards to USA companies.

I get a bit tired with this because the FAA is in bed with Boeing, EASA has to be in bed with Airbus too. Put up some proof or stop this nonsense talk.


The EASA allows large latitudes for self-certification and delegation as well. This is widely documented on leeham and other longstanding publications. Please quit drumming up sensationalist BS. It doesn't help the discussion or the tensions. If the FAA were in bed with Boeing, we would have seen them revoke the A330's certificate twice.


And what should have been for the FAA to revoke certificate. Has there perhaps been two crashes in a row that pointed to the frame as the reason and that twice?

patrickjp93 wrote:
And this is not going to be found to be a crime or deliberate skirting of rules. Sensationalist mainstream news is more clickbait headlines than news. The JATR publications so far don't delve into culture in any substantive way other than to condemn it despite not providing ANY corroborating documentation to support the claims. And given the FAA and boeing have both taken substantive issue with almost 1/3 of the findings, I'm willing to bet it's political malfeasance on the part of JATR.


So what do you call installing knowingly defect parts? And we talk about parts, that if they break, can provoke a crash.

Of course the perpetrator takes substantive issue with the findings, usually a criminal does. I do not see how the FAA takes substantive issue with its own findings, it is just that the fine is not appropriate to the crime, rather a patt on the hand.
 
patrickjp93
Posts: 648
Joined: Thu Aug 22, 2019 12:00 pm

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Tue Dec 10, 2019 4:57 pm

1989worstyear wrote:
patrickjp93 wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:

If it happend like told in the news, than we do not talk about a tiny mistake, but an obvious criminal act. It is just that the USA justice system is quite active in regards to foreign companies, but very passive in regards to USA companies.

I get a bit tired with this because the FAA is in bed with Boeing, EASA has to be in bed with Airbus too. Put up some proof or stop this nonsense talk.


The EASA allows large latitudes for self-certification and delegation as well. This is widely documented on leeham and other longstanding publications. Please quit drumming up sensationalist BS. It doesn't help the discussion or the tensions. If the FAA were in bed with Boeing, we would have seen them revoke the A330's certificate twice.

And this is not going to be found to be a crime or deliberate skirting of rules. Sensationalist mainstream news is more clickbait headlines than news. The JATR publications so far don't delve into culture in any substantive way other than to condemn it despite not providing ANY corroborating documentation to support the claims. And given the FAA and boeing have both taken substantive issue with almost 1/3 of the findings, I'm willing to bet it's political malfeasance on the part of JATR.


Why the 330?


4 different fatal crashes in its history, most notably the Air France once in Brazil.
 
patrickjp93
Posts: 648
Joined: Thu Aug 22, 2019 12:00 pm

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Tue Dec 10, 2019 5:00 pm

mjoelnir wrote:
patrickjp93 wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:

If it happend like told in the news, than we do not talk about a tiny mistake, but an obvious criminal act. It is just that the USA justice system is quite active in regards to foreign companies, but very passive in regards to USA companies.

I get a bit tired with this because the FAA is in bed with Boeing, EASA has to be in bed with Airbus too. Put up some proof or stop this nonsense talk.


The EASA allows large latitudes for self-certification and delegation as well. This is widely documented on leeham and other longstanding publications. Please quit drumming up sensationalist BS. It doesn't help the discussion or the tensions. If the FAA were in bed with Boeing, we would have seen them revoke the A330's certificate twice.


And what should have been for the FAA to revoke certificate. Has there perhaps been two crashes in a row that pointed to the frame as the reason and that twice?

patrickjp93 wrote:
And this is not going to be found to be a crime or deliberate skirting of rules. Sensationalist mainstream news is more clickbait headlines than news. The JATR publications so far don't delve into culture in any substantive way other than to condemn it despite not providing ANY corroborating documentation to support the claims. And given the FAA and boeing have both taken substantive issue with almost 1/3 of the findings, I'm willing to bet it's political malfeasance on the part of JATR.


So what do you call installing knowingly defect parts? And we talk about parts, that if they break, can provoke a crash.

Of course the perpetrator takes substantive issue with the findings, usually a criminal does. I do not see how the FAA takes substantive issue with its own findings, it is just that the fine is not appropriate to the crime, rather a patt on the hand.


Yes, 4 different fatal A330 crashes that were caused by wiring and then by shoddy flight computer software. Was it ever grounded? No. Should it have been? Maybe so.

Boeing did not knowingly install bad parts and the evidence saying they did is 2nd hand suggestion, not hard paperwork and email trails.
 
rbavfan
Posts: 3633
Joined: Fri Apr 17, 2015 5:53 am

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture

Tue Dec 10, 2019 5:30 pm

smartplane wrote:
Dutchy wrote:
>The United States Air Force has once again rejected taking delivery of new Boeing KC-46 Pegasus tanker jets after discovering foreign object debris (FOD) left inside the aircraft by Boeing workers.
>According to the USAF, its inspectors found tools and other debris inside the planes.
>This is the second time in a month the Air Force has halted delivery of the KC-46 for the same reason.
>Boeing delivered its first KC-46 tanker in January.


Is this systemic? The focus seems to be on making money and not on safety. On making money and not on engineering. On making spreadsheets work not on making aircraft work. Being proud at the bottomline, not proud on delivering a good product. Has it gone too far with Boeing?

The military have upped their inspection standards in relation to accepting purchases, increasingly hiring civil expertise. Part of the reason for this is they are leasing, or using composite military (Government) / civil funding.

While we may jest about certain ME3 airlines checking carpets and switching test engines, and another that discovered 'issues' with engines missed by previous customers (not all 'sand' related).

When the customer sets the bar high, guess whose aircraft get the most attention, compared to some customers who hardly bother with a CAF (and for example missed certain STS, AoA and MCAS warnings were not enabled).

Airlines and military, raise your acceptance standards for the benefit of crews and passengers, and OEM's are sure to follow.


There is a difference between missing something and the manufacturer, Boeing" not telling them it was there in the first palce. MCAS was hidden from most carriers & people died. Don't blame the carriers for something that was not coverd.
 
SEU
Posts: 282
Joined: Wed Mar 13, 2019 7:21 pm

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Tue Dec 10, 2019 11:32 pm

https://edition.cnn.com/2019/12/10/busi ... index.html

An email from a Senior manager of the Boeing 737 max program, emailed the CEO a while back stating the MAX was so dangerous, he wouldnt put his family on one, siting fatigued staff, schedule pressures and MCAS as the reasons

The MAX wont fly for a very long time imo. In a non capitalistic world, it would have been scrapped by now.
 
astuteman
Posts: 7184
Joined: Mon Jan 24, 2005 7:50 pm

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed Dec 11, 2019 7:45 am

smartplane wrote:
Boeing weren't well advised. Instead of being open with regulators and customers, senior management followed standard (not just at Boeing) corporate practice of deny, defend, divert and deflect..


Sorry, but I don't consider that to be standard corporate practice at all.

In the business I operate in (in the UK), and every other regulated business we come across we operate an openness bordering on paranoia with our regulatory community. It is the only way that we can build up the trust that we have to have in order to operate.

When we screw up (and we do), we fall on our swords in our efforts to be transparent

I have seen a number of posters claim that "Boeing will deny everything" because of the risk of litigation.
When my company was involved in a huge bribery scandal, we fell on our swords, and now have a code of conduct that is brutal to anyone found to be accepting bribes, even down to being taken out to dinner.
When Airbus became wrapped up in their bribery scandal, they did the same thing, and most of the BOD who existed back then have now gone.

It may be due to a difference in culture, but for me it is NEVER the right thing to try to hide corporate wrongdoing of any sort. The cost in terms of trust is just too high.

Just morphing into self-regulation for a second, those that criticise it don't understand the regulation process.
It is a fact of regulation. Period.
The Business HAS to have a major hand in the regulatory process - it owns the design, the justifications, and the analyses, and ultimately the Design Authority, which in the UK at least is a legal entity - the one who will be liable when things go wrong.
Without that, the regulator would end up being the design authority as well. Barmy.
THIS is the context in which that trust, built by openness, needs to be considered in.

