For the A350 lineup it seems to me that the A339 has taken the space of the A358. It is more likely that the market is bigger for the lighter and shorter range aircraft than the A358. If I am not mistaken the A358 would only have had an EIS right about the same time as the A339 as well. The 'simple' stretch A35K was still the same size as it is currently but it had less capability and airlines were asking for more. That is why it moved squarely into 77W range on payload as airlines were looking for a little more. Seems this is Airbus listening to their customers needs more than just doing what they want, possibly another post A380 lesson learned.
Thing is, in listening to some customers who wanted the heavier -1000 Airbus did lose their biggest A350 order, the 70 frame one from EK, with EK complaining about increasing weight and decreasing commonality with the A359. In the end they got the customer back because they were holding them by the short and curlies (they had their deposits for A380) which I would not call that a win-win because it included a death sentence for the A380 (why do A380 partisans keep looking for a "mulligan" for the huge financial hole that the A380 created?).
A product lineup that had a lighter A350 and a heavier A360 could have kept both sets of customers happy, but unfortunately that never happened.
The A350 is still very well positioned against the 777 and while the market may have moved to adding one more seat per Y row in the 777, there has also been some capacity restraint and yield management as well. Going bigger isn't always the answer and we will see how the 779 performs in this regard. I mean it is easier to add a extra seat into an aircraft you already operate to try and increase revenue, but you cannot take them out if you have overstretched yourself. I think EY is finding this out the hard way right now.
Right, but the thing is an A360 in the time frame originally being mooted, without the loss of time and money the A380 snafu caused, would have killed the business case for the 777x and it never would have launched, or if it did, it would have suffered the same fate as 747-8i.
Instead we end up in a place where blue chip A350 customers like SQ, CX, BA, LH, etc find themselves ordering 779 instead of Airbus extending their hold on these customers and extinguishing the 777x.
I am still unclear as to exactly you are advising what should have been done by Airbus that would have absolutely made the company better off than now. We can all play the perfect game, if Boeing didn't screw up the 787 then they would have had the NSA and Y3 ready to go by now, so it is not as easy as just saying Airbus should have just designed the A360 to kill the 777 and expect it would have happened.
I am still unclear why you feel the need to exaggerate my point.
It's an annoying discussion tactic mostly used when one's own point is weak.
I never used a word such as "absolutely", instead I used words such as "one theory" and "a much better place to be", go check.
And yes, I introduced the idea that Boeing screwed up the 787, even though this is a thread about Airbus's snowflake claim that the A380 was a success.
It is easy to just make a statement and then ignore the reality. Most programs have delays in them and those that don't have huge cost overruns that try and compensate for this. As we have seen as well that problems also arise with new models where they are either grounded or there are issues found within the aircraft that call for attention and cost to be spent (A380 wings). So not just speculating what could have happened if everything went perfectly, because there is almost no chance that that would happen, how much different could it realistically have been if there was no A380 screw-ups or if they didn't go ahead with the A380?
I suspect that if Airbus didn't learn the lessons on the A380 they would have repeated them on the next design. What in human history, the repeating of our mistakes over and over and over and over, makes anyone think that a company that still has some identity issues would have sorted out the problems that were present when there was no lessons to be learned? You have yourself posted many a thread to show and highlight when a new CEO or upper management is needed that there are factions within the company itself that plays out on a lot of decisions they make. So if Airbus either executed the A380 perfectly, still not a market for the aircraft, or didn't go ahead with it, what difference would there have been for Airbus today?
Yes, the biggest weakness to my argument is that it counted on flawless execution by Airbus, and that's a big ask. We can say A350 was about as flawless as you could hope for, but of course it learned so much from A380 which took the big hit.
Another weakness would be the one raised above: depending on the timing, an A360 may have been less CFRP and more GLARE, although that can be debated. The A380 from the rear bulkhead back is CFRP panel construction and I think that would have been used for an A360 in the same way it did get used for an A350.
As you should tell from me giving you ways to undermine my arguments, I'm not hard over into the "I'm right, you're wrong" dynamic.
Yet some of our Airbus partisans have no problem embracing the notion that Airbus is flawless except for that one-off snafu which was the boffins deciding to use different versions of the design software, and other than that, everything would have come up roses.
As for the model killer statement, you could argue that forcing the 777X into basically a one model line-up is as much of a killer as the 787 has done to the A330. I think that is about as far as you can go unless the company decides to stop production of a model, iIf you are able to limit the choice to one model when the company has spent money on a new engine and other enhancements. I still think it is silly to talk about a design like that as we know if you are able to have new engines on even old designs they will still have a market to sell to.
That is the nuance I was talking about. I mean it is fun to rile up others just like they do to you, for banter. But deep down we know you need to add nuance to an argument or when you look at why decisions were made if you want to discuss it seriously. Hence whenever someone brings up that Airbus was wrong with their predictions on VLA aircraft and Boeing was right, the easy reply is the 748. But we both know either company had their reasons for both decisions and while mistakes were made by both, there is justification for their choices.
Yes, we can agree these discussions are vastly over-simplified.
In part I used bullet lists to show that I was vastly over-simplifying things.
And getting this right is hard if not impossible.
Yet that's what keeps me so interested in this topic.
Human beings are making decisions to spend many billion dollars/euros/whatever many years in advance to bring together all kinds of very advanced technological elements with no guarantee of the market ever embracing the resulting product.
And we get to sit in our armchairs and throw spitballs at them when they get it wrong.
Yet that is what we should do (it is what MBA programs do as well), so we learn where they got it wrong.
I love it!