Rgds
 
seb76
Posts: 79
Joined: Tue May 20, 2008 5:02 pm

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed Dec 11, 2019 8:03 am

patrickjp93 wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:
patrickjp93 wrote:

The EASA allows large latitudes for self-certification and delegation as well. This is widely documented on leeham and other longstanding publications. Please quit drumming up sensationalist BS. It doesn't help the discussion or the tensions. If the FAA were in bed with Boeing, we would have seen them revoke the A330's certificate twice.


And what should have been for the FAA to revoke certificate. Has there perhaps been two crashes in a row that pointed to the frame as the reason and that twice?

patrickjp93 wrote:
And this is not going to be found to be a crime or deliberate skirting of rules. Sensationalist mainstream news is more clickbait headlines than news. The JATR publications so far don't delve into culture in any substantive way other than to condemn it despite not providing ANY corroborating documentation to support the claims. And given the FAA and boeing have both taken substantive issue with almost 1/3 of the findings, I'm willing to bet it's political malfeasance on the part of JATR.


So what do you call installing knowingly defect parts? And we talk about parts, that if they break, can provoke a crash.

Of course the perpetrator takes substantive issue with the findings, usually a criminal does. I do not see how the FAA takes substantive issue with its own findings, it is just that the fine is not appropriate to the crime, rather a patt on the hand.


Yes, 4 different fatal A330 crashes that were caused by wiring and then by shoddy flight computer software. Was it ever grounded? No. Should it have been? Maybe so.

Boeing did not knowingly install bad parts and the evidence saying they did is 2nd hand suggestion, not hard paperwork and email trails.


Facts don't seem to matter that much on this forum it seems !
The A330 has only seen three fatal crashes, not 4. The first of them occurring during certification campaign.
The first fatal crash in commercial service came so late in the A330's career (AF crash) that the model was in the mean time already deemed statistically safe and it's exactly the same reason why the 777 was not grounded after the accident in London.

On the other hand, with it's short career, the Max has the statistics working against him.
 
Flyingsottsman
Posts: 801
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed Dec 11, 2019 8:12 am

Yes money/greed, took over swallowing up McDonald Douglas clearing the way to be the only plane maker against Airbus, and not having any idea of what to do next, cant think of a new design oh well lets stretch the 737 even more put some program in which proved deadly, blame the pilots of Ethiopian and Loin Air. Like any corporate company in the world we live it now its money/share holders first customer and service second. Just take a look at the Banks down here our farmers are in drought and the banks are still removing them from their farms because they cant pay. Money first above everything else, now the 737 Max has come back to bight them in the arse big time.
 
Sokes
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed Dec 11, 2019 9:43 am

In the CNN/ NBC links the whistleblower didn't mention the missing redundancy of the sensor which caused both crashes..
I generally miss anything concrete beside workers being overworked.
What is missing in information is made up in emotions:
“I cried a lot,” Pierson told NBC News. “I’m mad at myself because I felt like I could have done more.”
It reminds me of whistleblowers who predicted that B787 built in South Carolina are not safe.
Why can't the world be a little bit more autistic?
 
User avatar
Revelation
Posts: 24809
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed Dec 11, 2019 3:57 pm

Speaking of issues with safety culture:

Last spring, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) managers approved removing a key feature of the 787 Dreamliner wing that aimed to protect it in the event of a lightning strike.

Boeing’s design change, which reduces costs for the company and its airline customers, sped through despite firm objections raised by the agency’s own technical experts, who saw an increased risk of an explosion in the fuel tank inside the wing.

Ref: https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... -measures/

Another well written and if true impactful report by Dominic Gates. As above it suggests that FAA's engineers objected to changes being made to 787 lightening protection done by Boeing to reduce weight and cost and reduce the airline's maintenance burden.

The part that concerns me the most:

Thorson, propulsion technical project manager at the FAA, wrote that agency’s technical experts had discovered errors in the way Boeing had summed up the various risks of the lightning protection features and that with the removal of the foil “the fuel tank ignition threat … cannot be shown extremely improbable.”

Thorson estimated that if the math were corrected, the ignition risk “would be classified as potentially unsafe.”

He recommended that the FAA reject Boeing’s assertion that it complied with regulations “due to the amount of risk that the FAA would be accepting for fuel tank ignition due to lightning.”

Thorson also objected to the FAA delegating to Boeing itself a System Safety Assessment of the design change that was specific to the largest Dreamliner model, the 787-10, because of different details inside the wing.

He wrote that the rationale provided for this delegation of oversight was the FAA’s inability “to support the airplane delivery schedule.” The FAA’s approval of the design change for that specific model on June 28 allowed Boeing to go ahead next day and deliver a 787-10 in South Carolina to Dutch airline KLM.

The "errors in the way Boeing had summed up the various risks" thing seems to be a recurring theme:
It appears we may be seeing an epidemic of "fake math", along with schedule pressure potentially winning out over safety.

The ticking time bomb is if Gates's reporting is true the same lightening protection design change was adapted for 777x, thus if FAA mandates a change then the first set of 777x wings are not going to be compliant.

Note that the FAA's official position is:

FAA Administrator Dickson wrote to the committee on Friday insisting that “the design change had no unsafe features” and that the 787s produced since the removal of the copper foil from the wing skin are “currently safe to operate.”

Of course, "currently" is a curious choice of words. If FAA re-evaluates and changes its mind, there will be a bunch of 787s that will probably need new wings along with those 777x.
Wake up to find out that you are the eyes of the world
The heart has its beaches, its homeland and thoughts of its own
Wake now, discover that you are the song that the morning brings
The heart has its seasons, its evenings and songs of its own
 
FluidFlow
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Wed Dec 11, 2019 4:14 pm

Revelation wrote:
Speaking of issues with safety culture:

Last spring, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) managers approved removing a key feature of the 787 Dreamliner wing that aimed to protect it in the event of a lightning strike.

Boeing’s design change, which reduces costs for the company and its airline customers, sped through despite firm objections raised by the agency’s own technical experts, who saw an increased risk of an explosion in the fuel tank inside the wing.

Ref: https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... -measures/

Another well written and if true impactful report by Dominic Gates. As above it suggests that FAA's engineers objected to changes being made to 787 lightening protection done by Boeing to reduce weight and cost and reduce the airline's maintenance burden.

The part that concerns me the most:

Thorson, propulsion technical project manager at the FAA, wrote that agency’s technical experts had discovered errors in the way Boeing had summed up the various risks of the lightning protection features and that with the removal of the foil “the fuel tank ignition threat … cannot be shown extremely improbable.”

Thorson estimated that if the math were corrected, the ignition risk “would be classified as potentially unsafe.”

He recommended that the FAA reject Boeing’s assertion that it complied with regulations “due to the amount of risk that the FAA would be accepting for fuel tank ignition due to lightning.”

Thorson also objected to the FAA delegating to Boeing itself a System Safety Assessment of the design change that was specific to the largest Dreamliner model, the 787-10, because of different details inside the wing.

He wrote that the rationale provided for this delegation of oversight was the FAA’s inability “to support the airplane delivery schedule.” The FAA’s approval of the design change for that specific model on June 28 allowed Boeing to go ahead next day and deliver a 787-10 in South Carolina to Dutch airline KLM.

The "errors in the way Boeing had summed up the various risks" thing seems to be a recurring theme:
It appears we may be seeing an epidemic of "fake math", along with schedule pressure potentially winning out over safety.

The ticking time bomb is if Gates's reporting is true the same lightening protection design change was adapted for 777x, thus if FAA mandates a change then the first set of 777x wings are not going to be compliant.

Note that the FAA's official position is:

FAA Administrator Dickson wrote to the committee on Friday insisting that “the design change had no unsafe features” and that the 787s produced since the removal of the copper foil from the wing skin are “currently safe to operate.”

Of course, "currently" is a curious choice of words. If FAA re-evaluates and changes its mind, there will be a bunch of 787s that will probably need new wings along with those 777x.


/sarcasm on It is safe as long as none of the mentioned models explodes mid-air due to possible lightning strike. Could never happen or tomorrow. It is a classical cost/return vs risk gamble every business does on daily basis.

And then there is always the possible way of deflection. Stray rocket, terrorism, etc. /sarcasm off
 
checklist350
Posts: 49
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Thu Dec 12, 2019 12:58 am

Revelation wrote:
Speaking of issues with safety culture:

Last spring, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) managers approved removing a key feature of the 787 Dreamliner wing that aimed to protect it in the event of a lightning strike.

Boeing’s design change, which reduces costs for the company and its airline customers, sped through despite firm objections raised by the agency’s own technical experts, who saw an increased risk of an explosion in the fuel tank inside the wing.

Ref: https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... -measures/

Another well written and if true impactful report by Dominic Gates. As above it suggests that FAA's engineers objected to changes being made to 787 lightening protection done by Boeing to reduce weight and cost and reduce the airline's maintenance burden.

The part that concerns me the most:

Thorson, propulsion technical project manager at the FAA, wrote that agency’s technical experts had discovered errors in the way Boeing had summed up the various risks of the lightning protection features and that with the removal of the foil “the fuel tank ignition threat … cannot be shown extremely improbable.”

Thorson estimated that if the math were corrected, the ignition risk “would be classified as potentially unsafe.”

He recommended that the FAA reject Boeing’s assertion that it complied with regulations “due to the amount of risk that the FAA would be accepting for fuel tank ignition due to lightning.”

Thorson also objected to the FAA delegating to Boeing itself a System Safety Assessment of the design change that was specific to the largest Dreamliner model, the 787-10, because of different details inside the wing.

He wrote that the rationale provided for this delegation of oversight was the FAA’s inability “to support the airplane delivery schedule.” The FAA’s approval of the design change for that specific model on June 28 allowed Boeing to go ahead next day and deliver a 787-10 in South Carolina to Dutch airline KLM.

The "errors in the way Boeing had summed up the various risks" thing seems to be a recurring theme:
It appears we may be seeing an epidemic of "fake math", along with schedule pressure potentially winning out over safety.

The ticking time bomb is if Gates's reporting is true the same lightening protection design change was adapted for 777x, thus if FAA mandates a change then the first set of 777x wings are not going to be compliant.

Note that the FAA's official position is:

FAA Administrator Dickson wrote to the committee on Friday insisting that “the design change had no unsafe features” and that the 787s produced since the removal of the copper foil from the wing skin are “currently safe to operate.”

Of course, "currently" is a curious choice of words. If FAA re-evaluates and changes its mind, there will be a bunch of 787s that will probably need new wings along with those 777x.


Excellent post. I've nothing to add but reiterate there seems to be a recurring theme where Boeing both games the risk assessment and strongarms the FAA into accepting a 'fait accompli' by steaming ahead with what is basically non-compliant production. Seems this was their intended solution / path for the MAX RTS as well until recently.

The FAA maintains the measures were compliant to existing regulations but if the report holds any truth this is another devestating blow to the reputation of the FAA.

I'm curious how the new risk assessment will turn out but given the financial consequences for Boeing this is akin to asking someone to risk assess themselves for a possible amputation. It seems to me the regulator needs to be the one in charge of the risk assessment.
 
patrickjp93
Posts: 648
Joined: Thu Aug 22, 2019 12:00 pm

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Thu Dec 12, 2019 3:37 am

Revelation wrote:
Speaking of issues with safety culture:

Last spring, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) managers approved removing a key feature of the 787 Dreamliner wing that aimed to protect it in the event of a lightning strike.

Boeing’s design change, which reduces costs for the company and its airline customers, sped through despite firm objections raised by the agency’s own technical experts, who saw an increased risk of an explosion in the fuel tank inside the wing.

Ref: https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... -measures/

Another well written and if true impactful report by Dominic Gates. As above it suggests that FAA's engineers objected to changes being made to 787 lightening protection done by Boeing to reduce weight and cost and reduce the airline's maintenance burden.

The part that concerns me the most:

Thorson, propulsion technical project manager at the FAA, wrote that agency’s technical experts had discovered errors in the way Boeing had summed up the various risks of the lightning protection features and that with the removal of the foil “the fuel tank ignition threat … cannot be shown extremely improbable.”

Thorson estimated that if the math were corrected, the ignition risk “would be classified as potentially unsafe.”

He recommended that the FAA reject Boeing’s assertion that it complied with regulations “due to the amount of risk that the FAA would be accepting for fuel tank ignition due to lightning.”

Thorson also objected to the FAA delegating to Boeing itself a System Safety Assessment of the design change that was specific to the largest Dreamliner model, the 787-10, because of different details inside the wing.

He wrote that the rationale provided for this delegation of oversight was the FAA’s inability “to support the airplane delivery schedule.” The FAA’s approval of the design change for that specific model on June 28 allowed Boeing to go ahead next day and deliver a 787-10 in South Carolina to Dutch airline KLM.

The "errors in the way Boeing had summed up the various risks" thing seems to be a recurring theme:
It appears we may be seeing an epidemic of "fake math", along with schedule pressure potentially winning out over safety.

The ticking time bomb is if Gates's reporting is true the same lightening protection design change was adapted for 777x, thus if FAA mandates a change then the first set of 777x wings are not going to be compliant.

Note that the FAA's official position is:

FAA Administrator Dickson wrote to the committee on Friday insisting that “the design change had no unsafe features” and that the 787s produced since the removal of the copper foil from the wing skin are “currently safe to operate.”

Of course, "currently" is a curious choice of words. If FAA re-evaluates and changes its mind, there will be a bunch of 787s that will probably need new wings along with those 777x.

Given we don't have access to the raw documents, I don't believe any arguments over mathematics and risk analysis that I can't dive into the figures on. Generally speaking a metal wing is already a Faraday cage and doesn't require a secondary inner foil for this reason. If Boeing can prove the efficacy of their carbon fiber construction to the same degree, given carbon fiber is highly conductive and thus ideal for making cages from, then I don't see the issue with their design choice.

And given you have to atomize Kerosine first for it to ignite, the only way a lightning strike could do this is if you had a catastrophic mechanical failure within the wing to begin with. What exactly is there to fail in the main span apart from the de-icing system, bleed-air pipes, and the electric pressurization turbines? The fuel pumps are far away from any source of Oxygen.

What risk scenario would that require? A pre-punctured wing gets struck by lightning right at the puncture site, producing a rapid expansion of air, tossing droplets into the superheated Oxygen, and then igniting from there? Beyond this, the fuel tanks of the 787 are filled with Nitrogen and CO2 filtered from the outside air as fuel is consumed, so where's the ignition risk?
 
FluidFlow
Posts: 743
Joined: Wed Apr 10, 2019 6:39 am

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Thu Dec 12, 2019 6:43 am

patrickjp93 wrote:
[...] vs. the A330, and there were 4, including the certification flight.


Please try not to spread lies and check your facts before posting. There were three fatal crashes:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Airbus_Industrie_Flight_129
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afriqiyah_Airways_Flight_771

There were two more serious incidents but they were no crashes:

Turkish Airlines Flight 726 and Qantas 72

Your mysterious fourth crash must have happened in the Twilight Zone

Also statements like:

Generally speaking a metal wing is already a Faraday cage and doesn't require a secondary inner foil for this reason.


do not help a safety analysis nor a risk assessment nor anything because:

Generally speaking does not help nor support individual cases at all. Physics does not live from general speaking it is a precise (at least as precise as possible with today's knowledge) science and there are multiple reasons certain forms and shapes of certain metals/materials are not optimal for use as a Faraday cage especially in a lighting strike situation. A metal barrel filled with gasoline on top of a 100m metal pole also acts as a Faraday cage and in theory protects the gasoline from ignition but it is not a safe storage for gasoline during a lightning strike.
 
patrickjp93
Posts: 648
Joined: Thu Aug 22, 2019 12:00 pm

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Thu Dec 12, 2019 1:34 pm

FluidFlow wrote:
patrickjp93 wrote:
[...] vs. the A330, and there were 4, including the certification flight.


Please try not to spread lies and check your facts before posting. There were three fatal crashes:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Airbus_Industrie_Flight_129
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afriqiyah_Airways_Flight_771

There were two more serious incidents but they were no crashes:

Turkish Airlines Flight 726 and Qantas 72

Your mysterious fourth crash must have happened in the Twilight Zone

Also statements like:

Generally speaking a metal wing is already a Faraday cage and doesn't require a secondary inner foil for this reason.


do not help a safety analysis nor a risk assessment nor anything because:

Generally speaking does not help nor support individual cases at all. Physics does not live from general speaking it is a precise (at least as precise as possible with today's knowledge) science and there are multiple reasons certain forms and shapes of certain metals/materials are not optimal for use as a Faraday cage especially in a lighting strike situation. A metal barrel filled with gasoline on top of a 100m metal pole also acts as a Faraday cage and in theory protects the gasoline from ignition but it is not a safe storage for gasoline during a lightning strike.


Gasoline is highly volatile whereas Kerosine is not. And when I say generally speaking, I mean every metal wing certified since the A330 is required to be, so really...
 
FluidFlow
Posts: 743
Joined: Wed Apr 10, 2019 6:39 am

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Thu Dec 12, 2019 2:03 pm

patrickjp93 wrote:
FluidFlow wrote:
patrickjp93 wrote:
[...] vs. the A330, and there were 4, including the certification flight.


Please try not to spread lies and check your facts before posting. There were three fatal crashes:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Airbus_Industrie_Flight_129
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afriqiyah_Airways_Flight_771

There were two more serious incidents but they were no crashes:

Turkish Airlines Flight 726 and Qantas 72

Your mysterious fourth crash must have happened in the Twilight Zone

Also statements like:

Generally speaking a metal wing is already a Faraday cage and doesn't require a secondary inner foil for this reason.


do not help a safety analysis nor a risk assessment nor anything because:

Generally speaking does not help nor support individual cases at all. Physics does not live from general speaking it is a precise (at least as precise as possible with today's knowledge) science and there are multiple reasons certain forms and shapes of certain metals/materials are not optimal for use as a Faraday cage especially in a lighting strike situation. A metal barrel filled with gasoline on top of a 100m metal pole also acts as a Faraday cage and in theory protects the gasoline from ignition but it is not a safe storage for gasoline during a lightning strike.


Gasoline is highly volatile whereas Kerosine is not. And when I say generally speaking, I mean every metal wing certified since the A330 is required to be, so really...


Yeah but the 787 and 77X do not have a "generally speaking" metal wing as their wing is not metal.

Also even though Kerosine is not as volatile as gasoline it is still necessary to avoid and prevent any source producing a spark inside the fuel tank, especially the emptier said tank is.

The moment the overall resistance of the direct path through liquid/gas mixture inside the fuel tank is approximately above 10% of the resistance of the path along the tank you risk a spark inside the tank. This can be precisely measured if you know all the parameters and all of them are known. So if you need to add coating to the tank to lower the resistance below the mandated threshold you better do it.
 
patrickjp93
Posts: 648
Joined: Thu Aug 22, 2019 12:00 pm

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Thu Dec 12, 2019 2:14 pm

FluidFlow wrote:
patrickjp93 wrote:
FluidFlow wrote:

Please try not to spread lies and check your facts before posting. There were three fatal crashes:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Airbus_Industrie_Flight_129
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afriqiyah_Airways_Flight_771

There were two more serious incidents but they were no crashes:

Turkish Airlines Flight 726 and Qantas 72

Your mysterious fourth crash must have happened in the Twilight Zone

Also statements like:



do not help a safety analysis nor a risk assessment nor anything because:

Generally speaking does not help nor support individual cases at all. Physics does not live from general speaking it is a precise (at least as precise as possible with today's knowledge) science and there are multiple reasons certain forms and shapes of certain metals/materials are not optimal for use as a Faraday cage especially in a lighting strike situation. A metal barrel filled with gasoline on top of a 100m metal pole also acts as a Faraday cage and in theory protects the gasoline from ignition but it is not a safe storage for gasoline during a lightning strike.


Gasoline is highly volatile whereas Kerosine is not. And when I say generally speaking, I mean every metal wing certified since the A330 is required to be, so really...


Yeah but the 787 and 77X do not have a "generally speaking" metal wing as their wing is not metal.

Also even though Kerosine is not as volatile as gasoline it is still necessary to avoid and prevent any source producing a spark inside the fuel tank, especially the emptier said tank is.

The moment the overall resistance of the direct path through liquid/gas mixture inside the fuel tank is approximately above 10% of the resistance of the path along the tank you risk a spark inside the tank. This can be precisely measured if you know all the parameters and all of them are known. So if you need to add coating to the tank to lower the resistance below the mandated threshold you better do it.

Like I said that's still not necessary. The design of the 787 and 777X wings and their maintenance systems is such you can't get enough Oxygen inside to facilitate ignition without puncturing the wing. Nitrogen gas and CO2 do not combust even at the voltages provided by lightning. The FAA engineer is behind on the technological capability if this is their concern. The A350 has the same tech and is certified under a different set of rules specifically because of this. The foil's unnecessary imho if there's no way to ignite the fuel anyway. It's at the point of requiring an act of God. Let it go.
 
FluidFlow
Posts: 743
Joined: Wed Apr 10, 2019 6:39 am

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Thu Dec 12, 2019 2:26 pm

patrickjp93 wrote:
FluidFlow wrote:
patrickjp93 wrote:

Gasoline is highly volatile whereas Kerosine is not. And when I say generally speaking, I mean every metal wing certified since the A330 is required to be, so really...


Yeah but the 787 and 77X do not have a "generally speaking" metal wing as their wing is not metal.

Also even though Kerosine is not as volatile as gasoline it is still necessary to avoid and prevent any source producing a spark inside the fuel tank, especially the emptier said tank is.

The moment the overall resistance of the direct path through liquid/gas mixture inside the fuel tank is approximately above 10% of the resistance of the path along the tank you risk a spark inside the tank. This can be precisely measured if you know all the parameters and all of them are known. So if you need to add coating to the tank to lower the resistance below the mandated threshold you better do it.

Like I said that's still not necessary. The design of the 787 and 777X wings and their maintenance systems is such you can't get enough Oxygen inside to facilitate ignition without puncturing the wing. Nitrogen gas and CO2 do not combust even at the voltages provided by lightning. The FAA engineer is behind on the technological capability if this is their concern. The A350 has the same tech and is certified under a different set of rules specifically because of this. The foil's unnecessary imho if there's no way to ignite the fuel anyway. It's at the point of requiring an act of God. Let it go.


I do not care actually it is parts of the FAA that does, the one agency that should know what they are doing. According to you they do not. And if you are right then congratulations to you and sorry to everyone that ever thought the FAA has any credibility.
 
Ferroviarius
Posts: 257
Joined: Sun Mar 11, 2007 3:28 am

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Thu Dec 12, 2019 2:39 pm

Dutchy wrote:
...
Is this systemic? The focus seems to be on making money and not on safety. On making money and not on engineering. On making spreadsheets work not on making aircraft work. Being proud at the bottomline, not proud on delivering a good product. Has it gone too far with Boeing?

Disclaimer: I do not want to trash Boeing, but it seems to me that Boeing suffers from a decease where large companies suffer from, just profit maximisation, not optimisation.
...


I think it is systemic, but it is not a Boeing-only issue, it is a world issue.
I fear it started when the "pursuit of happiness" was declared to be an undeniable human right. Happiness is made by a set of hormones in our body. "Global happiness" is made when some 10% of the global population are happy and have the means to get the rest suppressed.
"Happiness" means deciding by "gut feeling" not by brain.
I am a physicist - including PhD by KTH in Stockholm - and know that it is impossible to view future. So, many conclude that it then would not be possible to decide on what is going to shape future by "knowledge". They claim, one must use the "gut feeling".
I assume personally that it would be better to sacrifice economy rather than the planet.
But if even companies sacrifice safety for economy, then this is just one indicator on how bad the situation really is.
I am not sure whether it would be better to be pessimistic and accept economic decline thus making sure the world will be safer from nature disaster, rather than being optimistic and assuming that "we will be able to do it, let's go on and fight"!
Pax et Bonum,
Ferroviarius
 
patrickjp93
Posts: 648
Joined: Thu Aug 22, 2019 12:00 pm

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Thu Dec 12, 2019 2:45 pm

FluidFlow wrote:
patrickjp93 wrote:
FluidFlow wrote:

Yeah but the 787 and 77X do not have a "generally speaking" metal wing as their wing is not metal.

Also even though Kerosine is not as volatile as gasoline it is still necessary to avoid and prevent any source producing a spark inside the fuel tank, especially the emptier said tank is.

The moment the overall resistance of the direct path through liquid/gas mixture inside the fuel tank is approximately above 10% of the resistance of the path along the tank you risk a spark inside the tank. This can be precisely measured if you know all the parameters and all of them are known. So if you need to add coating to the tank to lower the resistance below the mandated threshold you better do it.

Like I said that's still not necessary. The design of the 787 and 777X wings and their maintenance systems is such you can't get enough Oxygen inside to facilitate ignition without puncturing the wing. Nitrogen gas and CO2 do not combust even at the voltages provided by lightning. The FAA engineer is behind on the technological capability if this is their concern. The A350 has the same tech and is certified under a different set of rules specifically because of this. The foil's unnecessary imho if there's no way to ignite the fuel anyway. It's at the point of requiring an act of God. Let it go.


I do not care actually it is parts of the FAA that does, the one agency that should know what they are doing. According to you they do not. And if you are right then congratulations to you and sorry to everyone that ever thought the FAA has any credibility.


Just because you have the 20 very best engineers in the world working on a project will not give you a successful project. Collective stupidity is a thing. You can make a team dumber by adding smart people to it. The software engineering world is incredibly familiar with this. As an engineer myself, and in fact as someone with knowledge of physics and a working brain, I am well within my rights to question engineering decisions and argue their merits.

On a factual basis, no available Oxygen means hydrocarbons cannot ignite in on-world conditions. In the Sun, sure, because you can ionize Oxygen freely from the available plasma, but on Earth, not without being in a fusion reactor. So again I ask you to use your brain to interrogate the FAA's concern and concede that Boeing might have knowledge the FAA doesn't, or at least is applying it in ways the FAA didn't (properly) consider.

Welcome to engineering. Everyone can be experts on their own domains and miss something trivial in anyone else's in the same group discussion.
 
rheinwaldner
Posts: 1865
Joined: Wed Jan 02, 2008 4:58 pm

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Thu Dec 12, 2019 2:51 pm

patrickjp93 wrote:
Just because a plane crashes early in its career does not mean it is unsafe. If I build 1000 planes and they all server 99% of their expected lifetime and then all suddenly crash on the same day just shy of their designed spec, then that's a statistically unsafe airplane that failed spec and never should have been flying.

That is rubish. Looking at fatalities per RPK or crashes per flight (two methods which largely correlate) are established methods, to judge the safety of aircraft types and operations.

- Worldwide aviation nowadays: <100 fatalities per RPK (= benchmark)
- A330 two years after EIS: 0 fatalities per RPK
- A330 15 years after EIS, right after the first crash with passengers: ~60 fatalities per RPK
- MAX two years after EIS: 4550 fatalities per RPK

So the A330 absolutely is in the range of expectancy and does not differ in any meaningful way from the global benchmark.

The MAX on the other hand shows the characteristics of a seriously flawed aircraft and has a safety record which we were not used to anymore since the 1960s.

In particular bad is (unprecedented since the Comet), that two crashes happened within a short time, which need to be attributed to the same technical system failure.

Therefore the statistics clearly show how bad the MAX is designed and comparing it with the A330 is just a red herring and indicates a serious lack of understanding.

patrickjp93 wrote:
For someone caring so much about "facts" you don't seem to know what "statistically safe" means, and nor do you have any understanding of statistics or probability. All planes have a designed mean time between crashes.

Which by Boeings safety culture in case of the MAX turned out 260 times worse than the other planes.
Many things are difficult, all things are possible!
 
frmrCapCadet
Posts: 4423
Joined: Thu May 29, 2008 8:24 pm

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Thu Dec 12, 2019 3:02 pm

Happiness for an enlightenment person and for philosophers is distinct from pleasure. For an extended discussion see:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/happiness/

Also keep in mind that cognitive science does not see human reason functioning without a reasonably emotional effective component. Just how humans evolved thinking, social existence, and various other skills may be as ultimate/basic a science as physics.
Buffet: the airline business...has eaten up capital...like..no other (business)
 
TObound
Posts: 785
Joined: Mon May 27, 2019 12:54 am

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Thu Dec 12, 2019 3:03 pm

Revelation wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:
Quote: Boeing “failed to adequately oversee its suppliers,” then presented the resulting planes to the FAA as safe despite those known problems, according to the allegations. Boeing gave those safety assurances on paperwork required for planes to fly in the United States, on export certificates, and in one case a statement that the planes conformed with military requirements, the FAA alleges.

This is the kind of thing that if shown to be true will get people fined and even thrown in jail ala Dieselgate. It'll be interesting to watch this unfold. It doesn't seem to have the same kind of "plausible deniability" that MCAS has been able to keep intact. The paperwork is there to establish accountability, and if the paperwork presents a falsehood, the people involved should be fined and/or jailed based on what the law allows.


I sincerely hope some of Boeing's management and senior leadership ends up in prison. If they don't nothing at all will change and we'll definitely be back here in a decade.

Not just Boeing either. The FAA was complicit too. Too bad they don't normally prosecute regulators.

I'd definitely be worried about the 777X being certified under the same lax regime. And I am going to guess that some airlines are thinking the same thing too.
 
FluidFlow
Posts: 743
Joined: Wed Apr 10, 2019 6:39 am

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Thu Dec 12, 2019 3:03 pm

patrickjp93 wrote:
FluidFlow wrote:
patrickjp93 wrote:
Like I said that's still not necessary. The design of the 787 and 777X wings and their maintenance systems is such you can't get enough Oxygen inside to facilitate ignition without puncturing the wing. Nitrogen gas and CO2 do not combust even at the voltages provided by lightning. The FAA engineer is behind on the technological capability if this is their concern. The A350 has the same tech and is certified under a different set of rules specifically because of this. The foil's unnecessary imho if there's no way to ignite the fuel anyway. It's at the point of requiring an act of God. Let it go.


I do not care actually it is parts of the FAA that does, the one agency that should know what they are doing. According to you they do not. And if you are right then congratulations to you and sorry to everyone that ever thought the FAA has any credibility.


Just because you have the 20 very best engineers in the world working on a project will not give you a successful project. Collective stupidity is a thing. You can make a team dumber by adding smart people to it. The software engineering world is incredibly familiar with this. As an engineer myself, and in fact as someone with knowledge of physics and a working brain, I am well within my rights to question engineering decisions and argue their merits.

On a factual basis, no available Oxygen means hydrocarbons cannot ignite in on-world conditions. In the Sun, sure, because you can ionize Oxygen freely from the available plasma, but on Earth, not without being in a fusion reactor. So again I ask you to use your brain to interrogate the FAA's concern and concede that Boeing might have knowledge the FAA doesn't, or at least is applying it in ways the FAA didn't (properly) consider.

Welcome to engineering. Everyone can be experts on their own domains and miss something trivial in anyone else's in the same group discussion.


That is a very limited view and as an engineer you should know that. If you only look at one condition and one case only you can design something to perfection. There are tho a lot of cases to be taken into account.

The fuel tank has an unknown puncture
A mistake was made during refueling and there is now oxygen in the tank

As long as you can not guarantee that there is never oxygen in the tank you need to account for the possibility so you also reduce the chance of a spark.

So as long as we do not know the assumptions behind the reasoning of the FAA we can only speculate and for now we trust the official source that steps forward and presents everyone with facts so to quote you

I ask you to use your brain


and take every possibility into account before judging a ruling made by a person and not by a nobody on the internet like me and you.
 
patrickjp93
Posts: 648
Joined: Thu Aug 22, 2019 12:00 pm

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Thu Dec 12, 2019 3:04 pm

rheinwaldner wrote:
patrickjp93 wrote:
Just because a plane crashes early in its career does not mean it is unsafe. If I build 1000 planes and they all server 99% of their expected lifetime and then all suddenly crash on the same day just shy of their designed spec, then that's a statistically unsafe airplane that failed spec and never should have been flying.

That is rubish. Looking at fatalities per RPK or crashes per flight (two methods which largely correlate) are established methods, to judge the safety of aircraft types and operations.

- Worldwide aviation nowadays: <100 fatalities per RPK (= benchmark)
- A330 two years after EIS: 0 fatalities per RPK
- A330 15 years after EIS, right after the first crash with passengers: ~60 fatalities per RPK
- MAX two years after EIS: 4550 fatalities per RPK

So the A330 absolutely is in the range of expectancy and does not differ in any meaningful way from the global benchmark.

The MAX on the other hand shows the characteristics of a seriously flawed aircraft and has a safety record which we were not used to anymore since the 1960s.

In particular bad is (unprecedented since the Comet), that two crashes happened within a short time, which need to be attributed to the same technical system failure.

Therefore the statistics clearly show how bad the MAX is designed and comparing it with the A330 is just a red herring indicating a serious lack of understanding.

patrickjp93 wrote:
For someone caring so much about "facts" you don't seem to know what "statistically safe" means, and nor do you have any understanding of statistics or probability. All planes have a designed mean time between crashes.

Which by Boeings safety culture in case of the MAX turned out 260 times worse than the other planes.

So selectively use high noise to signal statistical accounting methods when we have a very low sample size... Right... That's called actuarial malpractice.

What I said is not rubbish in the slightest. If you are disciplined about math and stats, when you actually take all of your emotional investment out of the outcomes, you wind up with some very sociopathic results, but reality is reality. And a benchmark is just a line everyone's comfortable with. If the Qantas A380 had crashed from its engine explosion, then by your standards the type should have been grounded worldwide, even though the reality is it has otherwise met all spec. You can have a crazy fluke early in an aircraft's life despite it being perfectly safe. This is actually why Boeing was perfectly justified to write off the Lion Air crash and why the FAA was as well. Lion Air was a known bad actor on safety and maintenance. Ethiopian, though less so, was by no means among the top 30 safest airlines either and was known to push their ground staff in conditions that would not be lawful in Europe, the U.S., Japan, Singapore, or Australia.

So the benchmark itself is actually worthless when the sample size is so small to compare it to, and especially with other mitigating factors at play. Welcome to the imprecision of everything human. And welcome to why patience is a virtue rather than a vice.

And so far we don't have ET602 attributed to the same technical failure. That jury is still out.
 
patrickjp93
Posts: 648
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Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Thu Dec 12, 2019 3:08 pm

FluidFlow wrote:
patrickjp93 wrote:
FluidFlow wrote:

I do not care actually it is parts of the FAA that does, the one agency that should know what they are doing. According to you they do not. And if you are right then congratulations to you and sorry to everyone that ever thought the FAA has any credibility.


Just because you have the 20 very best engineers in the world working on a project will not give you a successful project. Collective stupidity is a thing. You can make a team dumber by adding smart people to it. The software engineering world is incredibly familiar with this. As an engineer myself, and in fact as someone with knowledge of physics and a working brain, I am well within my rights to question engineering decisions and argue their merits.

On a factual basis, no available Oxygen means hydrocarbons cannot ignite in on-world conditions. In the Sun, sure, because you can ionize Oxygen freely from the available plasma, but on Earth, not without being in a fusion reactor. So again I ask you to use your brain to interrogate the FAA's concern and concede that Boeing might have knowledge the FAA doesn't, or at least is applying it in ways the FAA didn't (properly) consider.

Welcome to engineering. Everyone can be experts on their own domains and miss something trivial in anyone else's in the same group discussion.


That is a very limited view and as an engineer you should know that. If you only look at one condition and one case only you can design something to perfection. There are tho a lot of cases to be taken into account.

The fuel tank has an unknown puncture
A mistake was made during refueling and there is now oxygen in the tank

As long as you can not guarantee that there is never oxygen in the tank you need to account for the possibility so you also reduce the chance of a spark.

So as long as we do not know the assumptions behind the reasoning of the FAA we can only speculate and for now we trust the official source that steps forward and presents everyone with facts so to quote you

I ask you to use your brain


and take every possibility into account before judging a ruling made by a person and not by a nobody on the internet like me and you.


It's not a limited view at all. It's a simplified summary. We already have detection systems for leftover Oxygen in the tanks after a refueling. And a puncture would be detected upon tank pressurization (used to mitigate the bending moments along the spar).

So yes, you can be guaranteed Oxygen is not in the tank in any significant volume without an act of God midair. Those mitigation systems are robust and exist both in the A350 and B787, so if the FAA is concerned over this, they better be willing to yank the A350 certification.

I'm judging the ruling because I am capable of doing so. Skeptics are a good thing. Show me the proof, because I'm not stupid.
 
FluidFlow
Posts: 743
Joined: Wed Apr 10, 2019 6:39 am

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Thu Dec 12, 2019 3:17 pm

patrickjp93 wrote:
FluidFlow wrote:
patrickjp93 wrote:

Just because you have the 20 very best engineers in the world working on a project will not give you a successful project. Collective stupidity is a thing. You can make a team dumber by adding smart people to it. The software engineering world is incredibly familiar with this. As an engineer myself, and in fact as someone with knowledge of physics and a working brain, I am well within my rights to question engineering decisions and argue their merits.

On a factual basis, no available Oxygen means hydrocarbons cannot ignite in on-world conditions. In the Sun, sure, because you can ionize Oxygen freely from the available plasma, but on Earth, not without being in a fusion reactor. So again I ask you to use your brain to interrogate the FAA's concern and concede that Boeing might have knowledge the FAA doesn't, or at least is applying it in ways the FAA didn't (properly) consider.

Welcome to engineering. Everyone can be experts on their own domains and miss something trivial in anyone else's in the same group discussion.


That is a very limited view and as an engineer you should know that. If you only look at one condition and one case only you can design something to perfection. There are tho a lot of cases to be taken into account.

The fuel tank has an unknown puncture
A mistake was made during refueling and there is now oxygen in the tank

As long as you can not guarantee that there is never oxygen in the tank you need to account for the possibility so you also reduce the chance of a spark.

So as long as we do not know the assumptions behind the reasoning of the FAA we can only speculate and for now we trust the official source that steps forward and presents everyone with facts so to quote you

I ask you to use your brain


and take every possibility into account before judging a ruling made by a person and not by a nobody on the internet like me and you.


It's not a limited view at all. It's a simplified summary. We already have detection systems for leftover Oxygen in the tanks after a refueling. And a puncture would be detected upon tank pressurization (used to mitigate the bending moments along the spar).

So yes, you can be guaranteed Oxygen is not in the tank in any significant volume without an act of God midair. Those mitigation systems are robust and exist both in the A350 and B787, so if the FAA is concerned over this, they better be willing to yank the A350 certification.

I'm judging the ruling because I am capable of doing so. Skeptics are a good thing. Show me the proof, because I'm not stupid.


Systems fail and you know that. Every additional system to mitigate a risk is beneficiary for the customer. So if the FAA thinks it is better for the overall risk to also have the foil it is with a high chance true because in case of safety more is always better.

Is it necessary? We do not know. And you are right, Skeptics are a good thing. Being skeptic of Boeings risk assessment is also a good thing.
At the current stage we can only say that we better be skeptic about Boeing and the FAA as both seem to calculate far off reality.

The proof for what? That an additional layer of safety is better?
 
TObound
Posts: 785
Joined: Mon May 27, 2019 12:54 am

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Thu Dec 12, 2019 3:20 pm

seb76 wrote:
patrickjp93 wrote:
seb76 wrote:

Facts don't seem to matter that much on this forum it seems !
The A330 has only seen three fatal crashes, not 4. The first of them occurring during certification campaign.
The first fatal crash in commercial service came so late in the A330's career (AF crash) that the model was in the mean time already deemed statistically safe and it's exactly the same reason why the 777 was not grounded after the accident in London.

On the other hand, with it's short career, the Max has the statistics working against him.


For someone caring so much about "facts" you don't seem to know what "statistically safe" means, and nor do you have any understanding of statistics or probability. All planes have a designed mean time between crashes. There is no such thing as a guaranteed crash-free plane, none. You have an "expected" (estimated) time in which, barring unknowns (of which there are always thousands upon thousands) there should be no crashes save for "act of God" scenarios like a meteor hitting a plane mid-flight. That said, it all still boils down to Poisson random variables and hybrids of it and Chi-Square.

Just because a plane crashes early in its career does not mean it is unsafe. If I build 1000 planes and they all server 99% of their expected lifetime and then all suddenly crash on the same day just shy of their designed spec, then that's a statistically unsafe airplane that failed spec and never should have been flying.

If Boeing makes 5000 planes and two of them crash day 1 and the other 4998 make it to their last designed service day without further incident, that's a statistically safe plane that should have been certified and never had a substantive reason to be grounded other than fear of more crashes.

These variables are independent. You have to approach statistics with discipline and remember the golden rule: there are lies, damn lies, and statistics. If you don't have a core understanding of the underlying random variables, or even of the fact that design specs are glorified "guesstimates", you really shouldn't be commenting on the subject of the efficacy of the 737 MAX grounding vs. the A330, and there were 4, including the certification flight.


Being pedantic doesn't change a thing to the fact you are lying about those A330 accidents.....


Projection seems to be a trend with Americans these days.

"We did something corrupt. Everyone else must do it too."

They just can't imagine a world where public servants are actually taken seriously and corporate executives aren't rolling regulators.

This is the angle from which our friend here is approaching it. And it's patent nonsense. There's no evidence at all that EASA and Airbus have anything like the disturbing relationship detailed in many of these articles. And if it really was that troublesome, I would bet that Europeans would be among the first demanding answers.
 
patrickjp93
Posts: 648
Joined: Thu Aug 22, 2019 12:00 pm

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Thu Dec 12, 2019 3:27 pm

FluidFlow wrote:
patrickjp93 wrote:
FluidFlow wrote:

That is a very limited view and as an engineer you should know that. If you only look at one condition and one case only you can design something to perfection. There are tho a lot of cases to be taken into account.

The fuel tank has an unknown puncture
A mistake was made during refueling and there is now oxygen in the tank

As long as you can not guarantee that there is never oxygen in the tank you need to account for the possibility so you also reduce the chance of a spark.

So as long as we do not know the assumptions behind the reasoning of the FAA we can only speculate and for now we trust the official source that steps forward and presents everyone with facts so to quote you



and take every possibility into account before judging a ruling made by a person and not by a nobody on the internet like me and you.


It's not a limited view at all. It's a simplified summary. We already have detection systems for leftover Oxygen in the tanks after a refueling. And a puncture would be detected upon tank pressurization (used to mitigate the bending moments along the spar).

So yes, you can be guaranteed Oxygen is not in the tank in any significant volume without an act of God midair. Those mitigation systems are robust and exist both in the A350 and B787, so if the FAA is concerned over this, they better be willing to yank the A350 certification.

I'm judging the ruling because I am capable of doing so. Skeptics are a good thing. Show me the proof, because I'm not stupid.


Systems fail and you know that. Every additional system to mitigate a risk is beneficiary for the customer. So if the FAA thinks it is better for the overall risk to also have the foil it is with a high chance true because in case of safety more is always better.

Is it necessary? We do not know. And you are right, Skeptics are a good thing. Being skeptic of Boeings risk assessment is also a good thing.
At the current stage we can only say that we better be skeptic about Boeing and the FAA as both seem to calculate far off reality.

The proof for what? That an additional layer of safety is better?

Beneficial*, and how much? We already have redundant detection systems as well as redundant health check systems for those same systems. At some point adding another 9 onto 99.999...% reliability becomes statistically insignificant and financially very expensive. You can have perfect efficiency and security. Lord knows Intel has proven that between Spectre, Meltdown, Speculative Store Bypass, and now Plundervolt.

We call these ridiculously unlikely events "Acts of God" for a reason.

The FAA if it cared about risk and nothing else wouldn't let civil aviation exist. If you're going to play the game of risk mitigation is foremost always AND claim the regulators are saints, here's the absurd conclusion that thinking leads to. Reductio Ad Absurdum is a tool you can always use to ensure you're not being inconsistent or unrealistic. It's a balancing act of efficiency and safety, and it always will be, so don't pretend otherwise and put that argument on a pedestal.

It's not a matter of necessary or not. There's no perfect solution. It's a matter of where do you draw the line at and therefore what risk is acceptable. I'd argue the systems in place without the foil already get you to "requires an act of God to make it fail." And the only arguments needed are raw chemistry and the other well understood systems we have in place.

And you have no basis for saying Boeing and the FAA are not in lock step with reality.

Show me proof that this extra foil layer gives statistically significant improvement to safety. Based on my knowledge of physics, chemistry, and the systems in the wing, I'd happily bet $1000 there's no one who can.
 
patrickjp93
Posts: 648
Joined: Thu Aug 22, 2019 12:00 pm

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Thu Dec 12, 2019 4:17 pm

Note: should have been "can't" have perfect security and efficiency in previous post.
 
SATexan
Posts: 276
Joined: Wed Jul 22, 2009 6:49 pm

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Thu Dec 12, 2019 4:41 pm

When Air India first started reporting issues with 787 and demanded compensation, almost everyone on this A.net thought that it was an Air India problem. Back then everyone that dared to question Boeing's quality control practices were immediately shut down. Welp, now we know the problems with Boeing and it ain't pretty!
 
patrickjp93
Posts: 648
Joined: Thu Aug 22, 2019 12:00 pm

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Thu Dec 12, 2019 4:49 pm

SATexan wrote:
When Air India first started reporting issues with 787 and demanded compensation, almost everyone on this A.net thought that it was an Air India problem. Back then everyone that dared to question Boeing's quality control practices were immediately shut down. Welp, now we know the problems with Boeing and it ain't pretty!

You mean the ram air turbines that Air India did not properly maintain their sand filters on, which Air India improperly reported as broken engine blades? That's hardly Boeing's fault.
 
rheinwaldner
Posts: 1865
Joined: Wed Jan 02, 2008 4:58 pm

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Thu Dec 12, 2019 4:56 pm

patrickjp93 wrote:
So selectively use high noise to signal statistical accounting methods when we have a very low sample size... Right... That's called actuarial malpractice.

>300 aircraft, ~250k flights, 2 years of operation is not a too low sample size. You also need to consider the two cases. MCAS as the single major cause is confirmed. Due to the two cases you can rule out bad coincidence with large certainty. It would be grossly negligent and ignorant in respect to aviation safety if the MAX would have continued to fly "because the sample size is too small".

patrickjp93 wrote:
If the Qantas A380 had crashed from its engine explosion, then by your standards the type should have been grounded worldwide, even though the reality is it has otherwise met all spec.

A lot of "ifs" and "shoulds" sound terribly unprofessional discussing statistics.

patrickjp93 wrote:
You can have a crazy fluke early in an aircraft's life despite it being perfectly safe.

And you can have it two times and all doubt is gone. In that regard the MAX has crash statistics which are unprecedented since many decades.

patrickjp93 wrote:
Welcome to the imprecision of everything human.

With all the imprecision aviation safety is so good nowadays, that we dont expect new aircraft to crash at all in the first 10 years after EIS.
Many things are difficult, all things are possible!
 
patrickjp93
Posts: 648
Joined: Thu Aug 22, 2019 12:00 pm

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Thu Dec 12, 2019 5:14 pm

rheinwaldner wrote:
patrickjp93 wrote:
So selectively use high noise to signal statistical accounting methods when we have a very low sample size... Right... That's called actuarial malpractice.

>300 aircraft, ~250k flights, 2 years of operation is not a too low sample size. You also need to consider the two cases. MCAS as the single major cause is confirmed. Due to the two cases you can rule out bad coincidence with large certainty. It would be grossly negligent and ignorant in respect to aviation safety if the MAX would have continued to fly "because the sample size is too small".

patrickjp93 wrote:
If the Qantas A380 had crashed from its engine explosion, then by your standards the type should have been grounded worldwide, even though the reality is it has otherwise met all spec.

A lot of "ifs" and "shoulds" sound terribly unprofessional discussing statistics.

patrickjp93 wrote:
You can have a crazy fluke early in an aircraft's life despite it being perfectly safe.

And you can have it two times and all doubt is gone. In that regard the MAX has crash statistics which are unprecedented since many decades.

patrickjp93 wrote:
Welcome to the imprecision of everything human.

With all the imprecision aviation safety is so good nowadays, that we dont expect new aircraft to crash at all in the first 10 years after EIS.


No, no, no. The failure sample size, especially without knowing the circumstance, is too small, and no, we do not have that conclusion reached yet on ET602. Cite a source or put it to bed. Those two crashes on their own do not create a fatality rate as high as you claim. It's still well below 100. The only thing skewing your numbers is the timing. If crash # 1 had happened on day 1 at Lion Air and #2 had happened at Ethiopian the day it did, you'd still be under 20. This is why good statisticians control for outliers. You're failing to do so and control their influence. This is why the MAX wasn't grounded after the Lion Air crash: people controlled for the effect on immediate stats because Lion Air had an atrocious safety record. And again, Ethiopian is no saint. It's not a secret that their ground crew is overworked to exhaustion. When you do that, you insert mistakes even if no one takes a shortcut. Based on human nature, shortcuts were taken.

Anyone complacent enough to think you should have a guarantee of no crashes before 10 years EIS is living in a fantasy world. The chance could be 0.000000001% and still happen on day 1, just like Amazon could have a published and verified 99.99999999% durability of their data storage and still lose a crucial bit of my data within a microsecond. You have to be disciplined and take the emotion out of it. If we held the A330 to the standard you believe the MAX should be held to, it would have been grounded after the Qantas near miss, the Air France crash, and the Afriqiyah crash.

This is why laymen generally speaking shouldn't have the gall to be condemning the FAA, especially when the EASA operates the same way. This is why laymen shouldn't be on a soap box saying the 737 Max should have been grounded immediately after Lion Air. History and math both say you're wrong, and facts do not care about your feelings.
 
checklist350
Posts: 49
Joined: Fri Nov 01, 2019 5:40 pm

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Thu Dec 12, 2019 6:03 pm

patrickjp93 wrote:
FluidFlow wrote:
patrickjp93 wrote:

It's not a limited view at all. It's a simplified summary. We already have detection systems for leftover Oxygen in the tanks after a refueling. And a puncture would be detected upon tank pressurization (used to mitigate the bending moments along the spar).

So yes, you can be guaranteed Oxygen is not in the tank in any significant volume without an act of God midair. Those mitigation systems are robust and exist both in the A350 and B787, so if the FAA is concerned over this, they better be willing to yank the A350 certification.

I'm judging the ruling because I am capable of doing so. Skeptics are a good thing. Show me the proof, because I'm not stupid.


Systems fail and you know that. Every additional system to mitigate a risk is beneficiary for the customer. So if the FAA thinks it is better for the overall risk to also have the foil it is with a high chance true because in case of safety more is always better.

Is it necessary? We do not know. And you are right, Skeptics are a good thing. Being skeptic of Boeings risk assessment is also a good thing.
At the current stage we can only say that we better be skeptic about Boeing and the FAA as both seem to calculate far off reality.

The proof for what? That an additional layer of safety is better?

Beneficial*, and how much? We already have redundant detection systems as well as redundant health check systems for those same systems. At some point adding another 9 onto 99.999...% reliability becomes statistically insignificant and financially very expensive. You can have perfect efficiency and security. Lord knows Intel has proven that between Spectre, Meltdown, Speculative Store Bypass, and now Plundervolt.

We call these ridiculously unlikely events "Acts of God" for a reason.

.


If you are indeed an engineer and regard Meltdown an Act of God I'd fire you one the spot if you worked for us. This is a textbook vulnerability where engineering choices for performance came at the cost of security. There's a reason Intel processors are vulnerable to this specific exploit and AMD processors were not.

It's also a perfect analogy to Boeing's issues right now in fact and says a lot about current corporate culture at a lot of the larger US companies.
 
patrickjp93
Posts: 648
Joined: Thu Aug 22, 2019 12:00 pm

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Thu Dec 12, 2019 6:17 pm

checklist350 wrote:
patrickjp93 wrote:
FluidFlow wrote:

Systems fail and you know that. Every additional system to mitigate a risk is beneficiary for the customer. So if the FAA thinks it is better for the overall risk to also have the foil it is with a high chance true because in case of safety more is always better.

Is it necessary? We do not know. And you are right, Skeptics are a good thing. Being skeptic of Boeings risk assessment is also a good thing.
At the current stage we can only say that we better be skeptic about Boeing and the FAA as both seem to calculate far off reality.

The proof for what? That an additional layer of safety is better?

Beneficial*, and how much? We already have redundant detection systems as well as redundant health check systems for those same systems. At some point adding another 9 onto 99.999...% reliability becomes statistically insignificant and financially very expensive. You can have perfect efficiency and security. Lord knows Intel has proven that between Spectre, Meltdown, Speculative Store Bypass, and now Plundervolt.

We call these ridiculously unlikely events "Acts of God" for a reason.

.


If you are indeed an engineer and regard Meltdown an Act of God I'd fire you one the spot if you worked for us. This is a textbook vulnerability where engineering choices for performance came at the cost of security. There's a reason Intel processors are vulnerable to this specific vulnerability and AMD processors were not.

It's also a perfect analogy to Boeing's issues right now in fact and says a lot about current corporate culture at a lot of the larger US companies.


Way to misinterpret what I said. I said Intel has proven you can't (mis-spelled in original post) have perfect efficiency and security, and the pounding they've taken from learning that lesson has good takeaways for everyone. The only safe plane is a brick on the ground. Therefore, if you want the benefit of flight, you have to take the risk to actually fly in a not 100% safe vehicle where, by the laws of time, eventually X people are going to die a horrible, fiery death, whether it's by an act of god or a tiny miscalculation or manufacturing mistake or a series of hard landings that resonated just perfectly with a metal structure at Y temperature because of Z climate and eventually led to a failed pickle fork

Now for the flip side of that coin: not every increase in safety is actually worthwhile. I'm sure by some iota it would increase passenger safety to line cabins in memory foam. Are we ever going to do that? No, because it's not worth it. Going back to the inner foil of a composite wing, given what I know of the internals of the 787 and A350 wings, I sincerely doubt anyone here can provide a scenario that isn't an act of God which could allow lightning to set the fuel in the wing on fire. You'd have to have the wing explode or puncture under its own forces AND expel enough inert gases from the fuel tank to let it Oxygenate at high temperatures. I'm open to seeing evidence, but you have to provide me the evidence.

And until we get anything conclusive out of an investigation for how MCAS 1.0 came to be proving that it was managers wanting to cut corners, I think it's to everyone's benefit to cool it with the "evil Boeing is evil" direction the community has taken.
 
MSPNWA
Posts: 3698
Joined: Thu Apr 23, 2009 2:48 am

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Thu Dec 12, 2019 6:23 pm

Revelation wrote:
Ref: https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... -measures/

Another well written and if true impactful report by Dominic Gates. As above it suggests that FAA's engineers objected to changes being made to 787 lightening protection done by Boeing to reduce weight and cost and reduce the airline's maintenance burden.


Here's why I question whether it's a good article. I can take the same "facts" and create a narrative of a bloated, overreaching regulator that does harm to the public in the form of high costs and slower technology advancement without any statistically significant or relevant increase in safety. The body of information doesn't point in one direction. There's multiple conclusions possible because the conclusion is based on differences of opinion. That's how we know it's narrative-based "journalism". You then have to ask the question: what is the truth? We don't know. And considering the source that only writes in one direction, what is the truth should certainly be questioned.
 
TObound
Posts: 785
Joined: Mon May 27, 2019 12:54 am

Re: Something wrong with Boeing's safety culture?

Thu Dec 12, 2019 6:37 pm

rheinwaldner wrote:
patrickjp93 wrote:
So selectively use high noise to signal statistical accounting methods when we have a very low sample size... Right... That's called actuarial malpractice.

>300 aircraft, ~250k flights, 2 years of operation is not a too low sample size.


That this is being argued against is starting to make me genuinely wonder about how statistics are taught in the US.

That is more flight hours and trips than many airlines or air forces fly. And if most of them had two crashes within a few months of each other, there would be either be a full grounding or severe ops restrictions.

What's even crazier are Boeing fanboys who argue that they should have kept flying. Just imagine what would have happened to Boeing and the FAA if there was a third or fourth crash within a few months after that. Given the delivery rate, that was a high statistical probability. And a decent chance too that this would have happened on American, Canadian or European soil. This grounding saved their hides. Bigly, as their President likes to say.
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